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Personalism and Politics and Economics
Phenomenology of Dreams

Dries Deweer

The Person and the political paradox: The personalist political theory of Paul Ricoeur

J. Cutting, B. Toone and M. Trimble

The merits of a phenomenological analysis of dreams

R.T. Allen

Personalism and the free market

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CONTENTS

This issue's new contributors 1

Editorial and Journals received 2

Dries Deweer
The Person and the political paradox: The personalist political theory of Paul Ricoeur 3

J. Cutting, B. Toone and M. Trimble
The merits of a phenomenological analysis of dreams 13

R.T. Allen
Personalism and the free market 33

Notice: 'Personalist Workshop', Oxford, Sat. March 8th 2014. 51

Journals Received 51

Index to Vol. 9 52

Notes on this issues new contributors:

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EDITORIAL

Apologies for the delay in producing your October 2013 issue of *Appraisal.* Among other things, we were waiting see if any of the papers from the Lund conference would be available. Not yet, unfortunately, although we hope to have some for the March issue.

And speaking of March, we're looking forward to seeing you all at the Personalist Workshop in Oxford on the 8th. Looking at the line-up below, it promises to be a very interesting session. And what could be nicer than a spring day in Oxford? More details on p. 51 and our website: www.spcps.org.uk.

In other news, we have a change of editor to announce. Little as we have any desire to ape the tabloid newspapers it was, regrettably, necessary. Readers will no doubt recall from the last issue that Dr. John Cutting had manfully volunteered to take up the challenge. Sad to say, Dr. Cutting's other commitments have prevented him from doing so. Fortunately the now legendary Richard Allen was ready and willing to step into the breach, ensuring that this issue reached the presses as quickly as could be. My name might be at the top, but he did all the work. However, from here on in, dear readers, you're stuck with me; I shall be taking over officially from Vol. 10. In the meantime, on behalf of the BPF Committee and Membership, I shall take the liberty of thanking Drs. Allen and Cutting for their hard work on this and former issues. Thanks lads. I should also add that, despite these organisational shenanigans, neither of our former editors is currently on trial for phone hacking or bribing policemen. So far.

And so to our current issue: packed with intellectual goodness; rich in philosophical fibre; and guaranteed to keep you regular. We start with Dries Deweer on the political dimensions of personhood as found in Ricoeur's 'personalist political pedagogy'. This exploration of the 'risks and responsibilities of the person as citizen' considers the fundamental problem of civic and political life: freedom. The tension between autonomy, egalitarianism, and power is, of course, something that has troubled all great political thinkers. Alongside Hobbes and Locke, et al., we should like to put Polanyi on General and Specific Authority. For Polanyi, the scientific community would supply a model for civilised society in which freedom and responsibility are reconciled and, indeed, necessarily coeval. If Deweer is correct, Ricoeur, too, promises an important application of personalist principles to civic life and duty.

Next, we are invited to recline in the arms of Morpheus as B. Toone, M. Trimble, and our own John Cutting take up Husserl's phenomenological battle-cry and go back to the facts of dreams. This, too, we are told, is a subject which 'every major philosopher has had something to say about'. I was, I confess, a bit sniffy about that particular claim. I don't know about Polanyi, but I don't think Farrer ever did, or Feuerbach, or Whitehead for that matter. Nevertheless, with a line-up that includes practically everyone else, from Plato to Wittgenstein, I shan't quibble. To this list, our authors add Detlev von Uslar on the grounds that he alone provided the 'systematic phenomenological analysis' that dreams require.

Sniffy or not, I thought this paper raised some curious, if somewhat discomfiting, questions. Are we, I wonder, the same people in our dreams as in our waking lives? The connection between these apparently different individuals is quite tenuous enough: a meagre shred of disjointed memory wherein even first-personal perspectives aren't reliable. Action, of course, is the key to identity; but we – or at least *I* – seem to share few patterns of activity with the 'I' of 'my' dreams. Why, then, are we so sure that these two 'I's are one and the same person? I don't know about you, but I find that rather creepy.

Back in what I suppose is the real world, Richard Allen's contribution concerns T.R. and R.A.C. Rourke's application of personalist philosophy to economic policy and practice. The difficulties with this are, as Allen argues, many and various. In particular, if Allen is right, it seems that the Rourke's analysis of free market economics is both careless and inordinately idealistic. Certainly, their rejection of globalisation, apparently in favour of small farming communities, smacks of a kind of rural utopianism which is the privilege of those who don't have to live with it. How people who spend their lives reading and writing books can go on advocating a life of medieval toil is baffling. I, for one, prefer the real world.

As usual, responses and replies to this issue's articles, either in the form further articles or as discussion notes, would be very welcome indeed. Please send any and all to our delightful secretary, Mr. Mark Arnold (contact details above).

THE PERSON AND THE POLITICAL PARADOX: THE PERSONALIST POLITICAL THEORY OF PAUL RICOEUR

Dries Deweer

Abstract

Ricoeur's personalist 'political pedagogy' explores the risks and responsibilities of the person as a citizen. The ideas on freedom and responsibility that he developed from within the framework of moral theology were given a philosophical elaboration by means of an analysis of democracy and the notion of the political paradox. This paradox implies a particular personalist perspective on citizenship and civic responsibility, with both institutional and ethical requirements.

Key Words

Citizenship, democracy, freedom, personalism, power, responsibility, Ricoeur

Introduction

An important and perhaps surprising name among the authors on the political implications of personalism is Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005). Ricoeur was a child of his time. His younger years were dominated by an intense intellectual quest to find his vocation as a Christian in modern society; a quest shared by many in the interbellum years, and especially by a diverse group of intellectuals that we can group as 'French personalists'. Ricoeur met many personalist mentors along his journey. At the University of Rennes, he came into contact with the thought of Jacques Maritain, but quickly rejected what he considered to be neo-Thomist dogmatism. It was Gabriël Marcel, rather, that led him in the direction of existential phenomenology and the more modest perspective of an open personal ontology, without the ambition of uncovering a fixed foundation for human existence. In Paris, he came into contact with the personalist *Esprit*-movement and its founder Emmanuel Mounier, whose Christian and philosophical activism strongly attracted Ricoeur. On a political level, he found guidance from André Philip, whose Christian socialism showed how to combine Protestant Faith with leftist political commitment. Ricoeur's involvement with personalism became more active after the Second World War, when he became a regular contributor to two influential journals, the pluralist journal *Esprit* of Mounier and the leftist-Protestant *Le christianisme social*, elevating Ricoeur as a trusted theorist of French personalism. This involvement lasted until the end of the sixties, after which he took a more critical stance towards personalism.[1] The subjects he wrote about were diverse, ranging from history and historiography to the relationship between personalism and existentialism or the possibility of a personalist socialism. This article is, however, focused on what he called his personalist 'political pedagogy' that explores the risks and responsibilities of the person as a citizen (Ricoeur 1965a, 8-9). Initially, Ricoeur considered this issue within the framework of moral theology. That is the subject of the first part of this article. The ideas on freedom and responsibility that he developed from within this religious background were later given a philosophical elaboration by means of the notion of the political paradox, which I will discuss in the second part. Finally, I will look at the personalist interpretation of civic duty that ensues from this political paradox.

1. The Christian as a citizen

1.1 The neighbour and the fellow man

The separation of ethics and politics has always been a central target of personalist social criticism. The questions regarding guilt and responsibility in the aftermath of the war pushed this issue even more to the fore, especially among Christians, who were confronted with the complete perversion of Christian civilization. This was also the case for Ricoeur, who recognized that the horrors of the war served as reminders to Christians that they had a social and political responsibility alongside their inner and private responsibility. It was this moral-theological question that was the initial *leitmotiv* of Ricoeur's political thought. He acknowledged that the Christian's responsibility as a citizen was a complicated matter. The only certainty that he could find in the Bible was that neither anarchism nor blind obedience were valid options. Nevertheless, Ricoeur was of firm opinion that any Christian ethics necessarily implied a political component. The exposure of the false distinction between the 'neighbour', as the person that I meet, and the 'fellow man', as the one that I only encounter through social mediation, was the key towards that conclusion.

Regardless of the apparent discrepancy between the neighbour and the fellow man, Ricoeur wanted to assemble both concepts in his theology of the neighbour, as two dimensions of the same history and the same charity; on the one hand intimate and

subjective, on the other hand abstract but more extensive. Thus he wanted to reveal the unity of the intention behind all human relations: the same charity gives meaning to social institutions and personal encounters alike. We have to recognize the love of God in institutions and authority figures as well, albeit in a different manner. Institutions and authorities take on a different countenance through love, namely in the form of justice. The dialectics of order and justice was, according to Ricoeur, part of the larger dialectic of the activity of the love of God in history, despite the fact that this dialectic only appears in a defective manner, amidst misery and suffering. If the theme of the neighbour is detached from the social context, then it becomes sterile. Ricoeur stressed that it is important to keep an eye on the historical range of charity and to see how diverse the dialectic between neighbour and fellow man really is. Practically no encounter can take place without institutional mediation. Moreover, in some cases the encounter with the neighbour is only tangible in its collective dimension, for example in the experience of shared oppression. Hence, Ricoeur's conclusion was unambiguous: taking on the demeanour of the neighbour is not restricted to direct relations, but also implies justification, correction or criticism of institutions. Love of one's neighbour is, therefore, characterized by a perspective on both immediate and more distant relations. To care for one's neighbour implies a continuous criticism of social relations that are never personal nor universal enough (Ricoeur 1965a: 103-114).

If the love of one's neighbour has a political component, this comes down to the task of permeating politics with love. Hence, the Christian's political responsibility is in line with what Ricoeur considered to be the larger responsibility of the Christian in civilization, namely to incarnate faith in history and thus to involve oneself in the eschatological perspective that reveals civilization as the adumbration of the Kingdom of God. The Christian has to 'baptize civilization', i.e. to recreate the values of civilization in the perspective of Christian charity and in the light of eternity. Referring to the personalist vision of Jacques Maritain, Ricoeur made this concrete in the following:

> [T]oday our task as Christians is to discern the new values of justice and liberty that the technical conditions of the modern world permit and arouse, to recognize them wherever they are and to rethink and relive them in a climate of faith.[2]

Baptizing civilization or 'being the salt of the earth' , at the political level, comes down to a political order that performs its holy task, which refers to the utopia of politics as the pure servant and educator of freedom. That is the hope that should direct and enlighten every political authority (Ricoeur 1965a: 123).

1.2 Political vocations

The next question is how Christians are supposed to carry out their political responsibility. Ricoeur emphasized first and foremost that his plea for a politically active Christianity was not a plea for clericalism. The Church should not get mixed up in politics, but the faithful should all the more. Second, he recognized that there is not a single, unified Christian politics. It is impossible to directly infer political maxims from the Bible. The confrontation of all factors involved implies that political choices can never be absolute and always imply risks. Hence, the political responsibility of the Christian starts with a judgment in good conscience about the best way to apply Christian values in a given situation with what knowledge is available. In other words, there can be as many Christian political actions as there are Christians. Initially, Ricoeur stated that there are broadly speaking two options: either Christians get directly involved in politics to try to introduce Christian values into society, or they should found communities outside of society, that embody the Christian values as a way of sending a prophetic testimony to society. Those were the two distinct political vocations for the Christian of the twentieth century:

> [P]erhaps the true Church now has two kinds of sons, those who compromise to save man from the inhuman and those who take on the adventure of the village on the mountain. Perhaps the two poles of practical Christianity in the twentieth century arouse two vocations in fraternal tension within the Church: the vocation of the Christian in lay politics and the vocation of the Christian in prophetic Christian communities.[3]

The second scenario, of the prophetic communities, was according to Ricoeur an emergency scenario, when the political actions of Christians are to no avail. Gradually, Ricoeur exhibited more confidence in the possibility of Christian political action and he began to integrate both vocations in one general conception of Christian citizenship that combined participation in lay politics with prophetic criticism. However, he continued to acknowledge that Christian political action is a course strewn with obstacles. Politics is and remains a game of power, with complex relationships and often evil manoeuvres, which makes ethical dilemmas so pressing. Moreover, one has to face the technical and bureaucratic nature of modern society that threatens to deprive every social commitment of

prophetical content. Ricoeur was of the conviction that Christians have to accept these circumstances and come to a mature and firm conviction that something good can be done in any situation. Christians have to learn to function in society as it is, not in the sense that they should just play along, but in the sense that they should correct the system from within, for example by protecting personal relationships against the tendency toward anonymity, by keeping an eye on new kinds of poverty and oppression and by pursuing global justice. On the ideological level, moreover, the Christians should play a purifying, truth-loving role that unmasks myths and rejects totalitarian ideologies.

Ricoeur's moral-theological conclusion was that a Christian has the responsibility to be an active citizen, but in a Christian style. He argued for an awareness of the dark side of politics, but also of the crucial influence of politics on society. Hence, he stressed that his political responsibility confronts the Christian with a tricky question. This question is not about keeping one's innocence, but about limiting one's guilt. Taking into account the possibilities, a Christian has to be willing to dirty his hands, but with the qualification that he keeps exerting the pressure of evangelical ethics, the pressure of love and nonviolence, on political practice. Hence politics has to take an important place in the life of a Christian, but not the highest place. He not only has to participate in politics and work for the institutional elaboration of democracy,[4] but he also has to maintain an attitude of permanent and critical vigilance with regard to authority. This critical vigilance implies having an eye for the dangers that come with politics and continuing to confront politics with the Christian values that should ground political authority. That is the foundation of a Christian evaluation of governments and, as Ricoeur added, of illegal actions to right a wrong if necessary.

2. The crisis of democracy and the political paradox

2.1 The nature of democracy

In the moral-theological quest for the Christian social task, Ricoeur found a vocation to participate in an active and alert way in the democratic system. This moral-theological concern, however, brought philosophical questions to the fore regarding the nature of politics and democracy. Those questions induced the development of Ricoeur's personalist political philosophy, which began with an analysis of democracy and its crisis halfway through the twentieth century. The starting point of this analysis was the discovery that democracy is a historical project:

> Democracy is an idea in the making and at war. It is a story underway of which we have the task of continuing it. [5]

To understand democracy and our actual responsibilities, it is necessary to understand its historical development. Ricoeur stated that the evolution of democracy since the Middle Ages was rooted in a defensive reflex, with the extortion of the legal maxim of *Habeas corpus* as protection against abuse of power. He emphasized, however, that this originally negative dimension was gradually joined by a constructive dimension, in which democracy also emerged as the project of the construction of a political community, like in many autonomous cities in the late Middle Ages. Hence, Ricoeur described democracy as the historical battle for the elaboration of a constitution that organizes, divides and balances power and that enables the individual to keep the authority within its boundaries.

The negative and positive dimension that Ricoeur had discerned in the historical development also surfaced in his study of the fundamental values of democracy, namely freedom and equality. Freedom not only has a negative meaning, as resistance against the abuse of power, but also a positive dimension, as the idea of the active and responsible citizen that participates directly or through representation in institutions. The antithesis of freedom is, hence, not only despotism, but also anarchy and irresponsible liberty. Therefore, the safeguarding of freedom, according to Ricoeur, requires vigilance with regard to both its counterparts. As opposed to the second fundamental value of democracy, equality before the law, he also discerned two counterparts. The first counterpart is the existence of privileges, but beyond this, Ricoeur identified envy as a second counterpart, namely a sterile criticism of the necessary inequalities that result from the organisation of power, as the lack of these inequalities would amount to anarchy. In this way, Ricoeur demonstrated a very balanced vision on the foundations of democracy, with an eye for both rights and responsibilities.

Rather than focusing on the theoretical foundations, Ricoeur's focus was mainly on democracy in practice. The instruments that make democracy work; these were the core issues for him. He discerned three elements. The first element was the constitution, which he characterized by means of the symbols of the scales and the sword. The scales stand for the balance between government and citizens, in both directions, between the demands of the government and the performances of the citizens and between the demands of the citizens and the actions of the

government. In the symbolism of the sword, the constitution stands for the organisation of the settlement of differences between the claims of freedom and the claims of authority. In reference to the two dimensions of freedom, the constitution must avoid anarchy as well as despotism. The second element in the armamentarium of democracy is rights and liberties, which Ricoeur considered crucial in the safeguarding of equality, both with regard to privileges and with regard to envy. The third and last element is a style of governing that integrates the constitution and as well as rights and liberties. This implies, for example, that there should be an authentic representation of the people and that the majority should take up responsibility in government without hiding itself behind sham manoeuvres such as national unity governments, which Ricoeur considered intrinsically oppressive. He stated concurrently that majority rule has to be compensated by liberty and a critical role for minorities. The concrete manner in which these elements are realized was a matter of secondary importance according to Ricoeur, as long as the aforementioned elements are well institutionalized.

2.2 Crises of democracy

With the preceding analysis as a starting point, Ricoeur attempted an evaluation of the democracy of his days. It goes without saying that this evaluation in the aftermath of the Second World War did not paint a very rosy picture. Ricoeur distinguished two profound crises in the democratic projects. He called the first crisis a crisis of growth, or the socialist crisis. This crisis was the consequence of the bourgeois character of the development of democracy, namely the fact that democratic development was driven by the interests of the bourgeoisie in their struggle with feudal powers. This implied that democratic emancipation got mixed up with class interests. On the one hand, it was a struggle for authentic values, but on the other hand it was also the victory of a distinct social group. In other words, the idealism of freedom and equality clashed with the realism of the class struggle. The rise of the labour class demonstrated that the values of bourgeois democracy were insufficient and hypocritical: 'In sum, what is a democratic right for the starving ?'[6] In line with the personalist analysis of Emmanuel Mounier, Ricoeur considered bourgeois democracy as an immoral pact between political liberalism and economic liberalism, which kept democracy on a purely formal level. The reported growth crisis was founded on claims of social justice that Ricoeur saw as the continuation of democratic emancipation. This crisis does not question democracy in itself but concerns the growing pains in the development from a formal to a real democracy. The link between political and economic liberalism had to be cut according to Ricoeur, in aid of a synthesis of political liberalism and socio-economic statism.

Ricoeur called the second crisis a crisis of decadence. This concerned totalitarianism and the human decadence that facilitates it, namely the destruction in every man of the foundation of democracy, i.e. responsible and active citizenship. He thought that the threat of totalitarianism was based on the fact that people give up their negative and positive freedom to immerse themselves in a passive mob that subjects itself to a strong leader. In contrast to the growth crisis, nothing good was to be expected from this crisis of decadence. Ricoeur discerned multiple causes for this serious threat on democracy, ranging from urbanization to secularization. He also considered democracy to itself be responsible for totalitarianism, by means of the passions that it generated. Skirmishes, power games and political hatred produced an empty rhetoric, penning opportunities for skilful dictators that promised efficiency instead of chatter. The result of this is a democracy that takes itself down, of which 1930's Germany proved to be an outstanding example.

Keeping in mind the distinction between two democratic crises, Ricoeur tried to explain why the political situation of his time was so complex and confused, as they showed that while these two crises were theoretically distinct, they were practically mixed. He found the most manifest consequence of this mixture in the fact that there were two kinds of left and two kinds of right in play, namely liberal and fascist right and communist and socialist left. Ricoeur was of the conviction that the solution for the two crises was to be found in socialism only, by means of the struggle for a new democracy that safeguarded the formal liberties but complemented them with real liberties. Ricoeur's awareness of these two dimensions developed further under the influence of historical events such as the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and his visit to the People's Republic of China in the year before. Both events awakened Ricoeur to the intrinsically totalitarian nature of communism. A revolution that aimed at the abolition of socio-economic oppression of the human person but that denied that there existed something like a political oppression distinct from socio-economic oppression was doomed to fight against one form of oppression by means of another. Ricoeur argued for this statement through an analysis of political philosophy that uncovered the so-called political paradox.

2.3 The political paradox

In the article *Le paradoxe politique* (1957) Ricoeur stated that political philosophy is all too often reduced to an antithesis between two movements. On the one hand there are political philosophers that emphasize the distinct and autonomous rationality of the political. On the other hand there are political philosophers that stress the link between power and violence. Ricoeur marked Aristotle as the prototypical example of the first kind. In Aristotle he found the first elaborated formulation of the autonomy of the political domain. Aristotle argued that politics should cohere with reason. Whoever wants to understand politics, has to understand the particular rationality at play, which Aristotle discovered in the connection with its *telos*: human happiness. In other words, the autonomy of the political domain manifests itself in the way the political *telos* contributes to humanity. The state fulfils the social nature of the human being, since it is only as a citizen that man becomes truly human. This positive dimension should then be the starting point in the understanding of politics, not its perversion (Ricoeur 1965a: 248-251). According to Ricoeur, Rousseau strengthened our understanding of the autonomy of politics by demarcating between the political and the economic spheres. The social contract – the pact between individuals that constitutes the people *as* a people by means of the constitution of the state – demonstrates this independence, for it is not about giving up freedom in exchange for security, but about gaining freedom through the law that requires the approval of all and, hence, only demands obedience to oneself. This constitution of freedom and equality in a political community is impossible in an economic dynamic. This places Rousseau in line with Aristotle, with the substitution of the objective ideal of the *telos* by the subjective ideal of the pact (Ricoeur 1965a: 251-254).

The antithesis of this positive perspective in political philosophy is a perspective that sheds light on the other side of the picture. As politics is an autonomous sphere, it also has the ability to cause a particular alienation according to Ricoeur. Even if the state is reasonable in intention, her historical practice is based on human decisions. Moreover, there are no decisions without political power. The particular nature of the political sphere manifests itself here in the specificity of its means, namely in the monopoly of violence and the power of some over others. *The political*, in the sense of the development of political rationality, can not exist without *politics*, in the sense of the collection of activities that are directed at seizing and retaining power. Ricoeur explained that this is what philosophers such as Plato, Machiavelli and Marx emphasize, not because power would be evil in itself, but because power is extremely vulnerable to evil. In Plato's *Gorgias* the political tendency towards evil was manifested in the analogy of tyranny and sophistry, in which pride and manipulation of the truth appear intrinsically linked to politics. Machiavelli showed that it is not random violence that is the problem of politics, but rather calculated violence aimed at the constitution and preservation of the state. Every state bears the mark of this original violence. The legitimacy of the juridical order that this violence constitutes remains a contingent matter on the basis of this violent origin. Finally, Marx criticized the Hegelian picture of the state, because the reconciliation of antitheses was only realized in a fictitious law that neglects real relations. Behind this illusion lies violence, since the pretence of the law can only become real through a concrete random sovereign. Every political order is based on an external contradiction between the ideal sphere of juridical relations and the real sphere of social relations and on an internal contradiction between the constitution and the actual exercise of power. What Marx expressed in this way was the fact that there was no state without a government, a bureaucracy and a police force.[7] In sum, Ricoeur used Plato, Machiavelli and Marx as prototypes of a political philosophy that links politics to power and perversion of power (Ricoeur 1965a: 254-258).

Ricoeur refused to align with either of these two sides, but he wanted to combine both perspectives. The approach that puts the particular rationality of politics first showed, according to him, only an ideal conception of politics. Nevertheless, he agreed that this conception is the necessary starting point to understand politics, for an awareness of political evil should not hide the fact that a political rationality is more fundamental. The awareness of the dark side of politics should not lead to pessimism or *défaitisme*. This dark side has to be considered in the bigger picture of political power. Only because the state has an important role to play in history is it also a potentially major evil:

> It is precisely because the State is a certain expression of the rationality of history, a triumph over the passions of the individual man, over "civil" interests, and even over class interests, that it is the most exposed and most threatened aspect of man's grandeur, the most prone to evil. […] Henceforth, man cannot evade politics under penalty of evading his humanity. Throughout history, and by means of politics, man is faced with *his* grandeur and *his* culpability.

Ricoeur encountered here what he has called the

'political paradox'. The positive possibilities of politics carry as many possibilities for corruption with them. Bernard Dauenhauer summarizes this as 'the promise and risk of politics':

> Political practice displays progress in rationality insofar as it has developed a constitution that declares the fundamental equality of all the society's members before the law. And it organizes the people so that they can make decisions together and achieve a historical efficacy that would otherwise not be possible. But politics also always involves the ruling or domination of some by others. This ineliminable domination always tempts those who would rule to make ever greater impositions upon the ruled.

This ambiguity coloured all of Ricoeur's further reflections on politics and the political responsibility of the person.

3. Political liberty and vigilant citizenship

3.1 Personalist and Hegelian influences

Ricoeur's finding of the political paradox places all his reflections on politics in a particular perspective: 'The key problem of politics is *freedom*; whether the State *founds* freedom by means of its rationality or whether freedom *limits* the passions of power through its resistance.' The ambiguity of politics implies that freedom is not only about the negative freedom that is guaranteed by the politically established juridical system, but as much about the positive freedom to influence power and to avoid the government's exceeding of its boundaries. That is why Ricoeur thought that freedom is intrinsically linked to active citizenship. This kept him very close to the political ideas of other French personalists, such as Jacques Maritain, Emmanuel Mounier and Paul-Ludwig Landsberg, the latter two of whom were the main theorists of the early *Esprit*-movement that Ricoeur associated with. These authors shared an aversion to both liberal individualism and the collectivist alternatives of communists and fascists. At the essence of their alternative was a portrayal of mankind that did not reduce man to a self-sufficient individual nor to a subjected part of a larger entity.

French personalism attributed absolute dignity to every human being as a social and spiritual being that needed a moral community for its development, but that transcends the community on the basis of its personal vocation. Personalists translated this view into blueprints for social, economic, spiritual, and also political reforms. In the context of the failing democracies of the interbellum period, they argued for a personalist democracy, or a democracy with an ethical content, beyond majority rule or the idea of popular sovereignty. Personalist democracy is, in essence, a political system that creates the framework of freedom, responsibility and justice wherein every human being is capable to achieve full personhood. That is the *bonum commune* that politics has to aspire to. Although personalist democracy has a high mission, personalism is at the same time permeated by the awareness of the fragility of such a political system. That is why personalist democracy is also characterized by a profound distrust of authority. Personalists like Maritain, Mounier and Landsberg warned that political power without the necessary checks and balances lapses from support of the human person into oppression. Moreover, these checks and balances can not come from a constitution alone, but also from a vigilant and active citizenry that keeps political power in reign. This emphasis on personal political responsibility is characteristic of French personalism. It is framed within the positive conception of liberty that is central to the personalist discourse. Liberty is not the negative liberty to do whatever one wants to do as long as one does no harm to anyone else but the liberty to do what is good, i.e. the liberty to find one's vocation in life and to commit oneself to its realization. The task of personalist democracy is to guarantee the necessary conditions for this liberty, but the task of every person is to guarantee that democracy works. In other words, the person is in the service of the common good, but the common good is in the service of the person and her liberty. This way the person and the community are combined in a personalist and communitarian ideal, because liberty presupposes taking on responsibility in the struggle against political domination and abuse of power.

Ricoeur's inspiration came also from his contemporary and fellow-countryman, Éric Weil. Weil was a Hegelian political philosopher who considered the political domain to be the domain of reasonable action in history, or in other words, the domain of the realization of morality in a historical community by means of a state, which he defined as the institutional framework that gives expression to the decision capacity of a historical community in light of its own survival. What Ricoeur took over from Weil is an interpretation of the necessary connection between politics and morality. According to Weil the task of politics is to integrate morality, efficiency and tradition in a given historical setting. Given the situation of a modern efficiency-driven society man is confronted with a crisis of meaning. This results in the temptation to close oneself off from society and to retreat in the formal morality of personal reflection. This would, however, mean that we live for abstract ideals without any hope of actualization. The alternative that Weil proposes is

the perspective of 'living morality' in which one tries to give meaning to social existence. Politics is a necessary implication of this perspective of living morality. By means of prudent politics, the state has to bridge the gap between morality and society and to educate individuals to reasonable and responsible use of freedom. Politics is thus related to morality as a 'morality of virtue in history'. This approach of politics implies that citizenship is much more than a juridical status. Citizenship is, according to Ricoeur – following Weil – rather about being situated in a historical community and the implied moral vocation to realize reason and to fight evil in history.

Although Ricoeur shared this fundamental view on citizenship with Weil, he found that a crucial element was missing in Weil's political thought. This was exactly the link between power, freedom and violence that is expressed in the political paradox. Given the fact that political power faces man with opportunity as well as risk, the conclusion is that citizenship equals first and foremost a person's duty to enact political vigilance and the willingness to act and to enforce their rights in the public domain. The political liberty of the citizen consists of the absence of political alienation, i.e. the absence of a political power that oppresses the individual in his development as a human person. This liberty can only be realized in a democracy that really fulfils the demands of Abraham Lincoln, as 'a government of the people, by the people and for the people.' Given the political paradox, we cannot expect the total reconciliation of power and the individual. Nevertheless, this should remain a constant objective, by means of two distinct pathways that together make up the content of Ricoeur's moral concept of citizenship. These pathways consist of, on the one hand, the freedom of contestation and, on the other hand, the freedom of participation.

According to Ricoeur, the freedom to contest was the basic feature of Western democracies of his day. Hence, political freedom was the possibility to check and, if necessary, criticize power. The use of these rights should protect people from the abuse of power. This freedom to contest is the first expression of critical vigilance as an answer to the political paradox. However, as we have seen in his analysis of democracy, Ricoeur stressed the fact that democracy implied more than this defensive dimension. There is also an offensive dimension. Accordingly, he stated that contestation and opposition are essential to democracy, but they don't constitute a full answer to the political paradox. Whoever observes and checks power from the sidelines renounces at the same time the possibility to actively exercise power oneself. Ricoeur emphasized that a passive attitude with regard to politics, however alert and ready one may be, perpetuates political alienation as much as it diminishes it. That is why political freedom is also about the freedom to participate in the political decision-making as an active and responsible citizen, in a way that makes us collectively responsible for the common good. Neither element, positive or negative, is sufficient unto itself. Contestation without participation undervalues politics as deciding together on the future of the community. Participation without contestation undervalues the threat to be dragged into a perverted exercise of political power. Both cases result in political alienation.

3.2 Institutional and ethical requirements

In light of Ricoeur's theory of politics, both institutional and ethical requirements have to be fulfilled. Ricoeur aimed for a new kind of democratic order, which institutionalized positive freedom; in other words, the citizens should control the state. Hence, institutional techniques must be put into place that make the exercise of power possible, but the abuse of power impossible. The exercise of power is a matter of collective choices. The new democracy that Ricoeur wanted to develop had to remove the collective choice from technocrats and lobbyists, those who are the decision-makers in a bureaucracy. A maximal amount of people should participate in public debate and public decision-making. Clear ideas on how this should function, however, was something Ricoeur left for others to conceptualize. Undoubtedly, however, he stressed the fact that this would imply a profound civic education, so that citizens would be able to effectively use their freedom to contest and participate.

Next to an adequate institutional framework, a new conception of civic virtue was also needed according to Ricoeur. On this matter he was strongly influenced by Paul-Ludwig Landsberg, namely with regard to the assumption of Max Weber's distinction between *ethics of conviction* and *ethics of responsibility*.[8] Given the political paradox, citizens should adopt an attitude of political vigilance and readiness to defend their rights. The corresponding civic virtue is not an absolute ethics of conviction that follows an ideal in a manner blind to the consequences of power in the real world. Ethics of conviction has to be balanced by an ethics of responsibility, which stands for reasonable, prudent political action, aware of the dangers of the paradoxical nature of power, without ever losing sight of the ideal. Just like Landsberg , Ricoeur emphasized that the distinction between ethics of responsibility and ethics of conviction is not absolute. On the contrary, political ethics has to maintain a dialectical relation between both poles. Pure ethics

of responsibility would end in Machiavellianism, while pure ethics of conviction would lead to oppressive moralism or clericalism. Hence, Ricoeur's vision of political education was focused on the consciousness-raising and management of the tension between these two ethical poles. Only on the basis of this tension is virtuous political action possible; that is, political action based on practical wisdom that combines awareness of the political paradox and human fragility with a permanent care for the ideals that really matter.

Ricoeur's appropriation of Weber's concepts indicate the profound interweaving of ethics and politics in the thought of Ricoeur, despite his attention for the autonomy of the political. Even if the political paradox forces us into an ethics of responsibility, this should never be detached from the ethical ideals that have to found our political actions. Ricoeur identified these ideals in reference to Emmanuel Mounier as the personalist and communitarian utopia of a universal community that allow every human being to develop into a complete person. Ricoeur did recognize that an ethics of conviction should never directly influence political action if it is to avoid moralism. The dialectics of ethics of conviction and ethics of responsibility comes down to a permanent pressure of moral ideals on authority, without enforcing any particular policy. The credibility and authority of moral ideals requires that an ethics of conviction is first and foremost borne by individuals and groups that keep themselves out of the struggle for power and send a prophetic message to the rest of society. Hence he generalized the prophetic action that he talked about earlier in a moral theological context. It is then the task of the person as a citizen to keep the tension between prophetic ideals and the burden of responsibility alive.

Ricoeur also followed in the footsteps of Landsberg on the matter of a personalist account of pacifism.[9] Just like Landsberg, Ricoeur criticized the passive pacifism that strove for an abstract ideal without taking into account historical reality, insofar that nonviolence could only be valuable if it showed historical efficacy. In that regard, nonviolence has limitations. It is a negative attitude, a reaction to existing authority, but whenever it would build a new positive authority it would relapse into oppression. Nonviolence is also only a gesture and not a lasting institution. Given the political paradox, politics always goes with violence. This is not without consequences: 'That is why the politician is faced by a terrible problem; it is not the problem of maintaining his innocence, but that of *limiting his culpability*.' Ricoeur came to the conclusion that there is a necessarily tragic relationship between prophetic nonviolence and political violence. This means that we have to be able to resort to violence if necessary, while nonviolence has to remain 'the prophetic seed' of political movements. Legitimate violence does not rule out the importance of the testimony of nonviolence as a permanent pressure of ethics of conviction on ethics of responsibility.

In sum, we can state that the political paradox confronts us with a problematic political liberty and responsibility. Because of the paradox, liberty is always a matter of active citizenship and the enclosed responsibility to contribute to the maximization of political rationality and the minimization of political evil. This implies that we have to (be able to) actively use our liberty to contest and to participate. This requires both an adequate institutional framework and an appropriate political pedagogy that sheds light on the ethical dimension of this responsibility of every person. A permanent dialectics of an ethics of responsibility and an ethics of conviction has to be the *leitmotiv* in this effort. Active citizenship also means active participation in the violence that politics ensues. The cooperation of the critical role of ethical ideals and the recognition of the political paradox has to allow us to limit our culpability. The more we bring violence in all its forms into account, the more we are able to push it back. Our political responsibility remains, however, a necessarily tragic task.

Ricoeur illustrated this tragic dimension by means of the ultimate case, namely war and the military implications of citizenship. War is unjustifiable, but still it confronts us with a dilemma, because war is at the same time killing and sacrificing oneself for the survival of the state. Either we choose for efficient evil because fighting can be important for the survival of the state and the implied survival of values such as freedom, equality and justice without this being any justification for the horror of war or we choose to bear witness to the good, but then our betrayal of the state fails to remedy evil in the long run. As a conscientious objector, one can speak for the good, but one remains guilty of not averting painful consequences. The ultimate case of war shows political responsibility as a permanent ethical dilemma, an 'ethics of distress'. The state has to reduce evil, but is itself based on violence that tends to neglect the boundaries of legitimacy. Ricoeur's personalist political ethics confronts us with the hard choice between the testimony of the good and the lesser evil. The hard confrontation of ethics of conviction and ethics of responsibility is rather an explanation of the problem than a clear answer.

Conclusion

Ricoeur's political philosophy shows the essential characteristics of the political philosophy of French

personalism – the ethical approach of democracy as a political system of freedom and equality aimed at giving every person the capability to discern and realize her own vocation in life, joined by a distrust based on the fragility of politics that makes vigilant and active citizenship a necessary condition for the actualization of this political task. Originally this came to the fore within a moral-theological framework that demonstrated that the vocation of a Christian always implies a social and political responsibility, for the love of one's neighbour is not restricted to direct encounters, but has to penetrate into social institutions. If a Christian wants to put charity into practice, institutional relations also have to be given a moral content. Accordingly, Ricoeur stated that a Christian has the task of being an active citizen in a Christian interpretation. That Christian interpretation comes down to critical vigilance that keeps politics on the right track by confronting it over and over again with the Christian values that it is supposed to realize.

The philosophical foundation for this vision ensued from a double analysis: on the one hand, an analysis of actual democracy and on the other hand an analysis of the history of political philosophy. In the first analysis, Ricoeur emphasized that the core values of democracy – freedom and equality – imply both rights and responsibilities. He linked this to two crises that he discerned in the democracy of his days. Next to the problematic bond between political liberalism and economic liberalism, he talked about the totalitarian crisis that he blamed on the fact that people rejected their civic responsibilities. Subsequently, the analysis of the history of political philosophy made clear that the crises of democracy were linked to a paradox that was intrinsic to politics, for *the political* has the important task of realizing the rationality of freedom and equality in history, but can only do that through *politics*, which consists of the pursuit of power. The particularity of Ricoeur's reflections lies in the effort to think both sides of the coin together in a relationship. He underlined that politics expresses both man's guilt and greatness, for the awareness of political evil should not hide that politics is first and foremost the bearer of a crucial vocation.

These theoretical reflections armed Ricoeur to give expression to a personalist vision of freedom and citizenship. Inspired by the Hegelian Éric Weil, Ricoeur stated that citizenship refers to the fact that we are situated in a historical community that implicitly calls upon us to actualize morality. Ricoeur linked this idea with the personalist emphasis on the duty of vigilance with regard to politics. He identified the freedom to contest and the freedom to participate as complementary com- ponents of a true and unalienated citizenship. Contestation without participation rejects politics as the collective care for the common good. Participation without contestation neglects the risk of becoming willingly or unwillingly victim of the corruption of the exercise of power. In line with personalism and especially inspired by Paul-Ludwig Landsberg, Ricoeur argued that this vision requires not only institutional conditions but first and foremost ethical conditions. This refers to an ethical education that proposes a dialectical and tragic tension between an ethics of responsibility and an ethics of conviction. Virtuous citizenship comes, hence, down to political action according to practical wisdom that links the awareness of the political paradox to a permanent focus on the personalist and communitarian ideal of a universal community that allows every person to develop herself in a complete way. It is this vision of the person as a citizen that is central to Paul Ricoeur's contribution to the personalist legacy.

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Notes:

1. See especially.
2. '[A]ujourd'hui notre tâche de chrétien est de discerner les valeurs nouvelles de justice et de liberté que les conditions techniques du monde moderne permettent et suscitent, de les reconnaître partout où elles sont, et de les repenser et de les revivre en climat de foi.'
3. '[P]eut-être que l'Église fidèle a maintenant deux sortes de fils, ceux qui font tous les pactes pour sauver l'homme de l'inhumain, et ceux qui tentent l'aventure du village sur la montagne. Peut-être que les deux pôles du christianisme pratique au XXe siècle suscitent deux vocations en tension fraternelle dans l'Église: la vocation du chrétien dans la politique laïque, et celle du chrétien dans les communautés chrétiennes prophétiques.'
4. With regard to the institutional development of democracy, Ricoeur linked the Christian vocation to a pursuit of federalism, a dynamic multi-party system, new forms of political participation and the strengthening of the legislative and executive power over technocrats and lobbyists.
5. 'La démocratie est une idée en devenir et en combat. C'est une histoire commencée que nous avons la tâche de continuer.'
6. 'Bref, qu'est-ce que le droit démocratique pour qui a faim?'
7. Ricoeur did not fail to mention that Marx eventually disregarded the gravity of his own understanding because it was subject to his theory of infrastructure and superstructure that considered politics as the expression of socio-economic relations of power. This way Marx kept the illusion alive that the abolition of socio-economic oppression would also abolish political oppression.
8. Ricoeur read Max Weber in a peculiar way. He stated that Weber's vision of the political vocation already implied a dialectic between an ethics of conviction and an ethics of responsibility, since the politician has to combine passion for an ideal with a clear and detached view on reality. Ernst Wolff criticized this interpretation. First, he referred to the fact that Weber spoke about an ethics of conviction as a possibility, but an inappropriate kind of ethos for politics, while Ricoeur wanted an ethics of conviction to play a role next to an ethics of responsibility. Second, Wolff stated that Weber raised the ethics of responsibility itself to the status of an ideal, while ethics of responsibility is, according to Ricoeur, always in tension with the focus on ideals in the ethics of conviction. Third, Ricoeur gave an ethics of conviction a different meaning than Weber. Whereas Weber characterized ethics of conviction as the neglect of consequences of action, Ricoeur changed its meaning into a principle that marked the boundaries of the ethics of responsibility. In Ricoeur's use, the ethics of conviction operates as an ethics of refusal, which indicates where the limits of the ethically acceptable lie, after the example of Socrates' daemon. Wolff eventually identifies the big difference between Weber and Ricoeur in the latter's conviction that a practical reconciliation of both ethics is possible, namely in an ethics of limited violence. This amounts to the exercise of practical wisdom that adjudicates between the practical defectiveness of moral principles and the excessive inclinations of political power.
9. Ricoeur's stance on pacifism evolved over time. Influenced by the fact that his father was killed in action during the First World War he initially had strong pacifist convictions that were gradually balanced under the influence of Landsberg, Mounier and Philip.

THE MERITS OF A PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF DREAMS

J. Cutting, B. Toone and M. Trimble

Abstract

We review the philosophical, psychological and psycho-biological literature on dreams. We then rate 100 consecutive dreams of one of the authors using descriptive categories drawn from the psychological literature (e.g. predominant sensory modality, illogicality, awareness of dreaming) and the presence of anomalous ontological features referred to in the phenomenological literature (e.g. anomalous spatiality, anomalous temporality, anomalous thingness). There was unreliability in both sets of ratings. Nevertheless, there was sufficient agreement on most of the descriptive categories and on individual instances of anomalous ontology for us to compose a phenomenological profile of the dream, one, moreover, which undermines most philosophical and psychological assumptions as to the nature *of* the dream.

Key words

Dream, dreamer, psychology of dreaming, phenomenology of dreaming.

1. Introduction

The dream and the dreamer have been the focus of enormous lay interest ever since the dawn of documented humanity. During the two and a half millennia of philosophy as an autonomous discipline every major philosopher has had something to say about dreams, albeit, to us, surprisingly little. The baton of interest passed to psychologists about 150 years ago, to artists and writers about 100 years ago, and to neurophysiologists and neuropsychologists about 50 years ago. The impetus for this article is our conviction that despite all this endeavour the dream is still as obscure as ever.

The main reason for this hiatus in knowledge, it seems to us, is that each party to the investigation has rather *used* the dream to further his own project, instead of allowing the dream to reveal its actual nature. The lay person invariably interprets the dream in the light of what benefit it might have for a waker's problematic situation; the philosopher aims to buttress his own thesis as to the waker's *modus vivendi*, not the dreamer's; the psychologist fishes for purported clues along the 'royal road' to unravelling psychopathology, bracketing madness and dreaming without much further ado; the artist seeks inspiration for work which will appeal, obviously, to a waker; and the neurophysiologist and neuropsychologist hope for a window on the workings of the brain.

We, on the contrary, prioritize the dreamer, and plan to illuminate the dream and dreamer themselves, by seeking whether the extant psychological and phenomenological categories by which dreams have been described actually measure up to the dreamer's experience.

The article will be structured as follows. First, we review philosophical accounts of dreams, grouping these conceptually rather than chronologically as is the normal practice. Secondly, we consider psychological theories, amongst which Freud's is pivotal. Thirdly, we take a critical view of psycho-biological approaches to dreams – subclassified into neurophysiological and neuropsychological varieties – which are by far and away the current climate of dream research, their 'cutting edge', as Martin[1], a popular science author, refers to them. Next, we give pride of place to the only systematic, phenomenological analysis of dreams known to us, that of the 20th Century German philosopher von Uslar[2]. (Artistic theories will be accommodated in the philosophical section). Further, we give the purpose and results of our own study, which aims to evaluate the reliability and validity of extant measures of dream 'anomalousness'. Finally, we commend and even expand the phenomenological approach, which we find is the only one which gets anywhere near the actual experience of the dreamer, capturing the anomalous temporality, spatiality, objectivity and categorization involved which sets it completely apart from the waker's experience.

2. Philosophical accounts of dreams

Five themes are apparent in the philosophical literature on the nature of dreams:

(a) a general prioritization of the waker vis-à-vis the dreamer;

(b) a recognition of the dreamer's alterity, but only in the form of a paler, insubstantial or muddled world-view relative to the waker's;

(c) a claim that the dreamer is in no essential way different from the waker;

(d) an admission that the dreamer is in some ways party to knowledge that the waker lacks: and

(e) a prioritization of the dreamer rather than the waker with respect to which of them influences the other. As is obvious, these views constitute an entire spectrum.

(a) The dreamer as subordinate to the waker.

Hobbes[3], Scheler[4] and Heidegger[5] took the view that because the waker was a witness to the dreamer's

world, and the dreamer oblivious to the waker's, the dreamer was subordinate to the waker.

Hobbes:

> In dreams I do not often ….. think of the same persons, places, objects and actions that I do waking …… and because waking I often observe the absurdity of dreams, but never dream of the absurdities of my waking thoughts, I am well satisfied that being awake, I know that I dream not, though when I dream, I think myself awake.

Scheler:

> The waker knows that he is awake, and also knows that sometimes he dreams and what he dreams about; his world therefore encompasses that of the dreamer. The dreamer, however, does not know that he is dreaming and takes himself to be awake. The dreamer's world does not encompass the waker's.

Heidegger:

> That one always only speaks about dreams in waking and does not speak about waking in dreams indicates that *dreaming* belongs to waking.

(b) The dreamer as recognisably alien to the waker but compromised vis-à-vis the waker.

This theme pervades the sparse comments on dreams by empiricist philosophers such as Locke[6] and Berkeley,[7] and is evident in Plato.[8] Compared with the theme presented in (a) above, the present proposal, also common to most psychological formulations of dreams – see below – gives the dreamer due respect as a purveyor of an alternative world, but considers this a muddled, pallid, or insubstantial derivative of the waker's version.

Locke:

> The dreams of sleeping men are, as I take it, all made up of the waking man's ideas, though for the most part oddly put together.

Berkeley:

> Hylas: what difference is there between real things and chimeras formed by the imagination, or the visions of a dreamer?
> Philinous: [Berkeley's spokesman]: The ideas formed by imagination are faint and indistinct ….. The ideas perceived by sense, that is, real things, are more vivid and clear.

Plato:

> What about someone who believes in beautiful things, but doesn't believe in the beautiful itself……. Don't you think he is living in a dream, rather than a wakened state? Isn't this dreaming: whether asleep or awake, to think that a likeness is not a likeness but rather the thing itself that it is like?

(c) The dreamer and waker as essentially alike.

This stance is taken by philosophers from a variety of orientations, notably Spinoza,[9] Schopenhauer,[10] Nietzsche,[11] and Wittgenstein.[12]

Spinoza:

> We dream that we do certain things by a decision of the mind which were we awake we would dare not; and therefore I should like to know whether there are in the mind two sorts of decisions, fanciful and free? But …. this decision of the mind which is thought to be free cannot be distinguished from imagination or memory….. Those [i.e. dreamers] who believe that they speak but are silent are no different from those [i.e. wakers] who do anything from the [supposed] free decision of the mind …. and [therefore must be deemed] to dream with their eyes open.

Schopenhauer:

> Thus the world must be recognized, from one aspect at least, as akin to a dream, indeed as capable of being put in the same class as a dream.

Nietzsche:

> Waking life does not have this freedom of interpretation possessed by the life of dreams, it is less inventive and unbridled – but do I have to add that when we are awake our drives likewise do nothing but interpret nervous stimuli, and, according to their requirements, posit their 'causes'? that [therefore] there is no *essential* difference between waking and dreaming?

Wittgenstein:

> It is probable that there are many different sorts of dreams, and that there is no single line of explanation for all of them. Just as there are many different sorts of jokes, or just as there are many different sorts of language.

(d) The dreamer as privileged in some respects relative *to the waker.*

This *aperçu* is found in Descartes',[13] Leibniz'[14] and Bergson's[15] writings.

Descartes:

> I am now awake and perceive something real; but because my perception is not sufficiently clear I will of express purpose go to sleep that my dreams may represent to me the object of my perception with more truth and clearness.

Leibniz:

> To say nothing of the wonders of dreams, in which we effortlessly but also involuntarily invent things which we would have to ponder long to come upon when awake.

Bergson:

> What, then, is the difference between perceiving and dreaming? …..." What is wrong with the dreamer is rather that he reasons too much.

(e) The dreamer as progenitor of the waker.

This theme is rare, and only to be found, to our knowledge, in the writings of Benjamin,[16] Foucault[17] and the philosophically-inclined psychiatrist

Binswanger.[18]

Benjamin's comments on the relationship between dreaming and waking are scattered amongst his extraordinary and unfinished *Arcades Project*, a literary journey through 19th Century Paris, which he compares to a dream, relative to which he deems the Europe of the 20th Century an awakening therefrom:

> Every epoch, in fact, not only dreams the one to follow, but, in dreaming, precipitates its awakening.

Further cryptic comments convey the same sense of the dream as a condensed prescience of what is later to become elaborated waking experience:

> The imminent awakening is poised like the wooden horse of the Greeks, in the Troy of dreams.

> The realization of dream elements in the course of waking up is the canon of dialectics.

Foucault, in his earliest publication, adopts a similar view:

> The cosmogony of the dream is the origination itself of existence….. The dream is the bearer of the deepest human meanings ….. The dream is an existence carving itself out in barren space ….. It is the world of the dawn of its first explosion when the world is still existence itself and is not yet the universe of objectivity.

Binswanger, also cryptically, but clearly along the same lines, had earlier written:

> Dreaming, man ….. is 'life-function'; waking, he creates 'life-history'.

3. Psychological accounts of dreams

Freud[19] is the pivotal figure. Before Freud, the prevailing opinions in the 19th Century are best represented by Wundt,[20] the 'father of psychology', Maury,[21] a psychiatrist, and Hervey de Saint Denys,[22] a professor of Chinese literature who was drawn to dreams. After the publication of Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams* at the cusp of the 20th Century the exponents of a psychological approach who added most insight to the topic are probably Havelock Ellis,[23] a layman drawn to psychological issues, Jung,[24] psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, and Hobson[25] and Rechtschaffen,[26] both specialist sleep researchers.

Freud's own crisp summary of the 19th Century literature, similar to our own formulation of philosophical views pre-and post-Freud, is apposite:

> (1) Theories …. according to which the whole of psychic activity continues in dreams … (2) theories which ….. presuppose that dreams imply a lowering of psychic activity, a loosening of associations …. 3) theories which ascribe to the dreaming mind a capacity and inclination for carrying out special psychical activities of which it is largely or mostly incapable in waking life.

(a) Pre-Freud.

Hervey de Saint Denys (representative of Freud's first set of theories):

> Between dreaming and thinking there is only one difference, confirmation by real life ….. The dream shows us the scaffolding of the mental apparatus as one rarely perceives it in real life, the life of conscious thought ….. human imagination ….. memory.

Wundt (representative of Freud's second set of theories):

> The psycho-physiological conditions of sleep, dreams and hypnosis are in all probability essentially alike. Since psychologically they all appear as particular alterations of sensibility and volition, they can be explained physiologically as alterations in the functions of the underlying central structures.

Maury (representative of Freud's third set of theories):

> The condition of sleep or rather of dreaming is not one in which the intellect is affected. It is rather one in which there is an absence of willing, but some aspects of our intellect, far from being impaired, are actually overdeveloped.

(b) Freud.

Freud's contribution was a watershed. Before him, psychologists and philosophers alike, as we have illustrated, had undervalued the dreamer, according it, at most, an occasional insight into a thorny intellectual problem which had baffled the waker. But here was someone proclaiming that the dream, if only its hieroglyphics could be unravelled, was a source of insight into the waker's world itself, which the waker, on its own, was not party to. Ever since, no-one has had the temerity to denigrate the dream. This is his first legacy.

Secondly, he saw that the dreamer was a purveyor and a recipient of an entirely different world from that experienced by the waker. It was not simply that a repertoire of psychological functions – memory, will, imagination, attention – were in abeyance or preponderance, the essence of all psychological theories before and since. Freud was a phenomenologist *avant la lettre*, seeing the dream as a complete rupture from waking experience, both in its objective form, which he called the manifest dream, and in its subjectivity, which he referred to as the latent dream, the latter governed by all sorts of linguistic and logical rules alien to the waker. We are not concerned in this paper with Freud's speculations on the cause of dreams, e.g. sexual frustration, adverse childhood life events, etc., only with the *nature* of a dream).

(c) Post-Freud.

Freud's first legacy – the dream as edifying message for the waker – was elaborated by Jung:

> We can discern a compensatory function of the unconscious whereby those thoughts, inclinations, and tendencies which in conscious life are too little valued come spontaneously into action during the sleeping state ….. The dream rectifies the situation ….. as an expression of the self-regulation of the psyche.

His second legacy – the dream as a phenomenological puzzle – is taken forward by von Uslar,[2] see Section 5.

The other above-mentioned psychologically-oriented contributions are best categorized as elaborations of certain aspects of the pre-Freudians Maury and Hervey de Saint Denys with respect to what might be dilapidated about the dream. Wundt's call for a neurophysiological approach culminated, of course, in the discovery of REM sleep, a topic which we shall treat in the next section).

Havelock Ellis:

> We accept the facts presented to us in the dream ….. with the help of all the mental resources ….. only those resources are frequently inadequate ….. thus [in one of his dreams] the lady who wished to send a small sum of money to Ireland *is not aware* [our italics] of the existence of postal orders …. She might have been living in palaeolithic times.

Hobson:

> I suggest that there is something wrong in the brain's map room …. The orientational brain-mind is indeed operating at a severe disadvantage …. The dreamer is lost – disorientated.

Rechtschaffen:

> Several features of dreams reveal their relative single-mindedness: (1) non-reflectiveness …. The reflective stream of consciousness is drastically attenuated ….. (2) lack of imagination …. In the sense of the capacity to conjure up images ….. (3) thematic coherence ….. dreams do tend to take the form of a story ….. because attenuated reflectiveness and imagination prevents interruption by competing thought streams ….. 4) poor recall ….. is because the conditions which limit dreaming consciousness to a single thought stream also limit the capacity to simultaneously adopt a set for remembering that thought stream.

4. Psycho-biological theories of dreams

(a) *Introduction.*

As mentioned in the main introduction, the focus on dreams in the last 50 years has undoubtedly been biological, triggered by the discovery in the 1950's[27] of a neurophysiological accompaniment of vivid dreams known as rapid-eye-movement or REM sleep. In our view, and in the view of several contemporary dream researchers, e.g. Solms,[28] Hartmann,[29] Conway[30] and Ramachandran, [31] this, if not a red herring, is an as yet unexplained physiological association, the discovery of which has had a baleful influence on research into the 'nature' of the dream, which we are addressing. Virtually all 'psychological' accounts of dreams henceforth, including Hobson's, mentioned above, which we regard as exemplary, have felt obliged to incorporate some hypothetical comment as to the physiological status of the brain when a subject is dreaming, none of which, in our view, is any more illuminating than Wundt's original speculations. We shall consider such suggestions below.

More promising, as a general psycho-biological approach, in our view, are *neuropsychological* investigations about what parts of the brain are involved when someone is dreaming. Again, such claims were first put forward in the 1950's, by Humphrey and Zangwill.[32] Their value, see below, is, in short, that the part of the brain responsible for the concomitants of REM sleep – rapid breathing, sexual organ tumescence, both manifestations of arousal – is the most primitive region, the pons, which, as Ramachandran has put it, is 'reptilian', what we share with the humblest animals, and is in Ramachandran's vivid metaphor akin to 'turning the lights on' whereas the complex experience of dreaming would seem to require the highest regions of brain structure, the cortex, to account for such complexity.

(b) *Neurophysiological hypotheses.*

The 'REM phenomenon' has now been downgraded to a statistical fact that dreams are more likely to be reported if a sleeper is woken up during the regular phases of such rapid eye movements than when not, i.e. in what is called non-REM sleep – dreams being reported in non-REM sleep, and dreams not being reported in subjects with certain cortical lesions despite patent REM phases. This has led, on the one hand, to theories of dreaming which assume that rapid eye movements are nevertheless a marker of arousal and that dreams are a manifestation of a heightened emotional substrate vis-à-vis the waking state, and, on the other hand, to theories which eschew any such emotional provenance for dreams and which roam speculatively over all sorts of other useful functions which dreams might represent.

In the first group, the psychological mentor is still Freud, albeit with the jettisoning of some elements of his theory. What is retained, by Hartmann,[29] for example, is the guiding influence of emotion on what is experienced, and by Conway,[30] for example, the notion of a goal-oriented drivenness to try out various scenarios of what it is to be a human being without the inconvenience of these being antipathetic to surviving the actual circumstances of ones

environment.

If the above appear speculative, the remaining theories eschewing emotion as a driving force for dreams are equally without any basis. On this point, which applies to the emotional as well as the non-emotional theories of dreams, to be considered now, it is nowhere raised as a problem in discussions of dreams that the waker is someone who is exquisitely driven by the emotional or some other pragmatic value of what is encountered in their environment. It is not credible, or at least not argued with any persuasiveness in the literature, that the sleeper should be more alert to the emotional value of cues in their environment than they are when awake, or that they should consolidate experience more effectively when asleep than when awake. All the remaining extant theories of dreams invoking some non-emotional provenance fall prey to this criticism as well. They may be deemed the 'cutting edge' of dream research, as Martin(1) claimed, but they are totally lacking in any support from any analyses of the actual experience of the dreamer, which the present article aims to show. Not lacking in ingenuity however, the following theories, well reviewed in a discussion between Solms, Ramachandran and Conway,[30] have been proposed. In increasing degree of meaningfulness, the dream has been deemed: (1) 'froth' or 'noise', i.e. an epiphenomenal excretion of some neurophysiological process which itself never reaches dream consciousness; (2) a testing out of alternative scenarios of the repercussions of acting on some event in a particular way, which promoters of such a theory further compare to schizophrenic experience; and (3) a way of categorizing and consolidating the previous waking day's experience, a 'housekeeping' exercise, as it has been referred to.

(c) *Neuropsychological hypotheses.*

There are three historical phases in this.

The first phase was ushered in by an article by Humphrey and Zangwill[32] in 1951. The authors of this article nominated the right hemisphere as the source of dreaming. They reported three patients with dream 'cessation' after brain damage, of whom one had bilateral damage, one was a left-hander with right-sided damage, and the third's dreams had altered in quality but not ceased. On this evidence their conclusion was clearly flawed, but has resonated with a prejudice about the right hemisphere ever since to the effect that this hemisphere is an imaginative 'fellow' as opposed to the logical left hemisphere, and might well be the instigator of dreams.

The next phase saw the left hemisphere being invoked as the more likely substrate. Greenberg and Farah[33] in 1986 reviewed the literature to date, and found nine definite case-reports of complete loss of dreaming after brain damage, of which five had purely left-sided, only one had right-sided and was left-handed, and three had bilateral damage. Epstein and Simmon's[34] report of seven aphasic patients with left-sided lesions and loss of dreaming supported this new formulation, as did McCormick's *et al.'s*[35] study of four patients whose right hemisphere had been excised and yet continued to dream.

The final phase, which obtains to this day, was set in train by the largest study to date, conducted by Solms[28] in 1997, in which 52 personally interviewed patients with unilateral brain damage who had experienced 'global cessation of dreaming' were reported. Of these, 27 had a left-sided insult and 25 a right-sided one. By that time the literature of case-reports had grown, and he buttressed his argument for a *dual hemispheric* involvement in dreaming by citing 29 other cases of unilateral damage and dream cessation, of whom 22 had left-sided and seven right-sided lesions. Doricchi and Violani[36] had also conducted a literature search in the 1990's, which partly overlapped with Solms', and this came up with 33 cases of unilateral brain damage and dream cessation – 23 left-sided, 10 right-sided.

5. Phenomenological accounts of dreams

The slogan which heralded the phenomenological movement, simply stated by Husserl,[37] was *auf die Sachen selbst zurückgehen* ('back to the facts themselves'), and we take this seriously. Here, we consider the facts of the matter, not what the dream *might be* meaningfully expressing or *might be* as a dilapidated set of psychological functions. What is actually experienced or not experienced in a dream? is our concern. But there are two quite disparate meanings of phenomenology, as applied to dreams and to psychopathology in general.

One, superficial, simply refers to a crude and waker-oriented description of what the dreamer, as remembered and interpreted by the waker, was experiencing, in terms of the categories which the waker applies to his or her waking experience. So, we can ask, as numerous psychologists and other investigators espousing a psychological framework do, whether dreams differ predominantly or absolutely from waking experience in respect of: (a) sensory modality – preponderance of visual, dearth of gustatory, olfactory and tactile, and absence of pain and sexual sensation, say Calkins,[38] Havelock Ellis[23] and Hobson;[25] (b) colour – rarely encountered according to Havelock Ellis;[23] (c) the sorts of other humans encountered – well-populated with family,

friends and unknown people, in Calkins'[38] view; (d) the patency of linguistic constructions – against Kraepelin's[39] claim, Heynick[40] found that the occasional anomalous words and grammar were not syntactically deviant as in aphasia, but semantically and pragmatically deviant and akin to what is seen in schizophrenia; (e) false memories – events, things or people familiar to the waker are often unfamiliar to the dreamer and conversely, in Calkins'[38] opinion; (f) the range of emotions evident – similar to those of the waker, claims Calkins,[38] with, according to Boss,[41] extremes of emotion alien to everyday life; (g) reasoning ability – competent and often on overdrive, says Havelock Ellis,[23] absurd counter Calkins[38] and Hobson;[25] (h) morality displayed – sometimes alien to the waker's ethical stance, in Freud's[19] view; and (i) the status of insight into or consciousness of the dream as a dream – much disputed, but denied by Havelock Ellis,[23] Hobson[25] and Rechtschaffen.[26]

A second deeper meaning of phenomenology, which eschews the use of terms such as 'bizarre' or 'absurd' which litter the psychological literature on dreams, is the study of the very framework of experience. Is the thingness of things encountered in the dream the same as for the waker? Is the spatiality or temporality or sense of self identical to the waker's or not? These are the critical questions which anyone acquainted with dreams should ponder, the answers to which might render the terms 'bizarre' and 'absurd' redundant. Von Uslar[2] is our guide here, as he, and only he, to our knowledge, probed the depths of the phenomenology of dreams.

Von Uslar's exemplary dream, with which he illustrates his themes, begins in a rural setting from which the dreamer spies the dome of a religious building in the distance. As he approaches, however, things are not what they seem:

> My companion informs me that he can discern the towers of Strasbourg Cathedral as well as a clump of trees. To me the towers and surrounding buildings looked like something from my home town, but as I got closer I realized it was a different place. On arriving at the scene, there was only one tower but two small ancient churches joined by some sort of bridge, and as I entered one of these, which looked quite round from the outside, to my astonishment had an extremely narrow and long nave to it and was not round at all. The walls, moreover, were of a remarkable white colour and their texture a sort of wax or lava. As I shut the door I heard from inside an uncanny sound like scurrying of numerous feet. I tried to flee but my limbs wouldn't let me, almost as if I had suddenly become lame. Eventually I did escape, all the time pursued by the noise of those scurrying feet.

From this and other dreams he arrives at the following views on *thingness*, *spatiality* and *temporality* in dreams, along with an overview of their *characteristic content* and their *nature in general.*

Thingness:

> Thingness is the unity of contradictions ….. Even the materiality holds a strangeness ….. There is a thingness which withdraws from any sensory realm ….. Thingness is as it were an abstract thingness ….. It is not irreal but rather the most real ….. Everything in this world is in any sort of way a thing – the church, the group of trees ….. The dream allows us a deeper opening up on to the thingness of things ….. We find [in respect of Kant's categories, see below] another order, another sort of unity, the pre-eminence of actuality over possibility. This produces an over-reality of the dream. The same goes for quantity: one can become many.

Spatiality:

> It is richer than the waker's ….. It is not a pure dimensionality where things stand additionally in a pre-given space, but the dimensionality is the very way in which things are ….. [which] we can compare to an intensified spatiality ….. There is a width, freedom, openness of the space that we have here, in which things develop.

Temporality:

> Like the dream's spatiality its temporality is more bound to the objects than it is in waking life.

Characteristic content:

> In the dream our professional concerns are more to the fore than in our waking life ….. Typical dreams include not-ready for something ….. The dream has a remarkable preference for cities ….. Cities and dreams have something remarkable in common ….. One could talk of an architectural dream ….. Are there in this world of dreams no animals? We can't say this. There might well be. But they are not visible …. Things are quite otherwise with regard to human beings. There are few in this dream, to be sure [his exemplary dream], relative to the amount of buildings and other dead artefacts, but the building and the town testifies to their presence. What is characteristic of a dream is the blurring of boundaries of such living and dead realms – talking animals, flying humans, thinking machines. Maybe new orders are to be found in dreams ….. What is most uncanny about a dream is the lifelessness, which goes with the paralysis the dreamer experienced on trying to run away [exemplary dream again].

General nature of dreams:

> All modern theories of the dream, with the exception of Boss and Binswanger, ignore the world-forming essence of the dream ….. The dream is in fact a very model for Schelling's transcendental philosophy ….. We can say that relative to the waking experience, Kant's categories and his forms of intuition provided by time and space are *destroyed* [our italics], with nevertheless fragments remaining ….. On this basis

the dream can be described as a defective waking state ….. a masquerade [*Mummenschanz*] of nature

The question is whether the truth of our human condition is primarily in the waking state or whether it lies in our dreams ….. To answer this we need a geography ….. and an encyclopaedia of the dream world ….. The dream gives the impression of being between nature and art ….. We have the consciousness from our waking perspective that in our dream we are in another land with another language that we don't speak ….. The dream is a representation just like a work of art or a drama or a speech, and is ultimately not one of these but a multiform entity.

The principle of the phenomenology of dream as world and the dreamed beings as beings is not the separation of form and material but their very identity, an identity moreover of ideality and reality, subjectivity and objectivity, and being and meaning ….. A human being who only lived in a dream world would classify beings quite differently from how we wakers are accustomed to – what about the decomposition of the stone in the church [exemplary dream again]. What we find closest from among the arts to this world is architecture. Perhaps God plays a greater role in dreams than do human beings.

The world of the dream is infinite ….. no beginning, always already there, a common world, not a private one, a place of encounter with other human beings ….. Being is stronger than logic ….. It is not possibility conditioning actuality [as in the waker] but actuality creating that which is through the simple fact that it *is* ….. So, in the dream, intuition captures something of the world that the waking intuition is only incompletely able to catch, namely that the world is an identity, not a crude logical similarity, not a negation of negation as is the wont of the waker when confronted with this.

6. Purpose and description of study

The purpose of the study was to evaluate the psychological and phenomenological issues about dreams which surfaced when we reviewed the literature: How common were they? How reliably could they be rated?

Table 1
Rating scale for dreams

dream no. ……. rater …..…

Item		
1. Sensory modality (v, a, o, g, t) * or entirely abstract (ab)	Which?	
2. Colour	Yes	No
3. Content (humans h, animals a, plants p, nature n, man-made artefacts m-m)	Which?	
4. Setting (rural r, urban u, public p, domestic d)	Which?	
5. Familiarity (familiarity of actually unfamiliar)	Yes	No
(or unfamiliarity of actually familiar)	Yes	No
6. Emotion displayed	Yes	No
If yes, what?		
7. Language (any words whatsoever)	Yes	No
8. Consciousness (awareness of dreaming)	Yes	No
9. Immorality (including lack of reasonable care)	Yes	No
10. Anomalous perceptions (people, animals only)	Yes	No
11. Illogicality (impossible or grossly deviant logic)	Yes	No
12. Anomalous spatiality		
- activity quadrant (ru, rl, lu, ll) **	Which?	
- activity direction (n, e, s, w, ne, nw, se, sw)***	Which?	
13. Anomalous temporality (gross violation of natural sequencing or plausibility of temporal flow of events)	Yes	No
14. Anomalous substantiality (impossible metamorphosis or change in identity of one thing, person, or animal to another)	Yes	No
15. Anomalous thingness (impossible or implausible instances of things, people, animals, plants or events relative to such encountered in waking life)	Yes	No
16. Anomalous causality (evidence of grossly implausible or impossible causal effects)	Yes	No

* v – visual, a – auditory, o – olfactory, g – gustatory, t – tactile
** ru – right upper, rl – right lower, lu – left upper, ll – left lower
*** n – north, e – east, s – south, w – west, ne – north east, etc.

One of the authors (J.C.) wrote down, and drew, as much as he could remember of 100 consecutive dreams over 11 months. The evanescent nature of dreams meant that this had to be carried out immediately on waking up.

The descriptions and drawings were then evaluated by the two raters BT. and M.T., independently, according to a checklist devised by J.C. to reflect the phenomenological issues that concerned us Table 1.

The rateable items should be self-evident, except for *anomalous spatiality*, an item which was framed in such a way because of evidence from Hobson[25] that the movement of people or things in dreams had a right-ward and upward directionality along with evidence from the neuropsychiatric literature that hallucinations in schizophrenia[42] and in the hypnagogic state[43] are predominantly situated in the right upper quadrant, and that in an artificial situation created by ECT the world as portrayed in drawings is displaced outwards and to the right.[44]

7. Results of study

These are presented in Tables 2-6 (see next page): respectively, what we shall call the descriptive phenomenology of dreams in Tables 2 and 3, the emotional repertoire of dreams in Table 4, the ontological phenomenology of dreams in Table 5, and a possible lateralized distortion in the spatiality of dreams in Table 6: see next page.

(a) General considerations.

Inter-rater unreliability marred the results. Some of this could have been reduced if raters had conferred beforehand about how to rate each item. Most often the items themselves – e.g. illogicality, anomalous causality – were intrinsically ambiguous. We shall generally work within the framework of the actual results, and rely on reliably rated items. The very unreliability in rating much of the subject matter is itself worthy of note, however, as it is barely touched on in the literature.

(b) Descriptive phenomenology: part 1.

These items were selected to tap the general quality and content of the dream experience, following the leads provided by Havelock Ellis,[23] Calkins,[38] Hobson[25] and von Uslar,[2] in particular.

The results were clear-cut, and confirmed their findings: the dream was predominantly a *visual experience*, sometimes *purely abstract*, and only rarely did olfactory, tactile or gustatory experiences crop up; there was a *dearth of colour*; there was a *profusion of humans and man-made objects*, whereas *animals, plants and natural scenery were strikingly rare* and those that were present were unnatural or dead – see below); the setting was predominantly *urban and public or domestic*, as opposed to rural and private.

(c) Descriptive phenomenology: part 2.

These questions were devised to sample something of the *dreamer's* mental faculties and personal make-up whilst dreaming: Was he aware that he dreamt? Was he prone to immoral acts alien to his waking self? Did he use and understand language, and appropriately so? Were his thought processes illogical? Were there instances of false memories – taking the familiar as unfamiliar or the unfamiliar as familiar? Did he perceive the people portrayed as he would have done were he awake?

The results of this enquiry were as follows, in descending order of reliability according to the ratings.

(i) *The dreamer was rarely aware that he dreamt*. This supports the contention in this respect of Havelock,[23] Hobson,[25] and, in particular, Rechtschaffen,[26] who actually investigated two subjects who claimed that they were aware that they were dreaming and found that their awareness was only partial and only for experiences that occurred just prior to waking.

(ii) The *dreamer's perception* of what appeared in the dream *was anomalous* relative to a waker's in a proportion of instances. Restricting the issue to person perception, there were five examples which both raters agreed upon: a man with hydrocephalic skull and staring eyes; a colleague with a yucca growing out of his nose; a publishing rep with a massive hole in her face where her nose should be; an ex-wife with a face flat like a pancake; and a naked woman unnaturally angular like a cubist paining. No-one, except Hobson,[25] has appreciated this.

(iii) *The dreamer was occasionally immoral*, relative to his waking self, in at least three dreams, these being the only ones where both agreed on this: extracting coins and pocketing them from a broken meter on the street which was for giving money to charity; engaging in an amorous embrace with a woman in front of her husband; holding out right arm as a signal at a roundabout too long, thus confusing other drivers. Freud[19] was the only commentator to draw attention to such immorality.

(iv) *The dreamer used language, heard language uttered by other people, and saw words written down*, in around 50% of dreams. Freud[19] was therefore correct to emphasize the dream's linguistic status. He was also right in pointing out the paraphasias and neologisms involved. Kraepelin's[39] claim that any such anomalous linguistic structures were akin to aphasic utterances in their phonemic and syntactic deviance, already undermined by Heynick's[40] study, is given no support here. The following instance of neologisms, paraphasias and stilted phrases were evident: 'bellimi' (name given to

Table 2
Descriptive Phenomenology of Dreams Part 1
(no. / 100)

	BT	MT	mean
Sensory modality			
visual	88	82	85
auditory	50	42	46
olfactory	1	1	1
gustatory	2	2	2
tactile	0	9	5
purely abstract	7	16	12
Colour	11	11	11
Content			
human	89	84	87
man-made	50	28	39
animal	8	6	7
plant	10	2	6
nature	3	3	3
Setting			
Public	71	62	67
urban	11	15	13
domestic	18	28	23
rural	3	0	2

Table 3
Descriptive Phenomenology of Dreams Part 2
(no. / 100)

	BT	MT	mean
Anomalous familiarity*	5	35	20
Instances of language	48	55	52
Consciousness of dream as dream	2	6	4
Immorality* of dreamer or other *dramatis personae)*	17	3	10
Anomalous perceptions	10	19	15
Illogicality	44	59	52

* = ratings unreliable

Table 4
Breakdown of emotions displayed by dreamer
(no. / 100)

	BT	MT	mean
Any instance	30	23	27
Predominant emotion sole or first Mentioned by rater)			
Positive e.g. pleasure, joy	9	7	8
Negative e.g. sadness, horror)	7	2	5
anxiety / fear	6	8	7
Anger	3	4	4
Surprise	3	2	3
Intrigue	1	0	1
Sheepishness	1	0	1
extreme positive e.g. Wonder, amazement, glee, beauty	5	0	3
extreme negative e.g. disgust, appalled, forlorn, aghast	5	0	3

Table 5
Ontological phenomenology in dreams
(no. / 100)

	BT	MT	mean
Anomalous temporality *	4	33	19
Anomalous substantiality *	4	19	12
Anomalous thingness *	24	52	38
Anomalous causality *	11	52	32

* ratings unreliable

Table 6
Investigation into possible lateralized distortion in dream's spatiality - instan

	BT	MT	mean
predominant activity by quadrant			
RU	8	25	17
LU	1	11	6
RL	4	8	6
LL	3	2	3
predominant direction of activity			
N	1	11	6
E	3	11	7
S	1	4	3
W	3	6	5
NE	3	12	8
NW	1	2	2
SE	1	1	1
SW	1	1	
any N	5	25	15
any E	7	24	16
any W	5	9	7
any S	1	6	4

Aladdin-lamp-like object); 'meadow jacket' (First World War soldier's jacket); 'in this burst of modernity' (uttered by comedian); 'I'm not the meanest man in town' (uttered by actor); 'fly-away Friday' (in a list of things not to do on a chart). These resembled the sort of semantic and pragmatic deviance one encounters in language samples from schizophrenics[45] and from delirious and right-hemisphere-damaged patients, the latter known as non-aphasic misnaming.[46]

(v) The attempt to pin down the nature and incidence of what Calkins[38] had referred to as false memories, and we have labelled as anomalous familiarity, was not a success. In only four dreams did both raters agree on this one instance of the dreamer's dream-wife being unfamiliar and physically different from the waker's actual wife, and three of someone unfamiliar to the waker being taken as familiar by the dreamer). There is clearly something awry going on, however, relative to a waker's way of judging familiarity in terms of physical characteristics, because in several dreams the person deemed familiar was physically different over the time-set of the dream and this did not affect the familiarity recognition. It would appear that the rules determining the link between ascribing familiarity and identity are different for the dreamer from those prevailing amongst wakers.

(vi) Illogicality, regarded by most as the hallmark of a dream, was agreed on by both raters in 31 dreams, with a mean rating of around 50%. Here are two of them:

> A rider in the *Tour de France* is undertaking some archaeological investigation into which *Col* was ridden at some point on a past *Tour* by trying to obtain the letters of the name of the *Col*– possibly a 'g' – from a complicated process of matching the shape of ? a piece of map ? a piece of geological remains with some instrument.

> A lecturer on statistics is trying to explain the principle of probability by using the likelihood of Fleetwood Mac [1960's band] turning up in any list of things.

(d) Emotional repertoire of dreamer.

This result was relatively reliable: in 17 dreams both raters agreed that the dreamer was experiencing emotion, and in 16 of these there was further agreement on what emotion was displayed – positive (joy, pleasure, astonishment at beauty) in 7, negative (sadness) in 2, fear or anxiety in 5, and anger in 2. Overall, each rater recognized emotion in the dream transcript in about one third of the dreams, with the four types above virtually exhausting the repertoire, and with a rank order for any emotion, not just the predominant one: (1) positive 11 (individual raters 14, 7); (2) negative 7 (individual raters 12, 2); (3) anxiety, fear 5 (individual raters 4,6); 4) anger 4 (individual raters 3, 4). Hall and van de Castle,[47] who carried out the most comprehensive 'content analysis of dreams' – five dreams each from 200 students, 100 males and 100 females, two raters – found a similar range and distribution – happy 19%, sad 11%, what they called apprehension 36% and anger 14% - but they included more than one instance of emotion per dream, whereas we rated only the most prevalent. The dreamer, both in our study and in Hall and van de Castle's,[47] departed little from the range of emotions that the waker would probably experience and display on an average day, or from Ekman's,[48] celebrated six universally and reliably rated facial emotions – happiness, surprise, fear, anger, disgust and sadness – *except in one possible respect.* This concerns the issue, championed by Boss,[41] that:

> the dreamer is frequently and intensely in a very definite mood ….. Corresponding to his concentrated mood the dreamer can enter into realms of existence and behaviour all the more vividly.

No-one else has pointed this out, but an intensity of emotion, rarely achieved in everyday, waking life, did occur in a number of dreams in our series. One of Boss' subjects, for example, dreamt of a family dinner with her husband and children, and told Boss that she had never been so unreservedly happy as in this dream except on one single occasion, on her honeymoon. We have tried to quantify this by our categories of 'extreme positive' and 'extreme negative' emotions in Table 4. One rater was disinclined to rate emotions in this way, but one recognized a small but not insubstantial category of these, to which he gave such names as 'forlornness', 'horror', 'being appalled', 'being aghast' and 'being astounded' – hardly the sort of emotions undergone in the course of an average waker's day.

(e) Ontological phenomenology of dreams.

Our purpose here was to break new ground and see whether the insights of von Uslar[2] concerning the radical transformation in dreams of the very building blocks of experience – temporality, preservation of identity, thingness and causality – could be reliably rated. We call this section ontological phenomenology for the very reason that what is at stake is the possibility that the dream is a complete rupture in the rules obtaining in the waker's world-formation. In the event, our hopes for reliable ratings were not fulfilled. Nevertheless, we are still convinced that some such ontological transformations are in evidence, as testified by our high separate ratings of these, and the substantial number which were agreed on.

(i) Anomalous temporality was the hardest to

agree upon – only one dream was doubly rated in this respect:

> My father brings me and others presents. They arrive from the airport after him in a large sack like an old-fashioned postman's sack and feeling from the outside there appear to be some frames or rods inside. Looking inside there is a large bottle of Schweppes lemonade. [This item strikes me even in the dream as an odd present, and there is something odd too, recognized in the dream, as to how the sack got to the house so quickly after his arrival]. Despite his needing to leave almost straightaway he insists on beginning to assemble the frame [which also seems strange, even to the dreamer, because he is in a hurry to be off].

But a further 32 instances were noted by one rater; for example: (1) impossibly sudden shift from a cricket pavilion to a hospital; (2) impossibly moving from one situation to a completely different one – hotel to nappy changing to Tube train; (3) single situation multiplied 10 times in identical fashion – same meal re-eaten 10 times; (4) journey from Hertfordshire to Sussex taking 40 minutes when it would have realistically taken two hours; (5) transport of patients from S.E. England to Cornwall taking days rather than several hours; (6) meeting scheduled for 11 pm in Midlands deemed compatible with a meeting fixed for 11 am next day; (7) transport of travellers from railway station to village two miles away logistically implausible; (8) rapid shift of one situation – dogs entering a room – to another – stuffed dogs on dresser – impossibly abbreviated; (9) drive to find clothes shop in centre of London implausibly taking hours and hours; (10) growth of plant – sweet pea – and growth of beard on dreamer's face visibly noticeable; (11) impossible situation shift from garage to stage set.

The anomalous temporality can be categorized in most of these instances as a telescoping or elongation of a tempo of events which is impossible or grossly implausible when compared with the natural flow of such events. Note that the journeys can be implausibly prolonged as well as abbreviated, and that it is sometimes a hopelessly implausible or impossible estimation on the part of the dreamer rather than an actual event that is the focus of the anomalous temporality, and that sometimes there are rapid, impossible scene shifts, as if the dreamer were filming and his experience a film. Time speeding up, time slowing down, or time ignored as in the snap-shot sequences, would seem to be the prevalent themes. But these do not exhaust the range of what can be experienced. In dream 3 above:

> The dreamer was sitting at a table being served dinner and somehow the exact same scenario was repeated a number of times, probably about 10.

In the psychopathological literature this 'morbid phenomenon' has been described in schizophrenia and labelled 'delusional repetitiveness'.[49] Here is another instance of anomalous temporality, not amongst the 100 rated dreams, but so instructive that it is worth including in our article:

> I am complaining to a policeman that I am dissatisfied with the compensation offered by an insurance company following a smashed windscreen in an accident. I say to this policeman that policeman Boulton [definitely spelt like this in the dream] will be dealing with it in the future and then realize in the dream that this is an event that neither I nor the policeman I am talking to can possibly know about because it is in the future and hasn't been revealed to either of us. Even in the dream this struck me as peculiar. I was further aware in the dream that at the time of the conversation with the current policeman some encounter *had* occurred with P. C. Boulton. [Waker's comments, written morning after – The dreamer's premonition of P. C. Boulton's existence was remarkable because it was combined with a memory of P. C. Boulton in the past. It was as if the dream were going backwards in time. Instead of the waker's framework of an unknown future becoming a known present which itself slips away to become a partially known past, the dreamer was placing known experience simultaneously in future, present and past, certainly violating the laws governing waker's time].

(ii) *Anomalous substantiality* is the name we gave to the variability in identity of some thing, person, animal or event over the time of the dream, referred to, albeit rarely, and without further analysis in the dream literature by the term metamorphosis.[25] There were three doubly agreed instances: thing into another physically different thing crisps into chips); animal into person dog into three dogs then into human triplets); and identity of place into different identity garage entrance into stage set).

(iii) *Anomalous thingness* is the appearance of some object in the dream – which may be human, animal, vegetable or artefact – which has an impossible or grossly implausible make-up relative to anything encountered in the normal, waker's world. This included the instances of anomalous face perception, but was much wider in scope, and although we named it anomalous thingness, to be faithful to von Uslar's notion of altered '*Dinglichkeit*', it is actually tapping the entire issue of anomalous objectification in dreams.

There were 23 doubly rated instances. Excluding pure anomalies of person, this leaves 19. Four were man-made artefacts: nail file for etching numbers on blackboard, a missile-like metal ball, an implausible sofa sleeping half a dozen people, and a crisp/chips sort of food. Four were unrealistic animals: wasps which clumped together, a scurrying red animal with

a hemi-circular fin, thickset and unrealistically large Scottie dog, stuffed dogs on dresser. Two were unnatural plants: a sweet pea growing visibly in front of dreamer's eyes, dead grass blowing about unrealistically. Nine were miscellaneous: psychiatric discharge summary in 'Rasta', theatre seat into which theatre-goer was parachuted, package containing dog and baby, market in London like a casbah with stalls for cobblers, run-down country house with industrial activity of an uncertain sort going on, jersey that could not be got off by dreamer, orange/yellow oil smeared on a sleeper, garage forecourt that led through to a building nothing like a garage, and a piece of ice or stone which a barrister scuddied about on the pavement.

(iv) *Anomalous causality* was doubly rated in nine dreams. There were no obvious subcategories. Here are two of the doubly rated items: bridge game on a cruise ship could not proceed because all the aces had been removed from the pack by Brezhnev, and someone seriously ill needing a blood-stained gauze removed from their body and washed and replaced but at expensive cost and involving a cut in the Arts budget.

(f) Anomalous spatiality. This is given its own section because we thought that we had found a concrete measure of this, adapted from the neuropsychiatric literature, to the effect that in subjects with severely compromised right hemisphere functions – inactivated by ECT[44]– the representation of the objects in their world is skewed to the right upper quadrant of their field of vision. Hobson's[25] analysis of his subjects' pictures of movement in dreams provided a further concrete measure of anomalous spatiality, in that there was a preponderance of right-ward and upward activity.

Our results are quite striking. There was predominant activity in the right upper quadrant, overwhelmingly rated as such by each rater, and there was a predominant north-easterly direction of movement by *dramatis personae* in the dreams.

8. Discussion

(a) The dreamer as sui generis.

What we have demonstrated is that the dream, as experienced by one of us, and phenomenologically analysed by the others, is barely recognizable as the same entity which philosophers and psychologists have incorporated into their frameworks of a waker's world.

How can the dream be a paler, insubstantial or muddled world-view vis-à-vis the waker's experience (2b above), when it is usually as 'realistic' as anything experienced by a waker, sometimes replete with profound meanings to the point of near-epiphany, and generally internally coherent to the dreamer, albeit sometimes puzzling?

How can it be in no essential way different from the waker's experience (2c above), when a man with a yucca growing out of his nose can be blithely accepted, or when a unique experience of having a meal can be multiplied ten times in identical fashion, or when the dreamer can 'see' a sweet pea growing in front of his very eyes?

There may well be assistance from the dreamer into a thorny intellectual problem with which the waker is grappling (2d), as in Kekulé's celebrated example of seeing snakes form a ring, giving him a clue to the structure of the benzene molecule. But this unnatural behaviour of snakes is precisely what we are addressing.

Whether the dreamer is to be deemed dependent on the waker (2a), or a precursor or progenitor of the waker's world (2e), seem to us quite reasonable questions to ask, but the facts that would enable them to be answered are lacking. Consider this dream of J.C.'s, not in our 100 but instructive on this point:

> I am at an overseas conference having just flown in with colleagues. To my astonishment I encounter successively two old friends who were not with our travel group, and whose attendance there, separately, strikes me as a most astounding coincidence. Staring at one of them [who looks exactly as he would do in waking life] *I wonder whether I'm dreaming*, but then dismiss this possibility because his appearance is so realistic.

The dreamer may not know that he can also be a waker, as Scheler and Heidegger stressed, and probably does not know that he is dreaming except in light sleep, as Rechtschaffen ably demonstrated, but here is a dreamer who knows that sometimes he dreams but is not dreaming right now because his experience is so realistic.

Psychological formulations, invoking a redeployment of available mental functions (3a), or the superiority of a waker-dreamer conglomerate of experience over the lone waker's for the edification of the waker (3b), are both undermined by our study. The predominant finding is not that of someone relying on a quantitative increase in, say, memory or reasoning or imagination at the expense of some decrease, say, in attention – as is claimed in several psychological formulations – but of someone in whom each and every mental faculty is itself fractured. Thus, the dreamer's facial perception is awry, his emotional responses are both inappropriately profound or inappropriately bland relative to a waker's in the same circumstances, and his logic and reasoning conform to no known rule of the waker's repertoire. As for attempts by Freud and Jung to recruit the dream for their psychotherapeutic

exercises, these are scarcely credible. How could the experience of seeing a colleague with a yucca growing out of his nose 'compensate', as Jung would have it, for a waker's supposedly unhealthy attitude to life, and render him truer to 'himself' however that is to be measured?

(b) The dreamer as phenomenological puzzle.
What the dreams in our study do demonstrate, on the other hand, is the general correctness of von Uslar's[2] formulation, namely that something about the dreamer's experience of thingness, spatiality and temporality is quite alien to the waker's framework in these respects. The things the dreamer encounters – Heath Robinson gadgets with arcane functions; the dreamer's spatiality – which do not even conform to a three-dimensional matrix, but are concentrated and busy in one sector of this; and a temporality whose anomalous manifestations comprise unnatural acceleration, retardation and staccato sequences, along with natural-time defying repetitions of uniqueness and future-past interpenetrations; all these place the dream in a framework scarcely envisaged by any of the philosophers or psychologists mentioned, with the exception of von Uslar, and, to some extent, Hobson. In fact the portrait of the dream penned so far calls to mind imaginative writers such as Edward Lear, Franz Kafka and Jorge Borges.

(c) The dreamer as compromised knower.
One avenue explored psychologically last century is that the dreamer is not party to a realm of knowledge that is readily available to the waker. Havelock Ellis[23] alluded to it in his account of a dream where one of the *dramatis personae* is unaware that money can be sent to Ireland by postal order. Hobson[25] made 'disorientation' central to his account of dreams, attributing the frequent experience of getting lost in dreams to loss of navigational knowledge. Rechtschaffen's[26] article on 'single-mindedness' in dreams was to the effect that the multiple channels of knowledge available to the waker were unavailable to the dreamer, for example no resources to monitor or remember what is experienced.

We acknowledge that the dreamer *is* constrained or compromised relative to the waker in some respects. We did not evaluate this in our study because the issue only emerged in the course of our literature review in preparation for this article. But consider this dream, not in our 100, but informative enough to be related:

> I am dreaming about the country of origin of the popes. I consider that three or four originated from the city of Medellin in Columbia, which I realize in the dream is not the capital of the country, and find it odd even in the dream that so many popes should have come from such a city. These popes, moreover, were all made popes between the years 1190 or thereabouts (but definitely the 12th Century) and about 1600.

What astonished the author on waking up, and only gradually, was, first, the fact that there had never been any South American popes, to his waking knowledge, and, secondly, the impossibility of there having been any before Columbus reached America in 1492. There is clearly here a complete lacuna on the part of the dreamer of what the waker had known since childhood.

We do therefore recognise the truth in these commentators' remarks as to a compromisation of the dreamer's knowledge, though in what respects, or according to what regular pattern, if any, we are not yet able to say, and, even if any such were identified, we would see this as only part of the phenomenological puzzle of the dream, because in itself it could not be responsible for the altered objectivity, spatiality and temporality that also obtains.

(d) The dreamer as incompetent agent.
In addition to getting lost, which occurs several times in our series, and is made much of by Hobson,[25] which could be put down to lack of topographical knowledge, there are several other ways in which the dreamer fails to negotiate the hazards thrown up in his world. One is what von Uslar refers to as 'not-ready for something' dreams. These were not amongst our 100, but are otherwise common in our experience – e.g. turning up to give a lecture without notes, visual aids, or even the foggiest idea of what one is to say. A second is a naivety about the elements of a situation which would lead to an effective solution or accomplishment. We alluded to this above in the section on anomalous temporality: in several instances the dreamer made unrealistic assumptions about getting from A to B. Thirdly, and this was also illustrated and commented on by von Uslar, the very enactment of a plan is abortive or carried out by the dreamer only with extreme difficulty. In von Uslar's exemplary dream, he is trying to escape the uncanny scurrying of feet, and finds his legs turned to jelly, lame, lifeless almost. This too was not in evidence in our 100 dreams, but is otherwise frequent in our experience. Here is another instructive dream (outside the 100) on this point:

> I am trying to catch a train. I have allocated insufficient time to do this [supportive of points one and two above] but even when I get to the station my legs don't seem to propel me fast enough to get there.

The dreamer as agent is stymied on all aspects of getting things done – fails to grasp the wherewithal

needed for a successful action, goes unprepared, and cannot get his body to achieve the goal.

(e) The dreamer and death.

This theme follows on from the previous one. There is a pervasive sense of lifelessness in dreams. This was quite apparent in our 100 dreams. Of the plant 'life' encountered, only one of the instances rated by either rater was deemed a normal specimen; the others were, for example, 'dead grass or cactus', 'dead grassy substance', 'dead-looking grass blowing about unrealistically in the wind', and 'sweet pea tendril growing visibly in front of dreamer'. Of the animals rated as present, not one was a living example of a recognisable species or breed: 'stuffed dogs on dresser', 'congealed wasps', 'thickset and unrealistically large Scottie', 'scurrying rat-sized animal with hemicircular red fin', 'pieces of cut up snake in snake stew', and 'sneezing chimpanzee in logical problem'.

Von Uslar actually thought that the dream was best characterised as a variation on the theme of death, and kept comparing the exemplary dream of his escape from the church to Orpheus' journey to the Underworld and back. We eschew such analogies, but endorse his insight that there is a pervasive sense of lifelessness in the dream, both in the dreamer's lack of bodily vitality and in the things experienced around him architectural dreams are mentioned as common by von Uslar and are frequent in the dreams of one of the authors here, B.T.).

(f) The dreamer as a source of wisdom.

So far we have emphasised the mysterious or dilapidated aspects of the dreamer vis-à-vis the waker – as unique person, phenomenological puzzle, compromised knower, incompetent doer, and witness of the dead. But the literature throws up claims that the dreamer has unique strengths in the dreamer-waker equation, endorsed by the lay-person who thinks, surely these nightly journeys and scenes must be conveying some hidden meaning for my benefit.

We are sceptical of all such notions: Benjamin's according a prescience to the dreamer; Binswanger's and Foucault's claim that the dreamer is a world-creator prior to the waker; even Descartes' and Leibniz's crediting the dreamer with unique intellectual prowess; and especially Freud's and Jung's belief in the dreamer as privy to potentially edifying and encrypted facts about the waker's 'true' nature.

The overall impression of these 100 dreams on the three of us is of the dream as a banal and parochial affair, sometimes, even, with an old-fashioned flavour – cobblers in a street market being one example. Those overseas or global concerns that cropped up along with their proposed solutions – world food crisis solved by catching up with the world's rotation, water shortage in Portuguese town confined to residents, seemingly innocent men being executed world-wide for causing high tides – were so strange or else their proposed solution was so oddly presented that it beggars belief to think that these, according to Benjamin, might be models for the future, unless the future is to be of a similar ineptitude and nonsensical nature. The same goes for Binswanger's and Foucault's claim that the dream world precedes and conditions the waker's – if so, why is the waker's more focused on some matter in hand? As for the suggestion that the dreamer can solve intellectual problems which have defeated the waker, it is hard to see how a logical problem whose solution relies on the role of a sneezing chimpanzee or the cropping up of Fleetwood Mac in it could possibly provide any Eureka moment for the waker. Reliance on dreams for psychotherapeutic purposes seems to us, on the basis of the 100 presented here, also to have been a false trail.

(g) The dreamer as city dweller.

As we have demonstrated, there is a predilection for city life – shared meals in restaurants, meandering down streets, getting from one town to another, professional meetings in lecture halls and seminar rooms. You might say that this was the particular dreamer's J.C.'s) way of life anyway as a waker, but why no gardening or sports or country walks, which he engages in, and why no birds or proper flowers which he delights in?

Benjamin[16] and von Uslar[2] realized, however, that the dreamer's preoccupations were quite different from those of a waker, and specifically concerned a public arena and cityscapes. Von Uslar's own dreams were rife with architectural displays, and Benjamin's final philosophical project was the dream as a city and the city as a dream.

Why should this be so, if it is so? The dreams of a primitive person unacquainted with cities might provide a clue, as there might be some underlying shared pattern with his modern cousin. Eggan[50] analysed the dream reports of a Hopi Indian over several years and found considerable reference to the dead. It was not clear whether the Hopi's waking preoccupations were substantially different, but the theme resonates with our previous section, and we tentatively suggest that the siting of the dream in cityscapes is secondary to the strikingly dead environment of dreams we have drawn attention to. In short, the city, an unnatural edifice, is an ideal place for the dream to take root in.

(h) The dreamer as everyman.

The dreamer's world is radically different from the waker's, constrained by what knowledge is available, pervaded by a sense of death and decay, and situated in cityscapes which distil the essence of all this. But there is yet a further dimension to the dreamer's world, alluded to by Hobson,[25] and attested to in several of the dreams in our series, namely an unnatural and impersonal perspective on whatever is taking place. In short, the dreamer appears able to be here, there and everywhere, to adopt a third-person viewpoint on matters, a veritable view from nowhere even. Consider this dream, outside our series but instructive on this point:

> I walked past a burnt-out house whose framework was exposed in three dimensions. The stairs were preserved, but with nothing attaching them to the upper floor. It was scarcely *my* perspective [as I realized even in the dream] because nothing was hidden. It was as if the architectural skeleton of the house was simultaneously visible from all sides.

Within our own series, the following dreams were supportive of the present thesis:

> I 'see' a ship speeding down a canal but I am not on the bank but seem to be high up in a building with a view over the whole canal.

> I am ferrying passengers between station car park and village, and simultaneously seem to know what is happening to the ones left behind in the car park as well as those in my car.

> Three places in the Midlands are linked up topographically and I have a view on the links between them but am never in any one of the places.

> I am involved in trying to get from some place North of London to my village South of London but am never actually in either place, not even being anywhere but rather caught up in a theoretical issue of how one might get from one to another.

> I am parachuted into my seat in the theatre from on high.

> The waitress at a restaurant refers to the diners in the third person as 'her sat' or 'his sat'.

It is our contention that some of the peculiarity of the venues and unfolding of events in dreams stems from this very all-seeing perspective.

(i) The dreamer as artist.

This theme, and its inverse, the artist as dreamer, are commonly invoked by commentators, e.g. Massey.

On the inverse point, which we cannot properly cover here, one might merely note that Franz Kafka, generally regarded as the greatest writer of the 20th Century, was a prolific dreamer, and incorporated some of his dreams – 37 according to Hall and Lind[52] – into his stories, whose very titles, e.g. *Metamorphosis*, *Josephine the Singer* or *the Mouse-Folk, The Nature Theatre of Oklahoma*, encapsulate the flavour of a dream and the very phenomenology we are trying to capture here. In fact the term Kafkaesque probably conveys their atmosphere better than any other adjective. Consider this dream from our series:

> Extremely high tides have occurred in various tropical countries. There is a mark like you get on jetties to indicate how high they reached, though this mark is somehow a computation of the average across these countries. One such is Cuba, where a number of men, 10 – 20, are to be shot for their role in this high water, even though none seems to have done anything, either in the way of being responsible for it or in taking advantage of it. It is further quite puzzling to the dreamer how all these men could be collected together from far-flung countries to be photographed and executed. The dreamer is pervaded by a sense of injustice.

What we shall consider here, in more detail, is the former point, the dream itself's resemblance to a work of art. Von Uslar,[2] as we have seen, stressed the architectural motifs, but pointed out, as well, its similarity to a visual work of art, drama and speech, concluding that it was 'ultimately not one of these but a multifaceted entity.'

States[53] saw most resemblance between a dream and poetry, and identified the classical rhetorical devices of the latter – metonymy, synecdoche, irony and metaphor – in the former. We have already drawn attention to the cinematic aspects of dreams. *We* were most struck, however, within this general theme, with the *theatricality* of the dream. There were eight instance of either an actual play taking place (three instances) or of the scene involving someone over-acting their part (five instances): a man trying to produce a novel facial expression something like disdain; seminar leader on the topic of alcoholism making point by inviting seminar to own up to their drinking by making exaggerated gesture of pretending to drink wine; dreamer describing actor by saying 'You're not the meanest man in town' and his replying in a camp manner 'I'm not the meanest man in town'; well-known comedian mimicking another celebrity yawning; public meeting where two women speakers converse with exaggerated verve and panache about the voice characteristics of a man. Not a lot to go on, admittedly, but supportive of an artistic motif in a small number of dreams, and, within that, of drama as the preponderant theme.

How does any resemblance, even if it were significant, between dream and work of art, help in furthering our understanding of the nature of the dream? Benjamin[16] is our guide here, as he had the most developed views on the interpenetrations of life, dreams and art. He himself is not easy to

understand, however, and Friedlander[54] is a most helpful commentator on him. First, however, we need to take a stance on the nature of art itself, without which the dream, which is 'the unknown' in the equation here, cannot be properly compared, and the thinker who crystallized this best, in our view, was the philosopher Max Scheler[55] in this extract from his article on *Metaphysics and art:*

> Knowledge is *comprehension of what is there* – this obtains for metaphysical knowledge as well. Art is *building of what is not there*, but which would be worthy and meritorious to be there according to aesthetic ideas of values…. Art creates a new world of *thisness*, unconstrained by anything to comply with the real world ….. The artist – a small god – begins to create a world ….. not a new real world as a God does. He creates an ideal world which is notwithstanding a concrete and evident world *like* the real one….. from the primal phenomenon ….. represented most perfectly and most purely …..[For] a work of art must be aesthetically of value and *true in essence*….. and every primordial essence is primal phenomenon and idea.

In short, art must be true to the essence of what the world is but not necessarily true to its everyday appearance to the waker.

Now consider the following *aperçus* of Benjamin:

> Dream configuration is an extreme phenomenological manifestation.

> Working through the dream, reality reveals its true surrealist force.[54]

In the dream the rhythm of perception and experience is altered in such a way that everything, even the seemingly most neutral, comes to strike us; everything concerns us.[16]

> The dream turns what is plainest and most boring – the everyday – into something interesting.

> Dream images are the condensation of a broader reality ….. condensation of the phenomenal material into a limited number of contents….. Through that condensation the material acquires its illumination ….. the phenomena come to appear more meaningful than what they would have in fact been ….. It allows the dream to refract in an abbreviated form the world of ideas.[54]

There is some similarity here in these views of art and dreaming, which set both apart from the waker's everyday experience. What both Scheler and Benjamin appear to be saying, or at least what is consistent with what they said, is that if an everyday waker walking down the street meets a dog, for example, that dog could well be a mongrel, common but atypical. But the dog portrayed by an artist, and the dog encountered by a dreamer, will differ from the waker's version by virtue of the distillation of 'dogginess' in one form or other. The artist and the dreamer are both in the business of condensing the nature of 'dogginess', albeit differently in the two cases, and in what way different we don't know, as we are not privy to Scheler's or Benjamin's thoughts on the matter, if they had them, but in any case different from the waker's haphazard encounters with dogs. If this were so, it would provide a neat metaphysical paradigm. The dreamer – and Benjamin scarcely distinguishes the dreamer from the waker's store of memory – would be the repository of prototypical versions of the sorts of people, animals, and things that had originally been encountered by the waker, and would, as his or her life went on, constitute a rich archive which would condition any individual instance that came their way in the future. The artist, intent on honing exemplars to illustrate the essence of something, and the dreamer, somehow with readier access to this archive than the waker, would be natural allies.

Unfortunately, for this thesis, the facts of the matter, in our series of dreams, give no support whatsoever for its validity. In fact, our study points, if anything, to the very converse of this thesis, with respect to dreams, namely that the exemplars of people, animals and things, and even the few specimens of plant life which cropped up, are even *more atypical of their category*, if such category can even be identified in some instances, than anything encountered by a waker. Dogs encountered were 'a thickset and unrealistically large Scottie' or 'stuffed on a dresser'. Plant life was largely 'dry grass'. People might have a 'yucca growing out of their nose', or 'a flattened face like a pancake', or 'black hairy soft skin'. Things included an 'unbreakable glass candlestick', a 'candle-snuffer rack on the ceiling' and a 'nail file for etching numbers on a blackboard'. Even the people's facial expressions were atypical, in one instance being purposely invented by an actor to depict something never before expressed, somewhere between disdain and sang-froid.

In summary, the dreamer-as-artist theme is very problematical. It is almost as if the dreamer is mocking the very notion of his being artistically creative, portraying mock acting and camp actors, cluttering up his dreams with useless and barely recognizable things, and populating his world with deformed people. Whatever the reason for all this is, it makes a mockery of the dreamer-as-artist theme.

(j) The dreamer as encyclopaediast.

As usual, we take von Uslar's remarks as a starting point. He ventured the thought, that were the dreamer never to wake up, their encyclopaedia and classification of matters would be very different from any extant, i.e. waker-oriented, one. This

Table 7
Dream categories and exemplars thereof

	Category	*Category exemplar(s)*
1	Psychiatric exam	Question on liquorice making in 19th Century
2	Residents of town in Portugal	Rule forbidding them, but not tourists, to use water
3	Alcoholics on an island	Three different sorts of alcoholics
4	Commercial enterprises in S. London suburb	Upmarket brasserie and mini-department store doing well, department store and another enterprise going badly
5	Logical problem for solution	Sneezing chimpanzee is clue to solution
6	Seminar on alcoholism	Demonstration of an issue by lecturer's holding up imaginary bottle of wine and asking for participants' alcohol consumption
7	Psychiatric case presentation	Diagnosis made by presenter on basis of sole fact of having presented case
8	Poster with a list of 'don'ts' for would-be writers	List of 'don'ts' exhibited in different sizes of print, different fonts and one with the content 'Fly-away Friday'
9	Places of habitation in Oxfordshire	Three places linked topographically by a road
10	*Cols* ridden in Tour de France	Those whose name matches a piece of map are the clue to the exercise
11	Son's illness	Recovery hampered by writing down the dream about it
12	Fatal accident on zebra crossing	Kangaroo-court inquest convened which is mainly concerned about what to call the crime
13	High tides in tropical countries	Blame attached to a number of men from a variety of countries who are to be executed for it
14	World's food problem	World food held up at one end of world solved by going faster than the world
15	Psychiatric casualties of war	Seven or eight genuine ones and one feigned example identified by his wearing a special jacket under uniform
16	Book royalties	Wiped out because of rule requiring free copies – about 80 – to be donated to libraries in a London borough
17	Estate agents in North London	Best estate agent is one not committed to his job
18	Play	Actors in it make 'B' or 'C' remarks
19	Addresses lived at by friend	Current place would be identified if dreamer could recall whether sofa was free-standing or fixed to wall
20	Arterial roads entering London	Sponsored by pairs of people in order to provide radio service for commuters
21	Quantity of something	Linked in some way to ex P.M. Gordon Brown and greater than it appears to be
22	Car crash	Referred to by one witness as one of 220 similar unreported accidents
23	Reconciliation of adversaries	Achieved by bringing in Hungarian Jews, because of their historical suffering, and represented by a candlestick
24	Treatment of ill person	To be achieved by removing blood-stained gauze from body to be paid for by Government Arts budget

theme overlaps with the issue – 7c above – concerning the knowledge base that the dreamer relies on, but, whatever the dreamer's knowledge base might be, the way in which the dreamer derives concepts and categories, and, further, furnishes exemplars thereof, is quite definitely anomalous.

Consider Table 7 where all the instances of a 'category' and its exemplar or exemplars that were identifiable in the 100 dreams are listed. Some hardly deserve the title of category, but they are at least issues or events which have potentially a number of aspects. What strikes one first is their range – from global problems to parochial events. Secondly, there is a vagueness about them, not easily gleaned from

the list, because the most waker-comprehensible category has been extracted to give any sense to them. Thirdly, the exemplar or exemplars of each category are, in the main, false – liquorice making in the 19th Century is not part of the syllabus for a would-be psychiatrist, or tangential to the category – kangaroo-court only interested in naming the crime, or barely understandable – actors making 'B' or 'C' remarks. What is most striking, moreover, is the ridiculous nature of the exemplars or aspects of the situation, almost as if the dreamer had gone out of his way to invent the *least likely* member or association of the category.

A dream-world encyclopaedia would therefore be the oddest book imaginable on this showing. What comes to mind, in fact, is Borges' celebrated example of an anti-classificatory classification[56] of this very sort, Borges himself, like Kafka, being an avid collector and devotee of dreams:

> In a certain Chinese encyclopaedia it is written that animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) suckling pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camel hair brush, (l) et cetera, m) having just broken the water pitcher, and (n) that from a long way off look like flies.

As in the case of the dreamer as artist nothing in what we gleaned from our series of dreams supports the notion that the dreamer crystallises the essence of something and produces typical exemplars. Von Uslar, himself, vacillates on this. He claims on the one hand that the dreamer is a living example of Schelling's transcendental philosophy, whereby subject and object, and meaning and being, achieve an identity, but also remarks that Kant's 'categories' – the way in which in the waker raw sensory material is moulded into pre-set forms – are dilapidated. It seems to us that the dream, with its atypical and barely credible categories, and the ridiculous exemplars of such already waker-unnatural categories, can only provide evidence for a breakdown in idealist philosophies' core notions, not support for them.

(k) The dreamer as illusionist.

Our final thematic discussion will focus on the instances of metamorphosis and multiplication of the things, animals and people encountered in dreams. These instances, although not numerous – about eight in all – are nevertheless so extraordinary that even one instance would merit some consideration. They take two major forms in the course of a dream: a metamorphosis in which, (ia) some living entity or artefact changes its physical appearance but retains its identity, or (ib) changes identity as well; and (ii) a multiplication in which the dreamt object or the dreamer undergoes multiplication with the same physical characteristics and identity. Examples were given earlier. The whole topic, it seems to us, is a further indication that the dreamer is creating a world completely unlike anything a waker can encounter, because not only does the dreamer fashion his world with sorts of objectivity, temporality and spatiality that normal wakers can barely comprehend, never mind actually experience, but here is the dreamer further confounding the laws of nature by creating things, people and animals, whose stability, 'substance', and identity, over short periods of time, are ephemeral, just as if the dreamer-as-creator were an illusionist who had tricked his audience – the dreamer-as-experiencer – into taking something for something else or something for many exactly identical somethings.

How can this be? It can only be so if the laws determining the creation of 'objects' by the dreamer are completely unlike those conditioning 'objects' by the waker. As a preliminary to any philosophical discussion into the merits of idealism or realism as applicable to a waker, it should be clear that the dreamer is a special case in this respect, and that even someone like von Uslar, who acknowledges the phenomenological distance between the waker and the dreamer, is ill-advised to apply philosophical models designed for the waker to the situation of a dreamer. The same goes for the various psycho-biological suggestions as to the function of dreams reviewed above: the dream is not obviously 'noise' or 'froth' because there is a consistent, albeit waker-alien, pattern to it which we have tried to depict; the dream does have a different 'emotional gear', as it were, from the waker's value-ception of what concerns them, but it is played out in a parallel universe from that of the waker preoccupied largely with satisfying their appetites; the dream, as we have found it to be, is furthermore incommensurate with any consolidation or housekeeping exercise favouring the waker, otherwise why should the dream be experienced in the guise of ontological categories which are quite alien to the waker's *modus vivendi.*

9. Conclusion

Several unexpected points emerged from our study, and we shall end by briefly discussing five of them.

(a) The first surprise was the *extent* to which the dream and extant theories of dreams were such a *mismatch*. There were a few examples of the dreamer as artist, as disorientated voyager, as overzealous reasoner, as compromised knower, and as thanatologist, themes which encapsulate the proposals of the most astute commentators on dreams: Benjamin, Hobson, Havelock Ellis,

Rechtschaffen and von Uslar. But none of these applied to more than a small minority of dreams, and none seemed, intuitively, to capture the essence of the generality of the dreams in our series.

(b) A second revelation was the *sophistication of the dreamer* in certain respects. For sure, the dreamer is sometimes stupid, not to know, for example, that Columbus 'discovered America' in 1492. And, almost certainly, the dreamer is not aware of the world and concerns of the waker, despite some claims to the contrary, and Freud's and Jung's assumptions to this effect. But the dreamer has his or her own problems to sort out, maybe more complex than the waker's, in that people, places and things do not have the stability enjoyed by the waker. Despite this, the dreamer can make a reasoned judgement that he might be dreaming, but is probably not, because of the overriding sense of 'reality'. The dreamer is undoubtedly no fool when it comes to working out what is going on, and shows appropriate perplexity when the ontological situation gets tough.

(c) Thirdly, we were struck by what appeared to be a *systematic failure to follow the rules of categorical membership*. We were expecting bizarreness, and the very aim of the study was to try and dissect what this meant. We were also expecting a corny jokiness, because of anecdotes and our own experience to this effect. But to learn that the dreamer was set an essay on liquorice making in the 19th Century to assess his psychiatric knowledge, along with the other examples in this vein presented in Table 7, made us wonder whether the dreamer's encyclopaedia, as von Uslar termed it, was not constructed along some internally consistent rules, alien to the waker of course, but along the lines of a rule – 'exemplar of category is *least likely* member'. The whole selection of examples could be random, admittedly, as if the dreamer were dipping into a bran-tub and presenting the first item he comes across. But consider Scheler's[57] notion, that, in the realm of the mind, something's not-being-so has just as much weight as any being-so:

> Not being green is an attribute of a swan no less than being white is. In fact for each finite being-so of an object a host of not-being-so's would equally suit it.

Could it be that the dreamer brings up such not-being-so's as if they were a natural part of a concept or category? We are speculating here, of course, but peculiar facts such as we have uncovered here demand bold explanations, and it seems to us that maybe the dreamer's exemplars of things tap precisely the whole gamut of being-so's and not-being-so's, here treated as equally valid, which the waker would consider quite distinct.

(d) The fourth sort of unexpected material thrown up in these dreams was the element of sharedness between dreams and psychopathological conditions such as schizophrenia and certain forms of brain damage. We were quite amazed to discover how much of the experience of someone with right hemisphere damage or schizophrenia cropped up in dreams, respectively, *déja vu*, topographical disorientation, *Zeitrafferphänomen* (things experienced in unnaturally rapid tempo), dressing apraxia; and delusional repetitiveness, paraphasia, paraprosopia (distorted perception of other people's faces). We are inclined to think that the dream is not *sui generis* but has quite strong allegiances to what are usually considered as morbid human conditions. Looking back at the psycho-biological discussion earlier, we are indeed of the opinion that the dream is not much distinct from schizophrenia, and of the neuropsychological hypotheses set out – isolated left hemisphere activity, isolated right hemisphere activity – we are strongly of the opinion that the dream is a manifestation of isolated left hemisphere activity.

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PERSONALISM AND THE FREE MARKET

R.T. Allen

Abstract
The authors' personalist approach to economics and economic policy, which they do not properly distinguish, is rightly suspicious of government control but they do not fully appreciate what free-markets under the rule of law can do. They do not undertake sufficient and careful economic analyses of the alleged abuses and failings of markets, and so suggest remedies some of which are confused or would prove counter-productive.

Keywords
Capital, costs, economic policy, economics, economic theory, economic value, employees, employers, free-market, government and markets, just prices, just wages, labour, markets, markets failings of, needs, person, personalism, personalist, prices, work.

1. Introduction

A Theory of Personalism,[1] by T.R. and R.A.C. Rourke seeks to draw out the implications for politics and economics of the personalism of Mounier, Aquinas, Jacques Maritain, Yves Simon and John Paul II. Although this is an American book and refers to political and economic issues in the USA, it is a contemporary statement of much that is typical also of Latin personalism and Roman Catholicism generally in relation to politics and economics. And so a review of its contents should be of wider interest.

To avoid undue length I shall not comment on the philosophy of the person which the authors present and deploy, which I endorse on the whole, though with some reservations such as the adequacy of Aristotelian and Scholastic ontology for personal existence. Likewise, I shall not comment on their political principles except in respect of economic policy and to state now that I thoroughly endorse their rejection of any idea that personalism should entail an ideological 'one-size fits all' prescription of a particular political system, plus the affirmation that it can co-exist with several but not all (pp. 14, 63).

My focus will be restricted to their treatments of economic questions. Even then I shall restrict to a few general ones my remarks on the authors' criticism of globalisation as a main cause of the economic and ills of the present (Preface, and pp. 113-28). First they seem wholly to condemn it for they ignore the many millions which it has lifted out of dire poverty. Nor do they allow for other factors such as corruption, absence of the rule of law, secure property rights and economic policies that restrict or distort free trade, such as China's 'mercantilist' policy of maintenance of a low exchange for the renminbi, pouring investment into production of exports, building up large reserves of foreign currency and its complete disregard for foreign intellectual property rights. In any case, their case against globalisation is mostly that it magnifies alleged defects inherent in free markets, which in turn mostly consist of examples of 'leonine contracts', where the one party has a monopoly of supply or demand and the other is thereby faced with 'take it or leave it', and the creation and supplying of 'artificial needs' and 'illusory services', both of which will be treated in §3.2 below. Yes, in some cases foreign companies have taken undue advantage of the poverty of the local population in order to pay, by our standards, very low wages for a long day's work, or have used that as a threat to freeze or even reduce the wages of employees in wealthier countries. But the authors do not consider whether low wages are better than no wages, nor suggest how the problem could be alleviated and by whom. Indeed, any measures to make trade less free would affect poorer populations the most. If private or state-owned companies in richer countries are buying up large tracts of land in poorer countries solely to export the produce and if those exports are not surplus to what is needed to feed the local population, then it would be a legitimate restriction on trade if the governments of the latter were to prohibit or restrict it. Likewise restrictions on deforestation to prevent drought and soil erosion and to conserve a rich eco-system. What is needed is a careful examination of each likely and particular disadvantage of greater world trade and not sweeping and uncritical condemnations of it.

As for the authors' alternative to globalisation, that appears to be 'small communities', about which they say little except for favouring an economy primarily of small landowners and specifically family farms, which will be discussed in §4 below. Even large communities may not have the resources, notably sources of fuel and agricultural land, to sustain modern life their populations. Therefore the global division of labour and industries and therefore extensive global trade is an economic necessity. Certainly many 'needs', artificial or not, would have to be forsworn if we were to revert to such an economy, which, by the way, depended upon what we now regard as a high mortality rate to keep the

population from outgrowing its capacities, or upon yet more land to be stolen from the native Americans, or upon emigration as from Ireland.

Instead I shall raise questions about their view of economic science, their economic analyses or lack of them, their somewhat uncritical attitude to certain features of markets, and their use of a 'straw man' of a wholly 'laissez-faire' economic policy, which, perhaps for some American cranks, no one endorses these days, not even Ludwig von Mises. Government policy itself, it is generally agreed, creates via law some fundamental conditions for a free economy, especially in industrial societies, such as limited liability, provisions for bankruptcy, protection against breaches of contract, fraudulent practices, adulterated food and dangerous substances, accidents at work, monopolies and practices that restrict access to markets and fix prices. As Adam Smith said, with authentic Christian cynicism (otherwise known as the Doctrine of Original Sin), 'People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices'.[2] Other reforms may now be desirable and even necessary. But the authors tend to go too far and not to think of the consequences of some of the measures they advocate as the answers to their criticisms. My general conclusion is that free-markets serve persons as persons more and better than they think, and that a free-market should be the default economic policy of government.

2. Comments on the general approach of the authors to economic science and policy.

I shall begin with some general items. First, the term 'capitalism'. Almost universally used, even by Milton Friedman but definitely not by Hayek,[3] this amounts to a surrender to Marxism for it was used by Marx to mean an economy dominated by the holders of capital at the expense of labour. Thus it begs serious questions, and in the works on which the Rourkes draw, one notes an opposition to it, as meaning a market economy, almost equal to that to any command economy.

Next, the scope of economic theory and practice. The authors reject the attempts of an American Roman Catholic school of 'economic personalism' which tried to combine free-market economics with Christian social thought,[4] because it accepted 'the predominance of nonpersonal factors such as the market and the predominance of technique'. As for the former they refer to Mounier as stating that the market or any other system must serve persons, which implies, in respect of the latter that 'economics is inherently related to the broader human good and subject to it', and so economics as 'a technique bereft of moral ends' is impossible (pp. 16-7). This, I suggest, begs several questions.

As for the former reason, what do they mean by 'nonpersonal'? Like 'impersonal', it can apply to two very different attitudes and practices: not treating persons as persons, and treating persons impartially. The law does, or should, treat people in both ways: respectively, as persons by respecting their rights and by seeking to protect them, and impartially, that is, apart from any 'personal' connections to, or attitudes towards, the persons who come before it. Somewhat similarly a market has both 'nonpersonal' and 'personal' aspects. It cannot operate effectively without a system of law which treats participants in it 'nonpersonally' in the second sense, and gives no special treatment to some in the same position as others, e.g. to creditors of the judge or arbitrator, or to companies in which the local 'big man' has investments. Also the prices which a market produces are the 'nonpersonal', because unintended, total results of numerous transactions of individuals and companies, unless they are 'fixed' or largely determined by monopolists, cartels such as OPEC in the market in crude oil, or conspiracies of traders as recently with 'Libor' rates. Equally, the operations of a market are 'personal' because it is persons, either individually or as determining the policies and actions of companies, who buy and sell in it. Even when prices in stock and commodity exchanges are determined by the computer programs of the traders, the decisions to use those programs instead of their own judgment are definitely personal ones made by those traders.

Nor are markets the only form of 'nonpersonal' unintended mass results of many personal judgments and actions: so too are those of elections, unless they are rigged. Therefore if the Rourkes wish to eliminate 'nonpersonal' market forces, then that can mean only that they intend prices to be 'personally' fixed by a central authority, and thus to create a wholly 'command' economy. In any case, all this is a fantasy because as von Mises showed,[5] without a market to fix at least some prices to act as data for others, no *calculation* of prices could be made, only the totally arbitrary allocation of prices, or rather their elimination and of any way of measuring efficiencies and inefficiencies. Furthermore, as Michael Polanyi showed, any attempt at a centrally planned economy would soon outstrip the span of attention of any one person or any group.[6] Indeed, in this respect a market is the *least* nonpersonal form of an economy above that of self-sufficient households.

As for economics being more than a 'technique', that is exactly what it needs to be to be of wider

value. *Economic theory* is, or should be, the *pure* science that attempts to explain the workings of an exchange economy where money acts as a means of exchange and measure and store of value and thus where prices, determined by the balance of supply and demand, can guide decisions. 'Value' in economics is necessarily 'subjective value', what people are actually willing to pay ('effective demand') when they buy and to receive when they sell. Prices indicate to buyers and sellers what and where they can most efficiently deploy their resources. A rise in price is a sign to producers and sellers that there is an increase in demand or shortage of supply for the relevant product or service in that place, and thus where they can get more for it, and conversely a fall in price is a sign to buyers as to where and what they can get more for their money or to producers and sellers that demand has fallen. That is how a market works, and how, in general, it will direct goods and services in the most efficient way and avoid money, time and effort being spent on what is not effectively wanted and on not being spent on what is. *Applied economics* is the theoretical and practical *use* of the theorems of the pure science to formulate general policies for dealing with problems that arise, such as unemployment and inflation, to understand better actual events such as the current recession and signs of recovery, and, in the light of the former, to suggest concrete policies to deal with them.

As for *economic policy* that is what any individual, group, organisation and authority decides to do in the way of gaining and using resources, whatever notice may or may not be given to or made of economic theory and applied economics. It is at that point that wider views of life and conduct, such as Personalism, inevitably come into play, and to be effective, unless inherently incoherent or blind to our situations in this life and this world, need to take at least some basic economic principles to heart. History, unfortunately, is littered with examples of people, organisations and governments that have not done so, and have either come to grief or resorted to criminality as a result. On the one hand, *economism*, as the reduction of all values and principles to purely economic and thus monetary ones, is to be condemned as the authors state, and it also ends up as counter-productive because sooner or later people revolt against being treated as merely economic units. On the other, to identify economic science, pure and applied, in general and free-market economic policies based on it, with economism, is an equally serious error, which also ends up as counter-productive when productivity declines, waste accumulates and the money runs out because basic economic principles have been rejected.

The general point is that everyone and every organisation, commercial or not, in any economy that, by means of the division of labour and extensive exchange of goods and services, has gone far beyond the poverty of self-subsistent households, needs to read the signs that are prices and changes in them. The principles of economics, explaining the creation and changes in prices of anything traded regardless of non-monetary values or disvalues, have irreplaceable value in doing just that, and so enabling prudent conduct of private and public business instead of blind or irresponsible squandering of resources. They reveal in respect of resources the limits and costs and profits of actions and policies. Other costs and profits there may be, such as family disruption, and economic science can point to their economic costs in turn, such as what the state then spends on dealing with increase juvenile delinquency, and next to the comparative economic costs of ways of dealing with them, such as are being done now in respect of welfare provision and reform in Britain. Equally, a management that consults and listens to its employees will generally be more efficient and profitable both directly by improving procedures and indirectly by making their employment at least more for the employees. It pays to treat them as persons and not as mere 'hands'. But that can be established only by a genuinely economic analysis that sticks to its proper task of revealing how prices are determined. Personalist policies require a neutral science of economics, just as they require a neutral accountancy to calculate the actual costs, returns, profits and losses, and that in turn requires a neutral mathematics. It is very true that not everything is a matter of economics (p. 132), especially the most important things in life, but everything has its economic aspect and so a clear-eyed, carefully thought out and evidenced-based economic science is invaluable in the modern world instead of rash and undiscriminating reactions to economic events.[7]

Finally, I shall consider the meanings of 'need', 'real needs' and 'artificial needs', terms which the authors use without properly defining them (e.g. pp. 121,132), as when they state that advertising and marketing create 'artificial needs' (p. 129). For A to need B, B must be necessary for A to do C. Consequently we need to know who is A or who are people of that sort; what is the C that they wish to do; and why B and not something else is necessary for it. For example, when I was working I often needed a car to get from home to work, the distances being too far to walk or even cycle, and there being no convenient public transport. Now all this presupposes certain desires: to work and not to be unemployed; to work at doing D rather than at anything else available to me; to work at place E

rather than anywhere else where I could do the same sort of work; to live at F rather than anywhere else within commuting distance from D; and to put myself about only so much in going from F to E and back, e.g. not to take twice as long by bus or not to get wet and cold in bad weather by cycle. Therefore if some 'needs' are 'real' and others 'artificial' that can be only as arising from desires that are themselves respectively 'real' or 'artificial'. Furthermore, needs are not the same as wants or desires: to alleviate my heart conditions I may need to take some regular and vigorous exercise, but I may be loth to do so.

The question now arises as how 'real' and 'artificial' desires are to be distinguished. It seems appropriate for any version of personalism to suggest that real desires and thus real needs are those that would truly constitute our personhood. That would certainly rule out any crude biological reductionism and its limitation of 'needs' and desires, or rather 'drives', to those for food, drink and sex. In any case, higher animals, especially predators, also need activity and gregarious ones companionship and even friendship. Moreover mankind is essentially transcendent of mere nature, and lives primarily in an 'artificial' and cultural world which we create, inherit and modify. Indeed, to have a notion of the 'natural' world, that unaffected by human action, is itself 'artificial'. Only the poorest people in all cultures wear mere clothing: the vast majority 'dress' themselves in clothes with some sort of style and decoration. Likewise with food, housing, tools and all the conveniences of life. Nor is life, even for those in the severest conditions, entirely given over to the satisfying of merely biological needs. Play, games, story-telling, conversation, rituals, singing, carving, painting, dancing, other crafts and arts, companionship, love and friendship — all these and more make life worthwhile. So also do the poorest people, even in hard times, sacrifice some 'necessities' to be able to enjoy a little 'treat' or 'luxury', as George Orwell discovered when preparing *The Road to Wigan Pier* in the 1930s.

So do I *need* the books on my shelves, the model railway in my garage and garden, my life-membership of a county cricket club, and so on? Are my desires for them 'real' or 'artificial' ones? Obviously, I could live without them, but is mere subsistence the goal of life? We need some way of distinguishing them which the authors do not supply. Nor do they say what they would have done about those that are 'unreal' and 'artificial'. Would they have them prohibited or severely restricted, and if so how? Simply by price so that only the well-off can indulge in them, or by rationing? Would any democratic government be able to do this? Perhaps democracy is itself an unreal or artificial 'need', and should be replaced by the dictatorship of the wise who can draw up lists of what is real and unreal, natural and artificial, and have the power to ban the supply of the latter in each case.

The only workable general distinction that I can think of is between desires that can be really satisfied and ones that cannot. In many cases that will obviously vary from person to person, and we have to find out, each in his own case, what does and what does not. I find nothing in contemporary fiction, except certain detective stories, to be satisfying, and little in chamber music of any period, yet others do. Nevertheless, certain desires can lead to self-destruction by becoming addictions: indulgence in alcohol, mind-changing drugs, revenge, hatred.

Otherwise, it is a matter of particular circumstances, ways of life and urgencies. During the war, we were severely rationed in the way of food (but not vegetables and bread), clothing, coal and petrol, industries in the way of metals, paper, other materials, fuel, etc. But cinemas and theatres (except in London until the end of the Blitz in Spring 1942) were allowed to stay open, for some relief from the war was a necessity, as was the wireless. Likewise victims of natural disasters immediately need food, drinkable water, medicine, medical treatment, shelter and sometimes clothing, to restore health and maintain life. Later they need help to rebuild their dwellings, businesses, pubic utilities and former way of life generally, or something like it.[8]

As for advertising, its real fault is to make false claims, as the advertisers for a certain malted-milk beverage invented 'night starvation' for which it was claimed to be the relief, rather than proclaiming its genuine tastiness And in Britain we now have legislation which makes such claims challengeable in court.

3. Chapter 4: 'The Person and Political Economy'

3.1 The requirements for a personalist economy.

Following on from the outlines of their personalist philosophy and its political application, the authors open Chapter 4 with what is then needed for an economy, which can be summarised as follows:

1. It must be 'grounded in, subject to, and in the service of persons'.
2. It must have 'the fullest participation possible in the production, distribution, and enjoyment of goods and services', and so 'the person must retain sovereignty over the means of production and well as the organisation and direction of work'.

3. The economy is to be 'for the sovereign people, not the people for the economy'.
4. It must promote 'solidarity as well as autonomy', both of which are essential to the person.
5. It must foster 'the communities closest to the person, such as the family and local community'.
6. 'These communities should be relatively self-sufficient'.
7. It must promote 'a living wage' for wage-earners.
8. It must ensure justice in exchanges between workers and owners, and between sellers and consumers.
9. As part of the common good it must never 'compromise the integrity of the political order', and so political authority must be able to set its limits (p. 113).

When surveying the application of these requirements, we need to ask if and how far each is possible; if they are consistent with each other, and how they could be adjusted in the light of the overall aim; and if there are alternative and perhaps better ways of implementing them. I suggest also that it is especially important to see what is meant by particular terms. For example, 'distribution' could mean simply what it does in statistics, namely, in what quantities or proportions does something happen to appear across a given field. Or it does it mean the allocation by one or more persons of something to others? Collectivists too easily slide from describing the former to advocating the latter which implies control by a central authority.

I shall now examine their diagnosis of what they take to be faults with markets but, as already stated, I shall say no more about the opening attack on globalisation, and move straight to the second section, 'The Person and Political Economy I: Principles of Justice', which in fact applies requirement 8 in the above list.

3.2. 'The Person and Political Economy I: Principles of Justice'

The 'principles of justice' include those 'governing production, social justice, and owner-worker relations, and the meaning of work'. In turn they are taken to mean that what is produced is not only 'wealth', such as property, homes, cars or money as a means to those other means, but the good of the person, 'the ultimate measure of what is good or bad in the economic order' (pp. 128-9). It would be difficult to quarrel with that, and I shall certainly not indulge in the self-contradictory defence of free markets, as by von Mises, which asserts that there is no genuine 'good of the person' other than what people want and their freedom to produce and buy it.[9]

But, they claim, this wider good of the person is now undermined by the separation of production and use (p. 129). Incidentally, that is precisely what Marx meant by 'alienation', why he condemned 'capitalism' as based on it, and envisaged a universal socialism as the only system free from it. Production for use means production for 'immediate' use, not in the sense of the absence of a temporal gap but that of intermediaries who buy the product and sell it to the consumer or to other intermediaries until it reaches the final user. In other words, production direct for consumption, in which profit is subordinate to service, otherwise service is subordinate to profit when it is for exchange with intermediaries who buy and sell simply to make a profit by so doing. Yet, perhaps somewhat begrudgingly, they allow that markets (p. 129) and merchants (p.130) do have a place, and are not as bad as State control.[10]

What evidence do they have for these assertions about production for use versus that for profit? For an example of profit subordinate to service they give that of a small businessman who knows his customers and so directly serves the needs of his community in more than merely business relations. But now in the globalised economy, 'profit-making emerges as the primary motivation independently of serviceability to the real needs of people' (p. 129). But our small businessman is a retailer then his merchandise will have come to him indirectly from one or more chains of producers and wholesalers and thus, it is alleged, primarily for profit. Even if he is directly selling his own products to his customers he would have to purchase his materials such as wood, metals, screws, paints and varnishes. Moreover, his community may be too small to support his business and thus he also would have to sell to customers outside it via the internet. Indeed, I would argue that villages need small industrial parks where inevitably all the businesses would be trading more widely. Likewise the village shop often cannot compete, not only on price but also on range of products, with the supermarket in the nearby town, and likewise the shops in the town centre with other and yet bigger ones in retail parks outside it and easier of access for those in cars and shopping for the week or longer. Which of these can better serve the needs of its customers? Perhaps one form of service has to be weighed against another and each suits a particular group of people or the same people at different times and in different places. For example, small retailers in towns can survive by offering more choice in just one product such as wine, cheese, tea and coffee, or exotic foods, or price-range such as expensive clothes, or as 'convenience shops' for people who just need the

odd item of frequently purchased groceries, while their customers make the bulk of their purchases at the supermarkets. Certainly the question is more complex than may at first appear.

Moreover, in respect of the other aspects of service, the presence or absence of competition can make a real and difference. The only grocer or butcher in a village, when transport to the town was too expensive for frequent shopping and few people had fridges, could get away with a begrudging attitude or some sharp practice, as our butcher, a nice chap, would always cut more than what we asked for and charge for it, and, my mother suspected, would save the better cuts of the same meat for his better-off customers. Conversely, on the wireless recently the head of a family-owned chain of shoe- and watch-repairers and key-cutters, explained that his response to the purchase of a rival chain by a company with great reserves could be only that of competing on service, which he did by 'upside-down management' and giving much greater freedom to those who operated the shops and removing those who performance was below par. The profit-motive at the lowest level improved service and profits all round. Honesty and service seem to be also the more profitable.

The authors also claim that from the separation of profit and service arise 'illusory services', those in which producers make profits but consumers lose when sellers persuade people to buy what they don't need and may not be able to afford (p. 129). I have already discussed the problems of the use of 'need'. Now I would point out that it is not 'advertisers and marketers' who are solely responsible for this. Besides the fact that some people, and perhaps most or even all of us at some time or other, without any prompting by salesmen or adverts, buy things on impulse which later they don't want, government policy may yet again exacerbate or fail to reduce this problem. The authors cite the record number of foreclosures and personal bankruptcies in America in 2003 as a result of taking mortgages which the borrowers could not afford: it proved even worse in 2008. Yet this was also the result of government action in two ways: the decision of Clinton when President to instruct Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to extend mortgages to very low-paid people, and of successive administrations to spend beyond revenue and, in unthinking Keynsianism, to rely on Alan Greenspan at the Federal Reserve to continue lowering interest rates to provide cheap money and thus prevent the unemployment which retrenchment would incur. Without that, and with similar policies here by Blair and Brown — a massive deficit and debts, low interest rates which permitted excessive private borrowing, and a new system of oversight which failed at its first test — the financial crash would not have been anywhere near as bad as it was. After all, Canada, so closely aligned with the American economy, was hardly affected by it, having sorted itself out a decade previously. Again just as the authors allow that legislation can control fraud and the sale of dangerous goods, so government can reduce the effects of being pressed to buy by setting 'cooling off' periods for payment or return of goods bought at the door or on-line. All these are legitimate measures which could also maintain people's confidence in markets. But to try to protect adults even more would be to treat them as irresponsible children and to keep them like that. Freedom entails the freedom to be irresponsible, to ignore 'caveat emptor' and the limits of what one can afford: in other words, to grow up by making mistakes and learning from them, or not to do so. Because every economy and market is created by persons, they can go wrong and those engaged in them can act badly. We are neither infallible nor sinless. Ultimately, it is not markets, nor industrialisation, nor globalisation that are to blame for poor service, trashy goods, unrepayable debts, and the like, but ourselves, and free markets disperse power more than any alternatives, which in any case can only restrict the scope and size of markets and never eliminate them.

Another set of ills they claim, following Yves Simon, to be consequent upon the separation of profit from service are those of 'one-way exchanges' in which one party benefits and another or the whole community loses. First are those where profit results from a mere change in prices, so that the producer, merchant in the middle or retailer at the end, having bought something at one price can then sell it at a greater price than he otherwise would, or that is what I take them to mean (p. 130). In other words, one of them benefits from 'windfall profits'. Yet so also would those who sold to him if they had done so later. Equally we can all make 'windfall losses' when the price drops and we have to sell at a loss, like those stuck in 'negative equity' in their houses who then wish to move, or when we put off refilling the petrol tank only to find that the price has gone up. Steady rather than volatile prices would seem to be a better state of affairs. But what do the authors propose to do about them? Institute price controls, which both prevent any adjustment to changes in supply and demand and replace the rule of law by arbitrary decisions by the appointed authorities as to what the actual prices are to be? Or, what governments like to do, and tax windfall profits? And then what about what they never do: pay compensation for windfall losses? These questions they neither raise or answer.

Next they turn to two other examples: what used to be called 'asset-stripping' and which they call 'extractive investments', and purely or mostly 'speculative' trading. (Again, five years later they would have had more to say about the latter.) Extractive investment consists in the purchase of a genuinely productive asset and then 'discarding' it for profit (pp. 130-1). By 'discarding' I assume they mean closing it, otherwise it would be an ordinary purchase and resale. It happened here 40 or so years ago when the value of land significantly increased. But the 'asset-stripper' could make a profit out of this only if there were buyers who thought they could make more profits from it than were being made by the existing business, and hence there would be an increase in economic value and otherwise a misuse of a valuable resource. Of course, the asset-stripper or his customer could be mistaken and there would be an overall loss, but life and business are like that. The moral of such stories is that the present owners or lessees of sites that are increasing in value should watch the market in land, seriously consider moving their businesses to cheaper premises, and then themselves make a profit from the change of use while giving the purchasers also a chance of so doing, instead of leaving it to the asset-stripper or 'extractive investor'. It is poor economic analysis which creates a problem, not a legitimate set of exchanges.

As for 'speculative', all trading, all economic activity, is 'speculative' in some sense, especially when prices are volatile because of sudden changes in supply or demand. Thus the price of diesel and petrol will rise if the members of OPEC cut their supplies of oil or if a natural or man-made disaster interrupts a vital link in the supply chain. Similarly, a retailer of women's clothes may be caught with too much unsellable stock by a sudden change in fashion. What is called 'speculative' trading is that which is more speculative than other forms, such as using the difference on the stock market or commodity exchanges between the date of a sale and payment for it in order to make a profit by anticipating a change in price without having to own the item in question, and indeed, to use borrowed money to do so before one has to repay it or pay the interest. Again, those traders are also liable to make losses. The danger of such trading is that a dealer will not only bankrupt himself but also those who have financed him, as a 'rogue' trader in Singapore brought down the long-established Barings bank which employed him, and a similar one in Paris incurred great losses for his bank. In both cases, and others, the banks concerned failed to check what their traders were doing. If people are careless and reckless, then sooner or later they will injure themselves and others. Even if laws are passed to regulate such activities, Juvenal's old question arises yet again: Who will regulate the regulators, or oversee the overseers?

The authors also cite derivatives and hedge funds, and could have added currency and futures markets, as purely speculative and thus wholly 'parasitic' trading which sucks money out of the real economy. Yes, much of this is sheer gambling for what can be high stakes. But these devices and markets do provide real services for businesses, without which they would not have been created in the first place. Futures markets assure buyers of a definite price at given date, and thus security in the meantime, as for buyers of grain when the harvest comes in. Yes, they could have made more profit if the price were to rise, and equally they would have made less or even an overall loss if it had fallen. They trade the chance of the former for security against the latter. Likewise, hedge funds offer businesses fixed exchange rates for currencies at future dates, and thus the opportunity of trading the chance of a favourable change in rates for avoiding an unfavourable one. Both are forms of insurance just like those for houses and contents, cars, travel, sickness and death. Again, as do ordinary insurance companies, hedge funds invest their profits elsewhere to make more profits from financing businesses which they expect to be profitable in turn. 'Parasitic' speculative trading is a risk, and a possible cost, incurred by these extensions of ordinary insurance services. The question that arises is not, How can we eliminate them?, as implied by the Rourkes and their citations from Simon, but, How can we reduce the risk of failures that have wide consequences? Governments are reviewing possible answers, one of which is to separate the 'casino' operations of banks from their other functions, but this may not work. Two others, which are being deployed, are to require banks to hold larger capital reserves so that they less likely to fail, and opening banking to more competition so that the existing big ones cease to be 'too big (to be allowed) to fail'. Again, it is failure to study how markets actually arise and operate that results in the wrong reactions and thus failure to ask and attempt to answer the right questions. Surely a self- proclaimed 'personalist philosophy', by engaging in some genuine economic analysis, ought to recognise what real persons actually do and the ultimate role of their personal responsibility for their actions.

Another form of unequal exchange which they discuss is that of wages. They claim it is 'increasingly the case around the world that workers must simply accept the wage offered, regardless of the relationship between the wage and the cost of

living'; that this a form of servitude; and that workers must not be considered as mere commodities governed by the 'impersonal laws of supply and demand' (p.131). How far the first statement may be true, and how far that in turn is due to globalisation as they also claim, I shall not attempt to answer, save to state again that globalisation has offered the populations of poorer countries many more chances of work than before, although often of a dull and repetitive nature and at low rates by any standards. The authors do not consider whether that may be better than no work and no wages, and that the competitive edge in wage-costs of such people may be the very factor that begins to lift them out of dire poverty. True, no one should be treated as a mere commodity but defiance of supply and demand will only incur worse conditions later. Other forms of 'job-saving' end up as job-aborting and job-destruction as uneconomic enterprises eventually fail or are kept going by subsidies at the expense of profitable ones and other taxpayers, by inflationary stimulations of demand, or tariffs at the expense of consumers, and thus of other workers on whose products or services that money would have been spent. This is precisely what happened in Britain in the 1960s and '70s, to be corrected at greater cost than otherwise in the 1980s.

'Unequal contracts' in which the one party has little bargaining power and the other can more or less dictate the terms of exchange or employment, are also 'leonine' ones. Lack of alternative employment, inability to move elsewhere and monopolist employers all give employees only a Hobson's choice of take it or leave it, like it or lump it, work or starve. There may be no easy way out of such situations, unless they are themselves the result of legislation and government policies, such the massive building post-war of subsidised Council housing combined with rent-control for ordinary private housing continued from the First War which trapped families in the areas where they lived because there was no affordable private housing anywhere and every local authority required so may years residence in its territory in order to qualify for one of its Council houses. And that often meant that their children were trapped in the 'catchment areas' of poor state schools. So also do laws enforcing minimum wage rates bring about less employment unless they do not exceed the market rate.[11] It is always necessary to work out what may the counter-productive results, especially upon other groups, of seemingly benevolent policies.

The last item in this section is work, specifically the lack of solidarity among workers who are in competition with others and know that a 'corporation' can always move to where wages are lower, and who have no sense of the 'genuine social fruitfulness of their work' but think solely of what they will earn, so do not experience work as a common good, and hence they are bored by it (pp. 131-2). But is it correct simply to assume that employers and employees are necessarily in conflict with each other and have no common interest and hence solidarity? The example I gave above of agreement to save jobs in the recession by short-time working and other measures, proved that both parties had and recognised a common interest in avoiding redundancies, and also showed solidarity within the workforce rather than division into full-time jobs for some and no jobs for others. A management that treats its staff properly has a more productive workforce and one that is more likely to stay with it. Conversely, rapid turnover is a sign of bad management, either in poor attitudes towards or treatment of their employees or in processes and systems which frustrate them. For if employers can move, then so can employees unless government policies handicap them, as also instanced above, or if there is no alternative employment. Irrespective of any sense of its social fruitfulness, some work is or can be inherently interesting and other sorts boring, especially that which consists in 'small repetitive movements', that is, on a conveyor belt, or that in security and standing just watching people or sitting and staring at computer screens. One effect of automation and IT has been to reduce the amount of such work in industrial economies, which increasingly need more highly skilled workers and offer more varied work.[12] True, such work may then be moved to poorer countries with low wages and long hours, but, again, is that better than no work? It is too easy for people who have never experienced real poverty to condemn something which may be dull and tiring but enables those doing it to feed themselves and their families, perhaps for the first time. In any case, I suggest that what matters to most employees is what they earn, their conditions of employment, how far they like their work, how they get on with their colleagues, the attitudes towards them of their superiors, and the atmosphere of the whole concern: in short, concrete benefits and disadvantages, and not a vague 'social usefulness'. Or do not a reasonable wage and conditions, some interest in one's work and a good atmosphere at work, themselves count as being 'socially useful' in a genuinely personalist perspective?

So far, some genuine problems of extensive market economies have been mentioned but their real causes have sometimes not been properly analysed, their advantages and disadvantages not properly weighed, and some of their uses ignored in

discussion only of their corresponding abuses.

The authors draw six general conclusions for economic policy so that 'economic organisation' is 'accountable to the people'.[13] These conclusions repeat the principles enunciated at the start of the chapter, as in §3.1 above, and add some proposals for implementing them.

In sub-sections (1) and (2) they allow that markets exhibit 'subsidarity', the principle of making decisions at the lowest possible level, as against State control, but do not cater for many human needs nor always properly distribute goods and services, as to the poor. State policies can provide for the latter, as with tax allowances for dependent spouses and children. But the state's involvement discourages creativeness and personal respons- ibility, and there have been other ways of doing this, such as mediaeval laws and customs that allowed free access to common resources such as land, forests and water (pp. 132-3). All this is well said, except for the last part, which cannot be applied in the heavily populated world today. In any case, what everyone or no one owns, nobody looks after, whereas the private ownership of property gives incentives for conservation and improvement. For example, in Britain common land was overgrazed and did not allow for the selective breeding of animals, begun by Robert Bakewell in the 18th C. Whatever injustices were involved in enclosures and however they might have been avoided or ameliorated, they were a necessary prelude to the agricultural revolution and the feeding of a growing population.

Next in (3) the authors recommend co-operative enterprises which return profits to their members and lament their decline because 'capitalism' has made people over-reliant on wages for income (p. 133). But consumer co-operatives flourished when incomes were low and the range of products small and so the members wanted more or less the same things. In any case they paid only small dividends which were no substitute for any part of the low wages of a farm worker such as my father at that time. Thus in Britain after the end of rationing in the early 1950s the local societies became absorbed into the larger ones and finally into one national chain which operates like the other supermarkets, because they could not compete in either price or range with the other retailers.[14] Producers' co-operatives may work for small vineyards in France who cannot individually afford to make, bottle and sell their wine, but I doubt if they have more than a few viable applications to other businesses. The point is that in a free-market economy people can try to create them and see if there is effective demand for them, just as they can for 'organic' produce and 'Fairtrade' products.

The same goes for the authors' following suggestion that utilities and urban public transport be partly owned by their users (p. 133). Indeed, because a constitutional and free state requires a wide diffusion of power and ownership to give as many people as possible a real stake in it, more experiments of this kind should be undertaken, especially when enterprises owned by the state or local government are privatised, though often owners of small numbers of shares are likely to sell them because of the relatively small totals of dividends that they receive.

But the sub-section (4) unfortunately contains some serious errors. It begins with the ominous statement that 'prices and wages must ultimately be linked to a morally adequate assessment of human needs'. The authors admit this can never be perfect and that the market price can serve as a just price when the parties are 'reasonably equal and free', that is, when their contract is not a 'leonine' one. Following Simon, they state that a just price is (a) the cost price and (b) one sufficient to provide capital for future investment and nonmarket distributions according 'to needs and free distributions', that is, to those who cannot afford what they need.[15] Hence they think it unjust that that a eighteen-year-old who has never worked can get millions of dollars from a manufacturer of trainers for advertising them; that those on a living wage prefer to pay low prices from which others cannot earn an adequate income; and that entertainers, athletes and speculative dealers receive huge rewards while other go hungry and farmers lose their lands, all in the globalised economy (pp. 133-4).[16]

Yet how can a 'just price' be calculated? All the components mentioned are themselves prices and the sums of other prices: not only is the cost price the sum of the prices its materials and labour, plus something 'sufficient to provide capital for future investment and nonmarket distributions according "to needs and free distributions,"' but so are the prices of those materials and labour for they have to be computed, and also, in this tree of regresses, those of the somethings 'sufficient to provide capital for future investment and nonmarket distributions according "to needs and free distributions"' involved in their production. In other words the price of any article or service rests upon whole networks of other articles and services and their prices. So either its 'just price' is a fiction or it is either the market price unqualified or what would be the market price apart from a 'leonine contract'. And the latter we may never be able to compute, unless there is a market price for roughly the same item among roughly similar people in roughly similar conditions but

without one side being able to dictate it. In such a case we can only say that a leonine seller could afford to take less and a leonine buyer to pay more. Ultimately the problem is the same as that of the economy of 'production for immediate use' without any 'commodity production for exchange' which is the goal of Marxism: that it would require, as von Mises showed, a market economy somewhere to set prices for it.[17]

Let us suppose that a more limited aim is chosen, namely a 'prices and incomes policy' to determine those goods and services which supply 'needs' and to calculate 'just prices',[18] for them, and to compile a list of occupations and to set 'just prices', that is, wages and salaries, for them even though such prices would necessarily be based on ones whose justice or injustice would not have been computed and amended accordingly. Would that at least bring some rough justice to the market? It is unlikely because of, first, the products and services which are not in the list of those needed. Are they to be banned, strictly rationed or left to the market? If the last, then producers and providers of services will move to providing for them where prices and profits are likely to be higher, and even more so if, as justice and the resentment of the lower-paid would demand, maximum as well as minimum rates for wages and salaries are to be fixed. In any case, maximum prices for products and services drive them away, and minimum ones for wages and salaries abort employment. Consequently, maximum profits for companies and rewards for the self-employed would have to be set and the surplus removed by 100% taxation above them. That would also satisfy the authors' outrage at what popular entertainers, 'supermodels', Champion League footballers, and 'celebrities' generally receive (pp. 133-4). Though it would also greatly improve popular culture, as the Rourkes would doubtlessly wish, unfortunately no democratic government would dare to attempt it. Second, such any prices and incomes policy would be thrown off kilter by changes in the prices of imports and imports, for no industrial economy can be autarkic. Again, techno- logical and other innovations reduce some costs, increase demand for what they make cheaper or create it for new products and services, or replace existing and dearer, less effective or less convenient ones. Some resources diminish while others are discovered, populations increase or decline, and desires and tastes change. All proposed alternatives to a free market economy — centrally planned production; Corporatism, Guild Socialism and Syndicalism and their fixed numbers of corporations, guilds and syndicates;[19] Distributism and fixed allotments of land or other capital — presume or would install a static economy. Any prices and incomes policy would also institute a similar immobility, which would only store up anomalies and misfits of supply and demand which eventually break the system and cause sudden and very disruptive adjustments, whereas a free market does allow frequent and less disruptive ones.

In the final two sub-sections the Rourkes consider the roles of 'corporations', i.e. companies and especially public ones whose shares are traded on stock markets, and of government regulation and intervention. As for the former they say, 'Profit is a practical necessity, but the purpose of the firm cannot be reduced to it' (p. 134). Surely that is the essence of businesses: to earn profits for their owners and shareholders by making things or offering services which people will purchase. The directors and management must always consider 'the bottom line', but really to do that they also always need to pay attention to customer satisfaction, and, at least for some of the time, to promoting, as the authors state, a 'sense of solidarity in the workplace' (p. 134), for, as already noted, a disgruntled workforce will not work as well as one generally satisfied with how it is treated, and not just in terms of pay. But businesses are not charities, and even charities need to be businesslike and not to waste the resources they receive. Sooner or later employees who cannot do their jobs, or whose functions are no longer required or are unprofitable, or who cause trouble, will have to be retrained if possible, made redundant or dismissed.[20] But perhaps all this may be more a matter of emphasis than real substance.

In respect of the role of government, they rightly reject both wholly anti-government ideologies and those which reject any co-operation between government agencies and private ones (pp. 134-5). What especially concerns them is the accountability of companies, which they appear to think to be little. Much of this passage is specific to the USA and other geographically large countries with federal constitutions, such as India, Canada and Australia, namely, incorporation of companies only in their home states or provinces.[21] The authors have a valid point regarding accountability and responsibility in large companies, as has been spectacularly shown in Britain in the megalomaniac and utterly reckless expansions undertaken by the chairmen and CEOs of the two big banks and three former building societies that crashed in 2008. For the directors or other directors, including statuary 'independent ones', failed to control the culprits, and the big shareholders also never questioned then. One answer, as has been mooted with the salaries and fees of directors and top executives, would be to

make general policy and large projects subject to approval at AGMs. Also here in Britain, companies can now be criminally liable for 'corporate manslaughter'. The real problems are more often with much smaller private limited liability companies and some government agencies. Some shady businesses seem to manage to escape damages and repayments for shoddy work by going into liquidation and then re-emerging under new names but with the same directors even though there are laws meant to prevent this. Similarly, when regulators do fine public agencies, it is the taxpayers who end up paying the fines while the individual directors and managers escape scot-free, and some get handsome pay-offs if they leave and even lucrative jobs in other public bodies. But the law cannot do everything and there are no substitutes for personal self-responsibility, integrity, diligence and sheer common sense at all levels of business and life generally.

Finally, the authors question the legal status of companies, especially large ones, as 'persons', which, they think, prevents them from being closed down no matter what they do, such as using their vast fund to engage in successful lobbying of governments for their own narrow advantages at the expense of the general good. Again, measures can be taken to limit that. As for the former claim, a 'person' in law is one who is legally liable, i.e. sue and be sued, and thus corporate persons are legally liable in their own right apart from the individuals who own or manage them. We come back to what the law could do: in some cases at least to make directors and CEOs personally responsible as well. Some regulators in Britain now have the power to remove individual directors and to prevent them from being directors of any company in future. But to close down completely a large firm which is still solvent and sell its assets would be a very different matter and could cause needless damage to many other firms and individuals.

3.3. Social justice

Quoting various sources, especially Pius XI's *Quadragesimo Anno*, the authors argue that 'social justice' indicates a distinct application of justice to social relations and issues in action with others to 'organize society so as to make it just', and that on two levels: interpersonal and social. For example, it may not be possible for an employer to pay a 'just wage', one that would support the employee and his dependants as the just return for his labour. The employer, unable to this, would not be guilty of injustice at the interpersonal level because the injustice would lie at the social level, so that employers and the rest of society should work to reorganise society so that it is possible that just wages be paid. That in turn requires co-operation and not competition in the economy as in the rest of society (pp. 138-9). As well as all the problems about 'just prices' as discussed above, the authors and their sources wrongly assume that co-operation and competition are dichotomous. For what are sports leagues but co-operation to organise competitions, agree rules and arrange fixtures? Or literary and musical competitions? Or elections by open competition by candidates for the votes of the electors, often with severe penalties for any attempts to 'rig' them? Likewise contracts for the provision of public services by competitive tender, and public and many private appointments by open competition among applicants. Why all the concern for preventing monopolies if cartels that co-operate to fix prices are right and firms that compete with each other for business are wrong? On the contrary, co-operation in these last examples is now rightly regarded as *unjust* and competition *just*. Common law jurisdictions have 'adversarial' courts, in which the cases for both parties are presented for the judge or jury to decide between them. That is surely 'competitive', and also co-operative in that both parties, judge and jury play their allotted roles and observe court-room rules, whereas courts in Communist states were wholly 'co-operative' because the role of the defence was to assist the prosecution in securing the pre-ordained verdict of guilty, surely, a paradigm case of injustice. So, what remains of 'social justice' in this example of securing 'just wages' and generally, is only that in states with sufficient wealth and honest and effective agencies for it to be possible, there should be public welfare systems, or publicly assisted ones—the personalist preference, to provide a basic level of provision for those otherwise unable to provide it for themselves. In other words, a system of assistance which can be reached from the duty of general beneficence alone.

The next application is that all citizens are responsible for building up the common good and social justice. This again is the duty of general beneficence and the addition of 'social justice' is redundant, though a clause needs to be added about 'according to their means, abilities and other duties', for more can be done by those with fewer ties, more time, more money, more education and more 'connections'. The authors give particular examples of groups that can be formed to promote the general good in specific ways, such as co-operatives and soup kitchens. Yet there are, as should be expected, other possibilities for them: organisations of all sorts can be taken over by small and dedicated groups who represent none but themselves; and they may in case pursue special interests and not the common good, such as producer and not consumer interests,

or those of 'nimbies' ('Not In My Back Yard') as against the need for more housing or industrial provision locally. The authors are fully aware of the lobbying of big business, but smaller groups can lobby just as effectively for their own special interests. Indeed, it is ordinary, non-activist citizens, quietly going about their own businesses, whose interests tend to be neglected and voices unheard.

The third application is that 'all vital interests should be organized', and that those directly involved in each 'interest' to take responsibility for its organisation, that is, from the bottom up, otherwise the organisation will be organised badly, as is the American economy (pp. 139-40). Yet it is again the ordinary person who is least able to be an activist on more than a small scale. Hence some charities, started by a few on a local scale, have become big concerns, even big businesses, with large turn-overs, professional and often well-paid executives and lobbying campaigns.

And the mention of 'interests' and 'organisations' built from the bottom up, sounds rather like a voluntary corporatism, in which each interest pursues its own obvious and narrow good while the common good is wrongly assumed to be the sum of these specific ones. Any such development incurs the risk of dominance by big single organisations or associations representing ones with a common interest or overlapping ones — there is now one that represents British charities as well the obviously economic ones like the Trades Union Congress, the Confederation of British Industries, the British Chambers of Commerce and the Institute of Directors (for smaller companies). It thus runs the further risk of an informal corporatism whereby government policy is not decided by the Cabinet and then Parliament, or similar institutions, but as in the 1960s and 1970s under both Wilson and Heath when it was decided by direct negotiation of a few senior ministers with 'the two sides of industry', namely, the Trades Union Congress and the Con- federation of British Industries. But these represent only producer interests and only some of those at that, and other interests are inevitably neglected, such as non-union members, small businesses, the self-employed, and above all those who are only consumers and not producers, the young, stay-at-home mothers actually looking after their children, the sick and disabled, the unemployed and pensioners. Similarly, when government spending is involved, the one interest guaranteed to be unrepresented is that of the ordinary taxpayer. In such ways, proposals to promote the common good can end up attending only to certain special interests. This is probably not what the authors have in mind, but it is one way their suggestions could be taken or turn out to be implemented.

A free-market both permits voluntary organisations and requires them, and not just for economic transactions, as by the National Assembly which, at the time of the French Revolution, prohibited all other associations. In free markets everyone's pound, dollar or euro is as good as any other's, and the small contributions of many can equal or outweigh the large ones of a few. Voluntary and independent societies are vital for a free and healthy society. They can supply services which the market or government cannot or has yet to get round to, limit government's extension over society, and provide the 'personal' touch so often lacking in big, bureaucratised and rule-bound institutions. They promote fellowship (and sometimes division and petty jealousy) and co-operation even when catering, as many do and rightly so, just for the common interests of their members. We do need more of them and more volunteers to run them, especially ones for the young, far too many of whom seem bored, rootless and have no experience of association except in gangs. In totalitarian states voluntary societies and clubs are either suppressed or integrated into the organs of the state and its only party, and have to serve as agents of their policies. And states where most income comes from the state, as in oil states where the greater part of people's incomes ultimately derives from royalties paid to the state by the foreign or state-owned oil companies, then for funds sooner or later many of them will depend upon some government grant,[22] the only alternative being individuals who have amassed money by corrupt dealings. A personalist perspective must value them but must also be careful about proposals for ways of helping them. For example, in Britain to benefit from money via the Lottery fund for sports, sports club have to be integrated into the national associations for the various sports, their leagues and competitions and training schemes, all now aimed at eventually to producing and supporting national teams fit for international competitions. A club that just wants some money to get its own ground where it can play friendly games for fun will not qualify for any help at all.

3.4. Work

The final section of Part I is devoted to the meaning of work and its relationship to ownership and the state. Here the authors cite John Paul II's *Laborem Exercens*, the principal message of which is that by work man fulfils his vocation of 'domination' and transforming nature, and which has the objective dimension of what is done and the subjective one of the free exercise of will and intellect, which is its

inherent ethical value of manifesting one's status as a person, one who decides about himself. It has two other ethical values: its support for family and the rearing and education of children, and its contribution to the wider society and its heritage. The authors note how this incorporates the ontology of the person: autonomy, freedom, rationality and intrinsic autonomy of others whereas the contemporary 'economist' idea of work values only its economic purpose as a factor in production to be bought and sold like any other commodity. (pp. 140-1).

Here it is necessary to pause and to distinguish the different meanings of 'work' and 'labour' lest we slip wrongly from one sense to another without realising it.

'Work' as a noun can mean:

1. 'Operation' or 'activity' in the widest sense, anything that something or someone does.
2. The specific, characteristic or usual operation or activity of someone or something.
3. For persons, the vocation or chosen activity around which someone builds his life, his 'life's work'.
4. What a person does to gain resources and support himself and dependants, his occupation or profession, which may or may not coincide partly or wholly with (3).

'Labour' can mean:

1. 'Toil', effortful, demanding work, especially in the course of (4), e.g. 'manual labour', 'labouring at' something.
2. In economics, those who 'work' in sense (4), especially in exchange for wages, salaries or payment in kind.

In the summary above, 'work' is used primarily in sense (2) of human beings in this world where all our activity, in one way or another, involves some transformation of nature and expresses, or should express, our status as persons. But it also implies (1) and therefore (3) and (4).

So when they next state that this account of work entails that 'labour' has priority over capital, 'labour' is not used only in sense (4) but to cover all our activity, and likewise 'capital' to mean whatever we use to *assist* us in whatever we do, which in turn is itself the result of human labour in some way: tools are *made*, and (my addition) 'human capital' acquired by experience and formal learning. Hence the logical and axiological priority of labour over capital. From this they infer that that work (primarily sense (4)) must be organised to reflect personal existence as summarised here. But now, they claim, both labour and capital are depersonalised; capital is no longer seen as the accumulated results of human work; and to treat persons as instruments of production is to reverse the moral and created order. The reason for this is 'the exclusive right to private ownership of the means of production', and to remedy this they cite five principles proposed by John Paul II:

1. Workers' rights must be based on the above account of work especially its ethical values and our duties to realise them.
2. Solidarity, of workers with other workers and with owners, is to be encouraged.
3. Thus issues about work are related to more than the actual or direct employer, but to all 'indirect employers' such as the state and associations of workers and employers.
4. The state with other indirect employers should enforce a just labour policy, in which the right to work is fundamental and unemployment seen as an evil, and thus a need for 'just and rational coordination [*sic*] of work', but without centralisation that violates such as a government insuring a right to work.[23]
5. The common use of goods, 'the first principle of the social order', requires either living wages or wages plus other income to sustain a family. Workers are also entitled to access to affordable health care and pensions, and to form associations though 'unions must not be partisan' (pp. 142-3).

In general these principles do embody a personalist approach to work, in the wide sense and the narrower one. But the claim 'that the exclusive right to private ownership of the means of production' is what stops their application is open to question. That 'exclusive right' is to be rejected because the possession of the means of production is 'capital' in opposition to 'labour'; they cannot be possessed for possession's sake; and the only legitimate title to their possession is that they should serve labour and therefore make possible the universal destination of goods and services (p. 142).

One consequence of this is that owners of business cannot do just what they like with the means of production in respect of how they treat their employees. But it is wrong to say that an 'exclusive right' over them is what prevents the application of the above principles as far as advanced, industrial and exchange economies are concerned. For these requirements for employment are already met or are on the way to being met, by way of such measures as 'health and safety' requirements, compulsory insurance against employers' liabilities, legalising workers' associations, and schemes for provision of medical services and pensions for all, and have been introduced them for a century and more. Indeed, it is certainly the case in some instances that there are too many requirements so that employers cannot afford to employ more workers. But where such

measures have not been taken or are seriously deficient, it is usually because there is either too little property of any sort, as in poor countries which lack the necessary resources, or where it is insecure because of the lack of the rule of law because government is absent, weak, corrupt or does not value individual rights sufficiently or at all.

Another implication of the rejection of this 'exclusive right' may be that the owners of business have no such right to make or provide what ever they wish or to take their capital out of production altogether. As regards the former, again there are restrictions on and standards for what can be produced or what can be offered in the way of services. If more are required, then the authors should specify them, otherwise they seem to be blaming governments, businesses and markets for not doing what they in fact do. But we should always remember the counter-productive effects of over-regulation. As for the latter, we would need to know what should be done about it. For example, should it be illegal to buy a small market garden from a going concern and turn it into a private flower garden, or to keep one's savings in cash in a safe or as gold in a vault, and not in a bank account so that the bank could then use it to lend a several times over to businesses?[24] Again, to spend it on permanent possessions could count as taking the money, as potential capital, out of productive use, unless what is bought is used to produce something, such as opening my model railway to public view or letting out all spare rooms in private houses.

Also when John Paul II is quoted as saying that it is an error of 'economism' to consider labour solely according to its economic purpose (p. 140), and 'work as a special kind of "merchandise" or as an impersonal "force"' (p. 141),[25] both he and the Rourkes may be confusing the necessity of abstractions in any science and in its empirical applications with interactions with real people. There could be no economic science at all if 'capital', 'labour', 'employment', 'wealth', 'prices', 'supply', 'demand' etc., could not be used to consider what falls under them in the abstract and apart from concrete realities. Neither could surveys of the whole economy or particular sectors of it be made without counting the totals and proportions of employees grouped as 'labour' in the statistics. Again, anyone intending to set up or expand a business must consider what 'labour' or 'workforce' he will need, and how much it will cost to employ them, and not real individuals such as Tom, Dick and Harriet, who have yet to be recruited. That does not mean that when these or other persons have been recruited that they have to be treated wholly impersonally just like the machinery or other equipment that has been bought or hired. *That* would be 'economism', the wrongful extension of the abstractions of the science to real interpersonal relations. Indeed, it would turn out to be counter-productive if they were.

It is also 'economism' to consider anything and everything *solely* in terms of its economic value, and, for example, to think the task of schools and higher education to be *only* that of providing what is needed by the economy and particularly employers. Curiously, what employers currently ask for from schools are general skills applicable throughout modern life, such as literary and numeracy, which too often schools have failed to teach, and, from further and higher education, genuine training in what various occupations actually need instead of non-qualifications such as business studies in schools and media studies in colleges and universities. Formal education certainly fails its recipients and society at large if it does not provide what all employment requires nowadays and, at higher levels, the specific training for specific forms of employment. Yet equally it fails if economism and a 'world of total work' (see the next paragraph) restrict it only to those tasks and do not put first those activities, in so far as it can prepare the young, for which work (4) is intended. Personalism certainly needs to confront economism and at the same time clearly to distinguish it from the study and application of economic theory. We do need bread and do not live by it alone.

The final general point: man's essential role in this world and life as 'dominance' over nature and 'work' as 'transforming' it, is both misleadingly expressed or translated and surprisingly inadequate. The language, original or not, suggests that we have a right to do whatever we like with the Earth rather than act as its 'stewards'. More importantly, it implies that all our 'work', in what I take to be senses (2) and (3), is to be the transformation of nature, like that of Adam and Eve in Eden. True, everything we do involves some present or past transformation, such as my typing these sentences on a PC, illuminated by electric light, and wearing clothes made from cotton and artificial fibres. Yet, as Aristotle said, we work (4) to have leisure to do things for their own sakes. (It is very good if such work is what we would like to do anyway, and often we use our leisure to practise crafts that were once or still are work (4) for others.) One fully personalist criticism of the present time that could rightly be made is the tendency to exalt work (4) for its own sake and to create a 'world of total work' in a sort of secular Puritanism that regards anything else as sinful idleness, or as a deserting from the supreme task of building a new world, or has simply lost sight

of what it is all for.[26] Hence here in Britain mothers who do not join the workforce but do their duty by staying at home to look after and bring up their own children, get no or little state help while their husbands in work have to pay taxes to pay the fees for the childcare for those who do, and universities, funded mostly or wholly by the state, are now pressed to do economically valuable research as well as applying what can be done with the results of pure research.

The five sets of principles list above along with some suggested ways of applying them, do have some deficiencies. First, items (3) and (4) together could easily suggest to those inclined to Corporatism in some form or other, or to similar systems such as Guild Socialism, that formal arrangements among the parties named would be needed to negotiate and determine the particular measures needed to specify and implement 'a just labour policy' and 'just and rational coordination of work'. That, they would say, would also implement the principle of 'subsidarity' and avoid the centralisation of solely governmental schemes.[27] Yet the whole population are consumers and the ultimate 'indirect employers' of all the employed and also of 'direct' employers, but are always forgotten save by the advocates of free-markets. For it is upon what the general public in a free society, and customers of any sort abroad, want and will pay for that ultimately determines most of what will produced and so what sorts of businesses and employees are required.[28] One would expect the government to be the guardian of the common good, but by negotiating with, or leaving central parts of economic policy to, organised special interests, and those solely of producers, it would abrogate that role. Apart from that, the Rourkes are only too aware of lobbying by big business and there are plenty of other special interests doing the same with money and organisation — trades unions, 'Green' and other environmental groups, the combined big charities, local groups to keep this open or prevent that — so that the interests of the unorganised many, and therefore the common good, are easily neglected.

4. *'Principles of Political Economy II: Small Property, Decentralisation and Popular Sovereignty'*

The authors now turn to wider considerations. Citing Aristotle and modern authors such as Jefferson, Chesterton and Belloc and their Distributism, and John Paul II,[29] they argue that an economy primarily of small landowners and specifically family farms, is the best basis for democracy. The picture is attractive, and many small farms in poorer countries could be made more productive with Victorian hand-tools, and with better local roads, as in India where half of their produce is currently lost in taking it to the local markets. Yet how would an agrarian economy produce the machinery and fuel it would need to maintain the present levels of production let alone to expand them so that more people can be adequately fed, and produce all the other conveniences of modern life, such as drugs and vaccines for farm animals as well as people, hospital equipment, the plastics and metals for constructing it, the electricity to power it, etc., etc.? The larger farms of Britain are more productive than the heavily subsidised peasant holdings of France, and the harvests of the prairies of North America feed millions more than those live there. The industrial revolution and the agricultural one before it, cannot be undone. And despite the downsides of technological innovation which the Rourkes list, such as the supersession of some industries and the making redundant of those who work in them, (pp. 149-50), civilisation and the human race cannot survive without it. Yes, dispersal of property is necessary for personal dignity and freedom, raising people out of the proletariat (as someone said, 'An ugly word for an ugly thing'), and for peace and stability generally, and the authors' arguments on that account are wholly valid, whether or not their particular proposals would be practical or counter-productive. One particular amendment I would suggest is that some concentrations of private property are desirable, not only to provide capital for industry and commerce, but also as bastions against government domination and as foci for initiatives requiring larger amounts of money such as the founding of museums and other institutions. For example: sixteen or so years ago the three main political parties in Britain were ready to replace the pound by the euro and so turn a necessary control over the economy to the EU, and to do so without consulting the electorate. It took a wealthy businessman, Sir James Goldsmith, to launch the Referendum Party with its threat to taking many votes from the party then in power, to stymie that antidemocratic subversion of our sovereignty and to force the governing party to promise a referendum before enacting any such measure. Similarly, in African and other states with little indigenous capital, save what is dispersed by the government from royalties on foreign-owned or state-owned extractive industries, notably oil, it is difficult to set up and fund any effective opposition or initiatives of which the government does not approve even though it may not ban them.

5. *'Principles of Political Economy III: Expanding Worker Ownership'*

The authors begin the final section of Chapter 4 with rightly stating that a personalist economy greatly values 'the most widespread distribution of the ownership of property, and, more broadly, the productive resources commonly referred to as capital' (p. 152). Yet they also criticise what they call the 'modern' notion of perpetual ownership (p.141). In fact, one complaint of the landed classes in the Middle Ages was about the mortmain of the Church over lands donated to it, lands which the Church could not then dispose of, and so they permanently went out of circulation among lay landowners. But security of ownership of land and other possessions, and thus perpetuity in ownership and free disposal, are essential to peace and prosperity, and are what is lacking in respect of land in rural China and generally in states too weak to enforce property rights or with no respect for them. And what would be the alternative? Reversion to state ownership or compulsory sale to private persons or organisations?

Reluctantly accepting that corporate ownership will continue, and promote centralisation of ownership, they seek ways of extending ownership within it. They cite Leo XIII, John XXII and John Paul II on the value of workers' ownership of businesses and, in particular, of those in which they work, and extensively refer to the proposals of Louis Kelso, Mortimer Adler and Norman Kurland.

Kelso's basic thesis is that technological innovation on the whole *decreases* the productivity of labour because it increases unemployment which is hidden by high taxes on labour, inflated wages, padded jobs and redistributionist measures. But the measures cited to hide that unemployment are in fact themselves designed to counteract the effects of knee-jerk Keynsianism which continues to inflate the money supply and artificially increase demand resulting in decreases in productivity and booms followed by busts, instead of making radical supply-side reforms such as large reductions in corporation tax, unnecessary government activity and expenditure, regulations and other barriers to and burdens upon trade. And it grossly underestimates the new employment that increased profits themselves promote by being used for consumption or further investment, as shown by the great increase in the service sector in advanced economies. In any case no link is made to Kelso's proposals for extending worker ownership.

They are similar to what the authors previously suggested for the users' ownership of urban public transport, and are deigned to avoid the problem of borrowers already having to own capital which they could use as collateral for a loan. A trust would borrow money with which it purchases stock in the company on behalf of all the employees. The firm would guarantee the loan by using future earnings to pay the interest on it. As the loan is paid off, blocks of shares are given to individual workers, so that they acquire new equity and also dividends to supplement wages and invest in pensions. This system creates new shareholders without taking shares from the existing ones. They point out that such loans for acquiring capital are self-liquidating because of the profits to be made from them, as opposed to loans for consumption which incur debts and interest to be paid on them. They add that this scheme would extend to workers the same method of leveraged buyout as already employed by managers to take ownership of their firms, and that that loans to acquire capital are an inherent right of persons (pp. 154-5).[30]

Yet, while a free-market economy would allow financial institutions to make such loans to employees' trusts and the latter to ask for and use them, they may turn out to be little used. Contrary to what the Rourkes say, the problem of providing collateral has only been moved from the employees to the trust and thence to the assets of the company and their potential for generating profits from which the firm would have not only to pay the interest but also to repay the loan itself, and if it failed to do so it would be declared bankrupt and liquidated: credit-worthiness applies as much to loans for capital as it does to those for consumption. Hence, again contrary to the Rourkes' statements, there would be redistributional costs to the existing shareholders, because (a) such a loan would reduce their dividends while the interest on the loan is being paid, and, more importantly, while the loan itself is being paid off; and (b) it would dilute the shares of the existing shareholders and thus reduce their dividends perpetually. On all these counts the scheme would presume that the firm would continue to flourish, indeed to increase in business and profits, for immediately it would have the extra burden of the loan and interest to pay off and thereafter it would have more shareholders to satisfy. And as with all such schemes, the employees will lose their capital as well as their jobs if they become redundant when trade declines. The question is, Would this be made compulsory, either if the employees want it or even if they don't? Whether it is compulsory or entirely voluntary, no firm would want to create more than a small proportion of new shares because of these costs to the existing shareholders, and so they would add little to the employees' incomes. Consequently, there can no *right* to such loans, even if the

necessary financial and legal institutions already exist, unless the government were to make them compulsory if the employees want such loans, and were to underwrite any failures at the expense of the ever-mugged taxpayer. But even then investors could well seek for other outlets for their money, just as under Louis XIV and Louis XV merchants took money out of the way of the tax-gatherers and deposited in Geneva, and today under François Hollande ambitious people outside the bloated public sector move themselves to London which has become one of the largest French cities.

The authors mention further proposals by Kelso, such as a way of providing non-government insurance for bad loans incurred by these schemes, and for the Federal Reserve to take future profits as collateral, and to avoid financial commitments by the government (pp. 155-9), but the same problems would arise. This is not to say that such schemes could be not tried, first on a modest and always on an entirely voluntary basis, to see if and how they actually work, whether employees and companies do agree to operate them, and how far they prove worthwhile. I have my doubts, but, as with monasteries, communes, kibbutzim, local currencies, the Bangladeshi Grameen Bank that does not ask for any collateral at all for loans (p. 154), credit unions, and so forth, in a free country with the rule of law and a free-market economy as the default economic policy, people can join together to give them a try. And always the Rourkes are right in wanting to avoid the heavy hand of the state and compulsion unless it is absolutely necessary. The free market has its limitations and can be abused, but so can everything else in this world, and often we have to look for the option with the least abuses, in seriousness as well as number. And my mostly negative comments on this chapter of their book are meant to show that their genuinely personalist concerns can be and are better, or not as badly, met by a free market under the rule of law and with government provision or, even better, government-assisted provision where the market fails, than they appear to think.

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Notes

1. Langham, MD, Lexington Books, 2005.
2. *The Wealth of Nations*, Bk 1 Chap. X.
3. E.g. Friedman's *Capitalism and Freedom*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962. Hayek uses 'market economy' but would prefer 'catalaxy', i.e. 'system of exchange'.
4. The authors, writing for an American readership, do not mention the 'Corporatism' to which Roman Catholic social thinking became inclined in the 19th C. and 20th C., especially after Leo XIII's *Rerum novarum*, nor the Distributism of Chesterton and Belloc: see §4 below. Some Protestant and much secular politics and economics in continental Europe also turned to Corporatism and similar schemes such as Guild Socialism and Syndicalism. In Corporatism the firms and trades-unions in each industry are to join in a 'corporation' which will set prices and standards for those engaged in it: i.e., remodelled guilds on a national scale. Other institutions such as universities and the professions would also form autonomous corporations. In a Corporate State the legislature and electorate would be formed by representatives of the corporations, including the heads of the mini-corporations which are families. All this is designed to preserve autonomy and property against Socialist collectivism while also avoiding the 'individualism' and 'atomism' of free-markets. See also the end of §3.4 below. Note that they use 'corporations' and 'corporate' solely in the American sense of limited liability companies, especially big ones.
5. *Socialism*, trans., J. Kahane, London, Jonathan Cape, new ed. 1951, Pt II, Chs I and II.
6. *The Logic of Liberty*, Chs. 8 and 9, not only the section on the span of control but especially also those on corporate and spontaneous order, and on polycentricity.
7. Economic science needs also to be disassociated from any philosophy in which it has been embedded, such as Utilitarianism and its hedonist psychology or value-scepticism as by von Mises, so that genuine criticisms of the philosophies are not irrelevantly directed at the economics, as indeed has often been done by those initially hostile to free markets.
8. See also n. 18 below.
9. Despite his value-scepticism von Mises was a passionate defender of freedom, democracy and civilisation, and, as well as arguing that a free-market economic policy will be more economically efficient, he argued that it was the best support for them and that other policies would threaten them. So too did F.A. Hayek, Michael Polanyi, Milton Freeman and others. The Rourkes again confuse economic science and economic policy when they criticise unnamed 'free-marketers' for measuring economic progress solely in economic terms (p. 132).
10. Is there some lingering nostalgia here and elsewhere for the economy and society of the Middle Ages with largely self-subsistent manors in the countryside, artisans in guilds in the towns, and the division of society into the three 'estates' of those who pray (clergy and the religious orders), those who wield the sword, that is, govern and defend (the aristocracy and knightly classes) and those who work (peasants and artisans), with merchants mostly regarded as unproductive parasites? Socialism also often neglects the questions of who is to distribute physically and how, the products from producers to consumers, as distinct from 'distribution' as 'allocation', i.e. rationing.
11. *Experto crede.* In our schools, colleges and universities, unless they are independent or 'free'

ones and so not bound by statutory or other union-negotiated agreements, teachers and lecturers receive annual increments up to certain levels which they cannot refuse. All well and good when one is in work. But unless there is a real shortage of suitable applicants, once one leaves the system, either voluntarily or by redundancy, it is virtually impossible to return because inexperienced or less experienced applicants will always be cheaper to hire at the level at which one was working let alone lower ones, and for higher ones those still in the system will always be preferred to those now out of it. It is the one profession where experience is a handicap, because of this system of minimum salaries according to the levels reached and years worked in the latest, below which one cannot negotiate a competitive salary. Again, the more that costs to employers are added on top of wages and salaries, the less likely are they to employ more people. The same applies to the harder or more expensive it is made to dismiss ineffective or redundant employees. Such 'job-security' for some will mean no jobs for others. All this is especially true for small businesses on narrow margins or without the time and money to contest claims of wrongful dismissal or to make redundancy payments. And with such businesses a general increase in production and employment often begins.

12. This does create a problem for poorly educated young men for whom there are far fewer unskilled or low-skilled labouring jobs these days. Better schools are needed, especially in poorer districts, with a more practical curriculum though not a narrowly vocational one.
13. This sounds like 'democratic socialism' whereby representatives of the people control the economy, or it could mean an exchange economy governed by the rule of law with the laws enacted by representatives of the people, or some high degree of regulation between the two, as favoured by the EU for its 'single market'. The authors' adherence to the Scholastic notion of 'the sovereign people' may also imply an acceptance of the axiom of Roman Law that law is the will of the sovereign. As the Jacobins and others have demonstrated, those acting for 'the sovereign people' can institute a 'totalitarian democracy', wherein in theory everyone together decides what they all shall do (see, J. Talmon, *The Origins of Democratic Totalitarianism*, London, Secker and Warburg, 1952.) In Common Law jurisprudence, law is primarily customary law, interpreted and developed to cover new situations by judges, and added to by statute law, and so not exclusively the will of any one person or body. Perhaps it is likely to be the more rooted in the people rather than imposed from above.
14. Ironically, it was the other retailers who feared the end of rationing because of the nation-wide reach of the Co-operative Wholesale Society whose products were retailed by the local co-ops.
15. Unless by 'cost price' Simon and thus the Rourkes intend its technical meaning in economics which includes 'normal profit', the average profit margin prevailing in the market at the time for the specific product or service, without which few and eventually none would make or offer it but would try something else instead, then that also has to be added. Also they have completely forgotten the costs of distribution especially for physical products—investing capital in buying and holding stock, insuring it, paying rent for, or amortising leased or purchased land, buildings and equipment, transporting it, finding outlets, and wages and salaries for all those doing this, plus 'normal profit' for wholesaling and then for retailing it.
16. Some of us do know what it is like to live on a low wage, or to be children of those who wages were low, and how every penny had to be watched, and money carefully saved for the rent, the electricity bill, new school clothes and shoes, a holiday and so forth, and who would rightly have been indignant at being asked to pay over the odds.
17. Perhaps this notion of a 'just price' rests upon a lack of distinction between the economic value of something and whatever non-economic value it may have, and thus the error of thinking that there is an inherent economic value. Whatever their aesthetic values, 'old masters' can secure prices much greater than similar paintings by other painters. Again for such things rarity increases economic value, as when the prices of his paintings increase when a renowned painter dies.
18. That is what governments do for sickness, disability and unemployment benefits, state pensions at the like. Some figures are fixed to allow the beneficiaries to live at a level around or somewhat below what they had been earning or would earn on low wages or their previous ones up to certain limits. But instead of amending the results according to 'just prices', they are computed or amended according to what the government thinks it can afford or taxpayers will bear either directly or indirectly and hiddenly by way of the inflation caused by chronic government overspending.
19. They also face the problem of intertwined industries and professions in the modern world, unlike the mediaeval one: clerical staff, accountants and others work in all and some independently; many manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers have their own road transport; manufacturers of electrical components, glass, metals, plastics, machine tools, etc., each supply different industries, including each other. Which goupings would comprise really distinct industries? Not to speak of conglomerate companies which own subsidiaries in different industries.
20. This must be a problem for workers' co-operatives, and also in countries where it is very difficult to dismiss workers, such as Spain under General Franco and perhaps even now. Again, when employees have shares in the companies they work for, which is likely to promote solidarity, they will lose their investment as well as their jobs if it goes bust. Incidentally, I take it that by 'solidarity' they do not mean only solidarity with fellow workers, as a socialist would understand it, but solidarity with the company and everyone in it.
21. They commend the 'anti-corporate' attitudes of such as Jefferson, Adams, Paine and Lincoln, and also previous the regulations (but without mention of the dates) in Wisconsin for business corporations, which, *inter alia*, limited them in the amount of capital they

could amass, prevented them from buying other corporations,* to incorporation only in the state where they did business, and only for a limited time. They state that 'personalism should not simplistically argue for the re-implementation of all these provisions without qualification (p. 135), but do not suggest which they would reinstate. As they stand, those cited here may have had some possible and practicable application in a time of small businesses and poor communications but certainly not today with extensive inter-state trade. And who would begin, work hard to establish, invest in, or do business with, a company set to be dissolved at a known date?

* Michael Oakeshott (*Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays*, new and expanded ed., Indianapolis, Liberty Press, 1991, p. 405) commended the same proposal by A.C. Simons of Chicago U. and his reason for it, that it would be a safeguard of freedom against overweening concentrations of power. In Britain we now have the Monopolies Commission whose task is to prevent the formation of monopolies and to break up existing ones, but taking over declining firms is one way of turning them around. Indeed, some companies exist to do just that and then sell them at a profit. In contrast, in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s, amalgamations, promoted by government, of manufacturers of motors, in order to save the weaker ones, finally brought down all of them: 'united they fell'. A general ban would probably be counter-productive.

22. As the charities' lobby has recently disclosed, perhaps inadvertently, some charities now depend heavily on government grants or contracts for what they do instead of upon voluntary donations.
23. I assume that when they first use 'a right to work' they mean the absence of artificial barriers to work which have no relevance to what is actually required for the work, such as closed ('union') shops, irrelevant qualifications, colour bars and other forms of job reservation, and on the second occasion actual opportunities to work, such as job-creation schemes, plus by 'insuring' they mean 'ensuring' for which 'insuring' could be one method.
24. This was the error of the Unprofitable Servant in the Parable of the Talents, Mt. 25:14-30, or Pounds, Lk 19:12-27.
25. It seems as if an ideology of private rights without corresponding duties, which few have maintained and which has been confused with economic liberalism generally, has been wrongly read into history and the present time.
26. See Josef Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, trans. A. Dru, London, Faber, 1952; and J. Huizinga, *Homo Ludens*, trans. as *Man at Play*, trans. R.F.C. Hull, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949.
27. See above §3.3. 28. The exceptions are where government decides much or all of what will be produced, as by rationing or direct control of production. Even states where government policy focuses production on exports (good old-fashioned mercantilism!), such as Germany and China, it is what consumers abroad will pay for and at what price, which ultimately determines what will be produced.
29. But not, curiously, the American Southern Agrarians of the 1930s: see, *I'll Take My Stand: The South and the Agrarian Tradition*, ed. D. Davidson, New York, Harper, 1930.
30. It is strange that the Rourkes should favour leveraged purchases of shares, which are used not only for management buy-outs but also for take-overs by complete outsiders.

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INDEX TO VOLUME 9, MARCH 2012- OCTOBER 2013

Articles — ***Issue No. & Page***

Personal integration and aestheticism: A sketch 1/3
You are not the person I knew: Eclecticism and context in continuity of identity 1/14
Are classical and medieval scientific ideals rooted in a 'Community of Persons'? 1/18
From the Absolute to the individual: person and pre-mortal existence in Boehme, Schelling and Howison 1/23
The Confucian conception of person 1/29
Humanism and anti-humanism in the philosophy of Alain Badiou 1/33
Personality: C. S. Lewis' semi-postmodern view of the human person 1/40
Jonathan Edwards as a pluralistic personalist 2/4
Autonomous robots and tacit knowledge 2/8
Determinism determined 2/15
Anthropomorphism and the evils of realism 2/23
Emotional parasitism 2/34
The diagnosis of scientism: Eric Voegelin and Michael Polanyi on science and philosophy 3/3
The psychiatric concept of causation: philosophical and semiotic contributions 3/13
The merits of a phenomenological analysis of dreams 4/13
The Person and the political paradox: The personalist political theory of Paul Ricoeur 4/3
Personalism and the free market 4/33

Discussions

1. Do robots really have tacit knowledge?
2. Reply 3/40

Book Reviews

M. R. Broome, R. Harland, G. S. Owen and A. Stringaris (eds)**:** *The Maudsley Reader in Phenomenological Psychiatry* 3/42
Hugo Meynell: *The Epistemological Argument Against Atheism* 2/48
Mary Jo Nye**:** *Michael Polanyi and his Generation: Origins of the Social Construction of Science* 2/46
Murray Rae (ed.) *Critical Conversations: Michael Polanyi and Christian Theology* 2/41
Jacqueline Marie Vieceli: *A Philosophy of Global Pluralism. A Multicultural Approach to Political Theory* 3/44

Authors and Reviewers ....

R.T. Allen, ... 2/34, 2/48, 3/40, 4/33
Roman Briggs 1/3
Conor Cordnor 3/3
J. Cutting 3/13, 3/42, 4/3
Dries Deweer 4/3
James DiGiovanna 1/14
Jasper Doomen 2/15
Chris Goodman 2/46
Richard A.S. Hall 2/4
Wendy C. Hamblet 3/32
Mihály Héder and Daniel Paski 2/34, 3/40
John Hofenbauer 1/18
James Mclachlan 1/23
Gordy Mower 1/29
Henrieta Anisoara Serban 3/44
Simon Smith 2/23, 2/41
Joseph Spenser 1/33
M. Trimble 4/13
B. Toone 4/13
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SOM = *The Study of Man* (London, Routledge; Chicago, University of Chicago Press; 1959)
TD = *The Tacit Dimension* (London, Routledge; New York, Doubleday; 1966; reprinted Gloucester, Mass., Peter Smith, 1983)
Also:
SEP = *Society, Economics and Philosophy: Selected articles by Michael Polanyi*, ed. R.T. Allen (New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Publishers, 1997).