

APPRAISAL

The Journal of the British Personalist Forum

www.spcps.org.uk

Vol. 9 No. 3, March 2013

ISSN 1358-3336

Conor Cordner

*The diagnosis of scientism: Eric Voegelin and
Michael Polanyi on science and philosophy*

J. Cutting

*The psychiatric concept of causation: philosophical
and semiotic contributions*

Wendy Hamblet

Struggles for recognition and the 'really made up'

Discussion

R.T. Allen

Do robots really have tacit knowledge?

Mihály Héder and Daniel Paski

Reply



APPRAISAL

Published twice a year in March and October; four issues per volume.

© Copyright British Personalist Forum 2013

Officers of the SPCPS

Chairman Dr Alan Ford, chairman@spcps.org.uk,

Secretary: Mr Mark Arnold, 3 Church Close, S. Hinksey, Oxford secretary@spcps.org.uk

Treasurer, Membership Officer and Webmaster: treasurer@spcps.org.uk

Editor of Appraisal: Dr John Cutting, Inst. of Psychiatry, London; editor@spcps.org.uk

Assistant Editors:

Contents: Dr Simon Smith

Submissions: Mr Mark Arnold, secretary@spcps.org.uk

Production: Dr R.T.Allen

Editorial Advisors:

Prof. Klaus Allerbeck, Faculty of Social Sciences, J-W Goethe University, Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany

Prof. Giorgio Baruchello, Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, University of Akureyri, Akureyri, Iceland

Dr Angela Botez, Institute of Philosophy, Romanian Academy of Sciences, Bucharest, Romania

Dr Tibor Frank, Dept of Philosophy, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Budapest, Hungary

Dr Wendy Hamblet, Dept of University Studies, North Carolina A&T State University, Greensboro, NC

Dr David Lamb, Dept of Biomedical Science & Bioethics, University of Birmingham

Dr Endre Nagy, Dept of Social Policy, Semmelweis University, Budapest, Hungary

Dr Henrieta Serban, Institute of Politics and International Relations, Romanian Academy of Sciences, Bucharest, Romania

The Rev'd Julian Ward, Nantwich, Cheshire (formerly at Regents Theological College, U. of Manchester)

Dr Norman Wetherick, Edinburgh (formerly at the Dept of Psychology, University of Aberdeen)

Editorial Policy:

P *Appraisal* seeks to develop and promote constructive ways of thinking, especially from within a personalist perspective, in philosophy and other intellectual disciplines.

P *Appraisal* believes that philosophy should not be a narrow, academic and technical specialism, but should address itself to the general public and to the intellectual and practical issues of the present.

P From time to time *Appraisal* will include *Re-Appraisals*, articles or collections of articles upon 20th C. thinkers whose work deserves to be more widely known.

P *Appraisal* takes a particular, but by no means exclusive, interest in the work of Michael Polanyi.

Format:

P The maximum length of articles is 10,000 words, although longer articles can be split into 2 parts for publication in successive issues. Shorter items (discussions, working papers, notes, etc.) are especially welcome.

P All contributions should be in good, clear English, without jargon, and with end-notes and frequent sub-headings (at approx. every 700 wds).

P Please see inside rear cover regarding references to the works of Michael Polanyi.

P All contributions should be sent via e-mail or on disk.

P Please ask for the Style Sheet or save or print it from our web site: www.spcps.org.uk.

NB. All submissions must be composed or rewritten according to it.

Please send all initial submissions and other communications regarding Appraisal to the Secretary

Indexing: *Appraisal* is indexed in *The British Humanities Index* and *The Philosophers' Index*.

Reciprocal Arrangements:

Appraisal exchanges copies with *Polanyiana*, the journal of the Michael Polanyi Liberal Philosophical Society (Hungary), *Tradition and Discovery*, the journal of the Polanyi Society (USA), *Personalism* (Poland), *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, and *La Revue Roumaine de Philosophie*, and would welcome similar exchanges with other journals.

Subscriptions: Please see inside rear cover.

APPRAISAL

The Journal of The British Personalist Forum

Vol. 9, No. 3, March 2013

ISSN 1358-3336

Editor: Dr R.T. Allen

20 Ulverscroft Rd, Loughborough, LE11 3PU, England

www.spcps.org.uk

© The British Personalist Forum, 2013

CONTENTS

This issue's new contributors	1
Editorial	2
<i>Conor Cordner</i>	
The diagnosis of scientism: Eric Voegelin and Michael Polanyi on science and philosophy	3
<i>J. Cutting</i>	
The psychiatric concept of causation: philosophical and semiotic contributions	13
<i>Wendy Hamblet</i>	
Struggles for recognition and the 'really made up'	32
Discussions	
<i>1. R.T. Allen</i>	
Do robots really have tacit knowledge?	40
<i>2. Mihály Héder and Daniel Paski</i>	
Reply	40
Book Reviews	
eds M. R. Broome, R. Harland, G. S. Owen and A. Stringaris	
<i>The Maudsley Reader in Phenomenological Psychiatry—J. Cutting</i>	42
Jacqueline Marie Veceli	
<i>A Philosophy of Global Pluralism. A Multicultural Approach to Political Theory—Henrieta Serban</i>	44
Latest Journals Received	48

Note on our new contributor:

Dr Colin Cordner is a Ph.D. candidate of the Department of Political Science of Carleton University, in Ottawa, Canada. His research there currently focuses upon the insights of Michael Polanyi and Plato into the nature of faith and critical analysis, their bearing upon reasoning and being, and thus upon political and existential health. His interests also extend into the work of Eric Voegelin, the philosophy of history and of religion, and Hellenic philosophy. He originally hails from Saint Lin, Quebec.

EDITORIAL

As you will have seen from the front cover and previous page, we are in the process of changing our name from 'The Society for Post-Critical and Personalist Studies' to 'The British Personalist Forum'. The latter is not only shorter and easier to remember but is appropriately ambiguous between 'The British Forum for Personalist (thinking, studies, etc.)' and 'The Forum for British Personalist (thinking, studies, etc.)'. We are both: we have both a special interest in British personalist thinkers, especially Michael Polanyi along with trying to promote personalist ways of thinking in Britain, and are also open to other personalist thinkers and to contributors from outside Britain. Also the change from 'Society' to 'Forum' indicates our desire to encourage greater engagement on our part by members in our activities.

To this end we have built a new website. Until June 2014 we shall use the old url, as overleaf, to accustom members and visitors to the change. The new pages are fully interactive: as well as still providing on-line payment of subscriptions and download of the electronic version of *Appraisal*, we now also provide download of the back numbers, an open blog in which the Blogmaster will respond to emails sent to him, and a Members' Forum for posting announcements, comments and suggestions about the British Personalist Forum, and any other relevant matters. Please use it!

We intend to open companion pages on Facebook, LinkedIn and Academia in order to publicise the Forum and *Appraisal*, and shall ask members to link their respective pages to ours and to encourage their friends and contacts to do likewise. We want to go viral!

All this coincides with changes in the roles of our Committee members. The principal ones are: Dr Alan Ford is taking over as Chairman; Dr John Cutting as Editor of *Appraisal*; and I shall reduce my responsibilities to those of Treasurer plus Membership Secretary, Assistant Editor (Production) and Webmaster—the bulk of the computer work.

While loading copies of all previous issues onto the website, I was gratified to see so many interesting articles which I had forgotten as well as those I already remembered. I would like to thank all our contributors for the articles submitted and published over the 18 years in which I have been Editor, and hope the supply will continue and increase for John Cutting.

Below are details of some forthcoming conferences which should be of interest to our UK members. I shall attend the one in Oxford in July and the Macmurray conference.

R.T. Allen

'BEING A HUMAN: BEING A PERSON'

Tuesday 16th July 2013

Blackfriars,

64 St Giles, Oxford, OX1 3LY

Conference fee, inc. light lunch, £10

Registration deadline: Fri. July 28th, 11.00 am

To register contact:

m.slawkowski-rode@uw.edu.pl

For other details and speakers go to:

www.philevents.org/event/show9769

John Macmurray Annual Conference

**'LEARNING TO BE HUMAN:
John Macmurray on Education'**

Saturday October 5th 10.30-4.30, 2013

The Friends' Meeting House
43 St Giles, Oxford

Main Speaker:

Professor Julian Stern

*(Faculty of Education & Theology York St John
University)*

on

**'John Macmurray and Schools as
Households'**

See his essay of the same title in the *Oxford
review of Education*, Vol. 38, No. 6, 2012
(www.tandfonline.com/toc/core20/38/6)

For more details and booking go to:
johnmacmurray.org

**'THE SECOND-PERSON
PERSPECTIVE IN SCIENCE AND THE
HUMANITIES'**

Weds. July 17th, 4 pm – Sat July 20th (dinner), 2013

Ian Ramsey Centre, St Anne's College, High St, Oxford

Further details at

www.philevents.org/event/show/8456

and follow 'How to register: External Site'
for more details about fees, registration, accommodation,
meals, and payment.

THE DIAGNOSIS OF SCIENTISM:

ERIC VOEGELIN AND MICHAEL POLANYI ON SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

Colin Cordner

Abstract

The purpose here shall be to highlight and unpack certain key dimensions of both Michael Polanyi's and Eric Voegelin's diagnoses of scientism as an ideological movement. In doing so, it is my aspiration to distinguish scientism from science much as one might distinguish disease from health. The comparison shall be of an ideal of a closed, fully objective and self-contained system of explicit rules and propositions, to the open, active strivings to understand the real of a responsible and embodied person.

Keywords

Eric Voegelin, Michael Polanyi, science, scientism, positivism, philosophy of science, philosophy of history, consciousness, epistemology, political science, political philosophy, ideology

1. Introduction

On the first day of his 1951 Walgreen Lectures, standing before a distinguished audience at the University of Chicago, Eric Voegelin made many remarks which may have been deemed upsetting to some among his listeners. On that occasion, Voegelin let it be known how and to what extent he judged the adherents of positivism to have rooted themselves in a peculiar and anti-theoretical, self-imposed ignorance. Indeed, he proposed it to be rooted in a grandiose will-to-power which could be upheld in the face of reality only by a remarkable will to ignorance. However, his indictment of positivism for the destruction it wrought to political science was only secondary to his vituperating spiritual and psychological critique of the men and women adhering to its premises. The immediate critique would take several days to fully unfold; the larger critique would continue to unfurl onto Voegelin's last days. It would reach culmination in Volume V of *Order and History*, with his fullest exposition of the structures of consciousness, and the symptoms of spiritual derailment and revolt.¹

In 1962, Michael Polanyi would receive a similar invitation to present at the University of California, Berkeley, under the auspices of the McEnerney Lectures.² Over the course of four lectures, Polanyi would deliver his own compressed (though somewhat less caustic) critique of the fateful turn in Western civilisation which had brought it before the apocalypse of totalitarian regimes. In doing so, he

recapitulated, in brief, the systematic critique contained in his 1958 magnum opus, *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy*. His defence of civilisation in the West would take the form of a defence of the individual person and of science against the dangerous and impossible pretences he termed scientism and the Laplacean mind.

Thus, like Voegelin, Polanyi had engaged himself in the quest of rescuing and reconstructing science, particularly the sciences of man or politics, from what they perceived as an ideological derailment. This derailment, they argued, not only threatened the sciences as practices, but also, through the deformation of political science, the free and open societies in which they were embedded.

The purpose here will be to highlight and unpack certain key dimensions of both men's diagnoses. In doing so, it is my aspiration to distinguish science from scientism much as one might distinguish health from disease. The comparison shall be of an ideal of a closed, fully objective and self-contained system of explicit rules and propositions, to the open, active strivings to understand the real by a responsible and embodied person. It is the latter, living and incarnate, and seeking to dispose and to reform themselves in search of a deeper, more meaningful contact with reality, which both thinkers uphold as the paradigm both of science and of spiritual health.

A healthy *political* science shall thus manifest as a practice which can claim to deepen the experiential life of human beings, by bringing a certain clarity to the question of who man is. It would give a certain credence and clarity to his utmost aspirations—intellectual, aesthetic, and moral while providing also an understanding of his limits, and those of his fellows. We may call this the gift of prudence, in the sense of Aristotle's *phronesis*. An unhealthy political science, by contrast, would be one in which fails to attempt to inculcate either or both of these dimensions of knowing and being. Conversely, it might encourage the acceptance of their opposites: a conviction in the meaningless and mere subjectivity of individual aspirations, and the denial of prudent limits.³

In pursuit of this goal, I shall turn to those expressions of human existence which, those men firmly held, rooted the human person in the reality in which they were born and of which all persons

innately sought valid understanding. As such, I shall focus on expositing Voegelin's structures of consciousness, and Polanyi's structure of commitment. These can then be brought to bear on those expressions and practices which they held tended to derail the modern mind, with scientism being the primary focus.

In the course of this exposition, it will become apparent that subtle differences in emphasis separate the two men in such a way as to highlight the epoch-making revolts against reality, on the one hand, as opposed to quotidian nihilism, on the other. These I believe to be valuable, complementary, and often overlapping analyses, which may shed much light upon the avenues which they perceived for the renewal of political science.

2. Voegelin's search for order

Eric Voegelin expired on January 19th, 1985, thereby bringing to a close his own personal quest to enucleate the foundations of order in human existence. That quest had spanned approximately sixty years. By the end, his collected writing would fill thirty-four volumes, capped by the fifth and final volume of *Order and History*. Though unedited at his death, Voegelin remarked to his wife, Lissy Onken Voegelin, that he had gone as far and stated as clearly as possible, in that volume, all that could possibly be said.⁴ *In Search of Order*, he well understood, would be the key to all of his other works.⁵

That being said, it cannot be claimed that grappling with Volume V is any mean feat. Though easily the shortest volume in the series, it is also easily, one suspects, the most difficult of his collected works, its nearest competition being perhaps only the later editions of *Anamnesis*. That difficulty originates in the highly meditative nature of the volume. In Volume V, Voegelin increasingly eschews the somewhat more approachable form of an exegesis of political reality, and more directly approaches the question of man in his being and his awareness of his being. The order of history, Voegelin long affirmed, was the history of order, and the source of that order originated in the human illumination of reality in the very quest for its Ground.

In his own quest for the proper means to symbolise that questing structure, Voegelin produced or recovered a panoply of concepts and symbols. He would often either find these to be useful hand-holds for deeper delvings, or else inadequate formulations to be superseded. Take, for instance, the tripartite division of history so central to *The New Science of Politics* into the emergence of cosmological, anthropological, and soteriological civilisations. That

division becomes less important in later works, as the analysis shifts to the symbol 'history' itself, and to its status as a symbol proceeding from the imaginative response of concrete human beings to the ineluctable process of reality. Similarly, earlier formulations, such as '[man's] participation in being', and even his analysis of Gnosticism, he later found to be secondary expressions of more fundamental structures for which he would find satisfying insight and language only later in life.

Order and History may therefor be meaningfully read, perhaps in conjunction with *Anamnesis*, as the gradual unfolding of a meditative exercise decades in length, as the author teases-out the paradoxes of human existence in a world in tension towards the Ground of being. In Volume V, the focus of analysis had shifted almost entirely to the centrality of such meditation in itself. For Voegelin, anamnetic meditation and reflection brings to light the paradox of consciousness-reality-language, and to the modern phenomenon of the revolt against reality, of which scientism represented a persistent expression.

Central to Voegelin's elucidation of the mystery of existence was his recognition of the paradox of its tripartite structure. Stated tersely, every human being is at once aware of a reality which he or she intends, and which he or she shall tend to signify using concepts in the process of gaining and furthering an intellectual grasp of that which is intended. Thus, human *intentionality* intends reality either directly, as a whole field of 'things', or indirectly, via the 'things' which are experienced as parts littering the field. Conversely, that same concrete, flesh and blood person possesses an awareness of themselves as a predicate of reality, which is now mysteriously illuminating itself for its truth through consciousness. In the *luminosity* of consciousness, the unfolding of reality is illuminated as an intelligible mystery which cannot be pointed at with a signifier and conceptualised, but only alluded to in symbolic expression.⁶ Furthermore, upon meditative reflection (i.e. *reflective distancing*), that same person calls to awareness both of these dimensions of their conscious existence as well as the dimension of reflection itself. The subject of intentionality, who intends and conceptualises reality and its 'things', is simultaneously discovered as the luminous predicate or fount of the comprehending reality. Reality is thus illuminated through consciousness, and the mortal being who now reflects upon themselves distantly, finds themselves betwixt and between the status of intending subject and luminous predicate.

For this thoroughly paradoxical structure of existence (speaking both ontologically and epistemologically), ever evident to anyone who cared

to reflect upon and symbolise it, Voegelin adopted the symbol of Metaxy.⁷ All three dimensions of human consciousness or awareness, *intentionality*, *luminosity*, and *reflective distancing*, he noted to be a human constant in all times and persons. To distinguish the two modes in which reality is experienced, he coined the terms *thing-reality* and *It-reality*, for which we then may find corresponding expressions in, for instance, concepts and symbols, respectively.

The original structure

consciousness — reality — language

... quickly expands to:

intentionality thing-reality conceptual language

| | |
luminosity --- It-reality --- symbolic expression

|
reflective distancing

One then quickly notes no types or modes of reality, nor of language, corresponding to reflective distancing. Nor should there be. For, reality experienced in the meditative reflection is reality simply. Reality itself is the It which is both (i) the field of things signified, and (ii.a) that which is comprehensively, luminously symbolised and re-symbolised for its truth as (ii.b) that truth is won and lost to oblivion in the process of time. In the meditation, one reflects upon the mystery of the structure itself. History is that which Voegelin often, aphoristically, referred to as ‘life in the Metaxy’; it emerges as a reflective symbol called from human imagination to capture the comi-tragic character of humans winning and losing truth through the process of time.

On the one hand, truth is won through the noetic, pneumatic, or the more compact primary experiences of reality of great questioners. Those questioners may be poets, priests, prophets, or philosophers, who then symbolise the new truth, which is felt to make a compelling (if not compulsory) call upon him or herself and upon human existence generally. The new truth may find any of a variety of forms of expression, including myth and the arts as well as theoretical expositions such as those of Aristotle’s treatises, which will vary in depth, breadth, and clarity. Under certain circumstances, such luminous symbols may become socially and politically effective. They may even become the basis for the institutional expression of a political order’s existential and/or transcendental representation. Or, finding themselves in a society possessed of a different or more compact symbolisation of reality, they may find themselves

ignored or even suppressed. Here we may stop to recall the fate of Plato and the Academy to be largely ignored, and Socrates to be sentenced to death by Athens, even as its transcendental representation in the tragic cult was disintegrating, and its existence threatened by the spectre of Macedonia over the horizon.

Furthermore, while the symbols engendered in the originating experience may become a precious means for educating future generations and guiding them to renewing experiences of effecting *paideia* and *periagoge* in Plato’s sense there comes also a danger. The luminous symbols of life in the Metaxy will, at times, be misconstrued as metaphysical ‘concepts’ or ‘ideas’ denoting a wholly objective thing-reality. Such ‘concepts’ may then themselves become the propositional material for the construction of a dogma which shall then be presented as ‘true’.

In the worst cases, the dogmatic construction of reality as merely thing-reality intended by the human subject may even block all view of the comprehending It-reality, and of human existence in the Metaxy. Within the horizon of such a derailment, all experience of transcendence may come to be seen as instances of ‘untruth’, insanity, or, more subtly of ‘subjective’ beliefs or values. This phenomenon Voegelin referred to as the *eclipse of reality* through the erection of *Second Realities*. At its base, the philosopher saw as motive in such erections of unreality, a horror at the reality which does not bend to the intentionality of the erector.⁸

This then brings us to the matter of Voegelin’s analysis of scientism. In his early, 1948 paper entitled ‘The Origins of Scientism’, and in *The New Science of Politics*, he turned his attention to the temporal origins of the scientific trend in political science. He perceived among many purported practitioners of the science, the dogmatic effort to divest themselves and their students of all trappings of tradition and all ‘subjective’ values for the sake of studying science ‘scientifically’. What was largely presented as science was the adherence to a rigorous, impersonal methodology for the sake of extracting relevant facts from the intended sub-field of reality. An orthodox methodology would then, ideally, as closely approximate the methods of physics and chemistry as was feasible, and all data which was not amenable to extraction in this manner would be deemed irrelevant or illusory. That is to say, all reality that did not bend or reveal itself through the orthodox method was *a priori* defined as subjective fancy.

But, as he observed, the mere fact that this disposition to all of reality, in which the sciences of

phenomena and of substance or essence were erroneously conflated, was stark non-sense was irrelevant. As he observed, the fact that the fallacious nature of the scientific faith had, could, and was regularly proven to be unreasonable, illogical, and perverse, did not change the minds of its adherents. At the very least, the browbeating was not enough to prevent scientific dogma from becoming socially effective.⁹

In 'The Origins of Scientism', Voegelin traced the first solid footholds of the movement to the reception of the *Meditations* of René Descartes, and to the *Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica* of Isaac Newton. As he observed, it was, ironically, a theoretical shortcoming or defect in both works which allowed certain Enlightenment thinkers to dispense with 'the unnecessary hypothesis of God' in their constructions of reality.¹⁰ In the first instance, Descartes' materialisation of space, and, in the second case, Newton's positing of an absolute space, could, and would, be used to 'shut out God'. This, it was felt, would let the new scientists get on with their work without undue worries regarding substance. The fact that both the absurdity, and the logically and phenomenologically demonstrable falsity of both notions was pointed-out within Newton's lifetime was dismissed. Much the same fate befell the presentation of the means of correcting those errors through the relativisation and geometricisation of space. The working hypotheses allowed physicists to get to work, and to fend off criticism, while the philosophers' demonstrations of the contradictions were difficult to understand, and impeded progress. Centuries later, it would take an Ernst Mach and an Albert Einstein to correct, from within the discipline, those errors which had been observed from without by the philosophers.

By then, of course, the damage had been done, as every science took it upon itself to emulate physics in an attempt to emulate its enormous successes in describing phenomena. In the sciences of substance, however, such emulation was destined to miscarry by its very nature. And it did, almost immediately. In his opening speech to the Walgreen Lectures, Voegelin pointed out that the positivistic doctrine, a species of scientism so often breached in principle had reached both its apex and its inversion in the work of Max Weber. For, it was quickly discovered that to unveil 'facts' of political reality that were not completely irrelevant and meaningless, it was necessary to anchor them 'by reference to a value'. This led to a grave predicament, for a self-conscious practitioner would eventually come to worry that his facts took reference from a completely arbitrary value of their own making, thus upsetting the

positivistic ethos. Often, this upsetting turn of events would be overcome by reference to an established and objective value, two of which were of particular interest: the value of the State, or that of one of the scientifically-determined Utopias. Scientism in political science led self-consistent practitioners to become either handmaidens of the State, or of the secular millenarian movements of the age.

Max Weber, for his part, rescued himself from the trap by sneaking-in the category of 'belief' into his voluminous work. Weber thus re-established in principle that a credible social scientist might study society according to the standards of its own self-illuminating transcendental standards, as represented, for instance, in its religious practices. Of course, this did not, in principle, provide the criteria for a reasonable critique of beliefs in themselves.¹¹

Having traced scientism back to its earliest evident manifestations and elucidated its consequences for the very premises of political science, one is then invited to apply Voegelin's later work, in conjunction with the earlier, to fully enucleate the phenomenon. In 'The Origins of Scientism', the philosopher observed the stated desire of early enthusiasts to 'shut-out God' by imagining a fully materialised space as an infinitely closed field of things. It is those things whose natures might now be explicitly or objectively known to the human subject, according to their quantifiable translations from place to place with reference to an absolute space. Such a universe could rightly be held to do quite well without reference to a God or to substance. The fact that such a universe bears no relation to the universe in which the scientific thinker actually inhabits cannot be put down as an unfortunate error. Even in his earlier work, Voegelin identified a stubborn refusal, at the very beginnings of the movement, to be corrected as to the errors of logic and of science which were evident even at the time, and which have only become more flagrant and obvious in modern times.

Instead, we are invited to look to the phenomenon of the pseudo or second reality which has been imaginatively substituted for the given reality, which man in his lot must grapple and reconcile with. What becomes apparent then is several deformations of the scientific thinker's own existence. First, we should note the fallacious resolution of the paradox of consciousness- reality-language into the contracted form:

intentionality -> 'reality -> concepts, signifiers, etcetera.

^-----|

Here, we see the reality experienced by the scientific subject as it is reduced to a process of intentionalistic acts directed towards a fully objectified 'reality', which is then conceptualised for the sake of future intentional acts. The 'reality' here is to be understood as the thing-reality of intentionalistic awareness, which conveniently omits the participatory structures of being. The scientific thinker leaves him or herself out of the picture, holding themselves aloft and separate and independent from the pseudo-reality of their own devising. Rather than serving the purpose of illuminating reality for its truth through the responsive and responsible evocation of symbols by a receptive and reflective questioner, the imagination is turned to the task of blotting-out as much of reality as possible. That much may be accomplished by committing the more complex dimensions of experience and existence to oblivion. Into this *imaginative oblivion* is thus cast the question of whom man is, and with that question, all aspiration by the imager for illumination and self-knowledge. Stated poetically, she attempts to throw away her soul in favour of her will, and makes a desert of her world.

We are therefor also called to look to the roots of this turning away so opposed as it is from the *periagoge* in either Plato or Voegelin's sense in what the Austrian-born thinker termed the *egophany*, or *egophanic revolt*, in contrast with *theophany*. By theophany we are meant to understand those experiences of questioners from which issue the symbols which illuminate reality, and particularly the participatory structures of existence. By egophany, by contrast, we would understand the acts of imaginative oblivion which are meant to magically bring the quest to a close. The magic is effected in two stages: (i) By transforming the ineluctable, paradoxical process of reality into a goal or problem to be resolved by man's creative action, and, (ii) By distorting consciousness and language such that the Delphic quest to 'know thyself' is transformed in the imagination into a series of intentionalistic acts by which man creates himself in the very process of destroying and perfecting the thing-reality of his dream world, i.e. he creates for himself an 'identity'.

The pseudo or Second Reality imagined by the egophanic thinker is thus itself to be understood as a deformed symbol, or symbolic framework, evoked in response to the given, first reality. Whereas, however, from theophany issues a greater receptivity and comprehension of the comi-tragic character of existence, from egophany issues revulsion and revolt. While though, this revolt may originate in the pure

superbia of the egophanic thinker, Voegelin does not hesitate to point-out another common, and much more human, source of the revolt: the horror of existence, of its mundane and artificial sufferings, the ruin of home, hearth, and empires, the sufferings of the just, and the rewards afforded to the bad.¹²

Scientism and its deformed symbols of progress and control thus develops out of, and is sustained, at least as much in the passionate desire to sanctify reality as to destroy it.¹³ In so far, however, as *episteme*, scientific knowing, is, for Voegelin, rooted in an openness towards reality as it is given, the scientific revolt is self-defeating. It's very closedness makes science difficult or impossible, and tends to actually undermine scientific practice. In example, Voegelin points both to the sorry state of political science in the 1950s under the sway of positivisms and behaviouralisms of various sorts, and, in the realm of physics, to three centuries of resistance to recognising the need for a theory of relativity.

2. Polanyi's commitment to reality

Michael Polanyi expired on February 22nd, 1976, at the age of eighty-four. By the time of his death, he had witnessed the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, of which he had been a citizen, following the butchery of the Great War. Later, he had seen the rise of the Bolsheviks, Fascists, and National Socialists in Europe, the horrors of the Second World War, and the advancing nihilism of the continent's intellectual vanguard. This last, for Polanyi, seemed exemplified in the figure of Jean-Paul Sartre, his *Nausea*, his hollow, absurd freedom, and his moral capitulation to the open and honest immorality of Stalinism.

Born in the heart of the Hapsburg empire near its close, educated first as a physician, then as a chemist, Polanyi's deep unease at the disease afflicting the Continent would eventually turn him towards philosophy. His most comprehensive work, *Personal Knowledge*, while ostensibly a monograph on epistemology and the philosophy of science, quickly reveals itself as something else besides. *Personal Knowledge* ultimately bears upon the question of whom man is. It is a work of ontology as much as epistemology, and, as such, bears first upon the question of human knowing and being, before bearing on the pressing problem of how man should be.

In his reflections upon these matters, Polanyi came to focus at length upon one particular feature of knowing and being which bore both upon the fundamental existential question, but also (quite importantly for us) upon the phenomenon of

scientism. That feature is the structure of commitment as the indispensable feature of knowing, which Polanyi illustrates thus:

{ personal passion -> confident utterance
-> accredited facts }

Here then, the arrows 'indicate the force of commitment, and the brackets the coherence of the elements involved in the commitment'.¹⁴

This seeming simple diagram, however, serves us as a shorthand or clue as to what underlies it. To bring that fully to light requires considerable unpacking of the individual elements in order to better view the structure in its depth.

To begin to do that, one must, as did Polanyi, begin with the body that most intimate part of our persons and our knowing. Far from being a convenient (or, perhaps, inconvenient) transportation device for conveying our minds from place to place, and for performing manipulations upon the material world, we are, for Polanyi, as much our bodies as our minds. It is in attending to the larger world outside of the immediate boundaries of our bodies that we learn to dispose ourselves *subsidiarily*, in a relatively skilled or unskilled manner, such that we come to grips with that which we wish to know and to make sense of. Knowing skilfully, or simply dealing skilfully, requires a proper disposition of our persons with regards to that which we are attending to *focally*.

Polanyi's classic example of this is of the blind man's use of a cane to build-up an understanding of the world through which he's moving, and to get where he's going. It is by *indwelling* in the cane, which he holds just so, and by allowing it to become an extension of his body to sink into his *tacit awareness* that he may experience the sidewalk at the end of the cane as he swings it back it forth. If, however, he fails for a moment to dwell bodily in the cane, if for instance he makes focal the feeling of the pressure of the cane impinging on the palm of his hand as he strikes the ground, then his perception of the world will falter. One could say the same of a piano player who starts to pay too much attention to fingers as she plays: her performance will fall apart and become clumsy as she makes the focus of her attention, the subsidiary elements of her performance, e.g. the precise movements of her body in relationship to the piano. This elementary element in the development and exercise of our personal knowledge extends from the pre-linguistic attempts of an infant to co-ordinate the muscular actions of its head, neck, and eyes for the sake of bringing an object in its field of sight into focus, all the way up to the most cultured and sophisticated

performance of a piano concerto by a great master. In each case, it is only when the subsidiary elements of a comprehensive performance are brought to bear upon that which interests us be it the playing of a piano, or solving a problem which puzzles us that we may skilfully focus and dwell upon it.

With the invocation of language and culture, however, we come to those additional elements of our personal knowledge which we, as human beings, hold exclusively of all beings known to us, or which at least no other animal has been known to possess to any great extent. With language and culture, the essential forms of learning and intelligence which we share with other animals most strikingly with the higher primates to whom we are most closely related are enhanced and extended to an extent which no other animal can match.

With the ability to develop and express language comes the ability to extend ourselves, our intellectual control and comprehension, more rapidly and completely that would otherwise prove feasible. In so far as it also allows us to aid others in furthering their intellectual control and comprehension, or, conversely, to be so aided by others, it provides the basis for a certain *conviviality* of culture. Through language and indwelling, we may come to not only understand other human beings in their immediate moods and dispositions, but come to apprehend the world as they see it. Through *apprenticeship* and education, we do so in order to come to embody and reflect the understanding the very being of those whom we sense to have deeper insight than ourselves. Ultimately, we do so by disposing of ourselves in such a way as to become more as they are in our passionate desire, for instance, for deeper contact with the real, the true, the beautiful, or with justice.

Language, education, culture, and apprenticeship then form the basis for a *conceptual framework* which gives a structure to our personal knowledge and to those intrinsic passions. But, lest Polanyi's meaning of conceptual framework be mistaken for that of others, it should be observed that, for Polanyi, our frameworks are not determinate of knowledge or knowing. Rather, it would appear that they serve us in three ways: i) they give some means of expression, however limited, of what we know, but which we may not otherwise be able meaningfully to express, ii) they provide some basis from which to undertake our future impassioned gropings with reality, iii) they cultivate our intrinsic passions as well as our intrinsic intelligence.


The key to Polanyi's conception of our conceptual frameworks, then, would appear to be their very status as frameworks within which we find and give

direction to our often tacit, inexpressible knowledge, our intimations, and our heuristic passions, as well as our almost purely subjective desires, i.e. for nourishment or for sexual activity. Our conceptual frameworks, therefore, are not determinate of what we know, but form one element of our personal knowledge in service of our personal passions, which we pursue with universal intent.

Stated differently, we bring together and bringing to bear the *clues* subsisting within and without our bodies. Driven by our passion to know, and guided by both our tacit and explicit knowledge and by our conceptual frameworks, we act to apprehend and to pursue our intimations of a hidden reality, hitherto concealed from view and yet which we sense to be hinted at. This, not incidentally, is Polanyi's answer to Meno's Paradox. First comes the sensing within ourselves the open-ended and hitherto unrealised implications of what we know. From this follows our diverting of our heuristic passion towards the realisation of those implications, and bring to bear our personal knowledge, our clues, and our intimations upon the problem which we wish to illuminate. In doing so, we hope to make the *heuristic leap* across the *logical gap* which yet both separates those clues into disparate elements, and separates us from that which we perhaps only dimly perceive on the other side. If successful, we comprehend (i.e. bring together) those clues, such that they cohere as a solution to the problem which has troubled us, the implications of which may then itself come to stir us anew.

Thus, even this abbreviated summary serves to demonstrate the tremendous depth of our commitments, such that we may, I suspect, expand the diagram like so:

{personal passion->confident utterance->accredited facts}



At each stage of abstraction (represented by the successive stages of vertical expansion, or differentiation), we bring to awareness succeeding elements which give particular shape and direction to our personal passion. This giving of shape and of direction would then be what Polanyi termed our *calling*. Our calling is thus constituted, in great part, by the conceptual framework of our personal knowledge, which is itself constituted by a myriad of factors of tradition, pedagogy, and historical circumstance. Nevertheless, these give a foundation for a responsible exercising of our knowing and being in a passionate, committed pursuit of the undisclosed, but intimated, aspects of reality which yet allude us. When we find illumination, our commitment allows us to make sense of what we have found or discovered, and to accredit the facts as real. Those accredited facts themselves then becomes part of us, for every heuristic leap is the crossing of a Rubicon which cannot be uncrossed, and which changes our very way of being.

The implications of the structure of commitment for the subjects of science and scientism, is perhaps made clearer if contrasted with the structure of doubt:

Subjective belief; Declaratory sentence; Alleged facts.

Perhaps the most striking difference about the structure of doubt is its status as a non-structure. Absent is the holistic character of commitment, symbolised by the brackets enclosing its various moments and by the arrows joining them. In doubting, our knowing is taken apart, or else falls apart: its constitutive elements are rendered into free-floating parts. As such, we dispose ourselves to them separately and from the outside, rather than from the inside and as parts of a whole which gives them meaning.¹⁵ Thus, each element of the committed pursuit of reality becomes the object of sceptical interrogation. Personal passion is analysed for subjective belief, the confident utterance judged as a declaratory statement in terms of the rules of logic and grammar, and accredited facts are transformed into alleged facts.

In the normal course of our pursuit of knowledge, however banal or rarefied, vulgar or precious, doubt serves a purpose of critical analysis, including critical self-analysis. By doubting our conclusions or those of others, we subject what is being accredited as a fact to standards of verification or of validation, according to whether the alleged fact bears upon observation or invention, or else interpretation.¹⁶ Having submitted ourselves or others to such critique or review (of which scientific peer review is a particular species), we may [a] declare that what we

or they purported to know is true indeed, [b] find what we know clarified, perhaps in a manner which was completely unexpected, though implied, or [c] it may be declared mistaken, false, misleading, illusory, or untrue.¹⁷

Should we ultimately satisfy ourselves that what we know is true, the structure of commitment reasserts itself, and we allow our beings to be transformed to a greater or lesser extent. In a sense, we commit ourselves to being transformed. This, Polanyi affirms, constitutes the essence of science, and explicitly affirms the logic of Augustine's maxim: '*Nisi credideritis non intelligitis.*'¹⁸

If scientific practice must ultimately find purchase for scientists' open-ended exploration and discovery of reality in the personal commitment of those very scientists, and in their skilful disposition of their beings in the receptive pursuit of the object of their intellectual passions, then *scientism* must be something quite different. And indeed, scientism, by Polanyi's account, represents a sort of deformation of science in which doubt and objectivity, rather than commitment (or trust) and personal knowledge, have been granted an elevated status, at least in theory, if not always in practice.¹⁹ Doubting and method are put forward as the means of escaping 'subjectivity', rather than as complements to scientific connoisseurship and commitment to truth.

For Polanyi, one consequence of this inversion of the relationship between trust and doubt has been the steady destruction of all knowledge which cannot be made 'objective'. That is to say that all tacit knowledge, which forever forms the greater part of what we, in our persons, truly know, is deprecated in favour of that thin slice of what we know which can be formulated in rigid, explicit maxims of great generality. Scientistic doubt, in the name of objectivity, thus tends to hollow-out the sciences in the name of their purification.

For Polanyi, the pathos of this pursuit, which is exemplified in the ideal of Laplace's Demon, has tended to destroy knowledge and meaning wherever it has been engaged in seriously and consistently. This is so, for, in reality, it is patently impossible to know anything of importance about the more complicated strata of reality, which have emerged from the dead, mechanical matter of atoms, by referring to a universal table of atomic positions.²⁰

And yet, for all its impossibility, the ideal of the Laplacean mind, which purports to know everything because it doubts anything which is not quantifiable in terms of atomic positions and vectors, has been a socially effective illusion. However, whereas the natural sciences have largely continued apace by frequently ignoring in practice the doctrines of

scientism to which they at least pay lip-service, the arts, humanities, theology, and social sciences suffered greatly. By Polanyi's reckoning, nihilism was the natural correlate of the scientistic dismantling of the recognition of any meaning in human life above and beyond the easily quantifiable desires for power and profit. Fascism, National Socialism, and Marxism were the honest and legitimate heirs to scientistic scepticism and of the intrinsic moral passions which it had stripped of all direction through the intrepid annihilation of all conceptual frameworks which might make moral direction thinkable. In a final irony, this scepticism, taken to its logical conclusion, denies truth itself as a mask for the lust for power, thereby denying the grounds for science itself.

3. A diagnostic science

Throughout this essay, an attempt has been made to outline two philosophers' diagnoses of scientism as a peculiarly modern malaise, which could be understood as a defective mode of science or philosophy. The analogy of a disease of substance often suggests itself in their works, even, at least in Polanyi's case, where that term is politely omitted.²¹

As such, it proved necessary first to outline a state of health, against which to compare the proposed pathology. In the case of Voegelin, the description focused upon that of the questioner in his or her open, reflective quest to know reality in its breadth and depth. *Episteme*, or science, was therein understood as the quest undertaken in these terms. The opposing figure of man in revolt against reality thus presented itself as a case of closedness, self-assertion of the intentionalistic ego. It also took on the classification of a variety of magical thinking in which the process of reality was wished-away or else hidden behind an illusory Second Reality. The deformation of consciousness in its actual structure of *intentionality-luminosity-reflective distancing* into mere modes of intent or the will, were, for Voegelin, common symptoms of modern pneumopathology, of which scientism is a particular variation.

In Polanyi's case, the standard of health in human being and knowing focused upon the structure of commitment, and upon critical doubt as a complementary but subordinate tool for its clarification and analysis. Doubt as a way of life, as envisaged in dogmatic scepticism, was then presented as destructive of all knowing and of the human person, of which knowing is an active expression. It is thus a remarkable irony that the reforms of scientism are undertaken in the name of overcoming all possibility of subjectivity, and all

possibility for doubt. In its quest wholly to substitute explicit knowledge for tacit knowledge, and to substitute methodology for apprenticeship and connoisseurship (essentially to replace education with training), scientism's adherents were held actually to be damaging or systematically destroying the sciences.

This could only be so, for a rigid objectivism rooted in a radical scepticism is not only an expression of a form of doubting which necessarily causes the elements of commitment and personal knowledge to fall apart. It also inverts the relationship between trust and doubt such that that forced incoherence of the meaningful elements of comprehensive entities, together with a radical mistrust in one's own common sense, is presented as a virtue and as the premise of 'science'. Finally, it tends to cause one to view all 'facts' which cannot be quantified and made 'objective', fully utterable and explicit, as superfluous, illusory, or 'subjective' prejudice. The fact that such a 'science' could not, by its own premises, say anything whatsoever regarding operational principles or purposes, Polanyi remarks, not only renders the human sciences and arts absurd, but also the whole of biology, the applied sciences, great swathes of theoretical physics and chemistry, and even the pure maths. This is the case, for none among them can actually be practised without some personal knowledge of principles and purposes, which inevitably must be founded upon a bedrock of tacit knowing, and lived as a particular way of being.

In both cases, one sees scientism diagnosed as a break with reality. In both cases, the human tension towards the reality of which both human beings and the tension itself are parts, becomes strangely twisted. Voegelin, however, came to focus his study upon the great egophanic revolutionaries, and, secondarily, upon the historic developments which had first made such revolt possible, and then increasingly 'normal' in the West. Polanyi, on the other hand, focused much of his attention upon the outbreak, its continuing advancement, and its treatment.

In either case, the transference of the standards of scientism to the social sciences, particularly political science proper, could only have obvious and deleterious side-effects. Asides from the aforementioned setting aside of values as a subject-matter of political science, and the supplanting of a science of phenomena for one of substance, it necessarily entails the substitution of political training for political education in the classical sense. When under the influence of scientism, political science, to use Polanyi's language, will tend to be misconstrued as a science of pure, objective

observation which aims to make explicit reports on quantifiable political phenomena. Gone then is much of the impetus for the student (not to say the teacher) personally to immerse themselves deeply in the authority of a culture for the sake of understanding, and of developing personal judgement. Gone too is much of the intrinsic interest of the subject-matter, given that the standards and practices of scientism necessarily dissolve meaning in the acid of objectivity. One could then hardly expect that a student of a thoroughly positivistic political science to deepen their own persons, let alone their understandings of any society, including their own. If anything, one might be concerned for its teachings' effects on their pre-existing common-sense or prudence, and their aptitude or interest in any calling for personal political responsibility.

In this diagnosis, I believe both men to be fully in agreement, though their languages may differ. One might say that their respective approach to the same problem is somewhat reflective of their own ways of being: on the one hand, the reflective philosopher of history, and, on the other, the concerned physician. In both cases, we find a great concern expressed for the consequences of the failure, if not the refusal, to comprehend reality on its own terms was having both for the sciences, but also for what Voegelin termed the open, and Polanyi, the free society.

Department of Political Science
Carleton University
Ottawa, Canada
ccordner@connect.carleton.ca

Notes

1. It is worth noting that, for the duration of this essay, that I shall use the terms 'scientism' and 'positivism' somewhat interchangeably, though by the latter should be understood a particular species of the former, which has been of particular prominence in political science.
2. Copies of Polanyi's lectures are now freely available at <http://www.missouriwestern.edu/orgs/polanyi/McEnerney-intro.htm>.
3. In both Voegelin's and Polanyi's cases, I believe that we see two philosophers diagnosing the remarkable lack of prudence endemic in their civilisation, and which may be epitomised in the staggering will-to-power evinced in scientism. In this, I believe they parallel Thucydides, Socrates and Plato's diagnosis of the nosos or nosema endemic in Hellas at the time of the Peloponnesian War, of which the staggering polypragnosyne and lack of phronesis of the Athenians were much remarked-upon and acute examples.
4. Voegelin, Eric (1901-1985). *Order and History*, v.5. University of Louisiana Press, 1987. foreword.

5. *ibid.* p.1.
 6. One may be reminded here of Heraclitus' 18th fragment: 'The lord whose oracle is at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals, but gives signs.'
 7. It is perhaps worth noting that Voegelin's *Metaxy*, though indebted to Plato, whom he indeed credits, differs quite sharply. It seems to this author at least that Voegelin uses 'Metaxy' to symbolise or denote a tension in human consciousness which is fully realised in reflective meditation. Plato's usage of the word *metaxu*, or equivalent symbolisations in mythological imagery, denote the ontological status, not only of human beings, but of the world as such. This much seems to be indicated, for instance, by Book V of *The Republic*, in which Socrates proposes that to *planeton* ('that which wanders between'), comprising the world and its contents in its entirety, moves between to me on, and to on.
 8. Voegelin, Eric (1901-1985). *The New Science of Politics in Modernity Without Restraint, Collected Works*, v.5. University of Missouri Press: 2000. . p. 224.
 9. For Voegelin's reconstruction of Berkeley's psychological critique of absolute space as a notion, see Voegelin, Eric (1901-1985). 'The Origins of Scientism', *Social Research*, 15:1/4 (1948). p. 473-476. For Leibniz's critique see pp. 477-482. Compare then the response expressing confusion by Clarke and Newton to Leibniz, p. 481-482; and Carl Neumann's attempt, in the 1870s, to defend the Newtonian model against relativistic theory, and Ernst Mach's reply, p. 483.
 10. We might say that this move was ironic for, as Voegelin notes both in that essay, and, with reference to Descartes, in his letter to Alfred Schütz on Edmund Husserl, that there was no attempt by either Descartes nor Newton to disprove the existence of God. Quite the opposite: the former's meditation proceeded from the self-evidence of the transcendental ego, and the second posited absolute space and rest as a means of demonstrating the existence of the divine. See 'TOoS', and Eric, Voegelin (1901-1985). 'A Letter to Alfred Schütz Concerning Edmund Husserl' in *Anamnesis, Collected Works*, v.6. University of Missouri Press: United States of America. . p. 45-50, which is also now accessible at (www.voegelinview.com/letter-to-alfred-schutz-on-husserl-pt-1.html).
 11. See, for example, O&H, v.5, p. 35-37. Cf. TNSoP, p. 187-189.
 12. See TNSoP, p. 223, 229; and O&H, v.5, pp. 37-39.
 14. See PK p. 303.
 15. *ibid.*, p. 303-304.
 16. For the sake of space and scope, we shall set aside the additional problems of authenticating facts bearing upon more or less purely subjective (as opposed to personal) experience. For Polanyi's fine distinction between the personal and subjective, and the concomitant distinction between verification and validation, on the one hand, and authentication, on the other, see *ibid.*, p. 201-202.
 17. See *ibid.*, p. 303-304. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 120-121, 125-127, 320-321, 373-374.
 18. *ibid.*, p. 267. Incidentally, it should be noted that Polanyi's picture of science is largely commensurate with the traditional understanding of philosophy of the Platonic or Aristotelian variety. In the preface to PK, Polanyi himself alludes to the similarities.
 19. *Ibid.*, p. 274-276. Cf. p. 160-167, 269-271, and 306-308, in particular, for Polanyi's analysis of *pseudo-substitutes* for truth in the sciences and philosophy, in, for instance, the forms of 'working hypotheses' or 'simplicity', which are used as means of pursuing truth, without appearing to commit oneself to stating that there is such a thing.
 20. Unfortunately, a larger exposition of Polanyi's ontology would be impossible in any brief article. One can, however, make reference to part 4 of PK and to the issues of equipotentiality, morphogenesis, and evolution within the context of *emergence* to gain insight into the matter.
 21. A lexicon and index of the terminology employed by Voegelin, ranging from the scientific and scholarly (e.g. Thucydides' *nosos*, Plato's *nosema*, Augustine's *libido dominandi* and *amor sui*), to the polemical (e.g. 'pneumopathological' or 'spiritually diseased'), would likely take several pages on its own.
-

THE PSYCHIATRIC CONCEPT OF CAUSATION: PHILOSOPHICAL AND SEMIOTIC CONTRIBUTIONS

J. Cutting

Abstract

The purpose of the article is to draw attention to the problematic notion of causality in the psychiatric literature. The author describes the received viewpoint, which boils down to but two candidates (excluding various terms covering an inherent predisposition) – psychogenesis and organicity – the mechanism of each being only ever vaguely formulated. The author suggests that within the philosophical corpus of Max Scheler and Ernst Cassirer there are insights pertinent to the notion of psychogenesis, and that relatively unknown work by a handful of Russian semioticians sheds light on the issue of organicity in this context.

Key words

Psychiatric causation, Cassirer, Scheler, semiotics, schizophrenia, depressive illness.

1. Introduction

There are five generic models of psychiatric causation:

- (1) all psychiatric disorders (excluding delirium and dementia) are psychogenic (including psycho-social) in origin;
- (2) all psychiatric disorders are founded on brain-based dysfunction, i.e. organic;
- (3) some psychiatric disorders are psychogenic, some are organic;
- (4) all psychiatric disorders have *both* a psycho-social *and* organic basis – the biopsychosocial model;
- (5) most psychiatric disorders are neither psychogenic nor organic, but are caused by some inherent psychic propensity to such (labelled ‘degeneracy’, ‘genetic predisposition’ ‘endogeneity’, or personality disorder at various times).

During the 19th and well into the 20th Century the last of these models held sway. Essentially it expressed a view that the cause of psychiatric disorder was largely unknown but because of an observed clustering in some families it was presumed that an individual who became mentally disordered must have already been predisposed to become so. Such individuals and their families were deemed ‘degenerate’ in the 19th Century, whereas during the 20th Century the neutral term ‘endogenous’ gained currency. Latterly it was further assumed that

genetic factors or personality disorder accounted for this endogeneity.

From the time of Hippocrates it had been recognized that actual bodily disease or a certain life-style or unfortunate event could render someone who was previously of sound mind mad as well, and during the 19th Century the role of syphilis as an example of the first became established, and debates as to the contribution of the last two were frequent. Kraepelin¹ in his history of this period, *One Hundred Years of Psychiatry*, divided practitioners into ‘*Psychiker*’ – advocates of a psychological, chiefly moral, cause – and ‘*Somatiker*’ – advocates of a bodily causation. What marked the turn of the 20th Century in this respect was an exaggerated polarization in this, along with a shift in emphasis within each camp. The *Psychiker* were now spearheaded by Freud and the psychoanalytic movement, who claimed psychological, not moral, causes were rife in all forms of psychiatric disorders. The vanguard of the *Somatiker* were now neurologists, such as Wernicke² and Goldstein³, who nominated dysfunction of the brain, not just bodily disease in general, as the cause of psychiatric disorders, and as *the* cause of all such disorders. Kraepelin⁴ and Bleuler⁵, the co-originators of the current diagnostic scheme of psychosis, were more circumspect about causation, though both were inclined to believe that some sort of specific brain disease would be found at a future date, certainly in the case of schizophrenia. Altogether, though, from the turn of the 20th Century onwards, the central issue in psychiatry has been the role of psychogenic v. organic (meaning cerebral dysfunction) factors in causing the various conditions that have been given diagnostic status. The role of genetic predisposition or personality disorder has been accorded a subsidiary role, at most a latent substrate on which these two factors can play.

It was Jaspers,⁶ psychiatrist turned philosopher, who proposed a solution to the organic-psychogenic dilemma, to the effect that some psychiatric disorders, such as schizophrenia, were likely to be caused by as yet unidentified organic factors, because they were impervious to any empathic understanding by a normal human being, whereas others, such as depressive illness, were

understandable as extremes of human distress within the range of normal human variation.

Finally, in the latter half of the 20th Century, beginning in the United States, but seeping back into Europe, there arose the idea that all psychiatric disorders were multifactorial in origin, that schizophrenia, for example, could not arise unless there were some organic substrate and some psycho-social trigger to precipitate it. This 'biopsychosocial' model of psychiatric causation, well reviewed by Ghaemi,⁷ though he himself is antipathetic to it and a devotee of Jaspers, is in decline, according to Ghaemi.

The currently prevailing model amongst psychiatrists is undoubtedly an organic one, where all psychoses, and even neuroses and anomalous behaviour such as anorexia nervosa or alcoholism or nicotine addiction, are attributable to brain dysfunction.

Amongst clinical psychologists, on the other hand, who are just as numerous and influential in Britain as psychiatrists on issues of mental health, the overwhelming view is that psychogenic factors are all-pervasive. In other words the psychogenic-organic debate continues unabated, although now polarised to professional groupings.

It is clear from all this that the issue is highly contemporary and that is what brings me to discuss it in this journal. What stands out, however, apart from the passion it seems to engender, are a series of unresolved matters. One is the meaning of the term 'psychogenic': What is supposed to be the causal agent here? What is its effect? and how does it achieve this? A second is the nature of the proposed alternative route, the organic one: what is assumed to be going on here? and is its mechanism and effect actually different from the psychogenic one?

The justification for presenting all this in a philosophical journal is that the nature of causation in general is a philosophical topic and it seems to me that psychiatrists have taken a narrow and unsophisticated view of the subject. Even Aristotle⁸ had a *four*-fold scheme of general causation. Moreover, the way the debate in psychiatry has been conducted it is as if the exertions of many 20th Century philosophers to break the straight-jacket of the body-mind dichotomy in this field had gone unheeded. Macmurray⁹ for example, has a chapter in his book *The Self as Agent* on causation where he distinguishes between the *reasons* a human agent has for his or her actions and the *causes* that bring forth an event. Wittingenstein¹⁰ also castigates Freud, the arch-advocate of psychogenesis in diverse psychiatric disorders, for having confused reasons

and causes. It seems to me that the psychiatric concept of causation is crying out for some philosophical input. To this end I have chosen two 20th Century philosophers, Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) and Max Scheler (1874-1928), to illustrate, and hopefully resolve, the problematic.

The choice of these two philosophers is far from arbitrary. Although a number of other modern philosophers, two of whom have already been mentioned, deliberated on the nature of causality, the work of these two seemed particularly relevant to the questions posed earlier, for the following reasons.

First, each of them had considerable interest in, and knowledge of, psychopathology. Scheler supervised an early thesis of Kurt Schneider's, who was one of the most fertile psychiatric minds of the 20th Century, and who introduced the notion of *first rank symptoms* of schizophrenia, which are now the gold standard for diagnosing that condition. Kurt Schneider then developed a psychopathological theory of depression on the basis of Scheler's thinking¹¹. Cassirer, through his nephew, the neurologist turned psychiatrist Kurt Goldstein, had hands-on experience of brain-damaged patients, and communicated what he learnt in a long section of the third volume of *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*¹². All this attracted the author to their more general philosophy.

Secondly, each philosopher stands out from most other major philosophers of the 20th Century for having an interest in anthropology, in particular in regarding the human being as an entity in *the making*, with a past, a present, and, in Scheler's case, a predictable future, all phases differing fundamentally in the nature and inter-relationships of their core ontological elements, e.g. thingness, spatiality, temporality, causality. This too appealed to the author because of his long-held view, bequeathed to him by one of the greatest *psychopathologists* of the 20th Century, Eugene Minkowski, that schizophrenia and depressive illness, the most puzzling pieces of an already enigmatic psychopathology, are ontologically distinct from one another and from the 'sane'¹³. If the human being at some point in the past, and, hypothetically, at some point in the future, is so radically different from the contemporary variety, then, perhaps, the author surmised, psycho-pathological states so radically different from the contemporary 'sane' might yet bear some resemblance to the 'sane' of yesteryear or tomorrow. In fact, in a companion article to the present one¹⁴, the author and a colleague argue this very thesis. The current article is to do with causation, whereas the companion article dealt with the *nature* of schizophrenia and depressive illness. At the very least, Cassirer's and Scheler's general

view of the contemporary human being as an ephemeral phase in unfinished business allowed considerable leeway for metaphysical accounts of these psychoses.

The third recommendation for promoting the two philosophers' work as a possible source of insight into the problem of causation in psychopathology is their robust advocacy of a duality at the core of the human being. This seemed highly relevant to the task of unravelling the organic pathway in psychopathological causation. Both Scheler and Cassirer were of the firm view, even more so in the last flowering of their philosophy, that the human being was, at root, an amalgam of *Geist* (Scheler and Cassirer) and *Drang* (Scheler) or *Leben* (Cassirer). *Geist* is awkwardly rendered in English as spirit, though it encompasses what we call mind, or at least higher mind, as well. *Drang* was translated as 'impulsion' by Manfred Frings, until his recent death the editor of Scheler's *Collected Works*, the translator of several of his central writings, and the author of some of the best English-language critiques of Scheler.¹⁵ Frings' term, however, is rather mechanistic. There are, indeed, strong connotations in the German word of a remorseless driving forth of energy, but 'vitality', 'animality', 'fecundity', or Cassirer's term *Leben* ('life') are perhaps preferable. I shall leave it untranslated. In Scheler's scheme the two 'partners' are at loggerheads; in Cassirer's, *Geist* is deemed superordinate to *Leben* and controls the situation smoothly. But setting aside differences in terminology and proposed interactions, the prescience of both philosophers in recognizing a human being with two contrasting agenda, quite counterintuitive for the time, is astonishing in the light of subsequent neuropsychological discoveries. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the unfolding evidence of a vast difference and antagonism between circumscribed homunculi within the brain, localized in each of the two cerebral hemispheres, has been the most notable advance in the neuro-scientific field of the last 50 years. The discipline of neuropsychology nowadays is essentially the study of hemispheric differences, and so, as prescience goes, Scheler's and Cassirer's was formidable, not only in recognizing this duality, but in characterizing fairly correctly, as it turned out, the nature of its two components. Scheler died in 1928 long before neurologists had any inkling of this duality, and Cassirer died in 1945 before seminal articles by the British neurologist Brain in 1941 and by the American neuropsychologist Akelaitis,¹⁷ also in 1941, had become general knowledge. This foresight further endeared the two philosophers to the author.

Fourthly, both philosophers appreciated that the human being was set apart from the non-human animal by the sort of knowledge it could achieve about its situation, and, further, that the human being's superiority vis-à-vis the animal in this respect stemmed from the fact that the actuality that it portrayed was, in normal circumstances, an amalgam of what both parties, *Geist* and *Drang/Leben*, brought to every encounter. Whereas the animal (in possession of only *Drang/Leben*) responded univocally and automatically to any sign in its environment (e.g. the cat *must* chase the mouse), the human being, through its possession of *Geist* in addition to *Drang/Leben*, could achieve a nuanced take on any matter. This is precisely what Cassirer's symbolic forms are: mythical, religious, everyday (linguistic: see below), artistic and scientific amalgam of something that stands as a sign for the animal and something that stands as an example of an idea (e.g. red, as a red rag to a bull and an idea). Scheler is more explicit about any actuality's being a coalescence of *Geist's* and *Drang's* take on any issue. He states quite unequivocally, and many times during his writings on metaphysics,¹⁸ that the human experience of something is always a coming together of the idea and the 'ur-phenomenon'. The ur-phenomenon for Scheler is the form or Gestalt or image of what the animal supposedly experiences. In the human, any experienced chair is the essence of chairness (an idea) actualized in the encounter with this particular 'chair', whose animal take on it would be, for a cat, for example, a place to be comfortable (an emotion) or a place to scratch its claws on (a useful entity). This recognition of the duality inherent in the potential knowledge available to a human being about its situation was the most astonishing and helpful of all the two philosophers' insights for the author's psychopathological enquires, as it allowed the possibility of a fracture in this amalgam, which might account for some instances of psychopathology. What if the schizophrenic or depressive, for example, were restricted to only one component of what was a dyad for the 'sane'? Further, what if the difference between the world-views of schizophrenic and depressive consisted precisely of which member of the pair was viable or deficient in each case? Not only would the person have a limited repertoire of environmental and worldly 'things' to be attracted to – as he or she would be as 'deaf' or 'blind' to what *Geistor Drang/Leben* could pick up in either case – but he or she would experience whatever they did 'know' in a distorted way, skewed in a direction favouring the sort of knowledge that *Geistor Drang/Leben* on their own can purvey. Consider now the following examples of psychopathology, drawn from either the

literature or the author's own clinical experience. Four illustrate an anomalous attraction to environment or world, four an anomalous experience of such; the first two of each tetrad demonstrate an attraction to environment or person and a non-objectified experience, the latter two an attraction to a thing or a word and an over-objectified experience. All this is presented in the introduction because an elaboration of this is the core theme of the paper:

(i) *'Environment dependency syndrome'*
(Lhermitte 1986,¹⁹ *left hemisphere damage*):

Lhermitte described a dramatic example of a captivation which involved public events. He named it the 'environment dependency syndrome' on account of the lack of personal autonomy which the two patients he studied showed in their behaviour in a variety of everyday situations. In fact Lhermitte had set these up to test the limits of their slavish obedience: for example, gift shop, gaming room, bedroom, bathroom, museum, garden, buffet. When Lhermitte lifted the toilet seat, for example, even though the subject had just urinated, he would go again, and when Lhermitte repeatedly offered a glass of water the subject would drink glass after glass, or seeing two chess players in the gaming room would himself pick up a chess piece, or on seeing a bed with the sheet turned back would undress and get into bed.

(ii) *'Embroidment in another person's affairs'*
(Minkowski 1933,²⁰ *depressive illness*):

'You forced me, in making me talk, to become an animal. It was an entirely involuntary reaction'.

He felt himself as if pushed henceforth in the same direction, as if he were incapable of taking any other.

'I feel as if when you insist on something I must submit to your will and do what you demand of me. It annoys me to be in such a way the 'stupid creature' (*bête*) of someone, but I am incapable of resisting. I am 'caught up in your affairs' (*embarquée par vous*).... I am like a ghost, but a magnetic ghost, automatically attracted by all sorts of things going on around'.

(iii) *'Response-to-next-patient-stimulation'*
(Bogousslavsky and Regli 1988,²¹ *right hemisphere damage*):

Bogousslavsky and Regli noted that 11 of 134 subjects with a right-sided cerebrovascular accident would inappropriately respond to verbal requests, e.g. open your mouth, which were actually addressed to the patient in the bed next to them. They called this 'response-to-next-patient-stimulation'. What lured the patients were *words*, not social situations.

(iv) *'Fixing'* (Unnithan *et al.* 1981,²² *schizophrenic*):

His parents noted that he had started a 'fixing' (their word) behaviour, fixing his gaze and attention on real objects. This resulted in him opening doors up to twenty times once he had 'fixed' his eye on an object inside a room. His main complaint was of getting 'fixed' on items such as light switches, posters, radiator taps, always on the right side of his field of vision.

(v) *Nihilistic bodily delusions*

(Hécaen and Ajuriaguerra 1952,²³ *left hemisphere damage*):

'Right forearm seems cut, broken from my elbow downwards... It feels different, mechanical, heavier, as if *its not there* from the elbow, and in its place a *feeling of uneasiness*'.

(vi) *Nihilistic bodily delusions*

(*personal series of psychotic depressives*²⁴):

'I am shrinking away; I have no eyes, no face, no back passage, no body, no hands'.

(vii) *Delusional elaboration of anosognosia* (see below) (Ehrenwald 1930,²⁵ *right hemispheric damage*):

'Left half of my body has been substituted by scaffolding'.

(viii) *'Experience of bionic arm*

(*personal series of schizophrenics*²⁶):

'Legs and arms dropped off and bionic ones replaced them; pieces of metal in legs'.

All this has so far been considered bizarre and inexplicable, but this judgement is without the philosophical input which this article hopes to remedy, and make some sense of.

Finally, in respect of their relevance to the core thesis, both philosophers specifically addressed the *general* notion of causation, *and also*, uniquely amongst philosophers, to my knowledge, if one excludes thinkers like Levy-Bruhl²⁷ who is better designated an anthropologist, the specific issue of the changing nature of causation over the evolution of humankind, from animal to mythical human, and then spanning out to religious, everyday, artistic and scientific varieties of human experience.

I shall consider all this below, but clearly any philosopher who tackles head-on the nature of causality amongst different sorts of human beings over time is potentially of inestimable value to a psychopathologist looking into notions of causation held by, or applicable to, different sorts of human beings – deemed 'schizophrenic', 'depressive' or 'sane' – at any given time.

2. Psychogenesis

(a) Definition.

The actual term was introduced by a German psychiatrist, Sommer,²⁸ in 1894:

With the name psychogenesis [*Psychogenie*] ... we are dealing with morbid states [*Krankheitszustände*] which are evoked by ideas [*Vorstellungen*] and can be influenced by ideas.

Bonhoeffer,²⁹ an influential German psychiatrist at the turn of the 20th Century, accepted Sommer's notion of psychogenesis in principle, but considered that it only applied to a minority of psychotic and neurotic cases, and that it was either mediated by physiological over-arousal, or, in cases of prison psychosis, for example, it was a wish-fulfilment, for freedom, for example. It was not a mere idea that was to blame.

Jaspers³⁰ preferred the term 'reactive', but was talking about the same notion, and he also restricted it to a minority of psychotic states where the sorts of delusions and hallucinations had a clear meaningful link to the purported cause, and where the course of the illness remained sensitive to this cause, i.e. ceased when the causal situation abated:

In conclusion let us once more summarise the factors common to all *genuine reactions*: there is a *precipitating factor*, which stands in a close time-relationship with the reactive state and has to be one which we can accept as adequate. There is a meaningful connection between the *contents* of the experience and those of the abnormal reaction. As we are concerned with a reaction to an experience, any abnormality will lapse with the course of time. In particular, the abnormal reaction comes to an end when the primary cause for the reaction is removed (regaining one's freedom, the return of the homesick girl to her people).

Lewis,³¹ the pre-eminent British it overwhelming physiological arousal to an event? Is it wish-fulfilment? Does it determine the actual form of the psychosis and its course as well as cause the condition? psychiatrist of the 20th Century, concluded that the term 'psychogenic' should be given a 'decent burial', on account of its ambiguous nature: Is it an idea? Is

During most of the 20th Century, however, despite the above reservations and critiques, psychogenesis was accepted as an established fact in psychiatry, and the only issue debated was which theoretical model, purveyed by the various schools of psychology which sprung up during the 20th Century, best fitted the situation.

(b) Empirical evidence.

Notwithstanding the concerns about the status of psychogenesis, and even Lewis' obituary, there is compelling evidence that some sort of events in the life of a human being do give rise to some sorts of psychiatric disorders. The strongest link is between a life-threatening event and what is known as post-traumatic stress disorder, originally recognized in ex-soldiers, but now accepted as potentially emanating from peace-time near-death experiences. The best formulation so far³² is that the subject fails to integrate the experience into his or her accumulated repository of 'things that happen', and so it remains an isolated but active 'sore', preoccupying the subject in the day and dominating their dreams.

A slightly weaker, though statistically rigorous, link obtains between an adverse life event and depressive illness.³³ A vast literature attests to the validity of the link, the sorts of life events that are in play, and the interaction between the life event and the personality of the subject who succumbs to a depressive illness as a consequence.³⁴

In the case of schizophrenia, the role of psychogenic factors, whether causal or only determining relapse in an established condition, is least compelling.³⁵

(c) *Theoretical psychogenesis*. Regardless of the aforementioned caveats, the thrust of clinical psychology, and, less so, psychiatry, throughout the first three-quarters of the 20th Century, has been to accept blithely the notion of psychogenesis in psychiatric disorders. Each psychological school that emerged – psychoanalysis, Gestalt psychology, social psychology, cognitive psychology – with the exception of behaviourism, which had no place for the psyche, had their particular formulation of what psychogenesis meant, but were largely silent on how their view of the psychological make-up of the human being led to a psychotic, or even a neurotic, state.

(d) *Philosophical excursion (1): Cassirer's anthropological thesis*.

Cassirer charts the journey of the human being from its first escape from a simple animal environment – its mythical phase – then by means of its unique linguistic gift, to an eventual flowering of religious, artistic and scientific modes of knowledge. His comparison of the animal and *its* signs – heavily indebted to the renowned biologist of the time, von Uexküll – and the human being and *its* symbols, is the core of his philosophy.

According to von Uexküll, the animal is imprisoned in a one-sided cage of signs pertaining to its desires:

A zoologist had brought up a young starling in a room. The bird had never had a chance to see a fly, let alone to catch one. One day he saw the starling rush toward an invisible object, catch it in mid-air, return with the object to its perch; peck away at it with its bill and finally swallow the invisible fly. There was no doubt that the starling had had the apparition of an imaginary fly in its *Umwelt* [environment]. The starling's whole world had been so charged with the feeding tone, that The functional image of fly-catching, which was in readiness, forced the perceptual image to appear, and this released the entire action chain.³⁶

This graphic description shows that what caused the animal's behaviour was a univalent projection of its desires. Cassirer takes this up:

Every animal, as Uexküll expresses the basic relationship, carries its surrounding world with it during its entire lifetime like an impenetrable shell a firm protective wall which encloses the animal like the walls of a house The animals' 'world' is like an optical melody. The animal finds its way from one landmark to the next with these optical melodies the way someone who reproduces a song finds his way from one tone to the next.³⁷

The symbol, however, takes the human being out of this prison, and into increasingly greater degrees of freedom. Cassirer again:

Every symbolic form works in its own way and by its own means to bring about this turn from mere being-in-itself to being-for-itself Man has built an 'opposing world' which is now added to the surrounding world [*Umwelt*] of immediate existence, that he has directly to do no longer with 'things' [? he means images here as immediately below he says that 'things' are only available for humans] but with 'signs' that he has created, that he is not only a part of the world but has gone on to represent and depict this world..... The turn towards the objectivity of things is the true line of demarcation between the human world and that of all other organic creatures.³⁸

The implications for causality in the two situations of human and animal, and the further modifications during the phases of human development are these.

In the case of the animal what causes anything, as far as the animal knows, is the image in its environment. (It does not of course know that this is a creation of its own drives).

In the case of the primitive human, immersed in its mythical world, the critical transformation from the animal environment to a human world has occurred as a 'concentration' everything remotely associated with the image itself, and in each symbolic form itself a *progressive* distancing from the causative influence of the image and its co-incident paraphernalia.

In the religious symbolic form, which is next in line to the mythical, the human being escapes the clutches of the witch doctor, because the former knows that wax replicas or graven images are not an integral part of the causative image. But in some religions God's name is still taboo, and all religions retain the myth that the cause of everything is a human-like entity, albeit distant and virtually image-less.

The 'everyday', contemporary take on causality Cassirer roughly equates with the linguistic symbolic form, because the word imparts some stability on the panoply of images and their happenstance in play in the objective pole of the mythical world-view, and therefore now excludes anything of a causal nature except nameable things. In this way the spatial and temporal markers of an image largely drop out of causal contention because what is critical is now a 'thing' and not an image, and the same 'thing' can crop up now here and then there. The 'thisness' component of causality remains, however, because it is still contended that this stone breaks this window. The who-ness in causality is also retained, but as an alternative mode to thing-ness: who *or* what has caused this situation?

The artistic symbolic form, which Cassirer gives only a sketchy account of, exemplifies a further distancing from the mythical world-view. What causes a work of art is the artist, and what separates him or her from the subjectivity of the everyday person, and the work of art from banal actuality, are, respectively, their creative gift and a sense that their production is more valuable or beautiful than any image encountered in the actual world. We have moved a long way from a subservience to demonic beings, or obedience to a personalised but inexperienceable prime mover, even from a banal acceptance that impersonal things or our limited human circle are actually the only source of our pleasure and woes, to a stage where the human being realizes that the world, impersonal or personal, can actually be modified or even created anew to our specification.

Finally, the scientific symbolic form. The image is now denied any causative effect, replaced in this respect by a mathematically calculable state of affairs. Any semblance of an individual subject is also dispensed with, in favour of a generic agency which is no more than a conduit for the enactment of social rules and mechanical laws. In fact neither objectivity nor subjectivity is admitted either, except in the way of metaphorical approximations to an equation: is light a wave or a particle, for example?

In short: While natural intuition infers from the fact that A is the cause of B that B must be present when A recurs, that is, it infers the law from the cause, science infers the cause from the law.

(e) *Philosophical excursion (2): Scheler's anthropological thesis.*

Scheler's views on the transformation of causality across anthropological eras are most exhaustively laid out in *The theory of the three facts*⁴¹ and *Idealism and realism*.⁴²

The original sense of a causal relationship is the operation of the living organism's vital centre on the environment. In the discovery of a project being realized the human being, along with any animal, grasps the 'primary phenomenon of effective action', independently and earlier than any consciousness of it, or involvement of self, and certainly – against Hume – any calculation of the association of regularly occurring events. There is always a 'Who' involved, and no distinction in this respect between natural and ethical laws.

In the next phase, millennia down the road, though even the Greeks had the same word for cause as for responsibility – *aitia* – the causal question becomes increasingly 'What' rather than 'Who' is responsible. The causal relationship is further objectivized as an interaction between things alone, but the primary experience retains the original sense of a personal interaction in that, for example, the window appears to 'suffer' the impact of the stone.

With the advent of the scientific world-view the personal involvement and the one-to-one remnant of purpose and suffering go by the board, though, as Scheler notes, there are two phases in this itself. In the mechanical formulation of scientific causation, epitomised by Newtonian laws, the occurrence of an effect is tied to the spatial proximity of the cause, as a last vestige of the original experience of causation, whereas in 20th Century physics all such original elements have been expunged.

(f) *Philosophical excursion (3): Cassirer's notion of the symbol as a two-in-one amalgam.*

Cassirer distilled the essence of the human being in his term '*homo symbolicus*'. This was a living being whose concerns and nature were heterogeneous, ranging from the ascription of magical influence to its surroundings to calculation of the trajectory of heavenly bodies, yet all subsumed within a limited number of 'symbolic forms'. These symbolic forms were realms of the human being, in which disparate versions of spatiality, temporality, thingness, and, germane to our concerns here, causality, were displayed. The symbolic forms he delineated were mythical, religious, linguistic, artistic and scientific. For our purposes it is his characterization of the symbol, which all share, *and* the multiplicity of symbolic forms, which are critical.

The symbol is first and foremost a generic sign. Cassirer makes this quite clear in a section of his late work *An Essay on Man*.⁴³ Whereas the animal's

sign refers to an individual thing, the human's symbol, albeit a sign, has a universal applicability. The symbol signifies something which is not actually there as well as something that is there, and that, as Cassirer says, is the 'Open Sesame' to the human condition. The symbol mediates between the actuality of the immediate surroundings *and* the potentiality for another version of actuality – none of which is available to the animal. The human does not simply operate on the individual environment available to it, but is released into an arena pervaded by an ambiguous sense of what is general and what is unique about every matter, including itself.

The symbol is 'pure significance', i.e. potentially meaningful – 'pregnant' he also calls it, and it can bring forth fundamentally different sorts of objectivity depending on how many symbolic forms are in contention: a mythical demon, a religious god, a comprehensible word, a work of art, or a scientific atom. *All* are objective, *all* are meaningful, and *all* are what he calls 'works', the products of a collaboration, catalysed by the very nature of a symbol, to bring together what is real of the cosmos, really real and not just actually objective, *and* the capacity of a knower, the human being in its various phases from primitive to sophisticated – to grasp its nature.

The symbol moreover is unique among signs in being bi-directional or bivalent, pointing simultaneously to something objective *and* to something subjective. Whatever the terminology for objective and subjective throughout the history of philosophy, respectively, for example, real-ideal, being-thought, matter-form, life-spirit/mind, existence-essence, one of these has, according to him, been inappropriately prioritized vis-à-vis the other, albeit with exceptions such as Plato, Aristotle, Nicholas of Cusa and Kant, who all realized that the participation of the one in the other is the crux of metaphysics.

But if there is a 'third realm', that of the symbol, which is interposed between objectivity and subjectivity, and all their respective synonyms fraught with deceptive connotations, and which itself determines the very nature of objectivity and subjectivity within the realm in which it holds sway, and, further, if there is more than one type of symbolic form, each sharing the essential characteristic of a symbol in having a bivalent foothold in objective and subjective camps *in general*, but determining different varieties of objectivity and subjectivity, then the whole philosophical world picture undergoes a seismic change, and with it the demise of the idealism-realism chimera.

(g) *Philosophical excursion (iv):*

Scheler's formulation of meaning as an amalgam of image and idea.

Scheler's deliberations on meaning are scattered throughout his writings, but his most concentrated remarks can be found in *Phenomenology and the Theory of Cognition*⁴⁴ and *Erkenntnislehre und Metaphysik* (vol. 11 of his *Collected Works*, translated as *The Constitution of the Human Being*⁴⁵).

The critical insights are:

- (i) only human beings are in possession of meaning, unlike non-human animals who can only derive sense from their environment;
- (ii) this derivation of meaning is a consequence of their being *geistig*, unlike non-human animals who are merely *dranghaftig* (only possessing *Drang*, see above);
- (iii) meaning is the objective correlate of thinking;
- (iv) the meaning of something comes in the form of a dual simultaneous grasping of the image and the idea.

Scheler did not prioritize the human's prerogative of the symbol as the *sine qua non* of its status vis-à-vis the animal, though he did formulate the contemporary, everyday and the scientific world-views as progressively symbolic versions of some original encounter with an *Ur-phenomenon* or *Ur-bild* (urphenomenon or 'ur-image'). What he emphasized instead was that the human's encounter with anything actual was a simultaneous awareness of its unique characteristics and its essence. There was no meaningless 'sensation' arriving at a perceptual organ to which meaning was later attached in the brain. What something is is always incarnate in each and every encounter. The essence of anything, for Scheler, was a coming together of an idea and an image, and from the age of two, or so, when the human being ceased being predominantly animal and became human, by dint of turning the very images it had so far encountered into a functional scheme for grasping and essentialising subsequent images, all encounters were analytically two-fold – idea and image – but synthetically and actually unitary, e.g. a dog is *this* image imbued with dogginess.

However, unlike Cassirer, Scheler considered that this duality was specific to what he called the 'natural' outlook. In *The theory of the three facts*⁴⁶ and *Idealism and realism*⁴⁷ he writes about the 'phenomenological', the 'natural' and the 'scientific' fact, roughly comparable to the objectivities which Cassirer refers to as the mythical, linguistic and scientific symbolic forms.

The phenomenological 'fact' for Scheler is 'asymbolic' and 'immanent', the latter, Scheler

clarifies, meaning that 'what is meant and what is given coincide'.

Moreover, the phenomenon or ur-phenomenon or image or ur-image – he uses these terms interchangeably – is intuited, not perceived.

The natural 'fact' for Scheler is 'doubly symbolic': it is a symbol for the phenomenon and a symbol of the human's bodily state when he or she selects the phenomenon appropriate to this bodily state. Moreover, the 'natural outlook', according to Scheler, is a 'middle realm' between 'things-themselves' (and here, confusingly, he must mean phenomena or images) and the 'states we are in when we experience things-themselves'. In the natural outlook 'the intentional act which apprehends them intends something more than the content present' e.g. looking at a sphere I mean more than what is simply given as an image, i.e. it is in the very symbolic nature of the natural fact that the rest of the sphere is meant.

In the scientific 'fact' according to Scheler, the sphere is grasped as 'a symbol only' and 'the appearance and anything of the phenomenological fact disappear, leaving only its empty representational function':

Now for the first time a man in a certain state stands over here and a sphere stands over there. These can no longer be given to one another but are from now on only parts of reality which can affect one another, without the man's knowing any more of this than the sphere does.

Furthermore, scientific facts are 'univocally determined through selected symbols'.

Surveying the three 'facts' overall, Scheler writes:

We can say therefore: (1) the phenomenological object is self-given; (2) the object of natural intuition is symbolically given but it represents itself; and (3) the object of science is only symbolically intended and is represented by an artificially established sign.

This looks quite different from Cassirer's scheme. At the mythical (ur-image, phenomenal) end of the human progression, there is, in effect, *no symbol*, but rather a univocal determination of an image. Whereas at the climax of humanity so far, the scientific viewpoint, there is no dualistic symbol either, but again a univocal determination of an artificial cipher, shorn of any imagistic content. In other words, symbolic duality is concentrated in the 'natural fact' (Scheler) or 'linguistic symbolic form' (Cassirer), which for Scheler is even *doubly* symbolic as it symbolises both the image and the state of a knower, whilst at both ends – mythical and scientific – it attenuates to become a univocal determinant. In contrast, Cassirer's position regarding the mythical human being and the scientific

as *both* varieties of *homo symbolicus* is not entirely justified. Lofts,⁴⁸ commenting on Cassirer, writes:

We can perhaps ask ourselves in what way the mythical subject is different from the animal. *From a certain perspective there is no difference* [my italics].

Moreover here is Cassirer⁴⁹ himself writing about the scientific phase of humanity, surely undermining his own position with respect to the scientific outlook as a symbolic form:

Here scientific concept formation and scientific terminology go one step further [further than the linguistic symbolic form], freeing the sign from all its restrictive sensuous conditions.... The sign tears itself free from the sphere of things in order to become a purely relational and ordinal sign.

(h) *Summary of the relevance of these philosophical excursions into the nature of psychogenesis.*

The merit of these philosophical considerations has been to highlight the fragility and ephemerality of the notion of psychogenesis. What causes what in our mythical forbears is indeed, *assumed by them*, to be a concatenation of human (who), spatial (where), temporal (when) and individual (which) aspects of our environment and world. What causes what in a scientific viewpoint is nothing of this sort, but a mechanical law for events to be thus and not otherwise. Moreover, the philosophical issues addressed uncover the fact that the way human beings responds to their situation has also varied over anthropological eras, automatically registering and then behaving in accordance with an individual sign (mythical phase), assuming that some general law determines our actions (scientific phase). In either case there is a univocal cause and effect relationship, whereas the actual situation in a contemporary human being is rather a nuanced and dual amalgam of what is imagistic and presumed physical of the world and what is ideational and presumed mental. Psychogenesis emerges from this as a rather atavistic notion, a generic term for all the potentially adverse human, temporo-spatial and individual setbacks that one can encounter. Organicity, which I shall deal with below, rather conforms to an overly scientific viewpoint on the potential of anything to disturb us, couched in a mechanistic and inevitable form.

3. Organicity

(a) Definition.

By the end of the 19th Century a number of specific links had been recognized between either physical illnesses such as syphilis affecting the brain and madness, or between particular regions of a

damaged brain, such as left frontal lesions, and a certain loss of mental a function such as loss of ability to speak. By the early decades of the 20th Century there was then a general consensus amongst psychiatrists that brain damage or temporary cerebral dysfunction could give rise to a restricted range of psychiatric disorders. Bonhoeffer⁵⁰ again best expressed the received view, as he had in the case of psychogenesis (see above), with his concept of ‘exogenous psychoses’. Brain damage or dysfunction – organicity in our scheme – could, according to him, produce ‘delirium’, ‘confusion’, ‘hallucinosi’, a ‘twilight state’ or ‘amentia’ (states in which clouding of consciousness accompanied by hallucinations, muddled thinking and disorientation existed in varying degrees). These were organic psychoses, as his notion was later interpreted, caused by a disturbance of brain function. Schizophrenia, depressive psychosis and mania were then deemed ‘functional psychoses’ because recognizable brain damage or dysfunction of the sort that could be identified at that time – essentially post-mortem evidence – was not apparent.

(b) *Subsequent empiro-theoretical developments in the concept of organicity.*

During the 20th Century this strict separation between psychiatric disorders caused by brain disturbance and those caused by other factors – psychogenic and endogenous (see above) – fell apart.

Paper after paper documented the occurrence of schizophrenic,⁵¹ depressive,⁵² or even manic⁵² or neurotic mental states (obsessional, anxiety, phobic) after brain damage or cerebral dysfunction. Just as impressive were case-reports of undoubted psychogenic factors giving rise to a mental state dominated by confusion, so-called *bouffée délirante*, the supposed hallmark of an organic psychosis.⁵³

Furthermore, the crude measures of organic brain damage or dysfunction available from the autopsy at the beginning of the 20th Century gave way to an increasingly sophisticated array of electro-physiological, radiological and scanning techniques, which uncovered all sorts of structural and metabolic abnormalities *in vivo*. The notion of a ‘functional psychosis’ as a non-organic entity was completely undermined, as was the concept of a neurosis free from organic antecedents, because in the former as well as in the latter cerebral dysfunction could be revealed.

Not only this, but in the course of the 20th Century the functions of specific parts of the brain were worked out and there were a host of suggestions as to how supposed critical elements of the hitherto

named 'functional' psychoses – their emotional disturbance, their peculiar sorts of delusions, for example – could be attributable to some dysfunctional lobe or nucleus of the brain which subserved emotion or certain sorts of mentation.

Most intriguing of all, for the widening notion of organicity, was the discovery in the 1940's of the fundamentally different functions, and even 'world-views', purveyed by the two hemispheres of the brain. Surgical treatment of intractable epilepsy at the time was to sever the band of fibres connecting the two hemispheres, the corpus callosum, and the psychological evaluation of the 'subject' in this new state was astounding. Questions directed to the right hemisphere, a hemisphere devoid of expressive speech functions but nevertheless communicable by non-verbal means, revealed a 'personality' (e.g. 'I want to be a racing driver when I grow up') and a psychological profile (e.g. it had a semantic and pragmatic language versatility but rudimentary syntactic facility) which was quite different from that of the left hemisphere (e.g. 'I want to be a draughtsman', prominent syntactic versatility). One psychiatrist, Flor-Henry,⁵⁴ in the late 1960's took a giant step in suggesting that the hitherto labelled 'functional' psychoses – mania, schizophrenia, depressive psychosis – were caused by the 'organic' condition of hemisphere imbalance, i.e. that the normal pattern of right-left harmony was in some way awry.

In summary, as with psychogenesis, the organic dimension in the causation of psychiatric disorders moved remorselessly from the status of a dubious claim covering a minority of instances of psychiatric disorders to an all-pervasive hypothesis concerning all cases. And as with the psychogenic proposal there is every reason to seek out philosophical enlightenment about the matter. I shall first appeal to the work of Soviet semioticians, who combined knowledge about the new subject of hemisphere differences with an innovative approach to uncovering what a subject in an isolated hemispheric state might experience. I shall then consider Cassirer's informed view on the effects of brain damage on symbolic forms. Finally, I shall invoke Scheler's distinction between the essence of something and the idea and image which make it up, which I have already alluded to, and will elaborate below.

(c) *Russian semioticians.*

Rarely translated, and even then in obscure German and English language publications, the extraordinary results of decades of work during the Soviet era, chiefly by Deglin and collaborators, have been trickling into the awareness of Western neuropsychologists and neuropsychiatrists. I have

called the thrust of their work semiotic, because: it includes experiments on thinking patterns, perceptual strategies *and* language, but with the express intention of finding some common pattern in all these disparate mental functions under certain circumstances (to be described); and there is always attention to a bivalence within each of these mental functions under these circumstances.

In brief, the experiments were carried out on patients with schizophrenia and depressive illness who were in the immediate aftermath of having had ECT (electro-convulsive therapy), applied either to the right or the left hemisphere. The mental abilities of such people, apart from their status in this respect as someone already with a psychiatric disorder, were thus being tested under conditions of suppression of the functioning of an entire hemispheric cortex, and the person being tested was to all intents and purposes a uni-hemispheric subject. Their performance on the same tasks had already been recorded under non-ECT conditions. The most striking findings to emerge, for our purposes, from among the many linguistic, thinking and perceptual tasks devised, were these.

(1) Subjects⁵⁵ were shown famous pictures, by Monet and Sisley for example, depicting weather scenes, e.g. Waterloo Bridge in London under fog or a storm brewing. They were asked to describe the picture and give the time of day and the weather portrayed.

Under conditions of left hemisphere suppression (right hemisphere alone functioning normally) the subjects described the pictures with considerable exactitude, much better than they did when their right hemisphere was suppressed, and better even than when tested in a normal state with both hemispheres intact. So, for example, one said, on seeing the Monet, 'Morning, fog', and on seeing the Sisley, 'There is a storm brewing'. Moreover, they gave precise accounts of the colours and nuances of light and shade portrayed.

Under conditions of right hemisphere suppression (uni-functional left hemisphere) the *same* subjects gave 'drastically impoverished' descriptions, relative to when their right hemisphere was the only viable one, and even relative to their normal, bi-hemispheric state. One subject, for example, said, on seeing the Monet, 'I cannot make out any image whatsoever; it's an abstract representation'. Another said of the same picture, 'I can only say that it is something like the surface of the earth, or material of some sort, or even another planet'. Yet another said that the surface looked convex or hollow. Several subjects, however, tried to classify the picture as belonging to this or that school of painting, or place it within a specific, historical period of art.

(2) The next experiment,⁵⁶ required subjects to comment on whether some object, e.g. 'brother' or 'bread', was appropriately named, or whether another name could be given it, e.g. 'sister' or 'meat' in the above examples, or even whether a completely made-up word would do.

Under conditions of left hemisphere suppression (right hemisphere alone) subjects replied, for example, 'Bread is called bread because it's white and tastes good. Bread fills you up. Why should anyone call it anything else?' Or, 'Brother, that's someone who's a blood relation and that's why it's a brother. You can't call it anything else'.

Under conditions of right hemisphere suppression (left hemisphere alone) subjects replied that 'bread' or 'brother' could easily be called something else.

The authors concluded:

The right hemisphere does not know that a verbal sign is arbitrary and conventional. It appears, in fact, that for the right hemisphere the verbal sign is as firmly attached to the object, indeed part of the object, as is its form, colour or smell.

(3) The third experiment,⁵⁷ no less astounding in its results than the other two, required subjects to solve syllogisms, either pertaining to their personal experience, e.g.

There are fish in all rivers where people put nets;

There are nets on the River Neva (in St. Petersburg, where the experiment took place);

Are there fish in the River Neva or not?

or to their general knowledge beyond their personal experience, e.g.

Every State has a flag;

Zambia is a State;

Does Zambia have a flag or not?

Under conditions of left hemisphere suppression (right hemisphere alone) subjects gave predominantly personal accounts, e.g. 'Once upon a time there were all sorts of fish in the Neva, but now they've poisoned the Neva and all the fish died out', or, 'Is there really such a State, Zambia? Where is it? Who lives there?'

Under conditions of right hemisphere suppression (left hemisphere alone) the answers were dominated by logical considerations, e.g. 'It says so here that Zambia is a State, and since every State has a flag, so Zambia has one too'.

(4) In summary, the experiments demonstrate that the two hemispheres subserve quite different roles in the perceptual, linguistic and logical structure of the human world. The right hemisphere presides over an imagistic world, and is held back by its partner in this respect; its world is linked to personal experience; and the linguistic terms it deploys are part and parcel of the image. The left hemisphere, by contrast, facilitates an almost imageless world, with an alien

and geometrical quality; it eschews personal experience in favour of logic; and the language it employs is uncoupled from the things referred to.

(d) Cassirer, Goldstein and the 'concrete attitude'.

Cassirer's acquaintance with brain-damaged patients was considerable, because his nephew, Goldstein, managed a unit for head-injured war-veterans in Frankfurt and the latter invited him to examine some of them. What Cassirer gleaned from his 'hands-on' experience seemed to confirm to him what he had already worked out philosophically, namely that the intact human being viewed all matters through a symbolic lens, because when brain damage crippled their faculties human beings lost their symbolic facility:

One of Goldstein's patients whom I had the opportunity to observe could not find the 'name' for the watch [*Uhr*] but in answer to my question of what time it was, he replied at once 'One o'clock' [*ein Uhr*]. Thus he had lost the word *Uhr* in its function as a 'name for a thing'; while in other functions he used it freely.⁵⁸

In other words, the self-same word *Uhr* could be lost and found depending on whether it was a symbol or a representation of a practical concern. The same principle obtained in perception:

Gelb and Goldstein have described the case of a patient who suffered from amnesia with respect to the universal colour names If, for example, he was asked to pick a red or yellow or green sample from a series of coloured stripes of wool or paper, he was utterly baffled On the other hand, he did strikingly well when he was asked to select from a group of samples a shade corresponding to the colour of a definite object. Then he always chose with great precision the colour of a ripe strawberry, a mail box, a billiard table.⁵⁹

In the following cases the constraints of what Goldstein came to call the 'concrete attitude' and the loss of what he called the 'abstract attitude' are shown in the starkest fashion:

Once, on a bright sunny day, I asked him [a brain-damaged patient] to repeat after me 'It is bad rainy weather today', he was unable to do so Another psychic blindness patient had suffered a serious hemiplegia and was unable to move his right arm. He could not repeat the sentence 'I can write well with my right hand'. He always replaced the wrong word 'right' with the correct word 'left'.⁶⁰

Cassirer's enquiries into the brain-damaged person's experience of space, time and action all seemed to confirm the principle that brain damage exerted an overarching effect on a person, affecting every faculty and action, such that whatever was symbolic about them had been wiped out, leaving the

Disorders of zufälliges Sosein (coincidental being) in brain-damaged patients RHD			
<i>Subcategory</i>	<i>Syndrome</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Location</i>
Disorder of mynness	anosognosia for hemiplegia	denial of ownership of paralysed limb	RHD
	loss of ownership of object perception	perception of object accompanied by experience of perception not belonging to perceiver	RHD
Disorder of thisness	Capgras' syndrome	denial that this person is who he or she claims he or she is	RHD
	environmental agnosia	inability to recognize individual buildings but preserved ability to recognize them as buildings	RHD
Disorder of who-ness	prosopagnosia	inability to recognize identity of face	RHD
	phonagnosia	inability to recognize identity of voice	RHD
Disorder of whose-ness	somatoparaphrenia	ownership of paralysed limb attributed to someone else	RHD
	response-to-next-patient stimulation	spoken request by doctor to neighbouring patient taken as self-directed	RHD
Disorder of where-ness	visual neglect (unilateral visuo-spatial agnosia)	ignorance of items appearing in one half of visual field	RHD*
	reduplicative paramnesia	claim to be living simultaneously in multiple locations	RHD
Disorder of when-ness	<i>déjà vu</i>	present event experienced as past event	RHD*
	palinopsia	present event experienced in future	RHD = LHD

Notes:

1. RHD = right hemisphere damage
2. See Cutting (2012)⁶⁵ for references, except for loss of ownership of object perception.⁶⁶
3. * = predominantly RHD rather than almost exclusively RHD

person subservient to concrete instances of anything not unlike the animal in von Uexküll's³⁶ formulations.

(e) Scheler's notion of zufälliges Sosein and its loss in brain damage.

What Cassirer did not know, however, was that he had been shown a selective sample of brain-damaged patients. Those that he had been shown, or at least had reported upon, had aphasia or colour agnosia, whose site of damage, well-known by the 1920's when he was writing the first three volumes of his *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, and crystal clear now, is in the left hemisphere.

He was not shown cases of reduplicative paramnesia, where subjects maintain that they are in several different places simultaneously, associated with right hemisphere damage and known about since 1903;⁶¹ nor anosognosia, denial of a paralysed limb almost always on the left, also a reliable

indicator of right hemisphere damage and first described in 1914;⁶² nor what became known as Capgras' syndrome, delusional misidentification of another person, again linked to right hemisphere damage and first reported in 1923.⁶³

Thereafter a host of seemingly miscellaneous neuropsychological and neuropsychiatric consequences of brain damage were added to the literature, whose only common denominator was the fact that they were not the same sort of disorder as aphasia or colour agnosia (or indeed other dilapidations of symbolic function such as object agnosia, alexia, agraphia and apraxia, respectively disorders of object perception, reading, writing and action). They were given assorted labels, some eponymous such as Capgras' syndrome (above), and some under the mistaken apprehension that they were subclasses of agnosia, e.g. prosopagnosia⁶⁴ (inability to identify the *owner of a face* but with

preserved ability to recognize the object as a face). Furthermore, it took until the last decades of the 20th Century for it to be appreciated that what they also shared, in addition to having nothing to do with symbolic functions, was a link with right hemisphere damage, not left hemisphere damage as in the case of aphasia, true agnosia, and the like.

Even to this day their mutual resemblance is barely acknowledged, but it should be apparent to the reader, on surveying the above table where a selection of these is set out, that what they share is a loss of what Scheler referred to as *zufälliges Sosein*⁶⁷ (the co-incident or accidental being of something), as opposed to a loss of *Was-sein* (the what-being or nature of something) which characterizes aphasia and true agnosia which Cassirer and Goldstein confined themselves to.

What is also clear, from the philosophical and anthropological considerations presented earlier in this article, is that what is deficient here – myness, thisness, who-ness, whose-ness, where-ness and when-ness – is only ‘co-incident’ from a contemporary standpoint, and was not always so. In fact, as we showed, these very supposed co-incident characteristics were, in the mythical phase of humanity, attached to the image or nature of the ‘thing’ itself. It is the natural, contemporary outlook which uncouples them and treats them as co-incident, and in the modern, scientific outlook they evaporate entirely.

The results of the Russian, semiotic experiments we described provide a parallel validity for the above transformations in showing that two different cerebral states in contemporary humans mimic: in the one case what we might term the atavistic world-view of detailed image, name and ‘thing’ as one, and reliance on myness; and in the other case a scientific or at least a science-fiction sort of world-view of grossly attenuated or extra-terrestrial and geometrical images, a structuralist version of language where the choice of signifier to refer to a signified is quite arbitrary, and an adherence to formal logic sometimes against the grain of personal experience (not illustrated above but also demonstrated in Deglin’s study). Furthermore, the atavistic and science-fiction alternative world-views are subserved by the right and left hemispheres, respectively, which, when actually damaged give rise to exactly what one would predict on the basis of these semiotic experiments: selective loss of co-incident

characteristics of things (loss of *zufälliges Sosein*) with right hemisphere damage; loss of at least some symbolic aspects of the mind (concrete attitude) with left hemisphere damage.

4. Fragility of the psychogenic / organic dichotomy

Before integrating the above considerations into some coherent proposal about the concept of psychiatric causation the author wishes to draw attention to a stache of evidence undermining the notion that organically-caused psychiatric and neurological disorders are irreversible. The purpose of this exercise is to clear the way for a proposal to the effect that psychogenic and organic causes share a common pathway in how they exert their effect, and produce *the self-same psychiatric disorders* in doing so. For much of the 20th Century, following Bonhoeffer, who is our bogeyman here, the established view was that psychogenic causes produced their own sort of psychiatric disorders (deemed functional), e.g. schizophrenia, depressive illness, whereas organic causes produced *their* own psychiatric disorders (deemed organic), e.g. delirium, dementia; and that the two constellations, psychogenic cause / functional disorder and organic cause / organic disorder, were further characterized by a potential amelioration or even cure in the former but not so in the latter. In other words, cause, nature of disorder and prognosis were all bound together and two different versions of all these were then treated as generic sorts of disease entities. The following case reports undermine this neat separation.

Cassirer and Goldstein were pioneers here, demonstrating how the simple word ‘Uhr’ could be available in some circumstances and yet unavailable in others (see above), despite the presence of indubitable brain damage. The discovery was taken a step further by Gelb and Goldstein’s⁶⁸ demonstration that a colour agnosic patient was completely baffled when asked to pick a skein of wool of a nominated colour but performed perfectly when the object to be colour-matched was a specific thing, e.g. ripe strawberry.

What has subsequently emerged is that some of the organic brain consequences which we have here grouped together as disorders of *zufälliges Sosein* can also be manipulated into remission by encouraging an abstract attitude to a task, the very

inverse of what had made available what was seemingly lost in agnosia and aphasia. There is definite evidence for this in cases of visual neglect, loss of where-ness, and loss of myness.

In one case of what is generally referred to as 'blindsight'⁶⁹ in the literature, Ishiai and colleagues⁷⁰ managed to re-instate the ability to draw a complete daisy in a man who could only draw the left side of this (i.e. in his right visual field), by instructing him to regard the flower as a big circle with little circles around it. Rafal and Robertson⁷¹ found that their patient with left-sided neglect 'could not see' a coin in his left field of vision if he was simultaneously shown a coin of the same monetary value in his right field, but 'could see' the left-sided coin if a key was displayed on the right, and 'could not see' a silver dinner fork in his left field if a plastic fork was shown in the right field.

Fotopoulou and colleagues⁷² obtained a dramatic and permanent cure in a patient with anosognosia – see the table above – when she was shown a video of herself, and later⁷³ published an account of two further patients with anosognosia and somatoparaphrenia – see the table – who improved substantially simply by being shown their paralysed limbs in a mirror. The authors claimed that it was the induction of a 'third person' viewpoint which had relieved the condition.

All such instances of remission and substantial improvement – Cassirer's and Goldstein's, and the disorders of *zufälliges Sosein* – demonstrate that supposed 'organic' disorders behave like 'functional' ones, undermining the received view that organic deficits are irreversible. But there is also a body of evidence that functional psychoses, such as schizophrenia and depressive psychosis, and even neuroses and addictions, can be caused *and* cured by organic brain damage. Hoff and Silberman⁷⁴ had long ago shown that a psychiatrically intact patient undergoing a neurosurgical procedure while conscious, and having part of her exposed right hemisphere locally anaesthetised as part of this, spontaneously announced that her own voice, as she spoke, sounded alien. (This at least shows that a core symptom of schizophrenia can be reproduced by brain damage). Starkstein and Robinson⁷⁵ demonstrated conclusively that among stroke patients those whose lesion was in the left hemisphere were far more likely than those with a

right-sided lesion to develop a depressive illness. Right-sided brain damage, but not left-sided, is reliably reported to induce an anxiety neurosis⁷⁶ or an obsessive-compulsive neurosis.⁷⁷ Moreover there is a case report of someone with anorexia nervosa⁷⁸ whose condition completely remitted after a left-sided brain insult, and, amongst a sample of smokers who sustained a stroke, those whose lesion was in the right hemisphere were significantly more likely to give up and report total loss of craving than those whose lesion was left-sided.⁷⁹

So, in summary, the organic-functional dichotomy in psychiatric causation is undermined on all fronts: organically-induced conditions behaving like functional ones, and supposedly functionally-induced conditions caused *and* cured by organic lesions.

5. Conclusions

(a) Summary of *aforementioned*.

What we have shown, to summarise the entire article so far, is that causation is multifarious across ontological realms or symbolic forms, *and* across anthropological eras (Scheler and Cassirer); the two hemispheres of the brain each subserve different constellations of objectivity and subjectivity which conform to different versions of causality in the philosophical analysis (Russian semioticians); the two major psychoses – schizophrenia and depressive psychosis – also conform in their nature, and in the instances when they *are* caused by organic factors, to the same sorts of different semiotic / hemispheric constellations that we identified. It would be quite reasonable to suppose, therefore, that psychogenic causes of schizophrenia or depressive illness, if such causes exist, must exert their effect by creating the same symbolic or *zufälliges Sosein* perturbations which their fellow organic factors do.

(b) 'Functional' psychosis as a morbid anthropological world-view vis-à-vis contemporary norms. So far, we have restricted ourselves to philosophical anthropological and neuropsychiatric / neuropsychological considerations, pointing out the close similarities between: on the one hand, an atavistic world-view, the artificially isolated right hemisphere's semiotic status, and actual cases of left hemisphere damage which facilitate a right hemisphere 'take' on anything; and, on the other hand, a 'science fictional' world-view, the artificially isolated left hemisphere's semiotic status, and actual cases of right hemisphere damage which facilitate a left hemisphere outlook. In a companion article¹⁴ I have already tackled the *nature* of schizophrenia

and depressive illness, and drawn attention to the contrasting world-views that anyone afflicted with these subtends, in the vanguard of humanity in the former, archaic in the latter. In this article I am specifically concerned with the cause of these conditions, and wish now to highlight those aspects of their nature which resonate with the general thesis we have been developing here – namely the dilapidation of *zufälliges Sosein* in certain organic disorders and a heightening of this way of being in other organic disorders. We shall restrict the discussion to schizophrenia and depressive illness because these, in my view, constitute the greatest challenge to any causal formulation. What we aim to show is not only that each major psychosis conforms to alternative sorts of world-views, compatible with either what *is* to come of humanity and what has largely *been* overcome, but that the core psychopathology of each can be largely accounted for in terms of the six sorts of *zufälliges Sosein* displayed in the above table – this-ness, who-ness, whose-ness, myness, where-ness and when-ness – exacerbated in depressive illness, selectively picked off in the much more variegated clinical picture of schizophrenia.

The schizophrenic person is frequently under the delusion that his or her actions, feelings, thoughts, urges and sensations are not theirs. This delusion is so characteristic of the condition that the German psychiatrist Kurt Schneider,⁸⁰ trying to assemble diagnostic criteria for it in the middle decades of the 20th Century, came up with the notion of ‘first rank symptoms’, and accorded these various sorts of experiences pride of place in his scheme. In fact, when the British psychiatrist Mellor⁸¹ rationalized Schneider’s scheme into 11 first rank symptoms, no less than five of them are completely explained by a loss of *myness*, what several German psychiatrists have referred to as a loss of *Meinhaftigkeit*. Bürgy (2011),⁸² a recent commentator on the issue, regards them as constituting ‘the core syndrome of schizophrenia’.

The schizophrenic person, moreover, often entertains the delusion that their body is under the control of someone else, sometimes even claiming that someone else is inside them, a breakdown in the sense of *whose-ness*.

Capgras’ syndrome (see above), and other manifestations of what is now called ‘delusional misidentification’ because subjects can misidentify things, places and even themselves as well as other people, occurs in around a sixth of all schizophrenics,⁸³ and these are an admixture of loss of *who-ness* and loss of *thisness*.

There is a profound disturbance of spatiality in schizophrenia, first brought out by one of the greatest

psychopathologists of the 20th Century, Minkowski,⁸⁴ who put it down to a ‘morbid preoccupation with geometry’. In fact, a ‘morbid spatiality’ is more widespread than this, and encompasses a dislocation of events and processes, which, in the normal person, are *inside* the mind, but in the schizophrenic are experienced as in *external* space. The three sorts of auditory hallucinations given first rank status by Mellor (see above), voices speaking thoughts aloud, hallucinatory voices discussing the subject in the third person, voices describing activities as they occur, and ‘thought broadcasting’, thoughts escaping into the outside world where they are experienced by others, all of which constitute another four of the 11 Schneiderian first rank symptoms, are none other than a *disturbance in where-ness*: something is not *where* it should be in the natural world-view.

Finally, anomalous temporality – a *disturbance of when-ness* – afflicts schizophrenics too. The best accounts of this are still those of patients reported by Fischer⁸⁵ in the 1920’s:

Time stood still. Then it became endless. Then it disappeared entirely Then a new time emerged.

Time stood still. Then it became different.

I’m living in eternity. There are no hours, no midday, no nights.

In the case of the depressive all this is inverted, but, as with the schizophrenic, a disturbance of at least some of the various subcategories of *zufälliges Sosein* reach to the heart of the condition.

For example, delusions of guilt – *I* am responsible for something untoward – are the commonest delusions in depressive psychosis.⁸⁶ They are none other than a sense of overwhelming responsibility – *exaggerated myness* – for the woes, imagined or actual, of others:

Failed to help man on park bench.
Caused tragedies to befall family; girl dying of love because of him.⁸⁷

The depressive, furthermore, is exquisitely vulnerable to the charisma of other people, beholden to them, even to the extent of automatic obedience, as in these examples of Minkowski:²⁰

You forced me, in making me talk, to become an animal. It was an entirely involuntary reaction.

I feel as if when you insist on something I must submit to your will and do what you demand of me. It annoys me to be in such a way the stupid creature [bête] of someone, but I am incapable of resisting. I am caught up in your affairs [embarquée par vous].

What is going on here is an enhancement of the power of another to influence one’s life, not in the way the schizophrenic senses a mechanical control,

but rather as an overwhelming sense of being part of someone else's way of being, which we can only construe as an *exaggerated sense of whose-ness*: To whom do I belong? Myself or someone else? Like exaggerated mynness this too is quite central to the condition in the opinion of two of the most perceptive commentators on the psychopathology of depression last century – Tellenbach³⁴ and Kraus⁸⁸ – who both considered that the depressive was overly involved in someone else's social situation at a premorbid stage and that any change in this precipitated the actual morbid state.

Of the other subclasses of *zufälliges Sosein*, there is undoubtedly a change in the experience of temporality, the nature of which is disputed among psychopathologists, but from patients' accounts⁸⁹ and from experiments asking patients to estimate durations it is clear that depressives under-estimate the passage of clock time, deeming it, in one study,⁹⁰ to be moving *twice* as slowly as normal people reported. This would suggest that, unlike schizophrenics whose characteristic experience in this respect is that 'time stops', the depressive finds it achingly long, which we could construe as *exaggerated when-ness*. But as with the transformation of the experience of causality over human eras, what is at stake is a qualitative change, not a mere pervasive sense of temporality or not, and this makes it clear why psychopathologists have been muddled, and proposed quite different formulations of depressive temporality – future blocked,⁹¹ future overwhelming,⁹² but, probably closest to the truth, Minkowski's⁹³ notion of a profound alteration of both past *and* future and a further alteration in the relationship between the two, and Ratcliffe's⁹⁴ assertion that 'depression encompasses a range of subtly different changes in the structure of temporal experience'.

The same qualitative change which occurs in the depressive's experience of space can be found in both Cassirer's account of mythical space and Scheler's description of the animal's spatial environment. For example, the second commonest type of delusion in depressive psychosis are nihilistic delusions,⁹⁵ and whereas the schizophrenic characteristically 'morbidly objectivizes'^{96,97} what in a normal person remains in a non-objectivized internal world, i.e. projects it into external space, the depressive reverses this process, de-objectivizing what populates the normal's external world, including the corporeal experience of the subject's own body:

Husband's eyesight gone; no ward outside hospital bedroom

Diamond missing from nine of diamonds card

No heart; as if I'm not here; complete shadow

I'm shrinking away; I have no eyes, no face, no back passage, no hands.⁹⁵

Their morbid spatiality is not an enhanced sense of spatiality but quite consistent with mythical, non-objectivized experience.

As for the status of 'who-ness' or 'thisness' in depressive illness there is an enhancement in each of these albeit not figuring so centrally in a subject's complaints. There are cases however, where *the human face is experienced more prominently* than normal.⁹⁸ There is also Minkowski's⁹⁹ astonishing account of a profoundly depressed man who was *quite preoccupied with the individual thisnesses of categories* and whose ability to draw boundaries to categories was deficient:

The essential values of an object or another being could not be appreciated by him..... Objects merged and seemed alike. Differences faded opposites all mean the same thing..... The address-band of his newspaper made him think of all the bands of all the newspapers of France. A member of his family had bronchitis and expectorated; the patient began to speak of all the sputum of all the tuberculosis sanatoria in the country and then went on to all the leavings of all the hospitals. When I shaved in front of him [Minkowski was employed as a live-in psychiatrist] he spoke of the soldiers in a nearby barracks who also shaved and then included all the soldiers of the army. 'The minute that I do something' he confided I must remember that forty million others do the same.

Consider now another depressive:¹⁰⁰

'It was as if the whatness of each thing – I'm no good at philosophical terminology – but the essence of each thing in the sense of the tableness of the table or the chairness of the chair or the flooriness of the floor was gone. There was a mute and indifferent object in that place. It became impossible to reach anything. Like, how do I get up and walk to that chair if the essential thing that we mean by chair, something that lets us sit down and rest or upholds us as we read a book, something that shares our life in that way, has lost the quality of being able to do that'.

In short, I have presented the case for the two major psychoses being pervasively affected, and, from a diagnostic point of view, centrally dominated, by disturbances in *zufälliges Sosein* – mynness, whoseness, where-ness, in particular. They are, moreover, distinguished from another by contrary directions away from contemporary norms: in the case of schizophrenia the collection of coincidental circumstances attached to any essential being is severely compromised, leaving the essence exposed, as it were; in the case of depressive illness, it is these very coincidental circumstances which pervade the subject's world-view – the sheer

enormity of individual instances – and it is the essence which disappears.

Even the experience of causality itself in the two conditions, to be distinguished from what really causes them, is quite polarized, and in keeping with their nature. The schizophrenic, for example, denies that he is the agent who moves his own limb. The depressive says, in effect, ‘I am to blame for everything’. The schizophrenic is here rejecting the very causative principle which Scheler claims is the original source of all experience of causation. The depressive is signing up, with a vengeance, to the very mythical standpoint which his or her witch doctor would readily endorse.

(c) *Final remarks on the concept of psychiatric causation.*

Have these excursions into Schelerian and Cassirean philosophy and Russian semiotics clarified the concept of psychiatric causation as set out in the introduction: psychogenesis in all cases; organicity in all cases; psychogenesis in some cases and organicity in others; psychogenesis *and* organicity in all cases; and psychogenesis in some cases, organicity in others, but most cases being idiopathic in origin (degeneracy, endogenicity, genetic inheritance and personality disorder being no more than labels for ignorance)?

It seems to the author that the various considerations elaborated during the article have *narrowed down the field of what can cause what*. In a negative way they have *restricted* the repertoire of potential causes to those which can affect the two channels which have been revealed as crucial for determining schizophrenia and depressive illness. For example, *an idea*, as Sommer thought, cannot cause a depressive illness, because a depressive illness requires a unique context in space and time and person to enter the channel which constitutes the condition. Further, an arousing event which might cause a depressive illness cannot cause schizophrenia because the very nature of schizophrenia is to reside in a realm where an evocation of high emotion has little effect, but where an idea or a spiritual value might well have a powerful effect. Consider these two cases, which epitomize the causal nexi which we have been building up in the course of the article. The first is a case of recurrent depressive illness from the personal files of the author. The second is a case of schizophrenia reported by Blankenburg.¹⁰¹

Depressive: A man of 48, in his third depressive illness, the previous two having lasting 2½ years, each untreated. On each occasion the precipitating event was an emotional attachment to a woman, in the first two an overwhelming love affair and in the third an emotional roller-coaster of a marriage. In his

background the man had lost his mother in infancy, had been brought up by a step-mother who continually demeaned him and showed no love, and his attitude to anyone who loved him was, it seemed, something uniquely new and unassimilable.

Schizophrenic: He was feeling unwell with various bodily symptoms which the medical attendant who first saw him thought were neurological in origin, and referred him to a neurologist in the neighbouring town. (He may well have been in a prodromal state at this point). While walking from the station to his appointment with the neurologist he happened to look in at the window of an art shop, and was captivated by a painting in blue, which he did not perceive as perceptually awry in any way, but as a marvellous specimen of ‘art’, a topic he had barely thought about before – he was a Mercedes Benz worker. From then on he became quite preoccupied with this picture, particularly its blue colour, and this led him to profound thoughts about the nature of art.

Both cases illustrate ‘psychogenesis’, but what a difference! – entanglement and love in a unique setting because it had never been experienced in childhood in depression, and complete capture by the aesthetic value of a painting in schizophrenia.

References

1. Kraepelin, E. (1917) *Hundert Jahre Psychiatrie*. Trans. 1962 by W. Baskin as *One Hundred Years of Psychiatry*. Peter Owen, London.
2. Wernicke, C. (1900) *Grundrisse der Psychiatrie*. G. Thieme. Leipzig.
3. Goldstein, K. (1936) ‘The modification of behavior consequent to cerebral lesions’. *Psychiatric Quarterly*, 10:586-610.
4. Kraepelin, E. (1896) ‘Die Dementia praecox’. In *Psychiatrie* (5th edn), pp 426-41. Trans. 1987 by H. Marshall. In *The Clinical Roots of the Schizophrenia Concept* (ed. J. Cutting and M. Shepherd), pp 13-24. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
5. Bleuler, E. (1911) *Dementia praecox*. Trans. 1950 by J. Zinkin, pp 337-47. International Universities Press, New York.
6. Jaspers, K. (1913) *Allgemeine Psychopathologie*. 7th edn. Trans. 1963 by J. Hoenig and M. W. Hamilton as *General Psychopathology*, pp 451-552. Manchester University Press, Manchester.
7. Ghaemi, S. N. (2010) *The Rise and Fall of the Biopsychosocial Model*. The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
8. Aristotle *Physics*. Trans. R. Waterfield, 1996, 194b 23-26. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
9. Macmurray, J. (1957) *The Self as Agent*, pp 146-164. Faber and Faber, London.

10. Moore, G.E. (1959) 'Wittgenstein's lectures in 1930-1933'. *Philosophical Papers*, p 316. George Allen and Unwin, London.
11. Schneider, K. (1920) 'Die Schichtung des emotionalen Lebens und der Aufbau der Depressionzustände'. *Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie* , 59, 281-6.
12. Cassirer, E. (1929/1957) *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, Vol.4, pp. 205-77. Yale University Press, New Haven.
13. Minkowski, E. (1933/1995) *Le Temps Vécu*, p 319. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris.
14. Cutting, J. and Andersch, N. (2013) *Max Scheler and Ernst Cassirer: A Convergence of Philosophies and a Framework for Elucidating Psychosis* *Comprendre*, 23, (In Press).
15. Frings, M.S. (2001) *The Mind of Max Scheler: the First Comprehensive Guide Based on the Complete Works*. Marquette University Press, Milwaukee.
16. Brain, W.R. (1941) 'Visual disorientation with special reference to lesions of the right cerebral hemisphere'. *Brain* , 64, 244-72.
17. Akelaitis, A. J. (1941) 'Studies on the corpus callosum. II The higher visual functions in each homonymous field following complete section of the corpus callosum'. *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, 45, 788-96.
18. Scheler, M. (1920's / 2008) *Max Scheler: The Constitution of the Human Being*. Trans from the *Posthumous Works* Vols. 11 and 12 J. Cutting, p. 400, 408. Marquette University Press, Milwaukee.
19. Lhermitte, F. (1986) 'Human autonomy and the frontal lobes. Part II: patient behavior in complex and social situations: the "environment dependency syndrome"'. *Annals of Neurology* , 19, 335-43.
20. Minkowski, E. (1933/1995), op. cit. p.305.
21. Bogousslavsky, J. and Regli, F. (1988) 'Response-to-next-patient-stimulation: a right hemisphere syndrome'. *Neurology* , 38, 1225-7.
22. Unnithan, S.B., David, A.S. and Cutting, J.C. (1991) 'Magnetic attraction of gaze: further evidence of hemispheric imbalance in schizophrenia?' *Behavioural Neurology* , 4, 63-6.
23. Hecquen, H. and de Ajuriaguerra, J. (1952) *Méconnaissances et Hallucinations Corporelles*. Masson, Paris.
24. Cutting, J. (1997) *Principles of Psychopathology*, p. 259. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
25. Ehrenwald, H. (1930) 'Verändertes Erleben des Körperbildes mit konsekutiver Wahnbildung bei linker Hemiplegie'. *Monatsschrift für Psychiatrie und Neurologie* , 75, 89-97.
26. Cutting, J. (1997) op. cit., p 254.
27. Lévy-Bruhl, L. (1921/1923) *La Mentalité Primitive*. Trans L. A. Clare as *Primitive Mentality*. George Allen and Unwin, London.
28. Sommer, R. (1894) *Diagnostik der Geisteskrankheiten. Urban and Schwarzenberg* . Wien.
29. Bonhoeffer, K. (1911) 'Wie weit kommen psychogene Krankheitszustände und Krankheitsprozesse vor, die nicht der Hysterie zuzurechnen sind?' *Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Psychiatrie* , 68, 371-86.
30. Jaspers, K. (1913) op. cit., p 392.
31. Lewis, A. (1972) "'Psychogenic": a word and its mutations'. *Psychological Medicine* , 2, 209-15.
32. Cutting, J. (2012) *A Critique of Psychopathology*, p 254. Parados Verlag, Berlin.
33. Brown, G.W., Harris, T.D. and Peto, J. (1973) 'Life events and psychiatric disorders, Part 2: nature of causal link'. *Psychological Medicine* , 3, 159-76
34. Tellenbach, H. (1974) *Melancholie*, 2nd edn. Springer. Berlin.
35. Cutting, J. (1985) *The Psychology of Schizophrenia*, p. 131. Churchill Livingstone, Edinburgh.
36. Von Uexküll, J. (1934) 'A stroll through the worlds of animals and men: a picture book of invisible worlds.' Reprinted in *Semiotic a*, 89 p.378, 1992.
37. Cassirer, E. (1996), op. cit., p.62.
38. Cassirer, E. (1996), op. cit., p.61-2.
39. Cassirer, E. (1996) op. cit., p.70.
40. Cassirer, E. (1925) *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, Vol.2. Trans. 1955 by R. Manheim, pp.45-8. Yale University Press, New Haven.
41. Scheler, M. (1933) 'Lehre von den drei Tatsachen'. Trans. 1973 as 'The theory of the three facts'. In *Max Scheler: Selected Philosophical Essays*, ed. D. R. Lachterman. Northwestern University Press, Evanston.
42. Scheler, M. (1927) 'Idealismus – Realismus'. Trans. (in part) 1973 as 'Idealism and realism'. In *Max Scheler: Selected Philosophical Essays*, ed. D. R. Lachterman. Northwestern University Press, Evanston.
43. Cassirer, E. (1944) *An Essay on Man*, pp 31-5. Yale University Press, New Haven.
44. Scheler, M. (1957/1973) 'Phenomenology and the theory of cognition'. Trans. in *Max Scheler: Selected Philosophical Essays* (ed. D.R. Lachterman), p 145 Northwestern University Press, Evanston.
45. Scheler, M. (1920's / 2008) op. cit., pp 257, 329, 331, 374.
46. Scheler, M. (1933) op. cit., p 219-52.
47. Scheler, M. (1927) op. cit., p 291-300
48. Lofts, S.G. (2000) *Ernst Cassirer. A Repetition of Modernity*, p.113. State University of New York Press, Albany.
49. Cassirer, E. (1929) op. cit., p 333.
50. Bonhoeffer, K. (1909) 'Zur Frage der exogenen Psychosen'. Trans. in *Themes and Variations in European Psychiatry* (ed. S.R. Hirsch and M. Shepherd), pp 47-52. Wright, Bristol.
51. Davison, K. and Bagley, C.R. (1969) 'Schizophrenia-like psychoses associated with organic disorders of the nervous system: a review of the literature'. In *Current Problems in Neuropsychiatry* (ed. R. Herrington), pp 113-94. Headley, Ashford.
52. Braun, C.M.J., Larocque, C., Daigneault, S. and Montour-Proulx, I. (1999) 'Mania, pseudomania, depression, and pseudodepression resulting from focal unilateral cortical lesions'. *Neuropsychiatry, Neuropsychology, and Behavioural Neurology*, 12, 35-51.
53. Ey, H., Bernard, P. and Brisset, C. (1960) 'Psychoses délirantes aiguës'. Trans. 1974 as 'Acute delusional psychoses' in *Themes and Variations in European Psychiatry* (eds. S. Hirsch and M. Shepherd). J. Wright, Bristol.

54. Flor-Henry, P. (1969) 'Psychosis and temporal lobe epilepsy: a controlled investigation'. *Epilepsia*, 10, 363-95.
55. Cernigovskaja, T.V. (1993) 'Die Heterogenität des verbalen Denkens als cerebrale Asymmetrie'. In *Psychosemiotik – Neurosemiotik* (ed. P. Grzybek), pp 15-35. Dr. Norbert Brockmeyer, Bochum.
56. Deglin, V.I. (1993) 'Die paradoxe Mentalität oder warum Fiktionen die Realität ersetzen. In *Psychosemiotik – Neurosemiotik* (ed. P. Grzybek), pp 55-96. Norbert Brockmeyer, Bochum.
57. Deglin, V.I. and Kinsbourne, M. (1996) 'Divergent thinking styles of the hemispheres: how syllogisms are solved during transitory hemisphere suppression'. *Brain and Cognition*, 30, 285-307.
58. Cassirer, E. (1929) op. cit., p.217.
59. Cassirer, E. (1929) op. cit., p.223.
60. Cassirer, E. (1929) op. cit., p.254.
61. Pick, A. (1903) 'On reduplicative paramnesia'. *Brain*, 26, 260-7.
62. Babinski, M.J. (1914) 'Contribution à l'étude des troubles mentaux dans l'hémiparésie organique cérébrale'. *Revue Neurologique*, i, 845-8.
63. Capgras, J. and Reboul-Lachaux, J. (1923) 'Illusions des sosies dans un délire systématisé chronique'. *Bulletin de la Société Clinique de Médecine Mentale*, ii, 6-16.
64. Bodamer, J. (1947) 'Die Prosop-Agnosie'. *Archiv für Psychiatrie und Zeitschrift für Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 179, 6-53.
65. Cutting, J. (2012) op. cit.
66. Zahn, R., Talazko, J. and Ebert, D. (2008) 'Loss of the sense of self-ownership for perceptions of objects in a case of right inferior temporal, parieto-occipital and precentral hypometabolism'. *Psychopathology*, 41, 397-402.
67. Scheler, M. (1928) *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd.9, 1995, pp 245-96. Bouvier, Bonn.
68. Gelb A & Goldstein K (1924) 'Über Farbenamnesie'. *Psychologische Forschung*, 6, 127-186.
69. Weiskrantz, L (1986) *Blindsight: A case Study and Implication*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
70. Ishiai, S., Seki, K., Koyama, Y. and Izumi, Y. (1997) 'Disappearance of unilateral spatial neglect following a simple instruction'. *Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry*, 63, 23-7.
71. Rafal, R. and Robertson, L. (1995) 'The neurology of visual attention'. In *The Cognitive Neurosciences* (ed. M. S. Gazzaniga), pp. 625-48. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
72. Fotopoulou, A., Rudd, A., Holmes, P. and Kopelman, M. (2009) 'Self-observation reinstates motor awareness in anosognosia for hemiplegia'. *Neuropsychologia*, 47, 1256-60.
73. Fotopoulou, A., Jenkinson, P.M., Tsakiris, M., Haggard, P., Rudd, A. and Kopelman, M. 'Mirror-view reverses somatoparaphrenia: dissociation between first- and third-person perspectives, on body ownership'. *Neuropsychologia*, 49, 3946-55.
74. Hoff, H. and Silbermann, M. (1933) 'Änderungen der akustischen Wahrnehmungswelt bei Temporallappenläsionen'. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 144, 647-64.
75. Starkstein, S.E. and Robinson, R.G. (1989) 'Affective disorders and cerebral vascular disease'. *British Journal of Psychiatry*, 154, 170-82.
76. Castillo, D.S., Starkstein, S.E., Fedoroff, J.P., Price, T.R. and Robinson, R.G. (1993) 'Generalized anxiety disorder after stroke'. *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, 181, 100-6.
77. Swoboda, K. J. and Jenike, M.A. (1995) 'Frontal abnormalities in a patient with obsessive-compulsive disorder'. *Neurology*, 45, 2130-4.
78. Dusoir, H., Owens, C., Forbes, R.B. Et.al. (2005) 'Anorexia nervosa remission following left thalamic stroke'. *Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry*, 76, 144-5.
79. Naqui, N.H, Rudraut, D., Damasio, H. and Bechara, A. (2007) 'Damage to the insula disrupts addiction to cigarette smoking'. *Science*, 315, 531-4.
80. Schneider, K. (1946) *Klinische Psychopathologie*, 5th edn. Trans. 1959 by M. W. Hamilton as *Clinical Psychopathology*. Grune & Stratton, New York.
81. Mellor, C.S. (1970) 'First rank symptoms of schizophrenia'. *British Journal of Psychiatry*, 117, 15-23.
82. Bürgy, M. (2011) 'Ego disturbances in the sense of Kurt Schneider: historical and phenomenological aspects'. *Psychopathology*, 44, 320-8.
83. Cutting, J. (1997) *Principles of Psychopathology*, pp. 135-8, 308. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
84. Minkowski, E. (1927) *La schizophrénie*. Trans. (in part) 1987 by J. Cutting. In *The Clinical Roots of the Schizophrenia Concept*, pp 201-210, op. cit.
85. Fischer, F. (1929) 'Zeitstruktur und Schizophrenie'. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 121, 544-74
86. Kuhs, H. (1991) 'Depressive delusions'. *Psychopathology*, 24, 106-14.
87. Cutting, J. (1997) op. cit., pp. 314-4.
88. Kraus, A. (1982) 'Identity and psychosis of the manic-depressive'. In *Phenomenology and Psychiatry* (ed. A. de Koning and F. A. Jenner), pp 201-16. Academic Press, London.
89. Kloos, G. *Störung des Zeiterlebens in der endogenen Depression*. Nervenarzt, 5, 225-44.
90. Kuhs, H., Herman, W., Kammer, W. and Tölle, R. (1991) 'Time estimation and the experience of time in endogenous depression (melancholia): an experimental investigation'. *Psychopathology*, 24, 7-11.
91. Straus, E. W. (1947) 'Disorders of personal time in depressive states'. *Southern Medical Journal*, 40, 254-9.
92. Vogeley, K. and Kupke, C. (2007) 'Disturbances of time consciousness from a phenomenological and a neuroscientific perspective'. *Schizophrenia Bulletin*, 33, 157-65.
93. Minkowski, E. (1930) *Étude sur le Structure des États de Depression*, pp. 21-38, op. cit.
94. Ratcliffe, M. (2012) 'Varieties of temporal experience in depression'. *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*, 37, 114-38.
95. Cutting, J. (1997) op. cit., pp. 139, 259.
96. Cutting, J. (1999) 'Morbid objectivization in psychopathology'. *Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, Suppl.* 395, 30-3.

97. Hirjak, D. and Fuchs, T. (2010) 'Delusions of technical alien control: a phenomenological description of three cases'. *Psychopathology*, 43, 96-103.
98. Cutting, J. (1997) *Principles of Psychopathology*, p.117, op. cit.
99. Minkowski, E. (1923) 'Étude psychologique et analyse phénoménologique d'un cas de mélancholie schizophrénique'. Trans. 1958 by B. Bliss as 'Findings in a case of schizophrenic depression'. In *Existence* (ed. R. May, E. Angel and H. F. Ellenberger), pp. 127-37. Basic Books, New York.
- 100) Hornstein, G.A. (2009) *Agnes's jacket: a Psychologist's Search for the Meaning of Madness*, p. 212-3. Rodale, New York.
101. Blankenburg, W. (1965) *Zur Differentialphänomenologie der Wahrnehmung. Nervenarzt* 36, 285-98.
-

STRUGGLES FOR RECOGNITION AND THE POWER OF THE ‘REALLY MADE UP’

Wendy Hamblet

Abstract

The nineteenth century has been called the century of nation-building. Is it mere coincidence that the century following on its heels was the century of genocide? This paper traces the identity politics of genocide to its conceptual roots in the notions of race and nation, and exposes the biological and historical meaninglessness of those terms, while conceding the enduring power of these ‘really made up’ social constructions.

Key Words:

Nationalism, racism, human nature, ritual, genocide, Hitler, Third Reich, identity politics, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ideology, Michel Foucault, Joseph L. Graves, separatism, Jeffrey Reiman.

The nineteenth century has been named the century of nation-building.¹ Countless peoples’ movements erupted across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and for hundreds of years these movements have been generally understood as spontaneous uprisings of distinctive peoples struggling for recognition. Nationalism was a sacred value of the era, in the conceptual tradition of the Enlightenment ideals that drove the French and American Revolutions—the ideals of the dignity and equality of men (and they did mean men)—so few persons questioned a peoples’ right to live freely in their own distinct way and their right to occupy a discrete territory, a homeland, where they could ‘be at home’ with others of their kind, governed by leaders selected from among their home group. Few questioned, in that conceptual climate, that distinctive peoples existed and that they had a right to exist separately from others.

Giuseppe Mazzini’s ‘Duties toward your Country’ (1854) voices the ideal in his vision of a new Europe divided according to kinds:

Natural divisions, and the spontaneous innate tendencies of the Peoples, will take the place of arbitrary divisions sanctioned by governments. The map of Europe will be redrawn. The countries of the Peoples, defined by the vote of free men, will arise upon the ruins of the countries of kings and privileged castes, and between these countries harmony and fraternity will exist.²

It was all a beautiful fairy tale, an idyllic dream of a perfect world—separate lands for separate peoples, all shaking hands across borders. It is unclear how the geographical mapping lands Mazzini at the happy conclusion of fraternity among the human kinds (certainly conflict theory holds that fraternity breaks down in groups under 15 and over 50 members³), but the rightness of the logic of human kinds was self-evident: as birds of a feather flock together and grains of sand settle to the level of their specific gravity, so for the peoples of the earth—like attracts like. But the dream of human kinds was never a more than that—a dream, and the dream had a nightmarish corollary: like repels unlike. The dreamers of Mazzini’s paradise could not foresee what the notion of discrete identity could mean for the identifiably different, those unlucky aliens living amidst the common ‘peoples’ struggling to achieve the imagined uniformity.

Yes, the nineteenth century was a century of nation-building. It is no mere coincidence that the century following on its heels was ‘the century of genocide.’⁴ It is no mere accident that the euphoric discourses of human specificity fulfilled themselves in murderous forms of countercultural rejection. Since the earliest human clans huddled together in caves and forests, ingroups have bonded, established group identity, and carved out a sense of belonging by locating and expelling alien presences—different others—who were seen as infecting the purity of the group. Millennia before scientists scrutinised heads, genitals, and genetic codes for definitive proof of distinct human identity, ingroups had already developed elaborate rituals for keeping the ingroup pure. Millennia of scapegoat/purification rituals ensured that the ‘us/them’ dichotomy was hard-wired into human cognitive processes and lodged at the ground of social, economic, and political life. The two radically polarised, over-simplistic conceptual ‘containers’ of us and them furnish fundamental categories for sorting the overwhelming data of perceptual experience; it is how our earliest ancestors made sense of the world.⁵ In times of unrest, external threat, food shortage, war, or other social chaos, ingroups have a deeply embedded tendency to draw together in solidarity by locating and purging difference from their midst, re-enacting the sacrifice ritual, the oldest known ritual in the vast

palette of human traditions, practised pervasively across the early millennia of human time.

Despite the long, well-established, and bloody history of rejection rituals, few people made the connection between the liberal values that advanced the rights of separate peoples to separately exist and the murderous rituals of exclusion and expulsion that would be called upon to grant those peoples their separate dwelling places. Few appreciated the logical connection between Mazzini's idealised Europe and Hitler's New World Order. The twentieth century saw the fulfilment of the peoples' identity politics in their logical conclusion—genocide. In the early years following World War I, the Turks acted to purge Armenian Christians from their historic homeland in Asia Minor.⁶ These killing sprees met no impassioned opposition from other countries, and indeed the killers, though long dead, are yet to be retroactively condemned for their crimes. The impunity of the Armenian Genocide furnished a precedent that Hitler would later call upon to rally his generals to the invasion of Poland: 'Nobody remembers the Armenians.'

It was in consonance with prevailing values that Hitler set out to purge Germany—and then Europe—of those who did not belong, 'inferior' peoples deemed to be infecting the 'superior' Aryan race and diluting its purity. Hitler's methods may have been recognised as regrettable, but his objective was completely understandable. Perhaps this helps to explain why so few countries publicly opposed the Third Reich's bloody march across Europe, even as millions upon millions of Jews, Poles, Roma, Sinti, African-Europeans, physically and mentally handicapped, homosexuals, communists, and other outgroups fell to the Nazi firing squads, death marches, labour camps, and ovens. Indeed, many countries and companies pitched in to help the Germans with their cause, making a handsome profit from the carnage. Right up until bombs were being lobbed across the English Channel and tanks were rolling across Russia, people were comfortable minding their own business and letting the various peoples of Europe sort out their own destinies.

What *could* one people say about another people for acting decisively to protect their purity? Were not the British protecting their Anglo-Saxon purity in the proliferating IQ research and the eugenics programs at their finest research institutions?⁷ Were not the Americans protecting their national character with their genetic research, their sterilisation programs among poor minorities, and their immigration policies, heavily weighted against Slavs, Jews, Italians, and other peoples deemed mentally unfit?⁸ The Germans

learned from the science of the day all they needed to justify their genocide. Hitler's mania around Aryan identity was just another, albeit more lethal, expression of a broadly shared obsession with the purity of the national stock.

So what were these elusive specificities which Mazzini envisioned in his perfectly organised new Europe? What curious 'bundles of adjectives' were peoples around the globe researching, writing, arguing in Parliament, sterilising in hospitals, ghettoising, border-patrolling, and murdering to preserve? Was all of this rhetoric about human kinds, all this mass xenophobia, really inspired by obsessions with family lines and cultural oddities about how to hold a fork? Struggles for recognition? What elusive qualities did these peoples want recognised?

We might seek our answer to this compelling question from an important document passed at the end of the Second World War in the much celebrated newly formed United Nations. Passed in 1948, the 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights' was hailed as a milestone of humanitarianism, a vehicle for extending world-wide the Enlightenment's universal and democratic values. It had taken two revolutions, two bloody world wars, two genocides, and many months of difficult negotiations to arrive at this agreement, whose lead article captures its spirit, pronouncing all human beings to be 'born free and equal in dignity and human rights.' Article 2 confirms everyone's entitlement to rights and freedoms 'without distinction of any kind.' However, Article 16 goes on to reassert the distinctions declared inconsequential in Article 2, declaring the universal right to a national specificity. Article 26 again affirms the particularity of human kinds in its mandate of universal education 'to promote understanding, tolerance, and friendship among all the nations, racial, and religious groups.'

The UDHR was a long and difficult time coming, and yet the one aspect of the declaration which met with not the slightest hint of resistance or debate was the categories into which the peoples of the earth were sorted—the categories of race and nation. These categories were to the crafters and signatories of the document so entirely self-evident that they required no careful definitions, no painstaking negotiation of their meanings. The question was not whether distinct human kinds existed or even whether they had the right to exist separately from others, but how to get to the fraternal relations that Mazzini had assumed a natural consequence of proper sorting; that is, how to affirm home group identity as good and valuable, while dodging the logical and political consequences

of this affirmation: the denomination of outgroups as other-than-good and less-than-valuable.

To this day, many decades later, the categories of race and nation, as clear and meaningful categories for delineating human distinctiveness and organising societies, have not yet come into question for the mass of humankind. Except for a small circle of race theorists, genocide scholars, and historians, the vast majority of people continue to believe in race and nation the way they believe in the law of gravity. The categories are assumed meaningful, natural, timeless, scientifically identifiable ways of sorting human kinds and organising political and social systems. The roots of racist and nationalist ideology run deep, embedded in language, religious worldviews, and philosophical histories, in literary works like Mazzini's, and political propaganda like Hitler's, as well as in the secular notions of civilisation that propelled the imperialist agendas of early global capitalism.

The Latin term *natio* from which nation derives betrays the long-standing interwovenness of ideas of national identity and biological specificity. *Natio* links with *natu* (by birth) and *natus* (born), belying the word's Ancient Greek origin in both *genos* (birth) and *ethnos*. Homer names the places where animals belong—pigs' pens and horses' stables—*ethea* and Herodotus associates the *ethea* animals with the *ethea* of *barbaroi*, voicing the definitive break in kind always posited as separating the 'us' of the civilised Hellenes from the 'them' of the uncivilised *barbaroi*.⁹ After Homer, *ethos* is used to refer to a nation or kinship group, but the link with animality remains intact and is plainly articulated in Aristotle's distinction between a *polis* such as Athens, a politically organised body of diverse people living under the rule of law, and an *ethnos* as the 'other' to the *polis*—a group of people incapable of noble forms of organisation or honourable political life, but stuck in the archaic pre-political formation of loosely organised kinship groups.

Aristotle's denigrating distinction exemplifies the first paradox of identity politics: it is often those most alienated by the definitions of belonging that cling to those definitions most fervently, as a means of establishing belonging. It is ironic that it is the *barbaros* Stagirite, Aristotle, who gives voice to the demonising distinction. It is the Stagirite too who carries the prejudicial *ethnos/genos* into the *polis* to explain distributions of class, declaring some people naturally born to rule and others by nature slavish and best served by being ruled by other, better men (*Politics*, 1254b16–21).

The pejorative connotation of *ethnos* enters the Western conceptual terrain through the Christian

New Testament, where *ethnikos* signifies foreign, heathen, and gentile. For the greater part of history, nation remained a derogatory term applied to foreigners to indicate their uncivilised nature and their incapacity for political life grounded in laws and other formal institutions. The modern affirmative sense of the word 'nation' is no older than the 18th century, when it rather suddenly took on the formidable meaning that propelled nationalistic movements across the age of nation-building. The new positive sense of the word is well captured in Joseph Stalin's definition of a nation as 'a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture.'¹⁰

How accurate is Stalin's definition? Historian E. J. Hobsbawm, whose work in this field is renowned, affirms the definition has not a single historical example to recommend it. 'No satisfactory criterion can be discovered for deciding which of the many human collectivities should be labelled [as a nation],' Hobsbawm insists.¹¹ Whether language, ethnicity, psychological bent, shared history, or something else, the criteria are 'fuzzy, shifting and ambiguous, and as useless for the purpose of the traveller's orientation as cloud-shapes are compared to landmarks'.¹² This illustrates another fundamental paradox of identity politics: the categories that give us our sense of distinctive identity are anchored in terms of definition that do not define anything at all.

Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent . . . political destiny, are a myth: nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality.¹³

The shiftiness of the definitions has proven no obstacle to their power. Anthropologist Joanna Overing, after Michael Taussig, warns us never to underestimate 'the reality of the really made up.'¹⁴ Hobsbawm too confirms the power of artefact, invention, and social engineering in the making of nations, explaining that nationalist leaders appeal to a mythical 'national consciousness' in order to *create* that consciousness, in order to generate a support base from which to launch themselves to power.¹⁵ From the top of the society downwards, national consciousness develops slowly and unevenly among the social classes and across the geographical regions of a country, with the popular masses being the last to be enlisted to the mythology. This confirms Michel Foucault's assertion:

Knowledge and power are integrated with one another and there is no point in dreaming of a time when knowledge will cease to depend upon power. . . .The

exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and conversely knowledge constantly induces the effects of power.¹⁶

Hobsbawm's decisive challenge to nationalism is summed up in his conclusion: no serious historian could ever be a nationalist, since nationalism *requires* getting one's history wrong.¹⁷

Since nation conveys concealed roots of *genos* and *ethnos*, Hobsbawm's critique of nation also dismantles identity claims posited in birth-lines and gene pools, unhinging the anchors of the second category employed in the UDHR, the category of race. Race is even more problematic for determining human kinds, yet, paradoxically, its mythology, though much more recent, is even more entrenched. In the case of race, the power of the 'really made up' is formidable at every level of American society, according to genetic biologist Joseph L. Graves. In his book, *The Race Myth*, the myth of race as a biologically determinate category is exposed to have 'scientific' roots.

The concept rests on three fervently cherished assumptions, explains Graves: that races exist; that each race has unique genetically determined characteristics; and that social hierarchy results naturally from these differences. The last and most dangerous of these assumptions dates back only to the 19th century, to the American naturalists who joined the idea of natural kinds with the notion of the organised *polis* to produce an ideology that holds that race, fixed and immutable by special creation, gives people the special features that assign them to their 'natural' position in their societies. In other words, social status matches perfectly with social desserts in a well organised society. The poor deserve their poverty, just as the rich deserve their wealth and power.¹⁸

A virtual torrent of scientific literature, asserting the inferiority of the non-white peoples who languished at the base of the social ladder, was created to justify the gross inequities of American society. Today that explanatory truth stream continues to flow strong and carries people along in its powerful current, framing the worldview and shaping the identity work of a great many people, at every level of American society, a phenomenon which Foucault names 'the politics of the scientific statement.'¹⁹ Though geneticists have investigated the depths of the human genome and declared vociferously that '[t]he human species does not contain biological races now, nor has it at any time in the past 250,000 years,' people doggedly cling to the belief that race is a biologically identifiable category that determines intelligence, personality traits, sexual characteristics, athletic ability, disease predisposition,

and other aspects of identity.²⁰ Though research has unequivocally proven that genes don't work that way, the torrential current of the 'really made up' continues its hammering flow, carving out the contours of peoples' reality from the top to the bottom of the social ladder, driving people to teach race to their children, just as they teach them table manners.

The fact is that there are more differences *within* any group than *between* any two human groups. 86% of human genetic variation occurs within a single human group; 10% variation is continental, and 4% defines local geographical variation.²¹ Among sub-Saharan Black African populations, for example, among people who self-identify as racially identical *and* share a geographical venue:

everything from skin colour to skull types to total genetic diversity is more variable than in any other of the world's populations. In other words, a person from the Congo and a person from Mali are more likely to be different genetically from each other than either is from a person from Belgium.²²

Science tells us that the categories called upon in the UDHR do not name specific human kinds, because there are no human kinds to name. The dangerous paradox is that scientists created the myth of human kinds in the first place, and though later scientists struggle valiantly to dismantle the denigrating myths, they have had little effect on popular consciousness or on political conscience. Identity politics compel formidable loyalty, though the divisions were invented by racists and separatists for the purpose of gaining power over others.

A huge force for the maintenance of myths of identity that vilify subgroups and rationalise their lowly social circumstances is the uncanny loyalty of the victims of these prejudicial myths. Subgroups continue to cling to the categories that were invented to oppress and exploit them. This clinging is indeed ironic, but it also makes perfect sense, for as Foucault shows, knowledge is power, so sharing the knowledge of the powerful is one way of establishing belonging, and who so longs for belonging as those most excluded from power, those most marginalised?

Whatever the popular imagination posits, whatever people teach their children, there are no natural kinds of human beings; no groupings are biologically, genetically, psychologically, or historically distinct. All identity groups are arbitrary, fluctuating, and endlessly diverse. But neither are people radically distinct individuals, cogs in a capitalist-industrial chain of producers and consumers.²³ We do cling to others, because belonging is a fundamental value in a human world. Carving out a place of belonging is

critical to an individual's well-being and to a groups' ability to gain access to the opportunities of their societies—the jobs, the scholarships, the country clubs, the presidencies, purportedly available to all. Belonging and alienation is a genuine problem for groups historically maligned by identity politics and clinging to myths of common identity can support their efforts to rearrange their possibilities.

People cling to each other for important reasons, but it is vital to recognise that as long as the terms of the struggle remain faithful to the markers of identity bequeathed by oppressive histories, they will continue to justify social inequities instead of equalise people's access to power and status. Calls for change on the part of the marginalised, when they remain framed in the historical terms of debate, continue to endure locked in the structural pinchers of the us/them dichotomy that radicalise imagined differences and alienate people from others who share their plight. Identity politics cannot escape Burkert's two containers: the over-simplistic, polarising 'us/them' dichotomy of good/bad; right/wrong; belonging/not-belonging; beautiful/loathsome; dangerous/benign. In always again taking up the binary logic of identity politics, people cannot help but reconfirm the categories that were created to vilify and suppress them. As long as people remain enslaved to the categories, the best they can do is a defensive, exculpatory politics that offers apologetics for their difference.

This is why many discerning social critics, from Albert Memmi to Franz Fanon, and more recently Adolph Reed, articulate their demands for social justice around critiques of identity politics, showing that discourses that remain logically faithful to historical binaries limit the political work to resorting the meaning-containers. Whether the binaries are coloniser/colonised (Memmi) or black skin/white masks (Fanon) or Black Public Intellectual/slave narrative interpreter to the whites (Reed), it is the binary structure of identity politics, they argue, that must be dismantled for people to break free of their histories of oppression and for justice ultimately to emerge.²⁴

Careful, unbiased research of social problems, and most recently of criminal justice procedure, demonstrates that the problem for marginalised persons is not so much how to gain recognition as a people, but how to escape that recognition. In a country where young people from all ethnic groups commit petty crimes at proportional rates, a young Black man has far greater difficulty escaping recognition as an 'incurably dangerous criminal' than any other mischievous youngster. This ready recognition raises astronomically his chances of

being funnelled into a system that beats compliance into his nature (body) rather than nurtures (educates) healthy social habits into his mind. In his excellent study, sociologist Troy Duster traces the history of the American criminal justice system's hyper-recognition rates:

In 1933, blacks were incarcerated as a race approximately three times the rate of incarceration for whites. In 1950, the ratio had increased to approximately 4 to 1; in 1960, it was 5 to 1, in 1970, it was 6 to 1, and in 1989, it was 7 to 1.²⁵

The heavily skewed incarceration rates help explain why in a country less than 13% Black, the prison population has become 'coloured' to over 70% Black over the past 80 years.

Police target and bully young Black men, and unfair courts 'that never listen' funnel them into group homes, boot camps, and other juvenile detention centres that brutalise and mistreat them and fuel their hopelessness and rage. Thus the system that arises to contain them shapes these kids in their image, hardening them, desensitising them, and destining them for prison. Then scientists put on their white coats and collect their funding to study the 'social problem'—diagnose it, determine its incidence, identify its defining features, and design treatments to contain the disease. It is not that the hardened and dangerous Black criminals incarcerated en masse are not a very real problem, proven by counting their numbers in arrest records, probation reports, and prison statistics. But it is easy to forget that these data:

reflect decisions of juries on who gets convicted and decisions of judges on who gets probation or prison and for how long and decisions [by police] about which crimes to investigate and which suspects to take into custody. All these decisions rest on the most fundamental of all decisions: the decisions of legislators as to which acts shall be labelled 'crimes' in the first place.²⁶

But social problems don't exist 'objectively' out there in society, waiting to be recognised by experts, who merely count the numbers and draw the obvious conclusions. 'Social problems' are a discourse, another stream of truth claims, constructed within a worldview under the influence of prevailing myths. Experts prove their scientific and academic legitimacy, increase their influence, and gain financial support and professional accolades by addressing these problems (criminally prone minorities) and not others (corporate crime).

Social realities take shape as individuals are funnelled through a system, a system composed of a series of portals administered by sentries whose everyday decisions stream people for this—or

that—future. And the everyday decisions of this army of functionaries are shaped by the society in which those decisions are made—societies structured in specific ways, societies with specific histories that breed specific fears and prejudices that lead people at every level of power, the sentries at every post and the scientists in every interpretative article, to make the decisions that they make and understand problems the way that they do.

Societies are so invested in the reality of their 'really made up' social myths that many kids in trouble, who hail from minority social groups, can no more get fair access to the resources they need to turn their fate around than their fathers got fair chances at decent jobs or their mothers got decent educations in the poor neighbourhoods where they were raised. Generations of people get 'recognised' straight off as deserving of failure and poverty, and this recognition, this 'really made up' truth, often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Identity discourses are knowledge streams that flow among numerous power centres in societies, and those streams flow all the more powerfully the more unequal and unjust the society. The US criminal justice system demonstrates that the 'really made up' has the power to create the diseases it purports to find already there in some people's souls. The 'really made up' has the power to shape reality, because denigrating myths breed shame and violence, while they excuse poverty and injustice, all of which are powerful conditioners of social reality.

So who gets to say what is really real? Is the truth contained in scientific fact, prison demographics, documents of rights, blueprints for 'naturally' ordered societies, the people's imagination? A broad watercourse of discourse streams converge to form local pools of identity, drawn along by the powerful undertow of history. All identity flagships on the sea of human difference are the most variegated patchwork-constructions, bound into fragile unities by the loyalties of the sailors. No single truth stream offers safe passage to a place of transcendental grounding; none faithfully mirrors some objective reality 'out there,' because reality is not objectively 'out there' but right here in the job line, the court room, and the schoolhouse, where subjects, not objects, are hungry and waiting to be fed. All these streams of truth flow up against an urgent ethical reality: they help to decide who gets to eat and who gets slapped for the pertinence of their hunger.

The older truths have the greater power to determine the pecking order in societies. But we don't have to accept the powerful discourses that re-express the old folks' resentments. People no more come in distinct kinds than babies come by

stork, God protects the meek, or nice girls save themselves for marriage. Myths come in all shapes and sizes. Though the voices of history are powerful, people can decide for themselves when to listen and when to hold their hands over their ears. We should try to resist the seductive siren song of the 'really made up' myth of distinct human kinds, because it will fasten us to the dehumanising truths of the past and alienate us from our neighbours who, whether we acknowledge them or not, sit at our dining table and share a common hunger.

Autobiographical Addendum:

I was the second-born of eight children, pushed up to the dining room table, taking turns getting our ears boxed as we learned our 'proper' table manners. As 'English children growing up in Canada' (a curiously self-alienating description), mealtimes often tabled not only lessons in correct fork usage and table posture, but heated arguments about the suitability of our alien circumstances for cultivating 'civilised behaviour.' Mum, an English warbride, had been deceived in a moment of pity for Dad's homesickness into leaving her beloved island. Her supposed trial of the Great White North turned out to have permanent consequences that explain her frequent dining table speech: *How can these children be properly raised in this godforsaken colonial wasteland?* To this, Dad would answer, just as passionately: *There is no better place on earth than Canada.* This patriotic Canadian wrote odes to his country's windswept plains and towering snow-capped mountains, but his poems could never rival the oft-quoted eulogy for Mother's homeland: 'If I should die, think only this of me: that there's some corner of a foreign field is forever England.'

Little did I know, as I was growing up, absorbed in helping my young siblings to learn the coveted manners that would save their tender ears, that the dining table conversations of my childhood would have direct bearing on the radical violence studies that would later command my scholarly attention. To me it is a curious fact that my parents met on VE Day (May 7th, 1945) in the streets of London, amidst euphoric celebrations of the end of Hitler's vicious and deadly nationalism. In my youth, I could but wonder about the elusive specificities which laid siege to the dining table of my childhood. Later, as my philosophical studies brought me to the subject of genocide, I continued to question the 'bundles of adjectives' that people around the globe were so passionately researching, writing, arguing in Parliament, sterilising in hospitals, ghettoising, border-patrolling, and murdering to preserve. Was all of this rhetoric about human kinds, all this mass

xenophobia, really inspired by obsessions about how to hold a fork? What elusive qualities did these people want recognised? What obsessive loyalties were driving them to teach racism and ethnocentrism to their children, just as they teach them table manners?

My parents demonstrated that old entrenched truths have great power to determine the pecking order in any society, but their disagreement also showed that truth is a slippery matter. We don't have to accept the powerful discourses that re-express the old folks' resentments. People no more come in distinct kinds than Canada is a mere frontier outpost of superior English culture, or babies come to being in the cabbage patch, or nice girls save themselves for marriage. Myths come in all shapes and sizes. Though the voices of history are powerful, people can decide for themselves when to listen and when to hold their hands over their ears. We don't have to be seduced by the siren song of the 'really made up' myth of distinct human kinds that fasten us to humanising truths of the past and alienate us from our neighbours.²⁷

Department of Liberal Studies
North Carolina A&T State University
<http://ncat.academia.edu/WendyCHamblet>
<http://ICOE.webs.com>

Notes

1. Walter Bagehot, *Physics and Politics* (Lanham, MD: Ivan R. Dee, 1999), 20-21.
2. Giuseppe Mazzini, "Duties toward your Country," *Introduction to Contemporary Civilization in the West*, 3rd edition, volume 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 540-43, 541.
3. Otomar Bartos and Paul Weir, *Using Conflict Theory* (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 35, 44 ff.
4. Eric Weitz, *A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
5. Walter Burkert, *Creation of the Sacred: Tracks of Biology in Early Religions*. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996).
6. Gaunt, David. *Massacres, Resistance, Protectors: Muslim-Christian Relations in Eastern Anatolia during World War I* (Piscataway, New Jersey: Gorgias Press, 2006); Dominik J. Schaller and J. Zimmerer, 'Late Ottoman genocides: the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and Young Turkish population and extermination policies – introduction', in *Journal of Genocide Research* (1): 7-14 (2008); Christopher J. Walker, *Armenia: The Survival of A Nation* (London, CroomHelm, 1980), 200-203.
7. For the United Kingdom, see N. Stepan, *The Idea of Race in Science* (London: Macmillan, 1982); B. Evans and B. Waites, *IQ and Mental Testing* (London: Macmillan, 1981).
8. For the United States, see L. Kamin, *Science and the Politics of IQ* (Potomac, MD: Erlbaum, 1974).
- A. Chase, *The Legacy of Malthus* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1980); D. P. Pickens, *Eugenics and the Progressives* (Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 1968).
9. Liddell and Scott, *An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 226; Homer, *The Iliad* 6.506-11.
10. Quoted in E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 5.
11. Idem.
12. Ibid. 6.
13. Ibid. 10.
14. Joanna Overing, 'The Role of Myth: An Anthropological Perspective', in George Schopflin and Geoffery Hosking, *Myths and Nationhood* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 1-18. c.f. Michael Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity* (New York: Routledge, 1992).
15. idem.
16. Michel Foucault, *Power* (New York: The New Press, 2001), James Faubion, ed., Robert Hurley, trans.
17. Hobsbawm (1990), 12-13.
18. Joseph L. Graves, Jr., *The Race Myth: Why We Pretend Race Exists in America* (New York: Penguin, 2005). Graves states: 'The most credentialed of [the naturalists] labored to find objective means to prove a fact that all learned whites already knew. Louis Agassiz theorized about why, Samuel Morton measured skulls, and Josiah Nott and George R. Glidden popularized the results' (20).
19. Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), 112.
20. Graves, *The Race Myth*, 20.
21. Nei, M. and A. K. Roychoudhury, 'Gene differences between Caucasian, Negro, and Japanese populations' in *Science* 177:434-436 (1972).
22. Graves, *The Race Myth*, 17.
23. Plato, *Republic* 414c ff. sorts the classes of his "city in logos" according to vocational aptitude, but he leaves permeable the borders between the classes because natural kinds is a myth, as fictive as the "noble lie" that men's souls are made of varied metals.
24. Franz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (New York: Grove Press, 1967); Albert Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991); Memmi, *Racism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000). More recently, Adolph Reed Jr. (*Class Notes*, New York: The New Press, 2000), highlights the dichotomous logic as an enduring problem in his critique of the 'Black Public Intellectual'. From Booker T. Washington to Cornell West, Henry Louis Gates Jr., Gloria Watkins (bell hooks), Michael Dyson, and Robin Kelly, Reed sees the modern black intellectual still locked in the ambiguous role of Willie, the head of the native bearers in a typical episode of 'Ramar of the Jungle', an early television adventure series. Whenever drums are heard in the distance, Willie is summoned to interpret what's going on with the restless natives. 'What are the drums saying, Willie?'

the confused white hunters inquire. 'Men afraid,' Willie tells them, 'afraid of evil spirits' (77). According to Reed, today's black intellectuals remain locked in the slave narrative role of interpreting a collective black will, a role restricts them to a narrow, other-directed, defensive, and exculpatory writing that remains riveted to the task of proving black people's equal humanity (82). Evidence of the restrictive nature of black public intellectual writing Reed locates in their tendency to 'come together in a hyperbolically log-rolling lovefest', congratulating each other on their brilliance, endlessly agreeing with each other, never really engaging in any actual debate, but instead issuing easy pronouncements of politically correct opinions 'against racism, sexism, homophobia, anti-Semitism, or . . . a lame Afrocentricity'. Reed bemoans their 'quietistic alternative to real political analysis', and its baleful effects for any serious

scholarly examination of black American life (87-88). Reed states, 'In rejecting all considerations of standards of evidence and argument as expressions of naïve positivism, the cultural politicians get to make up the story as they go along. Graduate students can figure out that this gambit has two very attractive features: it drastically reduces the quantity of digging and thinking one has to do and it clears the path to public visibility and academic recognition'.

25. Troy Duster, 'Genetics, Race and Crime: Recurring Seduction to a False Precision' in *DNA on Trial: Genetic Information and Criminal Justice* (Plainview, N.Y.: Cold Spring Harbor Press, 1992), 132-35. 133.
 26. Jeffrey Reiman, *The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison* (New York: Prentice Hall, 2009), 59. Emphasis mine.
 27. Rupert Brooke, 'The Soldier' (1914).
-

DISCUSSIONS

1. Do robots really have tacit knowledge?

In 'Autonomous robots and tacit knowledge' (*Appraisal*, Vol. 9. No. 2, October 2012, pp. 8-14) Mihály Héder and Daniel Paski, using Polanyi's ontology, argue that, because certain machines, structurally like organisms, do not have explicit knowledge, they therefore, like animals, have tacit knowledge. But there is another possible conclusion: that they have no knowledge at all. That, I suggest, is the correct one.

In short their argument is this:

(P1) Considering that machines and living things are subclasses of the same ontological class, and (P2) recognizing the control mechanism of a robot as the machine equivalent of living organism's regulative functions, while not forgetting that (P3) all forms of life are capable of knowing, that is, have some kind of knowledge, we arrive to the conclusion (C) that robots like Primer-V2 [a robot that can ride a bicycle] also possess some kind of knowledge. (p. 9)

The keys point in this argument are (P1) and (P2). Although I regard (P3) as false, it is more of a side issue than the central one. It can be rejected and the debate confined to the alleged equivalence of robots with those organisms which are conscious.

(P1) asserts that machines and living beings are subclasses of the class of entities which are emergent ones subject to dual control in which a lower level governed according to the laws of chemistry and physics has its boundaries determined by a higher level of operational principles, respectively, those of engineering and the purpose of the machine and those of biological functions.

In (P2) what distinguishes autonomous robots from other machines is said to be their control mechanism and that is taken to be the *same sort* of thing as the personal or sub-personal centre of a person or an animal. The question, then, is, Are these two centres really equivalent?

The control mechanism in an autonomous robot would correspond to the brain in an animal or its nervous system if it lacks a distinct centre. But a brain and a nervous system are physical and organic entities which are *used* by the personal co-efficient or sub-personal system, whereas the authors *identify the physical control mechanism as* the equivalent of the sub-personal co-efficient. Thus when, on p. 9, the authors cite Polanyi's use of 'centre' on PK 244 (his usual term is '(personal) co-efficient') they beg the question (and incorrectly apply Polanyi) in simply applying the same term to an autonomous robot whereas Polanyi said of his 'centre' that it is that of 'living individual,

'something active, that grows, produces meaningful shapes, survives by the rational functioning of its organs; something can behave and acquire knowledge, and at a human level, can even think and affirm its own convictions'. That is the real difference: the absence of a sub-personal co-efficient that would tacitly *use* the components and program of the control mechanism.

Hence, when the authors say that the robot 'knows how to *run* the program' the key word is not 'run' but 'knows', and likewise with the italicised words in '*execute* a code and *integrating* it with its body structure into physical motion, *enacting* [this last italicising mine] the knowledge of bicycle riding itself' (p. 11). For what is the robot but its physical components and program? What is the 'co-efficient' that would be the supposedly intelligent robot *itself* over, above and indwelling its electro-mechanical components and program, as I indwell my body, and thus *itself* performing all these acts as *I* and not my body or any part of it perform mine? That is what the authors need to establish but do not, and, I submit, cannot.

R..T. Allen

2. Reply

We are really thankful to Richard Allen for sharing his doubts about the conclusions of our paper, because it allows us to examine our problem from yet another angle. (And, of course, we are also thankful to our supporters, grant TÁMOP - 4.2.2.B-10/1--2010-0009 and OTKA PD 83589.)

First, we would like to emphasize how important the notion of 'active centre' is in Polanyi's philosophy. It is indeed related, but by no means substitutable with, 'personal coefficient'. The former occurs many times more in the text of PK and refers to a component of the machine-like structure of all that is living.¹ In connection with this we propose that the machine-like structure of some actual machines also contain their own respective 'active centres' that explains their performance in reaching goals, thus we can say they are enacting knowledge. They are equivalent with animals only in this respect, but clearly different in others; for instance, machines are not living beings.

In contrast with this, 'personal coefficient' and 'tacit coefficient' are consistently mentioned as the causes of the impossibility of articulating one's knowledge into explicit language terms, logical expressions or formulae—or program code, as we argue. Indeed, it appears that Polanyi's use of the word 'coefficient' is motivated by the terminology of chemistry and mathematics where coefficients are

parts of expressions and formulae, which might get ‘eliminated’ at some point—this is what one cannot do with the personal coefficient. For instance, Polanyi argues in PK Chapter 8, ‘The logic of Affirmation’, that no matter how much one explicates the mechanism of deductive logic, the inexplicable personal coefficient will still be necessary, and therefore the deduction will never be fully computerised. We agree with this conclusion as far as we do not think that machines have explicit knowledge like the knowledge of using deductive logic. However, we think that there is an implicit assumption here, according to which everything a computer does is necessarily explicit. (Harry Collins’ ‘Tacit and Explicit Knowledge’ states this explicitly). We think that this assumption is wrong, as the program code is not the machine’s performance, but the capability of executing code is.

To sum up the difference, we think that ‘personal co-efficient’ refers to a component of knowledge whereas ‘active centre’ refers to a structural part of a living organisation, or as we argue, of a machine. However, we believe that Richard Allen by ‘personal coefficient’ simply refers to the person itself.

Richard Allen argues that the sensor-effector-control mechanism of a robot corresponds to the nervous system and brain of an animal and those are both physical control mechanisms. However, in the case of the nervous system and brain of an animal there is an extra quality, the sub-person that indwells and uses this mechanism. We find both parts of the statement problematic. According to Polanyi’s view (which we share) a control mechanism cannot be ‘physical’ in the sense that it cannot be fully described with the laws of physics. According to Polanyi’s well-known dual control principle, physics or chemistry can only set the limits in between the higher-level boundary conditions take effect. However, they cannot explain why an entity is co-ordinating its parts in order to reach a goal, and one reason for this is that physics and chemistry do not provide teleological statements about the world at all. So, both machines’, and living things’ control mechanisms are emergent. The other troubling issue in Richard Allen’s proposal to tell life and machines apart is the origin of the ‘personal coefficient’ that indwells living organisms but absent from machines. Excluding here the possibility of an external origin—that would lead to some sort of dualism or vitalism—we must assume that the person or (sub-person in case of animals) is emergent on the organisation’s body. Why do only living things exhibit this phenomenon? What is the difference then between machines and living organisms in this respect? We think that both of them are emergent,

both of them have machine-like structure by dual control to achieve goals, and the difference is something else, it is the ‘inventive powers of animal life’.

In *Personal Knowledge* (p. 344) Polanyi discusses living organisms’ active centres, which, of course is not completely identical with the similar centres of a robot that has been designed by a human. Polanyi makes this clear himself on pp. 336–337 where he explains that ‘This conceptual framework strongly suggests to me the presence of an active centre operating unspecifiably in all animals. [...] There are then two principles at work in animals: namely (1) the use of machine-like contrivances and (2) the inventive powers of animal life’.

As machines are not living beings, and even more not persons, we cannot say that they possess the ‘inventive powers of animal life’. But this distinction also makes it clear that the body of animals is not simply ‘physical’, as for instance materialists think, but they are shaped by emergent machine-like boundary conditions, which make them able to perform at different activities and reach goals. In the case of the bicycle riding robot this machine-like body is operated by an active centre in the robot itself, while in the case of a hammer it is operated by the human’s centre.

So our answer to Richard Allen is that machines have an active centre, which fulfils the function of operating a machine-like body just like in the case with the machine-like bodies of living organisms. In other respects, living beings and man-made machines are quite different of course. However, let us make a really important remark. Comparing the bicycle-riding robot to a human can be really misleading. Even though we emphasise in our original article that it is not the case, many readers seem to interpret our statements as we said that humans and certain robots are essentially equivalent. Maybe it is because the activity of bicycle riding is associated with humans. However, that is not our argument, in fact, that would be a materialist position. That is because regardless of the slight but important similarity discussed above, there is a huge distance in terms of hierarchical emergent ontological levels between living, conscious, cultural humans and autonomous robots. Both of them are emergent, both of them have a centre, both of them possess tacit knowledge, but they are essentially different. This is why we prefer to compare a robot with simpler life forms, like amoeba, which, in our view uses tacit knowledge to achieve its goals. The robots are still different because they lack the inventive powers of life, but still, they know how to ride a bicycle, as seen here:

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mT3vfSQePcs>

Mihály Héder and Daniel Paski

Note:

1. Our quick search on the ebook version of *Personal Knowledge* revealed 9 vs. 66 occurrences. The exact numbers might be incorrect but we think the general ratio isn't.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Maudsley Reader in Phenomenological Psychiatry

eds M. R. Broome, R. Harland, G. S. Owen and A. Stringaris,

Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012. ISBN 978-0-521-70927-9 pbk; 295 pp. £40

This anthology consists of an Introduction and three parts: 'Influences on Phenomenology', extracts from Brentano, Dilthey, Weber and Bergson; 'Phenomenological Philosophy', extracts from Husserl, Scheler and Heidegger; 'The Phenomenological Approach in Psychiatry', extracts from Jaspers, Minkowski and Binswanger; and 'Phenomenologies of Mental Disorder', extracts from Goldstein, Jaspers, Vinkowski, Binswanger, Bannenberg, K. Conrad, Fünke, K. Schneider, E. Strauss, Gesattel, Scheler and Merleau-Ponty.

Phenomenological psychiatry was founded as a discipline in a precise place, at a precise time, and for a precise purpose. Four psychiatrists—Eugene Minkowski, Ludwig Binswanger, Erwin Strauss and Victor von Gebattel—met in 1922 at a meeting of the Swiss Society for Psychiatry in Zurich. They were unhappy with both psychological and organic approaches to psychiatry prevalent at the time, and decided to launch an alternative programme. They called this 'phenomenological' because they were aware of the new philosophical school of philosophy instituted by Husserl's *Logical Investigations*¹ published in 1900/1901 and believed that a philosophically-based psychopathology, loosely beholden to Husserl's innovations, was the way forward.

The anti-psychological stance of phenomenological psychiatrists should not be underestimated. Husserl himself was probably the first great thinker to realise that the psychological bandwagon of the 19th Century was bogus. Where is the person in psychological formulations? Psychologists see merely a cacophony of functions. If anything, the theme which bonds all these phenomenological psychiatrists is precisely an attempt to thread their way through the false notions that psychologists were at that time, and still are, proclaiming was the nature of the human being.

All sorts of misunderstandings about the term 'phenomenological psychiatry' have accrued in the intervening century, but the core venture—to fashion a non-biological, non-psychological understanding of what it is to be mad or mentally ill in other ways—has lingered on. In fact the same doubts

about the correctness of a purely biological, or a purely psychological approach, or even a combination of these, favoured in North America and known as the 'bio-psychosocial model', are as pressing today as they were in 1922.

This book covers the ground in exemplary fashion. The editors are all relatively junior psychiatrists who themselves experienced the same dissatisfaction with the state of psychiatry at the beginning of the 21st Century that the tetrad referred to above had in the 1920's. The selection of authors, the particular extracts from these authors, and the framing philosophical discussion, are all illuminating. The book is of primary interest to psychiatrists, whose acquaintance with this literature is probably cursory, as it is seldom taught, and hardly referred to in the standard textbooks that they read. It should also appeal to philosophers, thinkers of all sorts, those who have been or are mentally ill, and, indeed, anyone who takes an interest in psychiatry and psychology.

The richness of the book is such that it is difficult to know what themes to draw attention to. I shall concentrate on two, which get lost in the very comprehensiveness of the book. One is the confusion surrounding the term 'phenomenological' and hence the heterogeneous nature and non-Husserlian provenance of most of the extracts selected. The other is the contemporary relevance of the extracts. In short: What has 'phenomenology' as a philosophical school of thought, and the Husserlian version in particular, got to do with so-called 'phenomenological psychiatry'? and, What does the future hold for 'phenomenological psychiatry', squeezed between its two powerful competitors—clinical psychology and biological psychiatry?

On the first point—the problematic terms phenomenology and phenomenological—confusion reigns because the philosophical school of phenomenology was itself heterogeneous and because some psychiatrists deemed 'phenomenological' in this book arrived at their notions about psychopathology independently of any philosopher who was part of the philosophical school of phenomenology. A third level of confusion obtains in addition, because some so-called 'phenomenological psychiatrists' used the term 'phenomenon' in a completely non-philosophical way to mean little more than its everyday use as a class of experience. I shall take these points in turn.

Husserl was the originator of the school of phenomenological philosophy, though not of course the term 'phenomenology' itself in a technical, philosophical sense, which is in the title of Hegel's greatest book. But Scheler and Heidegger are now regarded as equal contributors to the school, certainly so in Spiegelberg's² masterly historical account of the movement. Setting aside other major philosophers in the early and middle decades of last Century—Hartmann, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, for example—who held some views in common with these three, and who are also known as phenomenological philosophers, the differences between Husserl, Scheler and Heidegger themselves are so great that the very notion of a phenomenological school of philosophy is hard to credit.

This means that to call someone a 'phenomenological psychiatrist' one should first ask which phenomenological philosopher was his mentor. Binswanger, for example, started as a Husserlian, then came under Heidegger's influence, then turned back to Husserl; von Gebsattel espoused Scheler's views. But Minkowski's 'maître' was Bergson and hardly mentioned phenomenology, whilst Strauss barely quotes any philosopher except Aristotle. So, even amongst the original gang of four, phenomenological philosophy, Husserlian or not, was not the critical influence.

What does link nearly all the contributors, however, is an interest in, and an attempt to apply, philosophy of some sort to psychopathology. With the exception of Conrad, who was concerned to show the relevance of Gestalt psychology rather than philosophy, and Jaspers, who actually became a philosopher after four years as a psychiatrist, but whose overall approach to psychopathology is rather anti-philosophical, perhaps a better label for the movement tracked in this book would be philosophically-oriented psychopathology or philosophical psychopathology.

To confound matters still further, the term 'phenomenon' in psychiatry is generally taken to mean a psycho-pathological entity, such as delusion, hallucination, or, in an article included in the book, by Jaspers, pseudo-hallucination. (A pseudo-hallucination is a perceptual experience which falls somewhere between the normal experience of something as independent of the perceiver and externally located, and something dependent on the perceiver and located in the mind.) All such 'phenomena' are hypothetical constructs by a 'normal' person of what someone in an anomalous state of mind experiences or thinks, and 'pseudo-hallucination', with which Jaspers chooses

to illustrate the whole notion of 'phenomenon', is dubious even as a class of psycho-pathological experience. Jaspers, whose book *General Psychopathology* was first published in 1913, and whose centenary is being celebrated this year in conferences and articles, is fêted by psychiatrists of all sorts of orientation for supposedly bringing 'phenomenology' to the world of psychiatry. In fact, he 'de-philosophised' the term, and turned 'phenomenological psychiatry' into a crude technique for identifying symptoms and signs in psychiatry in the same way as they are processed in general medicine.

In summary, 'phenomenological psychiatry' is, in the main, a philosophically-beholden approach to psychiatry, which treats in utter seriousness, what the mad, neurotic, and even people compromised by their indulgence in damage-inflicting behaviours (gamblers, fasters, drinkers), say or do as variations in the extant ontological framework of contemporary life. Such variations are neither deemed pathological, as biological psychiatrists would have it, nor regarded as outliers on some normal curve of mental functioning, as clinical psychologists suppose. The label 'phenomenological' for this psychiatric movement is misleading, as has been shown. The psychiatrists involved, whose views are well presented in this book, were, to be pedantic, rather philosophical psycho-pathologists, their philosophical influence being largely 20th Century philosophy, amongst which phenomenology was one of the major innovations.

What of the contemporary relevance of all this? and what of the future with respect to the dual constraints exerted by clinical psychology and biological psychiatry?

One criticism levelled at phenomenological psychiatry is its lack of therapeutic potential. Unlike a biological or clinical psychological approach, where there is a smooth transition from an assessment to either drug treatment or psychotherapy of some sort, an exposition of a schizophrenic's sense of space or a depressive's experience of time is not obviously beneficial to anyone but a philosophically curious psychiatrist.

Another negative point of view which might strike a reader of this book is the sheer diversity of what has been written under the umbrella term phenomenological psychiatry, to which I alluded earlier. The reader might also note the dearth of Husserlian applications to psychopathology, despite his being the stimulus to the entire venture. In addition, one might well wonder which of the numerous philosophers whose work has been applied, exemplified by the extracts in this book, is to

be preferred in this exercise. Scheler even turned the table on philosophers themselves, with his view that some philosophical systems were only true of psycho-pathological states of mind,³ and Minkowski stated quite specifically that the depressive condition was a living exemplar of a materialist philosopher's credo and the schizophrenic condition an incarnation of an idealist's.⁴

My view on the supposed therapeutic nihilism, and rather scattergun approach of phenomenological psychiatry (i.e. any philosophical psychopathology is better than none), is as follows.

Drug treatment in psychiatry, some of it very effective, was all discovered serendipitously. No-one ever sat down with assured knowledge of the nature of some condition and devised rational drug treatment, because no such knowledge existed in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s when effective antidepressants, antipsychotics and mood-stabilisers were discovered. In the case of psychotherapy, whether psychoanalytic or cognitive, benefit is claimed in a variety of conditions, which is surprising because the model of depression which is espoused, and for which most benefit is alleged, bears little resemblance to the nature of depression built up by the phenomenological psychiatrists in this book, nor would one expect the two sets of models to coincide, because, as I said earlier, the phenomenological approach is anti-psychological. If, however, the phenomenological approach is correct, and I believe that it is the right way forward, as schizophrenia and depressive psychosis, at least, on even casual acquaintance, can be seen to involve an ontological break with contemporary world formation, then a phenomenological/philosophical account of the two conditions appears to be called for. Effective drug treatment can then be put down to a particular alteration in the chemical status of the brain, which in a yet unknown way alleviates the nature of the targeted condition. The efficacy of psychotherapy, which is anyway nowhere near curative, can then be attributed to a combination of placebo effects and cognitive restructuring, neither of which validates the model which the psychologist adheres to. If anything, because of the dire side-effects of otherwise beneficial drug treatment, and because of the dubious link between the cause of improvement with psychotherapy and the model of the condition which is supposed to justify the therapy, what psychiatry is crying out for is an approach that will resolve the nature, once and for all, of schizophrenia, depressive illness, and a host of other conditions, and, by example with general medicine, will then rationally direct the search for appropriate treatment. Throughout the 20th Century the cart has always

been put before the horse in this respect. Because antipsychotics worked, and because they blocked the neurotransmitter dopamine, then schizophrenia must be caused by dopamine excess; or because cognitive restructuring ameliorated a mild depressive illness, then all sorts of depressive illnesses were caused by faulty cognitive attitudes. I am optimistic that at least some of the contributions of phenomenological psychiatrists will be picked up by psychiatrists of the future and used as the building blocks for safer and more rational treatment than is the case now.

As to which of the various 'phenomenological' views will survive the test of time this seems to me to be in the hands of philosophers. If Husserl's overall philosophy is more correct as an account of the 21st Century human than Scheler's or Heidegger's, for example, then so be it, or if, as I believe, Scheler's and Cassirer's give the more accurate account of the 'normal', contemporary human, then clearly a Schelerian/Cassirean—psychopathology should be pursued. The psychiatrists included in this book were smart enough to realise that philosophical psycho-pathology was the way forward, but were not purporting to be great philosophers themselves, and had to take on trust the truth of their mentors' systems.

In conclusion, a marvellous book, even for someone like me who has immersed himself in this literature for 30 years. Buy it, whoever you are, and dip into its richness.

John Cutting

Notes

1. Husserl, E. (1900-01/2001) *Logical Investigations*, trans. J. N. Findlay. Routledge, London.
2. Spiegelberg, H. (1994) *The Phenomenological Movement*. Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht.
3. Scheler, M. (1915/1973) 'The idols of self-knowledge', in *Max Scheler: Selected Philosophical Essays*, ed. D. R. Lachteman, pp.55-78. Northwestern University Press, Evanston.
4. Minkowski, E. (1933) *Le Temps Vécu*, p.319. Presses Universitaire de France, Paris.

Jacqueline Marie Vieceli,

A Philosophy of Global Pluralism. A Multicultural Approach to Political Theory, with a Foreword by Patrick O'Meara, Lewiston, Queenston, Lampeter, The Edwin Mellen Press, 2013, 302 pp., ISBN-13: 978-0-7734-2656-6 (hardcover), ISBN-10: 0-7734-2656-6 (hardcover).

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, science and architecture, the universally understood literature, the archetypes, or the power and deep meaning of the great myths of humanity – the myth

of the saviour, the myth of the golden age, the myth of unity etc. – are but a few examples of cultural products that shaped the universal consciousness of humanity.

Many contemporary thinkers (including Huntington, in his warning about the clash of civilizations) oversee the possibility ‘that some members of a civilization may have more in common philosophically with members of another civilization than they do with members of their own civilizational group’ (p.3), as some may have a lot in common with human ancestry and others may have more in common with the others than they might be willing to admit. Other particular situations are also possible. The undeniable existence of particularisms does not contradict the possibility of the universal dimension of humanity, but they only describe it, ‘colour’ it, and provide its substance.

In this perspective, the Introduction and the first chapter of the volume explain that the major concerns of humanity have created a sphere of universal themes, values, (moral) norms, human rights and ideals that transcend cultural relativism and emphasize the need to reframe political theory from a universal and global vision, maintaining at its core the equal value of all human beings, cultures and human communities. Jacqueline Marie Vieceli discusses the question of commensurability and incommensurability of cultures, which philosophically is extremely captivating, but whose political shadow functions so that sustains the existence of ‘inscrutable others’, a category not so distant from the unreasonable, dangerous and perpetual child-like others. Disagreements and differences within and among cultures could be ‘read’ and construed – and this is the political shadow of ideas – either as insurmountable, or as contextualized illustrations of the very universalism some may choose to ignore. In this line of argumentation Chapter III, portrays the phenomenon that brings together the different traditions of thought in their dimension of quest for human virtue. Thus human virtue is forged in society either by the state (for Greek and Confucian thinkers) or by the religious elite (Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist and African traditions). But in all traditions, as different as they may be, from the Chinese legalists to the Hindu Kautilya, St. Augustine, Joseph de Maistre and Martin Luther, ‘the primary responsibility of the state is the suppression of wrongdoing through law and use of punishment’ (p.67).

None of human traditions is univocal or static. Thus the idea of divine mandate as source of political legitimacy is not related exclusively to the Western or Eastern thought and, similarly, the idea of the

social contract generated by the authority and sustained by community is not exclusively Western (it is present in some form or another also in Hindu, Confucian and African thought, in Sunni Muslim thought and in Buddhist canon, p.85). The pre-established image of Asian or African thought might indicate obedience to tradition, respect for elders and the virtue of hard work as main characteristics, while many ideas in these traditions are counter-intuitive for Westerners as they are dedicated to the limits of power, the right of people to free themselves of oppressive rule, enlightenment and concern for needs and wishes of the people are also Asian values, too (p.86). On this foundation of ‘liberal’ Eastern thought the Eastern ideas of good government were developed and abound in all cultures with ideas of political obligation. The right of the people and the duty of rulers were the two pillars of political thought with relevance for political practice that gradually shaped the road toward the pinnacle of themes related with human rights and democracy.

Although ideas of human dignity and human right are not exclusive to Western political literature, the legal instruments and the legal forms that developed civil, political and economic rights are developed in systematic manner in Western societies. These are interested more in individual autonomy and in the limitations of the interference of the state, and in implementing these ideas into practice. Human dignity, though, provides sufficient common ground for an increased cultural comprehension and inter-connection in the world.

‘The Economy and the State’ (Ch. VII) makes interesting parallels in the political economy thought East and West. The idea of the state promoting free markets and individual action, while protecting these spheres from crime developed by Adam Smith is investigated in relation to the ideas of social welfare guided by the Roman Catholic Church (Pope Leo XIII), the vision of state as patronage, and as regulator; neither as a player, nor a monopolist (Confucius, Mencius, Kautilya, Ibn Khaldun).

Is it justifiable to use political violence in resisting oppression? The following chapter answers the question and identifies a duality of positions: some accepting revolutionary violence and other advocating non-violence, forgiveness or even the resistance without any reaction. Where these positions meet is the common ground of a Lockean perspective on human nature – rational human beings, able to seek improvement, able to correct themselves and animated by some idea of good, freedom and justice that they have in common. The more severe social cleavages, though, the further we

are from the possibility of non-violent reconciliation leading to peaceful reform.

The most difficult of all particularisms appears to be the topic of the causes for differences in women's status among various civilizations, which casts a dark and thick shadow on The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The core argument for this difficulty is that 'men and women in any of these traditions have available to them various and sometimes contradictory images of women, as well as the lives of actual individual women on which to base the visions of gender relations which they consider desirable' (p.210). The informal power that women enjoy in all cultures in their family-like environments (the universal dimension) is partially contradicted to various extents in different cultures by the deficient formal power and integrity of political and human rights for women (the particular dimension). The spiritual accomplishments of women (the universal dimension) are counter-weighed by 'the negative images of women as intellectually weak and inherently sinful' (the particular dimension).

The separation between state and church presents as well an intricate distinction between the West and the East, as well counter-suggestive, since both 'Western and non-Western thinkers have rejected the linking of religious and political authority' (p.232), although the rejection of truth claims made by religious authorities is rather a Western specific characteristic of the Western political thought. In all societies some favour a conjunction between church and state and some recall the discrimination and persecution associated with the intrusion of the religious power as a disguised inhuman political power, advocating a severe separation between the state and the church.

The global perspective on political philosophy teaches us that we could be further in securing a common ground against inequity, tyranny and conflict, and closer to understanding the importance of human life in decency, only that the intercivilizational dialogue muted by misconceptions. The similarities of many ideas, arguments and directions of political philosophy offer a possibility of dialogue about differences.

Ernesto Laclau proposed a vision where 'there is no beyond the play of differences', a vision of 'weakened universalization' where any universal value is dimmed by particularism, by context. Also, pure particularism is impossible because each description and definition of position has to be defined as difference from something which attracts other differences 'within a whole system that reconstructs a certain universality'¹. In Laclau's view, while Marxism moved toward a discourse of universality that was incompatible with difference, and struggled to eliminate differences, the problem of democracy is that it creates a society of the multiplicity (of cultures, demands, interests, and so on), which *seems* the ultimate argument for particularism.

A Philosophy of Global Pluralism shows that the interplay between universalism and particularism both strengthens and weakens universalism and particularism. Particularisms of all sorts only emphasize more clearly (their) universal dimension, and we should start talking of 'This universalism which is not one'².

Henrieta Serban

1. Ernesto Laclau, *Emancipation(s)*, London: Verso, 1996.
2. Linda M.G. Zirelli titled her review of *Emancipation(s)* 'This universalism which is not one' in *Diacritics*, volume 28, no. 2, Summer 1998, pp. 3-20.

LATEST JOURNALS RECEIVED

Members of the Forum (i.e. individual subscribers to

Please contact the Librarian: David

The full contents of **Revue Roumaine de Philosophie**, and the **Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia** are displayed on the Forum's website www.spcps.org.uk

Appraisal) can borrow copies from the Library.

Britton, librarian@spcps.org.uk.

Tradition and Discovery

Ed. Phil Mullins, Missouri Western State College, St Joseph, MO 64507, USA;

mullins@missouriwestern.edu;

www.missouriwestern.edu/orgs/polanyi/.

TAD is now available on line.

Latest Issue: Vol. XXXIX No. 3, 2012-3

Articles on Polanyi and Edward Shils.

Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia

Praca da Faculdade 1, P - 4710-297 Braga, Portugal; jvila-cha@facfil.ucp.pt; www.rpf.pt.

Articles in Portuguese, Spanish, English, French, Italian, German.

Latest Issue: Vol. 68, 1-2. 2012. 'Science and Philosophy: Encounters' (several articles in English)

SUBSCRIPTIONS

All individual subscribers become members of the Forum for the two years of each Volume.

All prices in £ Sterling and include postage (by airmail for Overseas)

	Vol. 9, 2012-3, 4 issues		Vols. 1-8 in .pdf
	Printed	Download from website, .pdf format	format on CD
UK			
Individuals	15.00	10.00	6.00
Institutions	25.00	-	10.00
REST OF EUROPE			
Individuals	25.00	10.00	7.00
Institutions	29.00	-	11.00
REST OF WORLD			
Individuals	23.00	10.00	8.00
Institutions	31.00	-	12.00

Please send cheques or money orders (payable to 'The British Personalist Forum') in **GBP (£)** to *Appraisal*, 20 Ulverscroft Road, Loughborough, LE11 3PU, UK, or pay on-line at www.spcps.org.uk and follow the link to Subscriptions.

Copies of issues of the current Volume already published will be sent upon receipt of your subscription.

References to books by Michael Polanyi:

Because of the particular interest in the work of Michael Polanyi, and in order to avoid unnecessary repetition, please make references to his books by means of the following abbreviations followed by the page number:

- CF = *The Contempt of Freedom* (London, Watts, 1940; reprinted New York, Arno Press, 1975)
- FEFT = *Full Employment and Free Trade* (London, C.U.P., 1945; 2nd ed. 1948)
- KB = *Knowing and Being* (London, Routledge; Chicago, University of Chicago Press; 1969)
- LL = *The Logic of Liberty* (London, Routledge; Chicago, University of Chicago Press; 1951)
- M = *Meaning* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1975)
- PK = *Personal Knowledge* (London, Routledge; Chicago, University of Chicago Press; 1958)
- SFS = *Science, Faith and Society* (London, OUP, 1946; 2nd ed. U. of Chicago Press, 1964)
- SOM = *The Study of Man* (London, Routledge; Chicago, University of Chicago Press; 1959)
- TD = *The Tacit Dimension* (London, Routledge; New York, Doubleday; 1966; reprinted Gloucester, Mass., Peter Smith, 1983)

Also:

- SEP = *Society, Economics and Philosophy: Selected articles by Michael Polanyi*, ed. R.T. Allen (New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Publishers, 1997).