APPRAISAL

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Re-Appraisal: Max Scheler (Pt 1)

Max Scheler
1874-1928

Soren Engelson
Emotional awareness in Scheler's axiology and the queerness-argument

J. Cutting
Max Scheler's metaphysics

Robert Zaborowski
Max Scheler's model of stratified affectivity

Angelika Krebbs
The phenomenology of shared feeling

I lkka Virtanen
Representation of the body as a basis of personal knowledge

APPRAISAL

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This issues new contributors:

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Søren Engelsen is a PhD student in philosophy at the University of Southern Denmark. He is currently researching fundamental issues in ethics, with pre-linguistic experience of value as a central focus of attention. In his dissertation, he is engaging axiological points from the Continental tradition of phenomenology (i.e. Husserl and Scheler) in contemporary meta-ethical discussions in the Analytic tradition.

Dr Angelika Krebbs studied Philosophy, German Literature and Musicology in Freiburg, Oxford, Konstanz and Berkeley. 1993 she earned her doctorate with the thesis 'Ethics of Nature', written on behalf of UNO. Since 2001 she has been chair of philosophy at Basel University in Switzerland. 2005/2006 she was Rockefeller Fellow at the Center for Human Values in Princeton and 2009 Academic Visitor at the Oxford Faculty of Philosophy. Her main areas of research have been: philosophy of language, ethics, political philosophy, aesthetics and philosophy of love.

Ilkka Virtanen works as a researcher at the School of Information Sciences, University of Tampere, Finland. His current research interest deals with theories of knowledge in the field of management studies, particularly the application of Polanyi's philosophy in the contemporary knowledge management literature. He has a background in cognitive science and for that reason he is also interested in the cognitive aspects of Polanyi's theory of knowledge

Dr Robert Zaborowski has an MA in Philosophy in 1990 from Paris I, a PhD in Philosophy in 1990 from Polish Academy of Sciences, Habilitation in History of Psychology in 2003 from Polish Academy of Sciences. He is Professor of Greek philosophy at the University of Warmia & Mazury, a researcher at the Polish Academy of Sciences, and the author of *Fear and courage in the 'Iliad' and the 'Odyssey'* (2002, in French), *Affectivity in the Pre-Socratics* (2008, in French) and several articles, papers and book reviews on the philosophy of affectivity.

EDITORIAL

Ever since *Appraisal* was launched in March 1996, I have been hoping to include a special feature, one of our 'Re-Appraisals', of Max Scheler. Thanks to the response to our Call for Papers on the PHILOS@ list (PHILOS-L@liverpool.ac.uk), we have received sufficient articles not only to occupy most of this issue but also to occupy most of the next one in October. Those in this issue focus upon the closely related themes of Scheler's levels of emotion, the forms of sympathy, the emotional apprehension of values, and his (later) metaphysics. In several respects, especially the emotions, love, sympathy and value, contemporary Analytic philosophy is at last catching up with understandings achieved by Scheler and other phenomenologists nearly a century ago. Yet, despite the fact that English translations of three of his books were published in Britain about 30 to 60 years ago (*The Nature of Sympathy*, 1954; *On the Eternal in Man*, 1960; *Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge*, 1982), he is virtually unknown here. We hope that the articles here and in the next issue will do something to promote greater interest in them. As it is, there is more which he investigated, particularly the nature, forms and sociology of knowledge, his account of phenomenology, and his earlier metaphysics and philosophy of religion, which will not be represented in this 'Re-Appraisal'. Finally, we are very grateful for the assistance given by Dr Phil Cronce in preparing this feature on Scheler.

11th INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PERSONS

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How to Engage People in a Common Cause'

Full details will be available later on the Fellowship website:

www.johnmacmurray.org

MAX SCHELER

Brief biography

1874 Born in Munich. Father Lutheran, mother Jewish; brought up as orthodox Jew.

1894-5 Studied medicine, psychology and philosophy at Munich; and then philosophy, economics and geography at Berlin.

1897 Doctorate, and 1899 habilitation thesis, both under Rudolf Eucken (noted for his 'Life-philosophy') at Jena. converted to Roman Catholicism; married Amalie von Dewitz-Krebs.

1900 Privatdozent at Jena.

1902 First meeting with Husserl; also began to meet Heidegger.

1907 Privatdozent at Munich, joined Phenomenological Society in Munich.

1910 Dismissed from Munich because of alleged adultery.

1910-11 Lectured at the Philosophical Society in Goettingen. Edith Stein one of his students.

1912 Divorced and then married Maerit Furtwaengler (sister of the conductor). Until 1919 supported himself by freelance lecturing and writing.

1914-8 Called up, but discharged because of stigmatism in eyes. Wrote articles for the German Foreign Office justifying the invasion of Belgium. Later wrote others more critical of Germany and the war.

1919 Professor of philosophy and sociology at Cologne.

1923 Divorced from Maerit but continued to write to her.

1924 Married Maria Scheu.

1928 Accepted new position at Frankfurt-am-Main but died on May 29th

1933 Works suppressed by the Nazis.

1954+ *Gesammelte Werke* published, edited by Maria, and then by Manfred Frings.

Principal publications with English translations

Books

Gesammelte Werke, 15 Vols. Bern, Franke Verlag, 1954-85; Bonn, Bouvier Verlag, 1986+

Das Ressentiment in Aufbau der Moralen, 1912, 1915, 1919: *Ressentiment.* Tr. William W. Holdheim. Intro. Manfred S. Frings. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1994.

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Max Scheler (1874-1928) Centennial Essays. Ed. Manfred S. Frings. The Hague, N. Nijhoff: 1974. Contains:

'Metaphysics and Art.' Tr. Manfred S. Frings; 'The Meaning of Suffering.' Tr. Daniel Liderbach, SJ.

Person and Self-Value. Three Essays. Ed., intro., partially translated Manfred Frings. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987. Contains:

'Shame' [*Ueber Scham und Schamgefuehl*], 'Examplars of Persons and Leaders' [*Vorbilder und Fuehrer*], *'Repentence and Rebirth'*

Max Scheler. On Feeling, Knowing, and Valuing. Selected Writings. Ed., intro. Harold J. Bershady. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992. Contains:

'Love and Knowledge.' Tr. Harold J.Bershady with Peter Haley; 'The Meaning of Suffering.' Tr. Harold J. Bershady

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Societies and Web Sites

Max Scheler Society of North America, http://mssnapages.wordpress.com

Max Scheler Gesellschaft, http://www.max-scheler.de/

Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/pages/Max-Scheler/50801417325

EMOTIONAL AWARENESS IN SCHELER'S AXIOLOGY AND THE QUEERNESS-ARGUMENT

Soren Engelsen

Abstract
The queerness-argument raised in the meta-ethical debate is often taken to be devastating for value realism. Through a presentation of parts of Max Scheler's axiology, the paper argues that if we take seriously the phenomenology of emotions and value, the normative 'force' of moral properties need not pose a problem and cannot reasonably be regarded as queer.

Keywords
Max Scheler, the queerness-argument, emotional awareness, value realism

In the contemporary meta-ethical debate, the motivational 'force' of values and moral properties has constituted one of the central fields of problems. In particular, J. L. Mackie's (1917-1981) famous queerness-argument[1] has been a central focus of much discussion. This argument has often been put forward as a devastating problem for any formulation of value realism: If moral properties existed, they would be ontologically 'queer' – weird, mystical – in that they would have an intrinsically action motivating force which, so it is claimed, is irreconcilable with a desacralized modern world view. Furthermore, knowledge of such entities would be epistemologically queer since it would require that moral beings have a mystical faculty of knowledge, a special kind of moral intuition.

In the following, I will argue that the core of Mackie's worry dissolve if we take seriously the importance of a careful phenomenology of value – and an appreciation of elements in the work of Max Scheler (1874-1928) can help us seeing this. Scheler is perhaps best known for his theory of the existence of an a priori hierarchy of values. In my view, this particular part of his axiological thought is not the part which is of greatest systematic relevance today, and it is not to be the focus in the following. We shall instead touch on some basic phenomenological studies in Scheler that can perhaps disclose important points about the pre-reflective experience of value and our emotional life which any adequate theory of the nature of value and ethics must take into account. The prime aim in the following is to draw attention to basic points about axiological meaning in connection with our emotions. To be more specific, I will discuss the relevance of elements in Scheler's phenomenological analysis of emotional experience of value as they are presented in Scheler's magnum opus *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*[2]; and in light of basic phenomenological points reconstructed from this work I shall critically address any worry raised in the queerness-argument.

1. The richness of experience – Scheler's overall phenomenological outlook

In his *Formalismus*, Scheler applies an overall phenomenological theoretical outlook, inspired by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), to the domain of value and ethics. Accordingly, he follows the phenomenological approach to philosophy in taking as the main theme of investigation the pre-reflective level of experience, i.e. that which is immediately 'given' to the experiencing subject. In the Husserlian inspired phenomenology we find a minimal understanding of the subjective phenomenal sphere as the fact that something is experientially present in a certain way; a certain 'something it is like' of which it is the job of phenomenology to give a thorough description. The pre-reflective experience is always given as a temporal and continually streaming Gestalt, or unity, and I can thematically analyze the content of this stream of consciousness in an act of reflection. This is exactly what the phenomenologist is doing in order to distinguish its elements and come to a reflected understanding of implicit elements, e.g. of the simpler experiences that are necessarily conditions for, or 'found', more complex ones. A significant phenomenological point, not least in connection with value theory, is that we can distinguish different types of acts of consciousness, i.e. different modes or attitudes of consciousness: I can be conscious of a subject matter as something I see, hear, remember, hate, love, fear, etc. Importantly in the present context, this implies that many different kinds of mental attitudes can have a cognitive content. If we focus on the content side of the intentional acts, it is a crucial phenomenological point that many other kinds of qualities are presented in our immediate experience than just the sensuous ones.

According to Scheler, parts of the history of philosophy are characterized by a prejudice that neglects this phenomenal fact of experience, such that a much too sharp distinction between 'reason' and 'sensibility' is posited.[3] Scheler delivers in the *Formalismus* a phenomenologically grounded

critique of the common identification of the content of experience (the 'material') with the sensuous content.[4] From this premise, no cognitive content can be immediately given in experience, and cognition must basically be taken to be something added by the subject to the sensuous content. Not until the subject has conceptually 'formed' the content is the mental state taken to be more than a contingent 'chaos' of impressions.[5] Everything irrational – i.e. everything not characterized by an order – is hereby assigned to experience. Also the emotional life is in this picture taken to be a part of the sphere of sense impressions and thus reduced to arbitrary inclinations of affection. A crucial agenda for Scheler, and a necessary condition for any phenomenologically based value theory, is the rejection of this concept of experience. The presumed chaos of the given is according to Scheler the main reason for a theoretical misery in modern thought: that many are blind to the fact that essential matters in the world can be presented in our immediate acts of experience.[6] If our point of departure is *die Sache selbst*, i.e. the subject matter itself as it presents itself in experience prior to our abstractions and speculations about it, we must recognize that often more than sensuous content is pre-reflectively experientially given.

I am not just immediately aware of objects with shapes, colours, sounds, etc., a range of other characteristics are parts of my immediate experience. According to Scheler, I immediately intend possibilities, necessities, distance, and value etc.[7] But do concepts not always condition my experience? Even though that may be so (though it is doubtful that it is always the case), the fact that the pre-reflectively given for me is often conditioned, does not necessary prevent me from being directly related to a given object. Conceptual abilities do arguably often found or 'mediate' e.g. my visual perception, but this does not alter the fact that I can relate pre-reflectively and non-propositionally to an object in my seeing it. What I normally experience is not my conceptual presentation of an object; instead, I see (in the case of vision) the object in and through the concept. This illustrates that the fact that conceptual or other capabilities can be necessary conditions of something to be given does not necessarily change our immediate relation to the object. The concept enables me to see the object, but does not necessarily alter my immediate relation to it. The concept of the tree is not an entity between me and the tree; rather, the concept (together with my sensuous impressions) function as a vehicle for my immediate seeing of the tree.

A classic phenomenological example of the fact that more is immediately given in experience than a chaos of sense-impressions is the phenomenological analysis of the 'horizon' in the context of which aspects of objects and relations are always intended. Not only the side of the object sensuously present for me is experientially given, but the object as a whole – including e.g. the backside of it – is also intended. Scheler illustrates the point with the example of a visualization of a ball.[8] even though the ball as a unity is never visually present due to the fact that seeing is always a perspective, the backside of the ball is none the less a necessary part of the field of meaning presented to me. The perspectivity of the visualization of the ball is even conditioned by the fact that I immediately – i.e. prior to the reflected conceptualization of the thing in question – experience a unity. Having a perspective is impossible without at the same time intending a Gestalt of which the perspective presents only an aspect. This amounts to an anticipation of new and possible experiences; which correlatively amounts to an anticipation of possible intrinsic and relational properties of the object.

There is much more than just sense impressions in the immediate pre-reflective experience: the pre-theoretical phenomenal sphere is not a 'chaos' of sense-data, but rather a 'richness' of objects of different types with a range of different qualities. It is crucial to stress, that the point about the richness of experience is surely not that everything phenomenally presented is uncritically to be taken at face value. The phenomenological point is rather that what is given in immediate experience is always the meaning-constituting starting point – even for the most abstract and formal theory, judgment, belief, etc. In other words, what is pre-reflectively given in simple experience always founds, i.e. necessarily conditions, the formation of meaning in complex and more abstract experience. This goes for moral principles as well – they are not developed in a vacuum but are founded on the building stones of pre-reflective experience or, in phenomenological-axiological terms: on simple value experiences. That meaning is necessarily grounded in simple pre-reflective experience requires of our theories that they adequately account for the phenomenology and do not let an idealizing activity conceal the simple founding layers of experience; in other words, we must restrain our conclusions in light of what is actually the subject matter of investigation presented to use prior to any abstraction. If we incautiously abstract from the richness of experience and reduce the given to the sensuously given, we are logically forced to give in to a reductionism: Relations, forms,

values etc. – i.e. all that is not sensuous impressions, but is none the less phenomenological facts – must be explained (away) by the supposition that they are strictly speaking arbitrary constructions (9).

2. Emotional awareness of value

This phenomenological critique of a reduced and 'poor' concept of experience is the theoretical point of departure of Scheler's approach to value, including ethical value. If we from the very beginning of our investigation reduce the given to the sensuously given, according to Scheler we fail to notice the fact that we have cognitively 'loaded' experiences of value in our emotional directedness at things and persons in the world. An almost automatic reaction to such a conceptualization of value that takes emotion as its starting point, is the denial that emotions are anything but mere projections of contingent inclinations and not at all truth-apt. In contradistinction to this view, Scheler claims that it is the person limited to sense-perception and a 'cold' distanced reasoning who is blind; blind to values, just like the colour-blind has no access to qualities of colour.[10]

An essential part of the mental life of human beings is characterized by emotional affection. Roughly speaking, two main tendencies have been dominating the contemporary philosophical debate on emotions. Either emotions have been seen as mere non-cognitive affective feelings, or – and this seems to have been the trend for the last couple of decades – emotions, as opposed to feelings, are conceptualized as a special kind of judgments, mainly due to their intentional nature, i.e. the fact that emotions are directed at or 'contains' objects. Today, in some philosophical environments at least, there seems to be a tendency to a more nuanced picture, as many recognize that emotions have an affective character, but are at the same time intrinsically intentional.[11] Or at the least it is often recognized, in 'hybrid theories', that both cognitive and affective elements are at play in emotional experience. This way, the debate seems to be approaching the position taken by Scheler and other of the early phenomenologists such as Brentano and Husserl. The phenomenologists anticipate the theories of the emotional life, which we find in various contemporary emotion theories that emphasize the cognitive function of the kinds of feeling which are essentially directed at something – theories, that typically also emphasize the importance of emotion in social cognition.

Scheler recognizes that our emotional life is characterized by contingent inclinations as well as sometimes having a cognitive function. He distinguishes between, on the one hand, feelings which are without cognitive content and nothing but reactive affections, and, on the other, processes of feeling which are essentially intentional.[12] The interesting kinds in the present context are the latter, which we in accordance with widespread contemporary terminology can just call emotions (as opposed to feelings). From a phenomenological point of view, we must recognize a plurality of types of emotional consciousness such as: Indignation, horror, joy, fear, shame etc. In Scheler's phenomenological axiology, such kinds of emotion can instantiate pre-reflective awareness, and this awareness is thematized as the founding experience that enables us to get know about what is valuable.

A phenomenological analysis such as Scheler's can help us see that intentional emotions can neither be reduced to more or less arbitrary non-cognitive reactions of feeling or to cognitive judgments. Phenomenologically, an emotion is a Gestalt, a unity, consisting of both characteristics; a synthetic whole, whose parts can be distinguished only as different moments of the same state of consciousness. In an emotion, an intentional and an affective element must be ascertained in one and the same state. My emotional awareness is an attitude distinguished by a distinct phenomenological feature. Emotions are modes of presentation with a distinct qualitative mark due to the nature of their objects. The qualitative, phenomenal aspect is the mark of the mental state, and this aspect is conditioned by and defined by the intended content. In a nut shell: An emotion is an affective kind of awareness of the value quality of something. And it is the very precondition for the possibility that things, actions and persons can at all appear to us with a non-neutral sense of meaning: a meaningful content, that 'puts pressure' on us to engage ourselves with our surroundings. For instance, I can be indignant about something. The phenomenal quality of the indignation defines the type of emotion – there is a certain 'something it is like' for me to be indignant – and I cannot be indignant without intending an object valued to be worthy of this indignation. Take my immediate indignation in connection with the observation of a brutal act of violence. This emotion is clearly both affective and intentional: It 'moves' me in a certain manner in and through my intending of the situation as brutal. Not until I am directed at a brutal act of violence in the indignant way, initially in a non-propositional and direct way that essentially affects me, I become aware of the disvalue, or the negative aspect, of the situation in its specific value-loaded character. The affective element of emotional awareness has a motivating function in our practical life. Any act of will is founded upon such

pre-reflective emotional experiences, i.e. has emotional awareness of (at least presumed) value, positive or negative, as its necessary condition.

Thus, certain kinds of emotions are according to Scheler mental states that intend value qualities of actions or persons. Values are basically intended as positive or negative features of something, and they are presented in the emotions. Only in acts such as indignation, joy, fear etc., are values such as brutality, joyfulness, fearfulness etc. at all presented to us and a part of our life-world. Drawing from Blaise Pascal, Max Scheler gives the point a metaphorical formulation when he claims that the emotional connection with the world contains an *ordre du cour*, an 'order of the heart',[13] in the sense that in our emotional awareness we 'see' or 'intuit' distinct qualities that 'moves' us in one way or another; in other words, in being emotionally directed, we 'perceive' values and distinct relations between them.[14] Emotional awareness can thus be conceptualized as the capacity that in the first place enables us to comprehend what basically matters to us. Accordingly, in so far as we reconstruct the content of our simple experience adequately, we realize that value qualities are part of what is appearing. If we reconstruct the givenness of experience without blinding ourselves with a prejudiced and abstract notion of it, we will not lose sight of the existence of values. Any conventional norm and any act of will, is founded on such pre-reflective value experiences.

It cannot be stressed enough, that being affected is not the constituting characteristic of the given value – emotion is not an expressively projecting attitude, but the act whereby the possibility of an understanding of the intended value quality is gained. That this position has nothing to do with so-called meta-ethical emotivism or expressivism, which analyses value statements as 'camouflaged' subjective projections of feeling with no cognitive and truth-apt content whatsoever. On the contrary, Scheler distinguishes sharply, as mentioned, between intentionally directed kinds of emotion with a cognitive content, and non-intentional, non-cognitive inclinations of affection. It is crucial for Scheler that the value qualities themselves posses a genuine independence in relation to the experiencing subject, life, human beings, etc.[15] We will soon return to this controversial aspect of his theory.

3. Epistemological queerness?

In the spirit of Mackie's queerness-argument, many thinkers in the meta-ethical debate question the very idea about an ability to 'see' or 'intuit' value qualities. Does this idea not presuppose a kind of sixth sense, i.e. a faculty of knowledge which is basically mystic? This is a standard objection to so-called meta-ethical intuitionism, and Scheler does in fact argue that we are able to comprehend values in a direct 'seeing'. For the same reason, Scheler can also be associated with intuitionism as it is represented in its classic variant by G. E. Moore.[16]

The question is how controversial and mystical the supposition about intuition of value needs to be when all is said and done. At least the phenomenological version of intuitionism, that Scheler represents, lays great stress on understanding intuition in connection with ordinary experience. It is worth to mention, that in our phenomenological context, the term 'intuition' is often a translation of the German 'Anschauung'. This means basically phenomenal presence, the concept has connotations to a form of experience that has an immediate and direct relation to its object. Taken in this sense, there is nothing mystical about intuition – and it must be up to a phenomenological description, whether or not the intending of value properties is part of our phenomenal presence or not. There are many doubtful elements in Scheler's axiology. But the fact that we have directed emotions, which must be recognized as intending aspects of situations that matters to us and 'moves' us – aspects we call values – is hard to get around if we take seriously the phenomenology of our emotional life. Regardless of their ontological status, value qualities are part of our emotional life. And there does not seem to be anything 'queer' about emotion as such.

Scheler and the phenomenological tradition in philosophy in general thematizes value experience in analogy to perception: Phenomenologists do use metaphorical expressions such as our 'seeing' or 'perceiving' of values, as though emotional awareness was in fact a kind of sixth sense. This metaphorical language is not used in order to posit a mystical faculty of knowledge, but to illustrate the fact that emotional awareness has some structural characteristics in common with ordinary sense-perception. In order to show the function and importance of the analogy without giving the idea that something mystical is at play, I will in the following try to reconstruct and give a sketch of these structural characteristics in a contemporary terminology.

The emotional awareness is described as a 'taking as value', wert-nehmen, in analogy to the German word for perceiving, wahr-nehmen, which can be translated as 'taking as true'. Like in the case of ordinary perception, we take something to be the case in the emotional awareness, because it immediately seems that way to us. We do this pre-reflectively and directly: I immediately 'see' the

brutality of the act of violence; i.e. I am intentionally directed towards the violence without in the first instance intending it in a propositional attitude. Just like sense-perception which is also basically non-reflective and non-propositional. In succeeding acts, I can intend the object propositionally and relate to it as a matter of fact – see that a no-good act of brutal violence is going on. As immediately directed, an intentional emotion has a direct relation to its object. It is a mode of presentation, not re-presentation. There is arguably no 'medium' between the object and my emotional directedness to it. As mentioned earlier, the pre-reflective givennes can be conditioned by, for instance, conceptual abilities, but this doesn't alter the fact that it is a direct awareness. In this case, we see 'through' the concept involved which conditions the awareness. Just like I cannot perceive the chair without the possession of the concept of a chair, I cannot intend the sadness of another person without a number of pre-conditions – for example a concept of sadness (possibly derived from my prior personal experiences) and an ability to enter into empathic relations. But being conditioned does not rule out, that I can be directly emotionally aware of the sadness of the other.

This also implies that my emotional relation to a fellow being as my object of awareness is not referential. Like sense-perception, emotional awareness normally plays a basic role in the formation of our practical beliefs and judgments. Just like we belief prima facie what we see, what we experience in the emotional evaluation also function as what we, all things being equal, form beliefs and judgments about in relation to practical concerns. They are so to speak 'inputs' to our practical judgments and our practical web of beliefs. Value judgment upon reflection, e.g. an assertion about an ethical matter, presupposes the emotional awareness, just like perception is presupposed in judgments about what is sensuously before us. In phenomenological terminology, the value judgment is founded upon the emotional experience. The content of my moral judgment consists of value qualities, which previously have been intended in a pre-reflective emotional awareness (if not by me, then by someone else who is testifying). The judgment is so to speak the reflective confirmation (or rejection) of the content of a pre-reflective awareness.

Furthermore, an emotion is marked by its presenting content and has thereby conditions of correctness. The violence is immediately intended as brutal as I am emotionally indignant about what is going on. Qua the direct relation to its object, emotional awareness – again, in analogy to perception – has a non-inferential function also in the justification of actions. For example, I am immediately aware of the prima facie wrongness of the brutal violent act, and under normal circumstances, this experience in itself functions as prima facie justification for the judgment that it is wrong. – Just like the experience of the cup being red justifies my judgment that the cup is red. There is no reference at play in my justification, such that, for example, I infer from practical principles that the violence is wrong, or that the apple is tasty etc. But having correctness-conditions also entails, and this is crucial to keep in mind, that I can be wrong about my indignation – it could come to my attention, that what I took to be brutal violence was in fact just some actors doing their job. It is important to stress, that even if the direct experience of value is intrinsically motivating, this does not imply that it is necessarily reason-giving in so far as it can be 'over-ruled' upon reflection that involves concerns about incorrect emotional intentions, common moral principles as well as rational concerns about other values in the future. The emotional awareness has a meaning-theoretical priority: it is not necessarily foundational in the epistemological sense of the word. The motivational 'demand' given in my emotional awareness can violate some of my basic principles, and I can end up judging against the givenness of my value experience (or revise my principles). I could, for example, due to a conviction about the 'necessity' of violence in order to prevent or realize other values in the future, judge that the experienced violence at the end of the day is in fact not immoral, even though it is a phenomenal fact that it is presented to me as prima facie wrong. The victim of the violence could be a raging mass murderer, for example. Analogically, I can visually perceive something in a distinct way, but at the same time be convinced that this cannot be correct. Seeing is not necessarily believing as is testified in the awareness of illusions (e.g. the Müller-Lyer-illusion), or other situations where I am reasonably convinced that my senses are unreliable.

Another worry related to the epistemologic component of the queerness-argument is that it can seem mystical to some that cognitive belief (-like) states with value content can be intrinsically motivating. But as we saw it in the previous analysis, what I have called pre-reflective emotional awareness is exactly an example of a state of mind characterized by being intentional as well as having content properties 'moving' or affecting the subject in that state of mind – a property exactly characterized as an intrinsically prima facie

motivation for action. Thus, we have an example of a state of cognition containing in it a 'normative force' qua its qualitative phenomenal characteristics. As mentioned, judgments and beliefs about moral concerns can plausibly be said to be founded upon acts of consciousness such as, amongst others, emotional awareness. In so far as moral beliefs and judgments are 'build' on or founded upon a kind of emotional awareness, they are 'loaded' with a motivational affectivity due to the nature of their content. This way, the value judgment or belief also contains a motivating force, although we in our 'distanced' attitude upon reflection can of course deliberate on the appropriateness of the value and question whether or not we ought to actually act on its motivation force. In a meta-ethical context, this analysis can serve as an explanation of the intuitive appeal to motivational internalism – i.e. that a moral judgment is necessarily motivating – as well as serve as an argument against an orthodox interpretation of the 'Humean' model of motivation that takes motivation to consist of two distinct components, a cognitive belief and a desire without cognitive content but with a 'world-to-mind' direction of fit.

Thus, from phenomenological grounds we seem to be able to overcome Mackie's epistemological worries.

4. Ontological queerness? The question of the objectivity of value

The basic feature of value properties per se is that they are intended, in one way or another, as being positive or negative. It is worth noticing, that from a phenomenological perspective, this implies that something – i.e. an object or property – 'stands out' as relevant or valuable, and the intending of this something necessarily implies that we are prima facie motivated to act upon its relevance, granted that we are capable of an appropriate action. This is exactly the property which the followers of the ontological part of the queerness-argument finds problematic.

Also here I shall question whether such properties need be queer at all.

Scheler argues for at radical value realism that we must admit have elements which are problematic. He claims that values exist independently of their 'carriers', i.e. the objects, persons and actions we intend as having properties of value.[17] Values, including moral ones, are held to exist 'beyond' the concrete temporal reality. They are taken to supervene on, or be 'instantiated' in, natural properties in the empirical reality, but nevertheless have a being which is ontologically independent. This 'platonic' part of Scheler's theory is typically taken to be controversial and to some degree with good reason. But even if we must admit that such a radical value realism seems highly implausible and most of all is perhaps a theoretical 'relic' from a pre-modern world view, perhaps we can reconstruct the phenomenological thrust of the Schelerian analysis which in a 'moderate' (or perhaps just correctly understood) version is fully compatible with a desacralized world view, that does not posit the existence of mystical entities of any kind. The question is if the Schelerian analysis could point towards an axiology which from the point of view of a careful consideration of the life of human beings is more adequate than the 'rationalistic' non-cognitivism and value scepticism that to a great extend is dominating the view on value and ethics in many philosophical environments.

To illustrate this, let us take a look at Scheler's concept of a priori preference (Vorziehen).[18] The understanding of the fact that one value is higher or lower than another – equivalent to an awareness of whether one value is negative or positive in relation to another – is according to Scheler experientially given in a certain form of a priori preference. The crucial and 'a priori' feature of this act of consciousness is that it is not to be understood as an act of will upon reflection, i.e. as an act of deliberately considering what to prefer in order to let an action follow in accordance. 'Preference' is in Scheler's terminology first and foremost a pre-reflexive act taking place without any choice or will at present.[19] Any wilful choice made is founded upon such a preference: Choosing wilfully has the intending of pre-reflective preferences as a necessary condition. Another way to formulate the point is that acts of will never occur in a vacuum: they are always founded in pre-given acts of preference which intends relations between qualities of value. In order for something to appear to us as something relevant to act upon, it must be pre-reflectively presented to us as a more or less relevant option, in other words, as more or less valuable. Consequently, at the phenomenological level, we must recognize an objectivity of values in the sense at least that what matters is pre-reflectively given as independent of our opinions about it. It is not up to my reflected opinion whether or not something immediately appears as more or less prima facie relevant to my actions – be it joyful, tasty, wrong, shameful, etc.

It must be stressed, that to claim with phenomenology that we intend value properties as independent of our opinions does not force us to suppose that the value itself is ontologically objective, in the sense that it is literally an intrinsically conscious-independent part of the intended object (in

the way it is arguably the case with e.g. ordinary physical properties), or that it exists in some 'heaven of ideas' for that matter. Instead of talking about value as having a ontological independence, we can simply note that an adequate phenomenological reconstruction of experience must include the finding that what is valuable is present as phenomenal facts in the sense that it is not up to our more or less arbitrary decisions to construe what appears as a prima facie matter of concern. It is rather the other way around: our opinions upon reflection about norms – our personal and social normative constructions – do always operate on the background of prior experiences of value that 'puts a pressure on us'. Prior experiences, which are in a sense prima facie 'preferences' given to us in advance, or in Scheler's terminology, given a priori.

If we maintain a distinction between our thematization of existence, i.e. temporal reality, and our thematization of properties and qualities, perhaps value realism need not be so controversially formulated. In accordance with phenomenology, we can hold on to the position that what exist are abstract or 'formal' properties or qualities of our concrete existing experiences. This amounts to simply claiming that different experiences, in a given subject or in different subjects, can have the same kinds of properties. Thus we can hold on to the notion of values that, as phenomenal properties, they can have a distinct nature independently of our opinions about them, without needing to assert the more radical thesis that these value properties can exist independently of the experience of them, and independently of the experience of them as being values of something. Analogically, we can also thematize other properties in their 'pure' form in an abstraction, for instance redness or loudness, without having to postulate that such properties have any existence independently from anyone experiencing something as red or loud. We see anticipations of a position such as this in Scheler, in that the analogy between value and colour plays an important role in his system.[20] Just like I can abstract from the red thing given in my experience and bring the quality of redness per se to givenness, I can abstract from the experienced 'carrier' of value – the sweet tasting apple or the brutal act of violence – and bring the value quality in itself to givenness; the tasty sweetness and the brutality as such. In this sense, the value properties are characterized by an essential independence: Regardless of whether they can exist independently of an experiencing subject or not, they can be considered in their 'pure' abstract form as properties or qualia, which are 'instantiated' in different concrete spatio-temporal experiences. Unless one finds the very idea about the existence of properties mystic and holds on to an extreme nominalism, value realism in this 'moderate' form does not strike as queer at all.

5. Concluding remarks

In light of the above, it seems that if we take seriously the phenomenology of emotions and value, as analyzed in parts of Scheler's axiology, the queerness argument does not seem to be devastating. The normative 'force' is not queer if we regard it as stemming from the emotional awareness intending value qualities in the phenomenological sense of the term, as presented above. Regardless of the ontology of value properties, what we from a phenomenological outset must recognize is that values are experienced as something given which is independent of our opinions about them. Be it the sweet taste of my apple, the beauty of the painting or whether the violent act is intended as brutal and wrong; the value quality of the thing in question is not experienced as something I am responsible for. This is not to say that value is necessarily ontologically independent from experience as such. It seems reasonable to suggest that the object of my moral experience is the simple value-qualities of the other's experience[21] – and as pointed out earlier, the independence of value-qualities need not be conceptualized as an independence from being experienced as such. This phenomenological point is mirrored by our propositional language about value; a mark of moral practice even recognized by contemporary ethical non-cognitivists. That we at the end of the day perhaps must locate value qualities in the ontological sphere of subjective phenomena, e.g. like colours, does not alter this fact. At the phenomenological level, it must be recognized that also ethical value makes its entrance as a meaningful issue. Our moral beliefs are not just products of constructions, conventions, choices or arbitrary feelings since we do not ever start 'from scratch' when we judge a situation normatively or reflect on morality; any construction, convention or choice of ethical norms is founded upon concrete emotional encounters with fellow beings; encounters, that is phenomenally enriched with value.

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10. Ibid. I. Teil, Einleitende Bemerkung
11. See for instance *Die Emotionen. Gefühle in der realistischen Phänomenologie*. Philosophische Anthropologie, Vol. 6, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 2008.
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13. Scheler, Max 2007 Vorwort zur zweiten Auflage
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MAX SCHELER'S METAPHYSICS

J. Cutting

Abstract
Max Scheler's writings on metaphysics are scattered over a number of articles and books, some published during his life-time, some posthumously in his Collected Works. The author translated the specific volume of his Collected Works entitled *Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik* and in this article I bring out his main ideas there, put them in the context of metaphysical notions published elsewhere, compare these to the metaphysics of his most renowned contemporaries – James, Bergson, Husserl, Hartmann and Heidegger – and discuss the relevance of Scheler's views for our contemporary world, particularly in respect of psychopathology.

Key Words
Scheler; James; Bergson; Husserl; Hartmann; Heidegger; metaphysics; schizophrenia; depressive illness.

1. Introduction

Max Scheler's metaphysical writings are largely concentrated in Volume 11 of his Collected Works[1], a volume that I translated in 2008[2]. The writings reflect his thoughts on metaphysics in the last years of his life – mid-1920's – and are essential to any understanding of his philosophy. They are, moreover, some of the most profound thoughts on the nature of the human being ever proposed. No-one venturing into the subject should ignore them. The only previous attempts to summarise them have been Frings' two books[3, 4], Frings being the editor of his Collected Works after the death of the previous editor, his third wife.

What are Scheler's essential views on metaphysics? And what is the contemporary relevance of these? This is the subject of the present article.

As a preface, I can say, first, that Scheler not only lived through the turbulent times of the First World War and the Weimar Republic, but acted as a diplomat and polemicist during that period. Moreover, he immersed himself in the sea-change that was occurring in physics at that time, and knew in detail the contemporary literature on the two mushrooming disciplines of psychology and sociology. Secondly, he was at the forefront of the new philosophical movement of phenomenology, and knew personally Husserl, Hartmann and Heidegger, and was considered by Hartmann and Heidegger the greatest philosopher around. Husserl was jealous and wary of him. In short, he was a modern Man for all Seasons.

What is then curious is that in his metaphysics he reverts back, way beyond the neo-Kantians, who were the dominant school of philosophy in Germany at the time, and way beyond Descartes, to the Medieval philosophers, albeit with a modern twist. Furthermore, he was a Christian for much of his life, in an era when faith was falling apart.

We are looking, therefore, at a man for all our modern seasons, certainly, but one with a canny eye to what was best about our past.

I shall structure this piece as follows:

First, I shall give an account of the critical metaphysical innovations that Scheler introduced. Secondly, I shall put them in the context of what other philosophers, specifically Husserl, Heidegger, Hartmann, Bergson and James – the contemporary philosophers he most admired – had to say. Thirdly, I shall give my own views on the relevance of Scheler's metaphysics for certain recalcitrant matters in human beings, namely their psychopathology.

2. Scheler's innovations in metaphysics

It is not hard to say which philosopher Scheler most resembles. In many ways he is *sui generis,* but not in the egotistical way that Schopenhauer, Husserl or Wittgenstein portrayed themselves – without tradition. Scheler was steeped in the philosophical problems of all ages, and took Hegel's sublation literally – i.e. that the movement of philosophy was the distillation of all that was correct, and that its mistakes were valuable critical counter-arguments. His interest in the Scholastic distinction between universals and individuals, something that his peers neglected, yet his realization that this distinction was complex and worked both ways, and that it was originally empirically derived and was certainly not God-given, is a good example of his seeing what was best in philosophy over time. Yet, it is Aristotle, not Plato, certainly not Descartes, and not Hume – with whom, nevertheless, he shares an empiricist predilection – that he most resembles. The similarities with Aristotle are: a shared preoccupation with the heterogeneity of living beings; a sense that the human being is ever collating what their animal and spiritual nature bring to any situation; and an appreciation that the human being is a being that

holds within itself a multiplicity of fundamentally different 'beings-so'.

Before dealing with the precise innovations in the volume on metaphysics mentioned above, we should consider his novel approaches to philosophy and their metaphysical implications in his published work up to the mid-1920's, before he composed the notes which make up his 'Metaphysics'.

His writings in the 1910's and early 1920's were prodigious and varied, and all were extraordinary by any standards. There were articles on war, tragedy, compensation neurosis (exquisitely relevant today), *Lebensphilosophie,* shame, and self-deception. The one that stands out most is his 600 page treatise on ethics – *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, Formalism in Ethics and non-formal Ethics of Values* – published in two sections in 1913 and 1916, and translated into English in 1973[5]. Despite its dry title, it conveys the sense of a brilliant mind daring to contradict Kant and all previous notions of ethics. Amongst the arguments he musters for his view that the basis of ethical behaviour is neither a subjective judgement based on a rational assessment of the rights and wrongs of the issue now, nor a utilitarian view as to future benefits to others, nor a communally-binding and spiritually *{Geist}* – based 'ought', nor a drive for pleasure, is his claim that the value of the matters involved in making the ethical judgement are always two-fold – one *objective* and one *subjective*. The above extant formulations of ethics which he criticises are unifactorial, setting aside the fact that ethics is not essentially to do with reason, altruism, *Geist*, or pleasure-seeking. This twofold principle, which he uncovered in the field of ethics, and which has been barely recognized by commentators, is a theme which pervades his final formulation of metaphysics. We can say, therefore, that by 1913, the date of the first section of *Formalismus* – which contains his views on values – one of the building blocks of his ultimate metaphysics had been laid.

The particular twofoldness which he elaborates here is so astonishing, and yet so fundamental to his later more general metaphysical position, that it deserves some elucidation.

The *objective* component in an ethical dilemma is the value or values encountered in some social situation – say, a beggar asking for money. Values, for Scheler, fall into five levels, each containing positive and negative examples. From bottom up, giving positive examples, there are: 1) sensory values, e.g. the delicious taste of a fruit; 2) use values, e.g. the appreciation of the potentiality of tools and environmental 'goods' in general; 3) vital values, e.g. the sense of nobility in a breed of horse; 4) mental values, e.g. the aesthetic appreciation of a picture; and 5) spiritual values, e.g. the ultimate human-specific sense of being a member of an absolute or cosmological fraternity.

All these values can kick in in some mundane situation. Confronted with a beggar, one may experience displeasure at a sensory level because of his looks or smell; there may be a negative vital value brought out in the form of a dilapidated life; there may occur a negative sense of uselessness, as one realizes that the man's possible talents have gone to waste, and that he is trying to obtain money for drugs; mentally, however, he may invoke positive aesthetic values as he plays his instrument; spiritually, he may appear as an epiphany of a world in ruins.

The value is 'perceived' through the apparatus of 'valueception', and the subjective experience is one of the corresponding five classes of emotions – displeasure, disgust, dissatisfaction, happiness and joy, in the example above. All emotions, according to Scheler, are primarily the subjective experience of the registering of a value, but these are not the critical active subjective component in the ethical dilemma. The *subjective* component at issue here is the 'moral tenor' of the human being who encounters and potentially registers the value. This 'moral tenor' is the very potential to register a value. Some humans are 'blind' or 'deaf' to whole classes of values, just as colour-blind humans are blind to colours. The higher the 'moral tenor', the more likely it is that that person will choose a higher value in any ethical situation. The ethical act itself, therefore, also has a value – the tendency to prefer a higher class of values within the five-tiered system being a positive value. This value, as Scheler says, 'rides on the back of' the act preferring this value rather than another.

In short, ethics is a bi-partite state of affairs, with the eventual ethical act determined partly by what is 'out there', independent of the particular human being, and comprising the values and their hierarchy that the human being comes upon, and partly by what he or she is in respect of a 'moral tenor' which can respond to such values. Note that reason or utilitarian calculations or communally-driven 'oughts' or pervasive pleasure-seeking do not come into it.

The three innovations in all this, barely recognized by philosophers to this day, are: 1) that values are intrinsic to the cosmos and everything is 'valu-able', whether human beings are around or not; 2) that there is a 'perceptual' system, independent of the systems which register things and qualities of things, which picks up values; and 3) that there is a part of the human being, independent of its reasoning, in

which resides its moral worth – its attunement to what is best among the values it encounters.

So, in the middle of the 1920's, Scheler, aged 40, has set out his stall, as it were, for a complete rethink of our emotional life. And of the few thinkers who have ever heard of Scheler most stop there. But in the next ten years he wrote, and had published in his lifetime, two further long treatises on matters which have a crucial relevance to metaphysics. We can say that each of these – *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, 1921, translated as *The Eternal in Man*[6], and *Erkenntnis und Arbeit,* 1926[7], untranslated, but meaning *Cognition and work* – further addresses the knowledge that a human being has about its world and the wider cosmos. It is as if, having teased out the immense complexity of our emotional life – objective values, subjective moral tenor, and the knowledge in the form of emotions which inform us of the goings-on between these poles – he now sees similar complexities in our religious life, and then realizes that he has to tackle epistemology head-on.

The Eternal in Man is his treatment of religion along similar lines to his radical re-evaluation of emotion. No, God is not a rationale of the human predicament, nor a crutch for the weaker of us, nor an embodiment of some primeval longing to know the causes of how we got here, nor yet a figment of our imagination. We know that God 'exists' because His nature is revealed to those who have the apparatus to grasp it. Moreover, the grasping of such a nature, as was the case in the valueception of values, is carried out by an apparatus independent of anything that grasps objects or qualities of objects, or indeed values. It is, in short, that which supplies *faith*, faith being the registration of the nature of God as the experience of colour is the registering of certain qualities of the external world. Faith-blind individuals occur, as do colour-blind individuals, the former much more commonly so than the latter, and even more commonly so in our age than in Medieval times. The 'objective' in all this is God, the truly 'subjective' is the religiosity of an individual, akin to moral tenor in the case of emotion, and faith is the subjective experience, comparable to any of the emotions in the general explication of our emotional life portrayed above.

Erkenntnis und Arbeit, an enormous undertaking, should be read in conjunction with its companion piece *Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens*, translated as *Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge*[8], and both were published together. This latter treatise is a persuasive account of how any knowledge whatsoever does not simply accrue willy-nilly in the course of one's life, but serves the three main drives of the living organism – sex, nutrition and power. What is astonishing about Scheler's formulation is how he appreciates the temporal changes over the course of humanity as to how each form of knowledge serving each of these drives waxes and wanes and how each form of knowledge appropriates to itself different contents – e.g. people, things – in different epochs. Knowledge, when Scheler's treatment of it is truly grasped, never looks the same again. What such treatment tells us about metaphysics, moreover, which he emphasises time and time again in his 'Metaphysics', to be considered below, is that the human being is a project in the making, and no cross-sectional account – whether Plato's, Aristotle's, etc. – however valid for one particular era can remain so over time.

Erkenntnis und Arbeit itself is a jewel, whose message, if it had ever been translated, and if it had been read and digested by the discipline it is aimed at – psychologists – might have led to the avoidance of some of the crass formulations of human beings and their psychopathology current today. It has very little to do with *Arbeit*, but much to do with *Wissen* (knowledge) and its higher-order cousin *Erkenntnis* (cognition).

There is an introduction about the woeful state of what we would now call epistemology and philosophy of mind, which contains the best definition of knowledge which I have ever come across:

> A participation by X, the potential knower, in the whatness of Y, the potentially to-be-known, whereby the whatness of Y becomes part of X, without the nature of Y changing in any way whatsoever, and without Y's existence being in any way involved; what changes is X, not Y.

There are then remarks on how various long-held assumptions about the nature of the mind and how it works – for instance, the notion of a 'stimulus' emanating from some thing to strike the human – are complete bunkum.

Keeping to our theme of Scheler's metaphysics, *Erkenntnis und Arbeit* contains trailers for many of the themes that dominate his 'Metaphysics': his notions of 'phenomenon', 'sphere', 'existential relativity' and 'functionality', in particular, to which we shall return. The treatise itself, however, stands out as a critique of what metaphysicians and their second cousins, psychologists, tend to do, which is to comment on things, qualities of things, and other aspects of the world, without enquiring deeply enough into the very nature of our knowledge of these matters. The overwhelming impression which one takes away from reading the work is of a philosopher acutely aware of, and sympathetic to, the new discipline of psychology, yet aghast at the mistaken, essentially Cartesian, line it is taking.

We are now in a position to tackle Scheler's final thoughts on metaphysics, brought together in Volume 11 of his *Collected Works.* Scheler's working method was to keep various pots boiling at the same time, and there are parallel comments in other articles that he was working on or revising that we shall refer to – the first part of *Idealismus – Realismus* (1927), translated as *Idealism and realism*[9], and later parts so far untranslated[10]; and articles entitled *Lehre von den drei Tatsachen* (1933), translated as *The theory of the three facts* [11], and *Phänomenologie und Erkenntnistheorie* (1933), translated as *Phenomenology and the theory of cognition*[12].

The volume of his Collected Works entitled *Erkenntnislehre und Metaphysik*, which is the central focus of this article, has six sections.

The first is a plea for the very study of metaphysics in an age, in which, according to Scheler, it has been displaced by scientific, artistic, ethical and mystical versions of what the human being and its world comprises.

The second section is a completely novel approach to philosophy, barely announced by anything in his previous writings, and only loosely indebted to Husserl's thought experiments known as 'reductions', where a philosopher imagines what a human being would experience if certain aspects of what it is to be human were struck out. This section is the most critical of all for his metaphysics. It is as if he finally stumbles on an explicit method that he needs to support his intuitive sense of what was wrong with philosophy hitherto and what he had been inchoately working towards in previous years. Yes, the critical thought experiment is what he calls a 'phenomenological reduction', a term which he borrows from Husserl, but Scheler's phenomenological reduction is nothing like Husserl's, either in its method or in its spectacular results.

When Husserl 'reduced' the apple tree in blossom [13], he merely 'bracketed' the judgement that this apple tree were real, a thought experiment of great ingenuity, certainly, but one which did not properly tackle the effect of an attenuation of reality on a person's experience, only the effect of a judgement to this effect. Scheler thought that when Husserl maintained that the experience of the apple tree would not change one iota, in *his*, Husserl's, reduction, because the image simply moved into the realm of inner consciousness with no change whatsoever in its appearance, Husserl had overlooked a far more plausible and radical scenario.

(1) If the reduction truly cancelled out all that was real, the apple tree would be frozen in time – no wind blowing its branches, no birds alighting.

(2) Further, an 'apple tree' is a variable image – to a gardener, a fruit-merchant, a woodcutter, each of whom takes a partisan view as to its nature, as they value it differently, and hence it appears to each differently. If the reduction cancels out all such partisan views, which it does in Scheler's version, then the 'reduced' tree is different again from *any* perspectival version of it, and, as Scheler says, becomes an everyman's apple tree, i.e. the essence of 'appletreeness'. More surprisingly, but quite uncannily correct, in the light of what schizophrenics experience – see below – the colour of the tree would change too, as well as its form, because the perceived qualities of an object are those which all human beings in their 'natural' attitude take to be worthwhile valuing – e.g. the rosy colour of an apple represents its ripeness and edibility. But if the reduction wipes out all such life-bound drives then the colour perceived becomes detached, 'free-floating' in Scheler's words, and in the same way as its reduced form approximates the *essence* of 'appletreeness' in respect of form, so will its colour qualities approximate the *essence* of red, green, etc.

Scheler's insight here cannot be overestimated. He sees the 20th Century human being as already a long way down the road of a natural 'reduction', in which we normals, nothing to do with any thought experiment, perceive the world as a 'reduced' version of what an animal or a primitive human does – i.e. its experience of shapes are more 'essential-like' than the latter's, and its colour experience is already adrift of the original sign value of edibility in the case of the apple tree. Scheler would have been intrigued with the fact that schizophrenics – see below – experience colours as more vivid and detached, schizophrenics being, on other counts as well, further along the reduction path than any sane 21st Century human being.

There are three other issues in this section, all innovatory, albeit with some prior discussion in *Erkenntnis und Arbeit* and in the parallel text *Idealismus – Realismus*, which I wish to elucidate.

The first of these is the notion of 'spheres' of existence and 'existential relativity'. The idea that he tries to get across is one which only Aristotle and Kant before him, and Heidegger after him, amongst all philosophers, really got to grips with, namely that there are fundamentally different modes of being in the constitution of the human being. Scheler refers to them as 'spheres' or 'realms' of being, and gives a variable number of them and different labels to them in the three places in his Collected Works where he discusses them – here, in *Erkenntnis und Arbeit* and *Idealismus – Realismus.*

What he is getting at is that the sun, for example, an example he himself gives, can look bigger or smaller to us, in our 'natural' or environmental attitude, depending on whether it is seen at noon or at dusk – in the latter case it is an enormous orb disappearing behind the horizon. But as an astronomical object within a scientific framework it does not change size at all. The 'natural' and the 'scientific' sun are two entirely different existential versions of the same entity.

The implications and ramifications of this principle are enormous. Scheler does not discuss Aristotle's contribution, but he does acknowledge Kant's insight into the difference between appearance and 'thing-in-itself' in this context. Heidegger's distinction between *Zuhandenheit* (an object, such as a hammer, ready-to-hand) and *Vorhandenheit* (an object, a hammer, for example, as a free-standing thing in the external world) is along the same lines.

Scheler, in my view, extends the notion correctly, and more profoundly, to the entire gamut of things, qualities, and ideas, with his ancillary notion of existential relativity. If there are radically different realms in which the same basic entity can appear – the sun as an environmental object varying in size throughout the day, and the sun as a scientific object invariable in size in these circumstances – then every single thing or quality which we experience should be subject to the same transformations, and that is because the entity itself, independent of us, can be known in these various but circumscribed number of ways. Each appearance is existentially relative to a particular way of knowing, and a knower, such as a sub-human animal, which does not have a scientific take on anything, will not know the sun as a constant. The sun as a changeable object in respect of its size is existentially relative to a living being with *Drang* – see below. Numbers, on the other hand, are existentially relative to a knower with *Geist*, and, so, when Heidegger writes[14] that Newton's laws of motion were neither true or false before Newton 'discovered' them, this is quite misleading: they were always true, but only revealed to be so when a being with *Geist* who could appreciate them came on the scene.

One could go on and on about this insight of Scheler's – e.g. if the dream is existentially relative to a being with *Geist*, then its content and form follows inexorably from this, i.e. there should be a certain temporality, spatiality, mode of existence and quality which is appropriate to this [15]. I shall exert a guillotine on any further reflections, but point the reader to a remark [16] in *Phenomenology and the theory of cognition* where he describes how each appearance of an entity in whatever realm can be traced back to its original 'phenomenon':

> This colour red, for example, is the X which corresponds to this motion (i.e. the movement of phenomenon in its sphere or realm to other realms); this nervous process, this sensation X, however, is not given itself. Thus draft after draft is drawn on red (the phenomenon).

(2) The second unique contribution to philosophy found in this section is Scheler's notion of 'phenomenon', or, as he calls it, 'ur-phenomenon', to distinguish it from the various other meanings of 'phenomenon', particularly that of mere appearance. Again, this discussion is trailered in *Erkenntnis und Arbeit*, but here, in the 'Metaphysics', he gives the most clear account of what he is driving at. The ur-phenomenon is Scheler's term for the objective entity, albeit ideal, that exists independently of the presence of any human being or even animal. It exists in the form of an image (*Bild*) or *Gestalt*, and is the ultimate object to which any symbol or idea or appearance must conform, all these three being versions of it in other realms. The ur-phenomenon itself is not real; it is ideal. This is because reality is that which is causally effective, and ur-phenomena are not; because reality is the province of forces, fields of forces, and nodal concentrations of forces, and ur-phenomena are not such; and because reality is only encountered in resistance, and ur-phenomena are not so. Nevertheless ur-phenomena are the very tapestry of the world which every sort of derived object, depending on what sort of knowledge is directed at the ur-phenomenon, must conform to.

What we have here, in my view, is the most plausible account ever mustered for an objective structure to the world. It is independent of any subject – worm or human – and any such subject will deem their knowledge-derived appearances of the ur-phenomena 'real', although all that they are experiencing are those aspects of the ur-phenomena which suit their drive-based needs. Every organism's environment or world is a selective version of the actual ur-phenomena, themselves ideal, but which each organism regards as real.

(3) The third issue I wish to highlight in this section, which appears nowhere else in Scheler's writings, and certainly not in anyone else's, is his emphasis not just on the bipartite state of affairs that is the human being's and animal's situation in their environment or world – objective ur-phenomena and subjective apparatuses for knowing a selective version of these – but a bipartite split in the sort of knowledge that a human being can have of its environment and world. This facility is restricted to humans; sub-human animals only know the three lowest tiers of values

and the 'goods' that accrue from them – pleasant, vital and useful. Humans, however, can bring to bear two 'acts' simultaneously on any situation. (This is because they possess *Geist* as well as *Drang* – see below).

How do we humans know that anything is blue or round, for example? We know this because two 'acts' take aim on the matter in hand. It may be an act of thinking and an act of intuition, or two acts of intuition such as seeing and hearing, or two acts of thinking such as grasping something's meaning and its relationship. Whatever the pairing the resulting knowledge is 'evidence', i.e. surer than anything that one 'act' can provide. Scheler actually compares this process to the skill of an artillery officer focusing two beams from different sources on a target, and coming up with a more accurate co-ordinate than if he had only one source. In the case of thinking and intuition, Scheler's view was that intuition gave you knowledge about the structure and quality of the ur-phenomenon (something that the animal achieved), whereas thinking gave you knowledge about the meaning of the symbolic derivations of it (beyond any animal's capacity). The coming together of these two acts then gave you the most profound version of what that something actually was – its essence.

This last notion, elaborated in supplementary remarks which make up the sixth section of Volume 11 – his 'Metaphysics' – is a massive insight into the notion of knowledge and objects themselves. Scheler regards the essence of something as that version of an entity which only a combined idea and ur-phenomenon can provide, and which only humans can achieve because only they have *Geist* which allows the idea of something to emerge. It is their dual possession of thinking in meanings and ideas *and* their intuition of the ur-phenomenon (*Bild, Gestalt*), and the two combined, which gives the essence. Moreover, this process, in Scheler's formulation, is one in which the essence is grasped by thinking the idea at the same time as the ur-phenomenon is encountered. Unlike what Aristotle thought, the essence is not *in* the thing itself waiting to be discovered, nor, as Plato thought, already pre-formed in some other realm, but triggered at or on the thing by the very encounter of that thing. The thing is experienced simultaneously as *this* thing with *that* essence. The pure thisness of the thing Scheler refers to as *zufälliges Sosein* (a happenstance of something), something which has a temporal and spatial framework and a form, but is devoid of anything by which you can say it belongs to a class of anything. *Zufälliges Sosein* is the way in which sub-human animals experience their environment, and only the supervention of *Geist* in the human can supply the meaning, through thinking, whereby this being can discover the essence of anything by directing its – *Geist's* – act on that something at the same time as that something's ur-phenomenon triggers the act.

Section 3 of his 'Metaphysics' is very short, and is clearly a set of notes which he made in preparation for the book 'Metaphysics' which he never lived to write. The section is entitled *The metaphysics of cognition*. The innovation here is his formulation of ideas as a draft {*Entwurf*} or sketch [*Skizze*], a proposal which resembles Max Weber's notion of ideal types, and which Scheler acknowledges as such. Scheler's view, however, is that it – draft, sketch – is not an individual's own unique version of some category or class or heuristically useful exemplar of something which can be applied to the vagaries of experience but is something that has its provenance in the absolute Being which human beings are but a concentrated version of. [This notion, which I find hard to grasp, is nevertheless a central tenet of his metaphysics – see the next section but one].

The fourth section of the 'Metaphysics', the book that was never written, is entitled *On the metasciences*. This is hard-going. Part of it deals with space and time, and part of it is a critique of extant theories of life. The overall theme is that metaphysics, as the term is understood, is not actually a 'meta-physics', i.e. a higher order collation of everything that is known about the material world (which is not how Aristotle used the term anyway, but is certainly implied in the term 'metaphysics'), and is not even a higher collation of *all* the 'sciences' pertaining to man – i.e. meta-biology, meta-history, meta-psychology, meta-ethics – all of which he refers to as meta-sciences, but is rather the combination of all such meta-sciences *and* what he refers to as meta-noetics (which is the enquiry into the way in which humans arrive at the essence of anything).

All this sounds very obscure on first encountering it. But it makes good sense when one realises what he is driving at, and when one recognises the philosophical and scientific positions he is trying to rebut. What he is saying is that even if one had a complete knowledge of all scientific facts about man, and had even exhausted what the Germans call *Geisteswissenschaft's* (the humanities) insight into the human being, this would not render metaphysics redundant. Philosophy, metaphysics in particular, is not the handmaiden of science, nor an overview of its best efforts, but rather a dual collaboration

between the sciences and the humanities *and* everything that can be gleaned about the coming-to-be of essences, this last being a completely non-scientific project. In his *Supplementary remarks* section of this Volume he even goes so far as saying that the very nature of science is a metaphysical issue, thus further demeaning the notion of philosophy as the handmaiden of science.

The fifth section, entitled *The theory of the causes of everything*, sounds extremely bold, and is so. It is his centrepiece of metaphysics. Some might call it theology, and he certainly brings in not only one but *two* notions of what is usually considered to be God. *Each* is quite alien to the theistic tradition, the varieties and sects of which look quite parochial when measured against Scheler's devastating critique of theism and his own ingenious alternative. To me, a life-long atheist, his separation of 'God', what he calls 'panentheism' – God-in-the-making – from an entity that provides the ultimate cause of everything – which he calls the *Ens a se* – is the most plausible account I have ever read of a theological nature. Note that he separates 'God' and 'the cause of everything', unlike all extant theologies, as far as I understand them, which conflate the two.

'God' comes at the *end* of human civilization, not at the beginning. This makes great sense. How could a humanoid being create men and women in its image, given everything we now know about the cosmos? No – there is a creative force – not God – which Scheler dubs the *Ens a se,* which sets in train *Drang* (untranslatable, but meaning roughly the urge to push on regardless possessed of vitality), which over vast stretches of time eventually matures enough to grasp something of another aspect of the *Ens a se*, which is *Geist* (again difficult to translate into English, but meaning all our connotations of spirit *and* mind). These two components of the *Ens a se* were in a state of tension in that entity before it released *Drang* into the cosmos, and Scheler regards *Drang's* coming to maturity and recognising *Geist* as both a formative episode in the coming-to-be of humans, who, according to Scheler are the only earthly beings with *Geist*, and a solution to the *Ens a se's* own original problem vis-à-vis its tension. The experiment which the *Ens a se* set in train by unleashing *Drang* has concluded with the coming-to-be of humans who now mirror the *Ens-a-se* in having both *Geist and Drang,* both in a tensed relationship but somehow having relieved the burden of the *Ens a se* in this respect.

A fantastic yarn, and without a shred of evidence, you may say. But it is not at all without plausibility when one looks at the increasingly documented psychopathological data about the conflicted human being, barely suspected prior to the 20th Century, except in the philosophies of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. What would Scheler have thought about the recently described *anarchic hand syndrome* [17, 18], for example? Here, a patient with a lesion or surgical transection of his or her corpus callosum, the band of fibres which connect the two hemispheres at a cortical level, behaves like two mutually antagonistic people: the left hand takes the steering wheel of the car that the right hand was driving and nearly causes a crash, or the left hand removes the cigarette from the mouth, or the left hand unbuttons the pyjamas that the right hand has just buttoned.

In short, this section is a story to bend the ear of the atheist, and, at the very least, make theology come alive.

The sixth and final section is entitled *Supplementary remarks.* There is an elaboration and clarification of the issues dealt with earlier, and the overwhelming theme promoted is that of a human being in possession of two modes of knowledge – intuition and thinking – directed, respectively, at the ur-phenomenon (or image) and the spatially extended object in the world, these two sorts of knowledge coalescing to produce an essence of what anything is as opposed to its *zufälliges Sosein* (its here-and-now happenstance).

3. Scheler's relationship to his contemporaries

Scheler admired James and Bergson for their pragmatism and vitalism; Hartmann for his notion of levels within a human being, from material to spiritual, each one containing a different qualitative mix of the core philosophical inventory, such as spatiality and temporality; Husserl for his early adherence to the notion of categorical intuition and for his innovative thought experiments involving 'reduction'; and Heidegger for his embellishment of what it is like to be an animal (not that Heidegger saw his *Being and Time* at all in this way).

What stands out, from our vantage point, in respect of the corpus of philosophy that each man produced, is the breadth and profundity of Scheler's output relative to the others'. Despite their prodigious outpourings – over fifty volumes from Heidegger, ten or so apiece from James, Bergson, Hartmann and Husserl – each is a one-idea or a 'handful-of-ideas' man. Heidegger came closest to Scheler's omnivorous and omniscient approach, and his acquaintance with the history of philosophy was probably superior, but he, too, in all the later works, which Scheler did not live to see because he died in 1928, perseverated along a few themes – e.g. Being, the overarching genius of Aristotle, the falsity of metaphysics – which Scheler already saw – see

below – as vitiating Heidegger's notion of *Dasein* as the core of a human being. More serious, and this again is the theme of this article, each one of these philosophers, despite brilliant insights into one aspect of the human being, remains a purveyor of one-dimensional man, albeit different dimensions among them. None saw the human being as a struggle between spirit and animality, or as a possessor of two radically different sorts of knowledge, or as a microcosm reflecting the macrocosm, or as having access to five different levels of values with the ensuing ethical dilemmas that this entails, or as a partner with the original creative impulse in the becoming of God, or as a being-in-the-making, or as a twofold fund of flexible access to essences and unique exemplars.

Scheler's critique of pragmatism – he does not specifically criticize James – can be found in *Erkenntnis und Arbeit*[19]. His main thrust is against pragmatism's one-sided view of knowledge as merely serving action, without seeing that there are other sorts of knowledge. He also criticises it for holding a generally false metaphysical stance on reality, representations and thinking, criticisms which apply to all the other philosophers mentioned here.

Bergson is taken to task in various places in Scheler's works – e.g. in *Erkenntnis und Arbeit* [19] and in the section on The metasciences in Volume 11 of The Collected Works[20]. Scheler thought sufficiently highly of Bergson to have recommended translation into German of his early books, but, nevertheless, regards him in those two critical pieces as too vitalist and too pragmatic.

Hartmann, whose book *Neue Wege der Ontologie*, published in 1949 and translated in 1953[21], gives a good account of his metaphysical position, is classed by Scheler as a 'critical realist' – see *Idealismus – Realismus*[22] – and is credited with the view that the very existence of something is known by ourselves through a mental representation. Scheler was scathing of all such realism, because, according to him, the existence of something can never be known, only its whatness is knowable, and therefore Hartmann's thesis here is doomed.

Scheler's relationship vis-à-vis Husserl is well described in Spiegelberg's (1994) book *The Phenomenological Movement*[23]. Scheler's views on phenomenology are to be found in *The theory of the three facts*[11] and *Phenomenology and the theory of cognition*[12], but, like Heidegger, he distanced himself from phenomenology and Husserl in later years. A note entitled *Against Husserl*[24], in *The Constitution of the Human Being* (my title for the translation of his 'Metaphysics' and some sections of his 'Anthropology')[25], indicates a complete severance by the mid-1920's from everything Husserl stood for. Scheler's own notion of *Bild* (ur-phenomenon, image, *Gestalt*), Scheler's formulation of the essence of something as the *same* in every exemplar of it, Scheler's own three reductions – phenomenological, scientific, Dionysian – and Scheler's radical departure from Husserl in numerous other ways, particularly his, Scheler's, insistence on the dual contributions of *Drang* and *Geist* to the human being, make the two philosophers so disparate that it is surprising that anyone now sees a link.

Scheler's philosophical affinity with Heidegger is much more striking than that with any of the above. They clearly respected each other above all contemporary philosophers. When Scheler died Heidegger wrote a powerful eulogy, which pops up in the middle of his published lectures on Leibniz given in 1928[26]. Similarly Scheler paid tribute to Heidegger by devoting the last year of his life, when he had premonitions of his early demise, according to his wife, to reading and annotating Heidegger's *Being and Time*, (see a translated part of *Idealismus – Realismus*[27] and untranslated parts[28]) which Heidegger had sent to him in 1927 as soon as it was published with the comment that only he, Scheler, would properly understand it.

A mutual admiration society of two must have held sway for a few years, as Heidegger, in his eulogy for Scheler, writes about 'day-and night-long conversations' between them both in 1928, but Scheler's comments[28] on *Being and Time*, which Heidegger must have read, as he offered to edit Scheler's posthumous works, could not have endeared Scheler to him:

> Is it even possible, without assuming concepts such as spirit, life, a living body, psyche, consciousness, dead things, material bodies – and without the ways of being of objects which conform to these concepts – to construct, as Heidegger wants to do, an original structure of the human being, which can stand firm in its own right.

Heidegger lived another 50 years after Scheler's death, and barely mentions him thereafter, except in a deprecatory manner. Was it Scheler's half-Jewish background and his status as a known anti-Nazi that led Heidegger to drop his offer to edit these works? We shall never know.

4. Scheler's contemporary relevance

The Anglo-American philosophers of the 20th Century scarcely knew of him, the plethora of French 20th Century philosophers – with the exception of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty – ignored him, and post-war German philosophers – except those who make up the *Max Scheler Gesellschaft*

– have buried him. Adorno, for example, in his *Negative Dialectics*[29], refers to his metaphysical position as hopeless. The efforts of Manfred Frings – the editor of his Collected Works until his recent death – tried to drum up interest in America to no avail.

The only consistent interest in Scheler within any discipline, to my knowledge, has been amongst psychiatrists. In the inter-war years a group of Swiss, German and French psychiatrists – Binswanger, von Gebsattel, Straus and Minkowski – founded a group of phenomenological psychiatrists, which led to a number of articles applying the philosophies of Husserl, Heidegger, Bergson and Scheler to their subject. This movement flourished in France and Germany from the 1930's until the 1970's – see reviews by Tatossian[30] and myself[31]. Scheler was less sought out as a mentor in this project than was Heidegger, but one psychiatrist, Kurt Schneider[32], who knew Scheler, and is now regarded as one of the greatest 20th Century psychiatrist because of being the first to propose a relatively reliable empirical definition of schizophrenia, stands out as the first 'Schelerian psychopathologist'. He realized that if there were different levels of emotional life, as set out in Scheler's *Formalism*, then there might be scope for several sorts of emotional 'illnesses', and he actually proposed that a depressive illness known to psychiatrists as endogenous depression – coming from within – might be based on a problem at the vital level, whereas what psychiatrists refer to as a reactive depression – caused by environmental adversity – might be taking place at the mental level.

This interest in potential Schelerian psychopathology has been taken up recently by a group of philosophically oriented psychiatrists at the foremost psychiatric centre in Britain, the Institute of Psychiatry in South London, and two recent publications – McGilchrist's (2009) *The Master and his Emissary* [33] and Owen's [34] (2010) study of mental capacity, a topic of contemporary interest to lawyers and psychiatrists dealing with psychiatric patients' informed decisions about their situation and treatment – borrow heavily from Scheler.

My own prediction is that what is becoming known as Schelerian psychopathology will increasingly occupy centre-stage. Here I shall briefly mention four of the most recalcitrant problems besetting mental health professionals, and how a knowledge of Scheler's philosophy can illuminate them. One is the nature of delusions, another is the debate about the homogeneity or otherwise of depressive illness, a third is the nature of schizophrenia, and a fourth the mode of causation in psychiatric conditions.

1) Delusions are quite various, and yet the thrust of psychological research into them has been to assume that some unitary mechanism prevails. Scheler's philosophy, taken as a whole, seems to me to undermine any such one-sided approach to any aspect of the human condition, and therefore one would expect delusions to be heterogeneous in nature and cause.

If we take one such delusion, known as Capgras syndrome after the French psychiatrist who first described it[35], we can show that something Scheler wrote about in his 'Metaphysics'[36] makes more sense of this than anything previously written about the condition.

The Capgras delusion is one in which a person claims that some familiar individual thing or person or event – wellington boots, spouse, even the First World War in one case – is not the genuine individual that they are acquainted with but an impostor or fake or look-alike, and, in some cases, has multiple other existences which are temporally and spatially specified.

A remark by Scheler in the second section of his 'Metaphysics'[36] makes it clear that whatever is taken up by *Geist* is accorded a unique status independently of its heretofore uniqueness in terms of its temporal and spatial parameters. So, whereas my wife, for instance, is the *same* in the natural attitude (i.e. to a sane person, not subjected moreover to the phenomenological reduction of a philosopher), across temporal (morning to evening) and spatial (in the house, in the office) domains, in any *geistig* take she is *different* in each temporal and spatial instance in which she appears. I must admit that the reasoning behind Scheler's remark eludes me, but he is spot on with regard to the condition at issue here: there is a case of a woman who thought her daughter was different in the morning from the daughter who returned from work in the evening[37].

2) Depressive illness is as mysterious now as it was in the age of Burton. Psychological notions of grief (within a psychoanalytic framework), defeat (a behavioural suggestion) or negative thinking (the only pertinent concept that the entire cognitive psychology revolution can come up with) address the tip of an iceberg.

Kurt Schneider's[32] suggestion, mentioned above, that different sorts of depression might be based on disturbances at different levels of emotional life, was the first inkling of the richness that Scheler's philosophy might provide to psychopathology. Since then there have been a number of purported philosophical formulations of depression[31], none of them faithful to any philosopher, and yet most of

them circling round the notions that the depressive is trapped in his or her body[38], or is living their life as an aspiritual animal reduced to eating and excreting[39]. My view[31] is that Scheler's later philosophy, invoking *Geist* and *Drang* as the two overarching poles of the human being, and his further appreciation that the normal human being is flexible in being able to shift between the knowledges which each pole possesses, provides the best explanation so far of the core depressive state: one in which *Drang* predominates, and where *Geist* is relatively inaccessible. A depressive illness, therefore, and there may be variations, as Schneider thought, is, on this view, a reversion to our animality adrift of our spirituality or mentality.

3) Schizophrenia. This condition, isolated by the German psychiatrist Kraepelin in 1896[40] from other sorts of madness, and called dementia praecox, then brilliantly described and renamed schizophrenia by the Swiss psychiatrist Bleuler[41], and then argued over ever since, is still as enigmatic as it ever was, despite a century of intense psychological investigation.

In recent years philosophers have stepped into the breach, trying to account for a condition which psychiatrists and psychologists despaired of explaining. Apart from perhaps shining a brighter light on the theoretical issue of 'what is madness', they have fared no better than their predecessors in other disciplines. But they have been pursuing their quarry without being properly conversant with the facts of the condition – the entire psychopathology of schizophrenia – and certainly without the benefit of Scheler's 'Metaphysics'. To me, Scheler's phenomenological reduction possesses the wherewithal to understand what is happening in schizophrenia. If the perceptual experience of a schizophrenic, to take only one aspect of their condition, is an aberration of normal experience, in the direction of colours standing out more[42,43] and living beings seen as zombies[44], then surely one should think that a philosopher who carries out a thought experiment called a phenomenological reduction in which things lose their vitality and colours stand out more has something to say about schizophrenia.

Schizophrenia, from all this, and only Scheler among philosophers saw this, is a 'living' phenomenological reduction.

4) Causation. Finally, taking the entire corpus of Scheler's writings, there is a crimson thread that runs through it, a theme that I have several times alluded to as 'multidimensional' man. In respect of the specific issue of causation which we are considering here, this means that causation is not a unitary phenomenon. To be sure, Aristotle, at the very dawn of philosophy, set out four different sorts of causality, but Scheler's version of causality accords it an even greater heterogeneity. In each of the realms or spheres which he identifies, see above, *all* the items which go towards making up a philosophical inventory of the human being – e.g. temporality, spatiality, existence, *including* causality – undergo a radical transformation. Causality in the inanimate sphere – mechanical – is different from that in the living or psychic sphere – predominantly teleological – which is yet different from that in the mental and spiritual spheres – linguistic or associative.

If psychiatric disorders – schizophrenia, depressive illness – are psychic constellations or even mental constellations, then what causes them is quite different from what causes billiard balls to ping against each other and from what causes physiological events such as diabetes. The endless discussions in the 20th *and even* 21st centuries about whether delusions are 'natural kinds'[45] such as gold or tigers, or whether they are artefacts because they are unlike physical illnesses[46], simply collapse because the multifarious nature of the relevant realms of discourse and the different sorts of causation endemic in each are not appreciated. Causation in psychiatry, if Scheler's overall work is digested, will never look the same.

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Notes

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MAX SCHELER'S MODEL OF STRATIFIED AFFECTIVITY AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR RESEARCH ON EMOTIONS*

Robert Zaborowski

Abstract

The article examines some aspects of Scheler's view on affectivity, especially his hierarchical approach which is useful in solving difficulties in analysis of affectivity and helps to avoid downwards as well as upwards reductionism in considering intricacy of emotions. After presenting how Scheler delineates the four levels of feelings, critical observations are made as to points which should be developed or refined so that Scheler's model could more broadly contribute to current debate over emotions and advancement of the theory of affectivity.

Keywords

Feelings, affectivity, emotions, levels of depth, vertical approach to affectivity, hierarchical model of affectivity, stratification of affectivity

1.

Feelings[1] are no longer neglected by philosophy as, according to some authorities, they have been in the past.[2] Yet, current research in its various forms and tendencies is usually dominated by a prevailing dichotomization, e.g. doing vs. thinking, body vs. mind, passivity vs. activity, practical vs. theoretical, personal vs. interpersonal,[3] perceptualism vs. cognitivism. According to this perspective feelings are considered as either being tied up with judgments or not related to them at all. As long as such positions are not categorical, they can be considered as pertinent. It can be the case that some feelings are cognitive while other are devoid of this feature. A problem emerges, however, when such claims become exclusive and one assumes that feelings are *necessarily* tied up with judgments or without any relation with judgments *at all*. By advocating this kind of exclusivism as to the statement that feelings are either bodily or mental, they turn out to be wrong. They both fall into reductionism, be it downward or upward.

As a matter of fact, some limit all area of research to bodily and biological phenomena. This approach is represented, for instance, by neurosciences, and appears compelling as far as bodily phenomena are easily observable and measured. Others take a reverse standpoint and restrict their inquiry to the so-called psychic and spiritual feelings. This contrasting approach can be seen as a natural reaction to the former. The long tradition of treating affectivity as a spiritual phenomenon is associated with poetry (I suppose this reference to poetry to be one of main grounds for scepticism against affectivity as such) and with literature. But, I would claim, neither of them is a satisfactory solution because each considers only a part of the whole story. Therefore, it would be right to say that they are only partly acceptable. By virtue of their one-sidedness they miss the whole image and/or what they present is a highly distorted version of it, for a major or minor part of affectivity is ruled out and their account of affectivity is not complete. They are, so to speak, partially right as well as partially wrong.

A tendency to reductionism is all the more surprising given that a different approach exists. A solution to escape the impasse and to offer an adequate interpretation of affectivity is to adopt a position which takes into account the complexity of affective phenomena. As the intricacy of emotions is not denied, one could wonder then why a complex position is so uncommon and why a consideration of affective phenomena as multifaceted and multilayered is marginalized. This is exactly what Scheler did by means of his model of stratification of affective life which offers a multilevelled interpretation of affective life.

Scheler is all the more relevant here, since, oddly enough, both his own in particular and the multidimensional model in general are rarely, if ever, referred to. Neither Scheler nor the hierarchical approach (as such, as well as those who support it, for example Nicolai Hartmann) are usually taken into consideration and, at any rate, they remain outside the main stream of the debate on emotion. For instance, in a 2008 book *Klassische Emotionstheorien: Von Platon bis Wittgenstein* there is a contribution devoted to Scheler by Kevin Mulligan.[4] But this is rather an exception. For the present purpose one can overview bibliographies included in books on emotions. For example, in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion* published in 2010 Scheler is mentioned only by name or in footnotes in two contributions.[5] But also, in the same volume Ben-Ze'ev observed that 'emotions involve all types of mental entities and states that belong to various ontological levels',[6] and Mulligan complains that

> [t]he philosophy and psychology of emotion pays little attention to the philosophy of value and the latter pays only a little more attention to the former.[7]

I am inclined to think that Scheler could have been here of great help, since, on the one hand, he defended a hierarchical approach to affectivity while, on the other, maintaining a strong and insoluble bond between emotions and values.[8] Another illustration would be a paper by J. Zhu & P. Thagard, *Emotion and Action*[9]. When stating that the

> dichotomy between emotion and reason has been questioned by a number of philosophers, psychologists, and neurobiologists,

they confine themselves to just 'last few decades' and list authors from the end of 20th century. They do not quote Scheler as, for example, Spiegelberg and Schuhmann do:

> Scheler's main effort here was to use phenomenology for the purpose of breaking down the rigid disjunction between reason and emotion [...][10]

These are only two examples. In order to see whether it is actually relevant and correct to refer to Scheler when dealing with philosophy of emotions, we would need to examine Scheler's philosophy and see how he treats this issue. Here, for such a purpose, I indicate just one passage from his work:

> Until recent times philosophy was inclined to a prejudice [...] consist[ing] in upholding the division between 'reason' and 'sensibility' [...] This division demands that we assign everything that is not rational—that is not order, law, and the like—to sensibility. Thus our *whole emotional life*—and, for most modern philosophers, our conative life as well, even love and hate—must be assigned to 'sensibility'[11]

As Scheler observes on the following page nobody examined the basis of such a prejudice, for instance

> whether there is also a *pure intuiting and feeling, a pure loving and hating, a pure striving and willing*, which are *as* independent of the psychophysical organization of man as pure thought, and which at the same time possess their own original laws that cannot be reduced to laws of empirical psychic life [...][12].

But this issue—looking into mental phenomena by terms of the emotion-reason dichotomy—will not be treated below. Let me refer to a personal experience: it looks like a joke, though it isn't. When I asked once about Scheler in conversation with a member of an academic team working on emotions she understood Scherer and when I spelled out that I meant Scheler it turned out that she had no idea who Scheler was. In this context what is particularly striking is that Scheler—or the hierarchical approach in general—is passed over in silence instead of being discussed, commented and adequately criticized. An investigation into Scheler's texts shows that claims about verticality or hierarchical structure of affective life as a new concept are not particularly well grounded or are exaggerated.

2.

But first things first. Scheler's starting point for a claim about a vertical distinction between different feelings is a pretty prosaic observation on some linguistic facts. Quite obviously, it applies to German:

> in such a finely differentiated language as German by 'bliss,' 'blissfullness' [*Glückseligkeit*], 'being *happy*' (the term happy is frequently used in the sense of 'lucky'), 'serenity,' 'cheerfulness,' and feelings of 'comfort,' 'pleasure,' and 'agreeableness' are not simply similar types of emotional facts which differ only in terms of their intensity, or which are merely connected with different sensations and objective correlates.'[13]

However, as we can infer from the English translation of Scheler's passage, the linguistic phenomenon of differentiating emotional facts is not an exclusive feature of 'such a finely differentiated language as German'. It works for English just as well. Moreover, apart from the words given in the translated passage there are other English terms of the same emotion-related group, e.g. joy, delight, felicity, gladness, gaiety, ecstasy, hilarity, merriment, mirth. Finally, Scheler's observation is valid for others feelings as well[14]. In the next sentence he lists:

> their opposites, 'despair,' 'misery,' 'calamity,' 'sadness,' 'suffering,' 'unhappy,' 'disagreeable'.[15]

A possible objection that we are dealing here with purely linguistic phenomena may be answered by pointing out that these are nonetheless conditioned by essential differences between various types of feelings or in Scheler's own words:

> [r]ather, these terms [...] designate sharply delineated *differentiations* among positive and negative feelings.[16]

From now on, the question is to know whether these terms reflect actual differentiations between feelings and, if so, whether these differentiations are delineated sharply.

If we are satisfied with Cartesian criterion of clear and distinct perception, then we would agree that pleasure and happiness, pain and suffering, sadness and misfortune are so different that they cannot be put on the same level. Rather they are rightly distinguished as sensible (pleasure, pain, sadness) and mental or spiritual (happiness, suffering, misfortune). A key example can be the sensible and the spiritual love as described by Plato by terms of

the ladder of love. Let us then acknowledge that there is more than one type of any kind of feelings and that this fact is irrefutable. We can concede that there are at least two types within any emotion-family and that they are neatly different. To some extent the awareness of coexistence of two contrasting species of particular feelings within the same genus resembles the realm of visual perception. Unless someone is blind, a clear and distinct differentiation of light and dark is accessible to him. However, you cannot perceive just one shade, say either light or dark, you must perceive them both. Here the case is different: you can feel a sensible pain but be blind or insensitive to spiritual suffering.

This is where two questions arise: how does this differentiation work? And: how many types are to be distinguished? The answer Scheler gives to the latter is that they are four: sensible feelings, vital feelings, psychic feelings and spiritual feelings. In case of the joy[17]-group these are: sensible pleasure, joy, happiness, and bliss. In his view they differ in several features which form a basis for an 'essential distinction in terms of quality or depth'.[18]

Scheler explicitly denies—in the passage quoted above ('not simply similar types of emotional facts which differ only in terms of their intensity')—that the difference could be explained in terms of intensity. Against identifying it with the criterion of distinction it can be argued that by increasing the intensity of sensible pleasure no joy is attained, by increasing the intensity of joy no happiness is attained and by increasing the intensity of happiness no bliss is attained. By the same token, one does not arrive at spiritual love by increasing his or her sensible love. Likewise, by reducing the intensity of bliss, no happiness is experienced, by reducing the intensity of happiness no joy is met and the same occurs with the intensity of joy in what regards pleasure. If, then, intensity[19] is not a right criterion of distinction, what it is?

Also, it cannot be identified with height.[20] By contrast Scheler speaks about *quality* or *depth*.[21] It seems to me that the first term, quality, refers to a description as such while the second one, depth, pertains rather to a position in *the order of ranks* of feeling. However, Scheler uses much more frequently the second one. Yet it seems that he does not understand them to be synonymous, because on another occasion he focuses on:

> [...] the fact that feelings are not only of different qualities but also of different levels of *depth*.[22]

Therefore a question concerning terminology should be asked. The problem is that depth, when applied in philosophy, is a metaphorical term,[23] for it refers to a physical dimension, fitted for geology, oceanography etc. The fact is plain and Scheler himself must be aware of it, given that he puts it (*'depth'*) sometimes in italics, sometimes in inverted commas, and sometimes in both.[24] What Scheler does mean by *depth* should be spelled out in the context of his general approach such as it is exposed, for instance, in a subsection on *'Higher' and 'Lower' Value*:

> In the totality of the realm of values there exists a singular order, an *'order of ranks'* that all values possess among themselves. It is because of this that a value is *'higher'* or *'lower'* than another one. This order lies in the *essence* of values themselves [...].[25]

Here, too, inverted commas and italics are in use when applied to *order of ranks* as well as to *high/higher* and *low/lower*. For Scheler the order of values is mirrored in the order of feelings and for this reason his approach is to be classified as vertical and holds not only for the world of values but also for the entire emotional life (resp. affectivity) which is to be understood hierarchically.[26] Both realms are stratified hierarchically, i.e. composed of strata or levels. This, again, is close to archaeology which excavates several layers (or strata) of the past.

3.

Scheler identifies four strata of feelings. He does not, however, provide a criterion of why they are four rather than, say, three or five. As to the former it can be said that by pinpointing four strata by means of a description, he proceeds by demonstration, provided, of course, that the description he gives of four strata is accepted in the main. It should be accepted insofar at least as the differentiation of the four strata is concerned, even if their material description is considered inaccurate. But it may well be that a number of four is a minimum. How can one ascertain clearly then whether limiting their number to no more than four is right?

Scheler's core claim in this respect runs as follows:

> I find this phenomenal character of the *'depth'* of feeling to be essentially connected with four well-delineated levels of feeling [...].[27]

But this looks circular, because levels of feelings are explicated in terms of a 'general relatedness of feelings to the ego [which] is in each of the above four types of feelings, a fundamentally and essentially different relatedness',[28] and so Scheler searches for features of levels to form a basis of a distinction in terms of depth.[29]

In fact, the distinction is provided by the delimitation of the four levels and then by their analysis. First Scheler names them in a following way:

> (1) *sensible feelings*, or 'feelings of sensation', (2) *feelings of the lived body* (as states) and *feelings of life* (as functions), (3) *pure psychic feelings* (pure feelings of the ego), (4) *spiritual feelings* (feelings of the personality).[30]

What follows is a description of what they have in common and next a description of the four levels. Their common feature is that

> *All feelings* possess an experienced relatedness to the ego (or to the person).[31]

What is felt is *some value*, which 'is joined to me more intimately through this function than anything is through representation'. The crucial difference between other contents and functions, e.g. representation on the one hand and feeling on the other,

> consists in the fact that the subjective character of experience does not wax and wane with the activity that goes into it as it does in the intellectual sphere.[32]

The corollary of this is that

> feelings cannot be controlled or managed arbitrarily. They can be controlled or managed only indirectly, by controlling their causes and effects (expression, actions).[33]

Such is a common denominator for the whole affectivity, *the whole emotional life*, the four levels of feeling. The differences there are between them are set out on next pages (pp. 333-344). In what follows I try to summarize basic features of each level and then to put them together in order to know how far the distinction and comparison can be brought forward.

A) *Sensible feelings* (*sinnliche Gefühle*)[34] are characterized explicitly by seven factors:
1. they are extended and localized in specific parts of the body,
2. they are states[35], never functions or acts, and as such lack intentionality,
3. they have no direct relation to the person but are 'related only to the *ego* in a *doubly indirect* manner'[36]: they are states of a part *of* the body *of* the person,
4. they are actual facts, occurring in some time and some place and being simultaneous with their object which must be present or represented as present (they cannot be given through remembering and expecting),
5. they are punctual, do not last, and are, therefore, without any possible reference to the past and the future; in other words they never lose their punctuality, they do not possess continuity of existence or continuity of development,
6. they are the least disturbed by attention given to them, and, accordingly, can remain 'unnoticed' when attention is led away from them,
7. they are subject to willing and not willing, and to arbitrary change. Later on Scheler adds other features:[37] they are consequences of stimuli, they are spatial and temporal feelings of contact, they reveal the value of what is present.

B) *Vital feelings* (*Leibgefühle*)[38] present following features:
1. they belong to the whole body but without having a special extension or place in it, they are not concerned by 'where?',
2. they do not show a manifold extensionality characteristic of sensible feelings,
3. they do not change necessarily when attention is directed to them,
4. they can possess a positive direction with different qualities, and, therefore, show an autonomy,
5. they always have functional and intentional 'are given the peculiar *value-content of our environment*',
6. they participate in post-feeling and fellow-feeling,
7. they can be recollected,
8. they '*indicate* the vital *meaning of the value* of events and processes within and outside my body'[39], they reveal dangers and advantages by anticipating the value of what is coming (they are spatial and temporal feelings of distance),
9. they are 'much less [than sensible feelings] subject to practical and arbitrary changes'[40].
10. they possess continuity of existence and continuity of development.

C) *Purely psychic*[41] *feelings* (*rein seelische Gefühle*)[42] are described as follows:
1. they are not states or functions of the ego but are attached to ego immediately,
2. they do not share extension, though can be in various distances from the ego,
3. they are subject to their own laws of oscillation,
4. they are dissolved by attention and grow when attention is diverted from their object[43],
5. they are 'still less [than vital feelings]'[44] subject to practical and arbitrary changes.

D) *Spiritual feelings* (*geistige Gefühle*)[45]:
1. are never states, and again: 'seem to [sic!] stream forth, as it were [sic!] from the very source of spiritual acts'[46],
2. are total in their character, that is, in/by what they enclose or 'permeate' 'these feelings appear [sic!] to bathe *everything* given in the inner world and the outer world in these acts'[47],

3. are absolute and not relative to extra-personal value-complexes, they fulfil our entire existence: either they are wholly absent or they pervade the '*whole* of our being', 'are given when we are given as absolute'[48],
4. are unconditioned and unalterable by the will, any deed or any way of life,
5. are '*not conditioned* by value-complexes exterior to the person', 'they take root in the value-nature of the person *himself*'[49], they are the only feelings that cannot be produced, merited.
6. do not participate in post-feeling and fellow-feeling[50].

4.

1. The description of the characteristics of these four levels is not easy to follow. First, the number of features varies in each case. Moreover, the four levels are not treated equally, e.g. the first and second levels are presented on four pages (and the first in seven well distinguished points), while the third one is given only a half page, and the four one just one page. Yet not all features of a level are exposed in the course of the relevant section and sometimes they are listed in a section devoted to another level[51]. Next, the elements of each level are not always described in view of the same aspects. Hence, there is just a little of explicit comparison. Finally, while many of them are positive, others are either negative and/or relational. What is the reason for this? Are some of the features to be taken as more important than others?[52] If indeed they may be compared with each other at all, this should be based on a reconstruction of the features of the four levels. Fig. 1 (on the next page) presents the result of such a reconstruction.

It may well be that the last column (*spiritual feelings are absolute, not relative*) and the 4th (concerning the relation to the person) ought to be merged into one—this would yield a full scale of the feature; but the 6th, 7th, 9th, and 10th columns still remain incompletely filled. Empty boxes could be completed with the proviso that this is hypothetical, e.g. spiritual feelings (7th column) are, one could infer, not subject to attention at all.

2. Scheler's method is that of ascending or superposing, since after a description of a lower level he passes on to a higher one and sets up the description of the latter upon the former. For instance, from sensible feelings he moves to vital feelings and insists on the fact that their characteristics 'diverge from those of sensible feelings'[54], but without saying anything about psychic and spiritual feelings. Next, when moving from vital feelings to psychic feelings, he says: '*Purely psychic feelings* differ most sharply from the stratum of vital feelings'[55], and finally, at his third move he states that '*Spiritual feelings* are distinguished from purely psychic feelings, it appears to me [sic!] [...]'[56].

3. Sometimes a feature is based on opposition of the level in question with another one but without taking into account two others levels, e.g. vital feelings do not show a manifold extensionality belonging to sensible feelings but nothing is said about psychic and spiritual feelings or, again, psychic feelings do not share extension as sensible feelings do but without nothing explicitly said about vital and spiritual feelings. Therefore, Scheler does not deploy a full comparison or presentation of this feature throughout all four levels. In my view, there is something left uncompleted or unexplicated.

4. With the description of the fourth level it can be observed that Scheler's analysis is unaccomplished. Its description, riddled with Scheler's *as it were*, *as it seems*, etc. becomes all the less certain. Or perhaps the fourth level itself is the least analyzable[57], which complies with the fact that it constitutes the very depth or the very core of human being?[58] In this case it must be gloomy perspective to conclude that what is supposed to be the core is so hard to be grasped. But, on the other hand, it can be claimed that by being unanalyzable the deepest level is secured, since it eschews any manipulation by means of external influence.

5. There are some enigmatic statements. On the one hand all feelings do not 'wax and wane with the activity that goes into it'[59] and are intentional and 'can be kept *away* but only by way of activity'[60]. On the other hand we are told that sensible feelings are punctual, evade intentionality and are the least disturbed by attention directed at them. Lack of *fellow feeling* is characteristic of sensible feelings (1st level). However, this feature reappears at 4th level (spiritual feelings). Likewise, Scheler claims that '[a] psychic feeling does not become a state'[61] and, then, he states that '[s]*piritual feelings* are distinguished from purely psychic feelings, it appears to me, first by the fact that they can *never* be *states*'[62]. Does this mean that psychic feeling can be, under *some* conditions, a state? A more general problem is that, as it seems to me, such distinctions—a classification of levels as *states*, *also states*, *not states* or *never states*—can be scarcely accepted as sharp- or well-delineating.

This appears to be even further obscured by other facts:

a) the ambiguous *as it were*, *as it seems* (see above) in the description of the 4th level,

Fig. 1

	SENSIBLE	**VITAL**	**PSYCHIC**	**SPIRITUAL**
Localization and extension[53]	[1] in specific parts of the body	in the total extension of the body, no special place, 'whole' body	no body-relation	no body-relation
Form and intentionality	[2] (always) a state, never a function or an act, no intentionality, *dead state*	having a *functional* and *intentional* character	an ego-quality, not a state or function	never a state
Relation to the person	[3] indirect, felt through the organic unit whose state it is	attached to the body-ego	immediate	
Spatio-temporalityu	[4] actual, some time and some place, there is no *post-feeling*, *pre-feeling* and *fellow feeling* at this level	can be recollected, participate in *post-feeling* and *fellow feeling*	can be brought to mind, extensionless and placeless	extensionless and placeless, does not participate in *post-feeling* and *fellow feeling*
Duration	[5] punctual, no continuity of existence, and of development, lack of duration	continuity of existence, and of development	subject to their own laws of oscillation	
Impact of attention	[6] the least disturbed (even increased) by attention, decreased by absence of attention	disturbed when attention is directed	dissolve completely when attention is directed, and increased by lack of attention	
Subject to will/control	[7] subject to arbitrary change and practical control	less subject (to a limited degree: by some kind of practical measures)	even less subject, i.e. possessing their own endurabilityand rhythm of fading away	not subject at all, unconditioned and unalterable, taking root in the person himself, cannot be produced and merited
		possesses a positive direction		
	simultaneous to and consequence of stimuli, pointing to the value of what is present, feelings of contact	anticipating a value of stimuli, pointing to the value of what is coming, feelings of distance		
				absolute feelings, not relative

b) sensible feelings (1st level) are contrasted more clearly with psychic feeling (3rd level, see e.g. pp. 334-335), than with vital feelings (2nd level),

c) Scheler speaks now about *sensible feelings*, *psychic feelings* and *spiritual feelings*, now about *pure*(*ly*) *sensible feelings*, *pure*(*ly*) *psychic feelings* and *pure*(*ly*) *spiritual feelings*.[63] Is it to say that there are *mixed* sensible, psychic or spiritual feelings? If so, how is it possible to distinguish them *sharply* from one another? But in the two subsequent sentences we read: 'In addition, the changing shades that purely psychic feelings can have through different feelings of the lived body and through different feelings of life do not affect that peculiarity. For psychic feelings are subject [...]'.[64]

d) The feature of being *less* or *more* disturbed by attention can also be hardly used for a *sharp* distinction of levels. It is, in fact, quantitative.

e) Scheler says that spiritual feelings are not at all subject to arbitrary change,[65] but, later on, that 'the least 'reactive' feelings are therefore the *bliss and despair*'.[66] Given the adverb *least*,[67] it is not clear at all whether the fourth level is indeed *sharply*- or *well-delineated*.

What is more, with this last point—i.e. the feature of being more or less subject to control—another problem emerges. As a matter of fact, we are told here that spiritual feelings are the least reactive of all, or that

> *vital feelings* are much less subject to practical and arbitrary changes, and psychic feelings still less so. Spiritual feelings of the person are not at all subject to arbitrary change.[68]

Therefore, a degree of being subject to modification is one of the criteria of distinguishing levels. Yet, proceeding by degree does not bring about sharp distinctions. Furthermore, this makes a problem since not being subject to modification is a common feature of feelings. Compare the following

> [...] feelings cannot be controlled or managed arbitrarily. They can be controlled or managed only indirectly, by controlling their causes and effects (expression, actions).[69]

with what has been listed above as feature differentiating sensible and spiritual feelings, that is a degree of controlling and managing.[70] In that way, distinctions are not sharp and, what is more, a contradiction arises.

The same question arises as to duration and oscillation of feelings. On the one hand, Scheler posits as a general characteristic of feeling,

> [...] the subjective character of experience does not wax and wane with the activity that goes into it as it does in the intellectual sphere.[71]

but, on the other, he alludes to laws of oscillation which concern not only psychic but all kinds of feelings. As he puts it:

> For psychic feelings are subject to their own laws of oscillation, as are the types of feelings of different strata in general [...]. [72]

Therefore, one might suppose, these laws vary according to levels. Unfortunately, they are not described by Scheler and, for this reason, it is hard to guess what Scheler has in mind when speaking about *own* laws of oscillation.

5.

These points seem to me crucial for further elaboration of Scheler's model. Perhaps then Scheler's model would have more chance of winning a broader acknowledgement as one of predominating model of affectivity it deserves. When completed, it should be expected that sets of features could be used for classifying any particular feeling on the 4-level scale.

In my view, points which should be spelled out are:

a) an explicit criterion of the number of levels;[73]

b) a clear distinction of major (principal) as well as minor (secondary) features of the four levels and then a comparison of the four levels in the light of these features;

c) a full exemplification of major particular feelings.

So far, the reconstruction I can make is shown in Fig. 2 below. In the future, all major feelings should be distributed across columns and rows.

feelings	joy	sadness	love	fear	etc.	etc.
sensible	pleasure	pain, displeasure				
vital[74]	comfort, joy		passionate love, vital sympathy	fear		
psychic	happiness	sadness, woe, grief, sorrow				
spiritual	bliss, spiritual joy(?)	despair, spiritual sorrow(?)	spiritual sympathy(?)[75]			

d) With the comparison done, a consideration whether distinctions between levels are sharp or smooth could be made. For example for Nicolai Hartmann, the author of another fourfold model, the differences between levels are sharp. Hartmann goes so far as to settle *a law of distance between levels*,[76] which points to the fact that '[t]he ascending series of ontological forms constitutes no continuum,[77] and 'are clearly marked off against

each other' or, to put it another way, that there is 'the "distance of strata"'.[78]

e) Other questions could be asked, e.g. as to whether levels are internally stratified. As a matter of fact, there are some hints in Scheler to this, e.g. when he uses an additional description of a level such as *pure*(*ly*) (see above) or when he speaks about 'the simplest sensible feelings'[79] (does it mean that within the level of sensible feelings there are simplest and less simple, more complex?); or when we are told that 'spiritual feelings *can* always exhibit an intentional character, and [...] the purely spiritual ones exhibit it essentially'[80] (does it mean that spiritual, but not purely, feelings *sometimes do not* exhibit intentionality?). Scheler speaks also about 'various distances from the ego' on the level of psychic feelings[81] and 'the deepest level of happiness',[82] but the most explicit seems to be his remark on 'the degree of depth within their depth-stratum'.[83] On another occasion, though, Scheler refers to a monolithic structure of levels,[84] e.g. claiming that 'vital feelings and their modes represent a unique stratum of the emotional life',[85] or that they are 'a *unitary* matter of fact'.[86]

f) It should be explained what *depth* means by way of translating the metaphor into philosophical language.

g) Scheler supports his account of verticality of affectivity with few examples such as Luther's confession after his daughter's death (after Scheler: 'I am happy in my spirit, yet very sad in my flesh. It is a strange thing indeed to know that she rests in peace and that she is well, yet still to be so sad'[87]) or an observation that:

> A serene face remains serene, even while crying. The fact that there is no blending into one feeling, as is the case in feeling of such diverse *levels of depth*, points to the fact that feelings are not only of different qualities but also of different levels of *depth*.[88]

Scheler's hierarchical model of affectivity could be brought closer to Hartmann's whose laws—of which one has been quoted—would be useful in practical application of Scheler's model to available data. For example Hartmann's *law of freedom*[89] positing that

> [t]he recurrence of lower categories never determines the character of the higher stratum. [...] a categorial novelty [...] is independent of the recurrent categories and consists in the appearance of new categories,[90]

in case of affectivity amounts to say that higher affectivity is independent of lower affectivity. The example of *serene face while crying* exemplifies this laws.[91]

h) Every analysis is carried out using language and in case of affectivity the difficulty consists in the fact that there is still no reliable terminology. For instance, a term *bodily feeling* seems appropriate but how to call the highest level of affectivity? *Spiritual feeling* seems odd so far as it refers to spirit. A term *mental feeling* is not good either since the distinction between psychic and spiritual feeling disappears in it. The very point is that whereas a term *bodily feeling* is universally accepted, in what concerns higher levels there is no such agreement. A term *psychic feeling* has been adopted,[92] and others terms such as *metaphysical feelings*[93] or *existential emotions*[94] or *existential feelings*[95] have been proposed as well.

6.

Benefits that can be derived from Scheler's model of affectivity result from the fact that this model is hierarchical. By this approach several affective phenomena can be taken into consideration, bodily as well as mental, long-term as well as short-term, passive as well as active, aesthetic as well as moral, egocentric as well as altruistic, reactive as well as spontaneous, determined as well as autonomous, destructive as well as creative, blind as well as intuitive, etc. A hierarchical model provides conditions for encompassing phenomena which in a one-level model are usually ruled out. In a nutshell, a vertical approach takes into account the intricacy of feelings which, in the horizontal model, is easily neglected. To use Scheler's own words it can be claimed that in case of horizontal approaches 'each contains something correct as well as something incorrect.'[96]

The intricacy of feelings can be spelled out also as *heterogeneity within homogeneity*. All affective phenomena present a common denominator and their generic differences in the vertical aspect are explicated by terms of different levels. By putting all affective phenomena in a one basket, as long as it is vertical, their different, even opposite features, are not erased.

The debate about feelings is far from over. Importantly, the vertical approach is employed more and more frequently. For instance, in *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion* recently published a reference to 'different *levels* of feeling' is made explicitly by M. Ratcliffe.[97] In doing so, he mentions Stefan Strasser (1977) and, more broadly, Martin Heidegger (1983). Ratcliffe insists on a distinction between the intensity and the depth of an emotional state. However, he is silent about Max Scheler,[98] in whose work such a distinction and a presentation of levels of feelings has been made decades earlier, already in twenties of the 20th century. What Ratcliffe says about existential feelings has much to do with Scheler spiritual feelings.[99]

On a more particular side, Scheler's work contains a number of useful distinctions as it is the case of differentiation between feelings and their expressions. This distinction is too often made blunt, not to speak about removing differences deliberately, as when we are told that feelings are to/should/can be controlled,[100] whereas Scheler is explicit: what can be controlled is the expression of a feeling and not a feeling itself.[101]

The task now is to work out Scheler's model in details, since at the moment it is, in my opinion, but a stage of a larger sketch. Only when it is elaborated or/and refined, it will be plausible to investigate to what extent this intuition can advance the theory of affectivity. Given Scheler's hierarchical approach it looks promising. Given its concern for wholeness it would be a pity to leave it behind.

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Notes

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1. For the sake of clarity, let me specify that I use *feeling* as a general category encompassing affective phenomena. This is a suitable rendering of the German *Gefühl* in a standard translation of Max Scheler, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values. A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism*, transl. M. S. Frings & R. L. Funk, Evanston 1973, being my basic source for this paper. See also C. G. Jung's remark from *The Tavistock Lectures* [1935] in: C. G. Jung, *Collected Works*, vol. 18: *The Symbolic Life. Miscellaneous Writings*, transl. R. F. C. Hull, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1977, p. 30: 'German psychologists have already recommended the suppression of the word *Empfindung* for feeling, and propose that one should use the word *Gefühl* (feeling) for values, while the word *Empfindung* should be used for sensation'. In turn, I use the word *affectivity* to encompass feelings in their horizontal aspect (as modi, say, sorrow, love, joy, fear, anger, love) as well as in their vertical aspect (as levels: pleasure/joy/happiness/bliss, liking/ sympathy/love/friendship, etc.), and as a handy synonym for what is called often 'the whole emotional life'.
2. The extent of this neglect should be determined. It seems it has not been as wide as it is suggested nowadays: rather philosophers—and Scheler can be an illuminating example here – dealing with affectivity were outside the main currents of philosophy. But throughout the history of philosophy even in its most rationalist periods of philosophy important names were incessantly associated with affectivity. For example the most important philosopher of emotions in Scheler's view seems to be Blaise Pascal, author of 'an a priori *ordre du cœur* or *logique du cœur*', a 'great idea', as Scheler calls it (p. 63, n. 18), who is not considered in the recent *Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion*, (ed.) P. Goldie, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010. As to Spinoza—who according to e.g. V. J. McGill, *Emotions and Reason*, Charles C. Thomas Publisher, Springfield 1954, p. viii 'showed, even more clearly, that emotions involve reason and reason, emotions [...]'—is adduced in a couple of passages, insufficiently in my opinion, even if in one of them—J. Neu, *An Ethics of Emotions?*, p. 507—we are told that 'Spinoza, perhaps the sagest of all, would have us aim at the maximum level of activity in our emotional life, including our emotional life [...]'.
3. See M. Stocker, *Intellectual and Other Nonstandard Emotions* in: *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion*, (ed.) P. Goldie, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010, p. 402.
4. K. Mulligan, *Scheler: Die Anatomie des Herzens oder was man alles fühlen kann* in: *Klassische Emotionstheorien. Von Platon bis Wittgenstein*, (eds) H. Landweer & U. Renz, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin—New York 2008, pp. 587-612.
5. In a paper by K. Mulligan, *Emotions and Values*, p. 480, n. 11, p. 486, n. 31, p. 487, n. 35, p. 489, n. 38, p. 493, n. 47 and in a paper by A. Hatzimoysis, *Emotions in Heidegger and Sartre*, p. 216. On the other hand, in the same collection, there are two papers on Heidegger: A. Hatzimoysis, *Emotions in Heidegger and Sartre* and M. Ratcliffe, *The Phenomenology of Mood and the Meaning of Life*.
6. A. Ben-Ze'ev, 'The thing called emotion' in: *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion*, (ed.) P. Goldie, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010, p. 41.
7. K. Mulligan, *Emotions and Values*, p. 475.
8. Some counterexamples for both can be given, e.g. V. J. McGill, *Emotions and Reason*, Charles C. Thomas Publisher, Springfield 1954, pp. 30-31: 'The German philosopher, Max Scheler, developed the theory that there are different levels of feeling, which form a hierarchy' and J. Hillman, *Emotion. A Comprehensive Phenomenology of Theories and Their Meaning for Therapy*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1960, p. 192: 'The existence of objective values revealed through emotion is the view of [...] Scheler. [...] Scheler holds that the realm of values is an ontological real world, consisting in a hierarchy of 'fühlbare' phenomena not given to the intellect but presented to feeling.'
9. J. Zhu and P. Thagard, *Emotion and Action* in: *Philosophical Psychology* 15, 1/2002, p. 20.
10. H. Spiegelberg and K. Schuhmann, *The Phenomenological Movement. A historical introduction*, [3rd ed.] Nijhoff, The Hague 1963, p. 293.
11. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 253.
12. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 254.
13. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 330.
14. In ancient Greek the phenomenon is even more manifest, e.g. in one author, Homer, you find so many

as 41 different words, only some of them being synonymous.

15. M. Scheler, *Formalism*, p. 330.
16. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 330.
17. Another problem here is that of vocabulary: joy is used both as a genus-term for including all species of joy (it is arbitrary to do so: a whole genus can be could be given not a middle term, but the highest, say bliss-family, or the lowest one, say pleasure-family – yet, in my opinion it would be more bizarre to identify the whole genus by a border-term) and as a species-term, designating one of species of the genus (then it can be replaced by its synonym, say, delight). See a recent remark by S. L. Feagin, *Affects in Appreciation* in: *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion*, (ed.) P. Goldie, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010, p. 648 about 'the *absence of a systematically developed vocabulary* to identify feelings'.
18. M. Scheler, *Formalism* p. 241.
19. Suffice it to say that in the literature intensity is discussed much more than depth is. See e.g. A. Kenny, *Action, Emotion and Will*, Routledge & Kegan Paul. London 1963, P. Greenspan, *Emotions & Reasons. An Inquiry into Emotional Justification*, Routledge, New York—London 1988, S. James, *Passion and Action. The Emotions in Seventeenth–Century Philosophy*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1997, A. Heller, *A Theory of Feelings*, [2nd ed.] Rownman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham 2009.
20. See M. Scheler, *Formalism* p. 96: 'This depth accompanies the feeling of a value-height. But the height does not *consist* in this depth'.
21. See also M. Scheler, *Formalism* p. 253: '[...] the being and non-being, as well as the quality and depth, of values of feeling-states ultimately vary [...]'.
22. M. Scheler, *Formalism* p. 331.
23. It is characteristic that when it comes to affectivity, metaphor(s) is (are) often applied. So Hume famous image that '[r]eason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.' is nothing else but a metaphor, what must be inferred from the way he introduced it: 'We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason.' (D. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* II, III, III, (eds) L. A. Selby-Bigge & P. H. Nidditch, [2nd ed.], Clarendon Press, Oxford 1978, p. 415).
24. On another occasions it is used, however, without commas and italics.
25. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* pp. 86-87. Although 'the height does not *consist* in this depth', both are symmetrical or parallel to some extent, since '[t]*he depth of contentment*,' too, is a criterion of the heights of values. This depth accompanies the feeling of a value-height' (p. 96).
26. He called his position *'emotional intuitionism'* and *'non-formal apriorism'* (p. xxiii).
27. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 332.
28. M. Scheler, *Formalism* p. 333.
29. This is not to say that the circularity is vicious. For an acute explanation of a non-vicious circularity in describing feelings see B. W. Helm, *Emotions and Motivation: Reconsidering Neo-Jamesian Accounts* in: *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion*, (ed.) P. Goldie, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010, p. 313: 'import and the emotions emerge together as a holistic package all of which must be in place for any of it to be intelligible. The circularity of the account is therefore a normal part of such holism and is not at all vicious'.
30. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 332.
31. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 332.
32. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 332.
33. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 333.
34. See M. Scheler, *Formalism,* pp. 333-337.
35. See M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 340: '*dead states*'.
36. See M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 334.
37. Added on p. 341.
38. See M. Scheler, *Formalism,* pp. 338-342.
39. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 341.
40. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 336.
41. On p. 339 we meet 'psychic and mental feelings'. There is only one such occurrence. This is an inconsistence of the translators, since in German (p. 351) there is 'seelischen und geistigen Gefühlen'.
42. See M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 342.
43. See M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 336.
44. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 336.
45. See M. Scheler, *Formalism,* pp. 342-344.
46. See M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 342.
47. See M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 342.
48. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 343.
49. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 344.
50. See M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 340.
51. For example he says (p. 338) that he has 'mentioned many of the phenomenal characteristics of vital feelings' but without exact reference.
52. Are factors which sharply characterize levels of feelings (see p. 333) the same as 'phenomenal characteristics' (p. 338)?
53. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 240 is even more explicit: '[...] it belongs to the essence of sensible pleasure to be extended and localized on the body (in contrast to the sphere of vital feelings and pure psychic and spiritual feelings) [...]'.
54. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 338.
55. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 342.
56. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* pp. 342-343.
57. See R. C. Roberts, *What an Emotion Is: A Sketch* in: *The Philosophical Review* 97, 2/1988, p. 208: 'bodily states [are so] attractive because they are more readily measurable than other factors'. See also V. J. McGill, *Emotions and Reason*, Charles C. Thomas Publisher, Springfield 1954, p. ix: 'Thus, obviously obstructive emotions, such as suffocating rage and paralyzing

fear, are usually emphasized, whereas obviously wholesome and facilitating emotions, such as mother love and scientific curiosity, are mentioned, if at all, only parenthetically.'

58. See M. Scheler, *The Meaning of Suffering* in: M. Scheler, *On feeling, knowing, and valuing: selected writings*, transl. H. J. Bershady, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1992, p. 85: '*Purely spiritual, religious-metaphysical feelings*, the 'feeling of salvation,' which relate to the core of the spiritual person as to an indivisible whole [...]'.
59. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 332.
60. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 332.
61. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 342.
62. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* pp. 342-343.
63. See e.g. p. 264: 'spiritual feelings' and 'purely spiritual feelings' (= p. 278: „rein seelischen Gefühlen und geistigen Gefühlen'), p. 342: '*pure psychic feelings*' (= p. 354: '*rein seelischen Gefühlen*') and p. 342: 'psychic feelings' (= p. 348: 'seelischen Gefühle'), and p. 333: 'purely sensible feelings' (= p. 346: 'rein sinnlichen Gefühlen').
64. M. Scheler, *Formalism* p. 342.
65. See M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 336.
66. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 337.
67. See also sensible feelings, 'the least disturbed by *attention*' (p. 335).
68. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 336.
69. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 333.
70. For another formulation see M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 337: 'Feelings which *spontaneously* issue forth from the depth of our person are beyond *any* volitional control.'
71. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 332.
72. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 342.
73. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 107 cautions against upward- as well as downward reduction: 'Vital value [...] cannot be 'reduced' to the values of the agreeable and the useful, nor can they be reduced to spiritual values'.
74. Plus other vital feelings, as listed p. 341: hope, anxiety, disgust, shame, appetite, aversion, vital aversion, dizziness..
75. '[...] which is the foundation of friendship' (M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 108).
76. N. Hartmann, *Der Aufbau der realen Welt. Grundriss der allgemeinen Katorienlehre, § 54*. Walter De Gruyter, Berlin 1940 *Gesetz der Schichtendistanz.*
77. N. Hartmann, *New Ways of Ontology*, transl. R. C. Kuhn, Henry Regnery Company, Chicago 1953, p. 76.
78. N. Hartmann, *New Ways of Ontology*, p. 76. He says also, p. 76, that '[t]his demarcation is the 'distance of strata'—a phenomenon characteristic of [...] hierarchical order'.
79. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 333.
80. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 264.
81. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 342.
82. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 343.
83. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* pp. 336-337, as referring to the realms of being characterized by categorical diverse groups, and (iii) layer as referring to the segmentation internal to each stratum.
84. R. Poli, *Alwis: Ontology for Knowledge Engineers*, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Utrecht 2001, chap. 8, pp. 124-126, proposed with relation to Hartmann a following terminological distinction: (i) *level* as a general term, (ii) *stratum* as referring to the realms of being characterized by categorical diverse groups, and (iii) *layer* as referring to the segmentation internal to each stratum.
85. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 338.
86. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 339.
87. Quoted after M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 331, n. 112.
88. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 331.
89. N. Hartmann, *Der Aufbau der realen Welt § 59, Gesetz der Freiheit* .
90. N. Hartmann, *New Ways of Ontology*, p. 76.
91. Other examples from M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 331 are the following: 'One can also be "serene" and "calm" while experiencing a serious misfortune, for instance, a great loss of property, whereas it is impossible to be "joyful" in this situation. One can also drink a glass of wine while being unhappy and still enjoy the bouquet of the wine.'
92. For instance by M. Stocker, *Psychic Feelings. Their Importance and Irreducibility* in: *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 61, 1983, pp. 5–26.
93. S.I. Witkiewicz, *Uczucia Metafizyczne* (1932), and S.I. Witkiewicz, *Geneza uczuc metafizycznych* (1932).
94. E.g. A. Morton, *Existential Emotions*, a public lecture given at the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Durham, Apr. 23, 2010
95. E.g. M. Ratcliffe, *The Phenomenology of Mood and the Meaning of Life*, pp. 349-371.
96. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 263.
97. See M. Ratcliffe, *The Phenomenology of Mood and the Meaning of Life*, p. 357.
98. This is all the more amazing that he makes use of S. Cataldi, *Emotion, Depth and Flesh* (1993) who opens her introduction with a long quote from Scheler, even though the book is mainly on Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of embodiment.
99. See M. Ratcliffe, *The Phenomenology of Mood and the Meaning of Life*, p. 367.
100. A quite rare counterexample is an observation in J. Hillman, *Emotion*, p. 126: 'the bodily demonstrations are not identical with the emotion, nor even can they be predicted for or correlated to specific emotions'.
101. M. Scheler, *Formalism,* p. 333: 'feelings cannot be controlled or managed arbitrarily. They can be controlled or managed only indirectly, by controlling their causes and effects (expression, actions).'

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SHARED FEELING

Angelika Krebbs

Abstract

When two parents mourn together the death of their beloved child what they feel for each other is not just empathy or compassion. Rather they participate in a shared feeling. This emotional sharing is not to be confused with emotional contagion or identification. It is also something other than conscious parallel feeling. German phenomenologist Max Scheler was the first to systematically introduce the category of shared feeling and to differentiate it from neighbouring phenomena. This article critically reconstructs Scheler's classical analysis and illustrates it with a literary example, Henry James' short story *The Pupil*.

Key Words:

Emotions, feelings, community, love, friendship, empathy, compassion, collective action, Max Scheler, Edith Stein, Henry James

On the first pages of his book *The Nature of Sympathy* from 1913, German phenomenologist Max Scheler introduces a category of feeling, which did not play any special role in the philosophy either before or after him. This is the category of the joint, shared and common feeling or emotional sharing ('Miteinanderfühlen'). Scheler distinguishes this category from empathy, compassion, emotional contagion and identification. Today philosophy of emotion usually falls short of Scheler's level of differentiation, unless it explicitly follows Scheler as e.g. Peter Goldie does in his book on *The Emotions* (2000). Scheler is to be sure not the only philosopher interested in the phenomenon of shared feeling. Think of David Hume, Adam Smith, Edith Stein, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre or Hermann Schmitz. But Scheler is arguably the philosopher who took this phenomenon the most seriously and who explored it the most deeply.[1]

Contemporary philosophy is just rediscovering the phenomenon of shared feeling. This has partly to do with the lively debate on ***collective action*** or we-intentionality, which has been going on for years (the main opponents in this debate are Margaret Gilbert 1989 and John Searle 1990 on the one hand and Michael Bratman 1999 and Philip Pettit 2003 on the other). If there is shared action, the obvious question is if there is also shared feeling.

A second reason for the newly awakened interest in the phenomenon of shared feeling is the not less lively debate in the philosophy of emotions and there especially in the philosophy of ***love.*** The mainstream of this debate which understands love between partners as reciprocal 'caring' (cf. Harry Frankfurt 2004) faces a minority which conceives of love as 'sharing', as shared action and feeling. In order to understand love, this minority needs to understand what shared feeling is (cf. Bennett Helm forthcoming).[2]

But the phenomenon of shared feeling is philosophically and life-worldly important also independently of love and collective action. It is not only lovers that share feelings, but also teams in sports, musicians in an orchestra, or citizens in a nation state. Even strangers can share feelings, if they find themselves in a situation in which, like in an accident or a crime, a shared emotional response is demanded. Shared feeling is a basis for community. As the long-standing debate between liberals and communitarians has shown, modern individualized society is in bitter need of a reflection on all the sources of ***community.***

With Max Scheler, this text wants to understand what constitutes shared feeling. For this purpose the text first deals with the, for the analysis of shared feeling, central passage in Scheler's work. In this passage at the beginning of *The Nature of Sympathy*, Scheler distinguishes four forms of fellow-feeling: beside shared feeling also compassion (fellow-feeling 'about something'), emotional infection and emotional identification. The second section reconstructs Scheler's distinction of four forms of the social unit, which builds upon the above distinction, in his main work *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*. The forms of the social unit are: mass, life-community, society and personal community. The third section takes a literary example, Henry James' short story 'The Pupil', as an illustration of the different categories of fellow-feeling and the social unit. The literary example is also meant to serve as a kind of existential proof for the existence of shared feeling.[3] The fourth section asks how the unity of feeling in shared feeling is exactly to be understood and distinguishes three options: as a unity of an I-Thou indifferent stream of experience, as a unity of the supra-individual accessibility of a value-content and as a unity of sense of different feeling contributions. The fifth section develops on the third option with the

help of Edith Stein and reads the central passage from Scheler again in this light. The claim is that with Edith Stein building on Max Scheler's foundations we finally have a convincing account of shared feeling.

1. Scheler on the four forms of fellow-feeling

At the beginning of his book on sympathy, Scheler distinguishes shared feeling from fellow-feeling 'about something', emotional infection and emotional identification. In the central passage on shared feeling as 'immediate community of feeling, e.g. of one and the same sorrow, 'with someone'' (p. 12) Scheler emphasises the distinction between shared feeling and fellow-feeling 'about something' 'rejoicing in his joy and commiseration with his sorrow' (p. 12). The passage is just about a page long (p. 12-14), but it is not easy to understand. We can differentiate eight argumentative steps in this passage:

1. *'Two parents stand beside the dead body of a beloved child. They feel in common the 'same' sorrow, the 'same' anguish.'*: shared feeling is introduced by way of an ***example***.
2. *'It is not that A feels this sorrow and B feels it also, and moreover that they both know they are feeling it. No, it is a feeling-in-common.'*: shared feeling is defined against a neighbouring phenomenon, the ***parallel feeling*** with mutual knowledge thereof.
3. *'A's sorrow is in no way an 'external' matter for B here, as it is, e.g. for their friend C, who joins them, and commiserates 'with them' or 'upon their sorrow'.'*: shared feeling is contrasted against another neighbouring phenomenon, the ***fellow-feeling 'about something',*** and an example for the latter is given: the friend C, who commiserates with the grieving parents. The fellow-feeling 'about something' is directed at a different object (a different value-content) than the feeling he is participating in. In this example C's fellow-feeling is directed at the suffering of A and B and not directly at the death of the child. Moreover, fellow-feeling 'about something' feels different. In the example C does not feel grief about the dead child, but is sad about the grief of the parents. The last point will become more evident after another example. Someone who is commiserating with somebody else, who has a toothache, obviously does not do this by getting a toothache himself. We can schematically illustrate the three cases in the chart immediately below.

The connection between the 2nd and 3rd steps of the passage must lie in the fact that in both parallel feeling and fellow-feeling 'about something' the suffering of the other person is objectified (is 'external'), while in shared feeling exactly this does not occur. Scheler's point that the participants in shared feeling feel 'each other' ('Mit-einander fühlen') also expresses this idea. This is what the beginning of the 4th step also uncovers.

Shared feeling	**Parallel feeling**	**Fellow-feeling 'about something'**
A + B	A B	C
↓	↓ ↓	↓
Child's death	Child's death	A + B
		↓
		Child's death

4. *'On the contrary, they feel it together, in the sense that they feel and experience in common, not only the self-same value-situation, but also the same keenness of emotion in regard to it. The sorrow, as value-content, and the grief, as characterizing the functional relation thereto, are here one and identical.'*: the assertion that the parents feel ***'the same suffering'*** is specified as a) the parents' directedness at the same value-content and b) the parents' possession of the same kind of emotional keenness or functional relation. By 'value-content' we should think of the painful loss of the child, i.e. not only the death of the child (as a value-neutral reference), but the death in its meaning for the good life of the parents (as an evaluative sense), by 'emotional keenness' we should think of the suffering caused by this loss. Scheler calls this keenness a 'function', because for him mental feelings like grief are not states of feeling, which, like physical pain, do not refer to anything outside of themselves. Scheler understands mental feelings rather as 'intentionally' directed to something in the world, they 'mean' something in the world, more precisely a value-content, and are not just caused by something in the world. According to Scheler the suffering of the parents is of one and the same functional quality and not one and the same function. We have two functions with an identical quality. We may thus say that there is a sense in which there are two feelings present, namely as two functions. In this sense there is only a 'type-identity' between the feelings of the parents, and not a 'token-identity'. But Scheler himself emphasises the other meaning, in which there is only one feeling in shared feeling, as a shared value-content and a shared quality of emotional keenness. He makes this point more explicitly later on in his book. He writes:

> Even in the first-mentioned example above [shared feeling], the process of feeling in the father and the mother is given separately in each case; only *what*

they feel—the *one* sorrow—and its value-content, is immediately present to them as identical. (p. 37)[4]

We will have to clarify how it can be that two people react with an identical and not only in some respects same kind of emotional keenness towards an identical and not only in some respects same situation in the world ('identity' is after all sameness in every respect!). The clarification of this question is the main subject of the present article.

5. *'It will be evident that we can only feel **mental suffering** in this fashion, not physical pain or sensory feelings. There is no such thing as a 'common pain'. Sensory types of feeling ('feeling-sensations' as Stumpf calls them), are by nature not susceptible of this highest form of fellow-feeling. They are inevitably 'external' to us in some respect, inspiring only commiseration 'with' and 'upon' the suffering of pain by the other person. By the same token, there is certainly such a thing as rejoicing at another's sensory pleasure, but never mutual enjoyment of it (as a common feeling-sensation)'*: not all feelings are sharable. What today is refered to as 'bodily sensations' is not shareable. For it is impossible to have a toothache together, this is indeed evident. In a different place, in his Formalism book, Scheler differentiates four classes of feeling: sensible, vital, mental and spiritual feelings (cf. p. 328-344). There it is suggested that all classes of feeling, with the exception of the sensible, are accessible to shared feeling and not only, as in our passage, the mental feelings.

Scheler describes ***sensible feelings*** (like pain, hunger, thirst and lust) as localised in the body and extended; never without content, but without intentionality (states, not functions); with a doubly indirect reference to the I (as part of the body which is mine); actual and therefore not directly accessible to reproduced feeling and fellow-feeling; punctual-unenduring and without a continuity of sense; augmentable by attention, but less destructable as well as more subject to the will than other feelings (e.g. through application of an appropriate stimulus or narcotics).

Then again, Scheler conceives of the ***feelings of life*** (like comfort, weariness, health or the simplest forms of fear, shame, disgust, appetite, aversion, sympathy and dizziness) as extended in the whole body, not localised in a specific spot in it; as unity of sense instead of apart from each other like it is the case with sensible feelings; as function/intention (I feel myself, my life), not a state, therefore accessible to reproduced feeling and fellow-feeling as well as an indicator of the vital value meaning of processes outside and inside the body—this being unmediated and preceding the intellectual grasp (temporal-spatial far-feelings in contrast to sensible contact-feelings). For Scheler ***mental feelings*** (like grief, joy or remorse) have an intrinsic I-quality (not via the detour of the body) and no extension, only a coloration through extended bodily and vital feelings.

Finally, ***spiritual feelings*** (like bliss, desperation, cheeriness and the peace of mind) are for Scheler never states and additionally disconnected from any sense unity; they are not about something in the world, but they develop from the being and self-value of the person, they permeate her entire existence.

6. *'It may, however, be the case that A first feels sorrow by himself and is then joined by B in a common feeling. But this, as will be seen, presupposes the higher emotion of **love**.'*: this is arguably about a special form of shared feeling, in which—differently as in the example of the grieving parents—at first there is only one person feeling something, and the second person, without himself directly being given the value-content, 'latches on' to the feeling of the other person. One example for this could be the shared annoyance of a couple on an evening about an insult that was inflicted onto one of them at work during the day. Such latching on to the feeling of the other person is only possible between lovers, according to Scheler. He does not explain more explicitly later on in the book why only the highest form of love (the spiritual love towards a person) makes this latching on possible.

7. *'The second case [fellow-feeling 'about something'] is quite different. Here also, the one person's sorrow is not simply the motivating cause of the other's. All fellow-feeling involves **intentional** reference of the feeling of joy or sorrow to the other person's experience. It points this way simply qua feeling—there is no need of any prior judgment or intimation 'that the other person is in trouble'; nor does it arise only upon sight of the other's grief, for it can also 'envisage' such grief, and does so, indeed, in its very capacity as a feeling.'*: the above mentioned point about the functionality or intentionality of non-bodily feelings is emphasised for the two forms of fellow-feeling we are looking at, shared feeling and feeling 'about something'. With this the distinction between the two 'true' forms of fellow-feeling from the two 'false' forms of fellow-feeling, which Scheler treats subsequently, is prepared.

Scheler explains ***emotional infection***, the first false form of fellow-feeling, with the example of the avalanche-like growing laughter of children, or the

lamenting tone of old women, or the cheerful atmosphere at a party. For Scheler, emotional infection is a causal, a mechanical phenomenon, it does not presuppose knowledge about the feelings of others, especially not an intending of these feelings or even fellow-feeling. Normally, you would get infected from others involuntarily and without understanding it, like you would get infected with the flu. But it is also possible to seek out infection, to seek cheerful company for distraction and hope that their mood will sweep you along.

Scheler conceives of ***emotional identification***, the second form of false fellow-feeling, as an extreme form of emotional infection. An *I feeds on* the other in or is *fed on* in by the other. Some of his examples for this are child's play ('I am Mummy'), hypnosis or obsession. However, in contrast to emotional infection, for Scheler, emotional identification is not mechanical, but vital-causal (with a directed causality) and it represents an instinctive knowledge. The location of emotional identification is the area of life-feelings. While Scheler tends to evaluate emotional infection negatively, there are forms of emotional identification to which he assigns a positive value. These are e.g. the 'truly loving sexual intercourse', in which in contrast to the typical idiopathic and heteropathic cases of emotional identification, it is not so that one *I* feeds on the other, but both *I*s sink into the life-stream.

8. 'But here [in fellow-feeling 'about something'] A's suffering is first presented as A's in an act of understanding or 'vicarious' feeling experienced as such, and it is to this material that B's primary commiseration is directed. That is, my commiseration and his suffering are phenomenologically two different facts, not one fact, as in the first case. While in the first case the functions of vicarious experience and feeling are so interwoven with the very fellow-feeling itself as to be indistinguishable from it, in the second case the two functions are plainly distinguished even while experiencing them. Fellow-feeling proper, actual 'participation', presents itself in the very phenomenon as a re-action to the state and value of the other's feelings—as these are 'visualized' in vicarious feeling. Thus in this case ***the two functions of vicariously visualized feeling, and participation in feeling are separately given*** *and must be sharply distinguished. Very many descriptions of fellow-feeling suffer from failure to make this distinction.'*: Scheler marks lastly a difference between fellow-feeling 'about something' and shared feeling. In feeling 'about something', even in one's own experience, it is possible to differentiate two facts: a) the vicariously visualized or reproduced feeling of the other person and b) the emotional reaction to it. On the other hand, in shared feeling the reproduced feeling is intertwined with one's own fellow-feeling, also in one's own experience, in a way that only one single fact is present.

Here an interpretational difficulty arises. Is this 'one fact' that Scheler now addresses the same one fact that is already hinted at in (4) (the parents' feeling 'one and the same grief')? Is this merely a repetition of something that has already been said? Or is this a new point? The latter seems to be the case. For the identity claim in (4) refers to the mother's grief for the child and the father's grief for the child. The identity claim now, in (8), refers only to the mother's reproduced feeling of the father's grief and the mother's fellow-feeling with the father's grief. This identity claim does not say anything about her own grief for the child. With this, Scheler makes two identity claims about shared feeling: a) the feelings of the two people make one unity, b) the reproduction of feeling and fellow-feeling in each person with the other, the mother with the father and the father with the mother, build one unity respectively.

For Scheler ***reproduced feeling*** is the vivid visualisation of another person's feeling. The person who is reproducing the feeling is by all means given the feeling of the other's as a feeling, but as an isolated, alien one; it does not filter across to him as his own feeling, as Scheler says. Using the example of cruelty, Scheler makes clear that reproduced feeling is only the precondition and not in itself a form of fellow-feeling. For even cruelty demands reproduced feeling, even though taking pleasure at somebody else's pain is surely not in itself a form of fellow-feeling. Reproduced feeling encompasses only the quality of the other person's feeling. In fellow-feeling the other person's feeling is additionally granted the same sort of reality as one's own:

> It is through fellow-feeling, in both its mutual and its unreciprocated forms, that 'other minds in general' (already given previously as a field) are brought home to us, in individual cases, as having a *reality equal to our own*. […] Vicarious feeling is not sufficient to confer this equality of reality-status: it only conveys the quality of the other's condition. (p. 98)

Fig. 1 illustrates in an overview the five phenomena, which Scheler initially strictly distinguishes: the reproduction of feeling and the four forms of fellow-feeling. But the chart also already notes that Scheler is prepared to see certain connections between these phenomena. So, in his opinion, emotional identification both genetically and logically underlies the reproduction of feeling and the

reproduction of feeling underlies true fellow-feeling, meaning shared feeling and fellow-feeling 'about something'. We now still have to address these ***dependence laws***.

According to Scheler, the other's feeling is directly present to the person who reproduces this feeling, in their expression—their shame, e.g., in their blushing. The shame 'ends' in blushing, as Scheler says, expression and feeling make one 'essence structure', the bodily expression is a 'symbol' of the feeling and not caused by the feeling. The other person's feeling is not given to the person who is reproducing the feeling only over an inference from his own emotional experience through the body of the other to her emotional experience, as the proponents of the analogous inference or of the projective empathy and imitation theory would have us believe. For his own emotional experience must not, for Scheler, be presupposed as given to the subject in an unproblematic way. Rather, the subject is just as well first to develop his own emotional life, as well as his understanding of the feelings of others. At the beginning of these two developments Scheler sees emotional identification, the experience of a feeling 'just like that', 'without presenting itself either as our own or as another's:

> an immediate ***flow of experiences***, ***undifferentiated as between mine and thine,*** which actually contains both our own and others' experiences intermingled and without distinction from one another. Within this flow there is a gradual formation of ever more stable vortices, which slowly attract further elements of the stream into their orbits and thereby become successively and very gradually identified with distinct individuals. (p. 246)

When a subject reproduces a specific feeling, he uses his experience of this flow for it:

> However, if such a (detached) reproduction of feeling is to be possible, I must at some time have gathered the *quality* of the emotional state thus vicariously felt (in conscious detachment from the subject to whom it refers), by having identified with a subject of this *type* […] it is by no means necessary that the qualities of the states we respond to should have actually been realized in our own experience before we can enter into them. (p. 97)

Apart from this 'at some time' of emotional identification, Scheler posits a 'at the same time', as well: I have (to be able) to still emotionally identify with the subject, whose concrete feeling I am reproducing, at another level, for example abstractly, as a life-form or as a human being. Therefore Scheler is asserting a double dependence of reproduced feeling to emotional identification: a temporally preceding one and a simultaneous one. In every reproduction of feeling emotional identification would also always take place (or would have to be able to take place). Identification and reproduction would not exclude one another, as the following quotation suggests:

> If we reconsider the types of identification so far described it will be obvious that their nature is radically different from any understanding due to the vicarious reproduction or rehearsal of personal feelings or actions, and equally remote from anything which can possibly be called 'fellow-feeling'. Both of these—vicarious emotion and fellow-feeling —completely exclude the sense of unity or true identification. (p. 33)

The modern man with his 'hypertrophy' of reason therefore did not completely lose the identification ability of animals, primitives and children, according to Scheler, but only 'almost completely' (cf. p. 30). However, what is really completely excluded is the reproduction and identification of the same concrete feeling.

2. Scheler's four forms of the social unit

Three years after *The Nature of Sympathy*, Scheler publishes his main work, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*. Here, towards the end, Scheler differentiates four forms of the social unit:

1. the ***mass***, constituted in infection and imitation;
2. the ***life-community*** (e.g. a family, a local commune or a people), characterized by original coexperiencing;
3. the ***society***, comparably distanced and existing through promises and contracts;
4. ***personal community*** or collective person (e.g. a culture, a church or a state), constituted in shared experience of individual people.

In distinguishing these four forms Scheler explicitly builds upon the distinction of the four forms of fellow-feeling in the Sympathy book, however not uncritically ('in conformity with the detailed, but not quite sufficient, preliminary work, *Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle*, especially its appendix', p. 526). It is not easy to compare and contrast the two foursome distinctions with each other, Scheler himself being of no great help. But this will be attempted in the following. The central goal in this is the clarification of the category of shared feeling.

Scheler himself names two principles for distinguishing the four forms of the social unit, the '*kinds of being with one another* and experiencing one another' (from the Sympathy book) on the one hand, and the 'rank of *values* in whose direction the member-persons of a social unit see "with one

another'" (p. 525) on the other hand. The Formalism book distinguishes the higher ranking personal values (e.g. the being of the person and virtue values) from the lower ranking thing-values (e.g. in ascending order, the agreeable, the useful, and the noble). Scheler produces this ranking of values with the help of criteria like durability, divisibility, dependence on other values and the depth of satisfaction (for closer treatment cf. in the Formalism book pp. 100-104). Scheler does not doubt for example that the values are higher the less divisible they are. Sharing material goods (a piece of cloth or a loaf of bread) among several people is only possible through a division of these goods, for the sensible sensations (warmth or satiation) that correspond to these are located in the body. That way a piece of cloth is worth approximately double than the half of the cloth. The height of the value corresponds to the extension of its bearers. This is entirely different with spiritual values, e.g. art works. These are intrinsically indivisible, there can be 'no piece of an art work'. Art works can be taken in and felt and enjoyed in their value by any number of people at the same time. It is essential for sensible values that they 'divide' the individuals that feel them, and essential for ***spiritual values that they 'unite'*** (p. 94).

Fig. 2 chart very concisely reproduces Scheler's complex system of distinctions of the four kinds of the social unit. The chart also marks the connections between the categories, as its predecessor on the four forms of fellow-feeling. For Scheler the life-community genetically and logically underlies society and they both underlie the personal community. The ***laws of dependence*** again have the double character of 'at some time before' and 'at the same time'. For example, life-community and society:

> Individuals who enter into societal relations must ***at some time*** have gone through a union of the structure of the community in order to be able to enter into the forms of mutual accord and volitional formation that characterize the societal unit. For A to be able to make a contract with B, it is not necessary for A to be communally related to B; but he must have been so related to C, D, or E at some time (e.g., in terms of the family in which he grew up) in order to be able to understand the sense of 'contract'. (p. 532)

and

> [All] societal combinations of individuals A, B, and C or groups G, G1, and G2 can occur *only* when A, B, and C or G, G1, and G2 ***simultaneously*** belong to another totality G3 of a community—one which is not necessarily formed by A, B, and C or G, G1, and G2, but which nevertheless contains them as members. Thus the individuals of all families of *one* lineage [*Stammes*] form a community vis-à-vis the individuals of all families of another lineage; within the lineage they form a community only as members of their families, and among themselves they form only a society. (p. 532-533)

For Scheler the sense of a contract can only be understood not by asking for another contract to abide by the first contract, and then for a third contract to abide by the second contract, to abide by the first contract etc. Contracts are grounded in the unmediated uniform will of the life-community:

> [T]he duty to keep mutual promises that are in a contract, the basic form of the formation of a uniform will in society, does *not* have its source in *another* contract to keep contracts. It has its source in the *solidary* obligation of the members of the community to realize the contents that ought to be for the members. (p. 531)

Let us try to relate Scheler's two foursome distinctions to each other. This is relatively easy in the cases of ***mass*** and emotional infection. Both of these play practically no role for the dependence laws, which Scheler is so interested in. If we keep our eyes on his dependence laws, it makes sense to correlate life-community with emotional identification, society with reproduced feeling or fellow-feeling 'about something', and personal community with shared feeling. Both dependence chains start with an original unity (the I-Thou indifferent stream of experience), following with a distancing process, which grants the precondition for the formation of a higher unity, a unity appropriate to man in his personal nature.

A detailed analysis of Scheler's definition of ***life-community*** leads to the same result. What is decisive here is that in the life-community the individual I-being of each member is not co-experienced as a starting point (cf. the long quote in the chart from p. 526). But this co-experiencing of the individual starting points is precisely constitutive for shared feeling. Shared feeling is only possible on the foundation of the distance between people, which is given in reproduced feeling. That is why—and as opposed to what is often claimed in secondary literature (e.g. Frings 1997, p. 101 and Spader 2006, p. 164)—life-community cannot contain shared feeling. The 'understanding', which Scheler emphasises in the life-community, is probably the instinctive understanding of identification. However, in the Sympathy book Scheler does claim that in the life-community there is only reproduced feeling and no identification:

> It is thus a fundamental principle of the evolution of feeling everywhere, whether from child to adult, animal to man, or from savagery to civilization, that in the early stages we still find identification where later

> on we encounter vicarious feeling. […] There is true identification still to be found in the herd, the horde and the crowd, whereas in communal life, such as that of the family, it is only vicarious feeling that is involved. (p. 97)

Yet indifference and cruelty, which are both compatible with reproduced feeling, can hardly hold a life-community together. That is why we should assume a transitional phenomenon between identification and reproduced feeling for the life-community.The possibility of singularising acts and of solidarity in life-community also supports this assumption.

Society cannot be neatly correlated to reproduced feeling or fellow-feeling 'about something'. For, in society there is too much distance between people. Scheler even speaks of a fundamental distrust. In society, the feelings of others are made accessible through analogous inferences. But precisely such inferences are not necessary in reproduced feeling and fellow-feeling 'about something'.

The ***personal community***, on the other hand, can very well be correlated to shared feeling although feeling is more passive than free action which is typical of the personal community.[5] As in his analysis of shared feeling, in his analysis of the collective person Scheler also emphasises that the communal does not result from an addition of parallel individuals, but that it represents an own reality:

> The collective or group person is not composed of individual persons in the sense that it derives its existence from such a composition; nor is the collective person a result of the merely reciprocal agency of individual persons or (subjectively and in cognition) a result of a synthesis of arbitrary additions. It is an experienced *reality*. (p. 522)

As in his analysis of shared feeling, in his analysis of the collective person Scheler rejects the idea of a 'collective soul substance' as an 'absurdity'. What exactly does he then mean by 'collective person'? Scheler draws on Kant for his concept of personhood. By 'person' Scheler means 'the unity of being of acts of different nature'. In Scheler's (as already in Kant's) dual metaphysics, the intentional or intelligible acts of the person are not reducible to the causally explicable processes in the world of bodies ('physis') or the inner world ('psyche'), but are co-original. Personal acts only demand correlates in the world of bodies and the inner world. ***'A collective person'*** then is a unity of being of acts of different kind, which are distributed to different people. Social acts, like questions, love or orders demand, in order to be complete, counter acts, like answers, that the love be requited or obedience. The essential reciprocity and correspondence of values rest on

> the ideal *unity of sense* of these acts as acts of the *essence* of love, esteem, promising, giving orders, etc., acts that require as ideal correlates responses of love, esteem, accepting, obeying, etc., in order to bring about a fact of uniform sense. (p. 536)

The collective person lives in the execution of such ***social acts***, on the one hand in each contributing member him- or herself, and on the other it also floats as a community over the contributing members and every member has only partial consciousness of the collective content of the communal experience. Social acts can run dry, as Scheler explains using the example of Robinson: 'An imaginary Robinson Crusoe endowed with cognitive-theoretical faculties would also co-experience his *being a member of a social unit* in his experiencing the *lack* of fulfilment of acts of act-types constituting a person in general.' (p. 521) In such a case the person would fall short of his social nature. For Scheler, man is essentially (a priori, before any empirical consideration) oriented toward community and not only toward the autonomy and individuality of the individual.

3. Henry James' short story 'The Pupil'

'The Pupil' (1891) is one of the masterpieces of the English-American author Henry James. The subject of the roughly 40-page short story is the relationship between the young private tutor Pemberton and Morgan, his highly gifted fosterling with a heart condition, and his family, the Moreens. The story is for the most part narrated from Pemberton's perspective (in third person). At the beginning of the story, set in France and Italy, his pupil Morgan is 11 years old, at the end 15. Apart from some ominous foreshadowing (for example the fact that looking back, the story will seem like a bad dream to Pemberton) the narration progresses in step with the action.

The action starts with Pemberton's job interview with Mrs. Moreen and his difficulties to direct the conversation to the topic of his salary. The first sentence of the story reads:

> The poor young man hesitated and procrastinated: it cost him such an effort to broach the subject of terms, to speak of money to a person who spoke only of feelings and, as it were, of the aristocracy. (p. 714)

After his studies in Yale and Oxford and a year abroad ('spent on the system of putting his tiny patrimony into a single full wave of experience', p. 717), Pemberton urgently needs money. The fact that he has such difficulties to bring up the subject already shows that he got infected by Mrs. Moreen's aristocratic ways (you have money, but

you do not talk about it). When he finally does come around to ask about his salary, the question seems vulgar to him:

> It was not the fault of the conscious smile which seemed a reference to the lady's expensive identity, if the allusion did not sound rather vulgar. This was exactly because she became still more gracious to reply: 'Oh! I can assure you that all that will be quite regular.' (p. 715)

It is interesting how the status of the question of getting paid, its vulgarity, is dominated by Mrs. Moreen. It is also remarkable that she infects him with a merely affected feeling. Mrs. Moreen knows, as the progress of the story shows, at least as well as Pemberton that the question is appropriate and not vulgar.

That Pemberton is so vulnerable to ***emotional and opinion infection*** *essentially has to do with his youth and inexperience, his fine, but passive and anxious nature, and of course his dependence on the job. Mrs. Moreen is furthermore a most skilful and cunning opponent. The game that she plays with Pemberton is getting him to do his job as a tutor for free and only out of a pedagogical dedication, so that the Moreen family can spend its not so large fortune on other, prettier things, like clothes, invitations and travel. The more Pemberton sees through the game, the more he can defend himself against the Moreens' manipulation.*

The Moreen family, Mr. and Mrs. Moreen, their two daughters and two sons, is a world in itself as a deracinated American family in Europe.[6] They are always on the move—from Paris to Nice to Venice and back to Paris—to find acceptance in the high society. Nothing is too degrading for this, especially for the parents:

> [T]hey were perpetually swallowing humble-pie. His mother would consume any amount, and his father would consume even more than his mother. (p. 741)

The Moreens are a good (or, rather, bad) example of a ***life-community*** and the ***identification*** which is at work there. At some point Pemberton considers how the Moreens could have ever succeeded to put him under their spell and to hold him for so long:

> not by calculation or a *mot d'ordre*, but by a happy instinct which made them, like a band of gypsies, work so neatly together. (p. 719)

And as he realizes that he is not their only victim:

> The Moreens were adventurers not merely because they didn't pay their debts, because they lived on society, but because their whole view of life, dim and confused and instinctive, like that of clever colour-blind animals, was speculative and rapacious and mean. (p. 729)

Like clever animals or children, the Moreens have the ability of imitation:

> They could imitate Venetian and sing Neapolitan, and when they wanted to say something very particular they communicated with each other in an ingenious dialect of their own—a sort of spoken cipher, which Pemberton at first took for Volapuk, but which he learned to understand as he would not have understood Volapuk.
>
> 'It's the family language—Ultramoreen,' Morgan explained to him drolly enough; but the boy rarely condescended to use it himself, though he attempted colloquial Latin as if he had been a little prelate. (p. 720)[7]

The children collaborate with the parents, e.g. when they flank the parents so that Pemberton cannot 'catch' them alone and bring up the tiresome question about his salary. Mr. and Mrs. Moreen work together, e.g. when he sends her ahead on matters of money and is himself, as the administrator of the family fortune, always conveniently absent when money is urgently needed.

As is already clear from the last quotation, Morgan Moreen has an ambiguous relationship to his family. On the one hand he works together with them, although he knows better, e.g. when they are trying to dupe Pemberton during his job interview:

> 'They'll give you anything you like,' the boy remarked unexpectedly, returning from the window. 'We don't mind what anything costs—we live awfully well.' (p. 716)

On the other hand he withdraws from his mother's affection:

> 'My darling, you're too quaint!' his mother exclaimed, putting out to caress him a practiced but ineffectual hand. He slipped out of it, but looked with intelligent, innocent eyes at Pemberton. (p. 716)

The boy, grown precocious through his difficult illness, sees through and hates his parents' games. He is bitterly ashamed of them, 'he would have liked those who 'bore his name' [...] to have a proper spirit.' (p. 741). Meanwhile his parents and siblings are proud of the wonder child of the family, but they also want to get rid of him, and, in a kind of 'forced adoption' (p. 721), they give him entirely over to his tutor. 'The Pupil' is a story about the boy's complete de-attachment from his family, about his raising 'his mental head, as it were, above the stream flooding over it', as Scheler puts it (p. 247 in the Sympathy book). It is also a story of the development of a friendship with Pemberton. In his '***being-together-with'*** Pemberton a ***personal***

community grows, admittedly an asymmetrical one, because of the age difference.

The first passage in which the beginning of shared feeling and judging is suggested, is about an evening conversation in Nice on a bench overlooking the sea. Morgan asks his tutor if he likes it with them. Pemberton avoids the question and Morgan is clearer in response to that, 'Do you like my father and mother very much?'. When Pemberton answers, 'Dear me, yes. They're charming people.' Morgan calls him 'a jolly old humbug':

> For a particular reason the words made Pemberton change colour. The boy noticed in an instant that he had turned red, whereupon he turned red himself and the pupil and the master exchanged a longish glance in which there was a consciousness of many more things than are usually touched upon, even tacitly, in such a relation. (p. 723)

Pemberton's blushing shows that he is ashamed. He is ashamed because he just lied and the boy caught him at it. He is also ashamed because he lets the boy's parents get away with so much and does not defend himself against them in a manly manner. Morgan sees Pemberton's shame and blushes himself. Morgan is therefore also ashamed and does not merely pity his tutor. How are we to understand Morgan's shame? As a case of infection, identification, parallel shame or shared shame? It is not infection or identification, because Morgan understands exactly what is going on inside Pemberton and can very well distinguish it from that what is going on inside himself. After all Morgan brought the whole scene about on purpose.

So what is Morgan ashamed about, and does he share his shame with his tutor? Morgan is probably ashamed for putting his well-behaved tutor on the spot by forcing him to lie. But also, and most of all, Morgan is ashamed for what his parents are doing to the tutor and that he, Morgan, does not do anything about it (and even, at least at the beginning, played along with them). Their shame is surely partially parallel, with some awareness thereof on both sides. But it is partially also shared shame, or at least the beginning of it ('the dawn of an understanding', p. 723). The two of them are directed towards the same value-content and their emotional keenness is the same, as the blushing shows. The value-content is the fact that the Moreens are 'treacherous' and not 'charming' and that they get away with all kinds of things, because people depend on them and even hide all that. That the two are directed in this way dawns on them in their 'longish glance'. This dawning later turns into a certainty and the two enjoy the fact that, in their unworthy situation, they at least know, that they know.

> 'Well, now that you know that I know and that we look at the facts and keep nothing back—it's much more comfortable, isn't it?' (p. 740)

The shared knowledge and fathoming of their shame and the search for a way out binds them even more tightly together and only makes it more difficult for Pemberton to abandon his fosterling, which he has to do to protect himself:

> They looked at the facts a good deal after this; and one of the first consequences of their doing so was that Pemberton stuck it out, as it were, for the purpose. Morgan made the facts so vivid and so droll, and at the same time so bald and so ugly, that there was fascination in talking them over with him, just as there would have been heartlessness in leaving him alone with them. Now that they had such a number of perceptions in common it was useless for the pair to pretend that they didn't judge such people; but the very judgment, and the exchange of perceptions, created another tie. (p. 741)

The two look for a way out together and out of Pemberton's first half-joking remark that 'We ought to go off and live somewhere together.' (p. 736) unfolds a shared fantasy of a flight, like one out of a 'boy's book' (p. 738). The increasing integration of their world-view is not only revealed in the text through that, what they say about the parents, but also through that, how they say it. They adopt each other's expressions and finish each other's sentences, like when Morgan takes up Pemberton's 'Except for that, they *are* charming people.' with 'Except for *their* lying and *their* cheating?' and Pemberton goes on with 'I say—I say!', 'imitating a little tone of the lad's, which was itself an imitation.' (p. 738).

When Pemberton receives a telegram with a lucrative job offer, no words are needed between them anymore to decide what he should do, he should accept and get the boy as soon as he earns enough money:

> It was really by wise looks (they knew each other so well), that, while the telegraph-boy, in his waterproof cape, made a great puddle on the floor, the thing was settled between them. (p. 747)

However, Pemberton is soon called back from his lucrative job in England through a telegram from Mrs. Moreen. Mrs. Moreen writes that Morgan broke down. As it turns out, it is not Morgan that broke down, but the Moreen family finances are about to break down, and the desperate parents are trying to pass Morgan entirely on to his tutor, for he had already alienated their child from them anyway:

> He had taken the boy away from them, and now he had no right to abandon him. He had created for

himself the gravest responsibilities; he must at least abide by what he had done. (p. 750)

When it becomes clear to the boy that their 'boy's book phantasy' can now be reality, he beams with child-like joy at his teacher:

> Morgan had turned away from his father—he stood looking at Pemberton with a light in his face. His blush had died out, but something had come that was brighter and more vivid. He had a moment of boyish joy, scarcely mitigated by the reflection that, with this unexpected consecration of his hope—too sudden and too violent; the thing was a good deal less like a boy's book—the 'escape' was left on their hands. The boyish joy was there for an instant, and Pemberton was almost frightened at the revelation of gratitude and affection that shone through his humiliation. When Morgan stammered 'My dear fellow, what do you say to that?' he felt that he should say something enthusiastic. (p. 757)

Now the boy really breaks down and dies. He dies because, in his pride, he cannot bear the public bankruptcy of the family. He dies because the joy of finally being able to 'run away' with his teacher is too sudden and violent. But he presumably dies most of all because of Pemberton's hesitation. Pemberton, who should have said something enthusiastic, but could not because he, poor as he was, did not want to have the boy on his back either:

> He had spent all the money that he had earned in England, and he felt that his youth was going and that he was getting nothing back for it. It was all very well for Morgan to seem to consider that he would make up to him for all inconveniences by settling himself upon him permanently—there was an irritating flaw in such a view. He saw what the boy had in his mind; the conception that as his friend had had the generosity to come back to him he must show his gratitude by giving him his life. But the poor friend didn't desire the gift—what could he do with Morgan's life? (p. 754)

Pemberton betrays their friendship. But Pemberton can hardly do otherwise. Morgan is still a child and their shared fantasy was childish-naïve. It cannot survive in the world as it is. Maybe Morgan also dies upon this realization. He is, as it is once said of him, 'too clever to live'.[8]

4. The unity of feeling in shared feeling

In shared feeling the participants feel 'one and the same' feeling. How should we imagine the unity of feeling in shared feeling, through what does it come to be? Does Scheler have a clear answer to this question?

Scheler does not have a clear answer to this question. We went through all of Scheler's central statements on shared feeling. Scheler claims unity of feeling and illustrates it with an example. But how this unity comes to be Scheler does not say, at least not explicitly.

But three answers in Schelerian spirit are possible. The first answer goes back to Scheler's idea of the I-Thou indifferent stream of experience (cf. Hans Bernhard Schmid 2008). The second answer has the supra-individual accessibility of certain value-contents as its starting point (cf. Stan von Hooft 1994, p. 19). The third answer is oriented towards Scheler's statements on social acts and transfers these statements out of the context of the collective person onto shared feeling.

According to the first answer the participants in shared feeling dive back into an ***I-Thou indifferent stream of experience.*** It is the stream that creates the necessary unity. Shared feeling is here understood as containing two levels. The *I*s are primarily separate and meant, only secondarily the separation is dissolved. Scheler's comments on the 'truly loving sexual intercourse' could act as a model for this. However, loving sexual intercourse is for Scheler clearly an example of emotional identification, although an untypical one. For Scheler a higher we precisely does not develop in a loving sexual act. Rather, the individual *I*s sink into the stream of all life:

> The most elementary form of this (genuine identification, belonging neither to the idiopathic type nor to the heteropathic type, i.e. 'mutual coalescence') is certainly to be found in *truly loving sexual intercourse* (i.e. the opposite of the sensual, utilitarian, or purposive act), when the partners, in an impassioned suspension of their spiritual personality (itself the seat of individual self-awareness), seem to relapse into a *single* life-stream in which nothing of their individual selves remains any longer distinct, though it has equally little resemblance to a consciousness of 'us' founded on the respective self-awareness of each. (p. 25 in the Sympathy book)

Furthermore, for Scheler the actual location of emotional identification is the vital. But in shared feeling we are dealing predominately with the mental, spiritual or personal, as the example of the grieving parents shows:

> The only 'region' in the whole framework of man's unitary intellectual and psycho-somatic nature where identification can take place is invariably to be found *midway* between the bodily consciousness, which embraces in its own specific fashion all organic sensations and localized feelings, and that intellectual-cum-spiritual personality which is the centre of activity for all the 'higher' acts of intention. For it seems to me certain that neither the spiritual nucleus of our personality and its correlates, nor our body and the phenomena (such as organic sensations and sensory feelings), whereby we apprehend the

> modification or restriction of its field, are such as to allow of the identification or sense of unity involved in each of the typical cases cited. A man's *bodily* consciousness, like the individual essence of his *personality,* is *his and his alone*. (p. 33)

In addition, the distance that is achieved in reproduced feeling is constitutive of shared feeling and Scheler's whole Sympathy book is written against monistic metaphysical attempts to remove this distance on an allegedly higher level:

> Our decisive ground for an uncompromising *rejection* of the metaphysico-monistic theories is that, in fellow-feeling proper, the 'distance' of the persons and their respective and reciprocal awareness of separateness is kept in mind throughout, as it is also the case with its both components, vicarious, and (in the narrower sense) companiate feeling. The reason being that fellow-feeling is not infection, nor identification.' (p. 64)

For Scheler reproduced feeling and with it shared feeling are in fact logically and genetically dependent on identification. But, what is only a precondition or a basis for something else cannot at the same time be essential for it. After all, fellow-feeling 'about something' and reproduced feeling and even the analogous inference of feeling in society are dependent on identification too without being themselves identification or shared feeling. Shared feeling is more than reproduced feeling and something else than fellow-feeling 'about something'. What is this more and this something else? The parents do not feel one and the same sorrow because they forget that they are two people.

The richly speculative idea of the I-Thou indifferent stream of consciousness can be tried on, taken seriously, and brought into connection with Husserl's idea of the life-world or Wittgenstein's idea of the life-form. As Wittgenstein explains, when you learn a rule sooner or later you get to a point where you cannot ask any more questions, where you hit bedrock. This point is the: 'That is just how we do it.' The point is the unquestionable social basis for all rule following. Scheler's genealogical idea of the I-Thou indifferent stream of consciousness can be seen as the rock-bottom social basis of all our feeling. Still it can and must be insisted that shared feeling is not just a relapse into an a separation of I and Thou dissolving 'That is just how we feel.'.

The second answer to the question after the unity in shared feeling keeps the separation of the *I*s and focuses on the ***supra-individual accessibility of certain value-contents.*** In contrast to bodily pain, which is only directly accessible to the person who has it, spiritual value-contents, like the death of a person or the sublimity of a piece of music, are accessible to everyone who is open to the value. The lower sensible values divide and the higher values unite us. The listeners of a piece of music in a concert are united in this good. It is possible to go further and ask if, as Alfred Schütz claims in 'Making Music Together', the listeners are not also united with the composer by taking the same way through 'inner time' together? And further still: is not every listener of a piece of music united with all the potential listeners of the same piece?

The problem with this answer is that it also takes something to be essential for shared feeling that is only its precondition. For feelings to be shared, the value-content they are directed at has to be accessible supra-individually. But the lonely or also the parallel and consciously parallel and even the enjoyed consciously parallel accesses to something supraindividually accessible is still not a shared access. If it were so, it would be hard to feel anything alone, apart from sensible sensations and idiosyncrasies. In this second answer shared feeling does not collapse into identification like in the first answer, but into parallel feeling. But the parents are not sharing one and the same sorrow just because they are directed at the same value-content.

According to the third answer shared feeling is a feeling, in which the participants intend their feelings as a contribution to a shared feeling and understand the feelings of others in the same way. A shared feeling is the ***unity of sense*** of different feeling contributions. It is not the sum of separately intelligible feelings plus everybody's knowledge about the feelings of others. Shared feeling cannot be achieved in this summative fashion. Shared feeling is an irreducible category of feeling like joint action in question and answer or order and obedience. The parents feel one and the same sorrow because their feelings are contributions to a single coherence of sense. This third and promising way of understanding the unity of shared feelings will be explored in the following with Edith Stein.

5. Edith Stein's further development of Scheler's approach

In her treatise entitled *Individual and Community* from 1922 Edith Stein starts with an example which is reminiscent of Scheler: A troop mourns the death of its leader. Stein distinguishes three phenomena with respect to this example:

1. A member of the troop mourns for the leader as a personal friend.
2. A member of the troop mourns for the leader as the leader of the troop.
3. The troop mourns for its leader.

The third phenomenon, community feeling, is the one which we and Stein are interested in, namely shared feeling. The second phenomenon, membership feeling, supplies the essential material for the third phenomenon. The first phenomenon, personal feeling, does not play any role in community feeling—it is only for the sake of distinction.[9]

Stein starts her analysis with the second phenomenon, membership-mourning. According to Stein, the mourning member aims at the importance of the death of the leader for the group. He has 'an intention toward the object', as Stein calls it, an intention which can do more or less justice to the object. Apart from this objective intention, the mourning member also has ***'an intention toward the communal experience'*** (p. 137). He aims at the troop mourning as it is constituted by the individual members' contributions. This intention, too, can be more or less successful. Stein explains the manner in which community mourning is constituted by the individual members' constitution by way of an analogy to biography. The biography of an individual is more than the sum total of all that happened in the individual's life. It is a coherence of sense in which some events are more important than others. So, too, in community mourning. Some individuals' contributions are more important than others'. It is the coherence of sense which holds the members' contributions together and makes for the unity of community mourning:

> The relationship of the communal experience to the individual experience is constitution, not summation. If you were capable of compiling within yourself all the coalescing experiences, but you united them as a mere aggregate without inner coherence in themselves, you wouldn't be in possession of the full communal experience, any more than you get the unity of an object by merely stringing together the sensory data. You don't have a new whole instead of an aggregate of components until the multiple contributions, governed by the unity of one sense, have integrated themselves into a structure of a higher kind. (p. 144)

Stein notes two presuppositions for community feeling. The first is that the members understand each other, that they are able to reproduce the feelings of the others. The second is that the object towards which their feelings are directed is supra-individually accessible. With regard to the second presupposition, Stein even goes so far as to call the unity of all who are united in a generally accessible object but do not interact with each other a weak form of social unit. This weak form of social unit she calls 'the unity of structure of experience'. Stein contrasts it with mass, society and true community, all of which she understands more or less along Schelerian lines. Stein's two presuppositions roughly correspond to the two options distinguished in the last section. By making clear that both interpersonal understanding and supra-individual accessibility are mere presuppositions of shared feeling, Stein rejects these first two options.

Father and mother stand beside the body of a beloved child. They feel the same sorrow because they both aim first at the same object, and second, at their community with each other. That is, they both try to do justice, first, to the importance of their loss, and second, to their common sorrow, as it is constituted by both of their contributions. With Edith Stein building on Max Scheler's foundations we finally have a convincing account of shared feeling.

Yet in Scheler we do not read much about the second kind of intention, the parents' intentions toward their community. We can, however, easily picture the parents looking at each other, touching each other, or talking about their loss and how to best live through it. Scheler's example is too sketchy to allow us to see the whole structure of shared feeling. For fuller examples we should turn to literature, like we did when we looked at Henry James' wonderfully delicate description of shared shame in his short story 'The Pupil'.

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Notes

1. For a collection of classical readings on shared feeling from the phenomenological tradition cf. Anita Konzelmann Ziv et alt. (eds.) *Phänemenologie des geteilten Fühlens* (forthcoming). The collection features texts by Scheler, Stein, Walther, Buber, von Hildebrand, Heidegger, Bollnow, Binswanger, Sartre and Schmitz.
2. Since my book *Arbeit und Liebe* from 2002 I have been working on a dialogical model of love. See my forthcoming contribution to the Nussbaum volume in the *Library of Living Philosophers*, cf. also Bennett Helm's *Love, Friendship, and the Self.*
3. This proof is of course somewhat curious because of the fictional character of literature. Martha Nussbaum 1990 and Gottfried Gabriel 1991 for example explain why philosophy must and can turn to literature to learn more about the good human life.
4. Cf. also p. 64: 'Even in mutual endurance of the "same" evil and the "same" quality of feeling-state [...] the functions of "feeling something" remain distinct, and the phenomenon itself includes an awareness of difference among its separate sources in two, three or x individual selves.' and pp. 244-245: 'What is the meaning of the proposition that "a man can only think his own thoughts and feel his own feelings"? What is "self-evident" about it? This only that if we postulate a *real substratum* for the experiences, of whatever kind, which I may happen to have, then all the thoughts and feelings which occur in me will in fact belong to this real substratum. And that is a tautology. Two real substrata, two soul-substances, for instance, or two brains, certainly cannot enter into one another, or switch from one to the other.'
5. For accounts of feeling which beautifully bring out its active side (how we learn to feel, how we interpret, manage and shape our feelings) cf. the recent narrative development of the cognitivist approach in Nussbaum 1990, 2001, Goldie 2000 and Voss 2004.
6. As Leon Edel points out in his James-biography from 1985, the story is partly autobiographical (see pp. 429-430). The small Henry was educated by private tutors at all sorts of places in Europe and the family had some serious problems with money.
7. A strong point of Olivier Schatzky's film adaption from 1996 is, that it makes vivid the smooth interplay of the Moreen family in gestures and facial expressions. A weak point is that it indulges in the cliché of the wonder child.
8. For similar readings of the end of the story cf. Terence Martin 1958/1959 and Richard Hocks 1990. For more on the 'unmentionable subject' of money in 'The Pupil' see Millicent Bell 1998.
9. Cf. Margaret Gilbert's article on collective guilt (2002) for similar distinctions.

FIG. 1: SCHELER'S FOUR FORMS OF FELLOW-FEELING AND REPRODUCED FEELING			
	Definitions (quoted) from **The Nature of Sympathy**	***Criteria:?*** *Directedness at the feeling of the other (1)* *Knowledge of the feeling of the other (2)* *Participation in the feeling of the other (3)*	***Examples***
Reproduced / vicarious feeling ('Nachfühlen', 'Einfühlen')	'The reproduction of feeling or experience must therefore be sharply distinguished from fellow-feeling. It is indeed a case of feeling the other's feeling, not just knowing of it, nor judging that the other has it; but it is not the same as going through the experience itself. In reproduced feeling we sense the *quality* of the other's feeling, without it being transmitted to us, or evoking a similar real emotion in us.' (p. 9)	1. intentionally directed at the other's feeling 2. perceives the other's feeling directly from their expression and not through an inference or imitation; depends on emotional identification and underlies true fellow-feeling (community of feeling and feeling 'about something'); 3. no participation in the other's feeling (only its quality and not its reality is grasped; does not preclude indifference, even cruelty).	What novelists are able to do; our capacity to have empathy with a dying bird.
Community of feeling /shared feeling ('Miteinander-fühlen')	A's sorrow is in no way an "external" matter for B here, as it is, e.g. for their friend C, who joins them, and commiserates "with them" or "upon their sorrow". On the contrary, they feel it together, in the sense that they feel and experience in common, not only the self-same value-situation, but also the same keenness of emotion in regard to it.' (p. 13)	1. intentionally directed at the other's feeling; 2. reproduced feeling (as the grasping of the quality of the other's feeling) and fellow-feeling (as the grasping of the reality of the other's feeling) are interwoven; 3. participation in the other's feeling as one and the same feeling (as value-content, as functional quality, but not as function, i.e. consciousness of the different individual starting points); of utmost ethical value.	Shared parental grief: father and mother standing at the dead body of their beloved child.
Fellow-feeling 'about something' ('Mitfühlen an etwas')	'But here A's suffering is first presented *as* A's in an act of understanding or "vicarious" feeling experienced as such, and it is to this material that B's primary commiseration is directed. That is, *my* commiseration and *his* suffering are phenomen-ologically *two different facts,* not *one* fact, as in the first case [the community of feeling].' (p. 13)	1. intentionally directed at the other's feeling; 2. reproduced feeling precedes fellow-feeling as a separate act; 3. participation in the other's feeling as a reaction to the other's feeling, therefore two feeling facts (as value-content, functional quality and function); ethical value inferior to that of shared feeling.	Sympathy with grieving parents: friend C who joins the parents and commiserates with their sorrow.
Emotional infection ('Gefühls-ansteckung')	'Here there is neither a *directing* of feeling towards the other's joy or suffering, nor any participation in her experience. On the contrary, it is characteristic of emotional infection that it occurs only as a transference of the *state* of feeling, and does *not* presuppose any sort of *knowledge* of the joy which others feel.' (p. 15)	1. not intentionally directed at the other's feeling, but unconsciously and involuntarily (mechanical causality, but can be put in service of conscious will); 2. does not presuppose knowledge of the other's feeling; 3. no participation in the other's feeling, but a flow with its own laws (that sweeps everyone along and makes them do things nobody wants to do or would take the responsibility for); of negative ethical value.	Gaiety at a party; laughter of children; lamenting tone of voice of old women; cheeriness of a spring landscape; dreariness of rainy weather; plaintiveness of a room; wanting to see cheerful faces; fear infection in an animal herd; *folie à deux*; mass panic; revolutionary mass.

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FIG. 1: CONTINUED			
Emotional identification ('Einsfühlen')	'The true *sense of emotional unity,* the act of identifying one's own self with that of another, is only a heightened form, a limiting case as it were, of infection. It represents a limit in that here it is not only the separate process of feeling in another that is unconsciously taken as one's own, but his self (in all its basic attitudes), that is identified with one's own self.' (p. 18)	1. not intentionally directed at the other's feeling, but unconsciously and involuntarily (however not mechanical, but vital causality); located in the vital I (affects, drives, passions) between body and person; 2. as instinctive knowledge of others, it underlies reproduced feeling and through it true fellow-feeling; 3. no participation in the other's feeling and thus not true fellow-feeling, but an I-Thou undifferentiated flow; where not pathological (as in hysteria or obsession) or dumbing (as in a mass) with positive value.	Primitive thinking; mysteries of antiquity; hypnosis; hysteria; child's play with a doll; obsession; truly loving sexual intercourse (as gate to the life-stream); mass (as a bad, dumbing down substitute for it); unity of mother and baby; targeted wasp sting for the purpose of paralyzing the caterpillar in order to lay eggs in it.

FIG. 2: SCHELER'S FOUR FORMS OF THE SOCIAL UNIT		
	Definitions (quoted) from **Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values**	***Criteria:?*** Kind of being with one another: constitution (1), existence of individual (2), reality of the unity (3) and solidarity (4), kinds and ranks of values (5), spatial extension (6), temporality (7)
Mass ('Masse')	'A social unit is constituted (simultaneously) in so-called contagion and involuntary imitation devoid of understanding. Such a unit of animals is called the *herd,* of men, the *mass.*' (p. 526)	1. constituted in infection without understanding and involuntary imitation, so it is mechanical through sense stimulation 2. the individual does not exist as an experience 3. has its own reality and laws apart from its members 4. no solidarity whatsoever 5. no personal values, only thing-values, therefore of lower rank 6. without a fixed location 7. only short duration
Life-community ('Lebensgemeinschaft')	'A social unit is constituted in *that* kind of co-experiencing or reliving (co-feeling, co-striving, co-thinking, co-judging, etc.) which reveals some '*understanding'* of the members of this unit (distinguishing it from the mass). However, this understanding is not that which would precede this *co*-experiencing as a separate act, but that which occurs *in* co-experiencing *itself.* In particular, here there is no 'understanding' in whose acts a member co-experiences his individual *ego*ness as the starting point of such acts; still less is the other being *objectified* (which distinguishes this unit from society). It is in this immediate experience and understanding, in which (as I have shown in the work mentioned) there is *no division* of any kind between the experience of self and that of the other or between bodily expression and experience in the comprehension of member *A* and that of member *B*, that the basic social unit which I call the *life-community* (in the pregnant sense) is constituted.' (p. 526)	1. constituted in co-experiencing [identification or shared feeling] or reproduced/vicarious experience [reproduced feeling] (with understanding), therefore amechanical; 2. the individual I does not exist primarily as an experienced vantage point, but rather only secondarily, through an act of singularisation (shared feeling); understanding there but without inference (as in identification, reproduced feeling, fellow-feeling "about something" and shared feeling) and does not precede co-experiencing; the other's being is not objectified (fellow-feeling 'about something'); identical content (conscious parallel feeling and fellow-feeling about something); 3. stream of experience with its own laws and with a unified striving and counter-striving (however with no real will, no ethos, just conventions and customs) 4. the reality of the community as primary focus of responsibility, with the individuals' co-responsibility preceding self-responsibility, therefore only representable solidarity (within a position in the social structure, e.g. social standing) 5. no personal values, only thing-values (welfare and the noble), therefore of lower rank; 6. spatial extension of, e.g., marriage/family (including underage members and pets): dwelling-place, of the local commune: home, of the people: fatherland, and of humanity: Earth; overlapping of spatiality possible; 7. the temporality of the life-community outlasts that of the life of individual members.

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FIG. 2: *CONTINUED*		
Society ('Gesselleschaft')	'The social unit of the *society* is basically different from the essential social unit of the life-community. First, the society, as opposed to the *natural* unit of the life-community, is to be defined as an *artificial* unit of individuals having *no* original "living-with-one-another" in the sense described above. Rather, *all* relations among individuals are established by *specific conscious* acts that are experienced by each as coming from his *individual* ego, which is experientially given *first in this case,* as directed to someone else as "another".' (p. 528)	1. constituted in conscious acts of the mature and self-conscious individual (e.g. through promises and contracts) 2. the individual exists, understanding of others is mediated through analogical inferences (dependent on unmediated understanding of the life-community); common cognition mediated through criteria and artificial terminologies (dependant on the unmediated shared natural language of the life-community); common will mediated through promises and contracts (dependant on the unmediated common striving and solidarity of the life-community) 3. no independent reality of the unity (only artificial unity); common will only through fiction and violence (the principle of the majority) 4. exclusive self-responsibility and no solidarity whatsoever (even baseless distrust) 5. thing-values (the pleasant, like sociability, and the useful, like civilisation) [and individual person values, therefore of higher rank] 6. no own space, or rather with the Earth as space of the life-communities, from which the elements of society come 7. no prolonged duration, only contemporaneity of the living
Personal community / collective person ('Personale Gemeinschaft'/'Gesamtperson')	'We must designate as *collective persons* the various *centers* of *experiencing* [Er-lebens] in this endless totality of living with one another, insofar as these centers fully correspond to the definitions of the person which we gave earlier.' (p. 520) '*[T]he unity of independent, spiritual, and individual single persons "in" an independent, spiritual, and individual collective person.'* (p. 533) '[T]he idea of a solidary realm of love of individual, independent spiritual persons in a plurality of collective persons of the same character (this unity of collective persons among themselves, as well as the unity of the individual person and the collective person, is possible in God alone).' (p. 538)	1. constituted in shared experience [shared feeling]; 2. individuals are experienced, therefore dependent on society; 3. the unity has its own reality (sum, synthesis, construction, interaction); 4. unrepresentable solidarity, single person and collective person each self-responsible and co-responsible, no last responsibility before the collective person (like in life-community) or before the single persons (like in society); co-responsibility of the collective person also towards other collective persons beside and over it (but there responsibility before a higher instance, e.g. God); 5. personal values (the holy and the spiritual) and in sovereign rule over life-communities (as their collective body) and through them indirectly also over society and its thing-values; collective person as highest form of the social unit; each real existing social unit as mixture of all four forms, tendency of historical development from predominant existence in masses to predominant existence in life-communities to predominant existence in society to predominant existence in the collective person; 6. spatiality, e.g. of the state (as a mixed spiritual-vital, imperfect collective person; only perfect in form of nation-state): territory (overlaps not possible), of culture-nation and cultural group (as purely spiritual, imperfect collective person): culture area as a playground of influence (overlaps possible) and of church (as purely spiritual, perfect collective person): supraspatial and intraspatial; elevates everything; 7. temporality e.g. of the state: more durable than the people; of culture (nation and culture group): more durable than state; of the church: eternal.

REPRESENTATION OF THE BODY AS A BASIS OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: A NEURO-PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON POLANYI'S SUBJECTIVE DIMENSION OF KNOWING

Ilkka Virtanen

Abstract.
The subjective dimension of knowing is a fundamental element in Polanyi's epistemology. Polanyi justified the idea of subjectivity by claiming that although conscious acts had an identifiable and 'explicit' object as focal point, the meaning arose from subsidiary, bodily roots. We address this conception from the perspective of contemporary neuropsychology, particularly basing on Antonio Damasio's theory of consciousness. We discuss the very first stages of knowing and aim to show that the bodily roots of knowledge and the arising subjective dimension of knowing are not only relevant, but indispensable aspects of knowing. Moreover, it seems that representation of knower's own body state is the most fundamental form of tacit knowledge.

Key words
Bodily knowing, consciousness, neuropsychology, subjective dimension of knowing.

1. Introduction

One of the most distinctive features of Polanyi's theory of knowledge is the emphasis on the subjective dimension of knowing; Polanyi situated the knower in the most fundamental position instead of what was being known. Polanyi argued that the knower actively formed the meaning of knowledge by integrating his personal appraisals and bodily feelings to the object of knowing. Hence, knowing always had a personal component. According to Sanders (1988), Polanyi was one of the first philosophers stressing the importance of the knowing person at a time when the starting point of epistemology was an objective ideal of knowledge.

Besides being a fresh epistemological insight, the subjective feature of Polanyi's theory has been a point vulnerable to criticism. Some notable figures of philosophy of science, such as Imre Lakatos and Karl Popper, have claimed Polanyi's epistemology subjectivist. Lakatos denied Polanyi's conception of tacit knowing because it dragged psychological and sociological elements to epistemological considerations (Gill 2000). Similarly, Popper (1972) argued that that the logical content of scientific problems, theories and arguments formed a world of objective knowledge. For him knowledge in this objective sense was independent of anybody's claim to know. As Popper (1972, p. 109) put it, 'Knowledge in the objective sense is knowledge without a knower; it is knowledge without a knowing subject.' Hence, Popper saw knowledge independent of the knower and the mental processes that led to it, which contradicted with Polanyi's conception of knowing.

However, as those conversant with Polanyi's thinking know, the subjective dimension does not make Polanyi's theory subjectivist, but rather broadens the scope of epistemology; Polanyi (TD) simply points out that it is impossible to get rid of *all* the subjectivity. Moreover, Polanyi (PK, p. vii) remarked that knowing was 'responsible act claiming universal validity' in the sense that the knower's intention was to relate himself to reality that others may also relate themselves to. In this important sense knowledge strives for objectivity and has always also an objective dimension. Hence, Polanyi does not make a clear objective-subjective dichotomy but accepts both of them as different dimensions of knowledge.

Whereas the objective approach to knowledge is rather straightforward to justify by basing on empirical observation and use of language and logic, it is rather complicated to present hard evidence to justify the necessity of knower-dependent perspective that enriches the meaning of the object of knowing as Polanyi argued. It can be thus critically asked, why and by what mechanism personal meaning that puts apparently objective knowledge into personal context is created?

Polanyi (1968) justified the idea of subjectivity among others by arguing that man lives in his body using it consciously and thus attends to what he has in mind from his awareness of his body. We address this idea from the perspective of contemporary findings of neuropsychology, particularly from the perspective of Antonio Damasio's theory of consciousness. Damasio (1999) suggests that consciousness and conscious acts (such as knowing) are grounded on knower's representation of the body, that is, continuously updated representations of body states. When the representation of self is set alongside with the representation of the object of knowing, it becomes possible to represent the relationship between the knower and the object of knowing. As a result, knowing becomes personal. This claim has an interesting correspondence with Polanyi's idea of the emergence of subsidiary

meaning. Polanyi's and Damasio's theories have also another significant common feature: whereas both traditional epistemology and traditional cognitive sciences normally tend to concentrate on features of knowing that normal healthy humans have in common, Polanyi and Damasio discuss aspects that makes our knowledge unique and personal. Moreover, Damasio argues that without the representation of the body knowing is not even possible. This claim is based on Damasio's studies and work with neurological patients who suffer impairments in the brain structures that map body state.

We compare Polanyi's and Damasio's theories in order to**:**

1. assess the correctness of Polanyi's idea of the structure of tacit knowing and its bodily basis from the neuro-psychological perspective;
2. discuss the justification of the idea of subjective dimension of knowing, and
3. attempt to specify or, if possible, even develop Polanyi's central ideas of the bodily knowing.

Since the arguments that Polanyi stood for are mainly philosophic, it may seem far-fetched to relate his thinking to the findings made by contemporary neuroscience. However, whereas the starting point of the classical definition of knowledge is the belief, whose truthfulness and justifiability are then analysed, Polanyi stressed the importance elements that *formed* the focal belief. Such elements include neural processes. As Polanyi (TD, p. x) wrote, 'tacit knowing is the way in which we are aware of neural processes in terms of perceived objects'. Polanyi made it clear that knowledge of the brain (subsidiary knowledge) and knowledge of the mind (focal knowledge) are not identical, even though the operations and existence of the mind depends necessarily on the brain (Grene 1977). Hence, Polanyi himself seems to have suggested that knowledge is not a matter that belongs exclusively to the realm of philosophy. In this sense the comparison between Polanyi's theory and findings of the contemporary neuroscience seems justified. Moreover, it should be interesting to see how Polanyi's (among others) philosophical arguments withstand findings of more empirical branches of science that study mind.

This approach seems promising because, first, both Polanyi and Damasio stress the importance of self and body in all conscious acts, which is a rather bypassed aspect in both modern epistemology and study of consciousness. Hence, Polanyi's and Damasio's thinking overlap in significant ways although their approaches and scientific foundations are everything but similar. Second, as well as Damasio, also Polanyi's is, among others, a philosopher of consciousness; the structure of (tacit) knowing covers all the acts of consciousness from perception to complex problem solving. Third, Polanyi has been criticized for his failure to explain cognitive processes involved in tacit knowing (e.g. Webb 1988). In this sense it seems promising to approach Polanyi's thinking from a neuro-psychologica perspective in order to develop or at least elucidate his central ideas concerning knowing in the light of findings of contemporary neuropsychology and cognitive science. We believe that by combining philosophical and psychological results it is possible to approach the concept of knowledge on a deeper level. In this sense we also aim at reducing the gap between philosophy and psychology by addressing the cognitive nature of knowing.

In the next section we consider briefly Polanyi's theory, particularly its central conceptions related to bodily basis of knowing. In the third section we present main points of Damasio's theory of consciousness. In the fourth section we compare the two theories presented in the previous sections by considering their correspondences and the following implications. Finally, conclusions are presented in the fifth section.

2. Polanyi's epistemology–bodily roots of knowledge

A fundamental feature in Polanyi's theory of knowledge is the structure of tacit knowing that is based on the distinction between two different kinds of awareness. *Focal awareness* concerns the object of a conscious act, for example an external object that the knowing subject attends to. However, all focal awareness is dependent on *subsidiary awareness* that contains non-specifiable processes and elements of conscious acts. For example, we recognize a familiar face (focal awareness) by being subsidiarily aware of its particular features (TD). These features form the meaning of the face, but we are unable to describe them specifically. In this sense subsidiary awareness refers to the tacit processes and elements that enable conscious knowing. Therefore the formation of focal meaning is fundamentally knower-dependent, bodily action; any act of consciousness has an identifiable object as its focal point but the meaning arises from a set of subsidiary, bodily roots that function as clues to the attended object. Active integration of subsidiary, that is *tacit knowledge,* elicits the meaning of the object of knowing functioning as the basis of personal understanding. In psychological terms the formed focal representation seems to refer to the conscious representation held in the working memory, which

can be described, for example, linguistically. In this sense focal knowledge is 'explicit', but it has tacit roots that cannot be fully traced.

Polanyi (KB) explained that all the major skills of human mind are based on a meaningful integration performed by the body and of the sensations felt by the body. Hence, knowing subjects use the body as their instrument in all transactions with the world. To support this idea Polanyi gave examples of clear instances of bodily knowing. One of his most used examples is visual perception (e.g. in KB). Perception in general refers to the acquisition and processing of sensory information in order to see, hear, taste or feel, and finally know 'what is out there'. Although perception seems an effortless process that has not much to do with knowing, perceiving things does not mean that they are perceived exactly as they are in the reality. For example, in visual perception a visual representation is constructed according to the type of data the receptors in the eyes are capable of recognizing. The brain then receives and analyses sensory signals; different features of the visual input (such as colour, shape and movement) are processed in separate brain areas specialized to certain type of processing. Consequently, the focal interpretation of the seen is dependent on the subsidiary knowledge and processes. Accordingly, perception is an active process that aspires to meaningful interpretation–it is not passive mirroring of the environment as such.

Polanyi also refers (e.g. in TD) to Lazarus and McCleary's (described in Lazarus and McCleary 1951) experiment in which subjects' bodily responses anticipated correctly a conditioned electric shock even if the exposure time of a shock-causing stimulus was too short for a conscious recognition. This kind of associative learning indeed is automatic and represents bodily knowledge in the sense that it is independent of conceptual knowledge structures and the use of language. In addition, the knowledge about the learned association is manifested by emotional response that in physiological terms can be viewed as a change in the body state. Hence, the tacit knowledge that Lazarus and McCleary's experiment expresses is literally embodied.

Probably the most understandable examples of bodily knowledge that Polanyi gave are related to motor skills, such as riding a bicycle or driving a nail. This kind of skill learning and the resulting know-how type of knowledge are usually acquired by active training and by trial and error, and the knowledge itself is stored in a form of motor maps in the motor cortex. Again, the acquirement and the use of motor skills are generally independent of conceptual knowledge structures.

However, bodily knowing does not refer only to sensory processes, emotional responses and physical engagement, but Polanyi stresses that *all* human behaviour is expressed in and through the body (Gill 2000). As Polanyi (KB, p. 147) puts it,

> The way body participates in the act of perception can be generalized further to include the bodily roots of all knowledge and thought. Our body is the only assembly of things known almost exclusively by relying on our awareness of them for attending to something else.

In this sense body is not a mere passive physical object in the world but serves as an interface by which one comes to know the world through interaction; man has various ways to manipulate the environment using the body, but the environment also constantly regulates man. Consequently, all knowledge has bodily roots because external objects are attended by being subsidiarily aware of things happening within the body.

In sum, Polanyi's approach differs from the traditional analysis of the knowledge, notably because he sees bodily participation more fundamental than the conceptual outcome of the process of knowing; the integration of tacit knowledge in the subsidiary awareness raises the meaning connecting it to the focal representation. Moreover, Polanyi (KB) claims that we observe external things by being subsidiarily aware of the impacts they make on our body and of the responses our body makes to them. On the basis of this, one can interpret that some kind of representation of the body state is a fundamental form of tacit knowledge as well as the ability to register changes in this basic body state and represent them.

In the contemporary psychology and neuroscience the basic principles of how humans construct representations of the environment is relatively well understood (Ledoux 2002). Since the fundamental brain structures and mechanisms do not differ significantly between individuals, it is somewhat puzzling how the subjective perspective can be explained from the biological point of view. From the perspective of Polanyi's theory especially interesting questions are, how and why the personal perspective is constructed alongside with the seemingly objective representation of the world.

As a philosopher Polanyi did not commit himself particularly deeply on the questions concerning the biological basis of the formation of the subjective perspective. Moreover, neuroscience and cognitive sciences were only developing at the time when Polanyi developed his theory and his most important results. However, Polanyi (KB) writes that acts of consciousness are not only conscious of something,

but also conscious from certain things that include our body; it is the *subsidiary sensing of the body* that makes the knower feel that it is his body. Indeed, as will be explained in the next section, representation of the body does not only make knowing personal, but seems to be an essential condition of knowing and more importantly, of being conscious and aware of the environment.

3. Damasio's theory of consciousness

In this section we describe Antonio Damasio's conception of how it is possible that organisms can know about their environment. The ideas presented below are mainly taken from Damasio's theory of consciousness (in Damasio 1999).

For Damasio consciousness is the special quality of mind that makes it possible to organism to differentiate itself from the environment; it is a sense of having self that lets the organism to feel that it exists, and that things around it exist. According to him (Damasio 1999), theory of consciousness should not be just a theory of how language and reason help to construct an interpretation of what goes on in the mind, but it should account for the foundation kind of the phenomenon that supports the higher forms of cognition (such as language and reason). The sense of self that Damasio refers is based on the constant representation of the body in organism's brain. This idea is an interesting common feature with Polanyi's thinking; also Polanyi (KB) argued that the subsidiary awareness of the body is an essential part of our existence as persons. He (KB, p. 31) writes, 'To be aware of our body in terms of the things we know and do, is to feel alive.' Hence, the knowledge of the organism's own existence makes it possible to know things external to the organism.

3.1 Evolutionary and biological background

Damasio's approach to consciousness is essentially evolutionary. The basis of his theory is that consciousness evolved with an organism's ability to know itself as something separate from the environment. Before that, in earlier stages of evolution organisms could merely represent their environment. They had simple emotional responses that regulated organisms and produced advantageous actions (such as escape or attack). Thus, emotional processes evolved to enhance the survival of organisms.

Damasio (1999) suggests that these emotional states that ranged between the poles of pain and pleasure were unknown to organisms that produced them. Hence, they did not know that they were performing these actions because they did not feel their own existence. However, as the brain evolved, cognitive and emotional processes grew more and more interrelated. According to Damasio, consciousness began when brains acquired the power to represent that states of the living organism, which were continuously being altered by encounters with objects or events in its environment. In other words, consciousness requires the representation of body signals that tell that some object or event has causally changed the body state. From that moment on, claims Damasio, we begin to know.

Another important, evolutionally motivated premise of Damasio's theory is a build-in urge to survival and maintenance of life, which can be seen from the level of single cell to the level organism as a whole. *Homeostasis* is a central concept in describing this urge. Homeostasis refers to the maintenance of chemically and physically constant internal environment of an organism. Practically homeostasis describes the largely automatic physical reactions and regulation of temperature, oxygen concentration and pH that aim to maintain a stable and constant condition of the body (Damasio 1999). From the evolutionary perspective living creatures are equipped with devices that aim to solve the basic problems of life (for example, such as the finding and the usage of sources of energy, the maintenance of the chemical balance, the maintenance of physical structure and the avoidance of external causes of injury/illness) automatically in order to support the survival (Damasio 2003). Also, in order to maintain the homeostasis organisms have some simple basic responses such as approach/retreat in relation to some object[1], or increase/repression of some action.

In addition to the adjustment mechanisms of the inner environment a representation of the body in the brain is needed in order to maintain homeostasis. According to Damasio (1999) this kind of representation of body is a collection of neural patterns that occur in many places in the brain (in several brain stem nuclei, in the hypothalamus, in the basal forebrain, in the cortex) mapping moment by moment the state of the physical structure of the organism. In normal circumstances the brain does never stop from receiving these reports concerning the body state. When a change in the representation of the body is registered, and particularly, if the change is in the circumstances is not advantageous for the organism, there are automatic responses that strive to restore the balance. Emotions are the key players in this process (Kolb and Whishaw 2009; Damasio 2003; Ledoux 2002).

Emotions are complicated collections of neural and chemical responses (Damasio 1999). All emotions have some kind of regulatory purpose aiming to the creation of advantageous circumstances to the organism. Thus, emotions are evolutionally and

biologically determined processes that function automatically without conscious deliberation.

According to Damasio (1999), emotions occur in two types of circumstances. First, when the organism processes certain objects or situations with its sensory devices, and second, when the mind of the organism conjures up from memory certain objects or situations and represents them as images[2] in the thought process. Damasio stresses that emotions affect both the body and the brain being responsible for profound changes in both of them. These changes have the potential to become consciously felt feelings of emotions.

The biological function of emotions is twofold (Damasio 1999). The first function is to produce a specific reaction to the inducing situation. For example, in animals the reaction might be to escape or to attack. These reactions are basically the same in humans except that they are normally tempered by higher reason. The second function of emotions is to regulate of the internal state of the organism in order to prepare it for a specific reaction. As an example Damasio mentions increased blood flow to the arteries of muscles and changes in the heart and breathing rhythms. The commands necessary to generate the reactions are sent mainly via two routes, namely via bloodstream in a form of chemical molecules and via neural pathways in a form of electrochemical signals. In both cases the result of these commands is a global change in body state.

As suggested above, emotions have a fundamental role in the homeostatic regulation. It is evident that the strongest need for the internal regulation comes from the environment in which the organism interacts. Damasio (1999) remarks that certain sorts of objects or events tend to be linked to certain kind of emotions more than to others; organisms have acquired the means to respond to potentially useful or harmful stimuli roughly the same way despite the environmental (or cultural) differences. However, as organisms develop and interact they gain factual and emotional experiences with different objects and events and thus associate many objects and events that would have been emotionally neutral with objects and events that are naturally prescribed to cause emotions.

The interesting question naturally is, how the brain 'knows' what stimulus is e.g. dangerous. One part of the answer is in genes and other part is in learning (Ledoux 2002). For example, most primates show intense fear of snakes even though they had never encountered them (Kolb and Whishaw 2009). Thus, genetically evolved neural networks sensitize organisms to significant stimuli from the viewpoint of survival. However, neural networks related to emotion also learn from experience. For example, a certain stimulus present in a situation that has led to pleasant experience might be associated with positive emotions although it has not directly induced them. Damasio (1999) stresses that while the biological machinery for emotions is largely preset, its inducers are external to it. Thus, development and culture shape fundamentally the manifestation of emotions in humans. As a consequence, the range of stimuli that can induce emotions is infinite.

Fear and pleasure are naturally extreme and rather clear examples of manifestation of emotion. However, most objects and situations lead in a similar way to emotional response ranging from very weak to very strong, because the organism inevitably undergoes modifications during all the events of sensing and acting (Damasio 1999). Thus, emotional system connects virtually *every* object and event (perceived or recalled) in the everyday experience to the fundamental values of homeostatic regulation.

3.2 Central concepts

Damasio (1999) distinguishes three different kinds of selves that predominantly describe the layers of consciousness whose characteristics and neural correlates can be identified in the making and maintenance of consciousness. It should be taken into consideration that Damasio's concept of *self* seems to be relatively wide by its meaning, and the three selves presented below refer above all to fundamental processes of consciousness:

Proto-self is an interconnected and temporarily coherent collection of neural patterns representing the state of the organism, moment by moment, at multiple levels of the brain as it aims at maintaining itself. It regulates and creates the necessary balance in exchanges with the environment, constantly making small adjustments to meet the narrow set of conditions for our existence. Hence, proto-self is mainly concerned with homeostasis, and its functions remain representation is unconscious.

Core-self is produced whenever an object of any kind modifies proto-self, and refers thus to the changed body state. Core-self is available to consciousness; Damasio describes it as feeling of being present in a sense that whatever it is happening, it is happening to us. Core-self does not change much throughout organism's lifetime.

Autobiographical self is linked to the idea of identity and corresponds to a non-transient collection of unique facts and ways of being which characterize a person. It occurs only in organisms endowed with a substantial memory capacity and reasoning ability, but it does not require language. It is based on memories and

also on anticipations of the future. It develops gradually throughout life. Autobiographical self permits to know about progressively more complex aspects of the organism's physical and social environment and the organism's place and potential range of action in a complicated universe.

Damasio (1999) also makes a division between two different kinds consciousness. *Core consciousness* provides the organism with a sense of self about one moment and about one place. It is produced continuously alongside with core-self as the organism interacts in its environment. The scope of core consciousness is the here and now. Damasio suggests that core consciousness is regenerated continuously in pulses as interactions with the world modify proto-self. The pulses of core consciousness blend together to give a continuous 'stream of consciousness'. Hence, core consciousness is a simple biological phenomenon that occurs when the brain's representation devices generate a representation of the self along with the object that the organism becomes aware. Thus, organisms produce core consciousness when they construct images of a part of themselves forming images of something else. The most essential function of core consciousness is to represent moment-by-moment the physiological state of the organism mapped by a collection of neural structures. According to Damasio core consciousness is the means by which the organism indicates to itself that it is engaged by some object or event. The object or event can be directly perceived or indirectly recalled from the memory of past perceptions. In both cases core consciousness indicates that the processing of images of anything is happening within the individual organism, in its perspective. Moreover, this means that the internal state of the organism is the basic constituent of the images of the external world, and it is made in a non-verbal language, a language of somato-sensory information.

Extended consciousness is dependent on long-term memory and working memory that give awareness of the lived past and expectable future (Damasio 1999). It is a multi-levelled phenomenon that on the one hand gives organism an identity, and on the other is the basis of human creativity enabling planning, problem solving and manipulation of mental pictures in the working memory. Hence, in Damasio's terms extended consciousness refers to the form of consciousness that is typical only to humans; the form of consciousness that makes it possible to put separate experiences into a broader context and over a longer period of time. Autobiographical self is the basis of extended consciousness.

Based on neurological evidence, Damasio (1999) claims that these two forms of consciousness have neural correlates. Moreover, neurological evidence suggests that extended consciousness is not an independent form of consciousness, but it is based on core consciousness; impairments of brain structures necessary to extended consciousness allow core consciousness to remain unscathed. However, impairments at the level of core consciousness impair extended consciousness as well.

3.3 First stages of knowing

The first stages of knowing can now be considered through the processes of proto-self and core-self. The object of knowing becomes mapped within the brain in the sensory and motor structures activated by that object. The sensori-motor maps pertaining to the object cause changes in the maps pertaining to the knower's body state (that is, in proto-self). These changes are re-represented in yet another maps that Damasio (1999) calls *second-order maps*. Second order maps, then, essentially represent core-self: changed body state caused by the object of knowing. This process is described in Figure 1 below.

The main idea of Damasio's theory is that organisms construct neural patterns related to their environment, and these representations of objects and events cause changes in the organism. In this sense the process of becoming aware of the environment has two stages: first, the construction of a representation of certain object/event, and second, the change in the body state caused by the representation. Studies concerning consciousness have traditionally considered only the first stage, and in fact, the neural bases of the process related to it (e.g. perception, memory and learning) are relatively well understood. From the epistemological perspective this traditional view seems to explain what humans have in common in their knowledge representations. In this sense the traditional view participates in explaining the objective side of human knowing.

However, Polanyi claimed that subjective dimension of knowledge is fundamental aspect in the study of knowing. According to Damasio's central argument, knowing becomes possible as the brain's representation devices generate a non-verbal account of how the organism's own state is affected by the organism's processing of an object and this process enhances the image of the causative object. This way the organism can connect knowledge concerning previous experiences to the 'selected' object (that is, conceptual, autobiographical and motor knowledge). Hence, in this sense Damasio

sees the basis of an act of knowing as a non-verbal object-organism relationship, in which the change in the organism caused by the object does not only manifest important information about that relationship but actually is the key mechanism how the organism can become aware of the object and can know it.

Damasio (1999) stresses that these first stages of knowing are not verbal, but based on images and emotions; the process is so natural that it can hardly be recognized. This process occurs also in the simpler brains than human brains are, which suggests that its foundation is independent of linguistic capacities. It is difficult to think that Polanyi would have any problem to call this process *tacit* and the knowledge manifested by it *tacit knowledge*. Hence, we suggest that 'the impacts that external things make to our bodies' (that we are only subsidiarily aware of) that Polanyi talked about include also internal impacts (changes in emotional states).

3.4 Neuro-psychological evidence

The justification of Damasio's theory is based on neuro-psychologica evidence; the theory predicts that alterations in the brain structures that are crucial in representing or regulating physiological changes in body should lead to compromised consciousness. In short, interruptions in basic emotion processes should interrupt consciousness. These crucial brain structures include:

1. Several brain-stem nuclei that regulate body states and map body signals;
2. The hypothalamus that maintains a current register of the state of the internal milieu by, e.g. registering the level of circulating nutrients and regulating it;
3. The insular cortex and the medial parietal cortices that, especially in the right hemisphere, hold the representation of the current internal state of the organism at the level of cerebral hemispheres;
4. Cingulate cortices, superior colliculus and the thalamus that receive converging signals from various sources and are thus capable of presenting second-order mapping (that is, a representation concerning how the organism is causally affected by the processing an object) (Damasio 1999).

Indeed, even relatively small damage in the brain-stem nuclei, in the hypothalamus, in the thalamus or at the cingulate cortex, causes coma or persistent vegetative state (Posner et al. 2007; Churchland 2002). In neither case are there any signs of emotion.

However, in Damasio's theory being conscious goes beyond being awake and attentive because, according to Damasio (1999), consciousness requires an inner sense of self in the act of knowing. Hence, damage in the structures that take part in the construction of the second-order representations (organism-object relationship) should disrupt core consciousness partially or completely. As distinct from coma, a person with impaired core consciousness can be awake and e.g. be able to move. Moreover, in this context we are eminently interested in the state in which a subject loses the capacity to know although being able, at least in theory, to perceive or to act in his environment. Indeed, Damasio describes an interesting class of neurological states characterized by wakefulness but a minimal degree of attention and purposeful behaviour. Epileptic automatism and akinetic mutism are examples of such states.

Epileptic automatism causes an absent seizure, during which a patient simply stares off into space; the patient may walk and act in his environment (drink water from a glass if there is one, open a door, sit on a chair etc.), but is clearly not self-conscious (Damasio 1999). The loss of consciousness is often accompanied by amnesia so that after the seizure the victim does not know anything about the seizure being however fully aware of the moments just before it (Kolb and Whishaw 2009). Thus, during a seizure a patient does not have any plans, beliefs, past or future–no sense of self.

Similarly, patients suffering from akinetic mutism may notice their surroundings, but stare in the void motionless and speechless for months. Damasio (1999) describes that a patient may lie in bed with eyes open and occasionally crab an object (or otherwise move the body normally) but non-focused staring resumes rapidly; a patient does not react to the presence of relatives or friends, but might utter meaningless words occasionally. After the seizure there are no experiences or clear memories related to the time of absence.

These neurological states described above (coma, persistent vegetative state, epileptic automatism and akinetic mutism) have something essential in common. In none of these cases are there any signs of emotion; patients' bodies, faces or physiological measurements do not express emotions of any kind to external or internal inducers (Damasio 1999). Patients do not have any sense of self nor of their surroundings; they do not manifest any form of knowing. They can move perfectly, but they do not have a conscious mind to formulate a plan and command the movement.

Accordingly, it seems that emotion and core consciousness go together based on the fact that they are present together or absent together (Damasio 1999). Also other researchers have suggested that there exists a close relation between emotion and consciousness (see e.g. Tsuchiya and Adolphs 2007). Damasio (1999) classifies the neurological examples and the related brain structures in a following way:

1. Disruption of core consciousness with preserved wakefulness and preserved minimal attention/behaviour (e.g. epileptic automatism, akinetic mutism): dysfunction in the cingulated cortex, in the basal forebrain, in the thalamus and in the medial cingulate cortex;
2. Disruption of core consciousness with preserved wakefulness but defective minimal attention/behaviour (absence seizures, persistent vegetative state): dysfunction in the upper brainstem, thalamus, hypothalamus or cingulate cortex;
3. Disruption of core consciousness accompanied by disruption of wakefulness (coma, anaesthesia): dysfunction in the structures of the upper brain stem, hypothalamus, or thalamus.

The loss of core consciousness entails loss of extended consciousness, but the converse is not true; compromised extended consciousness retain core consciousness (Damasio 1999). For example, a patient suffering from severe amnesia (impairment related to extended consciousness) might not know things that have happened just minutes or hours before. Moreover, since human memory also includes memories of events that we anticipate, an amnesiac may not have any memories regarding the intended plans for the minutes, hours or days that lie ahead. Although the patient is deprived both the personal history and the planned future, he retains the core consciousness for the events/objects in the here and now. Thus, patients have basic sense of their persons and they are responsive to external stimuli although the situation fails to make sense to them due to the lack of memories. Still, they are able to organize their behaviour and even report their own state; they are conscious because their emotional system supporting core consciousness is intact.

4. Overlapping aspects of Polanyi's and Damasio's theories: representation of body as a form of tacit knowledge

The foundation of both Polanyi's and Damasio's thinking is that the objects of conscious acts are directed to the knower itself, and accordingly, knowledge of the reality is based on the body. Thus, Polanyi and Damasio seem to suggest that knowledge is based on some kind of inner sense of self *from* which the reality is attended *to*. This conception emphasizes the idea of *intentionality*, that is, the idea that acts of consciousness are about or directed upon objects outside the mind.

Both Polanyi and Damasio claim that the relationship between the knowing subject and the object to be known is the basis of knowing; no knowledge is possible without the embodied activity of the knower. Hence, intentionality is the link that connects the internal and external (or subjective and objective) dimensions of knowing. Moreover, *from-to* structure underlines the knower-dependency of knowledge, because due to the bodily roots of knowing, knowledge is inevitably constructed and viewed from a personal perspective. Logically this means that the knowing subject has a perspective that is not entirely compatible with perspectives of other knowing subjects. The sensation of self in the act of knowing not only places the knowledge in a personal context, but the personal context also creates new knowledge that brains produce continuously in an interaction with the reality.

Both Polanyi and Damasio make a conceptual distinction between two different kinds of awareness/consciousness. Certain important theoretical aspects of Polanyi's distinction between subsidiary awareness and focal awareness seem to be analogous to Damasio's distinction between core consciousness and extended consciousness, respectively. The main idea of both of them is the fact that the higher form of awareness/ consciousness that humans experience and are able to describe linguistically must be based on a more fundamental form of awareness/consciousness. In other words, neither consciousness nor knowledge is a product of use of language or other 'higher forms of reason', but they are based on deeper and evolutionally older mechanisms.

Interestingly, for example the traditional analysis of knowledge (knowledge seen as a justified true belief) even highlights the role of language because, in order to be justifiable the belief is supposed to be presentable in a propositional form. In addition, the justification is gained by means of proper argumentation, which also refers to linguistic procedure. Moreover, language has also been claimed to be a prerequisite or even basis of human consciousness (see e.g. Bickerton 1990).

However, from the evolutionary viewpoint it is evident that consciousness and knowing could not have been started from the use of language, but vice versa. Language has evolved to a conscious creature

that has possessed knowledge of its environment. Moreover, the representation of the body is based on the ancient subcortical brain structures compared to neo-cortical (that is, later in evolution) structures, in which the linguistic abilities have been located (Colb and Whishaw 2009). Consequently, consciousness and knowledge must have deeper basis, which both Polanyi and Damasio have been interested in from their own perspectives–and against their contemporary mainstream conceptions.

In Polanyi's thinking humans are subsidiarily aware of their bodies while attending to focal targets. If Polanyi's concept of subsidiary awareness is compared to Damasio's concept core consciousness, it can be confidently argued that core consciousness (a second-order map representing body state changed by an object) is a phenomenon that belongs to subsidiary awareness. As Polanyi (KB, p. 147) puts it, 'every time we make sense of the world, we rely on our tacit knowledge of the impacts made by the world on our body and the complex responses of our body to these impacts.' Hence, in Damasio's terms 'impacts made by the world' and 'complex responses of our body' are expressed in second-order maps. In consequence, body state, manifested by emotions, is a form of tacit knowledge.

However, the 'impacts made by the world' cannot be assessed or even noted without some kind of knowledge of the organisms homeostatic basic state that it aims to maintain. Damasio (1999) calls this process of constant representation of the body state proto-self. On the grounds of Damasio's theory we argue that *proto-self represents the most fundamental form of tacit knowledge*: by means of proto-self the representation of bodily changes caused by the object becomes possible.

Basing on Damasio's description of the consequences of the impairments of the representation of body state, it is arguable that subsidiary awareness is impaired without the representation of the body; the patients suffering from akinetic mutism or epileptic automatism are able to form focal representations but they cannot connect these formed representations to anything. There might be an identifiable object in the focal awareness, but it remains meaningless without the emotional responses related to it. In other words, if the knowing subject is not aware of the bodily changes (that is, emotions) that focal objects cause, his sense of existence is weaken and the representations of the environment are at least close to meaningless. Damasio (1999) calls this state *being without knowing*. In this important sense, *representation of body seems to be also the basis of subsidiary awareness.* Figure 2 below describes the relation between Polanyi's paradigm of two kinds of awareness and Damasio's ideas of proto-self and core-self.

Proto-self is created and updated constantly independently of acts of knowing (e.g. during sleep) and is thus in this sense a processes partially external to subsidiary awareness. However, as it is impossible to register changes in the body state without the knowledge of the basic state, proto-self is a necessary component in subsidiary awareness. The changes caused by the object of knowing, manifested in a form of emotional regulation and represented in the brain, are also subsidiary. However, the subject may feel the emotion, and this feeling may become a target of focal awareness. On the other hand, feeling might be recognizable without ever becoming the object of attention but simply staying in the background. In that sense feeling might be also subsidiary.

5. Conclusions

The fundamental idea behind the subjective dimension of the knowing, argued by Polanyi, is the bodily roots of all conscious acts. Recent findings in the field of neuropsychology provide evidence that the representation of the body state is an essential condition for conscious acts, and hence, also to acts of knowing as Polanyi claimed. In fact, the overlapping neural systems and intimately relation between emotion and cognition is a theme that runs through all modern neuro-psychologica theories of emotion (Kolb and Whishaw 2009). Hence, knowing is not only a post-language phenomenon and Damasio's theory (among others) presents in a more concrete way the idea of bodily roots of knowledge that Polanyi sketched.

Representations of reality must be directed to organism itself (to the body state and changes in it) to be able to be conscious of them. In this sense consciousness implies subjectivity, that is, a sense of having a self that is separate from the world. This subjective feature cannot be avoided in acts of knowing. In consequence, it seems that the subjective dimension of knowledge is not only relevant but indispensable aspect of knowing as Polanyi claimed. When the same event is represented both externally (e.g. visual perception) and internally (emotional response), the relationship between the knower and the to-be-known becomes represented. This seems to be the principal mechanism how the feeling of knowing and the personal perspective is constructed.

Moreover, the second-order representation of body also contains embodied tacit knowledge, expressed in a form of emotion, about the external event, which



Figure 1. The formation of the relationship between the organism and the object.
1) Mapped representation of body state that precedes new act of knowing. 2) Perceived object provokes emotional responses that cause changes in body state. 3) Changed body state becomes represented alongside with the representation of the object of knowing. As a result, knowledge concerning the object arises from a personal perspective. Moreover, (tacit) knowledge based on previous experiences is manifested in the form of emotion. The emotion may become focally felt feeling (e.g. fear).



Figure 2. Polanyi's paradigm of two kinds of awareness and Damasio's concepts of selves.
Proto-self is created and updated constantly independently of acts of knowing (e.g. during sleep) and is thus in this sense a processes partially external to subsidiary awareness. However, as it is impossible to register *changes* in the body state without the knowledge of the basic state, proto-self is a necessary component in subsidiary awareness. The changes caused by the object of knowing, manifested in a form of emotional regulation and represented in the brain, are also subsidiary. However, the subject may feel the emotion, and this feeling may become a target of focal awareness. On the other hand, feeling might be recognizable without ever becoming the object of attention but simply staying in the background. In that sense feeling might be also subsidiary.

makes it possible to assess, predict and plan one's actions from a richer perspective. Thus, directing an external representation to self enriches its meaning. Interestingly, this is a perspective that has been largely bypassed in modern epistemology and study of consciousness, perhaps due to the exaggerated emphasis on human rationality.

We argue that the representation of body state can be considered to be in Polanyi's terms *subsidiary knowledge* of body state, and thus, the most fundamental form of tacit knowledge and the basis of cognition. Interestingly, Polanyi seem to have outlined this kind of idea although at that time there were not enough psychological evidence available to formulate the argument more accurately. Most importantly, Polanyi's philosophical arguments seem to withstand well the new knowledge that rapidly developing cognitive sciences and neuroscience keep producing, which suggests that Polanyi's theory is highly relevant also in these areas of science.

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Notes:

1. Damasio does not refer by objects only to physical entities, but predominantly to objects of attention. Hence, objects in this context might be entities as diverse as e.g. persons, places, memories, melodies, pains etc.
2. By image Damasio means a mental pattern in any of the sensory modalities, e.g. a sound image, a tactile image, the image of an aspect of an emotional state as conveyed by visceral senses, etc.

BOOK REVIEWS

Knowing and Being: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Michael Polanyi,
ed. Tihamér Margitay,
ix + 220 pp., Newcastle upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010.

This book is based on a conference held in Budapest in 2008 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the publication of Michael Polanyi's major work entitled *Personal Knowledge; Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy*. The individual chapters of the present book are based on papers given at the conference and, although conference-based books have their limitations, this one provides an excellent summary of the present positions with respect to the main themes of Polanyi's philosophical contributions. The book, as was the Conference, is divided into two parts entitled *Knowing* and *Being* in reflection of a collection of his papers published with the same title.

The first part concerned with *Knowing* is introduced by a very helpful article by Mullins which describes the development of Polanyi's thinking from, and beyond, his initial interest in the use of Gestalt psychology in the acquisition of knowledge. The rest deals mainly with the various aspects of Polanyi's most widely-acknowledged contribution to philosophy, namely *tacit knowledge* (or, in action, *tacit knowing*). This is knowledge that a person has acquired during a lifetime and which is virtually instantly at hand during problem-solving. It makes use of intellectual and bodily skills. Polanyi's truly pioneering work in this field was clearly related to his earlier experiences in problem-solving as a distinguished scientist, involving ideas and observational/experimental work in mutual interaction.

The second paper by Zmyslony attempts, with difficulty, to find a precise definition of tacit knowledge, despite it being clearly not at all difficult to recognise in practice. It involves both 'knowing what' and 'knowing how' in conjunction in problem solving and, typically for Polanyi, combined with a passionate commitment to discovery. In the following two papers several very fruitful connections of tacit knowledge are pointed out with respect to quite different philosophical fields. Zhenhua takes a hint from Polanyi himself and shows that there are very considerable connections with Heidegger's concept of 'being-in-the-world'**:** he also points out that one of Polanyi's models for knowledge-acquisition is also endorsed by Wittgenstein. Mulherin fruitfully compares the radical effect of the publication of Polanyi's *Personal Knowledge* (1958) with respect to epistemology in the natural sciences, with that of Gadamer's *Truth and Method* (1960) on that in philosophical hermeneutics. Polanyi's 'personal knowledge with universal intent' is a typical theme.

It is noteworthy that Polanyi's work is largely cold-shouldered by the mainstream, rather positivistic, community of philosophers of science. It is doubtless partially because of his post-critical stance, made explicit in the sub-title to *Personal Knowledge* (see above), that they are unenthusiastic but also because they are primarily interested in the general features of knowledge-acquisition rather than Polanyi's 'ready-to-hand' personal strategy. The above list of the philosophers who find common ground with Polanyi suggests that interest is growing in both post-critical and personal philosophies.

Lewis next discusses how tacit knowing relates to practical reasoning, the skill in which Aristotle considered to be a measure of a person's good ethical character.

Rutledge considers very favourably Polanyi's discussion of the relationship between an individual (scientist) and the community, 'Polanyi's optimism' as he puts it. This relates to a mutual trust between the individual scientist and his/her section of the scientific community when engaged in 'pure science' or 'blue-skies research'. This is the search for knowledge for its own sake. Polanyi had earlier emphasised the importance that in this connection the scientist concerned should be given complete freedom to choose his or her research topic. He had contrasted this with the then situation in the Soviet Union, where all scientific research was supposed to relate to perceived needs of society. The 'trust' theme is followed in the next article by Marta Fehér entitled 'Polanyi on the Moral Dimension of Science'. During the past few decades there has been an increasing tendency for governments and industry to promote *post-academic science*, as Ziman has described it, within the universities through financially favouring work related to the requirements of industry. Under these circumstances rival commercial requirements intervene, and the open and honest nature of science becomes compromised, with dismaying implications for the future. Polanyi would have been greatly in protest at this development

The second part of the book on *Being*, is considerably concerned with the extension of Polanyi's ideas on emergent levels of knowing in

relation to ontology, more specifically in respect of the developments during evolution. Once again his ideas are dismissed by the dominant neo-Darwinian community, principally because of his contention that, in principle, biological systems cannot fully be explained in terms of physics and chemistry.

Polanyi's 'from-to' approach to knowledge generation, whereby clues are integrated to find solutions to problems, can be formalised into sequences of upper and lower level systems whereby new concepts emerge at the sequentially higher levels. In *The Tacit Dimension* he had argued by analogy that in a similar manner evolution gradually gives rise to higher levels of being. Margitay fully supports his ideas about emergence in the context of knowledge-generation, but is doubtful about the extension to evolutionary development, partly because of the lack of personal appraisal in the latter case. Paksi on the other hand, in a deeply reasoned paper, makes one realise the depth of Polanyi's thinking on evolution. He considers that the emergent analogy is valid and maintains that Polanyi should not be charged with requiring a special factor, unique to biology, as part of his account. Polanyi attributes elements of teleology within evolution to nature exploiting the possibilities of a combination of the laws of physics-and-chemistry combined with those provided by a stable open system, the Earth. Under these conditions he considers that during an uninterrupted sequence of evolutionary steps there is a built-in tendency for the emergence of beings of ever higher potential (with humankind at the peak).. An in-between paper by Dinnyei considers non-reductive physicalism and prefers Polanyi's emergent-ontological approach, involving operational principles, as a more coherent formulation than that proposed by Kim.

Other topics discussed in the second part of the volume include 'The Immortality of the Intellect Revived: Michael Polanyi and his debate with Alan M. Turing' (Blum). Polanyi was bound to respond to Turing's paper 'Can computers think?' No tacit knowledge there! Allen's 'Emotion, Autonomy and Commitment' points to the incoherence of Sartre's 'radical autonomy' and points to Polanyi's insistence on the importance of emotional commitment, as well as intellectual striving, in achieving understanding. An interesting final chapter by Gulick discusses whether the seemingly contrasting views on economics of Michael, as a market liberal, and of his also well known economist brother Karl Polanyi, as a socialist are—given the present economic situation—as different as they once seemed.

Overall, for those who are concerned and interested in Michael Polanyi's highly original and fearlessly-expressed ideas on scientific and philosophical themes, *Knowing and Being* is highly recommended as an up-dated account of their achievements. There are surely many more developments to come.

Norman Sheppard

Ideologiile reformatoare **(*Reforming Ideologies*), Henrieta Anisoara Serban**,

Bucharest, Editura Institutului de Stiinte Politice si Relatii Internationale al Academiei Române, 2010, 185 pp. ISBN 978-973-7745-49-1

Ideologies are ideas whose long and dressy train constitutes the world and the life of human beings. Ideas change the spiritual landscape of life, configuring and reconfiguring the world for us. Ideas give ourselves back to us, when they do not lead the selves astray.

This book is published in Romanian with a substantial abstract in English. It identifies in the contemporary ideological landscape a few ideological 'twigs' that succeed in assisting people in their political quest, first of all, one for acknowledged identity. These are ideologies that do not follow political power as traditional ideologies do, but rather the change of attitude towards the self and the world. In this sense, they are a part of the persistent dream of humanity of a better world. At the same time, these ideologies also individualise parts of this dream.

All these reforming ideologies, all these individualising parts of the 'dream for a better world' are discursive. They are profoundly influenced by the importance of discourse within the world and human life, too, as by the amazing concrete aspects vested by the importance of discourse. The author bases her approach on perspectives opened by H. D. Lasswell, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, C. O. Schrag, Richard Rorty, Simon Critchley, etc. She illuminates how the shifting lines of our uncertainty become more pungent in discourse. Within the discourse the frailty of human self and its plans gain concretised dimensions and significance in the world. The discourse is the co-architect of our identity and of our 'form of life' which is an approach both political and ethical at its core. As ephemera, all our identities have a purpose and induce a hierarchical ethos, order and ethics.

Thus, with attention to our nurturing daily discursive nature, the book starts from discursive theory to dive into the post-Marxist world of generalised antagonisms. Also, feminism(s) reclaim loudly a voice of presence and present for women, the end of silence. Ironism approaches people as

embodied vocabularies freed from cruelty and this heritage enriches the vision on ecologism, humanism and neo-anarchism.

Ideas have consequences in the manner we understand the world and we relate to it. As windows to the world, as wings to self-defined heights they do smoothen the way to self-understanding in the lights of our self-designed reforms.

Ruxandra Iordache

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References to books by Michael Polanyi:
Because of the particular interest in the work of Michael Polanyi, and in order to avoid unnecessary repetition, please make references to his books by means of the following abbreviations followed by the page number:

CF = *The Contempt of Freedom* (London, Watts, 1940; reprinted New York, Arno Press, 1975)
FEFT = *Full Employment and Free Trade* (London, C.U.P., 1945; 2nd ed. 1948)
KB = *Knowing and Being* (London, Routledge; Chicago, University of Chicago Press; 1969)
LL = *The Logic of Liberty* (London, Routledge; Chicago, University of Chicago Press; 1951)
M = *Meaning* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1975)
PK = *Personal Knowledge* (London, Routledge; Chicago, University of Chicago Press; 1958)
SFS = *Science, Faith and Society* (London, OUP, 1946; 2nd ed. U. of Chicago Press, 1964)
SOM = *The Study of Man* (London, Routledge; Chicago, University of Chicago Press; 1959)
TD = *The Tacit Dimension* (London, Routledge; New York, Doubleday; 1966; reprinted Gloucester, Mass., Peter Smith, 1983)
Also:
SEP = *Society, Economics and Philosophy: Selected articles by Michael Polanyi*, ed. R.T. Allen (New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Publishers, 1997).