APPRAISAL

The Journal of the Society for Post-Critical Philosophy and Personalist Studies

CONTENTS

This issue's new and less recent contributors:

David Treanor graduated in social work and public administration prior to commencing his PhD candidature in the School of Philosophy at the University of Tasmania. His research examines the phenomena of friendship which analyses friendship as a phenomenon to suggest a tentative explanation to the philosophical problem of personal identity that is embedded in Aristotelian ethics: it is plausible and realistic to define a person by one's capacity for relationships. His interests are in personal identity theory, applied ethics and disability rights.

Dr Jan Olof Bengtsson, a previous contributor, lectures in the History of Ideas at Lund University, Sweden. A recent issue of *The Pluralist* (Vol., 3, No. 2, 2008) was devoted to his *Worldview of Personalism*, and he has written the entry on personalism in *The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* (with Thomas D. Williams).

Dr James Swindler, Professor of the Philosophy at Illinois State University, specializes in social ontology, focusing his current research on collective responsibility and freedom. He is author of *Weaving: An Analysis of the Constitution of Objects*. Educated at the University of Kansas, he has also taught at

Westminster College, the University of Miami and Wittenberg University. He won the *Review of Metaphysics* Dissertation Essay Prize and has held fellowships with the Eccles Humanities Center, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the National Science Foundation.

Dr Sally J. Scholz is Professor of Philosophy at Villanova University (USA). Her research is in social and political philosophy and feminist theory. Her books include *On de Beauvoir* (Wadsworth 2000), *On Rousseau* (Wadsworth 2001), *Political Solidarity* (Penn State Press 2008), and *Feminism: A Beginner's Guide* (One World 2010). She has also published articles on violence against women, oppression, and just war theory among other topics, and edits the *Journal for Peace and Justice Studies.*

Nataliya Petlevytch is a lawyer a member of Lviv Bar Association, Ukraine, and currently is studying for a LL.M. at University College, London, for one year. Her research interests are anthropology of law, personalism, and human rights. Her latest publications are: 'Person in the scope of philosophy of law (historical aspects)', (2010), 'European personalism: philosophic and legal dimensions' (2009), 'Person in legal relations' (2008), and 'Personalistic characteristics of law' (2007).

Dr Daniel Paksi is a philosopher at the Department of Philosophy and History of Science, Budapest University of Technology and Economics. His fields of interest are theories of evolution, evolutionary epistemology, evolutionary explanations of social systems and cultural phenomena, emergence, and systems theory. He defended his PhD dissertation on Michael Polanyi's notion of evolution and emergence in 2010. His current work is on the ontological aspects of emergence: 'medium emergence'.

Dr Eugene Webb is Professor Emeritus in the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington. He is the author of seven books, including *Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History* (1980). His latest book, *World View and Mind: Religious Thought and Psychological Development*, was published by the University of Missouri Press in February 2009.

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EDITORIAL

In this issue we have the final selection of papers from last year's 10th International Conference on Persons. Unlike those in the previous two selections, they deal with a variety of topics while exhibiting the same high quality of treatment that pervaded the whole conference. We also welcome Daniel Paksi and the first part of his examination of Polanyi on emergence—the second will appear in the next issue, and Eugene Webb who replies to Maben Poirier's criticisms of Eric Voegelin in our previous two issues. The next two issues, March and October 2011, are likely to be devoted mostly to Max Scheler, one of the most important personalist, and phenomenological, philosophers of the last century, yet strangely neglected today.

As many regular readers will be aware, *Appraisal* specialises in featuring philosophers of a generally personalist orientation who deserve to be more widely known, especially in Britain. Therein lies our problem, On the one hand, we wish to arouse interest in such thinkers and, more importantly, to encourage new thinking on similar lines, rather than merely talk about them among ourselves, the fate of societies and journals dedicated to a particular person or school. Yet, on the other, how can we gain the attention of those outside our own circle? Especially in a time of financial restraint, there is little chance of getting universities and colleges here in Britain, and probably abroad as well, to subscribe to *Appraisal.* Thanks to the generosity of one of our long-standing subscribers, we have previously made efforts to invite subscriptions but with no success. Two ways to attract more interest would be for members of the SPCPS and others whose articles we have published, to mention *Appraisal* in their other publications whenever appropriate, and to submit suitable articles to other and less specialist journals. We have a lot to offer and ought not to keep it to ourselves.

R.T. Allen

11TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PERSONS, 2011

The Conference is likely to be held at
The Brigham Young University, Pova, Utah, USA
in early August.

For further details, please contact Jim McLachlan, jmclachla@wcu.edu

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PERSONS: SPIRITEDNESS AND COMING TO BE

David Treanor

Abstract

Western philosophy contributes significantly to personal identity theory nevertheless my analysis returns to early Greek theory for a more diverse perspective in understanding the nature of personhood. I put forward the emphasis in contemporary thought on human beings as animals with a well-developed and complex brain falls short of conceiving human beings as persons and interpreting human experience. I develop two concepts, thymos and eros, to suggest how they might influence human existence and accord clarity and meaning to 'what is a person'. These concepts are considered through one's philia.

Key Words

Eros, thymos, personhood, philia.

1. Introduction

What is involved in thinking or conceiving a human being as a person? Macmurray[1] suggests there are three types of being that one encounters in the world: inorganic matter, living creatures and persons and notes the capacity of persons for self-transcendence. However, affording exact philosophical clarity to self-transcendence is complex though I propose two characteristics within the rubric of emotions that may assist with conceiving whom to count as a person. Most individuals start life at the centre of the universe, being caressed, attended to and typically it is through this lived experience that the baby enters a web of relationships that links the individual to other individuals, nature and the universe. Indeed, how an individual experiences these links (creative, positive or twisted and broken) influences one's interpersonal relations and impacts upon one's thymos. Accordingly human existence is stimulated by and indeed can be limited by the extent of one's personal relations, which has the capacity to develop and influence one's concept of personal identity and personhood.

This paper presents an account of a person and elucidates thymos and eros as primal realities, central to a person's psychological unity and an alternative explanation to personhood. As I unravel the terminology, I suggest thymos is the source and life force of emotions such as anger and goodwill and draw upon Hesiod's use of eros as one of the original powers in coming-to-be.[2] Hesiod's references are at the cosmic level and I tentatively suggest this illusion is descriptive in illustrating the nature of a personal coming-to-be. Thus, eros holds open the possibility of uniting and reconciling individual emotions to offer individuals a personal identity that is harmonious and in equilibrium. This coming-to-be is most clearly expressed in one's personal relations and I will mention seven constituents that influence and accord clarity to thymos that comprehends change as an integral component of personhood. First, I will present a concept of a person, second integrate thymos, and eros within this framework and then briefly comment on the importance of philia.

2. Concept of a person

My concept is simple:[3] Human beings are highly complex composite beings that incorporate stratified physiological, psychological, emotional and intellectual arrangements constituted through a living organism. I do not distinguish human beings from persons. This section clearly identifies my commitment to the philosophy of personalism, which has a number of streams that at their core emphasize the status of the person in human relationships. Indeed, there are a number of key characteristics to personalism and the three my notion of a person incorporates are: First, understanding and exploring how people should live. Second, I do not support the view that individuals, as human beings are just simply another member of the animal species and that the species rather than person is important. Indeed I clearly support the thought that persons have a psyche (soul). Third, I affirm that being human is a morally significant fact and have absolute respect for human life. Consequently, the particular school of personalism that most influences my concept is 'realistic idealism'[4] that holds that reality is spiritual, mental, and personal and nature is neither intrinsically mental nor personal. This naturally raises a problem for unity and plurality, that is, how can an object be individual and discrete and yet affiliate to a group of things of the same kind? My response is to distinguish what an object or thing is (i.e. the nature it shares with things of the same kind), from the fact that it is, (that is, it has its own act of existing). Therefore in analyzing the nature and unity of sensible beings (i.e. persons) I distinguish between the form and matter of a thing, as nature or essence reflects the form and the individuality is determined by the matter.[5]

The analogy I suggest to illuminate my concept of personhood comes from the Russian tradition, the matryoshka doll. I argue personhood is not contingent or reliant on the relationship between concepts in the same being. Accordingly, a sufficient condition to what is needed for a human being to

count as a person is the presence of different sorts of concepts and each concept has a varying degree of potential for development. However, though the concepts are separate elements they are interdependent and as a whole share singleness or constancy that unite in harmony. The matryoshka doll is a set of dolls of diminishing sizes located one inside the other; the set consists of a wooden figure, which is pulled apart to expose another figure of the same sort inside. Typically there are five dolls in each set and the dolls are mostly cylindrical, rounded at the tip for the head and tapered towards the bottom with a minimum decoration. Therefore the five aspects of my personhood are:[6] (i) a corporal structure with varying shapes, sizes and constituents; (ii) a physiological organism that relates to other living organisms; (iii) a psychological being with the capacity for consciousness and mental experience; (iv) an emotional being with the capacity to feel agitation, disturbance, delight and so forth, about other individuals, actions and/or events; and (v) an intellectual being with the capacity albeit limited to relate or consider ideas and make judgments. In order to comprehend how the doll works, one does not pick out a single figure and determine this is 'fundamental or the necessary or essential part'. Nevertheless, one can consider the doll from a number of different perspectives and relate each fraction as a constituent part in a way that shows why they do not contradict each other and how when considered as a whole represent alternative relations in a united plurality. Each constituent part is a capability, a characteristic that has the potential for development. Thus, I take an Aristotelian approach that conceives of a human being as a moral, political being in animal form with a developmental life span.[7]

3. Thymos and eros

Macmurray[8] employs the term 'the personal' in an attempt to give substantial content to his idea of a person and I put forward that further clarity to this notion may be gleaned by considering thymos and eros. These concepts relate to one's emotions and are present in the fourth stratum of personhood: an emotional being with the capacity to feel agitation, disturbance, delight and so forth, about other individuals, actions and/or events. Nussbaum[9] provides a prominent account of emotions as 'intelligent responses to the perception of value'[10] and is 'best explained by, modified versions of the ancient Greek Stoic view'[11] and names it a cognitive/evaluative approach. There are four critical elements that Nussbaum argues destroy the myth that emotions are 'thoughtless natural energies'.[12] Rather, emotions provide a structure from which one examines and judges the value, quality, or importance

of something, or some person for one's own personal development, thus emotions are 'acknowledgments of neediness and lack of self-sufficiency'.[13] First, emotions concern or connect something: they focus and aim one's attention at a thing or an event. The second part of cognitive/evaluative views of emotions is 'the object is an intentional object'.[14] Thus emotions are not simply something regarding or in connection with an inanimate object, more exactly emotions express a value to the person experiencing the emotion. This value is typically expressed and includes a psychological, 'spiritness' and even a possible physiological response in a personal way to an individual.[15]

The third aspect of emotions is the notion that emotions also incorporate a set of beliefs and that these beliefs are multidimensional. Frequently a belief is conceived of a particular state of mind whereby an individual posits an attitude of holding a proposition p to be true where there is some amount of evidence, though not irrefutable proof, for the truth of p. Nussbaum describes Aristotle's treatment of anger in the *Rhetoric* to reinforce her point that thought needs to be incorporated into 'the emotion itself'.[16] Finally, the cognitive/evaluative view of emotions is the connection between the 'intentional perception' and 'beliefs', an association because they represent a 'value';[17] the object has value to the individual with an emotion.

Peters[18] does not provide an exact definition of thymos, rather his reference is 'spirit, animus' and suggests the reader consults three other concepts – 'nous, psyche and kardia', to understand the term. The first perception of thymos is as 'spiritedness', and this is as a vital force that exemplifies an individual as a living being and has the potential to confer unique psychological attributes to a person. The 'spiritedness' is the source of such emotions as anger, courage, zeal, and goodwill. Accordingly, this quality or trait of an individual's personhood is unique to the individual for it is a psychological reality that relates only to the corporal being experiences. Homer provides a number of examples in the Iliad[19] where thymos serves two primary functions, first it urges an individual to action and second it is the source of emotions such as anger, joy and fear.[20] As philosophy theory develops, thymos continues to be powerful enough to influence Plato whose three-part soul includes nous and a thymos concept, his part of the soul concerned with emotions and the will.[21] Appropriately, for Aristotle, thymos is associated with kardia or the heart. Indeed, though kardia represents a metaphorical heart, it is the capacity to enter into relations with other individuals where one can identify and be in solidarity with them. Or the

contrary, one may develop aggressive or depressive tendencies towards an individual and refuse a relationship for multiple and complex reasons.[22] However, Hellenistic tradition locates kardia as 'the seat of the soul'[23] and Aristotle follows a similar path and calls the heart the arché that in this context translates as the ultimate principle of life, of movement and sensation.[24]

The *Rhetoric* provides Aristotle's most positive treatment of the emotions and I will now explore his use of thymos.[25] There are a number of strata in the *Rhetoric* and two of concern for us.[26] First, the emotions in *Rhetoric*[27] are the emotions of individuals. They are expressions of thymos and they demonstrate how thymos is indispensable to personal identity. The emotions constitute a fundamental association between thymos and goodwill; these emotions are civic and therefore belong to persons or human beings. Second, the Ethics presents an argument that individuals make choices and act through the influence of passions and desires. The *Rhetoric,* I suggest, further elaborates the need of individuals to appropriately experience emotion in order to perform ethical actions emotionally and rationally. Thus actions are responsive to circumstances and to emotions, an individual is a person with personal history, character, thoughts, emotions and capacity for praxis (action), thus one is defined by what one does, as well as one's feelings.

Therefore, thymos has a broad and narrow meaning, the former includes what inspires friendliness and aggression and the latter reflects one's response to personal insults. This interpretation of thymos may explain why Aristotle states[28] that one should treat friends and enemies differently, and indeed enemies with anger.[29] In one sphere of thymos, individuals have the ability to demonstrate goodwill and participate in the social life of the community one inhabits as it provides a distinction between what belongs, or relates to an individual rather than other individuals or one's immediate community. Indeed Aristotle provides examples where thymos enables goodwill[30] and anger[31] and I suggest these passages demonstrate how universal thymos is in individuals even if the individual is not a being with whom one wishes to associate.[32] In summary then, thymos is first and foremost the capacity for 'spirit', however, when overt it is the motivation to act on one's judgments. According to Aristotle, the Europeans and Asians have the capability though it is flawed from its absence of goodwill, which in turn prohibits the exercise of phronesis. Consequently, individuals without thymos and individuals who rely on thymos alone make ideal slaves.

Peters[33] also provides a concise historical account of the etymology of eros and notes it is force and as a concept that is typically represented in the pre-philosophical Greek cosmogonies.[34] It is when Zeus wants to create that he changes to eros and becomes 'a motive force on a sexual model'[35] that is then used to explain the cause of historical cosmological phenomenon. Peters mentions the Orphic use of the term and it is this application that I wish to explore. Accordingly, as Aristotle acknowledges[36] the prior contributions of eros 'opposing powers'[37] what I suggest is that it is eros that unites thymos through desire and passion. Therefore, this holds open the possibility of shared physiological, psychological, emotional and intellectual parity in all human beings.[38] There will naturally be a varying degree of disparity between each individual's capacities to experience these constituents. Nevertheless, some individuals may argue that it is possible for individuals to share a common parity, however, I content that the exact nature of the constituent is unable to be exactly replicated because of the diversity and complexity in forming and developing each component. Consequently what I tentatively forward is eros, as a personal coming-to-be, acts as a mediator to the extreme of anger and goodwill found in thymos. Eros is primary actuality in all aspects of its performance: illuminator, cultivator of being, source of pleasure, and the power that acts for consistency and accord. This description of eros is, explained by Hesiod's account in *Theogony*[39] and places it as one of the earliest powers in coming-to-be to conceivably influence philosophical and religious theories on eros in cosmogony and cosmology. Mooney[40] also understands and argues for Hesiod as having this view of eros.[41]

Hesiod describes the pedigree or line of descent of coming-to-be[42] as*:*

> Verily first of all did Chaos come into being, and then broad-bosomed Gaia [earth], a firm seat of all things forever,
> and misty Tartaros in a recess of broad-wayed earth, and Eros, who is
> fairest among immortal gods, looser of limbs, and subdues in their
> breasts the mind and thoughtful counsel of all gods and all men.[43]

Notwithstanding the limited data for clarifying the foundation for Hesiod's comprehension of the cosmogonic and cosmological *eros*, Mooney[44] presents a view that the latter was present in Orphic literature and the role of *eros* represent an original philosophical idea. The cosmogonic *eros* is presented as 'fairest among immortal gods, looser of limbs'[45]

and thus put forward for consideration as the finest of the gods. This occurs following the descriptive activities ascribed to eros as a force that unifies and creates.[46] I suggest the meaning of the expression by Hesiod of eros as one who 'subdues in their breasts the mind and thoughtful counsel of all gods and all men'[47] is one that comprehends eros as a coming together and formation. Consequently, eros behaves for the purpose of synchronization and understanding. Therefore, eros offers personhood the identity condition of individual's belonging to one another for eros acts as the mediating centre for thymos. Eros liberates an individual's thymos from the tentacles of one's hostility and transforms this expression of living in opposition with an individual to a spirit of inclusion. The abyss that separates the individuals is now null and void and one's thymos now acts to include another in their presence and sphere of importance. This change leads one to become more compassionate, trustful and understanding of other individuals and one's belief systems. Thus, I mean is that through belonging an individual discovers the intrinsic value of the other individual when one's thymos is aroused to act with goodwill.

I also suggest belonging in the sense an individual is comfortable and accepted for who one is by another individual is of crucial importance in our lives as persons. In the cosmological sphere Gaia is 'a firm seat of all things forever'[48] and associated with the metaphysical notion of prime matter. Gaia has the capacity to cause the Ouranos (sky, heaven) that encircles the substances that form the necessary processes to enable the familiar components of the Earth (for example, lakes, forests) to be identifiable. Thus, Gaia in my personhood sphere is 'belonging' for it is a place where one discovers the elements that constitute one's identity and that of other individual's. Indeed, belonging is what an individual may, or may not first experience in their relations with their birth mother and family. Therefore the core to belonging is that as an individual one's existence follows from the actions of other individuals. Thus to continue to experience and lead a genuine life one needs to develop as an individual physically and I contend psychologically and in relations with other individuals.[49] Maritain makes an accurate point when he states:

> Man…does not exist only in a physical manner. He has spiritual super-existence through knowledge and love; he is in a way, a universe in himself, a micro-cosm, in which the great universe in its entirety can be encompassed through knowledge; and through love He can give himself completely to beings who are to him, as it were, other selves a relation for which no

equivalent can be found in the physical world.[50]

However, why is it that an individual needs to belong to another? Is it a way of managing personal psychological insecurities? Or a way of ensuring that as individuals one meets other personal needs or desires? I claim an alternative view: an individual desire to belong is similar to *Gaia* in that it fosters a means to discover who one is through authentic mutual dependent relationships. This view is also supported by a number of other scholars[51] and one such classicist, Martha Nussbaum terms it 'sociability'.[52]

There may of course be a deficiency in the degree of synchronicity between an individual and groups in society. An individual's life is characterized by complex phenomenon that induces orderliness to complex social and cultural norms that are frequently imbued in societal structural arrangements. Indeed, it is a recurrent theme for society that these social structures commonly cause conflict for groups who live in social networks. It is possible to accord three causes to inter-group conflict.[53] (1), often the individual's in a group are of the opinion they are morally superior; (2), individuals in a group find it difficult to acknowledge that they might hold incorrect beliefs, opinions or acts misguidedly; and (3), an individual may deny that any other individual or group has factual certainties that offer any value. Nevertheless, an individual in a group may have occasion to reflect, question one's opinions and belief's following an event and the discovery of other ways of living. Why exactly this occurs may be impossible to know for definite and indeed it may also be difficult to apply a universal formula to enable an unanimous experience. However what does occur for an individual is a transfer and deterioration in one's certitudes, identity and an alternating of one's mind, thoughts, feelings and opinions. I put forward that on these occasions it is possible for eros to act as a balance or harmony between original realities that can transform 'dark' realities and produce positive results. I suggest Hesiod may have been aware of this view for he states:

> Out of Chaos, Erebos and black night came into being; and from
> Night, again, came Aither and Day, whom she conceived and bore
> After mingling in love with Erebos.[54]

It is from eros' role of balance and creating positive outcomes in the Orphic literature that I suggest considering is as a source of individual intention, shared meaning and existential import, instead of simply a physiological species event that is a facet of

usual human action.

Finally I propose that thymos and eros are unable to be regulated or imposed by law or regulation, for they are a free flowing attitude of one's lived experience. What I suggest this means in the practical sphere is: an individual exists, circumstances and or events may occur, that admit an individual to shift from egoistic concerns to develop an awareness of other individuals as beings of equal value and sharing in a common humanity.

4. Philia

Aristotle emphasises the importance of philia[55] to human life[56] and his subsequent ethical scrutiny shows how one is to conduct interpersonal relations with another individual. There are three forms of philia that he describes as relationships of utility, pleasure and complete friendship.[57] It is impossible to be prescriptive as to what attracts individuals to develop philia, on occasions individuals with an analogous disposition may be mutually responsive to each other and similarly individuals who differ in personal and other attributes may also be reciprocally attracted.[58] In essence, different degrees of practical and emotional bonds of mutual and equal goodwill, affection and pleasure define all these forms of philia.[59] As an individual, one will need to develop and maintain a considerable number of utility and pleasure forms of philia. This is a necessary condition for individuals coexisting in society. Therefore these forms of philia are appropriately understood as functional and meeting an individual's physiological needs.[60] In contrast 'complete' friendship is characterised by a voluntary association, shared activities, the intrinsic qualities of the individual, admiration for the individual's personal qualities and the basis of the friendship is venerable without qualification.[61] Accordingly, this form of philia is different from other interpersonal relationships: the philia is characterised by the 'rich' notion of intimacy offered by Telfer[62] and White[63] that incorporates personal and emotional congruency that permits a friend to be an 'another self'.[64]

Aristotle informs his readers that friendship is a 'virtue or implies virtue'[65] as much as it is also an activity that encompasses discourse and the performances of varieties of assistance, or benefits for some other individual.[66] Personal relations are not static phenomenon and individuals have the potential to influence the exact nature of their interaction through mutual affection and shared activity. It is also possible for individuals of different social and cultural status to develop and maintain a meaningful friendship. I argue that the level of participation by individuals in shared activity, intimacy, self-disclosure

and reciprocal goodwill, will reveal the nature of the friendship amongst individuals. Thus, I suggest that there is a set of constituents to friendship that are dynamic and experienced often as intensely or affectively, by the friends and can be in a way that is only visible to the friends. Certainly, these principles to friendship are not independent variables rather interrelated and characterized by vigorous activities that makes or creates changes in the affective dispositions of the friends. For example, friendship is not an unrequited phenomenon rather it is an intended alliance it responds to the dynamic of emotion, activity and shared values.

The constituents are considered as seven components[67] and while Aristotle does not stipulate such a categorisation, they are, I suggest a valuable tool for contemporary investigation.[68] The seven components are: First, friends are emotionally engaged with each other; second, friends are cognisant of each other; third, friends communicate with affection to each other; fourth, friends celebrate with each other; further, friends empower each other; penultimately, friends forgive each other; finally, friends have a unity of character. If each individual's activity and the level of participation is of the greatest extent possible for him or her then their friendship will be what Aristotle terms 'complete'[69] and what I will call 'integrity' friendship. This term I suggest explains a number of aspects to the phenomenon of 'complete'[70] Aristotelian friendship and in particular the notion of friendship being complete and adhering to moral principles. In addition, the term implies this form of friendship is also concerned with the interpersonal actions of individuals who act in accordance with virtue towards each other. Further, in this model of Philia, the individuals have a unity of character through possessing and persistently holding to exercising virtues of human excellence that promote a lived experience that develops their own personal identity.

6. Conclusion

In concluding I would like to note my primary aim in this paper as being to present a clear and comprehensive introduction to thymos and eros and how they might influence *personhood*. In so doing, I acknowledge the value of western philosophical thought in providing clarity to personal identity theory through the use of logical persuasion and deduction. Nonetheless, this emphasis places less importance on the individual lives of persons and how typically in one's daily communication sensitively, intuition and listening are valued above rational attachment. I have argued that in Hellenistic philosophy the prominent role for thymos and eros in personhood

and now suggest they may have a role in contemporary theory though the literature is sparse in this regard. Therefore, it is difficult to assert, or ascribe a central role to these concepts as sufficient identity concepts to count for personhood. Consequently my research will continue to explore and refine these concepts before this claim can be corroborated and validated.

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Notes:

1. John Macmurray 'Objectivity in Religion' in B. Streeter, *Adventure. The Faith of Science and the Science of Faith*, London, 1927, pp. 177-217.
2. M. L. West, *Hesiod: Theogony*, Oxford, 1966.
3. I have modified and expanded a reference to human beings that Dean Brackley makes in *The Call to Discernment in Troubled Times*, New York, 2004, p53. Professor Brackley makes the observation that individuals are biological, psychological and includes emotions in his intellectual category, I specifically use emotions as a separate dimension as they are intelligent, yet they admit to a specific type of intelligence that can be overlooked and neglected.
4. There are a number of people who express this form of personalism, these people include Jacques Maritain, Emmanuel Mounier in France, John Macmurray in Great Britain, Martin Burber, Max Scheler in Germany, and W. Norris Clarke and John F. Crosby in America.
5. J. Maritain, *A Preface to Metaphysics: Seven Lectures on Being*, London, 1939, p. 25.
6. My view is different from Michael Polanyi's. Polanyi presents a five-tiered 'hierarchy of levels found in living beings' and builds them from lower to higher forms of life. Polanyi's hierarchy is (a) human shape; (b) vegetative function; (c) sentience; (d) conscious behaviour and intellectual action; and (e) moral sense. M. Polanyi *The Tacit Dimension*, London, 1967, pp. 36-37. My view is horizontal as it is the image of the doll that is significant rather than the dimensions.
7. For example see Nussbaum's account of a typical human development. Martha C Nussbaum, *Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality & Species Membership,* The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 87-88.
8. John Macmurray *Persons in Relation*, London, 1969, p. 25.
9. Martha C Nussbaum *Upheavals of Thought*, Cambridge, 2001.
10. Ibid, 2001, p. 1.
11. Ibid, 2001, p. 22.
12. Ibid, 2001, p. 27.
13. Ibid, 2001, p. 27.
14. Ibid, 2001, p. 27.
15. Thus, as Nussbaum states the: 'aboutness is part of the emotions identity. What distinguishes fear from hope, fear from grief, love from hate –is not so much the identity of the object, which might not change, but the way in which the object is seen', ibid, 2001, p. 28.
16. Nussbaum, ibid, 2001, p.30.
17. Ibid, Nussbaum, 2001, p. 30. Nussbaum notes the difficult and somewhat nebulous meaning to *value* and provides a context to her meaning in her footnote on the same page.
18. F. M. Peters, *Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon,* New York, 1967, p. 196.
19. Homer, *The Iliad*, Ibid, 1997, p. 450 – 'Strong vow- and they bore straight down on the Argives full force. Shaking their spears, their hearts fired with hopes of dragging Patroclus' body out from Ajax'. The translator in this instance uses the expression 'their hearts fired with hope' for 'thymos'.
20. Ibid, p.206.
21. J, M. Cooper, *Plato's Complete Works*, Indianapolis, 1997. In particular, the Dialogues, *Charmides* and *Gorgias.*
22. J. Vanier, *Becoming Human*, Ontario, 1999, pp85-88, Vanier suggests that when individuals open themselves to individuals who differ from them and those shunned by society then one achieves true personal and societal freedom. Vanier argues that it is through the heart that one's develops one's capacity for compassion 'to change, to evolve, and to become more human', p. 88.
23. F. M Peters, *Greek Philosophical Terms: A Historical Lexicon,* New York, 1967, p. 96.
24. For example, Aristotle states: 'Moreover, the motions of pain and pleasure, and generally of all sensation, plainly have their source in the heart, and find it in their ultimate termination' 666a11, Aristotle, *De Partibus Animalium*, Volume 5, translator W. Ogle, in *The Works of Aristotle*, (eds.) J A Smith & W D Ross, Oxford, 1912.
25. Professor Garver has developed Aristotle's use of 'thymos' as an art of character and I am indebted to his exposition, as I have developed my notion of thymos after a careful analysis of his work. E Garver *Aristotle's Rhetoric: An Art of Character*, Chicago, 2004.
26. For example: 1360b4-12, Aristotle, *Rhetorica,* trans. W. Rhys Roberts, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, (ed) Richard McKeon, New York, 2001.
27. Book, II, chapters 2-11, Aristotle, *Rhetorica,* ibid.
28. 1126b11-1127a13, Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics,* trans. T. Irwin, Second Edition, Indianapolis, 1999.
29. 1327b39-1328a3, 'Some say that the guardians should be friendly towards those whom they do not know, now passion is the quality of the soul which begets friendship and enables is to love' notably the spirit (thymos) within us is more stirred against our friends and acquaintances than those who are unknown to us'. Aristotle *Politics,* trans. Benjamin Jowett in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, (ed) Richard McKeon, New York, 2001, where the translator has used 'thymos' inserted brackets to indicate the translated term.
30. 1166a7-9, Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. T. Irwin, Second Edition, Indianapolis, 1999.
31. 1379b13-1179b16, Aristotle, *Rhetorica,* trans. W. Rhys

Roberts, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, (ed) Richard McKeon, New York, 2001.

32. For example: 'Those who live in a cold climate and in Europe are full of spirit, but wanting in intelligence and skill; and therefore they retain comparative freedom, but have no political organization, and are incapable of ruling over others. Whereas the natives of Asia are intelligent and inventive, but are wanting in spirit, and the Hellenic race, which is situated between them, is likewise intermediate in character, being high-spirited and also intelligent' 1327b24-1327b30, Aristotle *Politics,* trans. Benjamin Jowett in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, (ed) Richard McKeon, New York, 2001.

33. F. M Peters, op. cit, p.62-66.

34. F. M. Peters, ibid, p.62.

35. F. M. Peters, ibid, p.62.

36. For example, 984b-985a *Metaphysics*, Aristotle discusses the account of earlier Philosophers of material, efficient causes, Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, trans W. D. Ross in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, (ed) Richard McKeon, New York, 2001.

37. F. M. Peters, op. cit, p 63.

38. First I need to state that Aristotle does not state this position. I am drawing my inferences from 984b, 985a, 1075b *Metaphysics,* op. cit; 1102a26-1103a3, *Nicomachean Ethics,* Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics,* trans. T. Irwin, Second Edition, Indianapolis, 1999, and 427b28-429a9; 433a10-434a20, *On The Soul,* trans J. A. Smith in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, (ed) Richard McKeon, New York, 2001.

39. Hesiod *Theogony & Works and Days*, trans. M. L. West, Oxford, 1998.

40. T. B. Mooney *Perspectives on the Philosophy of Love and Friendship in Ancient Greece: Homer to Plato*, Doctor of Philosophy Thesis, School of Humanities, Department of Philosophy, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria, May 1992.

41. Mooney, ibid, 1992, p.7, my brackets.

42. There are a number of different translations available, for example, Hesiod, *Theogony & Works and Days,* trans. M. L. West, Oxford, 1998; G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven and M. Schofield *The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History With a Selection of Texts*, Second Edition, Cambridge, 1983. In this instance I am using the latter source for reference as it more accurately reflects the notion of come-in-being.

43. G. S. Kirk *et al*, 1983, p 35.

44. Mooney, op. cit, 1992 pp.12-13.

45. G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven & M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History With a Selection of Texts*, Second Edition, Cambridge, 1983, p35, the line is actually line 120 in Hesiod, *Theogony*.

46. For example see Mooney, op. cit, 1992, p. 13, quoting Lamberton, R. Lamberton *Hesiod*, Yale, 1988, p. 21.

47. Kirk *et al* op. cit, p. 35.

48. G. S Kirk, J. E. Raven & M. Schofield *The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History With a Selection of Texts*, Second Edition, Cambridge, 1983, p. 35.

49. For example, I note John Macmurray as a source here and note in his first Gifford Lecture where he outlines the threat to the personal life posed by the functionalist view *The Self as Agent,* London, 1969, pp.

29-31 and then he proceeds to note the unity of the self as a *'personal unity' The Self As Agent,* London, 1969, p. 98.

50. J. Maritain *The Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain*, *Selected readings*, (eds) Joseph W. Evans & Leo R. Ward, Geoffrey Bles, London, 1956 p. 32.

51. As noted earlier: Jacques Maritain ibid; John Macmurray op. cit.

52. Martha C Nussbaum 'Aristotle, Politics, and Human Capabilities: A Response to Antony, Arneson, Charlesworth, and Mulgan' *Ethics*, 111, October 2000, pp. 102-140, p. 120.

53. I am relying on the work of Jean Vanier and acknowledge the brevity of these causes and refer the reader to the following reference for a further discussion. J. Vanier, *Becoming Human*, Ontario, 2003, pp. 35-69.

54. G. S. Kirk, *et al*, op. cit, 1983, p. 35.

55. 'Philia' is a difficult word to attribute precise meaning. Clearly Aristotle uses the word to express 'friendship' amongst individuals, however this term is too narrow for other passages where Aristotle appears to use the word to imply 'relationships' between individuals who 'get on well' with or individuals who 'like each other'.

56. For example, 1155a5-9; and 1155a23-28; *Nicomachean Ethics,* trans. T. Irwin, Second Edition, Indianapolis, 1999.

57. In the most general form at 1156a6-1157b4, ibid.

58. 1155a33-1155b-16, ibid.

59. 1155b16-1156a5, ibid. This generic definition is also offered by Neera Kapur Badhwar 'Friends as Ends in Themselves' *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. XLVIII, No. 1, September 1987, pp. 1-23, p1, and Nancy Sherman, 'Aristotle on Friendship and the Shared Life' *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. XLVII, No. 4, June 1987, pp. 589-613, p. 589.

60. Abraham Maslow, 'A Theory of Motivation' *Psychological Review,* Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 370-96, proposed a two tier system of needs distinguished by higher and lower needs. The latter group includes attributes that promote an individual's personal physiological and safety needs.

61. 1156b6-1158b10, *Nicomachean Ethics,* op. cit.

62. E. Telfer, 'Friendship' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* Volume 71, pp. 223-241.

63. R. J. White, 'Friendship and Commitment' *Journal of Value Inquiry,* 33: pp. 79-88.

64. 1166a30, Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, op. cit.

65. 1155a3, ibid.

66. 1156b20-30, ibid.

67. I have modified seven components that Jean Vanier presents about the nature of an initiate psychological and emotional friendship that he discusses between two women. J Vanier, *Becoming Human*, Ontario, 1999, pp. 22-31.

68. Indeed, in further research I intend to articulate where Aristotle details these components.

69. 1156b32, op cit.

70. Ibid.

THE CHALLENGE OF IMPERSONALISM: A REFORMULATION

Jan Olof Bengtsson

Abstract
The article approaches personalism indirectly by looking at its opposite, at that which personalism turns against: what Borden Parker Bowne called 'impersonalism'. Giving a brief historical overview of the forms impersonalism has taken in the West, and some suggestions of their significance today, the article develops further the comparative study introduced by later American personalists. It focuses on the impersonalism characteristic of many Eastern currents of thought, and raises the question of its implications for personalism.

1. Personalism and impersonalism

For personalists, who stress the practical, moral and social implications of their philosophy, the challenge of what Borden Parker Bowne called 'impersonalism'[1] is not merely a theoretical matter. And it is not limited to what he analysed primarily in epistemological and metaphysical terms. In order fully to understand the nature and meaning of impersonalism, a somewhat deeper and broader historical analysis is needed, which reveals the sometimes hidden presence and influence of this phenomenon in a broader sense, and its ramifications beyond philosophy.

Personalism as a conscious, explicit philosophy arose as a reaction against impersonalism in the distinct forms it took in Western modernity. This does not mean that pre-modern society was more personalistic. Not only do some of the roots of impersonalism and of what I call the 'pantheistic revolution' in the modern West reach far back into the Middle Ages and antiquity: the general worldview of the 'non-differentiated' cosmological civilizations, in Eric Voegelin's sense, the abstract generalism, or the abstract generalist interpretation, of Plato's and Aristotle's theories of form, the metaphysics of Plotinus, major strands in Hermeticism and Gnosticism, and the teachings of some of the most important mystics.[2] It is also the case that many of the general constituents of most forms of personalism are, in their explicit philosophical elaboration and conceptual formulation, distinctly products of Western modernity: the general

legacy of Renaissance humanism, the focus on subjectivity and self-consciousness, the stress on the individual (both in the Enlightenment and Romantic sense) and the broadly liberal political development related to this, the historical consciousness, the German tradition of *Bildung*.[3]

It is not even that personalism rejects everything in the impersonalist pantheism which contributed to shaping modernity in contradistinction and opposition to Christian (and Jewish and Islamic) orthodoxy. The simple polarity of orthodox Christian, Trinitarian tradition on the one hand and heterodox, pantheistic modernity on the other, and the construing of this polarity as one between personalism and impersonalism, is problematic not only for those who are not fully convinced by the arguments of the so-called 'social Trinitarians' that the Trinitological dogma as originally formulated is in itself already personalistic in the modern sense. It also leaves out the fact that one of the most important strands of modern Western personalism, the idealistic one developed by the so-called 'speculative theists' in Europe in the nineteenth century and continued in America by Bowne, extracted new personalistic insights from the general philosophical idealism which, as developed by other thinkers, was one of the main forms of modern impersonalism.

2. The nature of modern Western impersonalism

Yet impersonalism is, as such, a dominant influence in modernity with palpable cultural and political consequences. It is much more than materialism or scientific abstractionism and reductionism. The specifically modern developments of some of the mentioned pre-modern roots include the rationalist pantheism of Spinoza and his Enlightenment successors, the romanticized Spinozistic pantheism of many of the idealists and romantic poets, and nihilism. Not least, they include the ideological collectivisms which soon predictably replaced the shallow individualism that was in reality organically linked to and inseparable from the larger pantheism and its inherent tendency towards self-transformation into atheism, and which culminated in the totalitarian communism of the twentieth century which within the lifetimes of some of us killed tens of millions of human persons. Not only can modern materialism, and scientism and its philosophical ancillae, often be linked to the preceding, pantheistic forms of impersonalism, but postmodernism, broadly conceived, cannot be properly understood apart from the background of the relativism of romanticized

pantheism.[4]

The humanistic, moral, spiritual, and social values of personalism have always been challenged by impersonalism in various forms, and there is no sign that this will change in the foreseeable future. The deeper currents I have briefly indicated have today developed to a point where the threat to the value and dignity of the person is more formidable than ever. This is especially so in view of the technological resources for propaganda and control that are now available for the sinister praxis of impersonalism.

3. Understanding Eastern impersonalism

It is not least for this reason that the challenge needs to be even better understood than it has been in the past. The personalists' understanding is correct as far as it goes, but the challenge must be reformulated in order to make possible a grasp of the factors and dimensions that have heretofore been left out.

And this reformulation must include even more than what I have this far suggested. There are forms of impersonalism which at least in themselves do not seem to constitute or lead to serious threats against the values of personalism in the same way that the distinctly modern forms of Western impersonalism do. These are forms that constitute a philosophical challenge not least because of the truth they contain. It is on these forms, and on their relation to modern impersonalism, that I will focus here.

The reformulation must include impersonalism in the form it takes in the several Eastern traditions of thought and spiritual practice which have long been influential in the West as well. And including them introduces new considerations that are different from the ones pertaining to Western impersonalism.

The Eastern spiritual traditions' influence in the West is not unrelated to the story of Western impersonalism. For ever since the early nineteenth-century romantics, it was mainly Western impersonalists who became attracted to these traditions.[5]

There can be no doubt that there are similarities between some forms of Eastern spiritual impersonalism and Neoplatonism and some main forms of mysticism in the West, and there is a long-standing scholarly tradition which has stressed the close parallels between Shankara's *advaita* vedanta and the so-called absolute idealism in the West in the nineteenth century, primarily as represented by Bradley. But the emphasis on the similarities has often obscured the differences that are due to the extent to which modern impersonalism in the West is shaped by the specifically Western phenomenon of modernity, the development of which can at a deep level be analysed in terms of the complex dual and confluent influence of rationalism and romanticism. Because Westerners are still so deeply shaped by this influence, because its analysis has no vantage-point outside of it and is undertaken only from within it, its true nature still seems in many respects insufficiently understood.[6]

Even more than a thorough assimilation of the thought of the pre-modern West (which is, like modernity, specifically Western, but less so), the comparative, East-West perspective is eminently suited to rectifying this. For no equivalents of this broad, systematically conditioning influence are found in the non-Western, pre-modern traditions of Persia, India, China, or Japan.

Yet the predominance of Western rationalism and romanticism has often had the consequence that, on the one hand, Westerners have viewed Sufism, Buddhism, Vedanta, Yoga, Taoism, and Zen through Western rationalist and, more commonly, romantic glasses, and on the other that Easterners, either because of problems experienced in their effort to reach out to and make themselves understood by Westerners or because of the process of Westernization of the East, have adapted their own teachings to the Western rationalist and romantic sensibilities and mindset. For instance, yoga has been presented as a 'science', large parts of the 'scientific worldview' have been incongruously affirmed, or the importance of 'the heart' for spiritual enlightenment has been preached without any of the distinctions with regard to different meanings of that word that are called for from the perspective of their own historical teachings.

From the perspective of some of the most general and basic insights of the East, some of the constituents of Western personalism that are not just derived from but parts of modern secular humanism stand out starkly as in decisive respects problematic. Sufism, Buddhism, Vedanta, Yoga, Taoism, and Zen all have in common the emphasis on the need to transcend the human ego, understood as the false identification with the transient mind and body. The Sanskrit term for this phenomenon is *ahamkara*, literally, the 'I-maker'. The true reality, harmony with the whole, and the world of spirit, of being, of Brahman, of the Tao, of enlightenment, is reached only through the kind of meditation that allows the attachments to our psycho-physical apparatus, and the whole of the distorted and distorting perspective —on everything—that follows from it, to dissolve.[7]

When the eminent Christian psychologist William Kilpatrick criticized the school of humanistic psychology and the Association of Transpersonal Psychology for increasingly turning to Eastern spirituality in the 1970s, he mistakenly saw the

latter's teachings on the Self as tantamount to a new kind of transpersonally inflated, pseudo-divine egocentrism.[8] Clearly aware of the problems in psychology caused by modern individualism as based on rationalism and romanticism, Kilpatrick, no less than the psychologists he opposed, read Western phenomena into the teachings of the East.

4. Humanism and personalism

What I call early personalism, the forms of partly idealistic personalism which Bowne represents and which existed in Europe before him, rejected the distinctly impersonalistic drift of the modern pantheistic revolution. In some forms modern humanism too turns against a general pantheism and monism: for instance in Irving Babbitt's and Paul Elmer More's so-called New Humanism, which sought to reconnect to classical and indeed *classicist* insights.[9] Babbitt did this in a way which, without relinquishing some partial truths of rationalism and romanticism (of which his modern understanding of the philosophical significance of the will and the imagination is a particularly noteworthy example[10]), overcame the main romantico-rationalistic development that came to define the psychology which Kilpatrick, partly inspired by Claes Ryn's elaboration of Babbitt's philosophy[11], dismissed.

Babbitt's kind of humanism was not just congenial with but had close parallels in early personalism. There, personalism was defined in terms of self-actualization through the formation of moral character and the realization of higher values, all precisely defined. It is not enough to defend the person. The person can be monstrous and evil, or rather, can assume a monstrous and evil character. Personalism must defend the person always, but also stress the need for qualified personality, or personality as manifest through moral character and the assimilation, and the *living*, of certain values and qualities.

Early personalism also sought to understand in metaphysical terms the spiritual or ideal essence of the person. Yet although, since antiquity, the very term person had undergone a striking inversion of meaning, from the most external, the mask, the role, the socially determined identity, to the innermost spiritual essence,[12] the relation between that essence and what I called the psycho-physical identity was rarely, if ever, conceived in the same way as in the East. Without necessarily rejecting the whole humanist framework of thought—as Taoism often famously did with Confucianism, which latter Babbitt defended as truly humanistic—the Eastern traditions for the most part go beyond it altogether. Even at the highest levels of moral character, the psycho-physical identity is not enough; the

identification with it is false, no matter how necessary and beneficial such character is in this world and in human society. From the higher perspective, the reductive identification with the ego, the mind, and the body is as such monstrous and evil, as it were. As a student of the Upanishads, and for his time relatively free from the typical Western misperceptions, the early Paul Elmer More here supplemented his friend Babbitt, and added to the New Humanism the dimension of meditation, beyond the level of ethical mediation to which Babbitt kept.

5. The needed Eastern corrective

The Eastern traditions are full not just of theoretical analyses, stories, parables, and myths which in countless ways bring home to us how the ego and the mind stand in the way of true reality, harmony, insight, awakening, enlightenment, liberation. Even more importantly, there are the various meditative practices designed to bring about concrete experiential realization of the state beyond *ahamkara* and the impurity, conditioning, and misconceptions of our existential situation—or predicament—which it produces.

No matter how modern Western romantics as well as their critics read into the traditional East their own immanentist conceptions, the fact that the transcendent dimension is also there cannot be denied, although this dimension is not conceived in the radical, non-experiential manner of deism, or of a Karl Barth. In addition to the isolated and largely ignored contributions of More, the vastly increased scholarly and other familiarity with the Eastern traditions since the nineteenth century, and indeed since the counter-cultural, 'hippie' era in the 1960s and 70s, makes it possible for the West today to leave at least the most problematic reinterpretations behind.

Western impersonalism has not, in any of the forms I have mentioned, provided a tenable corrective to morally unqualified personalism. Again, as in some of the romantic poets, it was often itself inseparable from a simultaneously shallow and monstrous individualism. Nor is it really a proper corrective to the qualified personalism that is confined to the level of the psycho-physical identification. Early personalism sufficiently analysed the former - the kind of personalism that could be said to be represented by, for instance, Carl Rogers.[13] But only the Eastern traditions—and the few corresponding forms of Christian mysticism—fully diagnosed and prescribed a treatment for the latter.

6. Preconditions of the requisite synthesis

The West of course neither could nor should simply

relinquish its own rationalism and romanticism. There is a distinctiveness of the modern West that is good and not just one that is bad.[14] New creative cultural syntheses always appear, and it is inevitable that the assimilation of the Eastern teachings by Western philosophers who are open to such cross-cultural broadening of philosophy will inevitably to some extent involve an adaptation of them, and produce historically new versions. But it is precisely in this process that a Babbittian understanding of Western modernity seems to me a necessary precondition of the proper discernment.

Yet there is still much confusion that must be cleared away if the potential of new cultural bridge-building and dialogue is not going to be lost. Under the influence of the pantheistic revolution, personalism itself has come in the course of the twentieth century increasingly to emphasize the importance of the body for personal identity; John Macmurray is a case in point. It is because I accept the truth of the mentioned Eastern teachings—and their partial Western counterparts—that I reject this form of personalism. While the variegatedness of psycho-physical natures is not just a non-negligible fact but a positive value on the relative plane of existence, the kind of identification with them that from the higher perspective is seen to be ignorance reduces and debases the person, and also makes him more easily controlled and manipulable by the powers that be.

This does not mean that the body should be ignored or devalued. It is primarily the erroneous identification with the mind that is harmful to the body, as it indeed is to the proper use of the mind itself. The actualization of our true and higher nature as consciousness brings light to both the body and the mind—including will, imagination, and reason—and thus supports moral character-formation on the humanistic level.

In showing the element of illusoriness in the personal identification with the psycho-physical nature, Eastern impersonalism poses a challenge deeper and more important than modern Western impersonalism. It also seems it does not in itself have the same problematic practical implications and ideological applications. Yet if it continues to be seen, and made, to dovetail with modern Western impersonalism and reinterpreted in terms of its rationalism and romanticism, it may reinforce this impersonalism and aggravate its consequences. While I accept Eastern impersonalism's general position as far as I have discussed it here, I reject it with regard to the nature of the higher spiritual reality and totality to which we belong.

7. Towards an adjustment of personalism

Alan Watts spoke of 'the taboo against knowing who you are'.[15] What not only he, Aldous Huxley, and many others shaped by the Western pantheistic revolution, but also the authentic Eastern impersonalist traditions teach, each in their own way and with their own variations and emphases, is that we are not persons at all, that our personhood is illusion and ignorance, that we are ultimately non-distinct from the absolute impersonal being or non-being, and that the achievement of or the return to that non-distinction is our supreme goal.

I submit that despite the mentioned limitations, the Western personalists saw deeper than that.

And they were not alone in doing so. Despite the fact that they were thoroughly introduced in classic works on Indian philosophy—like, for instance, that of Surendranath Dasgupta—it is only recently that the significance of what is sometimes described as the personalist traditions of the East, in particular the schools of Vedanta that rejected important aspects of Shankara's *advaita*, has been more fully understood by the Western scholars whose perceptions of the East were so long shaped by rational-romantic impersonalism. But not least some American personalists had pointed to their importance. The comparative work they initiated needs to be continued, and the next step should in my view be the consideration of the fact that this Eastern personalism agrees with Eastern impersonalism in the analysis of the false identification of *ahamkara*. It is the world of real being *beyond* this identification that is here understood as at the same time oneness and differentiation, and it is the differentiated beings *on that level* who come to identify with—and temporarily shape and express themselves through—the ever-changing psycho-physical natures.

In this article I have merely reformulated the challenge of impersonalism as I think it must be understood in our time, and only briefly indicated that the challenge is such as to require a decisive new adjustment of personalism. The further elaboration of that adjustment cannot be undertaken here. Suffice it to say, in concluding, that in personalistic Vedanta and the interpretations of the Upanishads, the Bhagavad Gita, and the Vedanta Sutra on which it builds, and as supplementing Western personalism, is already found much of the answer, not least in terms of its long-standing tradition of spiritual practice and its authoritative accounts of spiritual experience.

AUTONOMY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

J. K. Swindler

Abstract

By attributing accountability, we constitute the moral significance of persons, actions and attitudes. Holding oneself accountable constitutes one's autonomy. Thus, moral persons are a kind of artifact. The impossibility of a private language proves that one can reliably follow rules by which one has bound oneself, and grounds the sociality of accountability. Autonomy is real only because it is the product of the attribution of accountability, rather than some mysterious quasi-empirical feature of minds.

Keywords:
Person, autonomy, accountability, private language, sociality, artifact.

1.

In the *Foundations,* Kant several times repeats the following idea

> Man...puts himself in a different order of things and in a different relationship to determining grounds of an altogether different kind when he thinks of himself as intelligence with a will and thus as endowed with causality.[1]

Although Kant ultimately sees the relation between his two standpoints or two worlds as inscrutable, we can make some sense of his point by understanding putting ourselves into a different order of things as simply attributing purposive action, i.e., as making ourselves subject to norms under which we are accountable. Kant has it right: I can no more think of myself as evading moral laws when I act than I can think of myself as evading natural laws when I don't. Moreover, in acknowledging my accountability I must admit that I am free since accountability brings my conduct under relevant norms, which it is up to me to follow or not. Merely attributing accountability to myself elevates me above the oppression of natural law. Even if freedom makes no scientific sense, anyone who thinks of me as bound by norms must concede my autonomy.

But how can this binding occur? Kant says, 'man *puts himself* in a different order of things'. How do we create objective facts by merely shifting perspective? The key, I think, is to see that although a thing is not in general what it is merely thought to be—is, after all, room for false belief—are what their properties make them and some properties can (indeed, can only) be determined by mental attitudes. They have no existence, as such, apart from how we represent them to ourselves, i.e., while 'natural' properties are mind independent, the ones that put us

into that other order of things are mind dependent.[2] Natural science conceals as much as it reveals. It often succeeds in showing how things and events come about, but stripped of whatever function or purpose they may have. For these are characteristic only of artefacts and science has long since given up construing nature as artefact. Nevertheless artefacts— of them as natural objects and events to which functionality is adjoined— quite real and they are of many kinds. In this essay I explore the possibility of understanding choices, actions and attitudes as artefacts that reveal the purposiveness and therefore the autonomy of agents. I suggest that normative agents, their actions, etc., are constituted as normatively significant artefacts by the attribution of the functional property of accountability. Attributing purpose to an act transforms the ontological status of the event, drawing it under norms characteristic of that specific kind of purpose—a language, making a promise, fathering a child—one accountable for enacting those norms and therefore making one autonomous.

2.

I want to consider the roots of this capacity to freely bind ourselves to follow norms. The issue goes to whether one can commit oneself to a repetitive task that stretches indefinitely out into the future, whether one can in principle know whether one is still on track, in short whether one can reliably follow a rule binding only oneself. Wittgenstein' question of the coherence of a private language is but one example, if a particularly trenchant one, of this query[3].

In rejecting the 'hyperbolic' scepticism of Descartes' first *Meditation,* Wittgenstein suggests that a central feature of our form of life is that linguistic practice is unintelligible except as a public, social enterprise. The meaningfulness of even so simple an utterance as the cogito depends upon a linguistic community. The private language argument casts doubt on what an isolated self[4] can be confident of by drawing attention to its contextual deficits. It recasts the cogito as subject to conditions associated with public discourse, thus refracting the Cartesian self, divesting self-certainty, and posing the question whether there is a use of language free from doubt that one is applying the rule of its use properly. Is there a concept such that I cannot doubt that I am thinking it and not some other concept?

Finding a semblance of certainty only in sociality, the argument reveals our dependence on others[5] to reliably represent to us standards that enable

confident re-identification of recurring locutions. Thus, language must be a communal enterprise impossible to pursue privately. So even the minimal language of the cogito testifies to our normative sociality. Thus, Cartesian subjectivity is not contrary to sociality, since it can only be framed around an already inherently social self. The cogito provides proof not merely of a thinker, but of an agent, interacting in a social setting, following norms for expressing concepts that apply to others similarly situated.

3.

The impossibility of doubting one's existence yields merely subjective certainty but what more is implied by that certainty is suggested in Descartes' claim that 'this proposition 'I am', 'I exist', whenever I utter it or conceive it in my mind, is necessarily true'.[6] This necessary truth is thus itself the ground of the indubitability of the cogito of pure subjectivity. But that necessity, therefore, immediately transcends the subjective self-certainty it grounds, providing not only the grounds of sociality just noted but a paradigmatic instance of what *ought* to be believed. Thus epistemic as well as linguistic normativity accompanies subjectivity. Our normativity is inescapable because it is already present in the cogito in at least these two ways. We need it, and we have it just where it is needed most.

Wittgenstein's achievement is to have traced the conditions of his own thought and language down to intersubjective norms, which ironically is very much in line with Descartes' own rejection of scepticism, though minus the theology. But, in revealing the implicit social normativity of linguistic expression, Wittgenstein also made it clear that these standards cannot depend on merely occurrent ideas or outward signs alone, since there is a serious mismatch between concepts on the one hand and either psychological content or behaviour on the other. For underlying the normativity of language is the normativity of concepts: language itself is governed by conceptual norms. Wittgenstein brought the problem to the surface by asking how we can confidently 'go on' following a rule in the face of ideational and behavioural ambiguities.

But the notion of a concept is itself ambiguous between the realist form or universal and the corresponding idea, even if both are expressed by the same locutions. The generality that concepts express and therefore their normativity derive from the form; the idea is derivative. This is key to solving the private language problem, which looks even now so puzzling because, I think, Wittgenstein failed to fully grasp the normative generality of concepts. Had he taken a realist stance (say Platonic or Fregean)

towards concepts, their generality and its importance could have come clear to him. But, as we know from his attempt to reduce universals to family resemblance, like Hume, he balked at the very notion of generality.[7]

What is the significance of generality with respect to the possibility of a private language, rule following, grasping concepts, etc.? Moreover, how does generality help us understand freely binding ourselves to normative standards?

4.

Here I want to extend the discussion in a different direction, to engage not only language and thought but freedom.[8] Let us begin by briefly distinguishing four familiar kinds of freedom according to the kinds of evidence they present. First, there is phenomenological freedom, the subjective feeling of freedom to act, even on whim, to raise one's hand or blink an eye or to choose one's words. This form of freedom is to be associated with the absence of constraint. Second is objective negative freedom, the lack of actual constraint or obstacles, i.e., 'freedom from' being actually prevented from acting, whether felt or not. Third is objective, positive 'freedom to', an ability to choose among real, live options and to act on one's choices. Finally, there is normative freedom or genuine autonomy, which transcends these others by binding oneself under genuinely general normative concepts or rules. Autonomy may involve all three of the other forms of freedom but the generality of the norms it lays down transcends their common focus on only a single choice or action.[9]

My aim here is to clarify autonomy. The first thing to notice about autonomy is that it is always, as I will say, 'rule-binding'. In our case that means binding ourselves by norms governing the coherence of intentions, attitudes, and actions. Second, autonomy is always first personal. No one can make another autonomous; it is always achieved by self-imposition of norms.[10] Third, standards of conduct, etc., entail accountability for satisfying or failing to satisfy those standards. This suggests a mechanism for creating autonomy: simply by holding ourselves and others accountable, we confer autonomy. For holding accountable has a point only if actions exemplify properties attributable only to agents, the properties expressed in what Kant calls 'maxims of action', like intending to do such and such or trying not to harm so and so. Holding accountable presumes agents act on maxims that may serve as norms. We make such attributions inveterately. On pain of ceasing our commerce with concepts, norms, laws, praise, blame, duties, etc.,[11] holding accountable is our principal means of affirming our autonomy and hence our

freedom. Since our feelings of freedom and our perceptions of resistance can so easily mislead and since autonomy is a conceptually necessary condition of rule-binding, I take it not only that ought implies can but that strictly, *only ought implies can.*

The important point is the mind-dependence of normativity and freedom. It's not just that only entities with minds can be free. Rather, autonomy is present only because it is attributed. It is the product of the attribution of accountability to oneself (or others), rather than merely an empirical feature accompanying having a mind.[12] Autonomy is to be understood as conceptually dependent on accountability and accountability on attribution. Thus, sociality transfers to freedom; freedom is a social concept.

This affirms again the generality of norms. Sociality—properties relating similar creatures similarly situated—of the essence of normativity. Indeed, the notion of a norm is, in part, the notion of a condition that applies equally to a relevant range of cases. This equality of application is due to the essential rationality of norms, which appears not only in the objective and general demands of norms but also in their intelligibility to those subject to them.

But whoever really is subject to or obligated by a self-imposed normative standard is able to satisfy its demands. Lack of this ability for reasons either internal or external to the agent is sufficient to defeat the demand: hence our practice of allowing excuses for ignorance, coercion, accidents, etc. By the same token, whoever falls under such norms, and can satisfy them, is also able not to satisfy them. Autonomy I take to be this remarkable capacity to satisfy or to fail to satisfy self-imposed norms. The evidence that confirms this capacity I take to be independent of any other subjective or objective phenomena, for I see nothing about us but our normativity that is rich enough to sustain our autonomy or by which we can put ourselves into that other order of things.[13]

5.

A word is in order about objectivity and normativity. Norms in the sense in play here rest on two key features. On the one hand, they are norms because they are rules that are self-imposed, i.e. they are patterns of conduct, etc. to which we commit ourselves, so that norms are already the result of autonomous agency. On the other hand, they are in principle accessible by other agents to whom they apply, which is the underlying condition of sociality. These two features—self-binding and intersubjective—the objectivity of norms.[14] They transcend any validity that could be gained from mere subjectivity or arbitrary convention.[15]

It may be helpful to compare the practice of promising, though we should be wary of generalizing from this kind of case. When I make a promise, there is the objective fact of the utterance and there is the broader objective social fact of the practice. The key point is that in making the promise, I take advantage of the fact that the obligation to make good on it that is internal to the practice is therefore internal to my promise in particular. Thus, I am objectively accountable to keep my promise. What goes for promising in this respect goes for normativity generally. I speak a language, drive a car, vote in elections and engage in any number of other practices with internal norms. In doing so, I autonomously take on the norms of the practice as my own and become objectively subject to them. Wittgenstein's private language argument suggests a model of how norms internal to an autonomous practice bind us.

One may, of course, respond with scepticism about objective norms. Surely these are not objective in the same sense that astronomy reports the facts about planets or botany about plants. Of course not: a different canon of objectivity is in order referring to a different order of things. Instead of asking what causes our choices, obligations, rights, etc. (which are not physically caused at all), the appropriate question is what *justifies* them. Norms cannot be explained causally any more than physical events can be explained normatively. No one could be rationally content that the conclusions of her arguments are merely effects of the operation of causal laws on prior events; conclusions are not merely caused but justified: the force of arguments can only be due to satisfaction of rational norms. As a thinker, one not only behaves in certain ways but also grasps the relevant norms, the principles that justify drawing certain conclusions, etc. The alternative is not thinking at all.[16]

6.

Now, I have been presuming that norms are given and, as McDowell, following Sellars, has taught us,[17] there is much room for scepticism about the given. Everything turns, of course, on what the given is supposed to be. Here there is a danger of falling into nominalism. If the given can only be like a signpost or rails trailing off in the distance, it is indeed ambiguous with respect to content and motivationally impotent. But what if that presence—a sense of duty or dignity—to be anchored in our common cognitive capacities so as to always point beyond itself via generalization? That is what is required for a meaning rule, an inference rule, a rule of calculation, a concept, or any other norm. Indeed, what if the norm were to go beyond the cognitive to the conative

or, better still, combine the two? What if the norm were to appeal and beckon us on by revealing that movement in a certain direction would bring out our own best nature: our capacity to maintain the integrity of our intentions, motives and actions, our sense of the ultimate worth and dignity of creatures like us who care about being in the right?[18]

By displaying such features, as if holding before us a mirror reflecting only our better half, such a given does not merely stand before us displaying unmoving information, merely demanding ever-finer interpretation. Since, in reflecting our own self-imposed normativity, this given is already a part of us. The tests we apply to our concepts, intentions, etc., are tests for whether they are worthy of us. Some concepts, like the necessities that show up in logic, ethics, mathematics, etc., are intrinsically objects of desire (Kant's 'higher faculty of desire') for cognitive beings and we have direct apprehension of these, as direct as anything we experience. This *Platonic given*, if I may call it that—idea and ideal—a siren calling us not to destruction like the ancient sirens but to fulfilment. That is the work of genuine social intentions expressing norms as living standards, not mere signposts but *cognitive motives*. Only by heeding such a call do we succeed in grasping concepts and carrying on coherently.

Less metaphorically, the Platonic given expresses both a cognitive and a conative content. This implies a two-step procedure reminiscent of Kant' testing of maxims of action. First, we formulate the maxim to confirm its relevance, the one that expresses our intention, a process typically prone to a frustrating, though hardly self-defeating, dialectic. Second, we generalize the maxim to determine whether it can hold up under other circumstances, from all points of view. In Kantian ethics, if an intention passes this test, we may act on it. But, to go beyond ethics, our intention may be to carry out a mathematical procedure like addition. We formulate the procedure and generalize it to test for consistency; if no discernible conundrums present themselves, conatively, we have earned the right to carry on with the intention, to proceed with confidence as the maxim directs. Obeying norms of language, institutional practices, etc., follow similar patterns.

How can we be certain of carrying on consistently or that someone else grasps precisely the same concept? So far as I can see, the best answer to that epistemic question is that we have applied and passed the test as described. Grasping is scalar, as is understanding. We grasp a practical concept fully when we understand its generality, its normativity and what falls under it. But it is easy to demand too much and that way lies scepticism. It is enough to be reasonably rather than perfectly confident of what we mean. We are prone to error: memory lapses, constitutional frailties, inattention, etc. But, no matter, insofar as one does grasp the concept, one is subject to its demands. And genuine universals do impose demands, both cognitive and conative. They do not stand mute and unmoving like Arthur Clarke' monolith.[19]

7.

We alone of all things seem able to determine our own nature. But the nature of anything—makes it a thing of a certain kind—the properties it possesses, the concepts it falls under, the laws to which it is subject. As creators of our own nature, we subsume ourselves under laws. My suggestion here has been that we do that by holding ourselves accountable, for coherence in act and attitude, and for respecting those who are similarly autonomous. Determining the content of the laws of our own nature and constituting our nature by imposing that content on ourselves, which we do by attributing accountability to ourselves, justifies our claim to dignity and autonomy.[20]

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Notes:

1. Immanuel Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,* trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), 76.
2. Cf. John R. Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality,* (New York: The Free Press, 1995.
3. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, tr., G.E.M. Anscombe, 2nd ed. (NY: Macmillan, 1958). Regarding rule following, in sec. 201, Wittgenstein concludes, 'there is a way of grasping a rule which is *not* an *interpretation*, but which is exhibited in what we call 'the rule' and 'against it' in actual cases'. Regarding privacy, he immediately concludes, in sec. 202, 'to *think* one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately' otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same as obeying it'. I am grateful to John McDowell for useful discussion of these passages.
4. A 'congenital isolate', to borrow Margaret Gilbert's apt phrase. See also my essay, 'The Permanent Heartland of Subjectivity', *Idealistic Studies,* 25, 3 (1996), 221-229.
5. Even if the other is only 'imaginary'. What is required is representation of another perspective that is subject to the same standards.
6. René Descartes, Second Meditation, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, tr. and ed. by Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Thomas Geach, in *Descartes Philosophical*

Writings (Bobbs-Merrill: Indianapolis, 1971), 67.

7. Op. cit., e.g., sec. 65-67.

8. As Casteñada used to say, 'When I doubt, complicate'.

9. Common parlance, of course, recognizes, in addition, various forms of institutional freedoms, but I think these can be subsumed under one or another of the kinds just distinguished.

10. It is obvious, on the other hand, that creating adverse conditions can effectively prevent the development of autonomy in others. Children are especially vulnerable but the point holds of the powerless in general.

11. Cf. P. F. Strawson, 'Freedom and Resentment', *Proceedings of the British Academy,* 48 (1962), 1-25.

12. Thus, most of the debate over free will is feckless, since it seeks the impossible: an empirically, i.e. passively, discernible property that can only be given by attribution, i.e., actively.

13. Notice too that this is not an issue of what control one may have over what. To be sure, being subject to an obligation requires some material, executive abilities. But the freedom that follows from accountability does so only conceptually, not physically or biologically, as it were. One may be free in this sense despite physical inabilities and other kinds of constraints. Thus, when Emerson visited Thoreau, in jail for tax evasion over the Mexican War, and asked, 'Henry, what are you doing in there?' Thoreau could reply, 'Waldo, the question is what are you doing out there?' Normative freedom, as I understand it in this Kantian sense, is not a matter of violating the natural causal order. It is matter of recognizing in oneself and others the fact of falling under normative concepts. It is in addition, grasping the content of those norms.

14. For, as Frege makes clear, it is necessary that concepts be shareable in order to make sense of their role in attributions, communication, and language. See 'The Thought', tr. A. M. and Marcelle Quinton, *Mind*, LXV (1956), 289-311.

15. Consider whether 'I think, therefore I am free' might be as self-confirming as the cogito itself or such reports of experience as 'I feel pain' appear to be. Ultimately, Descartes' reason for accepting the cogito is that he cannot doubt it. Every doubt that might be raised against it—his senses deceive him, that he is dreaming that he exists, that the demon makes him think so, etc.—confirms that he exists. In this sense, the cogito may be said to be self-confirming. It is an engine that turns doubt into belief. Similarly, unless I acknowledge the necessity that my thought and talk conform to the conceptual structures I intend them to contain and express, how could they be in the least degree meaningful? Either 2+3=5 or the exercise is a sham, which is to acknowledge the demands of the concepts, demands that would be senseless without my being able to meet them, which in turn implies my freedom. Thinking and saying 'I think' are normative and subjection to norms implies the possibility of keeping them or violating them and that possibility is freedom. In order to reject my freedom, I would have to affirm that I am not free. But that affirmation implies that I am subject to the norms of thought and language and therefore that I am free.

16. This point parallels Kant's well-known distinction between acting in accordance with a law and acting in accordance with the concept of a law.

17. See Wilfred Sellars, 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind', in *The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. I,* ed. by H. Feigl and M. Scriven (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1956); and John McDowell, *Mind, Values, and Reality* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), especially essays 10 to 14.

18. Here it is worth thinking through Kant' conative characterization of our consciousness of duty in the 2nd *Critique*: '[the moral law]… in itself positive, being the form of an intellectual causality, i.e., the form of freedom, it is at the same time an object of respect, since… striking down, i.e., humiliating, self-conceit, it is object of the greatest respect and thus the ground of a positive feeling… can be known a priori. Respect for the moral law, therefore, is a feeling produced by an intellectual cause, and this feeling the only one which we can know completely a priori and the necessity of which we can discern'. *Critique of Practical Reason,* tr. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), 76.

19. This point recalls remarks by McDowell in 'Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following', *Mind, Value and Reality*, 215-216. See especially 215, n. 25.

20. My thanks to Raffaela Giovagnoli for her astute comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Her interpretation and criticism is especially challenging and valuable regarding the development of autonomy under conditions of oppression.

PERSONS TRANSFORMED BY POLITICAL SOLIDARITY

Sally Scholz

Abstract

The unity with others in collective action to achieve a particular goal, known as political solidarity, transforms the individual. I examine the dual nature of that personal transformation — the motivational transformation and the normative transformation — and offer a study of the relation between political solidarity and empathy. While empathy may be part of the normative transformation, I argue that it is not a necessary element of the motivational transformation. I conclude with a discussion of epistemic empathy.

Key Words:
Empathy, identity, liberation, persons, political solidarity, resistance, solidarity

Solidarity, like justice, is a key concept in social and political theorizing. Political solidarity is that particular form of solidarity indicating

> a committed unity of peoples on a range of interpersonal to social-political levels with a social justice goal of liberation of the oppressed, cessation of injustice, or protection against social vulnerabilities; it simultaneously fosters individual self-determination, empowerment, cooperative action, collective vision, and social criticism among those in solidarity' (Scholz 2008, 58).

Examples of political solidarity abound. The most prominent is perhaps the unity of workers in Poland creating *Solidarity* in a passionate effort to resist communist party influence and assert the rights of workers to free expression (among other things). Workers throughout the world have joined in similar struggles for worker justice for well over a century. Similarly, women and men in Latin America protesting against U.S. government policy in their countries, college students around the globe spending breaks and summers working with the poor and disenfranchised or advocating for justice in Sudan, feminists working against gender violence, racially oppressed peoples and their supporters arguing for equality under the law, and countless other movements for social change demonstrate the power and potential of the committed action in a collectivity that is political solidarity. In all of these situations, those who engage in the moral relation of political solidarity are transformed. Their commitment causes them to see the world, live their moral commitments, and interact with community in a new way. In this paper, I argue that this transformation is really twofold. In both transformations, a person's relation to and in their community changes.

Political solidarity is a moral relation that mediates between individuals and a group united for a cause. Although the focus of studies of political solidarity are often on the ties that bind the group and the cause that unites them, individuals are transformed in a significant way by their participation in collective action with others. Some argue that the personal transformation occurs before the solidaristic relation is formed as individuals are motivated by empathy to join with others to bring about social change or that solidarity is the social form of empathy. Others argue that the transformation occurs within the processes of solidarity themselves. In this article, I argue that both of these moments of personal transformation are present but I also call into question the reliance on empathy as a motive for joining solidarity. Instead, I show how epistemic empathy becomes part of the normative transformation of a person who commits to the moral relation of political solidarity but that any number of things might motivate the initial personal transformation for political solidarity.

The article proceeds in four sections. First, I argue for the two transformative moments for political solidarity. One might be thought of as the motivational transformation and the other as the normative transformation. This helps to set up the question of the proper nature and role of empathy for and in political solidarity. Next, I address empathy directly. By analyzing what is meant by empathy, one can discern more clearly whether it plays a central or necessary part in political solidarity. The third section addresses epistemic empathy, and the fourth section concludes.

1. The dual nature of personal transformation for political solidarity.

Political solidarity, unlike social solidarity or civic solidarity, is a unity to bring about social change of some sort. As such, the persons joined in solidarity are united because they share a goal. The other two forms of solidarity are either descriptive of a social unity more generally or prescriptive of the obligations a state owes its citizens (see especially Scholz 2008, chap. 1). These are important forms of solidarity and likely play key roles in personal identity formation as well. However, for the purposes of this paper, I concentrate solely on political solidarity. I do this in part because it breaks into the more everyday relations of a community and in part because it is

oriented around a specific cause or goal that can be accomplished, surpassed, or altered. These distinctions mark it as unique from social solidarity wherein communal relations are more or less constant albeit with greater or lesser intensity, and civic solidarity which employs formal organizational structures of a state, region, or the international community to achieve goals of decreasing vulnerabilities among all citizens.

Political solidarity is a relation among a subset of persons within a wider community. These solidaristic actors aim, through their collective efforts, to alter some aspect of the larger community or society. While this might profitably be characterized as an oppositional relation, and indeed, those involved in political solidarity are opposing something, it is also important to note that political solidarity does not seek a strict or clean break from the larger community. It is not a separatist aim. On the contrary, the logic of solidarity is unity rather than division. That being said, however, the individuals joined in political solidarity do assume responsibility for opposing some aspect of the larger community and do make very public efforts to bring about change—perhaps even at great personal sacrifice. Distinguishing oneself in this way is more than simply pursuing personal interests over communal interests. It is adopting a new sense of 'communal' together with other people while not throwing off the former community life. Moreover, the new community or collective, because it is oriented around a goal of social change or social justice, is mediated and evaluated by additional moral standards than the larger community. The relations within the solidaristic community shape and are shaped by the participation of the unique individuals involved.

As a moral relation organized around a particular goal, political solidarity is not a pre-existing unity of people. That which brings people together might also serve to inspire others to join such that political solidarity results in an ever evolving group as individual members commit, alter their commitment, or drop out. In a similar way, each person commits to the cause according to their unique abilities. Some may devote all of their personal efforts to a cause while others make weaker commitments shaped in concert with other concerns or involvement with other solidaristic causes. Given this fluidity of the group and the variety of ways someone might be involved in political solidarity, it makes sense to talk of two forms of personal transformation: the motivational and the normative. The motivational transformation is that which brings about a change in a person toward political solidarity. The normative transformation is the transformation that is required within political solidarity in order for it to remain a moral relation.

1.A. The transformation that compels one to join in political solidarity with others.

Involvement in political solidarity for any given person may be motivated by any number of factors such as feelings of indignation, experiences of oppression or injustice, rational argumentation, desire to care for others who are suffering, or even employment situations. A transformation occurs when a person or a group of persons make an active commitment to work together. This commitment transforms an individual's former actions into part of a whole; isolated resistance efforts become a collective movement. I use the terms 'commitment' or 'active commitment' rather than 'conscious choice' because there may not be a conscious decision to become involved in a social movement. Political solidarity may transform a person from an individual into a solidary actor simultaneously with becoming a social movement. A social movement cannot be merely a conglomeration of individual actors and this is in part what distinguishes political solidarity from some other accounts of collective action.

What motivates the decision? Some fundamental change in how a person sees the world must occur in order for that person to make a commitment that will most certainly involve sacrifice and potential harm. Take for example an individual's decision to join in political solidarity with women's activists of Latin America, as Clare Weber describes in her book *Visions of Solidarity*. On Weber's account, many activists joined in solidarity with women in Latin America because they had been involved in the peace movement and struggles against unjust regimes in the region. But not all peace activists will turn to women's activism and some women's activists will join the movement of political solidarity precisely (or only) because it is a movement for the liberation of women. Equally plausibly, perhaps a person traveled in Latin America, developed some relationships, and came to a rich understanding of the situation of gender injustice from the experience of others. There might just as well be other motivations for a person to join collectively with others in political solidarity with the women's activists in Latin America. Perhaps, for instance, one's philosophical studies have led to arguments for global justice which, more often than not, entail a focus on poverty and gender relations. Political solidarity might then be a natural result of studied reasoning. Social and political stances against sweatshops, farmer subsidies, domestic violence, or colonial domination usually entail some connection to one's theoretical beliefs. If my principles of justice lead me to

conclude that violence against women is unjust, then I might feel compelled to respond to a situation of gender violence in Latin America that I read about in a newspaper. I do not necessarily need to know anyone in Latin America, nor do I need to seek to understand the experience of another as potentially my own. I can adopt a political commitment independent of such experience. So too, those who join in solidarity may convince others to be similarly stimulated to act by the force of their convictions.

If a commitment is made in solidarity or out of solidarity, then there is an implicit recognition that one acts with others, that is, that one is a part of a collective whole. This is not an abandonment of one's former communal life but a new collective life within or in addition to that which already existed. Political solidarity engages the lives and projects of many others in addition to fellow solidaristic actors. It has the potential to reshape one's relations with family and friends, one's social and political allegiances, and countless other interdependent relations.

1.B. The normative transformation within political solidarity

Any individual's commitment to political solidarity will be measured or determined by a number of factors including the exigency of the cause; the skills, ability, and desires of the individual; the coherence of other commitments, and any additional personal compulsions. That being said, however, does not detract from the fact that what one undertakes in committing to political solidarity is a moral relation distinct from other relations one maintains. I offer only brief characterizations of the arguments for the primary moral relations and obligations of political solidarity here; more extensive arguments may be found in Scholz 2008.

A solidaristic commitment to a cause transforms one's life by informing decisions. When one is committed to a political stance, one begins to see how other things affect that stance. Feminist political solidarity, for instance, might inform or influence such things as the purchase of one's daily needs. If a person knows a company practices unjust policies regarding the hiring and promotion of female employees, one's feminist political solidarity would likely encourage a personal boycott of the company's products or services or a political rally to raise awareness. In such a case, the individual enacts one of the normative transformations of political solidarity. The commitment to or relation to the goal of the solidaristic cause shapes mundane and moral decisions in new or newly politicized ways.

The commitment to a cause in political solidarity also informs other relations and, of course, puts one in a collective—a group that acts together, in concert, simultaneously, or consistently. Any individual who willingly takes on the commitment to solidarity also takes on a relation to others who similarly commit. This is the solidary collective. By becoming part of a moral collective for social change, participants also publicly set themselves apart from aspects of the larger society regarding the specific cause. Depending on the extent of the injustice to be resisted, this is generally not a spatial dislocation (though it could be that). Nevertheless, taking a stand in solidarity with others creates a relation not only with those others but also with all those people who are not part of the solidaristic effort.

In *Political Solidarity* (Chapter 3), I argued that at least three moral relations constitute political solidarity and form the heart of the normative personal transformation. The first and most distinct for political solidarity is the relationship to the goal of the social movement. Second, and perhaps most easily recognized, is the relationship between members of the solidary group. Finally, the relationship between both individual members and the solidary group and those not electing to participate in solidarity, or, in other words, the relation to nonmembers of the solidarity group, is the third moral relation.

These moral relations are interdependent with one another—each relation may be read through the other two. Reducing political solidarity to just the relation between solidaristic actors overlooks some of these key elements or relations of political solidarity.

Since political solidarity is an oppositional relation, the moral relation between solidary members and nonmembers may be broken down into a variety of different but interlocking relations. The differences result in part from the status of nonmembers and that status ought to be considered when thinking about the obligations of the relationship. Oppressors or architects of injustice are obviously morally blameworthy for the injustice the solidary group opposes. Nevertheless, opposition need not mean enmity. Individuals as well as the collective in solidarity might use this relation to challenge social structures, raise awareness of faulty assumption, and seek to change unjust practices through a wide variety of activist methods. Solidarity differs from other resistance efforts in seeing this as a moral relation. Individuals may have to experience the normative transformation in order to accept the relation to oppressors as a moral relation. Additionally, there is a moral relation to those people who, while not part of the resistance movement nor

directly responsible for oppression and injustice, receive some privilege because of the unjust situation. Finally, among the non-solidary people will be all those oppressed who do not (or have not yet) committed to political solidarity. The relation to nonmembers may be a relation between individuals or a relation between groups or states; it might be characterized by animosity, respect, indifference, disdain, or some combination of these and other qualities.

Finally and most importantly, when one commits to political solidarity, one commits to work with others for a cause, end, or goal. Part of the normative transformation is seeing that at times small actions have moral and political content. Ordinary actions become political actions when they are done in a reflective manner that actively engages the commitment to a cause or otherwise seeks to bring about social change challenges or resists a system perceived to be unjust or oppressive.

Regardless of the extent of one's commitment, the option to join in political solidarity is an adoption of moral obligations that have the potential to radically affect one's lifestyle and perhaps even all other significant moral choices. The ability to commit to a cause in political solidarity with others will both affect and be affected by the coherence of all other commitments. It is possible, in other words, to integrate the commitment to political solidarity fairly completely into one's life but the other commitments in one's life maintain their place and may at times pull one away from solidary action.

The diversity of individuals acting together in political solidarity might further contribute to the normative personal transformation. Each unique person contributes to the collective and while the collective shapes that individual's moral relations and decisions in at least some of the ways I have mentioned here, political solidarity is not a movement of the 'masses' wherein individuals meld with each other. As Max Scheler explains, there is an important distinction between the social unit of solidarity and the social unit of the masses:

> [T]here is no solidarity in the social unity of the mass because the individual does not exist at all as an experience and therefore cannot possess solidarity with others' (Scheler, 1973, 527).

By its very nature, solidarity generally, and political solidarity in particular, relies on the maintenance and value of individuals and what they contribute.

2. Empathy and solidarity

Having suggested these two personal transformations of political solidarity, I turn now to an exploration of the role or function of empathy in political solidarity. On one hand, it is clear that it may

place some role in motivating some people to make the commitment to join with others in political solidarity. On the other hand, empathy may set too high a standard for participation and end up excluding some people who would otherwise commit to the demanding obligations of political solidarity.

2.A. Empathy

Empathy generally means the capacity to understand and share another person's feelings or emotions. In everyday language, it usually means placing oneself in the other's position and often also means responding accordingly. It differs from sympathy or pity because one feels with the other rather than for the other. While not quite mutuality, there is a sense of togetherness to empathy and hence, understandably, many have seen a connection to solidarity. But political solidarity may be a unique enough form of solidarity that the connection is at least worth questioning.

Empathy may be defined as 'understanding that another is experiencing an emotion, and feeling an emotion that is similar to what the other feels because the other feels it' (Snow 2000, 68). In her thorough defense of this definition, Nancy Snow discusses the need for 'some degree of similarity' between the person experiencing the emotion and the empathetic person (2000, 69). Similarity is needed in order to ensure some accuracy in empathy. As she explains, 'emotions are composites of belief and affect' (2000, 69). For instance, Snow discusses the empathy one feels for literary characters. Whereas empathy for our friends results from our compassion for our friend and our knowledge of their beliefs and circumstances, fictional characters elicit our empathy because we identify with the characters in some way, according to Snow. She calls this identification an 'essential background condition' necessary 'to trigger our empathy' (2000, 70). Although we might follow Snow in calling this ''as if' empathy,' empathy as if the character were our real-life friend, what emerges in all cases of empathy is that empathy involves identification as a prior condition. Snow explores additional cases of accurate empathetic responses before concluding that 'actual similarities between persons as well as beliefs about similarities seem to be key factors for effecting empathetic identification' (2000, 71).

This account of empathy certainly seems to match the everyday usage of the term. One feels empathy for another because one understands a situation as well as the person for whom one feels empathy. People respond differently to different situations because they have different belief systems and cultural codes for responding. Knowledge of those ingrained characteristics would seem to be

necessary, as Snow argues, in order to have an accurate empathetic response. Further, if one is going to share the feeling, then moving beyond knowledge to similarity or identification seems essential.

The second aspect of Snow's argument is to ask whether empathy motivates altruistic action. This is a crucial question for accounts of political solidarity that attempt to build on empathy. When people claim to be 'standing in solidarity' with others they generally do not mean merely sharing similar feelings. On the contrary, to stand in solidarity is to take some sort of action, even if it is literally just standing as a show of resistance. The question is whether empathy is at the base of these actions. Snow argues that empathy is 'neither necessary nor consistent' with altruistic behavior (2000, 73-74). Empathy is a feeling that does not require a moral act and may be insufficient for an appropriate moral response to the needs of others. Even accurate empathy might be used to motivate actions that are themselves misguided or untimely. Much more than 'understanding that another is experiencing an emotion, and feeling an emotion that is similar to what the other feels because the other feels it' (Snow 2000, 68) is needed for altruistic action. While political solidarity is not necessarily entirely altruistic, it does carry the potential for personal sacrifice and is action that is collective in nature rather than self-interested.

Finally, as Snow argues, following moral norms themselves does not necessarily rely on empathy. One can act out of virtue or according to duty toward others without understanding the other's emotional state or feeling anything similar to what that other is feeling. Empathy and moral behavior might go hand in hand but one is not necessary for the other. Fulfilling one's duty toward others need not involve empathy though 'we could charge that emotional insensitivity to others can lead us to overlook occasions for the exercise of moral duty' (Snow 2000, 74). This last point, that there may be opportunities to act on moral duty that are not recognized without sufficient empathy, hints that empathy might be a valuable tool within the context of a social movement like political solidarity. Within the collective, members might profit from employing some forms of empathy as they re-navigate relations with each other and with the wider community.

2.B. Empathy and political solidarity

Central to the discussion of empathy and solidarity is the role of identity in political solidarity. Many earlier accounts of political solidarity relied on some notion of shared identity. Think, for example, of the identity politics of the 1970s wherein political action groups formed and revolved around shared identity and associated consciousness-raising. More recent discussions of political solidarity eschew identity-based accounts (Dean 1996; Scholz 2008; Shelby 2005) because they exclude from participation people who do not have a particular ascriptive identity. Whites who work for civil rights in a racist society, men who advocate for gender justice in a sexist society, and heterosexuals who resist the privileges of state sanctioned marriage would not count among solidaristic actors in an identity-based political solidarity.

Some accounts of solidarity, what we might call empathy-based political solidarity, rely on a strong notion of empathy to replace identity. Carol Gould, for instance, argues that it is because we feel empathy or care for distant others that we form global solidarity networks (2007, 152-153). In her view, solidarity is inextricably linked to empathy, indeed as the 'social counterpart' to empathy (such that solidarity requires empathy but empathy does not mandate or require solidarity). According to Gould, because we feel empathy for those who suffer poverty, oppression, or injustice, we are motivated to join in solidarity to alleviate that suffering. Gould may be speaking of a global social solidarity, that is, a unity among all human which she grounds in empathy. However, she is at least including some relations of political solidarity in her appeal to global solidarity networks and transnational solidarity. Although many people are, of course, motivated in exactly the manner Gould describes, it is not clear either that all people so engaged are motivated by empathy or that empathy is enough to sustain the oppositions and challenges that constitute political solidarity's efforts to bring about social change. Gould uses Sandra Bartky's account of solidarity as her inspiration. Bartky's account has had many spin-offs and variations but is itself indebted to Scheler's phenomenological discussion of fellow-feeling.

In her essay, 'Sympathy and Solidarity,' Bartky explores the problems feminist theorists have had avoiding the trap of exclusion and the possibilities of a 'political phenomenology of solidarity' (2002, 81). The idea is to articulate a concept of feminist solidarity, a manifestation of political solidarity. In an earlier work, she appealed to shared victimization as grounds for feminist solidarity, i.e., women joined feminist solidarity because they shared similar experiences of oppression and hence mutually understood each other's feelings (Bartky 1990). This was criticized as unable to account for the diversity of women's experiences and the many ways women might participate in or be complicit in their own victimization or the victimization of other women. In

'Sympathy and Solidarity,' by contrast, Bartky articulates a politicized reconceptualization of political solidarity drawing on the work of Scheler.

Bartky presents Scheler's four forms of 'fellow-feeling': true fellow-feeling wherein the participants experience identical feeling (which might be at root in her earlier essay); 'emotional infection' wherein one shares in a feeling without conscious choice or knowledge of the cause of the feeling; 'emotional identification' which causes the erasure of the self or the other in the intensity of the identification of feeling; and genuine fellow-feeling. Although Bartky sees more in emotional infection for political purposes than Scheler, it is genuine fellow-feeling that is crucial for the development of feminist political solidarity. In genuine fellow-feeling 'the feeling states of others are…given directly and immediately as 'intentional objects'' (2002, 77). Individuality is preserved but one directs one's intentionality toward the feelings of another much like how Snow describes empathy. Bartky points out that Scheler opposed those who used empathy for fellow-feeling precisely because it did not maintain the distance or distinctness of the individuals. For genuine fellow-feeling, the person experiencing a feeling and the person experiencing fellow-feeling maintain their individuality. Of course, it was a particularly egoistic version of empathy that Scheler had in mind, i.e., that one could only feel empathy if one had felt similar feelings oneself at a previous time. Snow's defense of empathy appears to be much closer to genuine fellow-feeling than the 'empathy' that Scheler criticizes. In either case, strict identification with the other is neither possible nor desirable for genuine fellow-feeling or Snow's empathy, and in that sense, we have moved well beyond identity-based accounts of solidarity.

Bartky replaces Scheler's 'love' as the affective bond with 'sisterhood or solidarity' and notes the importance of 'knowledge of the Other's circumstance' (2002, 79-80). Notice that much like Snow's account of empathy, then, some back-ground information is necessary for this form of fellow-feeling. But Bartky also finds Scheler's account 'highly suggestive for the construction of a political phenomenology of solidarity….[but] exceedingly impressionistic and in important ways, incomplete' (2002, 81). She replaces Scheler's 'vicarious visualization' with 'imagination' stating that one can imaginatively enter into the experience of the other without thinking of oneself as the other. Bartky turns Scheler's individual fellow-feeling into collective or political fellow-feeling. We can, she says, experience 'fellow-feeling for an entire class of persons rather than for a single individual' or even between groups of people (2002, 86). We use imagination, love, and cognition in the process. Imagination is a way of visualizing 'the sets of circumstances that give rise to the Other's emotion, as well as the behavior aspects of the emotion' (2002, 84-85). By imagining in this way, one can 'feel-with the victim.' Notice how very similar this is to Snow's account of empathy—one feels-with another but there is no identification of feeling although there is knowledge of the beliefs and cultural codes that inform emotional states. Interestingly, part of Bartky's aim is to show how cognition and emotion coincide in the experience of fellow-feeling. She ends up with something remarkably akin to empathy.

Importantly, Bartky actually begins her account by stating that 'to stand in solidarity with others is to work actively to eliminate their misery, not to arrange one's life so as to share it' (Bartky 2002, 74). The emphasis is or ought to be on working rather than on feeling. But sharing feeling with others, or empathy, clearly plays the central role in her account of the *motivation* to join in solidarity. This poses some potential problems, however, as I argue in the last section of the paper, the epistemic empathy engendered by imagination does aid in the fulfillment of the *normative* requirements of solidarity.

A third account of empathy's role in solidarity is found in the work of Brenda Lyshaug. Lyshaug, like Bartky, notes that Scheler's feeling-with 'does not erase the boundaries between self and other' but preserves the 'emotional distance between the one sympathizing and the object of her sympathy' (Lyshaug 2006, 88). Bartky's use of Scheler for feminist solidarity is insightful, according to Lyshaug, but falls short of constituting the bonds of solidarity because it eschews all forms of identification and fails to draw on forms of sympathetic identification that can build and sustain solidarity. Regardless of whether she is correct about Bartky's project, Lyschaug suggests using the concept of 'mobile identity' from the work of George Kateb to conceptualize and cultivate 'enlarged sympathy'. As she explains, 'enlarged sympathy involves *imaginatively introjecting* others' differences into oneself in order to claim a kind of kinship with them, a practice that can thereby alter one's own self-understanding to some extent' (Lyshaug 2006, 91). While I would argue that this posits the sort of epistemic egoism that Bartky eschews, Lyshaug nevertheless incorporates a personal transformation in her account of empathy for solidarity. The idea is to avoid folding the individual into the group in solidarity; rather, 'mobile identity' allows for a 'fluid attachment to identity' (2006, 91) that theoretically transforms the self in such a way that political bonds

or bonds of solidarity 'avoid suppressing or excluding difference among political allies' (2006, 91). Mobile identity and enlarged sympathy reveal a self with 'inner multiplicity'. Commonality among individuals results through the process of introjecting the self imaginatively into identities in the world and thereby discovering in the self the multiplicity of the self as well as the potentiality to be the other (2006, 93).

All three theorists creatively try to ground solidarity in the bonds between people. Gould relies on empathy, Bartky on genuine fellow-feeling, and Lyshaug on enlarged sympathy and mobile identities. In all three the emphasis of political solidarity is the bond or in connecting with others. History and experience offer many accounts of political solidarity where there is no empathetic connection, no imaginative experience of the other, and no enlarged sympathy. The empathetic bonds may form long after the activity of solidarity has begun. One might also ask whether empathy can be sufficiently political. In contrast, I argue that all that is needed for political solidarity is a collective commitment to a goal in the belief that change is possible. It is not clear that any account of political solidarity that tries to ground it primarily or solely in empathetic bonds can accommodate the variety of motives that compel individuals to commit to solidaristic action.

Further, by focusing on *political* solidarity, rather than solidarity more generally or social solidarity, these accounts emphasize the collective movement for social justice. It is worth asking whether the explanations of empathy and solidarity discussed in this section might be reintroducing or re-conceptualizing some form of identity-based political solidarity. If Snow is right about empathy, and I am inclined to think that she is, then empathy is built on some element of identification. Lyshaug is explicit about that, although her aim is to create an identity between and within persons that is not fixed. Bartky perhaps comes the closest to avoiding this concern insofar as she relies on imagination but even that, as we have seen, entails something like empathy. Any account of political solidarity that includes empathy as a necessary motivation or as a necessary element of motivational transformation thereby relies on identity among or between persons so engaged.

2.C. The problem with empathy

There are two primary concerns with accounts of political solidarity that require empathy as a motivation. The first is that such approaches either weaken what we mean by empathy or fall back on identity for solidarity thereby limiting participation in political solidarity. The second is that such approaches fail to adequately acknowledge the myriad ways that people participate in solidaristic activity to bring about social change.

The first of these problems has already been presented briefly. Empathy itself relies on identity so accounts of political solidarity that claim to be replacing identity claims with empathy fail to get free of identity. It is, however, worth pointing out that these empathy-based accounts of political solidarity do move beyond the former identity-based accounts to some extent. The identity-based accounts mentioned in the previous section appealed to relatively easily recognizable physical or social characteristics like race, sex, or gender identity. Political solidarity built on such recognizable characteristics might be empowering for participants but necessarily limits those who 'count' among the solidaristic actors. Indeed, that was a chief problem of identity politics per se, one might be excluded from fighting for a cause because one fails to pass the litmus test of identity with the members of the identity-based solidarity group. Appealing to empathy for political solidarity does overcome that central problem with identity-based political solidarity.

Empathy-based political solidarity expands participants to all those who are able to empathize, imagine, or enlarge sympathy with or for others who suffer injustice. This raises two related questions. The first is whether empathy-based political solidarity only pertains to people from privileged groups or classes who join with those who suffer? In other words, when the social movement is constituted by those who suffer, are we correct in calling it political solidarity or is it only when the privileged folks join in that their action is solidaristic action? No one, after all, is engaged in empathy for the suffering of others—all are feeling the suffering directly together. Given that movements by the oppressed often function and succeed quite nicely without the assistance of others, and given that reserving the concept to only those privileged who voluntarily join a struggle against that which does not adversely affect them seems parochial at best, it seems minimally problematic to say that empathy is needed for solidarity. The second question is whether individuals who have no personal connection with those who suffer can nevertheless engage in solidarity? When we hear about farm workers being exploited and abused, we do not necessarily need to know those workers, picture ourselves in a similar situation, or imagine what it must be like to be exploited or abused. We can engage in political solidarity simply on the basis of a recognition of injustice. Admittedly Bartky's account, using Scheler, gets us a step further insofar as there is an explicit acknowledgement that identity of feeling between two subjects is not morally valuable in solidarity. Nevertheless, there is still the need for two

subjects—one who suffers and one who imagines the suffering. I am suggesting that it is possible to be motivated to become involved in a collective cause for social change—political solidarity—without knowing or imagining one who suffers. The situation of injustice itself provides enough impetus.

Commitment-based political solidarity allows for a wide range of motivations and levels of engagement in political solidarity regardless of the affective bonds or exercises of identification between fellow solidaristic actors. It recognizes that personal transformation may be as unique as the individuals involved. It does not preclude empathy as a motivation for participation but it does not require it either.

3. Epistemic empathy

Empathy for the suffering of others may be *a* motive that transforms some participants of political solidarity but it need not be *the* motive. In whatever way they come to it though, individuals undergo a transformation that motivates them to relate to the collective of political solidarity and changes (in a potentially radical manner) how they relate to their general society or community.

Recall that Snow suggested that being emotionally insensitive might result in failing to see all opportunities to act on one's moral duty. Something similar may be argued of acting on one's duties in political solidarity. When one acts with others in political solidarity, one is resisting oppression or injustice with a diverse group of people. Some of these people are likely also victims of the oppression or injustice. Epistemic empathy is one of the tools that can help obtain valuable knowledge that might be crucial in efforts to overcome oppression and injustice. Solidaristic efforts might be misdirected or misapplied in such a way that relations of domination persist if we fail to adequately learn from one another. But we must also learn with an appropriate attitude. Those in solidarity do have some obligation to seek to understand how the actions for social change in solidarity might impact all the other relations discussed above—oppressed or otherwise. That understanding is more likely to be successfully achieved if undertaken from a variety of points of view of those affected others rather than solely from one's own point of view.

In order to accommodate the diversity of views and yet give adequate weight to the actual experience of oppression, then, political solidarity needs an epistemology that acknowledges multiple, overlapping, and perhaps inconsistent or contradictory knowledge claims. If participants in solidarity negotiate the importance of claims in a loving way that affirms the relevance of any given

perspective toward a cause as well as the work or experience at its base, then they employ epistemic empathy. Political solidarity requires that individuals commit to action in a nondomineering way so as to avoid re-inscribing any privileged social state they may have enjoyed in the larger society. By seeking understanding amongst fellow participants, even in spite of disagreement, the three relationships of political solidarity might be enhanced and additional opportunities to act together might become evident. Bartky discusses the demand for 'a knowing that transforms the self who knows, a knowing that brings into being new sympathies, new affects as well as new cognitions and new forms of intersubjectivity' (2002, 71-72). Epistemic empathy in political solidarity is circumscribed by the collective goal. Empathetic ties may indeed spread further but the obligations of political solidarity only suggest knowing that pertains to the collective project in an empathetic way. This is a knowing that assists in recognizing appropriate actions and engaging in self-evaluation and critique to assure that new oppressive relations do not form within the solidaristic movement.

Weber's study of the Wisconsin Coordination Council on Nicaragua (WCCN) serves as a revealing example of the need for epistemic empathy in political solidarity. Having moved from peace activism into activism on women's issues, the WCCN formed what they called the 'Women's Empowerment Project.' This project specifically focused on issues of violence against women and economic development. Women activists in Wisconsin joined together with women activists in Nicaragua to create the Women's Empowerment Project as more than a service providing organization but as a means to exchange information. As Weber explains, 'the WCCN women who formed the Women's Empowerment Project engaged in a grassroots strategy of participatory and democratic decision making, with efforts at learning from the situated and lived realities of Nicaraguan activist women. They were clear that they wanted an exchange of information and as equal a relationship as possible' (2006, 86).

This example shows an equal exchange. Knowledge cannot be seen as merely coming from one direction within the normative relations of political solidarity. Each person contributes something important to the collective. If it is only up to those who suffer to contribute to the knowledge base of privileged fellow participants in political solidarity, then as some feminist epistemologists have argued, the privileged participants are, in a way, exploiting the resources of their fellow actors (see Lugones and Spelman 1983; Spelman 1989; Alcoff

2000; Bailey 2000). Similarly, those who renounce their privilege or use it in a liberatory manner have some knowledge to share that might usefully be employed for the cause. Epistemic empathy allows for the sort of attentive openness that might actually help all participants recognize the importance of the epistemic views of others in shaping the social movement. That, it seems, is at least part of what happened with the WCCN. By not only encouraging but requiring all participants to exchange information equally (rather than unilaterally), the group saw connections they may not have recognized otherwise. Weber recounts how this information sharing led some of the U.S. women's activists to realize that they had to challenge the political system in the United States if they hoped to bring effective change to Nicaragua too. Diverse voices, epistemic empathy, and a shared commitment to a cause led to wider and more effective political action.

4. Conclusion

One becomes transformed by the commitment and activity of solidarity. Still, it is possible and at times necessary or even desirable for individuals to pull back or weaken their commitment to solidarity. These times allow for reflection on activism and a reorientation to goals while also opening avenues for additional social criticism. That, in turn, helps to sustain praxis as goals are critiqued, reworked, achieved, or surpassed.

It might be objected that every moral choice transforms a person. There may be some truth to that but the transformation of the person in political solidarity puts a person on a different path. It changes the communal context within which a person finds him or herself. Both the solidaristic community and the larger community affect the person's understanding of self and relations with others. Clearly, not every moral choice has such an effect on one's communal context.

Another possible objection to my account of political solidarity is that I am merely calling empathy by another name. That is, it might be objected that the collective commitment to a cause is nothing else than empathy. Such an objection, however, veers rather too far from practical and philosophical accounts of empathy which stress shared feelings. Political solidarity, unlike social solidarity, does not require shared feeling as a motivation though it may nevertheless benefit from epistemic empathy with all those who might be affected by one's actions both positively and negatively.

In this article I have focused on the personal transformation of political solidarity but in concluding I want to emphasize that political solidarity is a moral and political *relation*. As a relation, it necessarily involves others. One cannot, after all, be in solidarity with oneself—or at least that would seem to be contrary to the common usage of the term. The key is that we can be involved with others for a collective cause without necessarily sharing ties of empathy.

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PERSON AS THE SUBJECT OF THE LAW:

DEVELOPING PERSONALIST PHILOSOPHY OF THE LAW

*Nataliya Petlevytch**

Abstract

Personalist studies consider the law as a process with a person as a central essential participant and creator of this process. Therefore, a person as the subject of the law appears to be the subject of a legal relation (in both aspects: theoretical aspect – a person may participate in a relation, and practical aspect – a person participates in concrete relation). In the theory of law a subject of a legal relation is characterised by legal capacity, a power to have subjective rights and duties, and legal active ability, a power to exercise rights and duties by one's own actions. The proposed personalist research is aimed to study these characteristics of a person in legal relations with the Other(s).

Key words:

Legal relations, person, subject of law.

There is nothing more important to determine a legal epoch than understanding of a human being it is oriented at.[1]

Gustav Radbruch

1. Introductory thoughts

The main question that has brought to life this article, is the one about a subject of the law, is it an abstract legal construction or a person? The question is not new but in different life circumstances especially when a person is facing the state bodies' machine it arises and presupposes rethinking. Who am I participating in these legal processes: an abstract impersonal and formal legal entity or a human person? And the answer matters since it creates two different types of activities for all the participants and, hence, leads to different results.

'Person' is a common legal term meaning in general definition a human being[2] that is recognised by the law as the subject of rights and duties,[3] a human being in the system of social bonds and relations.[4] International legal documents affirm the dignity and value of a human person, which human rights and freedoms are derived from.[5]

While an abstract legal entity implies rights, freedoms and obligations and as a structure is created by the law, 'being a person' broadens this scope of characteristics, charges it and goes beyond a formal construction due to person's will, choice and responsibility, legal consciousness and personal correlation with the law which will be presented below.

David Granfield points out that 'without intersubjectivity... the law congeals into a deadly formalism'.[6] And taking into account this problem modern anthropologists of law consider a person as a true image of the law.[7] That means a person appears to be a determinative idea of law development, which the law aims to implement and, moreover, which directly substantiates the law. Accordingly, personalist studies, based primarily as they are on the major value of a person, are important to complete the understanding of this true image of the law.

The personalist research in this article is based on the works of philosophers Emmanuel Mounier, Jean Lacroix, Nikolai Berdyaev and philosophers of law Samuel J.M. Donnelly, Serhij Maksymov and others.

Mounier defines a person as 'a living activity of self-creation, communication and attachment with other persons that grasps and knows him/herself, in an act, as the movement of becoming personal.'[8] Thus, a person is never accomplished in his/her manifestation, requires growth and transcendence, he/she is in constant interaction with the Other(s), is engaged in life and is its active creator. I.e. a person appears to be a subject acting that does not exist without the relationship with the Other(s).

Accordingly, personalist studies consider the law as a process with a person as a central essential participant and creator of this process. Donnelly suggests personalist vision rather than a definition of the law as an activity that integrate persons into the society.[9] A similar idea is presented by other philosophers of law: for instance, Maksimov determines the law in anthropological terms as a way of human interaction.[10] Arthur Kaufman remarks that 'law happens in personal relations, if it does not happen we have laws but not law'.[11]

Therefore, a person as the subject of the law appears to be the subject of a legal relation (in both aspects: theoretical aspect – a person may participate in a relation, and practical aspect – a person participates in concrete relation). In the theory of law a subject of a legal relation is characterized by legal capacity, a power to have subjective rights and duties, and legal active ability, a power to exercise rights and duties by one's own actions. The proposed personalist research is aimed to study these characteristics of a person in legal

relations with the Other(s).

2. Philosophical concept of a person as the basis for the personalist research of the subject of the law

2.1 Person is neither an individuum, nor an individuality

As it was mentioned, 'person' means in general a human being, and according to this meaning it is difficult to distinguish this term from the others: 'individuum' and 'individuality', but in the personalist studies this difference is obvious.

'Individuum' is presented as an impersonal unit (the indication of the single contrary to the multitude, mass),[12] and is meant to be individually taken representative of the human community and/or the entire human race. However, this definition does not provide for the ability of being a subject of public relations and create social reality. As added by Leonid Batkin, the individuum is the notion that determines a single human being through its dependency[13], i.e. in its simple unicity in the community, being anyone. And as determined by Mounier, an individuum is any part of a 'disordered and featureless multiplicity of matter, objects, forces, influences,'[14] person's dispersion in multiple personages. An individuum refers us to an anonymous legal formal construction, attributes of a legal player without any difference in relation to its legal consciousness and legal culture.

'Individuality' appears the form of overcoming by a human being of its elementary quality in the social life into a certain form of self-realization.[15] It indicates a peculiarity and uniqueness, a 'metaphysical fact which makes us to be such and not the otherwise.'[16] Contrary to the individuum, individuality is the style of formation and manifestation of person's legal consciousness and legal culture. A person is distinguished from individuality by his/her openness and connection with Other(s), the possibility of transcendence. Individuality appears to be a constituent description of a person, which describes person's originality, opens up person's way of life and identity.[17]

A person is a social entity, but at the same time he/she is more than a mere member of a social group, since he/she is oriented at the community of persons – the community of free and morally responsible persons, neither of whom is fully overwhelmed by his/her social relations, i.e. combining the unicity and sociality. It correlates him/herself with the universal practice of mankind[18] and becomes the creator of the reality, and is not defined by this reality as its functional mechanism. In addition to sociality, the person is characterized by inwardness – 'the category of the human life that expresses its ability to create culture and to self-creation'.[19]

It is important to emphasize the main feature of the person – the integrity that embraces two aspects: unity of the inner structure of the personality, and the unity or consistency of individual life.[20] In other words, a legal subject finds itself in the unity of the inward and social person.[21] And, thus, being a legal subject does not mean to merely reflect the substance of the positive law by means of interpretation of the legal norms. This means to be a living person, the realization of real legal conscience.[22]

2.2 Person is a not an object but a subject

In personalist studies a person appears not as an object which can be dissociated from the world and be probed, but a centre, a 'unique reality which we cognize and at the same time create from within'[23]; and this process is limitless. An object – just a source of information – can be completely researched, systematized, and determined; an object is static in maintenance of such descriptions; a person cannot be completely described, because of growth experience, self-revealing and self-building.

A person appears pre-eminently as a subject, and a subject of high value. All relations a person participates in with the Other(s) are relations of subjects that provide for the equality and respect.

As philosophers of law determine, the quality of a legal subject is constituted by autonomy[24]; and the autonomy includes the activity of conscience, freedom of realization and undertaking responsibility for itself.

2.3 Person specifies involvement and transcendence

Philosophical anthropology recognizes a human being as a creature that transcents itself, its life activities. The core of its being is the inwardness, a capacity that personifies the possibility of unrestricted transcendence. As defined by Nikolai Berdyaev, 'a human being is the person not due to its nature, but owing to its inwardness. By its nature it is a mere individuum'.[25]

Merab Mamardashvili points out that 'person is always about transcending', i.e. in the personal nature itself is 'the resource of development' that exists in the history and ensures that, in the meaning of the human development, the human evolution cannot come to evolutional dead-end'.[26]

A person is also characterized by his/her capacity to act that reflects the fundamental need of the human being for the maximum possible manifestation of its capacities. A person provides for active presence of human being, but the one with

transcendent prospect of understandings of higher values that fill its activity with meaningfulness.[27] Individual freedom can be achieved by this action, which is not a freedom of avoiding an action, but a freedom to be involved in it and it depends only upon the person, because it implies a choice, which includes the ability to undertake responsibility for that which it carries out, along with intelligent and purposeful action.

A person is developed through an experience of self-realization; therefore his/her life is made by active involvement, which, however, always remains a manifestation and does not represent a person completely. Personalist studies come to the formation of an integral philosophical way of: it is 'needed to think about what to live by and to live according to the thoughts'[28] by adding to thought and action a moral component – virtue. In fact, as an action it cannot be simply mechanic, but is the result of the awareness of by the human being of its own Self, the Other(s) and the World in their correlations.

Nevertheless a person cannot be fully objectified by actions. The category of person excels its comprehension, since it carries in it the potential of the entire human being development. A person is substantially inherent in the human being but remains transcendent presenting an ideal, a task for a human being, which leads to the development and opening of itself in co-operation with the Other(s).

Taking into consideration the counterpoint characteristics of the studies term, in our opinion, it would be reasonable to single out the definition 'empiric person' (the result in case of concrete individuum) and the category 'person' in the meaning of a principle or idea that at the same time is available and exists in potential, makes the reason and goal of the human being's development. This research is about characteristics of the latter.

To summarize, it is necessary to note that the person as philosophical and legal category is a complex continuum of the inner experience (Erlebnis) and the external manifest, the objectified form (Erfahrung),[29] it defines the human being in the integrity of its sociality and inwardness, autonomous and conscious legal subject that is characterized by the will and system of values and is realized in the legal relations. Among person's characteristics some might be singled out: self-awareness (the ability to self-reflection and self-assessment), self-transcendence (the query of existential meaning and fundamentals of existence that soon is manifested in various forms of human life – an inner act after which a human being acts differently), identity (unexpendable nature of personality as human manifestation), autonomy (freedom but not in the existential choice that includes its maximum multi-variability, but in the qualitative meaningful nature of the choice, and thus also includes responsibility for the actions), goodwill (implemented in the creative activity) and interaction (active dialogue with the Other(s) and community development).

2.4 Person as subject-in-legal-relation

The philosophical study of person reveals the ambivalent nature of his/her life: simultaneous self-assertion and opening, going towards the Other(s), affirmation in inter-subjectivity. Lacroix says that 'a person is one whole,' though the manifestations of his/her existence are plural, the philosopher describes this existential complexity as the 'law of tension': a person is always realized through oppositions, which at the same time are mutually exclusive and mutually complementary. He develops the concept of the so-called 'shuttle motion' of personal development[30]: motion inward – to Self, interiorization, and motion outward – to other (subjects, and objects), exteriorization.

2.4.i. Interiorization

The process of 'movement inward', returning to Self, inner concentration and address to the primary deep layers of the own Self.

Interiorisation presupposes self-comprehension and internal self-forming, the search of answers to the questions 'who am I?', 'who am I not?'. A person performs a reflection and revision of the world view and value-system, which do not remain only theoretical, but form an internal motive and correlate with an action. Applying to him/herself a person evaluates him/herself, discovers self-respect and self-esteem which is related to the awakening of persons origins and at the same time consolidates him/herself. In this process a connective centre of various attributes and properties of a person is formed, which provides being in time and internal dynamic orientation to self-expressive action.

This process in the legal sphere correlates with legal capacity as a power to carry subjective rights and duties. It appears as the quality of primary condition, general ground for participation in the legal relations. In fact this ability arises from human nature, its legal meaning is 'the necessity and ability of a person to be a subject of the law'[31]. And the derivatives from this are the necessity and ability to have subjective rights, interests protected by the law, legal responsibilities and other components of the legal status of the subject of the law that are actually provided for the possibility of its functioning in the legal sphere. The necessity is conditioned by social nature of the person, his/her relationship with the

Other(s), and the ability is provided by self-assessment and self-esteem that is implemented in the capacity to act that is inseparably connected with the legal active ability. Paul Ricœur marks that 'we highly value ourselves as capable of evaluating out own actions, we respect ourselves due to our capacity to judge independently about our own actions' and pre-eminently 'self-evaluation and self-esteem address themselves…to the legally capable subject'.[32]

Being a person as a legally capable subject of law does not mean just to be informed about the rights and freedoms that are written in some legal documents and do not influence our life until we appear in some situation facing this influence. Legal capacity refers to a subject, not an object, and that is why it implies the development of active legal consciousness, re-evaluation and assessment of personal legal conduct, motives and goals. In connection with the above mentioned question it implies the consideration of the following: who am I in the legal relation?, what are my subjective rights and duties? etc.

Therefore, legal capacity appears not as a static attribute of a human being, but a part of becoming a person, it involves person's realization, unless it becomes a formal indication, potentiality, as well as undeveloped person.

2.5. Exteriorization
The process of 'motion outward', going towards the Other(s) (subjects), other(s) (objects), assertion of own existence as relation with the Other(s).

A philosophical encyclopaedia says that all reality is formed by the aggregate of relations and a relation is a connection of a human being with the world, a realized connection, recognizable and changeable by a person.[33] A relation appears as inter-communication, a dialogue with Other(s), necessarily an 'exit' from Self and participation in life dynamics in co-operation.

A person is connected to other people, and herein lies his/her richness. In personalist studies individualism, which shrinks a human being into itself, is criticized. An individualist is isolated, and remains in the vacuum of his/her own horizontal dimension of development and, thus, cannot exceed personal limits; for individualist, the Other(s) exists as an array of objects, while the person presupposes a co-operation with the Other(s) that are the value. The Other cannot appear as a mean, as an impersonal entity due to which an individual will be realized. Humanity is unique; an experience of Self is impossible without an experience of You and We.

And We is formed by personal manifestation as I and You are realized. 'Self is united with the Other, and the Other with I. Person is internal sense which needs output outside'[34].

Thus, personalist studies assert mutual connections of a person with other persons, and by origin this relation is based on activity of consciousnesses, respect, and recognition of everyone's value.

Co-operation in a legal sphere correlates with legal active ability – a power to carry out rights and duties by one's own actions that also arise from human nature. But personal actions are not simple external acts; a relation is constituted at the level of the thought (cognition of the Other, respect of the Other, awareness of his/her value), sense (perception) and actually action (concrete realization of right and/or duty). The personalist idea includes the notion that the realization of one's own rights is always carried out as a social legal act, not just an act; the Others are involved also and the person interacts with them as consciously willing and responsible. As Donnelly writes, it is very important to recognize oneself as one who acts and the system of legal norms (rules) appears to be 'means of communication, an adjunct and aid to action.'[35] Besides, philosopher of law describes correlation with the Other(s) in principle of crossing horizons, which means that a person in his/her correlation with the Other(s) broadens own world view knowledge and perception, that, for instance, personalizes the method of decision making in court system. This principle emphasizes and develops the idea that a human being forms itself actually in the interaction with the Others and it is important for personal growth to remain open for such an interaction.

Legal active ability presupposes autonomy and ability to take responsibility for own actions. Therefore, it is not a mechanical act of man, but the same as legal capacity; it is a part of the process of personal development and it requires the aforementioned relation, without which it remains also a formal indication, potentiality, as well as an undeveloped person.

Normative legalization of legal capacity and legal active ability in the rights, freedoms and responsibilities of a human being not only ensures the full-existence and state-guaranteed development of a person, but also guarantees the vital activity of the society in general, co-ordinating various interests, and implements 'anthropological necessity of the law' that includes two issues: the law as a necessity for human survival and as a necessity for humanistic life[36]. Personalist studies, in fact, develop the latter component.

Interiorization and exteriorization are processes

which cannot be separated from each other and complement one another: without connection with the Other(s) a person remains a theory, a virtuality; and without returning to Self – only a manifestation or a simple reflection. A person is formed by both processes; in fact, without manifestation and the I-You relation, reflection and self-understanding are impossible, and vice versa. Motion 'inward' and 'outward' create tension of personal development and realize, simultaneously, self-possession and self-giving. Both of these, however, are possible, led and balanced by one more personal ability – transcendence.

2.6. Transcendence

The horizon of exteriorization and interiorization is set through the prospect of transcendence. 'Transcendent towards which every person moves – it is beyond a person, it is 'in-between' different persons, and it is also within each of us'.[38]

Transcendence is an active, dynamic process of going beyond own limits, motion 'upward,' aspiration to the higher values and understanding of the idea of 0 person and the law. 'There is no person, where there is no higher being, and where there is no higher world to go up into' and 'the realization of person is a constant transcendence.'[39]

This higher world that Berdyaev figuratively mentioned is the sphere of values, law by itself as an idea and ideas of law, such as justice, or equality, or freedom, idea of a person as a creative conscious subject of law. These ideas are 'a task opened as though in endlessness'.[40] that is why they cannot be static, once achieved and stored, but they presuppose transcendence – search and development. Thus, a person combines exteriorization and interiorization in transcendence. And he/she reconsiders the ideas of the law, which allow for realization in a legal relationship, recognizes own autonomy, self-sustainability, freedom and responsibility of intercommunication, and finally becomes firmly established as a subject-in-legal- relation.

Thus a person is not given; a person is the result of the formation experience of oneself in relations with the Other(s). Becoming a subject-in-legal-relation, a person discovers a source of his/her own transcendence and opens up a source of the transcendence of the Other(s), that in fact are the same as Mounier determined. This unites them and creates preconditions for the integral legal space.

The intercommunication of people in a legal space joins them round a general purpose – the construction of a 'society of persons, the structure, the customs, the sentiments and the institution of which would correspond to the requirements of personal existence.'[41]

A person is presented as integral, autonomous and incomplete as an independent unit, since he/she requires the Other(s), cohabits with them. And such interaction is possible only provided the Others are recognized as persons, equal between themselves in their human dignity. Therefore it is important for society to be an association not simply of individuals – acting as impersonal units, but persons who are distinguished by a high legal culture and legal consciousness, since the primary goal and responsibility of the person is to create him/herself and the world around it. Preconditions of such a social unity are solidarity and equality. The first one, as a result of the recognition of the value of every person, and as a natural necessity of conscious and desired formation and maintenance of partnership and consensus[42]. Equality as a consequence of the perception of each person's dignity, (even if a person forgot about it), and the recognition of Self and the Other. And this perception must be properly adopted in the legal system. Mounier notes that equality can mean the equivalence of persons only and that cannot be commensurate.[43] Therefore personalist equality is reciprocity. Personalist society is possible if it is created by autonomous persons. The autonomy of the legal subject is formed in its consciousness, in the process of perception of the human being of its own self through its own free manifestations in the legal relations, and has as the consequence the formation of certain capacities that in their aggregate characterize the subject as the one capable of being master of itself. Being involved into the formation of the legal order due to rights, freedoms and obligations a person performs independent legal self-establishment and personalizes legal norms[44].In this research it is suggested to define personalization as the process of active value reorientation at the level of structures and processes (or theoretical and practical rebuilding) that is based upon the recognition of the highest value of person as the inward, free, creative entity. Anton Kozlovskyi emphasizes that the law must be personalized.[45]

In the process of personalization a person accomplishes permanent recognition – a premise of any conscious act that legalizes it. Philosophers of law (Ivan Ilyin, Maksymov) name this ability of recognition a determining moment of legal consciousness, by pre-eminently the very quality of human being, the very legal ability which in general makes law possible. This is a natural action of a person, and a person is impossible without it: veritable consciousness is such consciousness which acknowledges other consciousnesses.[46]   Ilyin

formulates the structure of recognition as follows: every subject of law recognizes:

1. law as a basis of relation, as an objectively meaningful idea;

2. his/her autonomy and dignity, as a force creating law;

3. autonomy and dignity of other subjects, as a force capable of law-making.[47]

In the process of interiorization, exteriorization and transcendence a person carries out a triple recognition, the recognition of the Other(s) as the subject(s) f the law, the recognition of him/herself as the subject of the law and the recognition of the very law. Thus, a person is not simply an impersonal unit of society, it is a human person that cooperates with other persons and carries out triple recognition. This recognition opens the possibility to cognize and to cooperate as autonomous subjects that realize their actions, to make choices and to take responsibility for them. Therefore personalist studies define a participant of legal life 'not as an object but as a conscious subject, not just a notional thinker, but as one capable of real assents, not just as an abstract individual, but as a concretely circumstanced person'.[48]

Consequently, carrying out triple recognition, person as a complex structure that presents unity of the inner (Self) and outer (relation) spheres, enters into legal relations, combines thought or reflection, intension or will and action or manifestation, is a live subject, the one that creates the law. Subject-in-relation is an ontological and gnoseological category, because it constitutes a legal relation; and realization of this makes cognition and perfection of this legal relation possible. A legal relation, in its turn, is a personal manifestation in coherence with the Other(s) and law constitutes the person and allows him/her to perceive him/herself. As 'law comes into existence through an act',[49] so a person opens up and is developed in legal relations that objectivise all processes: exteriorization, interiorization and transcendence. Thus, law evinces itself in legal relations and a legal subject, a person, exists in a legal relation. Consequently, as the highest value a person develops the law that also is fundamental mechanism for the development and self-realization of the person as the legal subject.

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Notes:

1. Gustav Radbruch, *Der Mensch in Recht // Philosophy of Law Issues*, Vol. II., 2004: 71-82, p.71.

2. See *Black's Law Dictionary: Definitions of the Terms and Phrases of American and English Jurisprudence, Ancient and Modern*, Henry Campbell,. 6th ed., West Group, 1991, p.1142-1143.

3. See *Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary* www.merriam-mebster.com/dictionary/person.

4. See *Legal Encyclopaedia*. 4th vol., editorial stuff, head I.S. Shemchushenko, Kyiv: *Ukrainian Encyclopaedia*, 2002, p. 351.

5. See *Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm

6. David *The Inner Experience of Law*, Catholic University of America Press, 1988, p .36.

7. See for instance S.I. Maksimov, *Legal Reality: an Experience of Philosophical Comprehension*. Kharkiv: *Yaroslav Mudryi National Law Academy*, 2002, pp. 251-252; Arthur Kaufmann, *Preliminary Remarks on a Legal Logic and Ontology Of Relations // Law, Interpretation and Reality. Essays in Epistemology, Hermeneutics and Jurisprudence*. Ed. by P. Nerhot, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990, pp. 122-123.

8. Mounier, *Le Personnalisme*. Moscow: Respublika, 1999, p. 462.

9. See Samuel J.M. Donnelly, *A Personalist Jurisprudence, the Next Step. A Person-Centered Philosophy of Law for the Twenty-First Century*. Carolina Academic Press, 2003, pp. 4, 8, 74-78.

10. See S.I.Maksimov, *On the Problem of Legal Person // Law Anthropology: philosophical and legal dimension. Articles of II Ukrainian round table on philosophy of law participants*, Lviv, 2007: 166-176, p.172.

11. Kaufmann Op. cit., p.122.

12. See *Philosophical Encyclopaedia*. Ed. by V.I. Shynkaruk, Kyiv: Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy by NASU, 2002, p. 239.

13. See L.M. Batkin, *Italian Renaissance in Search of Individuality*. Moscow: Nauka, 1989, p. 4.

14. Mounier, *Manifeste au Service du Personnalisme*. Moscow: Respublika, 1999, p. 303.

15. See *Modern Dictionary of Philosophy*. Ed. by prof. V.E. Kemerov, PANPRINT, 1998, p. 333.

16. Jean Lacroix, *Le Sens du Dialogue*. Moscow: *Russian Political Encyclopaedia*, 2004, p. 488.

17. See V.F. Baranivskyi, *Philosophy of Person: Actual Historical and Nowadays Issues*. National Defence Academy of Ukraine, 2004, p. 26-27.

18. See Jean Lacroix, *Le Personnalisme: Sources, Fondments, Actualité*. Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopaedia, 2004, p. 29.

19. *Philosophical Encyclopaedia*. Ed. by V.I. Shynkaruk, p. 179.

20. See V.I. Muljar, *Becoming A Personality in the Individuum-Society System: philosophical and cultural research*. Zhytomyr State Technical University, 2005, p. 121-122.

EMERGENCE AND REDUCTION IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
MICHAEL POLANYI (PT I)

Daniel Paski

Abstract:

The problems of emergence and reduction play a key role in the philosophy of Michael Polanyi. Polanyi deals with the concept of emergence *both epistemologically* (conceptually) *and ontologically* (existentially). However, epistemological emergence does *not* follow from his famous theory of 'tacit knowing' but from his theory of 'tacit knowledge'. Expressed differently in Polanyi's terms, the conceptually (epistemologically) emergent entities can be defined as 'test-tube' type 'boundary conditions'. The theory of boundary conditions is, in turn, his third and *crucial* theory for understanding his concept of emergence. *This* concept can be used to mark the existentially emergent entities that can be defined as 'machine type' boundary conditions. Polanyi is interested in *this* kind of emergence mainly, one that cannot be understood on the basis of his theory of tacit knowing, only on his theory of boundary conditions. Nevertheless, his resulting theory of ontological emergence is very unique and suggests an entirely new kind of emergence that I will call 'medium emergence'. It follows that different kinds of reduction are possible in the Polanyian universe, which also call for new concepts, such as 'synchronic' and 'diachronic' reduction, as discussed in the paper. After all, I will argue that Polanyi's concept of emergence is not a vitalist or a strong emergentist one in the usual sense, but rather *system theoretical* in nature.

Key Words:

Boundary conditions, emergence, levels, ontology, personal knowledge, reduction, system theory, tacit knowing.

Preface

The problems of emergence and reduction play a key role in the philosophy of Michael Polanyi. However, his approach to the topic is very special and unique, and it needs a textual analysis in detail. On the basis of his concept of emergence, the world cannot be divided simply into emergent and non-emergent entities, because he deals with the concept of emergence *both epistemologically* (conceptually) *and ontologically* (existentially). However, epistemological emergence does *not* follow from his famous theory of 'tacit knowing' (section 4 and 5) which in his theory determines *the structure of our cognition* but from his theory of 'tacit knowledge' (section 1, 3 and 5) which determines *the structure of our knowledge*. Expressed differently in Polanyi's terms, the conceptually (epistemologically) emergent entities can be defined as 'test-tube' type 'boundary conditions'. The theory of boundary conditions is, in turn, his third and *crucial* theory for understanding his concept of emergence, because *this* one determines *the structure of the 'comprehensive entities'*. *This* concept can be used to mark the existentially emergent entities that can be defined as 'machine type' boundary conditions. Important to note that Polanyi is interested in *this* kind of emergence mainly[1], one that cannot be understood on the basis of his theory of tacit knowing and knowledge, so I will investigate his non well-known theory of boundary conditions in detail (section 1-3).

At the same time, since every machine type boundary condition is *also* a test-tube type boundary condition, that is, every existentially emergent entity is also a conceptually emergent entity, hence Polanyi's theory of ontological emergence is very unique. (This is the reason why I will use the word 'existential' and not 'ontological' in the case of emergent entities). This theory cannot be interpreted without Polanyi's theory of tacit and personal knowledge and without his new concept of reality (section 7). It follows, for example, that in his concept of existential emergence there is no such kind of downward causation as would threaten the causal closure of the physical domain (sections 1 and 6). Also the control power of machine type boundary conditions can only be understood with the help of new kinds of causal concepts, I will find, and an entirely new kind of emergence which I call 'medium emergence' (section 6) will be necessary. All this, of course, influence the possibilities for reduction, which means that in the Polanyian universe there are: non-emergent things which can wholly be reduced (section 4); conceptually emergent things which can be reduced 'synchronically' in a quasi usual way (section 5); and finally, existentially emergent things which can only be reduced 'diachronically', in an entirely new way, proposed by me on the basis of Polanyi's concept of existential emergence (section 9).

My aim in the paper is to sketch *the most coherent possible* picture of Michael Polanyi's concept of emergence and to show that he has a

unique, absolutely new concept, where there can be *no room* for such accusations that he is a vitalist or a strong emergentist in the standard sense, moreover, his theory satisfies to the definitions of physicalism. On the basis of his theory of boundary conditions as well as his theory of evolution, his approach is rather *system theoretical* in nature.

1. 'Test-tube' and 'machine type' boundary conditions

Polanyi states that we can distinguish two different types of boundary conditions. One of them is the *test-tube type* which has *no* influence on the elementary processes taking place within; and the other, the *machine type* boundary condition which has the function of *controlling* and *harnessing* the elementary physical and chemical processes for the sake of some kind of *purpose*. (KB: 225-226)[2]

The test-tube in which we observe the different chemical processes has no significant effect on the latter; moreover, it has the function of making these processes *observable* for us, it is purposeful only in this sense. In contrast to this, the structure of a machine has not got the function of making the elementary physical and chemical processes observable—these processes are interesting for us only in the case when the machine fails—but *utilize* these elementary processes for the purpose of some kind of work. So, the machine controls and uses the elementary processes. In this regard, the role of a test tube type boundary condition is inessential, but a machine type boundary condition is always meaningful and purposeful.

It is important to emphasize that the two types of boundary conditions are not in full contrast to each other: every machine type boundary condition is *also* a test-tube type boundary condition. For example, when a machine goes wrong, its structure still serves as a test-tube type boundary condition, making the lower level physical and chemical processes observable and understandable.

An excellent example of a test-tube type boundary condition is the structure of a rock or a crystal,[3] since the structure of a crystal does *not* control or harness the elementary physical-chemical processes of the crystal. Moreover, the structure of a crystal is the *consequence* of the crystal's elementary processes in accordance with the lower level principles, in this case the physical-chemical laws. (SEP: 286) In contrast to this, however, the structure of a machine,—that is, the higher level boundary condition controlling and harnessing the elementary processes—is, of course, not the consequence of the elementary physical-chemical processes of the machine.[4] 'The structure of machines and the working of their structure are [...] shaped by man'

(KB: 225)—in accordance with some kind of human reason and with the higher level principles, in this case the principles of engineering.

> Engineering and physics are two different sciences. Engineering includes the operational principles of machines and some knowledge of physics bearing on these principles. Physics and chemistry, on the other hand, include no knowledge of the operational principles of machines. Hence a complete physical and chemical topography of an object would not tell us whether it is a machine, and if so, how it works, and for what purpose. Physical and chemical investigations of a machine are meaningless, unless undertaken with a bearing on the previously established operational principles of the machine. (TD: 39)

Because Polanyi wants to differentiate clearly between the principles of elementary entities and the principles of comprehensive entities, in his approach a complete physical knowledge means *only* the knowledge of the properties of elementary particles and the knowledge of physical laws referring to these but *not* to the knowledge of the properties of comprehensive entities (e.g. machines) which are fully physical *only* in the colloquial language (influenced by our mechanistic thinking). So it follows that even if we have complete physical knowledge about the whole world, as Laplace's demon has, we would *not* necessarily know anything about the principles of the working of machines because the principles of machines are *entirely outside* of the laws of physics. Moreover, in accordance with Polanyi's view, if we have only the complete physical knowledge of Laplace's demon available, then we *would not be able to recognize a machine or tool*[5] (SoM: 48-49)[6], because the higher *emergent* forms of things and beings *can only be recognized by our previous tacit knowledge* and the same is not possible using the Demon's purely explicit one.

So, in Polanyi's view, the Demon does not know everything, he knows only physical *substance*. The Demon does not know everything because he is only the deceitful rational ideal of modern philosophy that believes that our *whole* knowledge can be explicable. In Polanyi's view an engineer or a chemist can recognize a comprehensive tool or molecule and can identify it with certain lower level physical substance and processes, but they can do this not because the tool or the molecule is physical but because the engineer or the chemist, in contrast to Laplace's demon, has not only explicit physical knowledge but *also emergent higher level tacit knowledge* by which he can recognize and identify a comprehensive entity. However, this does not imply that a chemical molecule cannot be reduced

(existentially) to its explicit physical parts; this only means that the reduction cannot be done by a Laplacian demon. Reduction is simply meaningless for such a demon because he cannot recognize higher level comprehensive entities.[7] As opposed to the demon, we recognize and we *are bound to* recognize higher level comprehensive entities such as machines, tools, or crystals – in other words, entities which were identified by Polanyi as test-tube type boundary conditions.

This means that these comprehensive entities as test-tube type boundary conditions are just consequences of our specific tacit knowledge, in contrast to the knowledge of Laplace's demon, who can 'see' the physical substance and its processes *directly* (by his wholly explicit knowledge). We can identify the physical processes only *by the help of* our previous tacit knowledge of test-tube type comprehensive entities. After that, however, we can establish the scientific fact that e.g. a structure of a crystal as a test-tube type boundary condition can be *entirely* explained (existentially) by the lower level physical processes and there is nothing more to add concerning its ontology (section 5).

Nevertheless, as we have seen, there are comprehensive entities which are not just test-tube but, at the same time, machine type boundary conditions. This means that (existentially) they are not only the consequences of elementary physical processes, but they *control* and *harness* the elementary physical processes for some kind of purpose, that is, there is something 'more' concerning their ontology. The question is what exactly this 'more' means. The answer will, I maintain, lead us to the understanding of the Polanyian concept of emergence.

The first thing to be noted here is that the act of control exerted by the machine type boundary conditions does *not* lead to the breaking of the causal closure of the physical domain. In contrast to that of the crystal, the structure of a machine is not the consequence of the elementary physical processes of the machine, thus it can control and harness the latter. The structure is the consequence of such processes which are *contingent* upon the elementary processes of the machine. 'A boundary condition is always extraneous to the process which it delimits.' (KB: 227) Still, at this level, that is, at the level of the elementary, physical parts of the machine, these contingent processes can also be *solely* understood as elementary *physical* processes which are absolutely in accordance with the laws of physics.[8] It is another question, as we have seen this in the case of Laplace's demon, if it is possible to talk about a machine as a comprehensive entity

meaningfully—or at all—without the help of the higher level principles.

So, in the Polanyian universe there is no downward causation which breaks the causal closure of the physical domain, or otherwise a Laplacian demon could not 'compute all future configurations of all atoms throughout the world' (SoM: 48), and this is also the reason why Polanyi writes that e.g. '...the operation of the mind will never be found to interfere with the principles of physiology, nor with the even lower principles of physics and chemistry on which they rely.' (KB: 221) Thus, higher level control is *no* downward causation (see this theoretical possibility in El-Hani et al., 2005). Or, alternatively, we can say that there are *different kinds* of downward causations and the Polanyian notion of higher level control is of such kind of downward causation that does not break the causal closure of the physical domain (see Emmeche et al., 2000. 'Levels, Emergence, and Three Versions of Downward Causation.'). The Polanyian higher level control does not break the causal closure of the physical domain exactly because its effect on the physical domain is not physical but a different kind of *emergent* control which cannot be 'seen' and understood by the explicit physical knowledge of Laplace's demon. For him, nothing changes under the process of such emergent kind of control. With the help of the Aristotelian terminology, one can say that the elementary physical level has ordinary *effective* causal powers and the emergent comprehensive entities have a *new* kind of causal powers, which can be understood on the basis of Aristotle's *formal* and *teleological* causations (Emmeche et. al., 2000). Machine type boundary conditions always possess some kind of formal structure and always control and harness the lower level processes for some kind of purpose. In the Aristotelian philosophy, the different kinds of causalities are all necessary constituents for explaining a phenomenon and they do not hinder or 'break' each other's effect.[9] In the case of a machine type boundary condition, the situation is similar. We cannot fully understand a machine type comprehensive entity *either* without the causal process of higher level control *or* without the controlled lower level physical causal processes. We do not have the ideal knowledge of Laplace's demon; however, we should not forget that, at the same time, the demon 'sees' only the physical processes and explains everything with the help of efficient causality only; while we have to explain the whole multi-levelled entity with its higher level controls and fundamental physical processes together.

This sheds some light on why I speak about

'comprehensive entities' and not about the structures of the entities *themselves*. Another intelligent being—in this case, Laplace's demon[10]—who has a different personal point of view and knowledge than we do, does not recognize necessarily the same entity as we do. However, the fact that, for example, we humans recognize certain entities as machines is not a subjective, arbitrary act, but *a necessary consequence of our common commitments and personal knowledge—of our common point of view*. So in connection with the structure of comprehensive entities I intentionally speak about *our knowledge* and not about *some objective reality*. However, due to our common point of view, and the therefore necessarily recognized—machine type—structures of certain entities, what is grasped is unambiguously *more* than just our subjective knowledge.[11]

2. The origin of boundary conditions

The origin of boundary conditions is different in the case of test-tube and machine type boundary conditions. The former is much simpler. From an existential point of view a test-tube type boundary condition e.g. a crystal, is simply the consequence of lower level physical processes; from another (conceptual) point of view, it is the consequence of our previous tacit knowledge by which, contrary to Laplace's demon, we can recognize it. Of course, the same is true for a machine type boundary condition as well, since every machine type boundary condition is at the same time a test-tube type boundary condition. But from the existential point of view there is a big *difference* between the two types of boundary conditions. To understand this important difference let us investigate some other examples of machine type boundary conditions beyond machines proper.

Living beings, Polanyi says, have the *same* purpose as the structure of a machine: to control and harness the elementary physical and chemical processes and to utilize their powers. They do it exactly in the same way as we have seen it in the case of machines in connection with engineering. 'Thus the morphology of living things transcends the laws of physics and chemistry.' (KB: 227) The concrete purposes of biological beings are the *growth*—ontogeny—and the *reproduction*—phylogeny—of the organism. So it follows that according to Polanyi *the living being falls under the machine type boundary conditions*. (KB: 226-227)

This is an often quoted and often misunderstood statement from Polanyi. It means that living beings and machines have the same higher level structure but it does not mean that living beings are machines in any kind of sense. A difference between living beings and machines is that in the case of the former, the structure is not shaped by man but by the DNA[12]—more exactly by the genes which are coded in the DNA[13]—and, naturally, it is not the principles of engineering what stands behind but the *principles* of *evolution* and of *life*.[14]

However, beyond machines and biological beings, we can also find machine type boundary conditions in the cultural life of humans.[15] One of Polanyi's favourite examples of a cultural domain machine type boundary condition is speech. Speech restricts the words at the lower level in the same way as does the specific structure of living beings the elementary physical and chemical processes. Thus, speech functions on the words as a machine type boundary condition and it has its own emergent principles, according to Polanyi.

> Thus a boundary condition which harnesses the principles of a lower level in the service of a new, higher level, establishes a semantic relation between the two levels. The higher comprehends the workings of the lower and thus forms the meaning of the lower. (KB: 236)

Of course, the development of speech as a machine type boundary condition is not the consequence of the genes—although they naturally shape some biological structures necessary for speech—but of the cultural knowledge accumulated and handed down by generation to generation.[16]

It follows this example that there are not only two levels—for example, the level of physics-and-chemistry and the level of living beings, that is, the level of biology—but several such levels, which can be *built upon each other*. So, the higher level machine type boundary conditions can restrict not only the elementary physical and chemical processes, but any relatively lower level ones. In the case of our example of speech, there are several levels of such machine type boundary conditions built on each other.

> …namely the production (1) of voice, (2) of words, (3) of sentences, (4) of style, and (5) of literary composition. Each of these levels is subject to its own laws, as prescribed (1) by phonetics, (2) by lexicography, (3) by grammar, (4) by stylistics, and (5) literary criticism. These levels form a hierarchy of comprehensive entities, for the principles of each level operate under the control of the next higher level. (TD: 35-36)

And, of course: 'the operation of a higher level cannot be accounted for by the laws governing its particulars forming the lower level', because all of these levels have their own different purposes—to pronounce a voice, form a word, compose a sentence, etc.—as well as they have their own governing laws and principles. (TD: 36)

That is, in the theory of Polanyi, there are not just two levels, but several of them, which are gradually built upon to create something essentially new.

The theory of boundary conditions recognizes the higher levels of life as forming a hierarchy, each level of which relies for its workings on the principles of the levels below it, even while it itself is irreducible to these lower principles.' (KB: 233)

Each level relies for its operations on all the levels below it. Each reduces the scope of the one immediately below it by imposing on it a boundary that harnesses it to the service of the next higher level, and this control is transmitted stage by stage down to the basic inanimate level. (KB: 234)

Naturally, this bottom, inanimate level is that of the level of elementary physical and chemical processes.[17] Onto this base, further and further machine type boundary conditions are gradually built, until we arrive at the higher level human activities such as (for example) the process of obtaining scientific knowledge. And 'the principles additional to the domain of inanimate nature are the product of an *evolution*'[18] (KB: 234).

In other words, and this will be important, Polanyi states that the various, higher level faculties of living beings conceived as machine type boundary conditions (perception, speech, obtaining scientific knowledge, etc.) are the consequences of the process of *evolution* which determines the actual machine type structure of living beings, and, due to these faculties:

…as we ascend a hierarchy of boundaries, we reach to ever higher levels of meaning. Our understanding [and knowledge] of the whole hierarchic edifice keeps deepening [and cumulating] as we move upwards from stage to stage.[19] (KB: 236)

So, from the existential point of view a machine type boundary condition is the consequence of not only lower level physical processes, but also higher level emergent controlling processes.

3. The logical structure of boundary conditions

As we have seen in section 1, it is one of the fundamental *tacit* acts of our personal point of view (and tacit knowledge) that we recognize certain comprehensive entities as test-tube type boundary conditions, e.g. crystals. Merely *after* this act can we give a fully detailed *explicit* physical topography of the individual entity, something which in itself would be meaningless and would tell us nothing about the concrete crystal without the previous tacit knowledge of the crystal, such as it is the case for Laplace's demon. '…a complete physical and chemical topography of a frog would tell us nothing

about it *is* a frog, unless we know it previously as *a frog*". (PK: 342) This means that our previous tacit knowledge about the higher level test-tube type boundary conditions and our scientific knowledge about its fundamental, explicit physical parts are essentially *different* and cannot be 'translated' onto each other. One of them is tacit and only partly explicable and the other is entirely explicit, in Polanyi's terms. It follows that 'there is, indeed, always a noticeable logical gap between a topography and a pattern derived from it, and to this extent no pattern is specifiable in terms of topography.' (Polanyi 1962: 394)

So, in Polanyi's analysis, from the logical structure of test-tube type boundary conditions it follows that in the case of test-tube type comprehensive entities, on the basis of their fundamental parts and y the principles of those parts, the higher levels which have been recognized by our previous tacit knowledge *cannot* be fully specified.

In the case of machine type comprehensive entities there is more to say. There is a specific relationship between the lower level physical processes and the higher level controlling boundary conditions, namely.

…whatever may be the origin of a DNA configuration, it can function as a code only if its order is not due the forces of potential energy. It must be as physically indeterminate as the sequence of words is on a printed page. As the arrangement of a printed page is extraneous to the chemistry of the printed page, so is the base sequence in a DNA molecule extraneous to the chemical forces at work in the DNA molecule. It is this physical indeterminacy of the sequence that produces the improbability of occurrence of any particular sequence and thereby enables it to have meaning. (KB: 229)

For if the chemistry of the printed page, more exactly the chemical laws, which determine the chemical structure of the printed page—or the phonetics of the pronounced words—determined the order of the words that can be printed on the page—or can be uttered—then the words could not have an independent meaning, and we could not print different texts on the same page. In the same way, according to Polanyi, if the laws of chemistry determined the origin of a given DNA configuration, the latter could not code independent information and could not be the source of the higher level boundary conditions harnessing the elementary processes; therefore, living organisms could not have a specific, multi-levelled structure. However, the laws of chemistry left open the possibility both in the case of the printed page and in the case of the DNA that the same page (and ink) or the same DNA (due to another, independent pattern or sequence) can code

entirely different information in different cases.[20]

So in Polanyi's theory, higher level boundary conditions can restrict the lower level processes only if the correlation of the higher level boundary conditions and the lower level processes are *contingent*, that is, they are '*random*' with respect to each other.[21] Otherwise, if the lower—more fundamental—level processes determined the structure of the higher level—as we have seen it in the case of the crystal—they could not function as a machine type boundary condition. Nonetheless: 'Randomness alone can never produce a significant pattern, for it consists in the absence of any such pattern.' (PK: 37) So, if the correlation of the two levels is random, it means, on the one hand, that the higher level boundary conditions could be 'anything' and therefore can harness the lower level processes and, on the other hand, that in the two different levels *two essentially different, independent principles operate which cannot be deduced from each other*.

> Thus the logical structure of the hierarchy implies that a higher level can come into existence only through a process not manifest in the lower level, a process which thus qualifies as an emergence.[22] (TD: 45)[23]

It follows from the above that, paradoxically, the higher level can never be *a random consequence* of the lower because, given this, it ought to be itself random too, yet it is not the case. In itself the higher level can be entirely deterministic.[24] This *has to be so*, or otherwise it could not have meaning, it could not be purposeful, and it could not control and harness the lower level processes. In this approach the randomness is unambiguously *only a correlation* between levels and not a property of a level. The lower or the higher levels can be regarded as random *exclusively in correlation with another level*—in this case with each other—but *not in themselves*. 'By saying a factor is random, I do not refer to what the factor is in itself, but to the relation it has with the main system.' (Ashby, 1957: 259) So if their correlation is not random that means that the higher level entirely *depends* on the lower, thereby, there is no essential difference between them, and they are determined by *one*—lower level—principle.

So, according to Polanyi, from the logical structure of machine type boundary conditions it follows that in the case of certain comprehensive entities, on the basis of their lower parts and the principles of those parts, the higher levels and the principles of those higher levels which have been developed by the evolutionary process (and which have been recognized in our previous personal knowledge, from our personal point of view) *cannot* be fully specified; as a result of a creative process a genuine machine type boundary condition *emerges* which *cannot be determined* on the basis of its explicit physical processes and the laws of these processes.

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Notes
1. Inasmuch as he does not indicate separately, he always uses the word 'emergence' in this sense.
2. It is his well-known paper, 'which was originally published in *Science*, 160 (1968), 1308-12.
3. The shape of crystal is an original Polanyian example, however, we can think of e.g. a tornado or an astrophysical or geological phenomenon too.
4. It is clear from this example that the machine-like structure is not simply a matter of complexity.
5. According to the Game of Life analogy (see e.g. Dennett, 1991), physical knowledge is the knowledge of actual cell-states (black or white) as well as their laws of changes. The higher level, secondary knowledge (the knowledge of machines and their principles) is here the knowledge of higher level cell-shapes (glider, blinker, pulsar, etc.) and their rules of changes. Polanyi calls these boundary conditions and, as we can see that in the Game of Life, there is no breaking of the causal closure of the physical domain (see below in section 1). Nevertheless, for Polanyi, in contrast to Dennett, neither the higher level knowledge nor the lower level knowledge is objective (or subjective), and for Polanyi the main question is about the relationship between them. Is the higher level knowledge contingent in the explanation of the multileveled phenomenon and its lower level processes? See section 5 and 6.
6. 'Assume, for the sake of argument, that we posses a complete atomic theory of inanimate matter. We can then envisage the operations of a Universal Mind in the sense of Laplace. The initial positions and velocities of all the atoms of the world being given for one moment of time, and all the forces acting between the atoms being known, the Laplacean Mind could compute all future configurations of all atoms throughout the world, and from this result we could read off the exact physical and chemical typography of the world at any future point of time. But we now know that there is a great and varied class of objects which cannot be identified, and still less understood, by establishing their complete physical and chemical topography, for they are constructed with a view to a purpose which physics and chemistry cannot define.

So it follows that the Laplacean Mind would be subject to the same limitation: it could not identify any machine nor tell us how it works. Indeed, the Laplacean Mind could identify no object or process, the meaning of which consists in serving purpose. It would ignore therefore the existence not only of machines but also of any kind of tools, foodstuffs, houses, roads and any written records or spoken messages.' (SoM: 48-49)

7. It follows that the chemical knowledge of the chemist cannot be simply replaced by an ideal physical knowledge because the latter simply does not contain the former (section 8).

8. From the point of view of the boundary conditions, it can be stated that the test-tube type boundary condition is *contingent* according to the explanation of lower level processes since it entirely *depends* on them, it does not control and harness the latter and it is important *only* for the process of *observation*. Contrary to this, the machine type boundary condition *is not contingent* according to the explanation of lower level processes since its origin is entirely *independent* from them, controls and harnesses them and it is absolutely an important and *necessary* factor in the process of *explanation*. (Küppers, 1992)

9. Other authors also take Aristotelian causal notions as an inspiration to think of causal processes in the case of biological beings and other complex systems, as e.g. Salthe (1985); Rosen (1991); El-Hani and Queiroz (2005).

10. More exactly, the Demon's point of view and knowledge are different not because he has not got our personal point of view and knowledge but because his point of view and knowledge literally are not personal—this is exactly the reason of the hypothesis of the Demon as a rational ideal. However, in the nature, of course, there are no such ideal beings with a point of view from *nowhere*, so every kind of possible—intelligent—being has a different and *personal* knowledge.

11. This problem and its consequences will be discussed in detail in section 6 and 7.

12. The structure of an organism is 'a boundary condition harnessing the physical chemical substances within the organism in the service of physiological functions. Thus, in generating an organism, DNA initiates and controls the growth of a mechanism that will work as a boundary condition…' (KB: 229-230) So a DNA itself is not yet a boundary condition, but something which can originate boundary conditions, and thus functions as a "primary boundary condition'. (Küppers, 1992)

13. However, in accordance with the case of machines, this also does not mean the breaking of the causal closure of the physical domain. The structure of a living being is not the consequence of the elementary physical and chemical processes of the living being, but of such processes which are contingent on these processes. Still at this level, that is, at the level of the elementary physical, chemical parts of the living being, these contingent processes can also be solely understood as elementary physical and chemical processes which are absolutely in accordance with the

laws of physics and of chemistry. It is another question if it is possible to talk about a living being as a comprehensive entity meaningfully—or at all—without the help of the higher level principles, in this case without the help of the principles of biology.

14. In Polanyi's theory, pre-existing life is a precondition of evolution (just as in Darwin), therefore, it has to have a different principle. More exactly, the two processes are entirely different. Life is an actual developmental process of existing beings, while evolution is a comprehensive process of development from the first primitive prokaryote to the highest level cultural activity of man. (PK: 400) See in detail in Paksi, 2008.

15. As a matter of fact, naturally the machine type boundary conditions of machines also come from the human culture, but the next example is much clearer and typical of the machine type boundary conditions of human culture discussed by Polanyi.

16. This is probably the reason why Polanyi calls the emerging of human culture as the 'second major rebellion' of the evolutionary process (PK: 389) because this superseded the development of the strictly DNA-centric biological evolution and made possible the development of entirely new kinds of machine type boundary conditions. However, in accordance with the cases of machines and biological beings, this also does not mean the breaking of the causal closure of the physical domain, because in the same way, the structures of cultural entities at the physical level are the consequences of contingent physical processes. And it is also another question if it is possible to talk about a comprehensive cultural entity meaningfully—or at all—without the help of the higher level principles, such as cultural theory.

17. Built upon that zero level, the fundamental level of life are the following: 1. *compartment*; 2. *cell*; 3. *multicellular* organism; 4. organism with *nervous system*; 5. *culture*/language. (PK: 387-389)

18. Italics: D. P.

19. In another way, Polanyi puts it like this: 'We can recognize then a strictly defined progression, rising from the inanimate level to ever higher additional principles of life.' (KB: 234)

20. From the point of view of its chemistry or underlying matter two pieces of DNA with different informational pattern can be the same. For example, ATCGATCGATCG and TAGCTAGCTAGC; because Laplace's demon cannot differentiate between such higher level patterns and cannot understand their meanings: in Polanyi's approach the Demon can see *merely* the same meaningless sequence of quarks and electrons. See section 1 and footnotes 5-10.

21. From the lower level it means that the structure of the higher level machine type boundary condition is formed by one or more lower level processes which are contingent upon the lower level processes of the higher level structure. However, it is important to state that this formulation does *not* mean the lower level explanation of the phenomenon because the concept of contingence is *not* understandable without that higher level boundary condition which indicates the

boundary between the two contingent lower level processes. So from an absolutely lower level point of view there are only entirely homogenous and deterministic lower level processes without any kind of higher level entities and explanation.

22. Italics: D. P.

23. Polanyi describes three imaginary experiments which can help us understand this logically independent correlation and its consequences between two different levels. (PK: 39-40) (1) Take a large number of perfect dice resting on a plane surface and all showing the same face—say a one—on top. Prolonged Brownian motion—acting at low temperature—will destroy this orderliness and ultimately produce a state of maximum disorder. (2) Take a similar set of dice showing the one on top but let them be biased in favour of showing a six on top. Prolonged Brownian motion acting at low temperature will cause a rearrangement in the sense that most dices will show a six on top. (3) Take again a similar set of dice showing the one on top being biased in favour of showing a six on top. Prolonged Brownian motion acting at high temperature will destroy this pattern and produce instead of the same kind of random aggregate as in experiment (1). Experiment (2) shows that random processes can create such *conditions* in the case of which well-arranged pattern is forming at the higher level of the dices, however, it is clear from experiment (1) that random processes—as opposed to the appropriate conditions—will cause a well-arranged pattern only if there is an *action* of a higher level ordering principle restricting and controlling these lower level random processes. So the situation is that there is not only a well-arranged higher level pre-pattern which will destroyed by the lower level, here Brownian, processes but a continuously functioning higher level principle, here the loadedness of the dices. Finally, experiment (3) naturally shows that a higher level principle is not enough in itself if there are no appropriate conditions in the lower level. So, it means that any kind of lower level processes cannot be controlled by a certain principle. In simpler words, no matter how skilfully we can roll we will win for certain only if we have loaded dices. This boundary condition follows from an entirely different, logically independent principle as the skill of dice rolling. (In this case what is random is how the sides of the dice are named, and this is not determined—only—by the laws of physics, however,—also—by the principles of the higher levels, and in this sense entirely determined by them.)

24. It also means that the higher emergent levels are not the consequences of a neo-Darwinian evolutionary process by purely random, lower level mutations but the achievement of a goal-directed one by an emergent, higher level ordering principle.

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THE QUESTION OF ERIC VOEGELIN'S FAITH (OR ATHEISM?):
A COMMENT ON MABEN POIRIER'S CRITIQUE

Eugene Webb

Abstract:
Poirier argues that Voegelin was neither a 'deeply spiritual person' nor a Christian in any 'acceptable' sense of the term but 'a subjectivistic immanentist' and an atheist.   The charge of subjectivistic immanentism is based on an inadequate reading of Voegelin's central concept of metaxy exist-nce.   However, the charge of atheism does raise interesting questions.   Christian orthodoxy has room for ways of thinking about God that are more commodious than Poirier's and more compatible with Voegelin's, who in his own way really was deeply spiritual, but there is no place in Voegelin for the central Christian belief in eschatological fulfilment.

I have been asked to comment on Maben Poirier's, 'Eric Voegelin's Immanentism: A Man At Odds With The Transcendent?' published in *Appraisal*, Vol. 7, Nos. 2 and 3 (Oct. 2008-March 2009), and I welcome the opportunity to do so, because the questions Poirier raises are interesting and important ones. My own approach to them will be rather different from his, but I think he articulates those questions in a way that opens up possibilities for discussing the topics of God, faith, and atheism that offer a welcome relief from the simplistic and shallow framework of discussion dictated by what is currently being called 'the new atheism.'

To sum up his main points briefly, Professor Poirier says that although Voegelin is often interpreted 'as a classically based Christian thinker, and sometimes simply as a deeply spiritual person, who was critical of modernity,' he was in reality 'not only not a Christian in any sense of the term that is acceptable, but he was not a theist or even a deist.' Putting it more bluntly, he says, 'I argue rather that Voegelin was a modern thinker and an atheist,' because 'his seeming support for Christianity in his writings stemmed from his desire to use a modified or immanentised understanding of Christianity as the basis on which to erect a civil theology.' Christianity, that is, and belief in God were, for Voegelin, simply useful fictions. As evidence Poirier cites a conversation of Voegelin with his friend Robert Heilman:[1]

Professor Heilman reported that Voegelin, on one memorable occasion, said to him: 'Of course there is no God. But we must believe in Him.' Now, if the issue here is whether Voegelin believed or did not believe in the independent existence of the Ground, in short, whether he was or was not a deeply spiritual person in the traditional, and, some might even say, naive sense of the word 'spiritual,' namely, a person who wished to rekindle man's relationship with the independently existing Reality Who is the Divine, then the answer, it seems to me, is unambiguous.

Poirier also interprets Voegelin as an 'immanentist' who denied the reality of anything beyond his own subjectivity: Voegelin may have talked about 'the Beyond' and about an experience of 'the Ground,' 'but, for him,' says Poirier, 'the Ground that he experienced did not exist in the world beyond the experiencing subject.' Rather, it was no more than 'an expression of the existential consciousness of the experiencing subject.' And the same is true of 'the Beyond' that Voegelin talked about: 'Man is at one end of the experiential complex and 'the Beyond' is experienced as being at the other end. But 'the Beyond' is really not beyond. It is within, ...within consciousness.'

Let me list the charges in the order I will take them up:

1. Voegelin was a modern thinker.
2. He was not a Christian.
3. He was a subjectivistic immanentist.
4. He was an atheist.
5. He did not believe in any form of real transcendence.
6. He was not 'a deeply spiritual person.'

I do not necessarily intend to dispute each of these claims. I do differ from Poirier regarding most, though not all, of them, since I tend to approach them from a very different angle, but I am less concerned with arguing a simple 'yes' or 'no' with regard to them than with exploring them in a bit more depth in the hope that this may help us to understand somewhat better both those issues and Voegelin's own thought. What I say will be based in part on my reading of his writings, and also in part on the many conversations Voegelin and I had as I was writing my book on his thought—conversations in which I was trying at the time to get a better handle on some of these same questions than his writings alone seemed able to give me. Since mine was the first book published on him, I had no other interpreters to

serve as mediators between my understanding and his intentions; I simply had to read for myself and then discuss my interpretations with him. That Voegelin was pleased with the end result gives me some confidence that I can contribute usefully to the discussion of these issues. I also hope the fact that although I shared a great deal with him, I was not a 'follower' of Voegelin and did not coincide with him on all points (as will become clear below) may help me to build a bridge between Voegelin's point of view and that of Professor Poirier and of others who may share his concerns.[2]

With regard to the first item on the above list, that Voegelin was a modern thinker, I do not disagree. In fact, far from being what would commonly be called a 'traditional' thinker, Voegelin was a very modern thinker in that he was deeply committed to rational inquiry and respect for empirical evidence as well as skeptical of any reliance on traditional authority. His approach to the study of traditional thought was always by way of critically reflective inquiry and attention to the ways in which traditions were historically formed. The interesting question about Voegelin's modernity, I think, has to do with the extent to which his own thought may have been shaped more in various ways by some patterns of modern thinking than he himself was fully aware, and I think this is probably what Poirier is really trying to get at as well. Even a thinker as radically self-reflective as Voegelin could hardly expect to extricate himself entirely from the flux of history and stand serenely above the currents of thought that flowed through the time in which he lived. I do not have a simple answer to this question, but perhaps the discussion of some of the other points in our list may at least throw some light on it, especially the next two, the question of his relation to Christianity and to belief in some conception of 'what is called God.'[3]

The question of Voegelin's relation to Christianity is one I was intrigued by myself, as I indicated in my book in the chapter on his 'philosophy of religion.' After looking at it from various angles and culling citations from his writings that would support both 'pro' and 'con' arguments as to his being at least in some sense a Christian thinker, I wrote:

> From all of this it would seem that an interpreter who wished to put together an argument to the effect that Voegelin is not a Christian would be able to find as much evidence for his position as one who argued the opposite. The resolution of this apparent dilemma, however, cannot best be found by settling for one side or the other, but by refining the question. The most penetrating question is not whether Voegelin is a Christian or not but what is the shape of his particular variety of Christian thought—for that his

thought is Christian in at least some sense seems incontestable. Those of his critics who have attacked his treatment of Christianity have in effect been arguing not that Voegelin is not a Christian at all but that he is not a Christian by their standards. And he would agree.[4]

I also suggested there that in comparison with many prominent Christian theologians of his century who not only 'accepted the positivist critique of miracles' but also went 'some distance toward separating the symbolism of the Christian story from history altogether,' Voegelin took the historicity of Jesus and of divine Incarnation in him very seriously; 'If one wishes to find a modern reduction of Jesus to a disincarnate symbol,' I said, 'one can find much better evidence of it in such thinkers as Tillich or Bultmann.'[5]

On the historicity of the Incarnation, Voegelin himself had said in 'The Gospel and Culture': 'At a time when the reality of the gospel threatens to fall apart into the constructions of an historical Jesus and a doctrinal Christ, one cannot stress strongly enough the status of a gospel as a symbolism engendered in the *metaxy* of existence by a disciple's response to the drama of the Son of God. The drama of the Unknown God who reveals his kingdom through his presence in a man, and of the man who reveals what has been delivered to him by delivering it to his fellowmen, is continued by the existentially responsive disciple in the gospel drama by which he carries on the work of delivering these things from God to man.'[6] And lest this sound as if it might with deliberate 'ambiguity' be reducing Jesus, as Poirier might phrase it,[7] to merely an imaginary dramatic figure in someone else's 'immanentist' *metaxy* experience, Voegelin goes on to say that 'a gospel is neither a poet's work of dramatic art, nor an historian's biography of Jesus, but the symbolization of a divine movement that went through the person of Jesus into society and history.'[8] The entire Christian movement, that is, began with the concrete experience, and self-interpretation through Israel's heritage of symbols, of the historical person, Jesus of Nazareth—'from the constitution of his consciousness as the Son of God in the encounters with God and the devil, to the full realization of what it means to be the Son of God, to the submission to the passion and the last word: 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?'[9]—and Jesus's communication of this experience and interpretation to those who would bear witness to him.

I realize that the whole idea of associating Jesus with Voegelin's idea of *metaxy* existence may seem problematic to someone who interprets that idea the way Poirier does. The problem is worth stopping over. The experience of *metaxy* existence is the

absolute centre of all of Voegelin's thought, and since, as I think Poirier would probably agree, the idea of divine incarnation in Jesus is itself the center of orthodox Christian theology, to discuss both of them in relation to one another may help to clarify some underlying issues.

That Voegelin took the idea of divine incarnation in Jesus very seriously, i.e., that he had a Christology, is clear from many statements he made over the years. For example, in the first volume of *Order and History*, *Israel and Revelation*, Voegelin said, 'With the appearance of Jesus, God himself entered into the eternal present of history.'[10] And in 'The Gospel and Culture,' he said, 'In the historical drama of revelation, the Unknown God ultimately becomes the God known through his presence in Christ.'[11]
I realize, of course, that such citations will not suffice to answer Poirier's objections, which focus especially on the fact that to interpret Jesus as a person whose experience of existence in the *metaxy* was essentially like that of any other human being—even if in him it was uniquely 'open' (as Voegelin uses that term)[12] and faithful to the directional pull of the 'tension of existence'[13]—would be to see Jesus as one man among others. And Voegelin would not disagree; in fact, he would insist on it, since from his point of view, for divine incarnation to take place, it must take place in a concrete human being, and to be human is to live, whether with greater or with lesser openness and clarity, in the *metaxy*—since that is the only existence human beings actually experience. Voegelin interprets the Chalcedonian Definition of the Faith in precisely these terms:

…I shall quote the essential passage from the Definition of Chalcedon (A. D. 451), concerning the union of the two natures in the one person of Christ: 'Our Lord Jesus Christ…truly God and truly man…recognized in two natures…the distinction of natures being in no way annulled by the union, but rather the characteristics of each nature being preserved and coming together to form one person and subsistence.' This valiant attempt of the *patres* to express the two-in-one reality of God's participation in man, without either compromising the separateness of the two or splitting the one, concerns the same structure of intermediate reality, of the *metaxy*, the philosopher encounters when he analyzes man's consciousness of participation in the divine ground of his existence. The reality of the Mediator and the intermediate reality of consciousness have the same structure.[14]

For Voegelin, philosophy and theology, reflection and revelation—when they are genuine and not just a play of abstractions—all begin with the material of concrete experience, and human experience always has the structure of a tension between two (upper and lower) poles, which he frequently refers to as 'God' or 'the divine ground' on the one hand and 'man' on the other, and sometimes with a variety of other terms, as in this list in his 'Equivalences of Experience and Symbolization':

Existence has the structure of the In-Between, of the Platonic *metaxy*, and if anything is constant in the history of mankind it is the language of tension between life and death, immortality and mortality, perfection and imperfection, time and timelessness; between order and disorder, truth and untruth, sense and senselessness of existence; between *amor Dei* and *amor sui*, *l'âme ouverte* and *l'âme close*; between virtues of openness toward the ground of being such as faith, love, and hope, and the vices of infolding closure such as hybris and revolt; between the moods of joy and despair; and between alienation in its double meaning of alienation from the world and alienation from God.[15]

In *The Ecumenic Age* Voegelin says that all genuine insights and all experiences of revelation 'occur in the *Metaxy*, i.e., in the concrete psyche of concrete human beings in their encounters with divine presence. There are no Greek insights into the structure of reality apart from those of the philosophers in whose psyches the noetic theophany occurred; nor are there Israelite, Jewish, and Christian insights into the dynamics of transfiguration apart from the prophets, apostles, and above all, Jesus, in whose psyche the pneumatic revelations occurred.'[16] The 'dynamics of transfiguration' he speaks of there is itself a structural feature of the existential tension that is experienced (when one yields to or opens oneself to it) as a dynamism moving (or being drawn) toward the upper pole. One of Voegelin's terms for this is 'Exodus within Reality,' in which 'Reality is experienced as moving beyond its own structure toward a state of transfiguration.'[17]

To put this package in other (I hope a little plainer) words, human experience is pervasively an experience of longing for fulfillment; we live in a perpetual condition of incompleteness, but it is intrinsic to our longing that its tension is experienced as a reaching beyond unfulfilment toward the completeness, the perfect being, that would satisfy its longing. It can never really escape its own structure (that is, that of being 'between' [*metaxu*] poles of emptiness and fullness, etc.), but it can have a vivid sense of movement beyond incompleteness, and it is this movement that Voegelin refers to as 'transfiguration.'

In the same place in *The Ecumenic Age*, Voegelin also says, emphasizing the universality of this experience, 'Transfiguring incarnation…does not begin with Christ, as Paul assumed, but becomes

conscious through Christ and Paul's vision as the eschatological *telos* of the transfiguring process that goes on in history before and after Christ and constitutes its meaning.'[18]

This very universality is, of course, one of the points Poirier objects to when he says that 'for Voegelin, the expression 'the spirit of Christianity' is not specific to Christianity. It is a spirit that is present in the thought of all who live an open experiential life. It is present in the thought of Plato, the Hebrew prophets, the Buddha and Buddhists generally, etc…..'

Perhaps it will help to clarify the problem involved here if I point out that a crucial point of difference between Voegelin's Christology and that of some critics like Poirier has to do with the question of the uniqueness of the incarnation of God in Jesus. Christianity has from the beginning interpreted the incarnation in Jesus as in some manner unique, but the nature of that uniqueness has never been dogmatically defined. In the first essay I wrote on Voegelin, I addressed this very question (as it was raised at that time by some of the writers Poirier refers to, especially Gerhart Niemeyer and Frederick D. Wilhelmsen[19]), pointing out that:

> There is another way of formulating the underlying issue that never occurred to the earlier tradition, and that is to ask if the union of man and God in Christ is to be interpreted as unique in kind or in degree. …it is sufficient to identify it as a possible approach to show that the conflict between Voegelin's position and that of orthodoxy may not be a complete impasse. This very question has in fact, been taken up in recent times by theologians who grow out of the orthodox tradition and intend fidelity to it [I referred to Donald M. Baillie's *God Was in Christ* and W. Norman Pittenger's *The Word Incarnate*] but who do not interpret orthodoxy as requiring the more customary interpretation [i.e., that the divine-human union in Jesus was unique in kind]. It is worth remembering that, as Alan Richardson said in his *Creeds in the Making*, the Chalcedonian Definition did not prescribe a theory of how Godhead and manhood were united in Christ but contented itself with insisting on the mere fact of their union in him. 'Thus,' he says, 'it permits the formulation of theories provided that the principle is safeguarded in them.' Voegelin's interpretation of Incarnation in terms of continuity and universality would not in any way contradict this principle; rather, it is one possible theoretical approach beginning from it.[20]

The Chalcedonian Definition itself, in fact, would seem to imply uniqueness in degree rather than in kind since it explicitly refers to Jesus as being 'like us in every way except for sin.'[21] The root meaning of the word it uses, *hamartia*, translated as 'sin,' is failure, falling short, missing the target; the one who

was 'like us in every way except for sin' differed from us in not falling short of the calling to sonship to God that the Hebrew scriptures so frequently referred to as something Israel was called to but again and again failed to live up to (which is the specific Biblical symbolism that lay behind the early Christian references to Jesus as 'son of God'[22]).

Even if Poirier might acknowledge the openness of Chalcedon to such interpretation, however, he would nevertheless object, as he himself puts it, that 'for Voegelin, Jesus is strictly human, namely, a being who likely realised a maximal measure of the human potential, but it is His human potential that was maximized.' This is why Poirier says that 'what Voegelin really wished to convey by speaking of dogmatism [at the Council of Nicea], and by his use of the expression 'pre-Nicene Christian'' to describe himself 'was his support for an experiential life that is immanentist, which was what was present in the Arian belief' that the council condemned as heretical.

Actually I have a very different conception of what might have made Voegelin think of himself as 'pre-Nicene,' and that too is connected with the centrality, indeed the ultimacy, of the *metaxy* idea in Voegelin's thought. But before explaining what I mean by this, I think it will be helpful to further clarify what Voegelin actually meant by 'the *metaxy*.'

I hope I am not oversimplifying, but it looks to me as if Poirier thinks that the non-existence of God ('the Ground that he experienced did not exist in the world beyond the experiencing subject' but 'existed only as an expression of the existential consciousness of the experiencing subject') and the interpretation of Jesus as only a man ('strictly human, and nothing more than human') are logical implications of Voegelin's idea of the *metaxy* and that therefore Voegelin's thought could involve no real parallel to the Christian idea of the Incarnation: 'Voegelin's modern immanentist belief that there is no world transcendent God was what led him to the view that Jesus was a man like all others, and so, Jesus—as the Arians contended—had to be strictly human and nothing more than that.'

I think Poirier's reading of Voegelin's *metaxy,* however, is fundamentally different from Voegelin's own intention. Voegelin himself would probably have said that Arianism involved hypostatizing the 'man' pole of the metaxy (and probably the 'God' side also). To explore further Voegelin's conception of the *metaxy* may help not only to clarify the question of Voegelin's Christology but also that of his possible 'atheism.'

Let us consider more closely what Poirier says

about what he thinks Voegelin meant by it. He says that *metaxy* existence is for Voegelin 'only … an experience that man has—an experience that has man as its subject and its object—and that is all it is…. It is an experience that unfolds entirely within the immanent order of man's consciousness, and thus we are not justified in arguing that it says something about man's transmundane connections.' As illustration he cites a passage from Voegelin's 'Autobiographical Reflections' (in which Voegelin was describing his efforts to extricate himself from the positivistic currents of thought that surrounded him by developing a thoroughly experience-based mode of reflection like that of William James's 'radical empiricism'):

> The term consciousness, therefore, could no longer mean to me a human consciousness which is conscious of a reality outside man's consciousness, but had to mean the in-between reality of the participatory pure experience which then analytically can be characterised through such terms as the poles of the experiential tension and the reality of the experiential tension in the metaxy. The term luminosity of consciousness … tries to stress this In-Between character of the experience as against the immanentising language of a human consciousness which, as a subject, is opposed to an object of experience.

'Notice,' Poirier says, 'how Voegelin immanentises and subjectivises (i.e., intra-personalises) the expression 'the in-between.' … it is about the character and quality of human consciousness and experience.' And he identifies this immanentizing and subjectivizing with Voegelin's often repeated injunction that the poles of the experiential tension 'must not be hypostatized into objects independent of the tension in which they are experienced as its poles.'[23] To Poirier, this is conclusive evidence that Voegelin was an immanentist and an atheist: '...neither pole, the Ground pole and the man pole, can exist independently of one another, which is what is implied by 'hypostatising the poles.'[24]

But actually, if one reads the quoted passage carefully, one can see that when Voegelin says that 'the term consciousness … could no longer mean to me a human consciousness which is conscious of a reality outside man's consciousness' and rejects 'the immanentising language of a human consciousness which, as a subject, is opposed to an object of experience,' he is doing just the opposite of interpreting 'the participatory pure experience' as something contained within an immanentistically conceived human consciousness. To do that would be precisely to hypostatize 'the man pole.' Voegelin adopted a radically empiricist attention to the experience itself, prior to any assumptions about

whether there is an actually existing entity that might be assumed to be the 'subject' of the experience, or even an actually existing world of entities that that subject might both exist in and take items of as its objects.[25] Voegelin's approach is first of all phenomenological, a matter of holding back the urge to impose our accustomed categories of interpretation ('subject,' 'object,' 'entity,' 'world,' 'God,' 'man') so that we can notice the structure of the fundamental experience that is shared by all who participate in it, whatever the categories they might use to interpret it.

It looks as if the real underlying issue in Poirier's dispute with Voegelin here is that Poirier wants Voegelin to hypostatize God (the Beyond, the Ground) and assumes that if he refuses to do that, then he must be hypostatizing 'the man pole' as an individual consciousness that contains 'the God pole' as merely one of its ideas. But what Voegelin himself said was that 'any construction of man as a world immanent entity will destroy the meaning of existence.'[26] Nor are even 'language symbols' such as 'God' and 'man' to be understood immanentistically; as Voegelin put it in another part of the 'Autobiographical Reflections': 'This understanding of the In-Between character of consciousness, as well as of its luminosity—which is the luminosity not of a subjective consciousness but of the reality that enters into the experience from both sides—results furthermore in a better understanding of the problem of symbols: *Symbols* are the language phenomena engendered by the process of participatory experience. The language symbols expressing an experience are not inventions of an immanentist human consciousness but are engendered in the process of participation itself.'[27]

For Voegelin to be a subjectivistic immanentist, as Poirier claims, Voegelin would first, contrary to his own repeated injunctions, have to hypostatize an immanent subject with an 'immanentist human consciousness.' I hope it is sufficiently clear that this was not what Voegelin intended. Still, I suspect that even if I could persuade Poirier that Voegelin did not suppose a hypostatized human consciousness as the container of a 'God' idea, he would still object that Voegelin's 'God pole' is only an idea, not a reality. So before continuing with the discussion of Voegelin's relation to Christian thought, I will begin to address the question of what Voegelin meant by 'God' and how that might relate to the way the term has been used in the mainstream tradition of Christianity.

Poirier seems to suppose that orthodox Christianity has traditionally held that God is a particular entity, an individually existing being, but that is not the case.

There probably are and have been many Christians who would say that God is an individually existing being, but the great majority of traditional theologians have spoken of God not as '*a being*' but rather as 'Being Itself,' *Ipsum Esse*, to use St. Thomas Aquinas's phrase. That is to say, Christian theological reflection from late antiquity until at least the late Middle Ages, when William of Ockham *did* interpret God as a single, very powerful, individual entity, has generally tended toward what theologians now call 'panentheism' (literally, 'all-in-God-ism').[28]

It is true that the God of the ancient Israelites, the Jews, and the Christians has almost always been pictured as though he were an individual entity, and if one were simply to read the Bible uncritically, one might get the impression that that is all there is to it. But this is an inherent function of narrative form as such. Even a well educated, critical reader, while reading the stories about God in the Bible must in doing so imagine him as a dramatic character of the sort one encounters in stories. But while a story needs a cast of characters, and reading a story requires an act of imaginative empathy, the enterprise of theology has always been an effort to step beyond mythic picture thinking so as to clarify the larger framework of meaning the myths serve. The Bible is a book with many historical layers, each with its own version of God, and to read it as a whole is to retrace a millennia-long process of imaginative interpretation in which the biblical God moves, in a first transformation, from being one god among many, even if the most powerful member of the genus, 'a great God and a great king above all gods,' as in Psalm 95, to being the only real member of the genus.[29] Eventually, in a more radical transformation, the Yahweh of the Israelites moves, in some of the later prophets such as Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and the second Isaiah, toward being conceived as radically transcendent, beyond the cosmos and even, as Aquinas later argued, beyond the genus of gods altogether.[30]

In his treatise on 'the names of God,' Aquinas takes up a long list of names or terms that get applied to God, including whether it is appropriate to call God 'God.' His answer is that it can be appropriate, but that when that term is appropriately applied, its meaning is analogical, and that even its analogical meaning depends on the person who uses it having some real (i.e., experiential) knowledge of God.[31] Of the names of God in use, Aquinas says that the most proper is '*Qui est*,' 'He Who Is' since 'the being of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other.'[32] And yet, he says, 'still more proper is the Tetragrammaton [YHVH], imposed to signify the substance of God itself, incommunicable

and, if one may so speak, singular.'[33] As I put it in *Worldview and Mind*, 'YHVH is not an analogy but an indicator that with the symbol 'Being,' one has reached the ultimate limit of metaphors; the tetragrammaton is the jumping-off point into absolute mystery.'[34]

To state the matter succinctly, if Voegelin can be called an atheist because he did not think that God is an individual entity, then so could St. Thomas. And when he said to Bob Heilman, 'Of course there is no God. But we must believe in Him,' he could also have meant (as I think he really did) that the symbol 'God' is a mythic image taken from ancient mythology about a genus of entities of the type 'god,' but nevertheless, just as Aquinas's names of God are useful if imperfect analogies, it is a helpful image for the imagination to use in orienting itself in the direction of supreme transcendence.

I do not mean, however, simply to dismiss Poirier's challenge regarding the nature of Voegelin's God and whether that could really be said to be the God of traditional Christians, including Christians who think as deeply and subtly about it as Aquinas. I think that Poirier's challenge to Voegelin on this point has real force and that it offers an opportunity to bring to the fore some issues that neither Voegelin nor either his Christian followers or his Christian critics have made sufficiently explicit.

One of the most fundamental beliefs of the Christian faith from the start has been belief in Jesus's resurrection (see I Cor. 15 for a statement of this decades before the gospels were written). Another closely related one is expectation of eschatological fulfilment, of which Christians have believed Jesus's resurrection was both the sign and the actual beginning: 'But now Christ is risen from the dead, and has become the first-fruits of those who have fallen asleep. For since by man came death, by Man also came the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ all shall be made alive. But each one in his own order: Christ the first-fruits, afterward those who are Christ's at His coming' (1 Cor. 15:20-23).

Even if Voegelin's belief that the union of divinity and humanity in Jesus was unique in degree but not in kind would not rule out Voegelin's being considered a Christian in the terms of Chalcedonian orthodoxy, disbelief in the resurrection clearly would. Indeed, since belief in the resurrection would probably seem as central to Christian orthodoxy as belief in the Incarnation, I was surprised to see that Poirier refers to it only in a footnote.[35]

That may be because it is a question Voegelin never addressed in a clear and direct way in his writings. I can speak to this point myself, however,

on the basis of my conversations with him. Jesus's resurrection was not a topic that came up while I was writing my book on Voegelin, for the very reason that he had not written about that but rather about Paul's 'vision of the resurrected.' But not long after my book was published (I think it was sometime in the spring of 1981), we had a conversation in which I said something that indicated I myself took belief in the resurrection seriously, and this produced the response, 'I did not realize you were a fundamentalist.' He seemed shocked. And I was as surprised in my own way as he was—not so much by the fact that he expressed disbelief in that doctrine (I knew his mind pretty well by then), but by his simple identification of belief in the resurrection with fundamentalism. I hope I may be forgiven for speaking personally for a moment (since my own beliefs are not the topic at issue or even particularly relevant), but I suspect that although I consider myself an orthodox Christian in the Chalcedonian sense, I would probably have difficulty convincing many Christians, and perhaps Professor Poirier as well, of my orthodoxy (especially since I side with Voegelin on the 'unique in degree' vs. 'unique in kind' question). But I doubt if I would have any difficulty at all persuading them that I am not a fundamentalist. That Voegelin would simply equate belief in resurrection with fundamentalism suggests that Gerhart Niemeyer may not have been off the mark when he said that Christianity was the one great historical tradition Voegelin did not fully understand. Not only was the resurrection of Christ not an idea which he could consider at all credible, it was not even one that he could quite grasp the possibility of a Christian he respected actually believing in.

I spoke above of the ultimacy for Voegelin of the *metaxy* he found both in Plato and in his phenomenological analysis of his own meditative experience. He speaks of *metaxy* existence eloquently, brilliantly, and even with real reverence. But something else that I think Voegelin did not understand about the Christian faith is that Christianity has its own understanding of *metaxy* existence that not only includes everything Voegelin discerned in his own, but also a further dimension that seems to have been invisible to him: that Christian existence is lived between crucifixion and resurrection—between the crushing, palpable evidence in Jesus's crucifixion that the disciples' hope in him was misguided and the mysterious, impalpable evidence of an inchoate present fulfilment and the promise of a future, perfect fulfilment that is inherently mysterious and will always remain a radical challenge to our human imaginations, our

intellects, and even our sense of spiritual aspiration.

If we return, then, to the centrality, and as I suggested earlier, the real ultimacy, of the *metaxy* in Voegelin's framework of thought, I think we should be able to see why he would be so dismissive of any form of eschatological fulfilment and of the idea of a God who would have the ability to bring such a fulfillment about. He made this clear in *The Ecumenic Age* when he spoke of Paul's 'transformation of the mystery [of the vision in the *metaxy*] into metastatic expectations.'[36] Comparing Paul with Plato, he said that Plato 'preserves the balance of consciousness' by playing down 'the unbalancing reality of the theophanic event.'[37] Paul, in contrast, lost that balance through letting his theophanic vision tempt him to expectations of a radical transformation in the conditions of existence: 'The mythopoetic genius of Paul,' said Voegelin, 'is not controlled by the critical consciousness of a Plato.'[38] What Voegelin meant by Paul's 'transformation of the mystery into metastatic expectations,' is that Paul slipped into supposing that the *metaxy* itself could be somehow be transcended. Voegelin's own belief was that it could *not*, for the reason that the *metaxy* itself *is* ultimate reality.[39]

When this is understood, I think several other questions can answer themselves fairly easily. One is that what Voegelin seems likely to have meant (if he did mean it seriously), when he spoke of himself as a pre-Nicene Christian, has to do not with Arianism but rather with the 'openness of the theophanic field' that he said had been 'substantially preserved for three centuries' (i.e., until the Council of Nicea in 325).[40] The 'theophanic field' Voegelin refers to is the *metaxy* when it involves a vivid sense of the pull from the divine pole. What Voegelin probably thought of as the historical contingency that closed that theophanic field was the gradually increasing tendency in the aftermath of that first official church council to conceive of the uniqueness of the union of divinity and humanity in Jesus in a way that raised him inherently above the *metaxy* and made it impossible for others to realize that Jesus's experience of life in that openness was something that they could fully share. This is why Voegelin says in the same place that until Nicea 'the early Patres…found one or the other subordinationist construction to be the most suitable symbolism for expressing the relation of the Son to the Father-God' and that this continued 'up to Nicea (325), when the Athanasian victory put an end to this generous openness.'[41]

The answer to the question of whether Voegelin's God is the same as that of traditional Christianity should now be clear. The divine pole of Voegelin's

metaxy is something more akin to the Platonic Agathon, i.e., a point of orientation toward the good. If we consider such a distinguished figure in twentieth century theology as H. Richard Niebuhr, the difference between his God and Voegelin's can illustrate this without tempting us to stumble over the question of whether the Christian God is supposed to be an individually existing entity—something that Niebuhr did not believe either.

On the one hand, Niebuhr's *Radical Monotheism* explicitly makes the case for a panentheistic, non-entitative conception of the Christian God who—imaged as 'a deity'—is also our point of orientation toward the good as such. Faith in God, says Niebuhr is 'the confidence that whatever is, is good, because it exists as one thing among the many which all have their origin and their being in the One, the principle of being which is also the principle of value. In Him we live and move and have our being not only as existent but as worthy of existence and worthy in existence.'[42]

But on the other hand, Niebuhr also made it clear that the God of the Christian tradition is not *only* the supreme principle of value. In his *The Meaning of Revelation*, he defines the belief of the community of Christian faith by saying, 'In order that any being may qualify as a deity before the bar of reason it must be good, but it must also be powerful. There may be beings we can adore for their goodness which are as powerless as the self-subsistent values and the eternal objects of modern philosophy. But what is powerless cannot have the character of deity; it cannot be counted on, trusted in; to it no prayers ascend…. Deity, whatever else it must be to be deity, must be powerful in its goodness as well as good in its power…. We meet the God of Jesus Christ with the expectations of such power.'[43] For Christians, that is, their God is not only the symbol and ground of supreme value but also the radically transcendent source of all being, who (to use the mythic, but useful, analogical image of a supremely personal deity) has the real power to win, and in the person of Jesus of Nazareth already has won, a decisive victory over sin and death—a God whom they can trust to bring to fulfilment the intention He has had from the beginning of creation to incarnate His life everywhere, in everyone, and in everything to the extent of their capacities. As Saint Maximus the Confessor put it: 'God the divine Logos wishes to effect the mystery of his incarnation always and in all things.'[44]

At this point, then, I think we have an answer to the question of whether Voegelin was an atheist. It is clear that Poirier is not wrong when he says that Voegelin did not believe in the God of traditional Christianity. But I hope I have made it equally clear that one can think differently from Poirier about the meaning of the word 'God' without being an atheist. Voegelin's God may not have been Niebuhr's, but his divine pole of the *metaxy* was at least a version of what Niebuhr called a 'principle of being which is also the principle of value,' even if in Voegelin's case that principle (i.e., source or 'ground') had no ultimate power except that exerted through the gentle pull of the 'golden cord' of reflective insight, to cite another of Voegelin's favourite images from Plato's *The Laws*.[45]

Jacques Maritain, the leading Thomist philosopher of the twentieth century, argued, persuasively I think, that to be a real atheist is extremely difficult—he said he was not sure anyone except maybe Nietzsche had ever fully succeeded in it.[46] I think that a brief look at how Maritain distinguished between a real atheist and a 'pseudo-atheist'—i.e., someone who 'when he denies the existence of God, denies the existence of an *ens rationis*, an imaginary entity which he calls God, but which is not God'[47]—will help to answer not only the question of whether Voegelin was really an atheist but also the other remaining questions about whether 'he did not believe in any form of real transcendence' or whether he was 'not a deeply spiritual person.'

In his essay, 'The Immanent Dialectic of The First Act of Freedom,' Maritain talked about the act of faith that is implicit in what he called 'a *first* or *primal* free act, any free act through which a new basic direction is imposed on my life.'[48] 'The soul,' he says, 'in this first moral choice, turns away from an evil action because it is evil. Thus the intellect is aware of the distinction between good and evil, and knows that the good ought to be done because it is good. We are confronted, here, with a formal motive which transcends the whole order of empirical convenience and desire.'[49] The true good, that is, is understood to have its ground in ultimate reality; it is determined neither by an accidental desire of the individual nor by the arbitrary decree of a supreme power (such as the God of William of Ockham, who maintained that the good is grounded only in an arbitrary act of God's will, which God could change at any time).[50] In Maritain's words, 'The notion of a good action to be done for the sake of the good necessarily implies that there is an ideal and indefectible order…. an order that depends on a reality superior to everything and which is Goodness itself—good by its very being, not by virtue of conformity with anything distinct from itself.'[51]

That 'Goodness itself…transcending all empirical existence,' is what Maritain, following St. Thomas, means by God. Consequently, a person in that 'first

act of freedom' in which he decides for the basic orientation of his life, even if he may not be thinking 'explicitly of God, or of his ultimate end…. knows God, without being aware of it' and 'by virtue of the internal dynamism of his choice for the good,' he is in that very act making a choice of God as 'the ultimate end of his existence.'[52] Or as Maritain also puts it a little further on—in words that I am confident Voegelin's heart, too, would have resonated with—in that fundamental act of moral choice, the good 'appears to the intellect not only as what is in order, not only as what is right to do, but as *the good by means of which 'I shall be saved*,' the good by means of which some mysteriously precious part of me will escape misfortune and find its way home.'[53]

If I am correct that Voegelin's heart would have resonated with those words—and I do believe it myself on the basis of my personal knowledge of him as a man and an intellectual and spiritual companion in those last years of his life—this would answer the questions not only about whether he was a 'real atheist,' in Maritain's terms, but also about whether he believed in some form of real transcendence and whether he was a 'deeply spiritual person.' Voegelin knew the *metaxy* and its experiential structure through intensive meditative practice, the beginnings of which he wrote about in the 'anamnetic experiments' described in his *Anamnesis* and which continued until the end of his life.[54] The divine pole of Voegelin's *metaxy* may not have had in his conception the ultimate power of fulfillment a Christian believes and trusts in, but its transcendent goodness was something Voegelin definitely *did* believe in and gave his absolute loyalty to in a spirit of genuine reverence.

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Notes:

1. And, I might add, my own friend and one time department chairman, the man who hired me at the University of Washington in 1966. It was at Heilman's urging that in my book *Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1981), I included a glossary of Voegelin's terminology which was later expanded for inclusion in the final volume (number 34) of Voegelin's *Collected Works* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2006).

2. Perhaps I should explain what I mean when I say I was not a 'disciple' of Voegelin. The key to all Voegelin's thinking was, as I will explain further below, the idea that philosophical reflection must begin with

experience and most centrally with the experience of what he called, taking the term from Plato, the '*metaxy*' (the 'between') the experience of moving and being pulled between immanent and transcendent poles. Before I had ever read anything by or about Voegelin and knew his name only as someone Bob Heilman admired, I had written a book, *The Dark Dove: The Sacred and Secular in Modern Literature* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1975), in which I discussed the phenomenology of the sacred as an experience of tension between immanent and transcendent poles and applied that as a framework to study the experience and symbolization of the sacred in a number of modern authors whom I divided into atheists, pantheists, and traditional theists but in all of whose work, I argued, some form of experience of the sacred was reflected. This amounted to my own version of what I would later find Voegelin calling the *metaxy*, but which I had come upon quite independently of Voegelin (my main sources were Rudolf Otto and Mircea Eliade). For this reason, when Voegelin and I met, we found that we shared a coinciding experiential starting point for our thinking.

3. This phrase is the title of Voegelin's last essay, 'Quod Deus Dicitur' (1985), in Voegelin, *The Collected Works 12 Published Essays, 1966-1985*, ed. Ellis Sandoz. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), pp. 376-94. This volume will subsequently be abbreviated as *CW 12*.

4. Webb, *Eric Voegelin*, p. 226.

5. bid., p. 230. I cited Alan Richardson, *History: Sacred and Profane* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1964), pp. 133-39, on the tendency in Paul Tillich, Emil Brunner, Karl Barth, and Rudolf Bultmann to separate 'factual history of the sort investigated by historians and a suprahistorical realm of meaning.'

6. Voegelin, *CW 12*, p. 201.

7. Cf. Poirier, 'Eric Voegelin's Immanentism' Part I, *Appraisal* Vol. 7, No. 2 (October 2008), p. 22: 'Let me begin my critique of Voegelin by stating that everything that I have said about his thinking in my opening paragraphs is both true and false—depending upon how it is read—and this, I have come to believe, is an ambiguity on which Voegelin counted.'

8. Voegelin, *CW 12*, p. 203.

9. Ibid.

10. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956, p. 345.

11. *CW 12*, p. 199.

12. See my discussion of 'open' vs. 'closed' existence in *Eric Voegelin*, pp. 11, 63, 147-48, 158, 160, 196, 235-36, 237, 271-73, and 278.

13. See ibid., pp. 36-46.

14. 'Immortality: Experience and Symbol,' *CW 12*, p. 79.

15. *CW 12*, pp. 119-20.

16. *Order and History 4: The Ecumenic Age*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1974, p. 270

17. Ibid. p. 269.

18. Ibid., p. 270.

19. See note 12 of the first part of Poirier's article in *Appraisal* Vol. 7, No. 2, October 2008. Page 29

20. 'Eric Voegelin's Theory of Revelation,' *The Thomist*,

42, 1 (January 1978), reprinted in *Eric Voegelin's Thought: A Critical Appraisal*, ed. Ellis Sandoz. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1982), pp. 174-5.

21. 'kata panta homoion hémin choris hamartias.'

22. In case anyone might think it is a mistake (or irreverent or tendentious) here not to capitalize the word 'son,' I should point out that in the manuscripts of New Testament and other early Christian writings, there was no capitalization of any word (not even 'God') for the simple reason that lower case letters were not invented until the Middle Ages. I have the impression that some people think 'Son' should be capitalized because it has always referred to a pre-existent heavenly individual rather than to Israel itself as 'son of God.'

23. *CW 12*, p. 280.

24. On this question of whether Voegelin's Ground or God could be said to have any sort of existence independent of human consciousness, I might mention a conversation that seems pertinent. In 1976 when I presented my paper on his theory of revelation (which he had suggested Ellis Sandoz ask me to write for a symposium in Chicago), Voegelin invited me to dine with him and Lissy in the hotel dining room. During the course of that dinner, I asked him (rather naively I now think in retrospect) how he thought about the question of an immortal soul. What he said was that he believed the soul is immortal as long as it is immortal, and after that, it is not. I mention this because the implication is that human participation in the life of tension between the divine and human poles is finite, but this does not mean that divine pole is limited in the same way. That participating human beings may perish, will not snuff out the *metaxy* or annihilate its essential structure, and its poles therefore do exist independently of any individual human consciousness.

25. Voegelin sometimes referred to himself as a 'radical empiricist,' alluding to the famous essay of William James.

26. Ibid.

27. *CW 34*, ed. Ellis Sandoz, p. 99.

28. I should note, in case the term is unfamiliar, that this is not the term 'pantheism' (which would mean 'all is God' or that God is simply a name for the sum total of all finite reality). To explain the history of these ideas in detail would be impossible in the space available here, but I can refer the reader to an extensive discussion of it in my book, *Worldview and Mind: Religious Thought and Psychological Development* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2009). See especially chapter seven, 'The Dynamic Diversity of Religious Worldviews' and pp. 208-215.

29. It is perhaps worth noting that in Psalm 95, the original Hebrew has no capital letters to distinguish 'God' from 'gods' (as I mentioned earlier, in note 22, majuscule and minuscule were invented in the Middle Ages).

30. See Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, pt. 1, question 3, article 5, 'Whether God is contained in a genus,' i.e., is God an individual entity of any type at all? His answer is that he is not.

31. Ibid., question 13, article 10.

32. Ibid., article 11.

33. Ibid., reply to objection 1.

34. *Worldview and Mind*, p. 168.

35. Note 24 of his first article, p. 30.

36. *The Ecumenic Age*, p. 240.

37. Ibid., p. 241.

38. Ibid., p. 249.

39. I should note that the Christian idea of eschatological fulfillment does not necessarily imply that creaturely existence would cease in eschatological fulfillment to be *metaxy* existence. Christian writers have most often imaged it that way, but there have been some such as Gregory of Nyssa who have talked about eschatology as involving a never-ending movement into God, in the life to come just as much as in this one. Gregory developed this idea on the basis of St. Paul's image of being 'transformed from glory to glory' (2 Cor. 3:18). (It is also an idea that C. S. Lewis adopted from Gregory in his *The Great Divorce*.) In one of our conversations in the late 1970s I brought up this idea of Gregory's with Voegelin (at the time I visited him I happened to be reading Jean Daniélou's anthology of Gregory, *From Glory to Glory*), and he expressed appreciation of it.

40. Ibid. p. 259.

41. Ibid. On the same note, the separation of the western Catholic Church from the Orthodox Church in the east due to the west's change of the Nicene creed to say that the Holy Spirit 'proceeds from the Father *and the Son*' is not an issue Voegelin wrote about, but I think if he did, he probably would have said that this was a further step in the separation of Jesus from the *metaxy* and therefore from humanity (i.e., from those who *receive* the Spirit, i.e., the animating pull from the divine pole of the *metaxy*) by raising the Son to the level of the Father as the divine originating source of the very being of the Spirit—in contrast to the original Nicene doctrine (as formulated in 381 at the Council of Constantinople) that says, as St. John of Damascus paraphrased it, 'We likewise believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and Giver of Life, Who proceeds from the Father and abides in the Son.'

42. *Radical Monotheism and Western Civilization* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1960), pp. 27-28.

43. New York: Macmillan, 1941, pp. 134-35. This is a book that Voegelin read with interest and expressed approval of in writing, and that I had also talked about with him, which is one of the reasons I was surprised when he found it shocking to learn that my own faith was essentially the same as Niebuhr's.

44. *Patrologia Graeca* 91.1084d, quoted in Norman Russell, *The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition*, p. 317.

45. *Order and History 3: Plato and Aristotle*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), pp. 231-32, and Plato, *The Laws*, 644d-645b.

46. *The Range of Reason* (New York: Scribner's, 1942), p. 83.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid. p. 66, emphasis in original.

BOOK REVIEWS

Luigi Pareyson
Existence, Interpretation, Freedom: Selected Writings
ed. with Introduction by Paolo Diego Bubbio
The Davies Group, Publishers, Aurora, CO; 2009;
ISBN 978-1-934542-18-7. pbk. viii + 262 pp.

Five years ago I was asked to comment on a paper by Dan Lazea on Luigi Pareyson (1918-1991) (see *Appraisal*, Vol. 6 No. 1), of whom I knew nothing and none of whose works had been translated into English. I was impressed by what the author had to say about Pareyson, a professor at the University of Turin, and it was a pleasant surprise to receive unsolicited this the first English translation of some of his work.

The selections are grouped into four parts: Existence; Knowledge; Truth, Interpretation and the Critique of Ideology; and Ontology of Freedom. A very large proportion of Pareyson's many publications were on aesthetics (especially those of German Idealism), and there appears to be a predominance of aesthetic interest in his treatments, in these extracts, of knowledge, truth and interpretation. For his paradigm of knowledge appears to be interpretation and that, in turn, appears to be primarily the interpretation of art: all the extracts in Pt 2, 'Knowledge', are about interpretation and are taken from writings on aesthetics. In one of them, Pareyson states that the best definition of interpretation would be that it is 'a certain form of knowledge in which, in one way, receptivity and activity are indivisible', and that 'intuition' (by which he seems to mean perception) is at least inchoately interpretation because it is 'an inextricable connection of cognitive sensation and passionate figuration of knowledge and expression' (p. 83). But if interpretation is 'a certain form of knowledge' what are the other and non-interpretative forms? Equally, if 'intuition' is inchoate interpretation, how can there be knowledge which is not interpretation in one way or another? There is nothing in these selections about natural science, which Dilthey identified with 'explanation' as opposed to 'interpretation', nor indeed about anything other than philosophy and the interpretation of works of art. I for one would like to know what he did say about other forms of knowing or that he definitely neglected them.

Similar uncertainties apply to other important terms. For as well as a lack of explicit clarifications (we should not always demand exact definitions),

there is a notable lack of examples and applications, and thus his thinking, as represented in these extracts, remains at too abstract a level. It would have been especially helpful if, in addition to the Introduction, each part and each extract had its own introduction to set it in its context. (I have some experience of compiling an anthology.) I have one other negative remark to make: the item on the existential nature of ethics is simply an exposition of Kierkegaard (and half of it is direct quotation). Something more original would surely have been more suitable.

To return to the central theme of interpretation: Pareyson makes it very clear (despite his largely abstract manner) that it is a thoroughly personal act which transcends the distinction of 'subject and 'object' and thus the dilemma of 'subjectivism' or 'objectivism'. The primary relation is that of the person to truth and thus to Being, to which the person is open and not self-enclosed nor fixed in his existing perspective. Rather, being and truth can be known only by a person in and through his (the translation kowtows to Liberal censorship and employs the feminine form throughout) concrete and historical situation, which is the route and not an obstruction to them. Personality therefore does not entail subjectivism but is instead the guarantee of truth, even though the search for it remains hazardous.

Moreover, the variety of interpretations is a consequence, not of subjectivity, but of the infinite fecundity of reality which that very plurality reveals: each interpretation, necessarily partial, intends a whole which goes beyond it. Likewise, that not everything can be said, does not entail Heidegger's negative ontology of the total ineffability of Being.

All these features apply also to philosophy. There cannot be just one true and fixed philosophy. Rather the infinite richness of reality is reflected in the variety of philosophies, which are not self-enclosed and wholly incompatible. Ideology, in contrast, is the consequence of subjectivism, and replaces truth with its (merely) historical, expressive and technical situation and application.

Personality also entails freedom and with it freedom to reach out beyond one's existing situation, perspective and conceptions. This is not the freedom of subjectivism but that of responsibility. Yet, in the final part, 'Ontology of Freedom', there seems to be, in reaction against the rationalist necessitarianism of Hegel, a hint of what Scheler held to be the fatal German infatuation with and reification of

nothingness (most of all by Hegel!), so that Pareyson can say that God, 'because he *wants* to be, ... must defeat negativity, evil and nothingness, which are the dangers of his non-existence' (p. 248). Apart from that, Pareyson is someone who deserves to be read and appreciated in the English-speaking world, and I look forward to further translations.

R.T. Allen

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Patrick Hayden (editor),
The Ashgate Research Companion to Ethics and International Relations,
Guildford, Ashgate 2009, 492 pp., ISBN 978 0 7546 7101 5 (hbk); ISBN 978 0 7546 9164 8

This volume has a first merit in (re)linking international relations with the normative and ethical dimensions that become central for this subject matter. Another significant merit of this volume is to capture a particular direction of development for the theoretical dynamics of international relations in the dialogue with political science, generally. Not a long while ago, cosmopolitanism, critical theory, feminism and poststructuralism were only marginal and uninfluential in relation to international relations. Now they all hallmark a salutary quest for reassessing the traditions of the theoretical international relations and those more practical to international relations within the present-day dilemmas of the ever more globalized world affairs.

Patrick Hayden from the University of St Andrews, UK, the editor of the volume, acknowledges also that 'The expression "international ethics" did not come into general use until relatively late in the twentieth century, however, when it became clear that the sterile stand-off of the first "great debate" in IR – the intellectual struggle between so-called realists and idealists in the 1920s and 1930s over the nature of international politics and thus over the role of ethical principle therein – was not sufficient to meet the normative challenges confronting the world after the Second world War.' (p.1)

This observation does not imply that the renewed ethical and normative aspects exhaust the present day topics of international relations and the structure of the volume proves it. The first part of the book tackles the traditions and the resources of the mainstream international relations. It comprises discussions describing realism in a more contemporary key through articles on liberalism, cosmopolitanism, critical theory, feminist ethics and poststructuralism.

These approaches complete and complement each other they situate themselves as 'interlocutors'

within a wider discussion of international relations. For instance, the question of 'justice' in international relations becomes interdisciplinary related in this *Companion* not only to 'international justice' and 'transnational distributive justice', but also to matters of 'moral pluralism' and 'moral universalism', and also to environmental justice, without mentioning all the related and fundamental dimensions for the analysis of the concept.

The second part investigates the ethics of war and peace, through studies concerning the just war, humanitarian intervention, the dilemmatic relation between the security of the state and the security of people, or that between ethics and the weapons of mass destruction, as well as the relation between pacifism and international relations, generally.

The third part treats the correlations between ethics and the politics of the human rights. In this context, the studies approach the universalism of human rights, and genocide from the ethical and normative perspectives, but also the aspects by which gender imprints the universe of the 'chevaliers' of the human rights, the human rights of the child and the policies of childhood, and the particulars of the relation between human rights and democracy within the global context, and finally, international justice in its transitional nature, from the local to the international level.

In the forth part the volume investigates new dimensions of international justice, such as the relation among poverty, inequality and the global distributive justice, the political exclusion of the refugees and the quasi-absence of this sort of approaches from the ethics of the international relations. There is attention to human rights in connection to the human needs, human development and human security, to justice in environmental matters, in its national and international dimensions. The *Companion* notices the expansion of corporate power and corporate-led globalisation, faced with the vindication of the global responsibilities of the multinational corporations by the global citizens' movement and the international non-governmental organisations. A special interest is oriented towards matters of nationalism, self-determination and secession, assessed from the perspective of a postnational conception of sovereignty.

In the last part of the volume the main interest is the evaluation of the ethics of the global society. The studies approach the ethics of global governance related to the global governance of ethics, the understanding of the alternative globalization and of the social movements, the dialogue among religion, cultural diversity and universalism in international ethics, and the transformation undergone by the

international political community and the conceptions of global citizenship.

The contemporary world is characterized not only by a globalized economy, but also by the emerGence of a globalized civil society, of political liberalisms with global aspirations based to various extents to cosmopolitanism and on nuanced, inclusive and humanitarian understandings of the human rights, of the rights of the cosmopoliatnian individual, of an increased importance of the environment, as well as on the more intensified and more detailed debates concerning world justice as both a 'mutual advantage' and as 'impartiality' (aspects interpreted in their complementary dimensions, but also in their exclusive dimensions).

Global citizenship is portrayed in the *Companion* as a great near future hope. But this global citizenship has many utopian characteristics. Michael Walzer said in 1996: ''I am not even aware that there is a world such that one could be citizen in it'. Nevertheless, globalization did forge a political community with the influence of all the imperfections of the local, regional and national political communities, with the benefits of an 'emerging human rights regime' and with the wisdom of the experience of the shared risk (p.474).

International political transformation is possible and critical theory offers a glimpse of this transformation: 'In recent years, it has evolved into a pliable and pluralistic approach in internal relations theory, one that has allowed IR theorists to understand the transformative possibilities of globalisation and global society. With critical IR theory encompassing such a wide range of radical theory approaches, it is only fair to expect that more social theorists will prefer its

open-ended, self-reflective orientation to positivist approaches. But such anticipated success also comes with a caveat: that more interest in critical theory will generate increasing pressure to develop a pragmatic, concrete set of parameters that can compete with other paradigmatic social theory approaches (Wendt 1999). Indeed, because the hyperactive idealism and criticism can breed denial and scepticism, or a cunning cynicism towards authority, it can also dampen the critical spirit and desire of working toward a coherent platform of global justice' (p.74).

The international community is described and analyzed in this documented and complex work using interesting theoretical concepts that emphasize the potential emergence of an ethical and liberal global governance. The liberal principles of global governance correlated with the ethical global governance.

These principles should be considered in their totality, not only from the perspectives related to international diplomacy, but also from the perspectives sustained by the free market – to be one's own master should not become anyway in to be master of others. Nevertheless, this word of wisdom remain less interesting, a mere truism when it does not overpass the limits where international relations are reduced to a confrontation between the ridiculous idealists and monstrous imperialists.

Only considering this limited paradigm liberalism, human rights, democracy, cosmopolitanism, and humanism uttered their last word; otherwise, they still have significance and potential.

Henrieta Anisoara Serban

CONTINUATIONS

Continued from p. 13

If my assessment of Eastern impersonalism is correct, this part of the answer must be assimilated. But if it is, and if a synthesis is to be possible, a reformulation of Western personalism is required too.

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1. See Bowne, *Personalism* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1908), ch. 5, 'The Failure of Impersonalism'.
2. See my essay 'Idealism and the Pantheistic Revolution: The 'Big Picture' and Why it is Needed', in James Connelly, ed., *Aspects of Idealism: Selected Essays* (forthcoming).
3. See my book *The Worldview of Personalism: Origins and Early Development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), esp. the Introduction and chs 1 and 5.
4. See 'Idealism and the Pantheistic Revolution'.
5. For a discussion of the reception of the Eastern traditions in the West, see my article 'Spiritual Personalism: Prospects and Preconditions', *Appraisal*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (2003).
6. For a brief accounts and analyses of it, see 'Idealism and the Pantheistic Revolution' and my article 'Irving Babbitt and Personal Individuality', *Appraisal*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2000, and, for extensive analyses, the literature there referred to.
7. I suggest that this general description will be supported by any standard works on these traditions.
8. William Kilpatrick, 'The Brahmin in the Bahamas: The Psychology of Selfishness', in Kilpatrick, *The Emperor's New Clothes: The Naked Truth about the New Psychology* (Westchester, Ill.: Crossway Books, 1985).
9. See my article referred to in note 6.
10. See Claes G. Ryn, *Will, Imagination and Reason: Irving Babbitt and the Problem of Reality* (1986; 2nd ed., with the subtitle *Babbitt, Croce and the Problem of Reality* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1997).
11. See Kilpatrick, *Why Johnny Can't Tell Right From Wrong* (New York: Touchstone, 1992 (1993)), 167-8.
12. This was pointed out in a famous essay by Adolf Trendelenburg, 'Zur Geschichte des Wortes Person', published posthumously in *Kant-Studien,* 13 (1908).
13. Critical discussions of Rogers can be found in Kilpatrick, *Why Johnny Can't Tell Right from Wrong*, and Joyce Milton, *The Road to Malpsychia: Humanistic Psychology and Our Discontents* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002).
14. I have discussed, in outline, some aspects of it in a recent paper, 'Idealism as Alternative Modernity', at a conference organized by the R.G. Collingwood Society, 'The Empire of Idealism', in Prato, Italy, 2010.
15. In the title of one of his best known books, *The Book: On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are* (New York: Pantheon, 1966).

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21. See Maksimov, *Legal Reality: an Experience of Philosophical Comprehension*, p.328.
22. Real means such that causes effective and conscious legal activity, see Maksimov, *On the Problem of Legal Person*, p. 171.
23. Mounier, *Le Personnalisme*, p. 462.
24. See for instance E.Y. Solovyev, *Person and Law*. Moscow: Politizdat, 1991, pp. 403-431; Maksimov Op. cit., pp. 234-252.
25. N.A. Berdyaev, *Slavery and Freedom. Experience of Personalist Philosophy*. Moscow: AST, Khakiv: Folio, 2003, p.439.
26. Merab Mamardashvili, *Philosophy And Person*, www.psychology.ru/library/00044.shtml
27. See Mounier, *Revolution Personnaliste et Communautaire*. Moscow: Respublika, 1999, pp. 34-40.
28. Lacroix, Op. cit., p.158.
29. See John Lavely, *What is Personalism?*, *Personalist Forum*, Vol. 7, #2, 1991:1-33, www.siu.edu/~tpf/
30. See Lacroix, Op. cit., p.136, and *Le Sens du Dialogue*, pp. 487-491.
31. A. Pasichnyk, *On The Notion Of Legal Capacity/ Theory of State and Law // Business Activity, Economics and Law, Research Magazine*, #11, 2009, p. 29-30.
32. See Paul Ricoeur, *Law and Justice*. Kyiv: Dukh I Litera, 2002, p. 34.
33. See *Philosophical encyclopaedia*. Ed. by V.I. Shynkaruk, pp. 86-87.
34. Lacroix. *Le Personnalisme: Sources, Fondments, Actualité*, p.13.
35. See Samuel J.M. Donnelly, Op. cit., pp. 76, 83-87, 94-98.
36. See Otfried Hoeffe, *Vernunft und Recht. Bausteine zu einem interkulturellen Rechtsdiskurs*. Alterpress, Kyiv (2003), p. 29.
37. See Lacroix, Op. cit., p.29.
38. V. Tabachkovskyi, *Human Being-Existence-History*. Kyiv, 1996, p.62.
39. Berdyaev, Op. cit., pp. 447, 456.
40. See V.P. Malahov, *Foundations of Philosophy of Law*. Moscow: Academicheskyi Project: Kultura, 2005, p.81.
41. Mounier, Op. cit., pp. 479-480.
42. See *Philosophical encyclopaedia*. Ed. By V.I. Shynkaruk, p.593.
43. See Mounier, *Revolution Personnaliste et Communautaire*, p.161.
44. See N.S. Petlevych, *Personalist Characteristics of Law (Ukr.) // Philosophy of Law Issues*, Vol. IV-V, 2006-2007: pp. 179-183.
45. See A.A. Kozlovskyi, *Law As Cognition: Introduction into the Gnoseology of Law*. Ruta, Chernivtsi (1999), p.40-41.
46. Lacroix, *Les Sentiments et la Vie Morale. Russian Political Encyclopaedia*, Moscow (2004), p.420.
47. See I.O. Ilyin, *On the Essence of Legal Consciousness*, www.philosophy.ru/library/il/02/01.html.
48. Op. cit., p.42.

49. See Kaufmann, Op. cit., p.122.

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49. Ibid., p. 68.

50. See Webb, *Worldview and Mind*, pp. 161-168.

51. Ibid., pp. 68-69.

52. Ibid. pp. 69-70.

53. Ibid. p. 77, emphasis in original.

54. *Anamnesis: Zur Theorie der Geschichte und Politik* (Munich: Piper, 1966), pp. 61-75. Translated by Gerhart Niemeyer in *Anamnesis* (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978) and by M. J. Hanak in Voegelin, *Collected Works, 6: Anamnesis: On the Theory of History and Politics* (Columbia, Mo: University of Missouri Press, 2002).

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References to books by Michael Polanyi:
Because of the particular interest in the work of Michael Polanyi, and in order to avoid unnecessary repetition, please make references to his books by means of the following abbreviations followed by the page number:

CF	=	*The Contempt of Freedom* (London, Watts, 1940; reprinted New York, Arno Press, 1975)
FEFT	=	*Full Employment and Free Trade* (London, C.U.P., 1945; 2nd ed. 1948)
KB	=	*Knowing and Being* (London, Routledge; Chicago, University of Chicago Press; 1969)
LL	=	*The Logic of Liberty* (London, Routledge; Chicago, University of Chicago Press; 1951)
M	=	*Meaning* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1975)
PK	=	*Personal Knowledge* (London, Routledge; Chicago, University of Chicago Press; 1958)
SFS	=	*Science, Faith and Society* (London, OUP, 1946; 2nd ed. U. of Chicago Press, 1964)
SOM	=	*The Study of Man* (London, Routledge; Chicago, University of Chicago Press; 1959)
TD	=	*The Tacit Dimension* (London, Routledge; New York, Doubleday; 1966; reprinted Gloucester, Mass., Peter Smith, 1983)
Also:		
SEP	=	*Society, Economics and Philosophy: Selected articles by Michael Polanyi*, ed. R.T. Allen (New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Publishers, 1997).