APPRAISAL

A Journal of Constructive and Post-Critical Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies

Vol. 5 No. 1 March 2005 ISSN 1358-3336

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Notes on contributors

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Dr Alan Ford is a lecturer in History of Art and Visual Culture at the University of Gloucestershire. His research interests are in the theory of modernism and postmodernism, especially in their relationships to object-relations psychology and the philosophy of John Macmurray.

EDITORIAL

As promised in the last issue, this one opens with Appreciations of Drusilla Scott and Robin Hodgkin both of whom died last year. Through their publications and other activities, they contributed greatly to the fostering of interest in the work of Michael Polanyi. In particular Drusilla was the Chairman of the Convivium Committe from its foundation in 1974 to its suspension in 1979, and Robin from its re-establishment in 1989 to its close in 1994. With the Appreciations, we publish Jere Moorman's suggestions as to what Drusilla's book on Polanyi, *Everyman Revived*, can tell us about business procedures.

We have more on Polanyi in Sheldon Richmond's article and in one of the books reviewed, Anthony Monti: *A Natural Theology of the Arts*. In line with our policy of promoting interest in other personalist philosophers, we also feature Hans Popper's introduction to Gabriel Marcel's *Essai de Philosophie Concrète* (forty or so years ago there was considerable interest in Britain in Marcel, and his work deserves to be revived and re-appropriated); Jan Olof Bengtsson's survey of Personalism generally and, in particular, of an anthology of studies by and about the American Personalist school; and a review of Prof. Frank Kirkpatrick's latest book, *A Moral Ontology for a Theistic Ethic*, which, as one would expect, draws, *inter alia*, upon John Macmurray's personalist philosophy. Finally, Giorgio Baruchello and Wendy Hamblet continue their discussion of cruelty.

On p. 8 there are the latest details of our Conference on April 2nd and 3rd. There are plenty of places left, and, at the time of writing, space on the programme for 1 or even 2 more papers, which do not have to be on Polanyi. If you can come, please send in your application soon, and, if you can offer a paper, please do so immediately. Papers do not have to be completely finished and ready for publication, but can be exploratory drafts to open up discussion, on which we spend the bulk of our time.

APPRECIATIONS OF DRUSILLA SCOTT AND ROBIN H0DGKIN

1 DRUSILLA SCOTT

by David Britton

Drusilla died in February last year, aged 91, outliving her husband, Sir Ian Scott, by a year. She was the daughter of A.D. Lindsay, later to be Master of Balliol, founder of Keele University, and Lord Lindsay, one of the few Hereditary Peers created by the post-war Labour Government. Drusilla's first book was a study of her father, with the section on his Philosophy written by the late Dorothy Emmet. Her book on Polanyi's Philosophy, Everyman Revisited, was published in 1985, and a paperback version came out several years later. Drusilla modestly regarded it as a layman's work—by a layman, for the layman—but this is to underestimate it. A book so clearly written, with so much committed understanding of all the main lines of Polanyi's Philosophy, and even providing a challenge and an attempted clarification in an area which Polanyi had left rather vague—his religious outlook—has deserved its reprinting, and will remain for years to come a thoroughly reliable and readable introduction to his work. Drusilla became a personal friend of Michael and Magda Polanyi, and their many conversations, and correspondence over the years, were clearly crucial for her in coming to an understanding of his thought.

Personal contacts with the Polanyis became easier after Sir Ian's retirement from the Foreign Service in 1968, for life under their previous regime took them to India from 1937 till Independence in 1947, and then, after a few years in London, first to Finland in 1952, then to the Lebanon, then to the Congo during the hair-raising first years of Independence, then to Sudan, and last of all to Norway, where the dreadful antics of Labour's Foreign Secretary George Brown were almost harder to bear than all the dangers and crises of the various hot-spots they had been in across the world. A fascinating story of all this part of his and their life is told in Sir Ian's autobiography, *A British Tale of Indian and Foreign Service*, published by The Radcliffe Press in 1999.

Retirement soon took them to Aldeburgh in Suffolk, where Ian enjoyed the sailing, and Drusilla became active in the Pre-school Playgroup Association, helping to found Aldeburgh's own Playgroup. They were both active supporters of the newly-formed SDP, and later the Liberal Democrats. They had had five children, and these and grandchildren were always made welcome at Ash House, where the garden was a sort of adventure playground. It was during these years that Drusilla was able to get down to serious study, for the writing of her three books. The third book was an account, based on letters from the time, of the adventures of an ancestress who travelled to South America and knew Bolivar.

Oxford plays a large part in her story. Her father was Master of Balliol from 1924 to 1949. Her mother, Erica, was also interested in Philosophy and Mysticism, wrote articles, and later a book, *Losing Religion to Find It*. Drusilla studied Greats at Somerville, and also met her future husband at Balliol, through his being introduced to the Lindsay family by her older brother Michael. Ian studied PPE there, and went into the Indian Civil Service in 1932, while Drusilla did teacher-training and taught for a while at Clifton College in Bristol.

During these student years of hers, Polanyi, born in 1891, had left the continent, where anti-Jewish sentiment was growing, and came to Manchester University in 1933. Here he met and became a friend of Dorothy Emmet, who tells this part of the story in her *Philosophers and Friends*, published in 1996. I am not sure at what point there became a connection between A.D. Lindsay and Polanyi, but certainly as Polanyi turned from Science to include Philosophy, Lindsay became interested, and through him initially, and through Oxford, Drusilla took up the interest. Polanyi might also have been drawn to Lindsay through his stand against appeasement in the famous by-election, in which he stood as a Labour candidate against Quinton Hogg in 1938. Polanyi had also been involved in WEA work, a cause close to Lindsay's heart.

In 1945 Ian and Drusilla were in England on a long leave from India. There may have been a Polanyi connection established by this time, for in 1946 both Lindsay and Polanyi were invited to deliver talks for the BBC on the post-war situation, and hopes for the future. There is a remarkable convergence in their approach. Certainly there was by 1950, for Lindsay quotes from Polanyi's *Science Faith and Society* in his last Lecture of 1950, which he was too ill to deliver. Lindsay died in 1952.

Ian and Drusilla were in Putney from 1948 to 1952, and it was probably during these years that Drusilla became interested in Polanyi' s ideas. However, Drusilla was herself ill for some time in these years, after the birth of her fifth child, and I don't know how much opportunity she had to

follow up her interest. From 1952 onwards, as already indicated, they were off on their Foreign Service travels. But Drusilla kept up her interest, and must have read *Personal Knowledge* as soon as it came out in 1958. In 1961, on a leave spent in England, she spoke about Polanyi to myself and her daughter Rachel, whom I married in that year. She also lent me briefly her already heavily annotated copy of the book when she and Ian came to visit us at our cottage on the Stour in Suffolk. By that time even Ian had read the book, though he admitted to a blind spot in that area. I asked him on that occasion what he had derived from the book, and he replied, 'Well, I always felt that Bertrand Russell was somehow a fool, and now I know why'. This glorious sweeping judgment was just the thing for a frosty winter afternoon, as we swept down the hill at Boxted on our way home.

In Politics Drusilla was probably as close to her father's Socialism as to Polanyi's Politics of Liberty. There were in any case important overlaps between Lindsay and Polanyi, in their emphasis on free associations as part of the foundation of democracy. Lindsay had never been a Marxist, though he appreciated Marx's contribution to historical understanding. He certainly was never guilty of the Marxist or marxising denigration of so-called 'bourgeois liberties'. Drusilla was sympathetic to all these aspects of her father's politics, without, I think, feeling any conflict with her appreciation of Polanyi. But I never heard Drusilla express sympathy for Hayek, though she had his *The Constitution of Liberty,* there is only one annotation at the back, which is unusual for her. She almost certainly had read Hayek's *The Road to Serfdom*, but I haven't seen her copy of that, and don't know how much weight she gave it. In straight Philosophy there seems to me to be a convergence between her father's strong emphasis on action as a means of real knowledge, and Polanyi's theory of knowledge, especially his concept of tacit knowledge. They were both very much philosophers of 'embodiment' and 'engagement'. Lindsay could not stand what he called 'clever fools'.

Drusilla was much drawn to Polanyi as a Scientist who was not a reductionist, and who could also, as a Philosopher, criticise reductionism with considerable subtlety of approach—with considerably more subtlety than Koestler, for instance, or even than, dare I say it, Karl Popper! Polanyi went beyond criticism of this sort, into explorations of Meaning. Polanyi's theory of Truth, his fiduciary approach, had always caused problems for their mutual friend Dorothy Emmet. In some issues of *Convivium* in 1992 and 1993, Dorothy set out her problem, and Drusilla replied. Dorothy maintained that Polanyi needed the Correspondence Theory at some level in his approach. Drusilla maintained that this was irrelevant, and that it indeed missed the point entirely. I remember that Drusilla lent me the booklets, and about a week later asked me what I thought. She jumped up and down with delight when I told her I felt she must be right. I was flattered to be given such weight. However, when in the course of conversation I ventured to mention the Coherence Theory, she danced about like a mad flame on a log, and said — 'No, no, no' about seven times, 'Not that either!' Dorothy later went on to propose Kant's Truth as a Regulative Ideal, not perhaps remembering that Polanyi in *Personal Knowledge* had subjected this to a searching criticism. And the trouble with Kant was probably a failure of commitment at some deep level, and Polanyi's is a 'commitment' post-critical philosophy. That is to say, we float and swim in a veritable ocean of knowledge, which we live by trusting, for as long as we find it trustworthy. We cannot start by doubting everything, as with Descartes, or keeping a safe distance, as with Kant. For then we drown. Or, as Blake had put it in his time:

> If the sun and moon should doubt,
> They would immediately go out.

More especially, we cannot doubt everything which we cannot give an explicit account of. Drusilla explained this very well on pages 57-58 of her book on Polanyi. She writes:

> The theories of Gestalt psychology as Polanyi used them showed not just that there is tacit knowledge such as your recognition of your child's face—and explicit knowledge—such as the school record of his height and weight- but that there is throughout the whole range of knowledge, tacit and explicit, this same structure—scattered meaningless particulars being converted into parts of a meaningful whole by a change of focus. You stop attending to them and start attending from them to a whole, or a joint meaning which at first you only vaguely sense. But when the whole, the joint meaning, takes over, the particular bits have sunk into a subsidiary place in your attention and don't appear the same. In trying, therefore, to make any kind of knowledge totally explicit and testable, so as to make it reliably 'scientific', we are pursuing a will-o'-the-wisp, because however explicit it may be on its own, it has got to sink into subsidiary status before it can be meaningful as part of a whole, and this will change it. In attending from it we must let it lose its explicit character and so its testability.

2 ROBIN HODGKIN

by R. J. Brownhill

Robin Hodgkin has died aged 87 on August 19, 2003. He was an original member of the U.K. Polanyi society 'Convivium', was on the first organisation committee and helped with the setting up of some of the early conferences. He made contributions to Convivium's newsletter, was Chairman when the committee was re-established in 1989 and continued until its close in 1994. He broadcast on the work of Polanyi for the B.B.C. third programme. He also provided the humanities section for the Royal Society Memoir on Professor Michael Polanyi, F.RS

Robin was a stalwart member of Convivium, with enthusiastic contributions to its conferences from the floor and in its social time. This enthusiasm continued during the series of conferences organised by *Appraisal*, many a time he perplexed conference members by producing mechanical instruments and asking them to guess their purpose and use. Most of the examples produced were from mountaineering, and I once asked him the reason for the production of the instruments, he replied that he hoped it would help illustrate Polanyi's point that for an expert the instruments used become an extension of himself.

Robin Allason Hodgkin was born at Banbury on February 4, 1916 the second of three brothers belonging to the eighth generation of a Quaker family. His father, George Lloyd Hodgkin, died in Baghdad in 1918, where, as a conscientious objector to the war, he was undertaking relief work. In 1932 his mother married again to A.L. Smith, the then Master of Balliol College, Oxford. After attending the Dragon school, Oxford, and Leighton Park, the Quaker boarding school near Reading, in 1934 Robin went up to Queen's College, Oxford to read Geography.

A major interest of Robin was mountaineering, and coming up to Queen's he joined the Oxford University Mountaineering club. *The Daily Telegraph*'s obituary of Robin stated that he 'was one of the most gifted and audacious mountaineers of his generation'. Much of Robin'?s early life during his twenties was concerned with him establishing this formidable reputation.

Robin's new interest was education. He began by teaching geography at his old school, Leighton Park but in 1939 he started teaching at Gordon College, Khartoum but was then appointed Principal of the Institute of Education, and was much involved in Sudan's process to independence. He returned to England in 1954 and in 1955 he was appointed headmaster of Abbotsholme near Uttoxeter. On leaving Abbotsholme in 1968 Robin joined the Department of Educational Studies of Oxford University and began work on the series of books on education: *Reconnaissance on an Educational Frontier* (1970), *Born Curious* (1976), and his most important work, which was very much influenced by Michael Polanyi, *Playing and Exploring: Education through the Discovery of Order* (1983), the books very much take up the notion of a child's tacit knowledge, and the co-operative nature of education. They also make extensive use of Robin's experience of mountaineering. Robin's final work was an essay entitled 'Homo Ludens' and is in a volume entitled *The Passion to Learn* edited by Joan Solomon (2003).

Robin remained a practising Quaker throughout his life, He had a marvellous sense of humour, an was a delight to work with and to converse. In many respects he was an ideal Christian man and will be greatly missed at future *Appraisal* events.

He married in 1947 Elizabeth Hodgson, who pre-deceased him. He had two sons and one daughter.

3 INTIMATIONS OF A NEW KIND OF BUSINESS SENSE: A Review of Drusilla Scott's **Everyman Revived**

by Jere Moorman

Says the father of scientific management, Frederick W. Taylor: 'Exact scientific knowledge and methods are everywhere, sooner or later, sure to replace rule-of-thumb'.

From a twenty year apprenticeship to the thought of scientist/epistemologist Michael Polanyi I have come to believe, with Polanyi, that 'scientific objectivism' (as asserted by Taylor above) is a mistake, one similar to the mistake that Adam made when he ate the forbidden fruit from the tree of knowledge, fruit that was separate from the tree of life. The first mistake of 'objectivism' like the first 'sin' is an alienated, non-participating form of knowing. In Drusilla Scott's journey through the thought of Michael Polanyi, in her book *Everyman Revived—The Common Sense of Michael Polanyi*, she begins with a reflection as to how Polanyi believed 'that a terribly mistaken understanding of what science is has distorted our whole outlook and alienated men from their own power of understanding the world'.

She sees Polanyi as advocating a U-turn in accepted ways of thinking, a turnaround involving a recovery of man's own power for understanding the

world. Lady Scott, in tracing the journey of Everyman to his 'long lost home' (p. viii) has provided a useful outline that tracks my own personal pilgrimage in looking for ways to benefit from Polanyi's genius. This is a synopsis of my findings, in the form of a brief review of Scott's picture of Polanyi's picture of the revival of Common Sense.

'Objectivism' or scientism is a way of knowing in which only facts are considered real: i.e. there is a radical separation of fact from value, of the knower from the known. From this fact/value, knower/known dualism follows the assumption that the whole is nothing more than the sum of the impersonal parts; in principle, persons are reducible to inorganic, meaningless matter—persons are ultimately dead or meaningless—and the values of real persons don't matter.

Polanyi, on the other hand, offers a theory of knowing called personal knowledge, a new paradigm of knowledge by participation where knowledge by relationship of the knower and the known is primary; where wholes are found to have properties that parts do not have; and where persons are alive: i.e. not reducible to their factual components—where persons and their passionate contributions to their knowledge are indispensable. Scott reviews the short-comings of this entrenched paradigm of knowing which I am calling 'objectivism'; and clarifies Polanyi's new paradigm of knowing, personal knowledge. I am hoping that business and organisational people, especially managers and leaders, will find the new paradigm to be worthy of consideration: as a paradigm that accounts for more truth in a more appropriate way, with the practical advantages of a more efficient and effective way of achieving excellent business results.

Lady Scott presents her message based on the model of the mediaeval 'mystery play', *Everyman*—a journey of the recovery of a meaningful world from the illusory world of positivism and Cartesian anxiety. She begins with a critique of the impoverished state of knowledge—limited in the Middle Ages by either the blind faith demanded by priests or in modern times the belief demanded by modern 'scientism', which does not even recognise Everyman as a person. Everyman is called to recover an accreditation of his own intellectual passions in his pursuit of knowledge—a recovery of his commitment. In accepting the knowledge of impersonal 'expertism' Everyman discards five friends of Knowledge: Beauty, Strength, Tacit Knowing, Fellowship and Discretion. As part of the recovery of Everyman's accreditation of his own intellectual passions in his pursuit of discovery—he is called to recover a relationship with these five friends—thus, a recovery of his commitment and personal responsibility. Everyman begins with a vague consciousness that something is wrong with his understanding of knowing. Everyman follows the guide of Polanyi through his rejection of the ideal of scientific detachment and his offering of his conceptual reform of 'personal knowledge': i.e. a new paradigm of knowledge by participation where knowledge by relationship of the knower and the known is primary; where wholes are found to have properties that parts do not have; and where persons are alive: i.e. not reducible to their factual components, where persons and their passionate contributions to their knowledge are indispensable.

First: Everyman reinstates beauty, the ability to select the good facts from the bad ones on the basis of quality, disapproved of by pure scientism, as a friend leading him towards discovery. There are no interpreted facts; and some sort of connoisseurship is possible and necessary to pick out what clues should be considered as 'facts' worth interpreting. For example: no examination of the facts, however meticulously carried out, can make a person aware of the meaning of the *Mona Lisa*. As futurist John Naisbitt puts this from a business perspective: We are drowning in information but starved for knowledge. Beauty is one of Everyman's friends that can help him turn information into knowledge.
Secondly: travelling further Everyman befriends his powers of tacit knowing, without which discoveries would be impossible. When a piano-player self-consciously turns his attention to looking at his fingers, he has lost his powers of tacit knowing. He may have the goal of playing with 'precision' but in making knowledge so explicit and precise he forgets that he knows more than he can tell and that what he knows means more than he can say. The melody cannot be reduced to the notes, even though the melody relies on the notes. The tacit powers of the pianist are needed to bring forth the melody. Each higher level is more intangible than the one below it and also enriched in subtlety. From a business perspective John Sculley reminds us that 'No great marketing decisions have ever been made on quantitative data'. Market research will always tell you why you can't do something. It's a substitute for decision making, for man's tacit dimension, and for guts.

Thirdly, Everyman befriends the strength of his conviction that he can accredit himself in his ability to know reality by daring to go and explore what he dimly discerns, risking himself in commitment to the disciplined guess, needing all his powers and qualities (p.63). Everyman recovers his power to

hold his own beliefs confidently—beliefs that he may conceivably doubt. Columbus embodied for Polanyi the risk and daring involved in discovery, when we commit ourselves to a glimpse of reality which may be mistaken and is certainly incomplete…Our commitment is a vital part of our discovery (pp. 65-6). Discovery begins with the solitary intimation of a problem, of bits and pieces here and there which seem to offer clues to something hidden, clues to a yet unknown coherent whole. This tentative obsession, which spurs and guides us, is about something that no one can tell; its content is indefinable, indeterminate, strictly personal. Says writer Anthony Jay: 'The uncreative mind can spot wrong answers, but it takes a creative mind to spot wrong questions'. Polanyi calls us back to personal participation, towards a recognition of our disowned powers, toward the reestablishment of intuition and imagination as legitimate, necessary, precious parts of a rational framework for knowing. A reclaiming of meaning, creativity, imagination, intuition and spirituality as indispensable components of human life and the concept of the person. 'No longer scorned and devalued because not experimentally verifiable, non-scientific knowledge shares with science the need for faith, imagination and daring' (p.61).

Then Everyman reconnects with the need for conviviality, teamwork and Fellowship. Truth can only be pursued in a Society of Explorers. In this age of electronic communications, personal interaction is becoming more important than ever. The business world is too complex for the old time triangular, top-down autocracy. Most business problems are polycentric, requiring reports from many centres to solve. As James B. Patterson says: 'Don't let your vision get diluted, but don't be afraid of teamwork'. In differentiation, not in uniformity, lies the path of progress, says one-time supreme court justice Louis Brandies.

Finally, Everyman reconnects with his discretion and the Mindbody. Our vision of reality, to which our sense of beauty responds, must suggest to us the kind of questions that it should be reasonable and interesting to explore. Objectivism requires a specifiably functioning mindless knower. To accept the indeterminacy of knowledge requires, on the contrary, that we accredit a person entitled to shape his knowing according to his own judgment, unspecifiably (PK p. 264). Says Soren Kierkegaard: 'The basic corruption of our time consists in the abolition of personality'. We are responsible for our choices; there is no escape into the impersonal knowledge of anyone, anyplace. In spite of the hazards involved, we must use our discretion, and risk telling it like it is!!! People in organisations are different—and the differences create three major problems for managers. There is a great temptation to make an absolute category of the 'ideal employee' and to seek to disengage from historical, finite, committed particularity via an absolute commitment to the absolute category. Most people are risk aversive. But as author George Eliot reminds us: 'No great deed is done by falterers who ask for certainty'. Upon the journey to recover the disowned powers, the disowned friends of knowledge—there is the very recovery of real personhood: a reappearance of the self, the ending of epistemological despair; a recovery of the poet's eye; a recovery of man's God given genius. As Polanyi scholar William H. Poteat tells us: 'Our freedom is our reflexive power to speak our own names—to answer, when addressed: It is I, even though notwithstanding we are finally opaque to ourselves'. Our nature consists in movement; absolute rest is death—Pascal. 'One's real life is so often the life that one does not lead', Oscar Wilde. 'It don't mean a thing if it ain't got that swing', Duke Ellington (and Irving Mills). Having found that 'the ideal of a strictly explicit knowledge is indeed self-contradictory; deprived of their tacit coefficients, all spoken words, all formulae, all maps and graphs, are strictly meaningless', Everyman arrives, finally at a Meaningful World.

One may attempt to escape from the messy, relational, concrete knowing situation via deducing some embracing theory from a starched and ironed cosmos: such is one of many escapes into negative 'freedom from'; an escape that may be described as a sustained ironic detachment from fully personal existence (Dale Cannon).

Polanyi offers a heuristic philosophy which begins as an alteration of our common epistemological paradigm of positivism, an absurd world of knowledge without genuine knowers. Polanyi's conceptual reform leads to a new vision of our place in the universe and the nature of the universe itself. To accept commitment as the only relation in which we can believe something to be true is to abandon all efforts to find strict criteria of truth and strict procedures for arriving at the truth (p. 66). In Polanyi's view, there can be no purely formal factual statements. All intelligent statements presuppose evaluation and judgment. Interest, belief, and appraisal are essential to the finding and holding of what the claim to be factual or true. 'To be guided in one's decisions by the present and to prefer what is sure to what is uncertain (though more attractive), is an expedient, a narrow rule of policy. Not thus do states—nor even individual men—make their way to greatness': Marquis de Vauvenargues.

GABRIEL MARCEL'S *ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE CONCRÈTE* IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Hans Popper

1 The historical context: Macmurray, Husserl, Heidegger.

In her review of Costello's biography of Macmurray[1], Joan Crewdson refers to Macmurray's view of the primacy of action over thinking.

> 'For the first time', says Costello, 'Europe has produced a philosopher who refuses to follow the Greeks in making contemplation conceptually more fundamental than action. In Macmurray we have at last a thinker who presents a coherent view of how action relates to theory'.[2]

But he only does this by adhering to the 'organic' model of European thought, especially since Brentano and Husserl which, rather than setting off action against thought, has made the unity of all types of existence the centre of its preoccupation.

This is where Heidegger parts company with Husserl, whose concept of transcendental consciousness he regards as breaking up this unity. Although Heidegger himself differentiates between *existence* as designating specifically human self-awareness, and other types of being[3], this does not affect the fundamental unity of *hulë* where each individual has its own *ousia*. Yet Husserl's *Epochë* is the basic method for investigating phenomena; we cannot view a phenomenon, even if it be ourselves, and at the same time and in the same respect identify ourselves with it. Only when the pure phenomena, free from interpretation, have been inspected by our consciousness, can the intelligence create structures suitable for interpreting them. This specific universe of structured phenomena can then become the content of intersubjective conversation, so that the apparent dualism between appearance and reality is overcome[4]. There is no other dualism in the phenomenological and existentialist traditions, which concentrate almost

exclusively on the structure of the world of persons in the context of this unity of all being as this is comprehended by human consciousness. Macmurray professes no more than to have made a 'contribution' to this enterprise which he regards as the prime task for the philosophy of our time.[5] Indeed, the very terminology which he uses will be thoroughly familiar to students of phenomenology.[6]

Misguided as such a claim to primacy obviously is, it yet points to a fundamental characteristic of this complex of traditions. It is that, even when aware of trends within the tradition as a whole, each philosopher has yet to start, like Descartes[7], from first principles, even if his particular exploration leads in a totally new direction.

Thus Husserl, after still advocating the psychologism and historicism prevalent in the late 19th century in *Philosophie der Arithmetik* (1890-1901, repr. in *Husserliana* 12, ed. Lotte Eley, 1970), according to which all phenomena are reduced to links in a chain of efficient causes, all moral values and logic to psychological processes, so that their deep ontological structures are bypassed (this in the name of an all-embracing, strictly empirical discipline)[8], makes a revolutionary break and lays the foundation to what will alone give the empirical disciplines their ontological legitimacy and meaning; on these grounds he can justify the systematized body of observations and use them when he separates out and restructures the pure phenomena after these have entered consciousness[9]. First, then, consciousness must centre on the segment of experience with which it chooses to concern itself (from Franz Brentano he takes over the traditional term *intentionality*[10]); then it separates pure phenomena from more or less consciously interpreted and evaluated observations (the *Epochë*[11]) which enables consciousness to inspect the pure phenomena; these can now be mapped out and evaluated systematically by the pure *transcendental consciousness* (i.e. the pure consciousness inspecting and then working on the pure phenomena, in the first instance from the outside). He works out this system as a strict academic discipline (*strenge Wissenschaft*), that is, one that complements and completes all knowledge when, ideally, its task has been completed. He does this in a series of works: *Logische Untersuchungen* (1900-1: *Husserliana* 18 and 19, 1975, 1984; ed. Elmar Holenstein and U. Panzer); *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* (*Logos* I, 1910-11; pp. 289-314; *Husserliana* 25, pp. 8ff; ed. Thomas Nenon and Hans Sepp; 1987); *Die Idee der Phänomenologie,* five lectures (1907; *Husserliana* 2). But Husserl's thought is never a closed system; he never ceases to explore further and make new beginnings—as when he uses the invitation to lecture by the Sorbonne (1929) as a springboard for further expanding his philosophy into the universal discipline envisaged by Descartes, which he does by putting it on the plane of a phenomenological *Wissenschaft*. He calls Descartes the 'founder father'[12] of modern philosophy, and more specifically of phenomenology, by making *tabula rasa* of all experience, all thought. And, finding

what he regards as the one indubitable truth in the *cogito, ergo sum,* and *the one* completely reliable tool in geometrical reasoning, he moves out of the subjective stance, and, through a version of the ontological proof of the existence of God and God's moral reliability, back into the world, assured that this really exists; then, again with geometrical reasoning, he sets out to rebuild all knowledge into a complete deductive system.[13] This rather over-hastily laid foundation, as Husserl characterizes it, of the system of all natural knowledge and, beyond it, a *sapientia universalis*[14,] is generally ignored by modern scientists; but this has resulted in a feeling of frustration due to the lack of clarity in the understanding of the fundamental principles on which the new science must be based.[15] To supply what is lacking, we must still follow Descartes' programme of withdrawing from a view of the world which takes for granted what is really open to doubt, and, by *bracketing off* (*Epochë*) irrelevant interpretations and associations from pure phenomena, *attend to* these: *intentionality*; '*zurück zu den Sachen selbst*' ('back to the things themselves'), recalled by Heidegger (*Sein und Zeit,* p. 27; 15th edn., and repr., 1979) in the transcendental consciousness by perceiving their deep structures. In this operation, consciousness operates in the same manner as our own. This *intersubjective* activity, as he calls it, not only removes the supposed barriers between objects within and outside subjective experience, but, by adding the quality of *sensitivity* to that of sharpness of observation, it also broadens the area of inquiry to include the ultimate problems of morals and religion[16]. In that way he fulfils Descartes' hope, albeit in a different way, of a universality of both knowledge and values (*sagesse*)[17]. But he goes even further in claiming that this transcendental subjectivity gives new significance to the *gnöthi seauton* of the Delphic oracle, for: '*man muss erst die Welt durch* ***Epochë*** *verlieren, um sie in universaler Selbstbestimmung wiederzugewinnen'* ('one must first of all lose the world by means of *Epochë,* in order to regain it by establishing the existence of the self in a perspective of universality'); this is strongly reminiscent of 'qui perdiderit animam suam propter me, invenit eam' (Mt. 10, 39; 16, 25; Mk. 8, 35; Lk. 9, 24; Jn. 12, 35); he follows this up with a quotation from Augustine's *De vera religione* (39, 72; PL 46, 652): *Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi. In interiore homine habitat veritas*. ('Do not move out of yourself; return into yourself. Truth dwells in man's inmost being'.) Augustine goes on: *Et si tuam naturam mutabilem inveneris, transcende te ipsum. . . . Illuc ergo tende, unde ipsum lumen rationis accenditur*. ('And if you should have found your own nature to be changeable, grow even beyond your own self. .. Therefore make for this region from which the light of rationality is set ablaze'.) And he concludes this section by exhorting the reader:

> *Tu autem ad eam quaerendo venisti non locorum spatio, sed mentis affectu, ut ipse interior homo cum suo inhabitatore non infima et carnali, sed summa et spiritali voluptate conveniat.* ('But you have come to it by seeking, not in an area of space, but in the sensing of thought and feeling, as might be fitting, for man's innermost being, not in low and biological, but in the highest, the spiritual pleasure'.)

In Descartes' line of argument, the existence of God functions as the intermediate link in the chain from transcendental subjectivism to the existence of the outer world, and thence to universal knowledge of nature as a constituent part of universal *sagesse*. Husserl also starts with transcendental subjectivism but, by means of *Epochë,* he arrives at universal *Wissenschaft,* '*non locorum spatio, sed mentis affectu*' ('not in an area of space, but in the sensing of thought and feeling'); the *Epochë,* therefore, links intellectual and moral universality (phenomenological critical inspection and sensitive insight) with the spiritual *Epochë,* in which *interior homo* enjoys *spiritalis voluptas*[18]; his *sagesse* therefore goes far beyond Descartes' in anchoring it in Augustine's Pauline and Plotinian thought.[19] In so far as Husserl aims at the renewal of universal *Wissenschaft* as the foundation of a truth which far transcends the *sagesse* hinted at by Descartes[20,] by the twin methods of *intentionality* and *Epochë,* he and his erstwhile close friend Heidegger[21] are on common ground within the area of phenomenology, because both operate within the methods of traditional *Wissenschaft,* that is, the area to be inquired into is delineated and the terminology clarified, as preliminary to asking the right questions which alone can lead to illuminating answers[22] and clear away false notions. But whereas Husserl makes phenomenology the starting-point and the crucial principle of his inquiry for laying a sound epistemological foundation to his construction of *Wissenschaft,* Heidegger opens *Sein und Zeit* by stating that his aim is to come to understand being (*das Sein, to on*); only after concluding that being must be sought in *Dasein* (that which is actually *at hand*), does he move on to phenomenology as the area within which *Dasein* necessarily appears. And here, in common with Husserl, and following sound methods of research, he takes a detached look at *Dasein* and the vocabulary to be used in his phenomenological research.[23] But whereas this is the decisive *Epochë* which dominates Husserl's whole line of argument,

for Heidegger it is no more than the first of a series of detached questionings. Indeed, if we ourselves actually are a constituent part of *Dasein*[24], *Epochë* cannot possibly play such a decisive role as in Husserl's line of argument. But then Heidegger's ultimate aim is the uncovering of *Being* as such ('*Erschliessung von Sein als das* ***transcendens*** *. . . Phänomenologiache Wahrheit (Erschlossenheit von Sein) ist* ***veritas transcendentalis***'[25].

This opens up the question of how this *transcendens* is to be understood.

If we take our cue from the account of Plato's concept of the Idea of the Good—the Idea which makes the world of Ideas function effectively—then the *transcendens* is the dynamic factor to which all efficient causes (*dunameis*) owe their respective modes of functioning; in Aristotelian terminology, primordial *hulë* would already contain the aptitude for the emerging *ousia*; or, to see *hulë* in its preSocratic cosmological setting, it would be Anaximander's *apeiron,* only to be described negatively, but source of both fascination and dread, to which *Dasein* owes its existence. Or, if we are searching for a vision of the *transcendens,* we may, with Heidegger, conceive of a subjectivised Idea of the Good, such as remains unattainable to the inhabitants of the cave in Republic VII, as long as they keep their gaze fixed on the shadows moving across the wall at the back of the cave. But when they emerge from the cave, the *transcendens* still eludes them, because both the Ideas and the Idea of the Good are within the sphere of *Dasein*; Heidegger quotes (p. 1123 in *Gesamtausgabe* vol. 34) the qualification from the 7th Letter, 'that is, according to human power' (344B: *hoti malist' eis dunamin anthpröpinein*). But the full disclosure (*a-lëtheia*) of the truth, of Being (Sein), is no longer in the sphere of *existence,* but beyond it, in 'Ek-sistenz' where man is completely *pushed out* from *Dasein, exposed* ('*ausgesetzt*' in these two senses) to *that which is* in its totality ('*ausgesetzt dem Seienden im Ganzen*'), thus *placed inside* ('*eingesetzt*') in '*Auseinandersetzung*' (analysis, taking-to-pieces, in a situation of mutual concern, of controversy, of conversation) with both, with *that which is* (*mit dem Seienden*), that is, in so far as *being*/*das Sein,* has appeared in a clearing ('Lichtung', as in a forest) of *Dasein*. Sein is thus unique (*einig*); it is, therefore, only approachable by way of a *via negativa,* beyond all *Dasein,* which it yet encompasses ('*Mannigfaltigkeit*' which cannot be cut up into parts); at the same time, from the point of view of pursuing the *via negativa* to its completion, it is the *Nothing* (*das Nichts*): it is, so to speak, in evidence, yet, being nothing, it is not something ('*nichts*' – '*etwas*'). I am reminded, less of Plato's Idea of the Good, than of Parmenides (Diels-Kranz, vol. I: B 2, 3-5, p. 231, 9-11; B 6, 1-2, p. 232, 21-22; B 8, 1-49, pp. 235, 2-239, 49), to whom Heidegger frequently refers, and of Plotinus' first *hypostasis, to hen* (the Absolute One: e.g. VI, 4, 12, 37; VI, 9, 6, 1 ff: cf.: 'Un' (*hypostase*) in E. Brehier's Plotinus edn., VI, 2, 293; *Coll. des Univ. de France, Les Belles Lettres,* Paris, 1954), in the sense of *not* being the other *hypostases,* or the rest of the hierarchy of existence, of which, however, it is the necessary cause/foundation (*archê*); or of Boehme's *Ungrund* (the unmanifest dimension of all that exists, and, ultimately, of God Himself, as postulated through the *via negativa*: *Sign.* 3, 1-4; *Gnadw*. 1, 3-6; *Menschw.* 11, 1, 8; 6 *Theosoph. Punct*. 1, 1, 4-9; *Myst. Magn*. 3, 17; 6, 3), in the tradition of Pseudo-Dionysius and Eckhart—allowing, of course, for the difference between the time-involvement of Heidegger'e *Sein* and the supra-temporality of its counterparts in Parmenides, Plotinus, Eckhart and Boehme).

However, viewed from the angle of historical development, a dialectic of hiddenness and openness of *Seyn* (frequent spelling to designate its ultimate ontological status) opens the path to the silence in which 'the last God' passes by ('*Vorbeigang des letzten Göttes'),* which is not the supreme blasphemy ('*die Lästerung schlechthin*'), but a necessity because this last god brings the ultimate judgment in among the gods, thus raising to its highest height the being of the uniqueness of the being of the divine as such ('*weil zuletzt die Entscheidung uber die Gotter unter und zwischen diese bringt und so das Wesen der Einzigkeit des Gottwesens ins Hochste hebt*').

We note the religious language which Heidegger uses for passing through the historical phase of the traditional objects of worship in order to overcome these and approach the divine mode of being as such (again, I get reminded of the supreme anonymity of the Ultimate in Parmenides and Plotinus).

But we must beware of going beyond such *being reminded* and respect Heidegger's refusal to be completely explicit![26]

Outside metaphysical analysis, we can find the reality of the *transcendens* in Heidegger's imaginative identification with the creative factor which confers impact on the work of great artists[27] and brings his own thinking to life through his creative taking apart and welding together of Greek and German words and syllables and the syntactic behaviour of verbs which deviates from normal grammatical usage.[28]

Heidegger's *transcendens* is, therefore, not only an idea which he aspires to elucidating, it is also a

powerful force acting within his own philosopher's *Dasein*. He himself actually had a live experience of the impact of the *transcendens* when, one night, he attended Mass in the church of the Benedictine monastery at Beuron (South Germany), when he was seized by a dread of the primaeval power of the darkness of night, through which, he says, we have to break in order to attain true existence. And he links this with a childhood memory of protecting the light of a candle on the way from home to church and standing at the altar until the melting wax nearly burned the tips of his fingers; he both delayed and eagerly awaited the exact moment when the flame would go out.[29] In his writings, Marcel senses in Heidegger '*cette dignité sacrale de l'être*' (that dignity, supernal, sacred, of Being)[30] which is increasingly in danger of being taken captive (*livré*) by the depersonalising forces of technology and which has to be preserved at all costs. Due, however, to a certain weakness in his philosophizing (*une certaine déficience au niveau philosophique*), [31] Heidegger caved in (*indulgence*) under the impact of Hitlerism soon after it had come to power; in Marcel's judgment, this remains '*une tâche indélébile*'.

2 Marcel

Marcel's own experience of moral villainy is the Dreyfus affair which, he says, fixed in him '*une certaine attitude',* so that, all his life, '*je me suis comporté en dreyfusiste*'[32]; a somewhat expensive example of this partisanship is his suppressing a text before publishing it, because it might endanger someone.[33] Because the basic task of a philosopher is to resist the devaluing of a person, both in thought and in quality of living, as propounded, for instance, in his Frankfurt 1964 lecture, *À la recherche de la vérité et de la justice* (*In search of truth and justice*)[34]; and so he venerates the uprightness of Léon Brunschvicg, a philosopher with whom he disagrees.[35] That means that philosophizing must ultimately be person-centred, resting on an attitude of respect for the human subject who speaks and makes decisions and has, as Husserl has it, *intersubjective* dealings. Therefore there cannot be a philosophy which is a closed system, putting any further exploration over the infinite field of human behaviour over a time-stretch without beginning and end out of the question. Any one work might take the form of a systematic exposition—none of Marcel's are; but even such a systematic treatise would only be one stage on a journey of exploration whose end is unforeseeable. Thus, Husserl published a number of such systematic works, but left behind him a large body of manuscripts which even now has only been partially published—as described by Van Breda in *Husserliana* I (pp. viii-xi). Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit,* likewise, is only the first part of a project which he continued, but never completed, in the form of treatises and lecture courses; these bear the mark of a mind thinking aloud, comparable to Marcel, enemy of system-building, the weakness of which consists in the inability to do justice to philosophy's task of not bypassing

> un approfondissement de notre condition d'êtres existantset pensants, et que nous sommes tenus de nous demander si cette condition précisément autorise l'acte par lequel le métaphysicien 'pretend se transporter au coeur de l'être ou retrouver l'acte primitif dont dépend à la fois mon être propre et l'être du monde': Lavelle, *De l'Acte,* art. I.[36] (a deepening of our condition of existing and thinking beings, and that we must not shirk asking ourselves whether this is precisely the condition which authorises the act whereby the metaphysician 'aspires to transport himself to the heart of Being, or to find the first and primal act on the efficacy of which depend my very own being and the being of the world.)

The philosopher's thought must be constantly on the move—Marcel only accepts the designation 'néo-socratisme' for his work[37,] and, as a Catholic thinker

> je me considère comme ayant été toujours *un philosophe du seuil*, un philosophe qui se tenait, d'une manière assez unconfortable d'ailleurs, sur une ligne médiane, entre les croyants et les non-croyants, de façon à pouvoir en quelque sorte m'adosser aux croyants, m'adosser à la religion chrétienne, à la religion catholique, mais de manière a pouvoir parler d'eux et peut-être à les aider. Je pense que cette sorte de préoccupation, non pas apologétique—le mot serait tout à fait faux, mais que ce souci fraternel a joué un role extrêmement important dans le développement de ma pensée.[38] (I think of myself as having always been *a philosopher of the threshold*, a philosopher who, by the way, always kept most uncomfortably to a borderline defining the divide between believers and non-believers, in such a way as to be able to lean in a certain manner towards the believers, towards the Christian faith, the Catholic faith, but in such a way as to be able to converse with the non-believers, to be able to make myself understood by them and perhaps to help them. I think that a prime concern of this sort would in no sense be in the manner of an apologetic—an expression which would be totally false—, but that this concern as between brother and brother has played an extremely important role in the development of my thought.)

We note the fusion of indefatigable forward movement, wherever the problematic might lead, with a deep concern for the individual in

community, and even when influenced by other thinkers, Marcel always has to start from his own first principles, deeply embedded in his life's experience. Husserl sets out to refound philosophy on strict principles of *Wissenschaft,* but phenomenological *sensitivity* compels him to develop *intersubjectivity* and thence to a spirituality oriented by Augustine. Heidegger's procedure also obeys strict principles of logic and philological and historical research; but investigating the community of persons in *Dasein,* he also traverses the sphere of social and political responsibility (including his grave aberration in the early stages of Nazism), and his fraternal and charismatic relationship with students[39] and audiences in lectures, extending his metaphysical thinking to a stage which may only be compared to the development from Anaximander and Anaxagoras to Plato. Marcel got to know Heidegger's work extremely well, and, allowing for differences[40,] felt a close kinship with his style of practising metaphysics; while being acutely aware of the latter's Greek, non-biblical spirituality.[41] But as regards Husserl, Marcel rarely alludes to him, although he must have become aware of his work in the 1920's, more especially after attending the Paris lectures (held at the Sorbonne on 23rd and 25th Feb. 1929: *Einleitung in die transzendentale Phänomenologie*; repr., pp. 3-39 (title: p. xxiii), in *Husserliana* I: cf. note 14). In the discussion following Ricoeur's lecture, *Gabriel Marcel et la phénoménologie,* [42] he confesses to having deliberately bypassed (*je laisse de côté*) Husserl, '*que je connais beaucoup trop mal*'; but considering his explicit use of Husserl's phenomenology (*conscience de quelque chose*) in his Gifford Lectures, it is a dubious statement to harmonise with the statement that follows: his *much greater* indebtedness to Bergson (*ma plus grande dette vis-à-vis de Bergson*), who freed him from the straitjacket of the (positivist oriented) analytic philosophy in vogue at the Sorbonne when he was a student there. Bergson gave him the sense of affirmation and relentlessly explorative depth which he needed.[43] This revolution from analytic to organic thought, therefore, bypassed Husserl's need to rebuild epistemology, so as to arrive, step by step, at the transcendental phenomenalism which, on the basis of intersubjectivity, yielded, not only the new universal *Wissenschaft* (or: '*die Idee einer universalen Philosophie*'/'the idea of a universal philosophy'), but also the Augustinian *veritas* from the inmost depth of his humanity which figures at the end of both the Paris lectures, and the *Cartesian Meditations*. Marcel did not, therefore, notice the kinship between the Augustinian *veritas* which Husserl reached by an ascending scale of problems[45,] and the *mystère* which Marcel sharply distinguishes from *problèmes.*

I am, therefore, inclined to see Heidegger's *transcendens,* Husserl's Augustinian *veritas* and Marcel's *mystère* as being on a par within the bounds of metaphysics (as this term is conventionally used). For Marcel, it is the kernel of his concrète philosophy of being; his Catholic Christian faith then constitutes the climax and at the same time the foundation of his exploration of Being.

We see this very clearly in his *Journal métaphysique* (in two parts, I: 1914, immediately preceding World War I; II: 1915-23; first publ. 1927, repr. 1997, Gallimard, Paris) in which he develops his philosophy from a partially mature stage, so that all subsequent works extend his thought, not by way of changing it, but of applying it to different situations—as is indeed already the case with the *Journal,* in the first part of which he is emancipating himself from a type of analytic thought which seeks to build a speculative system by means of a strictly dialectic logic; but this he soon finds unacceptable[45]. Already on 1st Jan. 1914 (his first entry) he condemns a system which aims at being the faithful reproduction of a hierarchical plan, as developed by Leibniz or Hegel[48]. Although necessary as a logical base, the complexity of his experiences (e.g. E.S.P. experiments) breaks the framework of rationalism and helps him to develop the more informal style of his philosophizing that he practises to the end of his career. Different as the two parts are from each other, they yet mediate between the dialectic and exploratory mobile phases, but they also carry the results forward, from before World War I to the mature series of philosophical and dramatic works (*Être et Avoir,* 1929 takes up the threads where the *Journal* leaves off), the central ideas which are really there from the beginning[49]. Thus, already in the entry of 12th Jan. 1914[50,] we find his turning round the idea of faith as being identical with a judgment of existence, so as to confer the character of faith on the judgment of existence (*de voir dans le jugement de l'existence une foi*), thus yielding an immediacy and a unity in the apprehension of Being, which abstract reasoning confusingly converts into a duality. Hence

> *La théorie de la participation conduirait en ce sens à une nouvelle métaphysique qui se fonderait sur une religion*.[51] (The theory of participation would, in that sense, lead to a new metaphysics which would be founded on religion.)

The collection of studies, *Essai de philosophie concrète* (first publ., Gallimard, 1940; repr. 1999),

all date from the 1930's, that is, from the mature period, when Marcel was already deeply read in the works of Heidegger and Jaspers, with whom he finds points of both agreement and disagreement, so that these enrich his thinking, but without changing, either the character of his ideas, or his style of their presentation.

The *Introduction*[52] is again a polemic against closed systems, presenting, as they do, *problems,* not *mystery,* not persons and personal situations, so that non-rational, non-objective dimensions of experience are left out of account. He cites aesthetic experience as an example, which is certainly structured, in response to the structuring of its source (e.g. a landscape, a work of art), but unfolds experience in its inwardness; its *axes de référence* [53] are not those of common experience of the outside world. Miracles, again, do not make rational sense if plotted against the axes used by the natural sciences. But inside a specialised sphere (*un monde privilégié*)[54], they can be *observed, evaluated* and *offered* (as in eucharistic liturgy: 'discernés', 'appéciés', consacrés).[55]

Two persons co-operating on a problem of arithmetic are problem-solvers. But when they are together (in this or, some other situation) by way of being for each other, so that they are *participants* in the central *mystery,* its unity fully embodied in the *mystery* of community, that is, of a brotherhood authentic in its humanity, and whose actions (as, for instance, helping each other, or suffering martyrdom) are truly effective expressions of their personal nature in which they are rooted. Their brotherhood works creatively within the sphere of Being as a whole, so that, as seen by faith (*pistis*), their brotherhood acquires its fullness of meaning and existence under the fatherhood of God. In any case the soul, aware of its '*fidélité créatrice*'[56], bears witness to Being in its fullness which it embodies and which confers on it its liberty.[57]

The first in this collection of studies, *L'Être incarné, repère central de la réflexion métaphysique,* starts with a description of an experience of staleness, giving rise to the *elucidation*[58] of 'currents' of mental energy, [59] whereby torpid areas of the mind (*esprit*) are renewed, therefore prevented from decomposing. As the creation of these 'currents' defines the whole of his work as a philosopher (*tout mon effort philosophique*), their quality must be continuous and all-encompassing, facilitating encounters, not only between persons, but also between dimensions of one person. *Co-présence* therefore comprises self-encounter with interpersonal conversation. It militates against depersonalising system-building (abstract *pensée pensée*), in favour of encounters (self and others) in the concrète (*une philosophie concrète: la pensée pensante*), [60] communication arising from continuous, living renewal with Being itself (*l'Être même*). We are free to interrupt this process, even to abolish its very idea, but at the cost of all vitality (*se dévitaliser en fait*), and of sliding into the worst of all auto-idolatries.[62]

But in order to explore the nature of this concrète philosophy, in which self-knowledge arises when the self is in intimate relationship with itself and the Universe, so that the activity of thinking and the fullness of thought are identical, a starting-point and a point of orientation have to be found; not water-tight logic, which only results in system-building leading nowhere[63]; instead of Descartes' 'I think', or even 'I live', I have to start with '*j'éprouve*' ('I feel', 'I sense'); in true Cartesian style, but, instead of the deduction (thinking is a subclass of being), *sensing reveals existing,* and the subject, 'I', is reduced to almost complete lack of determination, rather like the German '*es erlebt in mir*' ('the experiencing takes place within me'), where the 'I' becomes the area where sensing/experiencing takes place,[64] the 'magnetic field' on which the spatio-temporal experiences get arranged in meaningful pattern through my imagination, until '*l'existant pensé*' ('the existing which constitutes the content of what is thought') becomes co-present with me. We note, that the meaning of '*pensé*' has broadened out from *deduction* to *sensing,* and that this existing is linked with the *I* by the preposition-derived prefix *co*: '*jusqu-à ce que l'existant pensé me devienne co-présent.*'[65] Here an analysis of the 'I' becomes imperative.

If our starting-point in this inquiry were the Cartesian 'I think, therefore I am', generalised into 'the *I* is the magnetic orbit for sensing existence', the point of orientation is this *I,* this orbit, within which sensing takes place by means of the pattern-forming imagination. But what I sense above all is the texture of this orbit, and that is my body. What is the relationship between the sensing *I* and the body? Evidently, the two are indispensable to each other; in fact, they belong to each other, yet without *either* being two discrete entities distantly related to each other, *or* forming one single identity. In other words, the sensing *I* is incarnated in its body: '*être*' is the verb, not the noun, in the expression '*être incarné*':

> *être incarné, c'est apparaître comme corps, comme ce corps-ci, sans s'indentifier à lui, sans pouvoir non plus s'en distinguer—identification et distinction étant des opérations corrélatives l'une de l'autre mais qui ne peuvent s'exercer que dans la sphère des objets.*[66] (Being incarnated/being made concrète: that means that

> its appearance is that of a body, of this particular body [like the English colloquial 'this here body'!] yet without identifying itself with it, nor being able to distinguish itself from it—identification and distinction being co-relative operations the one of the other, but which can only function in the sphere of objects.)

Marcel develops this line of argument in strictly philosophical terms, yet it is difficult not to think of Jn. 1, 14: *kai ho logos sarx egeneto—Et verbum caro factum est,* especially in view of the central feature of Marcel's thinking, participation, in which all sensing beings, human and divine (ibid: *kai eskënösen en hëmin—et habitavit in nobis*), meet up, so that this philosophy facilitates the transition to religious faith, more especially the non-idealist, the *concrète* type of orientation, according to which the nexus between myself and the world takes place and is disclosed in the body. In the present study, Marcel borrows Heidegger's expression *Dasein*: '*être au monde*'/'being belonging to the world': the 'I' functioning in the world, not by being in a relationship, or in communication with the world, but acting within, and being acted upon by the world: *participation*.[67] And from Jaspers[68] he borrows the term, '*situation fondamentale*', for summing up what is involved in the incarnated 'I' *participating* in the world. Building on his definition of metaphysics as '*une logique de la liberté*'[69] which regulates its development towards discovering itself, so that there is no opposition between a philosophy of *Being* and a philosophy of *Liberty,* Marcel approaches the underlying problematic by inquiring into the nature of the process of the 'I''s *receiving* what the world gives it. Two levels are analysed: that of abstract analysis, where distinctions are made between the stimuli coming from the world, the physical transmission, as well as that of 'translation' from this process into the 'message' received by the 'I'. We must object to this analysis, because, not only is the expression 'translation' inappropriate fiction (I can 'translate' a communication, exchange one set of symbols for another set), but it is quite remote from experience: the 'I' receives what the world gives in the form of one sudden event. Furthermore, the physical analysis disregards the moment of choice. We turn, therefore, to the second level, that of the actual concrète experience, where the 'I' receives what is given to its consciousness: '*chez soi*', [70] to itself which is now *home* (French '*chez*' from the Latin '*casa*'), which implies the 'I''s active, voluntary participation; Marcel praises Aristotle's penetrating handling of the image of a sign imprinted on wax:[71] the superficial (*lâche*) interpretation equates *aisthëthis* with passive acceptance (*subir*), whereas *dektikon, dechetai* (*what is shown*, *revealed*) and *lambanei* (*seize hold of*) indicate dynamic interaction between the 'I' as householder and the world as giver, so that such epistemological events are instances of the life of the world, which consists of a community of *incarnated,* free beings mutually *participating* in the consciousness of each individual, and, in doing so, in that of Being as a whole; and, not being static, the interaction between theses individuals and the passage of time is a creative one, in that the past is transformed into the future, whence it assumes present reality.[72]

In the last section of this study, the different ways in which the 'I' and the 'Thou' can interact—or fail to do so—are analysed in concrète detail.[73]

Two persons, from being total strangers, may get close in deep friendship and love; and that not only on the level of words spoken, but also in *silence*—when, for instance, Marcel made contact with the victims of World War I, and the very way they looked at Marcel conveyed deeply meaningful signs.[74] The reverse happens when two persons remain estranged from each other, in spite of superficial verbal exchanges: they are not persons to each other (I and Thou), but '*un tel*' ('that sort of a one'—Heidegger: 'man'). Subconscious processes becoming conscious verbal or other symbolic communicating agents are very elementary forms of communication in silence, evade, in fact, a mass of deep problems.[75] Marcel's own experiments with psychic phenomena (in which he acted as a medium, while observing himself with complete clarity), indicated communications of which he himself was not, as far as he knew, the source; but, if so, who was?[76]—Where the 'Thou' is the absolute, attainable only in religious or mystical prayer, this does not prevent questions regarding this 'Thou' from being ever-present. '*Lorsque nous parlons de Dieu, ce n'est pas de Dieu que nous parlons*' ('When we speak of God, it is not of God that we are speaking').[77]

This covers the main points in the first study, *L'Être incarné* .. and, by extension, the third study, *Ébauche d'une philosophie concrète,* in which, however, one point is of special relevance to our discussion so far, more especially as it was worked out parallel to, but quite independently from Husserl's *Epochë,* and, due to the respective philosophers' intentions, differing from each other in typical ways.[78]

Facing the apparent clarity of Descartes' *cogito,* Marcel is struck by an obscurity which prevents logic from yielding existential reality: some element or aspect of myself (*le moi*) casts a shadow[79] on itself, blocking the 'I' from the Other (*le Je et l'autre*); it is this inner obscurity, not that of the world as such. On the other side of this block lies

concrète, inexhaustible reality, but no inductive science will provide stages in a progress towards it. According to Husserl, also, only a radical change in oneself by means of *Epochë* can make *veritas* accessible to oneself. Here, concrète reality is covered with such a mass of refuse (*une foule d'apports et de scories*)[80] that it only becomes accessible through long and painful labour and clearance—or, more exactly, of purification, of painful ascesis; only a dialectical operation, strictly controlled by philosophy, can succeed. But this is a sensitive area, since it is the philosopher who reflects on the question, what am I?, [81] and its implications. It appears to demand an objective inquiry, yet the inquirer is also its subject. This raises the problem regarding the validity of such an affirmation which itself generates what it affirms. Marcel proceeds by a series of *two reflections*.[82]

The first, outside and preceding the formal affirmation, simply refers itself to something that is given (celle-ci se réfère à un donné); I take this to mean that, in this reflection, it naively takes its perception of the 'I' as proof that what it asserts is true; however, this being questionable, gives rise to *the second* and more profound reflection, when the affirmation reflects on itself, so that it both generates its allegation of truth and the statement of fact: '*cela est*' (this is the case), so that the affirmation encroaches on the consecrated ground of '*cela est*'. Does this lead to an infinite regress of affirmation and statement? Not if the affirmation is considered to be the generator of the fact, '*cela est*', that is, affirmation and fact are taken to be the same: '*cela est*' is true. But how is that possible? Marcel answers: Being Itself has invested the 'I' with truth—the 'I' being the affirming subject, while at the same time mediating between the Being and the affirmation. But what is the ontological status of this 'I'? Is there a hierarchy between these three entities, Being, affirmation, 'I'; and if so, which one dominates over the others (on which, therefore, the others are dependent for their validity)?[83]

The rest of the argument, and the many concrète examples given, are designed to show that, if the question regarding the ontological status of the 'I', or of the other two entities, is to be conceived as a *problem,* there is no satisfying answer. If, on the other hand, it is conceived as a *mystery,* both questions are transcended because they lose their significance. A *problem* is an obstacle, it confronts me in my mental progress; a *mystery* is something to which I surrender, so that the question, to what extent it might be in front of me, to what extent it is within me, loses significance.[84]

Many metaphysical problems are '*des mystères dégradés,* [85] such as the usual way of posing the problem of evil, which conceives the world as a badly working machine, the questioner placing himself outside the evil situation, judging it as if he were not involved. But this and other such questions about *problematic* situations are, in fact, seen as data given to the questioner as the *owner*; he manipulates the *problem,* whereas a *mystery* is received (*chez*!), not so much as something understood, but as something given a greeting.[86] Similarly, the tourist, exploring a country new to him, will, when he has seen everything of interest, get bored and will feel as in a prison, whereas for the native, who is in a creative relationship with his country, in whose concerns he *participates,* whose riches are to him inexhaustible, the very concept of 'givenness' loses all meaning.[87] Further detailed study of the wealth of examples and interpretations—including also the combination of *mystery* with *problem* in our actual world—is beyond the scope of our inquiry. But the concluding paragraph is important: recognition of the ontological *mystery* is, in fact, conditional upon the revelation of itself, when its fruitfulness irradiates our existence. It cuts across confessional barriers, so that non-adherents of a religions creed may feel its creativity, while adherents of a religion may well stay imprisoned within the bounds of the *problematic*. Marcel concludes this study by identifying this philosophy with the *mystery* itself:

> *Une telle philosophie se porte ainsi d'un mouvement irrésistible à la rencontre d'une lumière qu'elle pressent et dont elle subit au fond de soi la stimulation secrète et comme la brûlure prévenante*.[88] (It is a philosophy which thus carries itself forward with an irresistible movement to meet a light which it anticipates and which gives it in its inmost depth the secret stimulation and, as it were, the advancing fire.)

In the remaining studies, [89] Marcel changes direction by focussing far more on the person; then, in the final four studies, on theological issues, the underlying intention being to treat the issues under discussion in the light of the concrète philosophy.

Remarques sur les notions d'acte et de personne[90] shows the close and necessary link between an act when it is deliberate (i.e. not an erroneous action, or a clinical symptom, like kleptomania), therefore engages the person at the centre of its nature (responsibility is not shifted to, say, a limb), so that no act is conceivable without reference to a person, an 'I', who is deeply involved. Within the person, the nexus with his own self is central, reflecting himself in the act he creates; the alternative is self-alienation, the merely biological life of a nondescript 'on' ('man'/'one]). In terms of Marcel's vocabulary, the person is *close to,* in fact, *confronts*

the event which the action brings about; the quality of the relationship is one of admiration; so we see the person making himself *available* (*disponible*) to the act and the situation;[91] the opposite is *indisponibility* (not being available), the dire result of a person's *hubris,* seeing himself as the *owner* of what or whom he manipulates. Looking at the person's attitude to the cosmos (i.e. the total situation of which the person is an *incarnate participant*) from the inside, we discover, not a mere spectator, but deep apprehension of what the person in fact intuits, [92] with the immediacy and committed intensity with which an artist relates to his work. There is, therefore, a rightness, a harmony, between the cosmos and the person being '*en situation*': where they belong existentially, by virtue of what they essentially *are*, to stamp their character (*Prägung*), their personality with which they are at work as both creators and creation within the divine *mystery*. They belong to—or rather, within—themselves and, in each case, 'the other' (*l'autre*), who receives them: '*chez lui*' (*casa*; German '*heimlich*' and 'unheimlich', referring both, to the homeliness, and the deeper uncanniness of such intimate at-one-ness). The identity of 'the other'[93] is not immediately specified, because, being the result of *receiving* (*recevoir*), [94] it is imperative to set out, but with the richest, the fullest, not the poorest and most degraded acceptance [of meaning] (*il faut partir, de l'acception de la riche et la plus pleine, non de la plus pauvre et de la plus dégradée*), which surely implies the concrete and spiritual milieu of all personal participation.

In *Le transcendant comme métaproblematique,* [95] he contrasts life, a series of draws in a lottery, with death, the only certainty; unimaginable: I cannot understand it by putting myself in another's place; the accompanying problem concerns the fact of not existing any longer. Suicide cuts off my liberty, its cause is despair (*désespoir*),[96] giving way to the temptation to put a stop to this waiting, this miserable and indeterminate delay, and, indeed, to save myself from the suffering of what is imminent (*de la tentation de mettre un terme à cette attente, à ce répit misérable et indéterminé, et de me délivrer ainsi du supplice de l'imminence*).[97] Its implications are far-flung: cutting myself off from all links with my fellow-prisoners (*engagements . . . compagnons de captivité*), from a certain spiritual community, even from *all* community. Isolation with loss of liberty is, surely, the ultimate dehumanisation, so that it is the philosophical (though somewhat different) counterpart to *desperatio* in theology, which has to do with forgiveness of sins.[98] Its opposite is the transcendent—not an object (hence the non-intentionality of phenomenology), but the act of finding one's bearings. Its basis is the very positive *participation,* hence its orientation is towards a Being which, perhaps, *knows* me and knows my worth. *Terra firma* in this enterprise is reached, beyond metaphysics, in mystical prayer: not an abstract '*Être*' which *knows* me, but 'Thou alone' (*Toi seul*).[99]

In *De l'opinion à la foi,* [100] Marcel states that his analyses are Platonic. If, as a convenient model, we take the cave myth in *Republic* VII, then the duality of living in the shadow and living in the Sun (the Idea of the Good) can be seen as the counterpart to the persons who *participate* in Being and those who do not—with its implications of not having an 'opinion' of Mozart, but co-habiting with his works; of being subject to the flux of opinion and anchoring themselves, not in science, but in faith; it also clears the ground of fallacious God-denial, whereby I lay down the conditions under which the existence of God is admissible/inadmissible, i.e. I manipulate Being, analogous to the contrast between *possession* and *being*; between *problem* and *mystery*.

The quality of moral attitude is at the nub of the study, *La fidélité créatrice,* [101] which starts off with the danger of only seeing other beings as abstractions, on account of over-concentrating on Being in its unity. The danger can be overcome by faith. This leads on to personal relationships: with other persons, ultimately with God. The contrast is drawn between *constancy* and *fidelity*; the former works for the other out of a sense of duty; should the other person fail on the moral plane, the moral relationship breaks down and we move in a maze of fearful moral *problems*. But if to constancy is added fidelity, we enter the sphere of the spiritual economy, of *mystery*. From the outside it looks foolish; but as a stand, not only of being faithful (in itself equally unstable), but with '*je crois en toi*' (I have faith/trust in you—the biblical *pistis*) added, *participation* may be renamed *permeability,* that is, the replacement of rigidity by permeability, where I yield to the other person in self-giving commitment.

In *Phénomenolgie et dialectique de la tolerance,*[102] toleration is first treated as a *problem*: another person's religion is tolerated (he is not prevented from practising it); but this can also be from a more positive attitude, that of giving him his full personal rights (*contre-tolérance*), important on the social and political planes; this includes the more profound recognition of the value of the other, of the other's reality as a person which has to be guarded. The dilemma of the other misusing his freedom and harming society has to be faced. The motivation behind toleration (or other types of religious initiative) for serving God harbours the danger of

making 'God' into an idol. But when we face transcendence, it is important to realise that it is '*the* absolute fact' (*le fait absolu*), not *a* fact, like any other given object: this leads us from *problems* of toleration on to service of God, *the* absolute, *the Mystery* of the Transcendent.

The three theological studies, *Méditation sur l'idee du preuve de l'existence de Dieu,* [103] *L'orthodoxie contre les conformismes*[104], *En marge de l'oecumenisme,*[105] by using a phenomenological approach, overcome the dangerous illusions resulting in militant, inhuman theology and religion. The logical 'proofs' of God's existence are ineffective as they rest on a conviction of God's existence in advance (*préalable*): in a non-logical interpolation, tacitly setting up a major premise, I pretend that I extrapolate, that I venture out into the unknown, while the conclusion , 'therefore God exists', has been there all along. In any case, our real problem is not a balancing act, but trust, faith, *pistis,* in the face of the mystery of the living God; from this flows respect for man, a *mystery* from the *mystery* of God. If I set out to evangelize, the basis must be the realisation that each of us has a dark and a light zone in our makeup, so that the evangelist and the person being evangelized must meet in such a way that both their dark zones are lit up by their light zones.

L'orthodoxie contre les conformismes is very much a product of its time; the example of the Spanish civil war shows confrontations between Catholics (wanting to save the world from Communism) and Communists out to deliver the world from the Papists: 'We Catholics', 'We Communists': what really motivates them all is conformism, that is, the community's taboos, customs and traditions, rather than moral or spiritual principles; the same is true with the further splits within each camp. Marcel refers to Bergson's 'closed' and 'open' morality. The gospel belongs to the latter as lifting up the soul.

En marge de l'oecuménisme points to the danger of 'possessing' the truth, of which the others only 'have' a part. An example is the obsession with insisting on *the seven sacraments,* instead of realising that the whole Church has the sacramental quality, sign of the celestial reality, being the extension of the incarnation in the mystical body, which includes all Christians.

Notes:

1. John E. Costello, *John Macmurray: A Biography,* Floris Books, Edinburgh, 2002. The review by Joan Crewdson appeared in *Appraisal,* Vol. 4, No. 2, Oct. 2002, pp. 93-96.
2. ibid. p. 94.
3. In *Sein und Zeit*, 15th edn., Niemeyer, Tubingen, 1979; and in separate publication, Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1976; pp. 12-15 in sep. publn. 1979. Being in general, but related to *Dassein*; hence the specialised designation for human *Dasein*; cf. further: Rüdiger Safranski, *Ein Meister aus Deutschland. Heidegger und seine Zeit,* Carl Hanser, München, Wien, 1994, pp. 152, 181, 236-39, 423-24.
4. Edmund Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorsesungen*; repr. in *Husserliana* II, ed. Walter Biemel; 1st edn. 1950, 2nd edn., Haag, 1958; *Pariser Vorträge*; *Cartesianische Meditationen*: pp. 72-91, 121-81 (use of Leibniz' monads); in *Husserliana* I, ed. S. Strasser, Haag, 1950.
5. John Macmurray, *The Form of the Personal* (the Gifford Lectures 1953-4), Vol. 2, *Persons in Relation*, Faber and Faber, London, 1961; pp. 12-13.
6. E.g. 'methodological solipsism' (ibid. p.20) as the counterpart of Husserl's *Epochë*; or the difference between the *personality* and the *empirical selves* (pp. 25-6) as providing the basis for the study of the self as person, which functions as conscious agent in a community of persons, the basis for this being the concept of *intention* (p. 27), hence the distinction between the *scientific* and the *philosophical* view of the person (pp. 27-8) which adumbrates his phenomenological approach to the 'field of the personal' (Chap. I, pp. 15-43). For a critical study of the primacy of action within the phenomenological tradition, see Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II), *The Acting Person,* trans. A. Potocky, ed. A Tymieniecka (in collaboration with the author); ser. *Analecta Husserliana* X; Reidel, Dordrecht, Boston, London, 1979 (1969). The insufficiency of the exact sciences without metaphysical basis is frequently discussed throughout the phenomenological and existential traditions; e.g. Husserl, *Pariser Vorträge*, pp. 4-5; *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* (first in *Logos* I, 1910-11, pp. 189-314; *Husserliana* 25, 8ff); Heidegger, *Über den Humanismus* (Vittorio Klostermann, Frankf./M., 1947) pp. 6-11; *Philosophische Beiträge* (Gesamtwerk 36): 'das Gestell': cf. Safranski, op. cit., pp. 452, 458ff; Marcel: already in his *Journal métaphysique* (Gallimard, Paris, 1927), 1914-23: esp. entry for 26.2.1923 (pp. 286-90); *Être et Avoir* (rev. edn., ed. Jeanne Parain-Vial; Éditions Universitaires, 1991; 1st edn.: Montaigne, 1935): Part I is a continuation (1928-33) of the *Journal métaphysique* Part II: *Foi et réalité*, followed by *Appendices* and *Notes*. In his *Notes* (1927-28), appended to 22.11.1928 (p.16), we note his fear of

death, when '*la machine ne marchera* plus', and to 3.10.1933, (p. 108): '*La question, "que suis-je" n'a pas d'équivalent au plan de l'avoir*', because (18.11.1932: p. 78) the question regarding the self (the person) is essentially questioning the *I* who asks about Being (*moi qui interroge sur l'être*), which points the way to the essential question, once the posing of the *problems* have been transcended and the door opened to the *mystery* (cf. the *Schéma* appended to 13.10.1933: p. 107). The opposition between *problème* and *mystère* (with implications for the divine *avoir* and the unifying *être*) figures throughout Marcel's work; cf. *Essai de philosophie concrète* (Gallimard. Paris, 1940; reissued 1999), pp. 103-4; *Le mystère de l'être* (Association Présence de Gabriel Marcel, 1997; nouvelle édition: avant-propos de Vaclav Havel; notes et annexes sous la direction de Jeanne Parain-Vial: the Gifford Lectures 1949-50), esp. the first two sections: *Le monde cassé* and *L'existence de transcendence* (pp. 25-66).

The classic precedent: Boehme's frequent use of the distinction between *Vernunft* and *Verstand,* e.g. Menschw. 1, 5, 11-27; Sign. 13, 2-9; Myst. magn. 11, 21-27; 36, 73-74.

On Brentano and intentionality: see Safranski (op. cit.) pp. 40-41, 81-84, 186, and note 10 below. Cf. further: Émile Boutroux, *Études d'histoire de la philosophie,* 2ème edition; Paris, 1901; pp. 211-88; Alexandre Koyré, *La philosophie de Jacob Boehme* Paris, 1929.

7. cf. notes 3 and 4 above.
8. *Wissenschaft* embraces both natural and human disciplines (in German: *Naturwissenschaften* ('natural sciences') and *Geisteswissenschaften* ('Arts subjects').
9. Dermot Moran, *Introduction to Phenomenology* (Routledge, London and New York, 2000): esp. pp. 101-46; Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie, Fünf Vorlesungen* (rep. in *Husserliana* II, ed. Walther Biemal; Haag, 1st edn. 1950; 2nd edn. 1958):. '*erkenntnistheoretische Reduktion*' (third lecture, pp. [43]-52).
10. *Die Idee der Phänomenologie,* fourth lecture (pp. 55-63); going beyond Descartes: *Pariser Vorlesungen,* pp. 12ff, 70-72; *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie, 1. Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, 2. Abschnitt*, 2. Kap., paras. 36: *Intentionales Erlebnis. Erlebnis überhaupt* (from Descartes), — 39 (pp. 79-89); 3. *Abschnitt,* 2. Kap., paras. 77-78 (pp. 177-85), in *Husserliana* III (ed. Walther Biemal1950).

Hegel sees in the herculean employment of man's faculties (*die angestrengte und fast eifernd gereizt sich zeigende Bemühung*) the task of philosophy to raise its sights from lowest sensuality to the stars; avoiding pious devotion, this setting of the sights to systematic knowledge (*Wissenschaft*) results in the totality of the shapes of apprehended reality assuming one all-embracing, universal shape. In *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (*Vorr*., pp. 8-11), intentionality is one moment in the total effort to direct thinking towards what is perceived, but in such a way as to create an organised body of knowledge. (*Werke. Vollstandige Ausgabe* ed. Johann Schulze; Duncker und Humblot, Berlin; vol. II: 1832).

Franz Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte* (only I vol. 1874; the complete work: 3 vols. ed. O. Kraus; ser.: *Philosoph. Bibliothek,* 192-94; Meiner, Leipzig, 1924-28.): 1, 124-25: a specifically human activity; footnote *: ref. to Augustine and Thomas Aquinas; *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis* (Leipzig, 1889; 4th edn.: Felix Meiner, Hamburg, 1955; ser.: *Philosoph. Bibliothek* 55): ed., introd., notes: Oskar Kraus; pp. 16-30, and notes thereto (pp. 53-91). Substituting for the ambiguous ('*missverstädlichen*', p. 16) expression, 'consciousness' (Bewusstsein), the term *intentionale Beziehung* (relationship on the basis of intentionality), Brentano characterises events taking place in the mind by calling them attitudes, relationships, the ways in which the mind directs its attention on the objects, situations, which it has in view. In contrast to Husserl's epistemological use of this term, Brentano focusses on the psychological qualities of mental operations. Following Descartes (*Oeuvres de Descartes,* ed. Charles Adam et Paul Tannery; Cerf, Paris, 1897-1910, 12 vols. VII *Méditationes de prima philosophia*; IX *Les méditations métaphysiques, Principes de philosophie*.) Brentano comments (pp. 16-18; further discussion: pp. 18-30) and quotes from the Latin text (note 21, pp. 54-55) of *Médit.* III (Latin: VII, pp. 36-37; French: IX, 29); he divides the phenomena of the mind according to the most profound differences in their intentional points of reference (*nach den tiefgreifendsten Unterschieden der intentionalen Beziehung*) into three basic classes (*Grundklassen)*; Descartes: '*ut prius omnes meas cogitationes in certa genera distribuam, & in quibusdam ex illis veritas aut falsitas proprie consistat, inquiram*.' We note that it is Brentano who characterises the nature of their differences as 'intentional points of reference.' Descartes merely describes them as '*rerum imagines . . . ideae . . . alias quasdam praeterea formas habent: . . . ex his aliae voluntates, sive affectus, aliae autem*

judicia appellantur.' He concludes (p. 42): '*Nempe si realitus objectiva alicujus ex meis ideis sit tanta ut certus sim eandem nec formaliter nec eminenter in me esse, nec proinde me ipsum ejus ideae causam esse posse, hinc necessario sequi, non me solum esse in mundo, sed aliquam aliam rem, quae istius ideae est causa, etiam existere*.' Brentano goes beyond Descartes and Husserl by inquiring into the actual role of the judgment in each of these ideas. An Aristotelian precedent is *De anima,* esp. III, 4: 407 a i-b 10; 7: 431 b 2 - 9:432 b 13; cf. further: I, 4: 407 b 27-408 a 34; Cicero, *Tusc. disp.* 1, 10 (19); II, 23 (54, 56); 27 (65); *Inv.* 2, 14, 46; Boethius, *In Isagog. Porphyr. comm*.: cf. *Index III verborum*: CSEL 48 (1906); *Concol.* IV, 2, 10*,* 12: CCSL 94; Augustine, *De Trin*. XI, 2, 2; 5: *PL* 42, 985; 987; *De musica* VI, 5, 9: *PL* 32, 1168; *De civ. Dei* XIX, 20: CCSL 48, 687; 40, 2-16; *Ennarr. in Ps*. CXXVIII; PL 37, 1689; *De vera religione,* cap. XXXIX, para..72: *PL* 34, 154; Aulus Gellius 15, 2, 5; Seneca, *Epist*. 113, 3; Pliny, *Epist.* 1, 3, 2; Quintil. 6, 3, 1; 10, 3, 23; Marius Victorinus, *Adv. Arium* III, 5: CCSL 83, 1; Thomas Aqu., *Summa contra gent*. 1, 5; *Quaest. disp. de ver*. 21, a. 3-5; Abelard, *Eth. seu scito te ipsum* 10ff (*PL*. 178, 649A; 652 ff.; Bernard, *Sermo 71 in Cant*. (*PL* 183, 1121c); Petr. Lombard., *Sent.* II, d. 40 u. 12; Chalcid., *Ad Tim. 42A* CXCIII Waszink p. 216.

The long tradition of the use of this term also carries with it a wide variety in shades of meaning: cf. for instance Arno Anzenbacher, *Die Intentionlität bei Thomas v. Aquin Und Edmund Husserl,* Oldenbourg, Wien u. München, 1972; Herbert Spiegelberg, *'Intention' und 'Intentionalitat' in der Scholastik, bei Brentano und Husserl* in *Studia philosophica. Jahrb. der schweizerischen philosophischen Gesellschaft/Annuaire de la société de Suisse de la philosophie* XXIX, 1969; pp. 189-216.

11. cf. esp. note 16.
12. 'Erzvater': p. 5, at the opening of the *Paris Lectures*; but he had already prepared the ground in e.g. *Die Ideen der Phänomenologie,* 3rd lecture, pp. 43 ff.
13. His critique of Descartes, and the influences from scholastic and Augustinian thought: cf. above notes 9 and 10.
14. cf. *Paris Lectures,* p. 4; Descartes, *Oeuvres* I, *Correspondance* 1: LXVI Descartes à Mersenne, Leyde, mars, 1636: 'Le projet d'une Science universelle qui puisse élever notre nature à son plus haut degré de perfection' (p. 338).
15. ibid. p. 5: 'novae meae Philosophiae': Descartes, *Oeuvres* (op. cit.) IV, 698. We note that, under the category of 'problems', Husserl subsumes 'problems' and 'mysteries', sharply distinguished by Marcel (cf. note 6; also discussed later in my line of argument).
16. The term *Epochë* ('pause', 'holding back') is used throughout Greek and Latin disputations, when, after rejecting what is obviously false, no further move is made towards deciding between possible alternatives. 'Habeo enim regulam, ut talia visa vera iudicem, qualia falsa esse non possint. .. Illud vero per absurdum, quod distis probabilia vos sequi, si re nulla impediamini. .. Ex his illa necessario nata est *ëpochë*, id est assensionis retentio' (Cicero, *Acad*. II, cap. 18; 58-59; cf. further: cap. 31; 103-4).

The Stoics: I. v. Arnim, *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta* II (Teubner, Leipzig, 1903):. Chrysippus, *Dialectica,* cap. 2, fragm. 127; Plutarch, *De Stoicorum repugnandis,* in *Plutarchi Chaeronensis quae extant omnia* (Herm. Cruserius, Gulielmus Xylander; Francof. 1599), II *Moralia,* 1035-36, 1107-29.

Augustine, *Contra acad., prima disputatio* (PL 32, 913): Lib. I, cap. 5, paras. 13-14: '.. Si enim fallor, non falso recta via vitae Sapientia nominatur. Tum Licentius: Nihil mihi tam ridiculum, quam ista definitio videtur, inquit . . . Diu ille tacuit . . .': an example of temporary *retentio.*

Husserl uses the term to designate the transition from the perception of phenomena to arriving at a judgment. Taking as his starting-point at Descartes' universal doubt, he proceeds to lay the foundation to the possible use of the positive sciences which need to be *bracketed:* '.. in Konsequenz davon, dass ich schon jedwede natürliche Erfahrung, auf die als *Dasein* ausweisende alle wissenschaftliche Begründung letztlich zurückweist, der Modifikation der Einklammerung unterworfen habe'. (*Husserliana* (op. cit..) III: *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie,* 1. Buch, p. 68.) The stages in this complex process may be laid out as follows: By realising that I perceive phenomena in my consciousness, I am moved to *bracket out* all confusions between inner and outer experiences; this leaves me with pure phenomena and, so to speak, above these, my rare subjective transcendental judgment; I now apply this to the pure phenomena and interpret them, so that they become an ordered and structured universe; with heightened *sensitivity,* I separate out unconscious objects from conscious subjects whose subjectivities operate in the same manner as my own; I *interact* with these, with my intelligence and will (intersubjectivity): *Paris Lectures* (op.

cit.) pp. 34-35; *Die Idee der Phänomenologie* (op. cit.), 3rd lecture, pp. 49ff; cf. *Paris Lectures,* p.39. As against Descasrtes' arithmetical type of unity of all being, Husserl's is 'a system of phenomenological correlative disciplines .... a universal taking stock of one's own thought (*Selbstbesimmung*), an insight bearing the stamp, first of a *monadic*, then an *inter-monadic* character'.

17. 'Weisheit' (*sagesse*): p. 44 in *Cartesianische Meditationen: Husserliana* (op. cit.) I; this is not Descartes' language; in his letter to Mersenne, Easter 1649 (*Oeuvres,* op. cit., 111, 350), he speaks of 'la philosophie et ensemble aux experiences'; *Responsio ad sextas objectiones* (*Oeuvres* (op. cit.) VII, 429): 'scientia quae non est cum charitate conjuncta'.
18. Augustine opens this section (XXXIX, 72 of *De vera religione*) with: 'Quid igitur restat, unde non possit anima recordari primam pulchritudinem'. Augustine had commented (XXXVIII, 71) on the true temptations in the wilderness, supremely, 'Non temptabis ... deum et dominum tuum' (Deut. 6, 16; Mt. 4, 7), in order to recognise 'temporalia et inferiora' in the perspective of 'aeterno spectaculo immutabilis veritatis.' In the section below XXXIX, 72 (i.e. 73), Augustine goes on to exhort the doubting reader to envisage the 'leap' ('cerne saltum') from the mundane to the spiritual light: 'huius lumen .. lumen verum', and he quotes Jn. 1, 9.
19. cf. Eugene Te Selle, *Augustine the Theologian,* Burns and Oates, London, 1970: Introd., sec. 3: philosophical influences on Augustine's early thought; pp. 43-45 lists the passages which Augustine either must have known, or probably knew, as far as can be ascertained; cf. esp. ch. 1, pp. 59-89.
20. But Descartes does not make the full scope of his *sagesse* (with its transformation of personal living) explicit, because that is not the programme of his inquiry.
21. Indebtedness to Husserl in the launch of his programme expressed by Heidegger in note 1, p. 38 of *Sein und Zeit* (op. cit.); further bibliographical details: p. [VII]: *Vorbemerkung zur siebenten Auflage* 1953; cf. further, A. de Waelhens, *La philosophie de Martin Heidegger,* ser.: *Bibliothèque philosophique de Louvain* 2; Institut supérieur de phil. à l'Univ. Cath. de Louvain, 1942, 1946; pp. 12-21.
22. cf. esp. *Sein und Zeit* (op. cit.), ch. 2 of the introd. sec., subsec. C (*Der Vorbegriff der Phänomenologie*), pp. 34-39; cf. further: *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* (1935-36), in Gesamtausg., I. Abt. *Veröffentlichte Schriften 1914-70,* op. cit., Bd. 5 *Holzwege,* pp. 1-74 (cf. also the important introd. by H. G. Gadamer in the Reclam edn., 1960). Truth is both hidden and revealed (Gk. a-lētheia) in the material ('Zeug') when fashioned by the artist, thus receiving its *form* in which 'das Schöne' resides, when it — 'aus dem Sein als der Seiendheit des Seienden sich lichtete. Damals ereignete sich das Sein als *eidos*. Die *idea* fügt sich in die *morphë*. Das *sunolon,* das einige Ganze von *morphë* und *hulë,* nämlich das *ergon, ist* in der Weise der *energeia*. Diese Weise der Anwesenheit wird zur actualitas des ens actu. Die actualitas wird zur Wirklichkeit. Die Wirklichkeit wird zur Gegenständlichkeit. Die Gegenständlichkeit wird zum Erlebnis. In der Weise, wie für die abendländisch bestimmte Welt das Seiende als das Wirkliche ist, verbirgt sich ein eigentümliches Zusammengehen der Schönheit mit der Wahrheit. Dem Wesenswandel der Wahrheit entspricht die Wesensgeschichte der abendländischen Kunst. Diese ist aus der für sich genommenen Schönheit so wenig zu begreifen wie aus dem Erlebnis, gesetzt, dass uberhaupt der metaphysische Begriff in ihr Wesen reicht.'
23. He actually uses the expression 'Verklammerung' (*Sein und Zeit*; op. cit., p. 36) to designate the emergence of phenomena into clear understanding, which when included, 'bracket into', become part and parcel of a conceptual system; this is really the exact opposite to Husserl's 'ausgeklammert' in connection with his *Epochë* (cf. note 16).
24. On the close and intimate relationship between *Dasein* and *Sein* in gen., cf. *Sein und Zeit* (op. cit.) pp. 12-19; 41-45; thence narrowing down the scope of detachment when confronting objects; but already in analysing the experience of perceiving, e.g. the lectern, the simultaneity of physical sight and mental interpretation of the sense data precludes *Epochë* cf. Safranski (op cit.), pp. 117-20; 177-82; 186-87.
25. *Sein und Zeit* (op. cit.) p. 38.
26. The cave: cf. esp. 514 A-B; *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit: Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet:* cf. Heidegger, *Gesamtausg*. (op. cit.); II. Abt.: *Vorlesungen 1923-44,* vol. 34, 1988, more esp. para. 9, pp. 64-79; *Grundbegriffe* (ibid. vol. 51, 1981), 2. Abschnitt, paras. 8-16, pp. 49-77; for discussion of the same ideas treated in *Über den Humanismus* (op. cit.), esp. pp. 12-26: cf. Safrariski (op. cit.), pp. 260-65; 289; 419-26. The religious passage: cf. *Grundbegriffe* (ibid.), pp. 406-7. For an excellent gen. survey of the later thought of Heidegger cf. sec. 4. (pp. 57-74) in Winfried Franzen, *Martin Heidegger*, ser.: *Sammiung Metzler,* Bd. 141; Metzler, Stuttgart,

1976.

27. cf. the section *Das Ding und das Werk* (pp. 5-23, esp. as from p. 13) in *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* (on this cf. above note 22). Interestingly, where Heidegger (p. 11) speaks of the synthesis of *Stoff* (*hulë*) and *Form* (*morphë*) in the complete *thing* (*Ding*), with its appearance as *eidos* (*Aussehen*), Gadamer (p. 117), in speaking of the *inadequacy* of the concepts of *Form* and *Stoff,* alludes to the poem, *Das Ideal und das Leben* (earlier title *Das Reich der Schatten*) by the 18th century poet and dramatist, F. v. Schiller (follower of Kant as aesthetic philosopher): 'Eingang in die ruhende Gestalt' (growth into the figure/the three-dimensional character in final repose). Compare this with Schiller, verse 4: 'Die Gespielin seliger Naturen/Wandelt oben in des Lichtes Fluren, / Göttlich unter Göttern, die Gestalt' (11. 34-36: 'the shaped figure, companion beloved of blessed beings, disporting themselves, moves around, up there, in the fields of eternal light').
28. Three key examples (among many): *Sein und Zeit* (op. cit.) pp. 160-75 ('Dasein', 'Rede', 'Gerede'); pp. 32-34 ('Logos'); Pp. 63-76 ('Weltlichkeit', 'Welt', 'Sein').
29. Cf. Safranaki (op. cit.), pp. 216, 224-25. I have not found the date, but it must be in the mid-1920's.
30. Gabriel Marcel, *Entretiens Paul Ricoeur Gabriel Marcel .. diffusés en mars 1967 sur France-Culture, et publiés pour la premire fois en 1968* (Aubier—Montaigne, Paris). *Postface de Xavier Tilliette,* Association Gabriel Marcel, 1998, p. 105. Heidegger's negative theology in the late essays: *Beitr. zur Philosophie: Vom Ereignis* 1936-38; *Über den Humanismus* (op. cit.); in *Holzwege*: *Anaximander*; *Gott ist tot* cf. Safranski (op. cit.) pp. 356-62; Gadamer, *Heideggers Wege. Studien zum Spätwerk,* Mohr, Tübingen, 1983; ISBN 3-16-244641-4.
31. *Entretiens Paul Picoeur Gabriel Marcel* (op. cit. in above note 30), p. 110: the 'déficience' occurs when Heidegger applies *Dasein* directly to Nazism: cf. Karl Löwith, *My Life in Germany before and after 1933. A report* trans. Elisabeth King, Athlone Press, London, 1994; pp. 34-41; a detailed gen. account: Safranski (op. cit.), chs. 13-20 (pp. 266-466), p. 276: Heidegger never admits that his political error was due to having *dreamt* in philosophy.
32. *Entretiens Paul Ricoeur Gabriel Marcel* (op. cit.), p. 97.
33. ibid. p. 87; cf. also his defence of Maurras, p. 97.
34. ibid. but cf. pp. 100-3.
35. ibid. p. 111.
36. *Essai de philosophie concrète,* ser. *Collection/Essais,* Gallimard, Paris, 1940, 1999; Introd. p. 12. The titles of the essays are: *L'être incarné repère central de la métaphysique* (1939); *Appartenance et disponibilité* (1939); *Ébauche d'une philosophie concrète* (1938); *Aperçus phénoménologiques sur l'Être en situation* (1937); *Remarques sur les notions d'acte et de personne* (1935); *De l'opinion à la foi* (1937); *Le transcendant comme métaproblématigue* (1937); *La fidélité créatrice* (1939); *Meditation sur l'idee de preuve de l'existence de Dieu* (1939); *L'othodoxie contre les conformismes* (1938); *En marge de l'oecurnénisme* (1938); *Phénoménologie et dialectique de la tolerance* (1939); *Situation et situations limites chez Karl Jaspers* (1933).
37. *Entretiens Paul Ricoeur Gabriel Marcel* (op. cit.) p. 116. In *Aperçus phénoménologiques sur l'Être en situation,* (in *Essai de philosophie concrète,* pp. 122ff), he clearly allies himself with the school of phenomenology; cf. further: *Entretiens autour de Gabriel Marcel,* publ. *Fondation europ. de la culture,* Éditions de la Baconnière, Neuchâtel, 1993; p. 213; Ricoeur's lecture: pp. [53]-74.
38. ibid. p. 82.
39. I once met one of his former students at a conference; he conveyed the impression of Heidegger as an efficient teacher who aroused his students' enthusiasm; on his sociability cf. Safranski (op.cit.) pp. 464-67; against this cf. Elizabieta Ettinger, *Hannah Arendt—Martin Heidegger*, Yale U.P., New Haven, London, 1995, esp. pp. 10-11.
40. Such as his objection to Heidegger's question, how it is possible for anything to exist at all (posed towards the beginning of *Sein und Zeit*): *Entretiens Paul Ricoeur Gabriel Marcel* (op. cit.), p. 21.
41. ibid., esp. pp.89, 103-4.
42. *Entretiens autour de Gabriel Marcel* (op. cit. in note 37), pp. 78-81. His use of Husserl's intentionality occurs in *Le mystère de l'être* (the Gifford Lectures, 1949-50); I use the new edn., publ. Association présence de Gabriel Marcel (Paris, 1997), pp. 60-61 and 70ff: the use of phenomenology when working out the distinction between *être* and *être vrai*.

    Late acquaintance with Husserl, but parallel thinking already when developing intersubjectivity, under the influence of Bergson: cf. Jeanne Parain-Vial's preface to *Être et avoir*, nouvelle, ed., 1992 (*Coll. philosophie européenne*; Éditions universitaires): esp. pp. 6, 8.
43. cf. above note 42, also: *Entretiens Paul Ricoeur*

Gabriel Marcel (op. cit.), pp. 14-15: 'la réflexion critique mais chez qui on sentait peu cette sorte d'affirmation dont j'avais besoin .. oui, on avait bien le sentiment que Bergson était en train de nous révéler certains aspects profonds de la realité qui est la notre'.

44. *Husserliana* I, pp. 39, 183.
45. ibid., esp. pp. 44-45; 'Logos' is here used as, for instance, by P1otinus, for the force, the agency which effects the orderly and rational functioning of the Cosmos (*Enn*. II, 9, 1). 'Philosophy' has the more universal connotation of a rationally constructed discipline of all natural knowledge, as compared with the modern narrow departmental 'subject', comprising logic, ethics, etc.
46. cf. esp. pp. 1015-3 (starting-point for studying 'l'inépuisable concret', which takes the line of argument to the centre of the 'mystère ontologique', pp. 120-21) in *Ébauche d'une philosophie concrète* (pp. 89-121), one of the studies included in *Essai de philosophie concrète,* op. cit. But the distinction between *problème* and *mystère* is central to his metaphysical thinking ('pour moi central', p. 103) and is presupposed in the totality of his philosophical writings: cf. *Deuxième leçon, Livre I: Le monde cassé* (pp. 25-46) in *Le mystère de l'être*, as his starting-point for arguing man's need and demand for transcendence (*Troisième leçon*: pp. 47-66).
47. *Journal métaphysique* (Gallimard, Paris, 1997): '...l'ascétisme logique dont j'etais alors animé me déconcerte a présent ...' (*Introduction,* p. ix); although not dated, it must have been written between 1923 and 1927.
48. ibid. p.4.
49. 'Effectivement le journal métaphysique d'*Être et Avoir,* qui prend la suite à partir de 1929, démarre conjointement sur la critique définitive de l'idéalisme et la découverte de la grace'. ('In fact, the metaphysical diary, which constitutes *Being and Having,* and which does duty for its continuation, as from 1929, takes off with the definitive criticism of idealism, coupled with the discovery of grace'), p. 135, in *Entretiens Paul Ricoeur Gabriel Marcel, Postface* (pp. 131-48) by Xavier Tilliette, an extremely useful survey of Marcel's religious and philosophical development as an organic unity.
50. *Journal métaphysique,* op. cit., p. 7.
51. ibid.
52. *Essai de phil. concrète* (op. cit.) pp. [11]-20.
53. ibid. p. 17.
54. ibid.
55. ibid.
56. ibid. p. 20.
57. ibid. text and note 1: this *Introduction* was written just before, or in the early stages of World War II, anticipating the disasters which, Marcel guesses, will consign us, once again, to the Catacombs ('Au seuil des catacombes qui vont peut-être à bref délai se refermer sur nous').
58. ibid. p. 22.
59. ibid: these 'currents' ('je répugne à employer ce terme physique') seem to involve the resources of the personality as a whole.
60. ibid. pp. 23-24 (but cf. already the first entry in the *Journal metaphysique* (1/1/1914), pp. 3-4; noësis noëseös); we are reminded of Husserl's and Heidegger's 'zurück zu den Dingen!' The allusion is to Bergson's style of thinking ('mode de pensée'), as against the unacceptable Bergsonism as an abstract system.
61. *Essai de phil. concrète,* p.24.
62. ibid.
63. ibid. p. 25.
64. ibid. p. 29.
65. ibid. p. 31.
66. ibid. p. 34.
67. ibid. p. 36. 'Participation' (*melexis*) is, as George Joseph Seidel (*Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Socratics, An Introd. to his thought*, Univ. of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, NE, 1964, p. 83) has it, tone of the keywords in Plato's thought'; but Marcel uses it 'dans une acceptation toute différente de celle qui lui est conférée par Platon'; thus, in the *Parmenides* (130-133A) the discussion concerns the problem of how objects relate to/participate in Ideas: *metalambanein, metalëpsis, methexis*; *eneinai* – indwelling; *eikasia*. At that stage, Socrates conceives Ideas as *paradeigmata* or *en të gusei*: basic structural patterns of nature, to a likeness of which all other things (particular objects) aspire (*eoikenai*). If we say that Ideas are not (or, with Heidegger, are no longer) Parmenidean Being, they are yet fundamentally different from Marcel's totality of incarnated beings in an intersubjective living relationship to each other, so that they participate in a very deeply personal communion of existence, very different from the '*koivöviav sönechein kai philian kai kosmiotëta kai söphrosunën*' of Gorgias 507E/508A, ('to maintain community and mutual affection with decorum and a sense of reason'), to which firmament and earth, gods and humans alike belong 'in friendship, wise restraint and decorum, justice', so that they are called '*kosmos*' (order/adornment), as against '*hakolasia*' (lawlessness, disorder). Here the personal dimension is as much part and parcel of the natural order as other—supremely mathematical—aspects (summed up by Aristotle, *Metaphys*. I, 6; 987b), what Plotinus later calls '*en kosmö*

koinönian' (*Enn*. II, 1, 7, 15). The radical break with such panpsychic thinking derives from the biblical tradition, of man *conversing* with God in intimate friendship (e.g. Moses in *Exod*. 33, 11; *Sept:* '*pros ton heauton philon*'), because partaking of the divine nature; II Peter 1, 4 has the same Plotinian vocabulary: '*theias koinönoi phuseös*', however different in meaning! For this conversation is not simply macrocosmic behaviour, but the expression of divine and human heart and will, in which awe and intimate communion fuse: 'Conticescant humanae voces, requiescant humanae cogitationes: ad incomprehensibilia non se extendant quasi comprehensuri, sed tamquam participaturi; particeps enim erimus' (Augustine, *Ennarr. in Ps. 146, 5;* para. 11; PL 37, 1906);—'Omnis igitur beatus deus. Sed natura quidem unus; participatione vero nihil prohibet esse quam plurimos.' (Boethius, *Cons. Phil.* III: 10, *prose*)—a mode of existence referred to by Marcel as that of '*l'être incarne*' (p. 36 in *Essai de phil. concrète*: op. cit.).

68. *Essai de phil concrète,* p. 37; cf. the title of the last study in this collection: *Situation fondamentale et situations limites chez Karl Jaspers* (pp. 313-59).
69. ibid. p. 44.
70. ibid. p. 45
71. ibid. p. 47: the reference is to *De anima* II, 12;424a 17-24; one great difficulty in understanding this apparently hastily written passage is the exact meaning of *logos* as being present in the imprinted *sëmeion* and 'the perceiving creature', cf. Aristotle, *De anima,* ed. W. D. Ross; Clarendon, Oxford, 1961; text: after p. [63]; commentary on this passage: pp. 264-5.
72. *Essai de phil concrète*, perceiving: pp. 40-48; time: 31; but further: *Journal de métaphysique,* pp. 7ff; but Marcel often returns to this question throughout his work as philosopher and dramatist.
73. *Essai de phil concrète,* pp. 51-59.
74. I can bear this out from my experience as a Samaritan volunteer, when mutual love and trust established between myself and a caller who is totally unknown to me can acquire deep significance for both of us—may even have physical effect at the other end of the line. I think that Marcel would have been fascinated by the autobiography of the Jewish pianist Wladislaw Szpilman: *The pianist. The extraordinary story of one man's survival in Warsaw, 1939-45. .. With extracts from the diary of Wilm Hosenfeld*. F*oreword by Andrzej Szpilman. Epilogue by Wolf Biermann*, transl. Anthea Bell; Phoenix, Gollancz, London, 1999; esp. pp. 175-81: Szpilman's rescue by a German officer, their initial (and fully justified) mutual distrust, the conversations by words and silences, ending in a firm friendship: cf. *Postscript; extracts from the diary of Captain Wilm Hosenfeld* (the officer who rescued Szpilman); Wolf Biermann's *Epilogue* (pp. 188-222, for Hosenfeld's story.
75. *Essai de phil concrète,* op. cit., p. 52.
76. ibid.
77. ibid. p. 59.
78. ibid. pp. 100-21.
79. ibid. p. 100.
80. pp. 100-1.
81. ibid.
82. ibid. pp. 102-3. In *Le mystère de l'être, cinquième leçon,* reflection in two successive modes of operation (cf. esp. pp. 96-103) is applied well beyond epistemology, to the basic existential question, who I am, thence, more profoundly, the meaning/significance ('*le sens*', p. 98) of this question and to 'la signification néfaste et métaphysique' ('the uncanny, at once evil and metaphysical question') of the bureaucratisation of man.
83. *Essai de phil. concrète,* p. 103.
84. cf. note 6.
85. *Essai de phil. concrète,* p. 104.
86. ibid. p. 105: 'salué'; my professor of Greek philosophy (Prof. Herbertz, Bern, summer term 1948) described an *idea* (e.g. P1atonic) as welcoming the entrant: 'herzlich willkommen' ('a warm welcome'), as opposed to a *concept* which is framed by the questioner; the above entrant surrenders (the Eckhartian *Gelassenheit*), while the questioner manages, manipulates, for the concept (like Marcel's *problem*) is his property.
87. ibid. pp. 107-9.
88. ibid. pp. 120-21.
89. As I am confining myself to Macmurray (to set the scene) and to Husserl, Heidegger, Marcel's contemporaries, whose affinities and contrasts are of central importance to my line of argument, I am here excluding Marcel's critique of Karl Jaspers, with whom he shows profound agreements, but also disagreements.
90. ibid. pp. 152-73.
91. ibid. the study, *Appartenance et disponibilité*: pp. 60-88.
92. ibid. *Aperçus phénoménologiques sur l'Être en situation*: pp. 122-51.
93. ibid. pp. 132-54.
94. ibid. p. 132.
95. ibid. pp. 202-11.

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WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM POLANYI ABOUT THE COMPUTATIONAL THEORY OF MIND

Sheldon Richmond

Abstract:

My paper is about Michael Polanyi's lessons for the 'computational philosophy of mind', mainly a negative lesson. My paper in short says that computers will never be anything but mindless! The problem is that we expect, on one hand, people to be smart about computers, and on the other hand, computers to be smarter than they ever can be. The solution is to work harder at better computer design, better support for computer users, and work even harder at stopping the pretence that people are nothing more than organic computers.

1 Overview

For Polanyi, consciousness exhibits two main characteristics (among others): the tacit dimension and subjectivity. These dimensions seem to make the programme of AI or computer simulation of intelligence and more broadly, human consciousness impossible. AI, or more generally, the computer simulation of intelligence, requires both outwardness and articulateness or formalisability. Whatever the computer simulates must be out there so that we can compare the real entity with its public properties and causal relations to the simulation. Also, the real entity must involve rules of behaviour that we can represent digitally and with algorithms or formal functions or computer programs which are essentially formal functions. Those who argue that the mind or consciousness or intelligence is either reducible to the brain or is a property of the brain allow for the computer simulation of intelligence. Polanyi argues that consciousness though dependent upon the material basis of the brain for its existence is not merely a property of the brain, but forms a level of existence or a separate entity with its own special properties, namely, the tacit dimension of knowing more than we can articulate or formulate, and inwardness or subjectivity. So, if AI or computer simulation of consciousness is impossible, what can computers and computational philosophy teach us about the mind? Thomas Nagel bluntly states, 'Eventually, I believe, current attempts to understand the mind by analogy with man-made computers that can perform superbly some of the same external tasks as conscious beings will be recognised as a gigantic waste of time'. [1] For Polanyi, computer simulations can teach us a lot about the mind, though only from a negative perspective of what properties the mind does not have and what properties computers cannot achieve. *The fundamental negative is that computers cannot achieve the personal nature of mind: its subjectivity or 'my-ness' and its single-minded focus on the over-all task or project*. I shall focus on the most recent developments as opposed to the earlier developments to explain why computers can't do more.

One of the more recent and exciting developments now in progress is autonomous, single-purpose, intelligent agents that act independently but achieve spontaneous organisation. For instance, several intelligent search agents are set out with the single purpose of gathering information on the internet, and return the desired information through a process of feed-back, trial and error, and self-governing interaction. However, this is not intelligence of the human variety where human agents are able to direct several tasks with an over-reaching goal in mind. Moreover, the computer does not need to focus upon any one single task nor does it need to become aware of a single task to get results, whereas the human mind needs to focus on the task, and review the results of the task in order to continue and to complete the task. For instance, when typing an essay, we may not need to focus on every element of the task of typing but need to be able to focus on the words resulting from typing and to review those words, revise the words, and then to decide whether to terminate the task. Even when writing stream of consciousness, we are aware of the stream. So, consciousness needs a focus for awareness in order to reflect upon the task, change the direction of the task, learn from errors, and decide when the task needs to be continued, put aside for the moment, or has been completed, whereas the multi-tasking and multi-processing computer uses algorithms to interrupt various tasks, swap tasks, co-ordinate tasks, and so forth, without ever focusing on one single task above the other tasks.

In brief: no matter how smart we can get several computers to be by using the internet, multi-tasking and multi-processing; by using brute force; and by using autonomous single function agents, all this simulated intelligence does not achieve awareness or self-awareness, and focus of mind on overall projects that integrate and direct multiple sub-tasks towards the completion of the overall project.

2 Background.

(a) Theoretical

In Physics, the Law of Entropy, is equivalent to the negative law of the impossibility of perpetual motion machines. The Law of the Conservation of Energy—the total energy of a closed system remains constant—does not forbid the possibility of perpetual motion machines. However, throw in the Law of Entropy—energy tends to distribute equally in a closed system—we see that perpetual motion machines are impossible because it would take an equal amount of energy that is already in the closed system to recycle the energy expended through the motion in the system.

I do not want to dwell excessively on the relationships among the Law of Conservation of Energy, the Law of Entropy, and the Impossibility of Perpetual Motion. My main point is that some Laws of Physics teach us about impossibilities as well as possibilities. However, we should keep in mind that some so-called laws of impossibilities are misleading. For instance, the old saw that what goes up must come down implies the impossibility of perpetual motion upward. However, we know that with sufficient force, an object can escape the gravitation pull of the earth, and even the solar system, and move through space 'forever'.

This twofold approach in physics with mechanical systems forms the backdrop of some questions I have about computational philosophy: the philosophical approach which attempts to explain consciousness or the Mind in terms of computer systems.

1. Firstly, as in the case of the Law of Entropy, are there laws of impossibility about how much we can do with computers with respect to simulating human consciousness?

2. Secondly, as in the case of Newton's Laws of Motion, how much 'force' do we need, as it were, to get computers to escape, the gravitational pull, as it were of mechanical and electrical systems regarding getting computers to duplicate human consciousness?

Both questions represent common assumptions in the debate, ever since Alan Turing came up with what we now call the 'Turing Machine' about 50 years ago. Firstly, the Turing picture—or what John Haugeland has called GOFAI, good old fashioned artificial intelligence[2]—assumes that with enough brute force we can replicate the mind. Basically, minds are nothing more than Turing machines, but our real world systems are practically more limited physically than brains or minds, and so fail to duplicate minds because of their physical limitations. Better design, more processing power—i.e. faster CPUs—more storage facilities or better chips and hard drives, etc. etc., will allow us to break the gravitational pull as it were of the earth-bound computer systems.

This corresponds to the second approach or principle in physics I mentioned above: the laws of physics tell us positively what we need to do to accomplish some seemingly impossible task, such as flying forever through space.

Some thinkers, most notably, philosopher Hubert Dreyfus[3], AI researchers Joseph Weizenbaum[4] and Terry Winograd[5], have launched a sustained and exhaustive critique of the GOFAI project in terms of the impossibility of replicating human consciousness in computers. Certain features of human consciousness such as judgment, multi-tasking (i.e. whistling while working, chewing gum and walking), and pattern recognition cannot be duplicated by serial processor systems, no matter how many CPUs and how big the storage systems are you throw into those systems.

This corresponds to the negative principle in physics I mentioned above: the laws of physics tell us negatively what we cannot do in certain areas. For instance, we cannot build anti-gravity machines because all mass is subject to gravity. So much for easy weight-loss programmes!

However, GOFAI has shifted its ground and transubstantiated into new approaches, partly due to their own self-recognition of the limits of serial processor computers, their own models of the human mind, and partly in reaction to the external philosophical critics such as Dreyfus and internal 'traitors' such as Weizenbaum and Winograd. Trying to untangle the twists and turns of the thread of the debate is a major and worthy task in itself that might require one or more book-length treatments. I can provide only a caricature of a caricature in the following paragraphs, but I must provide some characterisation of this debate, no matter how crude, in order to show how Polanyi's approach can help us get a deeper understanding of both the nature of mind and the limits of computational philosophy.

Human problem-solving, according to Newell and Simon[6], uses heurstics, or strategies and deductive logic. Hence, when we attempt to replicate human consciousness we need only build congeries of expert machines—i.e. chess-playing machines, number-theory proving machines, and so forth.

Marvin Minsky[7] has taken a similar track to Newell and Simon, in looking at the mind as a system of interacting modules. He calls this 'the society of mind'. There is no unified, central director called the 'self' which co-ordinates

activities. Rather, the mind is a set of interacting processes or agents, with no central control other than that which arises indirectly through the mutual adjustment of the agents to each other. So, rather than building a big machine that replicates the mind in a top-down fashion, we build networks of machines that signal each other, divide the tasks, or take on specialised tasks. This is an anarchic society of minds where order is achieved by mutual consent, as it were, among the specialised computer systems.

Roger Schank[8] took a more unified approach to mind by arguing that the mind is a memory machine that learns, when it attempts to confront novel situations, by applying remembered themes or representations. Though the mind is not a collection of strategies, or not only a collection of strategies, it is a collection of memories or stories. It is when the story does not apply to a novel situation and when the mind comes up with a new story that we learn. Schank and his various teams have attempted to develop different expert systems for different story genres, as it were, for instance race-track betting, poetry generation, the stock market, and so forth.

All the while various philosophers have been attempting to find a materialistic view of the mind more congenial to the common sense view of the mind as a special sort of entity and to the computational theory of the mind as something no more special than the computer. Jerry Fodor[9] produced the functionalist theory of the mind where the mind is a family of modules with specialised functions. The nature of the substratum required to produce those operations is not important—whether the material is made up of brain matter, or computer systems, or even urban centres. The important aspect for understanding mind is—what functions are mental functions? How does the mind remember, learn, represent? Or, in brief: what is the grammar of the mind? Whether this grammar uses circuits or organic chemicals is irrelevant to understanding mind. Supposedly, on the opposite side of Jerry Fodor are Paul and Patricia Churchland[10]—and their lengthy books in the field, which they invented and called 'neurophilosophy'. The mind is the brain, and the brain is composed of neurons that interact associatively. In order to mimic the mind in computer systems, we need to mimic the material substratum of the mind which is the brain. More precisely: the mind is no more and no less than the brain. So, we need to build computer systems which function as brains: parallel processing and distributed systems, where events trigger other events according to the nature of external stimuli. The triggering systems adapt as the external stimuli change.

John Searle[11] refashioned the theory of mind to avoid such novel approaches in AI. The mind, according to Searle is a biological entity, but is not reducible to the brain. It is a set of properties produced by brain activity. He also produced a puzzle that is intended to show that no manner of computer power can duplicate the special mental property of the biological system of the mind—i.e. understanding. This puzzle is called the Chinese Room where people with no understanding of Chinese just compare symbols using various rules and produce the correct translation, which is what a computer translation system would do. Can we say that such a translation system or 'information processing system' has any 'understanding' of Chinese? Searle, of course, expects us to answer No, or to come up with a theory of understanding that reduces understanding to symbol manipulation.

Noam Chomsky[12] through studies of linguistics, as opposed to philosophical theories of mind, intentionality, speech acts, and so forth, developed a view that is actually very similar to Searle. Though he does not launch any direct attack on AI, I think his theory of language, knowledge, and the mind does have an implicit critique of more recent approaches in the computational theory of mind. According to Chomsky, the mind is not identical to the brain, but is a biological system with an evolutionary history. When the human brain evolved to a certain stage, it produced a brain with special attributes—such as the attribute of having a universal and deep grammar that allows all humans to learn all languages. So, Chomsky like Searle, argues that human language has special features that cannot be replicated by mechanical or non-organic systems. Ironically, at least from the perspective of the computational philosophy of mind, Jerry Fodor has of late switched camps and developed a critique of computational philosophy very much like Chomsky and Searle. Though from the perspective of his general philosophy, as a modern 'Cartesian' philosopher applying and extending the thought of Chomsky to thought, a natural consequence would have been such a critique of computational philosophy. In brief, he argues that the mind uses forms of reasoning that are context dependent and cannot be formalised.[13] These non-mechanical processes are functions of the mind as a biological product of evolution, though not the kind of evolution pictured by current neo-Darwinians such as Richard Dawkins[14] and Daniel Dennett.[15]

So, where do we stand in this debate between the new theorists of mind and their critics? Churchland, Schank, Simon and Newell, and Minksy, attempt to develop a theory of computational mind as interacting modules, though Schank is somewhat of

a renegade in appealing to more traditional approach to the mind as a unified system which calls the specialised faculties or modules into operation when and as needed. Their critics look at functions of the mind which cannot be replicated by non-biological systems—such as interpretation, representation, intentionality, and the use of language.

How does Polanyi's theory of knowledge and mind fit into this debate? Apart from us who admire Polanyi's philosophical work as one of the outstanding contributions made to philosophy in the twentieth century—why care?

I suggest that Polanyi's theory of mind can further the debate. We are at an impasse and Polanyi's theory can break the impasse. That is why Polanyi's theory of mind is important for those interested in this debate.

Briefly here is how Polanyi's theory of mind can break the impasse. We are stuck at an impasse in this debate because there is something missing in the theory of mind which Polanyi has explored in great depth—the two inner dimensions of the mind that most ordinary people find quite puzzling about mind when they start to think about it. The first inner dimension is the sense of my mind as *my* mind—it is unique and subjective. The second inner dimension is that my mind allows me to do and understand things that I cannot fully explain to others, but only show them. Polanyi explores both dimensions as features of what he calls 'personal knowledge'—the subjective aspect of knowledge belonging to the individual person living in a social context, and the tacit dimension of knowledge which allows individuals to articulate their questions and theories.

However, there is a prior question which needs airing: why even care about this impasse in the debate between computational theorists and their critics, especially since there are debates within computational theory and among their critics? Even my simplification of this complex of debates within debates is not all that simple and straightforward, and is still tangled. I think that the answer to this question—why care about the computational theory of mind and the tangle of debates about this theory and in this theory?—will even show how Polanyi's implicit contribution to this discussion is of fundamental importance for philosophy in general, and not only for certain specialised fields of philosophy—i.e. mind, science, and technology. I propose an answer to the 'why care?' question in the following section.

(b) Practical

We all have heard much about globalisation, the technological revolution, and the communications revolution. We seem to be near the beginning of a major shift in the political, social, and economic organisation of all nations and societies. Some not only debate about slowing down this rapid shift, but also take political action for slowing down the movement towards a global economy, though there seems to be little we can do to slow down the technological movement towards the implementation of computer technology and internet access for all we do, from e-mail to paying bills and ordering groceries. In this spinning vortex of massive global social, economic, and political transformation, there is one small area which is often overlooked but which is the most serious practical, nerve-wracking, time-wasting, obstacle-making situation in most people's daily lives at work and home. This is the situation where, when attempting to do something with a computer, we cannot do it either because we do not know how, or because the computer fails.

Because the ordinary, intelligent person, for some reason, does not find the use of computers to be transparent, and because computers are error-prone, I and thousands of others, have work to do. The job function is called various names, including 'computer trouble-shooter', 'client services', and 'end-user support'. I work as one of those who help others with computers. I mention this because I want to use real life situations to illustrate this problem of the lack of transparency in the use of computers.

Here are some simple scenarios (the names are changed to protect the innocent and me from legal suits):

Bill is using a program for word processing which I shall call 'Word Wizard'. However, when he attempts to retrieve a specific attachment in e-mail using 'Word Wizard', the program 'crashes'. The program freezes and Bill needs to shut down the program. However, when Bill uses 'Word Wizard' to retrieve other attachments, the program does not crash or freeze. It only freezes with that attachment. Bill is puzzled. So am I. The only solution I can think of is to save that file to disk, use a standard text-editor for retrieving the text, but without the formatting features. All the bolds, underlines, fancy fonts, and so forth are lost. However, Bill gets the text. Bill is puzzled. My only guess is that some code in the text—the code for creating the formatting—conflicts internally, causing the program which depends on that code for text formatting to halt.

To Bill's mind, he is following a simple procedure which he has used many times before. The computer for some reason does not allow him to use that procedure. He is doing nothing out of the ordinary, nothing different from his usual routine, and the document he is working on, or attempting to retrieve, is in itself apparently innocuous. Everything should be transparent and work as always.

Consider another example:

Beatrice has written notes for saving a document to a drive on a computer. Though she has done this many times before, she likes to work with written notes which she made when she was instructed on how to save documents. However, after saving the document, and retrieving it, according to instructions, she noticed it was blank. All her work disappeared. She is puzzled and so am I.

To figure out what happened, I ask some basic questions: How did you save the file? Did you get any messages on the screen? Beatrice tells me that she always does the same: Choose the option, 'File Save As', and Choose 'Yes' when prompted 'overwrite the file'. It always worked so far. However, after further interrogation, I find that she had intended to delete some text, add new text, and then save the document before rushing off to a meeting. But she did not have time to add new text, so she just saved the document with the deleted portion of text. So, my explanation to Beatrice was that she mistakenly deleted everything and that she had then saved the blank file overwriting her existing file.

To Beatrice's mind, the computer should have known that the file was empty, and should not have overwritten a full file with a blank file. The computer should be more adaptable. I suggested that she choose the 'preference' to save the original file as a backup when saving any modification to that file. She still was not too happy because she expected the computer to be smarter than that! It should 'know' not to write a blank file over a file with data or text.

I could provide many more examples with different sorts of tasks, applications, and different levels of sophistication. I have two points:

1. Computers are not transparent—i.e. they do not replicate the human mind, and require special sorts of operations to use them.

2. Those who design the special sorts of operations do not understand the mind or culture of ordinary people, including themselves when acting as ordinary people.

I shall provide one example from my own experience as a systems administrator. One time, some years ago, before going on vacation I decided to do some computer 'house-keeping'. I ran the program for doing the 'house-keeping'. The unexpected result was that every user account was obliterated. Thank goodness for tape backup! This undocumented result was explained on the vendor's internet site as a 'bug' in the 'Frequently Asked Questions' site of the vendor of the network operating system—which one usually looks up after the problem occurs. Their solution to the 'bug' was not to use the house-cleaning feature in question after shutting out all users.

Here, as a sophisticated but ordinary user, I expected a certain level of obviousness or transparency. I expected at least some warning from the system in use, but none was given. The only 'warning' was listed on the vendor site, which is usually consulted only after a problem is noticed. Rather than correct the 'bug' and put it in the place for downloading 'critical updates', the vendor decided to provide an advisory in the place where one looks after running into a problem.

Moreover, as a sophisticated user of technical computer procedures, I mistakenly forgot to keep in mind the trivial lesson that all reasonable expectations regarding what we can rely on from computers concerning obviousness and basic etiquette should be suspended and replaced with the rule: computers are never to be trusted. But, why? Why can't we demand transparency or user-friendliness? Why can't we even expect some minimum level of obviousness in the use of computers? Why are computers so obscure and user-hostile?

First, computers cannot replicate the human mind—they can never be transparent to humans.

Two, computer developers or tekies live in a different culture from computer-users or humanists, and even they themselves change cultures to the culture of computer-users or humanists without being aware of that when they use computers.

In the remaining portion of the paper I shall look only at the first answer above for now and explore how Polanyi's theory of mind explains the inevitable lack of transparency of computers. (I have been exploring the second answer in other works in progress.)

3 Polanyi's implicit critique of the transparency of computers.

Polanyi's view of mind or, in general, *personal knowledge*, has the theoretical import for breaking the impasse in the debate between the proponents of the computational philosophy of mind and their critics. It also has the practical important for providing guidelines for the better design and

development of computer technology.

(a) The theory of mind as personal

It is almost trivial to say that the mind is personal or belongs to the individual. What else could it be? Even if the mind is identical to the brain, at least the mind is identical to *my* brain. However, the computational philosophy of mind as a formal system or network of formal systems—societies of agents, each doing specialised tasks, and each co-ordinating their activities through mutual adjustment—treats mind as impersonal. This is one step short of Karl Popper's theory of the Mind as Objective.[16] Though the psychological mind is personal, it is of little interest because psychology reflects the nature and structure of Objective Mind or World 3. One of the interesting aspects of Popper's theory of Objective Mind is that it compels one to take an ecological perspective on minds and their products—especially the internet. This form of impersonality does not deny the personal nature of mind, it just attempts to diminish its importance paradoxically for psychology as well as for epistemology. Popper may have gone over-board in his critique of belief-epistemology and 'psychologism' i.e. explaining knowledge in terms of the justification of belief, and the logic of beliefs as opposed to abstract principles of methodology. However, this aspect of Objective Mind is irrelevant to the issue here: is there anything in the world that resembles the common sense idea of a personal mind? Computational philosophy rejects this idea of the personal mind as part of folk psychology, made famous in the critique of Steven Stich.[17] Our ordinary beliefs about beliefs are fictional or mythical. Rather, beliefs and other so-called mental events are abstract processes or functions that have having nothing personal about them. In effect, 'beliefs' are part of abstract representational systems that function according to abstract rules of syntax, semantics, and logic. Ludwig Wittgenstein[18] had already rejected the common sense notion of a mind as belonging to a person in terms of his rejection of 'private language'. The language of mind talk, whether it is about pain or belief, is a social language with reference to social activities as part of 'language games' in specific 'forms of life'.

Polanyi's view of mind as intimately related with the person, as part of the life activities of the person, explains the 'my-ness' of mind. The individual person has an inward, and subjective life of mind, where contact with mentors, and activity in various communities with various traditions or cultures informs the personal biography of one's mind. Moreover, because of the my-ness of mind, the inner world of mind, and the tacit knowledge of individual minds, the only way to get to know the mind of another and to learn the tacit skills and knowledge of another is to apprentice one's self to the other person. It is not merely through reading the abstract books of others, but through direct, face-to-face contact over a long period of time, that we get to understand the other 'my mind' out there, and do we get to learn the tacit skills and knowledge of that other 'my mind'.

In the terms that I have been using to discuss the nature of the computational philosophy of mind, the theoretical import of Polanyi's theory of knowledge as personal and of mind as personal, is this: the mind is not transparent. No set of abstract, formal systems, can describe the individual mind of an active, living, person. At best, abstract systems can describe the books or products of the mind of the person, but not the mind of the person as it is in the person's real-time activities. This is so because our minds, in real-time, are engaged in activities where we focus outward by relying on an inner, inarticulate dimension of thought and feeling. Hence, the main lesson from Polanyi is that because the mind is not transparent we cannot replicate the mind in computers. However, a secondary lesson is that we can replicate whatever abstract processes the mind uses and produces. For instance, current computer research on specialised agents can simulate specialised human activities and intelligent functions such as medical diagnoses in specific areas.

Another aspect of current research in computational consciousness is the use of multi-tasking and parallel processing to simulate higher intelligent functions such as natural language or fuzzy logic, information search, retrieval, and analysis. However, the irony is that though people are able to 'multi-task' in some ways, they are as Polanyi argues—single-minded or single-focused. We need to attend to the task we are engaged in, in a single-minded way so that we can use our tacit knowledge to guide us in our task—reflectively to redirect our activities, and even to produce novel ideas and activities in the attempt to accomplish our task. So, though it seems that people 'parallel-process'—do many things like whistling while working, or chewing gum and walking, or carrying on multiple conversations, these parallel tasks are often either distractions or aspects of a larger, more comprehensive project. Here again, we come back to the main lesson we learn from Polanyi's theory of mind: the opaque mind works best when attending to a single project or having a single focus. We can then use tacit or subsidiary clues to help us carry out and complete our single project.

This theoretical reflection about the opacity and individuality of the personal mind—the 'my-ness' of minds—has an important practical implication for the development and implementation of computer systems.

(b) The practice of mind as personal

Those who develop computer systems think of minds as poor computers. If we were more logical, faster in our processing, and more persistent, we would have no trouble with computers. It is that we cannot adequately do what computers do very well. We cannot break tasks down into sufficiently small steps in the required sequence, we cannot do those steps rapidly, and we cannot last very long doing those minute and repetitive steps. Basically, what Weizenbaum warned us about many years ago is coming to pass: if we can't make computers do what we do as intelligent beings, we call what computers do as intelligent and reduce our activities to replicating, as best we can, computers. In my terms, we start ignoring the opaque aspects of personal minds and only concentrate on the transparent aspects. But this does not work. People tend not to understand how computers work because they expect computers to work 'logically' in the same way that people work or interact. But computers have their own rules—basically abstract and impersonal rules for acting. As everyone says, 'computers are stupid'. Also, as everyone knows, that means computers need detailed instructions where nothing is taken for granted and where nothing is assumed. Furthermore, as everyone knows, computers are literal, and every action or result required by the computer must be explicitly spelled out by, in the first instance, the computer programmer, and in the final instance, by the activities of the computer user—and only those activities that were built-in the computer by the computer programmers and hardware engineers.

The problem is that we explicitly know those things about computers—we know that computers are abstract, stupid, explicit, literal, and so forth—but we expect that, though computers are not like humans, they are human-sensitive: sensitive to humans who have minds of their own, and can understand our minds and what we expect. But this is not the case. Computers need special instructions, and special hardware in order for them to behave according to our expectations and in order to adapt to individual persons with their own individual knowledge and expectations.

We are slowly learning this lesson and are developing better 'ergonomics'—at least, the so-called GUI, graphical user-interface with the use of pointing devices is supposed to be more 'user-friendly'. However, this is not an easy task. We tend to stop short of the mark and expect users to adapt to what we think is user-friendly. We go about teaching people about the 'mouse', what the left button does, what the right button does, what the wheel does, and how we can 'personalise' the functions of the buttons and the appearance of the pointer on the screen. However, this merely underlines the fact that GUI or 'windows' in the generic sense, and the mouse are not all that user-friendly. Children may pick up the skills required for using computers rather quickly, but that only proves that children are better at adapting themselves to new technologies, and not that the new technologies are better adapted to humans.

The practical lesson of Polanyi's theory of personal mind is that no matter what designers do, because computers are abstract instruments, they can never be transparent to human users. At best, we can attempt to figure out how we can design computers so that they do what we expect them to do with as few repercussions or misadventures as possible. This means, at best, we need inbuilt systems that will prevent people from totally befuddling and frustrating themselves. A subsidiary lesson, but a lesson very important to me, is that 'client service' or 'end-user support' people will never run out of work to do. There may be less work as computer designers improve their understanding of the personal and 'my-ness' nature of human minds, but the limit is that computers still require explicit instructions which are never transparent to people who work with interpretation, tacit knowledge, and single-focus minds. We think that the computer will do what the book says, but the book was written by people with human minds and so some important steps are taken for granted. It is just those steps that others need to have explained in order to avoid becoming frustrated by their computers. *The positive side of this story is that people are never replaceable.*

4 Conclusion: Is the common sense view of mind 'folk psychology'?

Polanyi is famous for focusing on commitment in science. Commitment is often contrasted with critical thinking, and hence open discussion or debate. However, I think this is not the view of commitment that Polanyi had in mind or intended to present in his theory of personal knowledge. The scientist is not dogmatically fastened to a position. Rather, the scientist is committed to a position in the sense of taking the risk of presenting it to the scientific community, defending the position, and

listening to criticism. Rather than merely conform to the majority view, the scientist often commits himself to a minority view—even a minority of one. The common sense view of the mind as both unique to the person—as having the quality of 'my-ness'—and as more or less transparent to one's self and to others through ordinary face-to-face interaction, has been dismissed as 'folk psychology'. In its place, the computational philosophy of mind has been lauded as scientific, naturalistic, and Darwinian. However, the common sense theory of consciousness or mind is in effect part of the nature of consciousness itself. What we believe about consciousness or the mind is part of the mind. So, can we dismiss the common sense theory of consciousness where mind is thought to be personal or unique and inner directed or subjective without changing the very nature of human consciousness? I think there is a need for some to commit to common sense in this respect both for the sake of continuing the debate and for the sake of maintaining the tradition or institution of mind as unique and subjective. In other words, labelling the common sense theory of mind as folk psychology is not just intellectually dismissive, but has dire political and social consequences. If ultimately we reject the common sense view of mind and replace it altogether with the computational theory of mind, we will change the very nature of consciousness, and not merely change a theory. Here, as with other theories about human institutions, the object of study actually is part of the subject who is doing the studying and can change what we are studying as well as the subject who is studying. We make the theory true by changing *what is* to become *what we think it is.* To borrow computer science jargon—we are caught in a recursive loop, or a mutually reinforcing system where *what we say is* becomes the *truth* and is self-perpetuating and self-validating. This is even worse than a 'self-fulfilling prophecy' where what we predict comes about because we predict it. We create what we think we see and then we do see it, and we justify what we think because 'seeing is believing'. The political and social consequences of changing consciousness into computer systems—replaceable, mechanical systems, that have only instrumental value—are almost too obvious to mention. People have become dispensable instruments to be replaced by newer and cheaper systems with faster processors and higher memory. People are coming to be treated as organic computer systems where civility and morality are nothing more than techniques for manipulation and control. We need to institutionalise the moral imperative: *unlike tools and instruments people are never replaceable.*

Notes:

1. *The View from Nowhere*, 1986, Oxford University Press, p. 16. www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/nagel/.
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12. http://web.mit.edu/linguistics/www/chomsky.home.html.
13. http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/documents/disk0/00/00/13/60/
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WHAT IS CRUELTY?
A discussion
between Giorgio Baruchello and Wendy Hamblet

1 An answer by Giorgio Baruchello

Blaise Pascal stated that we have three sources of belief: reason, intuition, and tradition. In order to formulate an answer to the question at issue, I shall refer to all three sources. My first step will be to pursue the third source of belief: I shall review succinctly a selection of representative statements about cruelty by famous philosophers from the origins of Western thought to the late 19th century.[1] My second step will be to determine whether and, if any, which intuitions do their views on cruelty address or rely upon. Finally, Pascal's first source of belief will help me evince a reply to the interrogative at issue, on the basis of the information resulting from the two previous steps.

Aristotle is said to have condemned cruelty as 'calculated acts of outrage'[2] and, for this reason, as morally worse than 'acts committed in anger'.[3] Seneca censured it too as 'the inclination of the mind toward the side of harshness'.[4] For Seneca, exemplarily cruel are 'those who have a reason for punishing, but no moderation in it'.[5] In this, they differ from those displaying 'savagery… who find pleasure in torture;' as regards such a bestial disposition, 'we may even call it madness'.[6] Similar is the position of Thomas Aquinas, who defines cruelty as 'hardness of the heart in exacting punishment,'[7] and as not to be confused with mercilessness.[8] Cruelty is a form of 'human wickedness,'[9] i.e. it involves reflective deliberation, and, in this, it differs from 'savagery' or 'brutality,' which are forms of irrational 'bestiality'[10] that feed on 'the pleasure they derive from a man's torture'.[11] First to deviate from this choir of disapproval is Niccolò Machiavelli, who, in *The Prince*, mentions 'cruelties being badly or properly used… and the possibility of evil… to speak well… [i.e.] of those [cruelties] that are applied at one blow and are necessary to one's security, and that are not persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the advantage of the subjects'.[12] Against Machiavelli's quasi-utilitarian justification of cruelty resonates Michel de Montaigne's dismissal of the same, for it possesses a morally dubious parent—'fear is the mother of cruelty'[13]—and equally dubious children: chastisements,[14] hunting,[15] torture,[16] and war.[17] Indeed, with regard to war, Montaigne writes disdainfully:

I could hardly be convinced, until I saw it, that there were souls so monstrous that they would commit murder for the mere pleasure of it… For that is the uttermost point that cruelty can attain.[18]

Thomas Hobbes follows Montaigne in his loathing of war, as he states that 'to hurt without a reason tendeth to the introduction of war, which is against the laws of nature, and is commonly styled by the name of cruelty'.[19] 'Montaignesque' sounds also Joseph Butler, who claims that 'disinterested cruelty is the utmost possible depravity, which we can in imagination conceive,' although he believes it to be a very rare phenomenon.[20] In this he is echoed by David Hume, who doubts that even 'the cruelty of Nero be allowed entirely voluntary, and not rather the effect of constant fear and resentment'.[21] Montesquieu, instead, finds cruelty to be much more widespread and to imply a very important point in favour of penal moderation. In fact, he identifies an entire nation affected by it, i.e. Japan, and a dramatic effect of the consistent use of inhumane punishments:

True is that the character of this people, so amazingly obstinate, capricious, and resolute as to defy all dangers and calamities, seems to absolve their legislator from the imputation of cruelty, notwithstanding the severity of the laws… [A]re such men, I say, mended or deterred, or rather are they not hardened, by the continual prospect of punishment?[22]

Penal moderation had to be moderate for Adam Smith, instead, for whom 'mercy to the guilty is cruelty to the innocent'.[23] After all, he could not afford to be too kind-hearted, as in the economic reality that he praised 'there is no order that suffers so cruelly… as the race of labourers'.[24] For Smith, cruelty was not a rare event, and even less rare was for Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who, in his *Confessions*, lists as cruelties such diverse, painful realities as remembrances, agonies, uncertainties, separations, lost affects, diseases, hands, oppressions, errors, offences, calumnies, deaths, imaginations, inconveniences, and idleness itself! Perhaps, he was confirming implicitly the Marquis de Sade's understanding of cruelty as

> nothing but the human energy that civilization has not yet corrupted … Cruelty, far from being a vice, is the first sentiment that Nature has imprinted within ourselves. The child breaks his toy, bites his nurse's nipple, strangles his bird, long before he has reached the age of reason.[25]

Widespread is cruelty for Giacomo Leopardi, who envisages 'the cruelty of punishments, which are common in the State,'[26] and the cruelty of philoso-

phy and religion, which cause

> the human genus, extraordinary example of infelicity in this life, [to] look now upon death not as the end of its miseries, but as that after which more unhappiness has to come… [Not only philosophers and priests] have been crueller to the human being than fate or necessity or nature… but… have surpassed in cruelty the most ferocious tyrants and the most ruthless executioners ever seen on Earth.[27]

Also 'neglect and indifference [are] the cause of an infinite number of cruel and vicious actions'.[28] Indeed, the whole of life seems to be pervaded by it and the only consolation for 'the strong man [is] to see, with stoical gratification, all of destiny's cruel and hidden cloaks being stripped off'.[29] Friedrich Nietzsche embraces super-humanly this tragic realisation, and defines cruelty 'as one of the oldest and most indispensable elements in the foundation of culture… the psychology of conscience is not, as is supposed, "the voice of God in man;" but the instinct of cruelty'.[30] For Nietzsche,

> almost everything we call "higher culture" is based on the spiritualization and intensification of cruelty… the "wild beast" has not been laid to rest at all, it lives, it flourishes, it has merely become deified.[31]

In effect, 'cruelty belongs to the most ancient festive joys of mankind… for those who are cruel enjoy the supreme titillation of the feeling of power'—the will to power being at the core of life itself.[32]

To conclude, for Western philosophers, 'cruelty' is by no means univocal. It refers to deliberate, excessive violence, to irrational, bestial sadism, and to indifference to another's suffering; it excludes direct and/or indirect justified exercises of violence and it includes them; it is blatantly bad, but it may be used well for the subjects' good; it is a rare condition, yet it is most common among humans; it is a prerogative of theirs, although it can be described as an all-pervading metaphysical force. Most puzzlingly, all connotations touch upon intuitive dimensions of 'cruelty,' whether existential, moral, or historical. Some cruelty is certainly contained in phenomena such as: the art of the executioner; the eruption of unrestrained physical violence; the refined tortures of the libertine; the daily experience of humiliation and abuse of the prisoner; the premeditated, cold use of political assassination; the ordinary struggle of each and every one of us against death, illness, need, frustration, and disillusionment; etc. Perhaps, rather than speaking of 'one' cruelty, it would seem more appropriate to speak of, and discern amongst, 'many' a cruelty.[33]

A first distinction could be drawn between 'natural' cruelty and 'human' cruelty. The former would refer to the understanding of cruelty as a metaphysical drive embedded within the universe itself, which may find expression in human agency, i.e. in the latter type of cruelty, but not exclusively.[34] This latter type of cruelty could be divided itself between that which stems from 'delight' in another's suffering, and that which stems from 'indifference' to another's suffering; this suffering being determined either by the 'action' or the 'inaction' of the perpetrator.[35] Action and inaction, in turn, can operate 'directly' and/or 'indirectly,' i.e. along a short or long chain of moral responsibility.[36] Finally, cruelty of the 'human' type could be divided into 'orthodox' cruelty and 'unorthodox' cruelty, depending on whether it is morally, legally, religiously, customarily, and/or otherwise justified, or not. The reply to 'what is cruelty?' would then translate into replying to another question, i.e. 'which cruelty?'

This does not mean that we cannot retrieve any common denominator: after all, we would be talking still of various 'types' of the same thing, i.e. of 'cruelty'. Naturally, in order to retrieve it, we must look at very general features, common to most of the cruelties listed above, or at least a set of family resemblances. The first and most evident is *suffering*: there must be detriment of some kind resulting from the form of human and/or natural agency that we label as cruel.[37] The second feature is the *actuality* of the agency that brings about the suffering and of the suffering itself: as long as the detriment of somebody is hypothetical, then there is nothing but cruel intentions or a mystification of cruelty.[38] The third feature is the presence of some *mens rea*, whether of a human or non-human fashion. Somebody or something is responsible for the suffering, whether by direct or indirect action or omission, displaying either delight in or indifference to the suffering.[39] If this is enough to define cruelty, however, it is open to discussion: in fact, it might just be violence.[40]

2 A reply to Giorgio Baruchello by Wendy C. Hamblet

We could indeed look to the opinions of any number of thinkers, the usages in any number of contexts, to determine what is being meant when the term 'cruelty' is being employed. This investigation will, as Dr. Baruchello has demonstrated, open onto a universe of meaning, a veritable Pandora's box for the one chasing down a firm definition. What is interesting to me in regard of the plethora of meanings for the term 'cruelty' is the way that the latter comes into view for the subject

(the one controlling the definition) only from the safe distance of the observer of the cruelty *of others*. That is to say, it becomes a far easier affair to select 'calculated acts of outrage' and 'forms of irrational bestiality' when others are the agents of those behaviours than when one is oneself entering into activities that may be so characterized.

When we look at actions that are undeniably cruel—the experiments of the Nazi doctors, the hacking of Tutsi neighbours by Hutu during the Rwandan genocide, the terrorism of Timothy McVeigh, the 'collateral damages' of American retaliatory bombings in Afghanistan and their 'war of liberation' in Iraq—we find that, even in these extreme acts of bloody brutality, cruelty, like beauty, resides in the eye of the beholder. People very rarely see their own actions as cruel. In fact, the number of perpetrators who actually enjoy committing acts that could be named cruel are few. On the contrary, it seems to be the case that people are often physically disabled at the prospect of having to hurt, maim or kill others. We have reports of Nazi infantrymen, whose orders included shooting in the back of their heads civilians lying face down on the ground. The soldiers could not, for vomiting or passing out, fulfil their tasks of executing the innocent prisoners (the ineffective executioners would then simply be shuffled off to desk jobs, exposing the flimsiness of other executioners' arguments that there was a 'kill or be killed' policy among the soldiery in Nazi Germany).

Few people see their own actions as cruel. They may regard them as unfortunate necessities or as the lesser of evil options available at the moment, but they rarely see themselves as cruel persons for having committed the acts that others might call cruel. In truth, many of the worst perpetrators are fully convinced that they are doing good when they are harming other people. Witness in the world today how many acts of mass murder, how many episodes in the 'War on Terror', cite their god as, not only condoning but demanding the brutality.

To understand the purity that is felt at the homesite of cruel action, we may look to the philosophical tradition. Plato has insisted, with Socrates, that no one knowingly does wrong. All moral error is an epistemological problem and not an evil choice made in calculated coldness.[41] That explains why early education is so important for Plato that the just city is declared an improbability unless it begins with citizens ten years of age or younger. For Aristotle, too, moral behaviour is about knowing the correct response to situations as they arise, and this knowingly correct response can only be developed through the repetition that builds moral habit and by choosing one's friends and exemplars with care.[42]

Phenomenologists in the post-Holocaust tradition are also stunningly accepting of the notion of the 'innocence' of cruel perpetrators. Emmanuel Levinas, whose extended family was lost to the Nazi genocide and who himself spent the war years in a Nazi prison camp, has affirmed the Socratic claim that no one does harm knowingly, showing, in his phenomenological account of the lived experience of human subjects, that, through pleasure and use, each subject 'unthinkingly' goes about its business of carving out a safe house in the voluptuous real of the 'elemental', and though all subjective encounter is fundamentally violent—all acts appropriative—the violences entailed in all human encounter is 'innocent' because 'unknowingly' effected.[43] This includes, for Levinas, the cruel 'irresponsibility' of the S. S. guards. In a stunning hyperbolization of the call to responsibility (encapsulated in the god's charge to be 'the brother's keeper'), Levinas makes the suffering victim responsible even for the guard's irresponsibility.[44] Levinas states:

> Biology teaches the prolongation of nourishment into existence; need is naïve. In enjoyment I am absolutely for myself. Egoist without referent to the Other; I am alone without solitude, innocently egoist and alone. Not against the Others, not 'as for me…'—but entirely deaf to the Other, outside of all communication and all refusal to communicate—without ears, like a hungry stomach.[45]

If all action is fundamentally violent and yet innocently (unintentionally) effected, then cruelty, being a subset of violence where intention (to harm beyond the demands of just punishment) takes on particular importance, ceases to exist. No act can be cruel, no agent of any monstrous act cruel, if subjects are 'naïve' and oblivious of the harm that they do—'entirely deaf to the Other'.

In everyday parlance when we speak of cruelty, we mean to denote people or acts that have to do with deliberate excessive violence. People may be cruel by either performing cruel acts or by entertaining cruel intentions. The cruelty seems to reside in the intention to do unwarranted (because immoderate) harm beyond the necessities of well-intended punishment, whether one acts upon that intention or not. Cruel intentions subdivide into two categories—where the agent exhibits pleasure in harming; or where the agent is indifferent to the harm that he effects to others. Where there is pleasure in harming, we may safely use the term 'pathological', and admit its rarity. Where there is indifference, we have a graver problem: we must admit that almost everyone has the potential for cruelty.

When refugees panicked and fled the Nazi Regime in the spring of 1939, nine hundred odd mainly Jewish refugees took to the seas in the cruise ship *S. S. Louis*. Everyone had landing certificates illegally sold to them in Germany by the Cuban Director of Immigration. When the landing certificates were invalidated upon entry into the Havana harbour, the refugee ship was ordered out of Cuban waters.

U. S. histories love to cite this cruel rejection of those so desperate, but rarely do they mention that the ship sailed on to Florida, then to Canada and back to Europe, and was consistently turned away at every port. No one would aid them in their plight.[46] No doubt, few of the citizens of those hardhearted countries who had turned away the refugees would characterize themselves as cruel, yet their indifference was a crucial factor in the problem. Had they cared for their human fellows in their time of need, perhaps the end result in human lives would have been more positive. Only 350 of the 936 refugees that returned to Europe survived the Nazi terror.

Many thinkers from Joseph Butler to Roy Baumeister have written that cruelty is rare.[47] But, if cruelty is indifference, then almost every person on the planet is cruel, and most certainly those of us in the West who have access to certain knowledge about the suffering masses on earth and go on with our lives in complete obliviousness to the fact of their misery. Indifference to the woes of other human beings is an almost universal human feature. Otherwise how is it the case that, with twenty five thousand children dying each day from hunger and hunger-related diseases, the world has not gone mad with compassion [from *com* (with) + *passus* (suffering)] in the suffering-with of these vast masses of innocents.

3 Concluding remarks by Giorgio Baruchello

Dr Hamblet is correct in highlighting the vastness of the semantic area covered by 'cruelty'. Indeed, my historical survey could retrieve only very general features of the concept at issue. Generality, however, is not necessarily a bad thing. Generality is only one step behind universality, which is a target at which many philosophers have aimed, whenever they have seriously tackled the critical understanding of metaphysical, ontological, epistemic, and ethical categories. In this respect, Dr Hamblet adds one further general element to my tentative, comprehensive characterisation of 'cruelty,' as she speaks of 'the cruelty *of others*,' or, as I shall call it hereafter, of the controversial presence of 'evaluative perspective'.

Cruelty, as Hamblet writes, seems to reside 'in the eye of the beholder'. Depending on whose role and relative position we consider within the context of a phenomenon, the acknowledgment of cruelty may be more or less straightforward. In fact, due to cruelty's necessarily adversarial two-party nature, which comprises the perpetrator and the victim, two major potential accounts compete for recognition, one for each party involved. Whenever the account of the perpetrator is 'lauder', the term 'cruelty' itself is likely to disappear from the scene as an applicable moral category; unless the perpetrator is an honest sadist, who is willing to admit that cruelty is exactly that which is being brought forth. Too much blameworthiness, shame, and disapproval is implied by 'cruelty' to be prone to predicating it of one's own actions (and/or inactions). Whenever the victim's account is 'lauder', instead, then 'cruelty' is likely to persist and to connote most forcefully the dramatic two-party interaction at stake. Most tellingly, the typical first step in a person's and/or group's struggle in opposition to the cruelty that is being perpetrated against him-/herself/themselves is the obtainment of full recognition as the victim of cruelty. Crying, calling the police, and writing newspaper articles are all possible means to this morally important end.

Evaluative perspective should not be taken as an ethical scandal, or as a reason for epistemic discouragement. No form of knowledge can subsist without an initial interpretative angle, no matter whether it is personal, collective, self-serving, or instrumental. From this interpretative angle one can select, evaluate, and define the meaningful 'bits' of reality to be dealt with and understood as specific phenomena—without a point of view, there is nothing to be viewed. Of course, such an interpretative angle needs not to be absolute and unchangeable, even when it is apprehended tacitly by all the members of a certain community throughout most of their existence—given a point of view, another can be taken. A rigid body of reference is also required, in order to apply the categories that were tacitly and/or explicitly endorsed, thus allowing the fundamental and indispensable lexicon of the knower to be employed consistently—without a point of reference, the view cannot but be blurred. Once again, this body of reference needs not to be the only one available, and it may be cognitively and/or morally relevant to change it, in order to cope with phenomena for which our lexicon appears to be inadequately equipped—a bright and terse view may keep too much out of view.

Philosophers, social scientists, political theorists, moralists and the moral agent as such are all in one and the same position. They may possess and/or

agree upon a set of fundamental categories, which they can apply rationally if and only if they adopt a specific body of reference, which serves as a standard of comparison for any further evaluation. Personal experiences, cultural backgrounds, and differences of character can all have an influence in the determination of this body of reference: one, however, must be selected, or the categories possessed remain inapplicable.

As regards the two-party context of cruelty, this body of reference is most likely to be either the perpetrator's account or the victim's. As stated before, the former tends to deny that 'cruelty' applies as a relevant moral category (with the notable exception of the honest sadist), whereas the latter tends to do the opposite. The conclusive evaluation of the context may be formulated eventually by either of the two parties involved, or by a third party: a 'neutral' observer. Still, even in the case of a 'neutral' observer, the issue boils down to deciding whether the victim's claim that cruelty is the case is correct or not.

Prudential reasoning suggests that the victim's account be preferred always and anyway: if cruelty is dreadfully bad, as agreed upon by most thinkers and by *sensus communis*, then we ought to try to avoid cruelty as much as possible. Hence, whenever there may be somebody claiming to be the victim of some cruelty, we would better refrain from acting, or from non-acting, as not to re-initiate and/or continue the alleged cruelty. Naturally, prudence can lead to seemingly paradoxical consequences: teenagers would never go out dancing not to be cruel to their overprotective mothers; private corporate companies would not be taxed by any public authority in order for these authorities not to be cruel to the companies' stock-holders, despite the companies' record of environmental pollution, unsafe labour standards, parasitic reliance upon public infrastructures, etc.

In effect, by following prudence, we are likely to encounter variously and problematically competing claims of cruelty, rather than actual paradoxes. In such cases, the only solution would be to opt for lesser evils. Giacomo Leopardi had already suggested this solution in his poems, since he depicted the human condition as a painful, endless picking amongst misfortunes (pleasure itself being nothing but momentary respite from pain). Hamblet's own comments point in this dramatic direction, for they remind the reader of how much cruelty exists that is due to sheer indifference. Instead of seeing cruelty as a rare, almost insane reality, Hamblet's remarks help the reader realise the tragic ordinariness of cruelty. No life passes by that one is not involved in some causal chain of action (or inaction) leading to major detriment of another; no life passes by that one does not realise that he/she is also morally responsible for it in some degree; and no life passes by that one does not become aware of the fact that trying to change one's position within such chains of action (or inaction) may cause new and/or further detriment to oneself and/or to somebody else. What shall one do? Which chains should be broken? And which kept?

It is in order to find an answer to these questions that philosophical thinking is required. Common sense can give us a valid foothold to start from, as Hamblet correctly points out. However, common sense cannot lead us all the way to the solution of moral quandaries. To achieve this goal, in fact, we need a deeper and better sense of the axiological basis that allows us to assess the nature and the extent of the detriment that is due to the various cruelties, amongst which we are compelled to select. And also, prior to that, we need a clearer understanding of the specificity of 'cruelty,' for this moral category cannot but be vague, as long as we have not been able to distinguish it from its most common semantic cognates, such as 'aggressiveness,' 'brutality,' and, in particular, 'violence'. Perhaps, the results of philosophical thinking will be equally unable to solve the quandaries *in toto*. Still, such results are likely to have taken us farther than mere common sense. The final solution is bound to be left to the wisdom that moral agents mature in their life. Like all moral agents before and after them, they will be called to exercise the ever-changing and context-specific art of applying practically their theoretical understanding of the universe in which they dwell.

1 Notes

1. Definitions, quasi-definitions, and pseudo-definitions of cruelty are rare but do not lack completely in the philosophical literature of the 20th century. We find some in the writings of André Dinar [*Les auteurs cruels* (Paris: Mercure de France; 1972)], Antonin Artaud [*The Theater and its Double* (New York: Grove Press; 1958)], Philip Hallie [*The paradox of cruelty* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press; 1969)], Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari [*Anti-Oedipus* (New York: The Viking Press; 1977)], Judith Shklar [*Ordinary Vices* (Cambridge: Belknap; 1984)], Clement Rosset [*Joyful cruelty: Toward a Philosophy of the Real* (New York: Oxford University Press; 1993)], Tom Regan [*The Case for Animal Rights* (Berkeley: University of California Press; 1983)], Richard Rorty [*Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1989)], and John Kekes

['Cruelty & Liberalism', in *Ethics* 106, pp. 834-844]. I am indebted to their works in my analysis of this phenomenon.

2. Aristotle quoted in 'Understanding and Experiences of Cruelty: An Exploratory Report', by A. Caputo et al., in *The Journal of Social Psychology* 140 (5), 649-60, §1.
3. ibid.
4. Seneca quoted in A. Caputo et al., *Op. cit.*, §1.
5. ibid.
6. ibid.
7. T. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II, II, q159, a1. 26 June 2003. *New Advent*, www.newadvent.org/summa/ (29 September 2003).
8. ibid.
9. T. Aquinas, *Op cit.*, II, II, q159, a2.
10. ibid.
11. ibid.
12. N. Machiavelli, *The Prince*, chapter VIII. 4 May 2003. *Project Gutenberg*, www.ibiblio.org/gutenberg/cgi-bin/sdb/t9.cgi/t9.cgi?entry=1232&full=yes&ftpsite= www.ibiblio.org/gutenberg/ (RTF version downloaded on 29 September 2003).
13. M. de Montaigne, *Essays*, part II, essay 27. 4 May 2003. *Project Gutenberg*, www.ibiblio.org/gutenberg/cgi-bin/sdb/t9.cgi/t9.cgi?entry=3600&full=yes&ftpsite=www.ibiblio.org/gutenberg (RTF version downloaded on 29 September 2003).
14. M. de Montaigne, *Op. cit.*, part II, essay 11.
15. ibid.
16. ibid.
17. ibid.
18. ibid.
19. T. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, part I, chapter XV. 7 April 1998. *Adelaide Library Electronic Texts Collection,* http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/h/h68l/ (29 September 2003).
20. J. Butler quoted in *British Moralists 1650-1800*, by D.D. Raphael (Indianapolis: Hackett; 1991), vol. 1, pp. 334-5.
21. D. Hume quoted in D.D. Raphael, *Op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 72.
22. C.-L. de Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws* (New York: Hafner, 1949), chapter VI, §13.
23. A. Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, vol. II, chapter I, §27. 2003. *Library of Economics and Liberty*, www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN.html (29 September 2003).
24. A. Smith, *Op. cit.*, vol. I, chapter 11, §263.
25. D. A. Marquis de Sade, *Philosophy in the Bedroom*, dialogue III. 11 May 2003. *Oeuvres du Marquis de Sade*, http://desade.free.fr/philo/philo.htm (29 September 2003) [the translation is mine].
26. G. Leopardi, 'Dialogo di Plotino e di Porfirio' in *Operette morali*. Update date not available. *Biblio-Net*, www.biblio-net.com/lett_ita/testi/dialogo_di_plotino_e_porfirio.htm (29 September 2003) [the translation is mine].
27. ibid.
28. G. Leopardi, 'Detti memorabili di Filippo Ottonieri' in *Op. cit*. Update date not available. *Biblio-Net* www.biblio-net.com/lett_ita/testi/detti_memorabili_di_filippo_ottonieri.htm (29 September 2003) [the translation is mine].
29. G. Leopardi, 'Dialogo di Tristano e di un amico', in *Op. cit*. Update date not available. *Biblio-Net*, www.biblio-net.com/lett_ita/testi/dialogo_di_tristano_ad_un_amico.htm [the translation is mine].
30. F. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, Chapter 11. 16 September 2003. *The Nietzsche Channel*, www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/eh.htm (29 September 2003).
31. F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, §229. 16 September 2003. *The Nietzsche Channel*, www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/bge.htm (29 September 2003).
32. F. Nietzsche, *The Dawn*, Book One, §18. 16 September 2003. *The Nietzsche Channel*, www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/dawn.htm (29 September 2003).
33. A much more detailed account of all the different nuances of cruelty is given in my Ph.D. Thesis: *Understanding Cruelty: From Dante to Rorty*, University of Guelph, 2002.
34. I derive this distinction from Hallie's works, in which he speaks of 'fatal' cruelties and 'active,' 'human' cruelties.
35. Regan and Kekes are the authors that, in the 20th century, have most precisely outlined this distinction. An echo of this distinction can be found in Ted Honderich's 'After the Terror: A Book and Further Thoughts', *The Journal of Ethics* 7, 161-81, where the author distinguishes evils due to 'commission' and to 'omission'.

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CRITICAL STUDY:
PERSONALISM: A LIVING PHILOSOPHY?

Jan Olof Bengtsson

Personalism Revisited: Its Proponents and Critics. *Thomas O. Buford and Harold H. Oliver, eds. Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2002. xxix + 399 pp; ISBN 90-420-1519-5; Eu. 80, US$80.*

Like the humanities in general, philosophy is no longer a unified discipline within a coherent, unambiguous system of knowledge-production in an Enlightenment tradition on the basic principles of which all agree. But it is a considerable force in the educational system and in the intellectual culture at large, since in this new situation philosophy is precisely where virtually all of the relevant controversial issues about knowledge and the Enlightement tradition themselves are discussed. As an increasingly amorphous 'discipline', philosophy articulates our culture's central concerns.

Within this 'discipline', it is possible to defend particular worldviews and articulate specific understandings of what philosophy is or ought to be. Personalism is not a philosophy that deals with technical issues as isolated, within the context of an understanding of reality that is defined primarily by science or even ordinary experience. It belongs in what can perhaps be called the category of 'worldview' philosophies, or 'life- and world-view philosophies'. It is comprehensive and systematic, and presents a central understanding of things or a core of distinct positions with implications for all of the major branches of philosophy, including the philosophy of religion, and aspects of philosophical theology too. Philosophies of this kind do not simply contribute to the 'progress' of the various sub-disciplines within philosophy as unitary sciences conceived as collective enterprises to which individual philosophers and schools make contributions over time. Since such a conception of the nature of thought and knowledge normally presupposes assumptions about and perceptions of the nature of reality obtained from elsewhere, from outside the respective philosophical worldviews, it is really incompatible with the conclusions of the latter, which tend rather to redefine the whole intellectual setting of their own activity. This is not to say that they normally succeed in this. The Aristotelian as well as the Enlightenment division of the branches of knowledge are both sufficiently well-entrenched and sufficiently flexible and expandable, even in the present situation of complete disagreement on fundamentals, regularly to accommodate the various direct and indirect claims of the various worldview systems as so many contributions to some single enterprise. Yet the cumulative effect of such challenges still continously redefines the discipline. Today the fact of the incompatibility of the fundamental claims of what can perhaps roughly be classified as modernists, postmodernists, and traditionalists, is increasingly recognised. The formal framework of philosophy endures, and provides an arena for their debates. This is probably something that for practical purposes we should value and appreciate, regardless of how much we may consider the underlying institutional assumptions of the Enlightenment tradition, in onesided or extreme radical versions, to be untenable.

At its worst, philosophy has, in some respects ever since the Greeks but more programmatically in the modern project, been a shallow, immature neoterism, breaking on principle with tradition and considering truth to be always situated 'ahead' of us and to be attainable exclusively by ever new departures, erasing the accumulated insights of the past. In extreme forms, this mentality has had and continues to have disastrous historical consequences. At its best, it has been able to reconcile the spirit of innovation and criticism with a recognition of the fact that in central respects, wisdom is already given in the great cultural, moral, and religious traditions of humanity and that our task is quite as much one of assimilation and transmission as one of new explorations.

Personalism is a philosophy with many neglected resources and a considerable undeveloped potential. It is a humanistic philosophy as well as a philosophy of religion. At its best it built on the most central and important intellectual, moral, and religious insights of the west. Its neglected resources are such that provided certain interpretations of these traditions, as focused on the concepts of person and personality which are of the essence of the western cultural tradition, and that provide the guidlines and many of the instruments for further elaborations of these interpretations. In this sense it was in many respects what I would describe as a traditionalist philosophy. A key feature of personalism was its unremitting criticism of impersonalistic pantheism and radical monism as well as naturalism and materialism. Not least important was its clear perception of how the

former positions by a certain inner logic tend to produce the latter. In these respects, personalism was from the outset firmly established in the tradition of theism. It accepted central features of what was from the establishment of the synthesis of Christianity with Greek philosophy until the modernist break with this synthesis a dominating worldview of the west. This was an 'orthodox' consensus built both upon the traditionalist view of how wisdom is already given in the past, and upon its confirmation in experience. In these respects personalism rejected radical modernism and would welcome aspects of postmodernism only to the extent that they are the expression of the dissolution of the modern project. But in contradistinction to Thomists, for instance, it built in fundamental respects on elements of modern philosophy, in particular modern idealism and the developments in the Enlightenment, in Romanticism, and in liberalism in a broad sense that are relevant to the understanding of the nature and status of human individuality. In these respects, it contributed essential elements to what I believe should be described as an 'alternative modernity', one which is defined by an assimilation of tradition while at the same time being open to a creative development of it by means of new philosophical ideas.

For instance, personalism firmly opposed, from within modernity itself, the naturalistic or scientistic reductionism that tends to become part of the very definition of knowledge, and thus to shape the whole institutional organization of knowledge in the dominant, radical form of modernism that defines itself in principle against the traditionalists. This view of knowledge remains a strongly ideological position with weak philosophical or even scientific support, yet some of the motivation behind it is at least understandable. The Enlightenment project was to a considerable extent a defence against the horrors of the religious wars of the seventeenth century. But today, this motivation is overlaid with all of the motives of a militant secularism that is quite as fanatical as the old religion could be at its worst. The resulting definitions of knowledge and philosophy, far from providing a neutral formal setting for research, imply, quite as much as religion, a definite worldview. In theory as well as in practice, it systematically threatens the essential values that emerged within the pre-Enlightenment tradition, not least of which is the value of the person as understood by classical Christianity.

Personalism's status within, and as part of, an alternative modernity in fact allowed it to contribute to an alternative response precisely to the problem that was one of the legitimate sources of the Enlightenment. It pointed to a way to preserve the genuine values of religion within a new framework of what I think can best be called a 'qualified pluralism', not only including the previously warring branches of Christianity, but more open to the incorporation of the wisdom of the great non-western traditions than even an ecumenically conceived Christian traditionalism. In fact, it provided many excellent general philosophical resources that could assist comparative study of and mutual deepening of understanding between all of these traditions. This was amply demonstrated in the careers of some of the most prominent personalists.

However, there are also problems with personalism understood as representing an alternative modernity. As historically existing, it has often, despite its firm and acknowledged roots in the Christian and classical traditions, often tended to appropriate or build syntheses with forms precisely of the other, radical forms of modernity which are in turn largely products of the problematic potential or version of philosophy as such at which I have hinted.

Personalism exists in many different forms, but the two best-known are the American school established by Borden Parker Bowne, and the French personalism of Emmanuel Mounier. But there are also strong currents of existentialist personalism, phenomenological personalism, and Thomistic personalism. Although there are many significant differences between them, as personalisms their positions often overlap, and they have often stood in close contact with and been influential on each other. The journal *The Personalist*, edited by the leader of the Californian branch, Ralph Tyler Flewelling, published articles on and by most kinds of personalists, and Mounier was one of its advisory editors. Karol Wojtyla's personalism was inspired quite as much by Mounier and Max Scheler as by a Jacques Maritain. The French school has been a strong presence in Polish personalism, but the latter also draws inspiration from the American school. Martin Buber's dialogical personalism has influenced many other forms of personalism, and is also a distinct form of its own. National variations of personalism have developed in many countries.

On the whole, it is, however, the American school that remains the paradigm of personalism, in the sense that it is this school that is still normally perceived by scholars to define it. While this can be regarded as acceptable, the standard historical accounts of personalism that are currently given in connection with this definition and hold the American school to be not only the paradigmatic but also the first systematic philosophical form of

personalism, are in my view erroneous. The origins of personalism should rather be sought in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century currents of continental European philosophy. Although some of the European twentieth-century forms of personalism are related to the earlier European forms that cen there be discerned, the American school is in some respects even more so, and alongside British personal idealism, it could be regarded as a further development and perhaps a culmination of it.

Buford's and Oliver's volume is one of the most substantial recent signs of life from this American school. It contains no new work however, but is a selection of papers originally read to the Personalist Discussion Group, which has—impressively—met at the annual meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association since 1938. I will review this revisiting of personalism as both a proponent and a critic.

The papers are divided into four sections, of which the first three, 'The Personalist Vision', 'The Enlargement of the Vision', and 'Problems Within Personalism', are mainly devoted to the American school itself, although some enlargements in the second section and some critical suggestions in the third are of European origin. Of course, neither nationalism nor narrow school sectarianism are fruitful stances within philosophy, and the editors, and the organizers of the Personalist Discussion Group, being eminently aware of this, have often welcomed other philosophers with related positions of interest, and often of European orientation, some of whose contributions are here included in a valuable fourth section, 'Related Philosophies'.

In the second half of the twentieth century the American personalist school was no longer visible and perceived as a main strand of American thought to the degree that it had been in the first. Yet the perhaps most important contribution of the present volume is that it clearly evidences and documents some of the continued creative energy and originality that was in fact there.

The first section begins with an overview by Warren E. Steinkraus, 'A Century of Bowne's Theism', followed by expositions of the classical themes of personalism by the leaders of the school like E. S. Brightman and Peter A. Bertocci, and by D. Luther Evans. The central theme in Bertocci's contribution on 'Theistic Personalistic Idealism and the Problem of Good-and-Evil' is Brightman's notion of 'the non-rational given', which, limiting the power of God, explains 'non-disciplinary evil'. This idea was certainly not present in Bowne, but nor can it in my view be said to be strictly an innovation of Brightman's, as American personalists seem to think. In many ways it is rather, I submit, a return to and a variation of one of the most characteristic features of the romantic personalism of the later Schelling. It is significant that, while it was used by Schelling, to some extent in the footsteps of Boehme, to explain the possibility of the personality of God as such—a growing, developing God—it was also one of the elements of the wider Hermetic pantheism that we now know shaped German post-Kantian idealism from the outset, and which was one of the things other and later personalists in the nineteenth-century turned most sharply against. In my view, Brightman here, together with, for instance, the later Max Scheler, represents a relapse into a pantheism which provides only a spurious support for personalism, and which in other forms is directly opposed to it.

It is hard in the case of personalists like Brightman and Bertocci to avoid the impression that the problematic that induced them to accept the non-rational given as an ultimate metaphysical principle results at least to some extent from their progressivist view of history, and their concomitant liberal theological reinterpretation of Christian eschatology. Apart from the fact that on the most general level the tenability of their solution depends on what we define as non-disciplinary evil, and on what grounds we do so, expecting some this-worldly perfection to be achieved by means of gradual progress of course makes more evil seem non-disciplinary than what would be the case if the constitutional limitations of the created order, as intended by God, were recognised in their implications for the philosophy of history. This is not to say that all evil can immediately be explained as disciplinary. If the Brightman-Bertocci view, while retaining liberal progressivism, indeed rejects facile explanations and boldly faces the reality of evil, such explanations were of course not what more orthodox personalists like Albert C. Knudson and Harold DeWolfe presented, despite the fact that they shared the liberal view of history. They seem to have insisted on our acceptance of God's omnipotence (in the standard, rational form) and on mystery precisely against too facile explanations. Brightman and Bertocci sought to present a non-facile explanation, but the question arises what kind of explanation a non-rational given really is. It may eliminate the perceived problem of the theodicy, but as for non-disciplinary evil, the theory after all says pretty much the same as its critics: things are the way they are, and we just have to accept it. I think there are both philosophical and theological reasons for not accepting the Brightman-Bertocci solution with its dubious Hermetic pedigree that has been so curiously hidden in the American personalist

debate.

We find already in Bowne's own liberal view of history an important part of what I believe is at least one major source of the later experience of the problem. But it seems to me that this experience must also have been reinforced by Brightman's socialism. We are already deep into the problematic aspects of personalism that represent a departure from the alternative modernity which its best nineteenth-century traditions represented, even if the latter too often need to be corrected, with regard to the tendency to share general idealist pantheism, secular humanism, and philosophies of history. The *liaison* with radical modernism becomes evident in the present volume not least in Walter G. Muelder's contribution, 'Socialism Revisited: A Personalistic Perspective', in the second, 'enlargements' section. Muelder of course has some strong personalist reservations and objections against Marxism. But the whole enterprise of trying to dovetail personalism with an ideology that builds in principle on radical, anti-traditionalist modernism and all of its anti-personalistic underpinnings, unfortunately seems to show how comparatively superficial was the understanding of some of the personalists of the basic dynamic of western modernity, or, alternatively, how deeply shaped they themselves were by it. Muelder focuses not least on the analysis of alienation. Personalism in this form tends in my view to become just another version of unwarranted, eclectic Christian socialist reinterpretation and compromising, helplessly sliding down the fateful slope of secular humanism at the bottom of which we are today. In many cases this personalism was of course well-intentioned; but even then it was almost always bound up with a blindness to the horrors of the real societies built on the totalitarian ideologies and their underlying historical momentum, a blindness, or even a willingness to look away, which betrayed the extent to which Christians and personalists too were not only confused with regard to the deeper nature and principles of the classico-Christian tradition, but contaminated by radical modernist aversion towards the traditional west. No distinction was made between dubious modernist reinterpretation on the one hand and legitimate development and enhancement in the spirit of the tradition on the other. Regardless of its metaphysical roots, throughout the twentieth century, the personalists themselves risked becoming part of what was very much a given, non-rational evil.

There are other, related problematic tendencies, or potentialities, within the personalist school. The alternative modernity of personalism sought delicately to balance enlarged modern ideas of humanistic culture, individual freedom, and personal self-actualization against the restraining legacy of the classico-Christian tradition. But situated, at its origins, in the ambiguities of the intellectual landscape of the crossover period of the nineteenth century, such ideas, as linked to general progressivism, more or less qualified acceptance of evolutionism, and other context-specific notions, could easily assume a purely secular humanist meaning. The sharp dividing line between tradition and radical modernism became strangely blurred, and the higher form modernity often failed to maintain and assert itself as a distinct alternative.

Thus personalist language entered into much of the self-actualisation therapies of humanistic psychology, which were in turn linked to the typical social and political ideas of secular humanism. In this situation, it must have been difficult for the personalists to resist reconceiving the dignity of the person in terms of shallow self-esteem or a dubious self-assertion, detatched from the genuine self-respect of character-formation, confession, and divine forgiveness. Personalism also tended to be caught in the hopeless modernist dialectics of romanticism and rationalism and of individualism and collectivism. The classical and Christian horizon, within which personalistic ideas first developed, was gradually lost from view, and personalism was cut off from a true understanding of its roots. The modern elements were no longer developments of the traditional insights. As alloyed with further modernist ideas, they now constituted a break with them.

Frederick Ferré's 'Personalism and the Dignity of Nature', in the second section, is interesting in this context of personalism's position between tradition and modernity. Its advocacy of panpsychism and 'personalistic organicism', as such, harks back in some respects to the romantic pantheism and philosophy of nature as reactions against Enlightenment rationalism and mechanism. But what Ferré turns against, in this context, is Bowne's idealist and personalist disregard for the independent value of nature. In its anthropocentrism, such personalism too can be seen as a mere continuation of modern rationalism. At the same time Ferré finds in Bowne's, and his successors', rejection of the 'dissolution of all things into the Absolute', in their 'rejection of pantheism and the associated aversion to monism', 'a basis for extending the ontological horizon to various gradations of real being' (113). Ferré's article, certainly one of the best and most central in the present collection, represent an important enlargement of the personalist vision in the sense of a creative adaptation to problems largely ignored by

its early American representatives. Yet it seems to me to rely too heavily on the resources of modernism. In turning against rationalist instrumentalism, whether purely exploitative or 'expressivist' in Bownes' personal idealist sense, it is all too easy to forget the difference between such modern rationalism and a traditional Christian and Platonic or Aristotelian view of nature rightly understood.

One of the most significant enlargements evident in the book is the incorporation of aspects of phenomenology as not only a development but a confirmation of the experience-based epistemology of personalism. This renewal signified a *rapprochement* between American and European personalism, and is most prominent, in this volume, in Erazim Kohák's strong defence, with a clarifying use of symbolic logic, of personalism's central, classical claims that we can 'adequately conceive of the cosmos as Personal', and that this conception follows as a 'rigorous consequence' from 'our recognition of human being as Personal'. Interestingly, it is Husserl's phenomenology rather than Scheler's that Kohák builds on (although the general influence of the latter is evident too). Although his paper, 'The Person in a Personal World: An Inquiry into the Metaphysical Significance of the Tragic Sense of Life', the best in the present volume, is related to the theodicy problematic I have touched upon above, it has a broader scope and a more general relevance for the personalist claims mentioned. In John Wild's critique of Brightman's *Person and Reality*, in the third, 'problems' section, phenomenology is well used to highlight the difficulties created by the excessive rationalism of early American personalism, but, not least in the light of Kohák's article, it is clear that this criticism points to the need for a revision and modification of a certain form of personalism rather than to any more general weakness. Again, as Kohák shows, phenomenology can rather confirm some of its basic positions.

The problematizations of personalism in the third section are contributed by thinkers generally favourably disposed toward the personalist school, for example Leroy E. Loemker and Joseph D'Alfonso on the mind-body problem in personalism, and their articles too suggest revisions and amendments (not always convincing) rather than abandonment. Errol E. Harris's 'The Problem of Self-Constitution in Idealism and Phenomenology' is rather general and not directly related to specific positions of the personalits school.

The fourth section, 'Related Philosophies', take us beyond the personalist school but in the fruitful way that relates it to relevant actors on the broader philosophical scene. Here Charles Hartshorne appears with an address on 'The Structure of Givenness', alongside contributions by J. N. Findlay on 'Essence, Existence and Personality', John E. Smith on whether the self is an ultimate category, Mili□ □apek on Bergson, William H. Werkmeister (who, as R. T. Flewelling's successor as editor of *The Personalist*, was himself a member of the personalist school) on Kant, and Mary T. Clark on the greatest personalist of the second half of the twentieth century: 'The Personalism of Karol Wojty□a'.

As a whole, the book displays clearly both the strengths and the weaknesses of twentieth-century, mainly American, personalism. Above all, it highlights the importance of the Personalist Discussion Group for the continued existence, coherence, and vitality of personalism as a philosophical school or tradition in the United States. This is also specially emphasized in John H. Lavely's interesting introduction, 'A History of the Personalist Discussion Group (1938-1988)'. It is clear that not least through this forum, personalism has indeed remained to some extent a living tradition.

However, since the question I have raised about the extent to which it remains a living tradition, and, above all, the question about its prospects for the future, depend for their answers upon an assessment of the strength of the problematic tendencies that I have indicated, more must be said about the latter.

In comparison with the collection of essays published by Paul Deats and Carol Robb in 1986, *The Boston Personalist Tradition in Philosophy, Social Ethics, and Theology*, and with Rufus Burrow's *Personalism: A Critical Introduction* (1999), the present volume, with the exception of Muelder's contribution, largely leaves out the social ethics of personalism and focuses instead on other philosophical and to some extent theological issues. None of the leading personalist social ethicists after Muelder, like Deats, Robb, or Burrow, seems yet to have appeared at the Personalist Discussion Group. In some respects this makes for one of the strengths of Buford's and Oliver's book, because the social ethics side of personalism, which may in some cases simply be called its political side, sometimes seems problematic to me in the sense that it is here that the radical modernist identity of personalism, with all of its implications, becomes most evident.

This is a difficult and sensitive subject to write about. The leading twentieth-century representatives of personalism have continued to defend the metaphysical and theological aspects of their

tradition in a way which, even if all of their developments and variations are not fruitful or tenable, merits sympathy and respect. Even their social ethics side, especially as linked to the civil rights-movement and the man who remains the best known of all personalists although personalism is not what he is best known for, Martin Luther King, has admirable and noble dimensions that must unhesitatingly and unreservedly be acknowledged as such. There are certainly partial truths in twentieth-century and contemporary personalism's social ethics. The problem is that its relation to the broader social-ethical momentum of modernity and postmodernity is unclear and ambiguous. Many of the leading personalists display that strange, confused kind of 'good intentions' that was such a characteristic feature of the twentieth century. The Deats and Robb volume is in many ways a moving document of the consolidation, in this in many ways central, representative strand of American intellectual life, of the humanitarian ethos of liberal and, increasingly, socialist Christianity first developed in the nineteenth century. Not least the predominance of pacifism among the personalists is striking.

Bowne was certainly a liberal and shared some convictions with the coming social ethic. Yet he was still, in the tradition of the earlier European personalism, adamant in his opposition to the distinctive, deeper underpinnings of radical modernism. As Steinkraus describes the reception of his work, 'Philosophical theism alone might be tolerated in a patronising way, but theistic thought combined with a rapier wit, some personal devotion, and combative attacks on atheism, scientism, and materialism could not be suffered' (6). But this spirit seems gradually to have faded among his followers. Throughout the first half of the twenthieth century, and in some quarters well into the second and into the present, liberal-socialist Christians often could not perceive any conflict between their kind of Christian faith and the combined rational and romantic ethos of secularism, a general cultural radicalism. Their Christianity was increasingly redefined in terms of and reduced to the latter. Precisely because of his personalism, Bowne was more sharply aware of the deeper philosophical roots and presuppositions, as well as the consequences, of the naturalism that in some way and in some form always entered into such radicalism. But at least in the fields of social ethics and political philosophy, twentieth century personalism seems similar to that of other forms of liberal Christianity in its eagerness to endorse, embrace, and integrate all of the radical ideologies, even though the Christianity that the personalists at the same time sought to convince themselves was compatible with this or its real inspiration, was still, through its distinct theism, often stricter than that of other forms of liberal theology.

This is not the place to rehearse the analyses of how the combined rationalistic and romantic dynamic of modernity made for the gradual transposition of religious devotion from its proper object to this-worldy causes, of how, as the traditional understanding of religion became increasingly watered down and reinterpreted beyond recognition, religion blended and merged with the secular ideologies, and of how the good intentions thus began to pave the way to hell. Yet these analyses must be mentioned, since they apply to and explain much of the history of twentieth- century personalism. The intransigence of the standard radicals seems to some extent to have been taken over by the personalists too, as the true meaning of Christianity tended to become identified with their causes and with aspects of their ideologies. Slowly but surely, the traditionalist sources of personalism, including the larger, restraining moral worldview of which it was a part, are then, or will then be, dismissed as the 'ideology' of the oppressor enemy. The partial truths of the class-race-gender agenda that increasingly dominates personalism as everything else in the conformist academia of populist mass democracy will be lost in a militant egalitarian and anti-traditionalist ideology that dispenses with fairness and proper criteria and serves nothing but the will to power of an empty pseudo-elite. Personalism risks moving ever closer to the sheer relativism and ultimate nihilism of the pure autonomy of secular modernism, with its ever-expanding list of 'rights'. And if it does, the prospects for its continued vitality will, in the long run, be bleak indeed.

But how far could such a development go? We are dealing here with the fate of a central American current of idealistic affirmation of ethical individuality. At its best, American personalism, with its Methodist faith and its strong insistence on the distinction between personalism and individualism, was a vigorous assertion of some of the essential elements that will have to be part of the constitution of a viable alternative modernity, capable of withstanding the dynamic of radical modernism. But the reason why we have to ask ourselves today to what extent personalism is still a living tradition, is the crisis that must necessarily occur at the point where the problematic consequences, from a proper personalist perspective, of the radical modernism with which it has entered into such a close relation, become too obvious to ignore. Deats's and Robb's book

presents the larger setting of the philosophical aspects of personalism displayed in Buford's and Oliver's, and thus the gradual and significant displacements within its worldview. Where do the personalists draw the line?

Bowne did not hesitate to engage in 'combative attacks on atheism, scientism, and materialism'. Today, scientistic naturalism is a dominant ideology which supports militant secularism in education and culture and tends to define the academic disciplines as such in terms of reductionist materialism. To a considerable extent it is a tacit and indirect presupposition of the flourishing even of the postmodern currents, and the two strands of radicalism are variously joined or coordinated. But personalism's response seems fatally blunted by its liberal-socialist acceptance of modernism.

These problems have to be addressed because a distorted, debased radical modernist and postmodernist version of personalism is unfortunately very much a real possibility. Our culture is already deeply formed by a pseudo-personalism in the sense that the older currents of Enlightenment and Romantic individualism have been continuously reinforced in their complementarity and their problematic aspects further developed or transformed in existentialism, relativistic subjectivism, humanistic psychology, narcissism, and the cult of dubious celebrities. But shallow individualism is, as was clear already in the early nineteenth-century, necessarily bound to its dialectical opposite of collectivistic, pantheistic, monistic, primitivistic or other absorption or extinction of the individual self in some larger whole. Personalism at its best opposed both of these extremes from a distinct position that is far from being any kind of compromise between them, a position that is independent due to its premodern, classical and Christian moorings. But how can personalism continue to oppose them if it becomes a part of the deeper dynamic that produced the development of which they are a manifestation?

For example, have personalists produced any qualified analyses of and responses to the dissolution of the nineteenth-century subject-individual-person in high modernist literature, and the continuation and variation of this theme in postmodernism? What is the personalist position with regard to the ever more uncompromising autonomist, positivist, utilitarian and hedonist politics, educational, cultural, legal and other, of the welfare-state that they so strongly supported (and from some of which, as not least black American conservative thinkers and writers have always pointed out, working-class black Americans are the ones who tend to suffer the most)? Beyond the state of contemporary art and popular music, of radical feminism, divorce (half of the population), drugs, pornography, abortion (one third of the persons in wombs), same-sex marriages, and bestiality, what is the personalists' attitude to the 'rights' of homosexual pedophiles defended by NAMBLA (the North American Man-Boy Love Alliance)? (With America's present position in the world, these are the whole world's concerns.)

It is of course impossible to determine, by means of an extrapolation of the logic at work in existing writings, precisely how far the personalists are prepared to go along with this. But, apart from particular practices, already a general Rousseauan view of man and society is problematic enough, since it is ultimately destructive of personhood even when not further radicalized. The great personalist to whom Mary Clark's paper in the present volume is devoted rightly characterized our culture as a 'culture of death'. This was very much in line with Mother Teresa, who asked 'When a mother can kill her baby, what is left of civilisation to save?' The other aspects of this culture of death in America, such as crime, violence, rape, psychological disorders, and suicide (up 5 000 per cent among adolescents since the fifties), need not be commented upon here. The concern for the critic of my kind, who is at the same time a proponent of personalism, is that the continued, valuable work of the personalists that he wants unreservedly to support will be increasingly compromised by a linking of the criticism of commercialism and other present evils that in itself is important to a simplistic and predictable view of the causes of these evils and a downplaying of traditional individual morality, discipline, virtue, and culture. It is necessary for such a critic sharply to separate these different elements of the personalists' work, to disentangle carefully the valid philosophizing, at display in Buford's and Oliver's book, from the modernist illusions with which they tend to become ominously intertwined. If it does not oppose the culture of death, surely personalism will soon be a dead philosophy.

Individual moral culture is certainly not everything, there is indeed a place for social ethics, and rightly understood they are of course interrelated. But if personalists join the long-standing and ever-aggravating trend to reject the former as the insignificant, narrow-minded preoccupation of the petty bourgeoisie while affirming the sweeping romantic liberation of the presumed natural goodness of oppressed humanity, they too will ignore the true conditions of possibility of debased commercialism as well as of the other ills of contemporary society, and to

disown the only means of their cure. A scenario is conceivable where the ever-expanding agenda of radicalism, naively taken to be nothing but a continuation of the civil-rights movement, is increasingly accepted by personalists, with fewer and fewer reservations, and the theism and Christianity that were once constitutive of personalism are correctly perceived to to be hindrances and threats, and consequently relinquished; where the opposition against naturalism is abandoned along with the concern with the whole range of issues connected with it, with their vast ethical implications, as some double-aspect theory or so-called 'non-reductive' form of naturalism is adopted and personhood begins to be understood in terms compatible with these alone; where the social aspects of personalism are stressed, even more strongly, while at the same time the family, the fundamental social unit, is implicitly and explicitly dismissed. Personalism proper will then have been given up, as indeed it has sometimes seemed to be in the second half of the twentieth century. We will be left with newspeak personalism.

But surely there must be other personalists who would not go along with this development. Surely some personalists will already have begun to see that something is wrong with our comtemporary culture, something other and deeper than what their radical personalist predecessors thought it was. Surely such personalists will begin to reconsider certain crucial elements of modernism that have become parts of American personalism itself. Elsewhere, Buford has shown that he is familiar with the analysis of America's characteristic contemporary problems of Allan Bloom and Robert Bork. A personalism which confuses tolerance with the programmatic relativist rejection of all normativity has succumbed to an individualism far worse than the one it once defined itself against. In the familiar pattern of the deeper dynamic of modernity, this individualism is in turn a necessary manifestation of the impersonalistic pantheism against which personalism first arose as a philosophical and theological reaction, unique in its clear perception of its relativistic and nihilistic implications.

If it was not for the absolutely crucial importance of these considerations for the question of the vitality and the future of personalism, it would be unfair to raise them here. For, as I have already pointed out, Buford's and Oliver's volume is more inclusive and, on the whole, devoted to developments, variations, and criticisms of philosophical aspects of personalism that are quite independent of its twentieth-century accretions in social ethics and politics. It shows the potential of American personalism, and inspires hope that it will be possible to stop it from sliding further down the slope of radical modernism. The problem is that because of the undecided nature of its position with regard to the issues I have raised, there are as yet no unambiguous signs of the kind of renewed vitality of personalism that can only come with their clear and principled resolution. New resources, philosophical, moral, and religious, will be needed to revive personalism, to make it the powerful force and vibrant presence not just in philosophy but in the broader academic and general culture that it once was.

Such resources are available. Personalism needs to sever its ties to the ideologies of radical moderism and connect to philosophies and cultural currents that can help reorient it back towards its traditional roots and to reformulate them in a creative fashion adequate to the renewal of western culture in the context of a qualified pluralism in the coming world civilization. In an article in *Appraisal*, No. 1, 2000, Randall Auxier presented an entertaining fictional meeting between Irving Babbitt and Josiah Royce. They were both at Harvard. But neighbouring Boston University is not too far away to arrange also a meeting between Babbitt and another contemporary colleague and classical American philosopher: Bowne. Babbittian humanism remains a force in American intellectual life, representing the other, higher side of American culture which is so difficult to perceive, not least for Europeans. It stands in need of a personalist supplementation and modification. But American personalism, quite as badly, needs to be corrected by a classical humanism of Babbitt's type, by assimilating, for the first time, the kind of analysis of the dynamic of modernity that Babbitt offered, and by revising its own positions and orientations accordingly. The meeting between Babbitt and Bowne would be even more important than that between Babbitt and Royce.

As for the theological side of personalism, a reconsideration of some of the basic assumptions of its version of liberal Christianity, and some partial alignment with an emerging ecumenical orthodoxy would also be desirable. But at the same time, personalism was liberal theology in its highest and noblest form; it should not relinquish its unique position as, at least potentially, a defining part of an alternative modernity, by some simplistic, unhistorical, premodern reaction. Rather, personalism will need to reconnect with other qualified modernists or creative traditionalists of the alternative modernity. As cured of radical modernist autonomism, its deep understanding of personality itself at the same time gravitates towards aspects of

Christian orthodoxy and tradition, and renews and develops them with the help of some of the best intellectual resources of the modern world. A reworking of personalism within or a synthesis of personalism with Claes G. Ryn's philosophical development of Babbittian humanism by means of the partial truths and valid insights of idealism, his so-called 'value-centered historicism', would, I suggest, be a promising project. As elaborated both in *Will, Imagination, and Reason* and *Democracy and the Ethical Life*, Ryn's value-centered historicism would supply resources which because of their profound congeniality with personalism in its earlier forms would be better suited than many other philosophies to assist in leading it out of its present ethical and politico-philosophical impasse.

More generally, Babbittian humanism, open in principle to the dimension of religious transcendence and revised along personalistic and theistic lines, offers an intellectual and cultural framework attuned to personalism's own, exemplary tradition of pluralism, which is often, I think, very much in line with what Ryn calls a 'higher cosmopolitanism'. It is an unfortunate omission in the present volume—or rather, in the Personalist Discussion Group—that the example set above all by Ralph Tyler Flewelling and *The Personalist* in the field of comparative philosophy and broader inter-cultural interests is not represented. This is one of the most valuable parts of personalism's legacy, and one that is of course increasingly relevant in today's world. Babbitt, like Flewelling, had a life-long interest in Oriental philosophy, and the principles behind this side of his work, as further developed in value-centered historicism, are elucidated in Ryn's Distinguished Foreign Scholar lectures at the University of Beijing, *A Common Human Ground: Universality and Particularity in a Multicultural World*, which will soon be published.

An alignment with such humanism and with similar, relevant philosophies, is one way in which the continued importance of the rich tradition of personalism could again be more widely perceived and appreciated—and in Buford's and Oliver's, and the Personalist Discussion Group's, own dialogical and ecumenical spirit of connecting personalism to other, related philosophies. While modifying them in accordance with its own insights into the nature of personality and the relations between personality, values, and the moral order, the other philosophies could also help enhance the expression and further elaboration precisely of these insights. An redefinition of personalism in terms of the humanism of radical modernism on the other hand, the pseudo-humanism that swiftly turns into, or turns out to be, anti-humanism, precludes almost all significant comparative and dialogical possibilities.

Another way of reviving personalism, and to rescue it from some of its problematic developments, is to make it more aware of its historical origins in nineteenth- and even late eighteenth-century Europe. By such historical self-knowledge, and a concomitant reappraisal and selective philosophical reappropriation of these neglected, proximate sources in modern thought, understood as a development of and variation within the general classico-Christian worldview, personalism could find its way back to and discern more clearly the point at which it began to go wrong. It could rediscover a version of its own basic liberalism which was in harmony with essential truths of tradition rather than losing itself in radical modernist ideology. It could learn to make the necessary distinctions between higher and lower forms of the Enlightenment, Romanticism, and liberalism. It could begin to see how its distinctive positions and its characteristic polemics first developed, and its own deeper identity would then be revealed in clear, historical light. It would then be understood why some of its modern intellectual alliances are in reality at odds with its own deeper nature and its true ideals.

These suggestions should be enough to indicate the enormous potential of personalism when reinserted into its proper intellectual and moral framework. Personalism could become a pioneering philosophy in the necessary work of renewing humanistic, moral, and religious thought and culture. Philosophy, we must hope, will somehow persist as an institutional framework in which even basic assumptions can be discussed. Personalism can and should become again an important presence within it. Bowne's combativeness is needed. With the proposed changes, such a future is possible. For American personalism to remain a living, viable philosophy in the twenty-first century, its movement must be in the opposite direction from the one it has followed until now. The partial truths of modernity that it has assimilated must be firmly reconnected to the foundational traditions of the west, disentangled from the disastrous dynamic of modernity with its combined rejectionist and reinterpretative momentum. Although the papers published in the present volume fail to address these issues, the fact of their more centrally personalistic philosophical orientation, and of their being selected as displaying such an orientation, may be a sign that personalism is at least beginning to refocus on real thought in its own main tradition.

If, on the other hand, personalism continues on the way I have here criticized, it risks finally going

down together with the whole of rationalist liberalism in its radical modernist form and its postmodern, irrationalist offspring. Lost in a maze of contradictions, dumbed down by unjust egalitarianism, torn apart by anti-humanist relativism and nihilism, debilitated by false emancipationism, locked in the proto-totalitarian straitjacket of political correctness, there is no way that personalism, or any other qualified human thought or culture, can survive. Put to the test by true Christianity, rigorous thought, and authentic representatives of the other great traditions of humanity, as these awake to concerted resistance and gradually begin to chase the darkness away, personalism will fail, and end up on the wrong side. It will end up inside a bubble of chirping sectaries who will continue to lure our society further along the road to self-destruction, and whose most astonishing feature will be their ignorance of the extent to which they have long been seen through and exposed by the best thinkers and writers of our age no less than, by way of anticipation, those of the past. If personalism—in a broader sense, of which the American philosophical school is but one manifestation—cannot be pulled from the wreckage of radical modernism and postmodernism, a most characteristic and precious fruit of western civilisation will have been lost. It can be argued that it would not be an exaggeration to say: *the* most precious fruit.

But by repudiating these tendencies and their utter spatio-temporal provincialism, while reasserting its life- and world-view within philosophy as part of an alternative modernity, personalism can at the same time contribute to the avoidance of an aggravated culture war beyond the compass of any rationality, liberality, or modernity whatsoever, between a dogmatic naturalism and relativistic nihilism, significantly joined, on one side, and religious orthodoxy and traditionalism degraded to shrill fundamentalism on the other. As part of an alternative modernity, upholding modernity's highest partial truths, personalism can contribute to reestablishing a sound intellectual climate of academic freedom, civilized debate, and objective standards, which recognizes the need for tradition and not just for innovation, and which is open to qualified, creative defence of the former and criticism of the latter.

There are in fact signs of the times that point toward a hopeful long-term scenario for the third millennium. With the downfall of a bankrupt radical secularism, only the spurious personalism, the distortions and corruptions of personalism, would go. True personalism, qualified personalism, could rise again and flourish with the creative renewal, in the ecumenical context of the future global community, of the west's great, foundational traditions, the traditions which, although they could certainly be used to defend slavery, also alone made possible its abolition, and the civil rights which for some American personalists define their philosophy. For personalism, properly conceived, is a dynamic part of these traditions and nothing else.

Stockholm

BOOK REVIEWS

Frank G. Kirkpatrick
A Moral Ontology for a Theistic Ethic: Gathering the Nations in Love and Justice.
Ashgate 2003

This is an ambitious book, and one that largely achieves what it sets out to do. In trying to find a basis for a theistic ethic, the author has chosen not to confine his discourse to the strictly theological domain, but to take his argument out into the secular world.

In case this gives the impression that we have here yet another secular theology like those of the 1960's, I hasten to say that this is not so. Fitzpatrick's God is a real God, an active agent in the world, bringing about an eventual 'Kingdom', in which all creation, not only humanity, will flourish. He is happy to use some secular understandings of what 'flourishing' is, while adding that a Christian theistic understanding of 'a life in Christ' is considerably more than this, (though not elaborating on that 'more' in this particular work.)

While the transcendent aspect of God is not much emphasised, other than at the beginning of his exposition, his immanentism is that of an agent, not a mere secular summing-up of the totality of human experiences, activities and aspirations. His Biblical God intervenes actively at many points in the historical process, and he has an interesting account of how this can happen without the suspension of natural laws. (But this latter notion would need to be developed in far more detail in order to be persuasive).

In further emphasis of the realness of God, he talks of God as an 'Other' in relation to humans and to Creation generally. Yet the 'Otherness' of God is not radically different from the way in which humans, as persons, are 'other' to each other, and this brings God and Creation to a significant likeness, without at all undermining the separateness of God. God is a Person, and we are Persons. We are active agents in the world, as God is. Mutuality and trust are essential to human beings, and to human societies and communities, as also to the relation between humans and God.

Although the author takes his discourse out into the secular world, his main theological propositions about God's work and the coming Kingdom are not themselves subjected to the scrutiny of secular philosophical enquiry. They are presented, chiefly in the early chapters of the book, in apposition to and in opposition to the more radical and in fact classical theological propositions concerning God's transcendence, which he sees as too abstract and impersonal He hopes, by doing this, both to refute certain current theological tendencies, and at the same time to present an alternative that would be more attractive and persuasive to secular moral philosophers, should they take the wise step of putting prejudice aside and actually considering what theism might have to say.

The author has himself taken a significant step in the direction of a serious consideration of secular moral philosophy, and would like this to be reciprocated. He makes a very good case for the creative results that would ensue—and mainly by showing the creative results of his own venture. He finds in some secular moral understandings a considerable congruence with his theism—congruences that neither moral philosophers nor, more surprisingly, many current theologians have bothered to look for. This is not to say that a secular moral philosopher is likely to be persuaded, purely on the basis of these congruences, to assent to the author's active and Kingdom-making God, nor perhaps would the author expect such a thing,. Rather, it is as though he is saying to them—'Were you, on other grounds, (your own personal experience, for instance), to accept the God I am proposing, you would surely have to admit that the theological picture we now both accept fits very well with the moral philosophy that you first established on secular grounds'. And indeed Charles Taylor, the most sympathetic and theistic-leaning of the secular moral philosophers, is represented as coming very close to this position.

It is in the area of natural law philosophy that the author's whole thesis and argument come closest to their self-realisation. His case would have been even stronger, or so it seems to me, had he relied more on the secular currents of natural law, rather than on its theological foundation. (This is not because Aquinas is dogmatic—on the contrary, he is quite extraordinarily flexible here, on Kirkpatrick's own showing. But it would have given better support to his enterprise of making contact with secular moral philosophy. The work of Cowan, for instance, is not mentioned) For if it is in our nature, and in the nature of all living things, to seek to preserve themselves; and if this is itself a 'good', because existence is felt and known as good; and if it is also in our nature to be social, and to need the co-operation and trust of other beings in addition to our bare self-preservation and individual goals; and if these statements can be shown to be true discoveries rather than self-justifying human contrivances—then we will have a moral ontology that is both firm, and capable of an 'opening' to the

theological domain. It may be that these propositions cannot be established without recourse to the act of Creation of a Creator-God who has made us and Creation like this, but I had supposed, (perhaps mistakenly), that Aquinas had been happy to leave them 'free-standing', as part of natural philosophy, discoverable by reason alone.

Certainly, in order to 'open out' theologically for the author, the social needs of humans require to be grounded in a very specific social nature and character, rather than in the mere convenience of the lonely separated self-sufficient ego seeking its individual goals in mutual association. For in the latter case we would have a cool contractual arrangement, not an actual spiritual and emotional need for association. It is assumed, in an individualist outlook (as exemplified by John Rawls), that priority must always be given to individual goals and life- styles, and that mutuality as such is not a high value. If this were true it would of course constitute a specific 'nature' of humanity just as much as the rather different characteristics claimed by natural law philosophy. But it would be impossible for Kirkpatrick to make it compatible with his version of theism, with God's 'overarching intention' towards human flourishing and mutuality in the long narrative of Creation and Redemption.

There is a spectrum of receptivity to the author's theism. Natural law, especially on a theological basis, is already part of the theological domain, and can be expanded from human mutualities to human relationships with God, and more conscious rather than 'given-natural' co-operation with God's purposes. And natural law on a secular basis would come next in order of closeness, though there is a case for putting Charles Taylor himself in that place. Next there are a large number of secular moral philosophers, those who reject the separated ego as the basic human 'unit'. The author is able to make creative use of many of these philosophers, finding the harmonies he is seeking there, and making the theological extensions that he needs.

Next there is the philosopher of individualism, John Rawls. After an initial seeming-hostility the author shows a great warmth, and is able to bring out a warmth in Rawls himself that is decidedly there. He is also able to make creative use of several things in Rawls' philosophy. This is done in the context of castigating some of those on his own 'side', warm-sounding communitarians guilty of the various illusions that a merely sentimental 'togetherness' can generate, which can include oppression of individuals who do not fit the mind-set of the group. For sometimes the individual, however lonely and isolated and ego-bound, is right, and the 'warm' group mind-set is wrong. This is very true, and needed saying, as I know from my own experience in some contexts of the Society of Friends.

In other parts of the book, the author gives the impression that he has himself found a sort of religious communitarian utopia on his own doorstep. It made the reader feel he or she should sell up immediately, and hop on the first plane to Trinity College, USA! But a healthy realism returns in these castigations, as also in his severe criticism of the erstwhile prophet of Christian 'agape', Anders Nygren, who preached a 'self for others' so extreme and total as to be both unrealistic and inhuman, even perverse. The damage done to emotionally vulnerable people in the Christian fold by attitudes such as these is incalculable. (It is necessary, in my opinion, to have a completely different perspective in this whole area, one best sketched out by Berdyaev in his 'The Destiny of Man', where he says—'Love cannot be neutral and directed equally upon everyone without distinction. A different word is needed for that—"caritas", charity, mercy. One must be merciful, but it is impossible to love all alike'. Berdyaev also writes—'The true purpose and meaning of love is not to help our neighbours, do good works .... or attain perfection, but to reach the union of souls, fellowship'.) I have interpolated this passage from Berdyaev as a criticism of at least some passages in Kirkpatrick's book, though the emphasis on self-preservation in natural law, and other passages, go some way to correcting these impressions. His use of Macmurray, to whom I will soon come, and for whom friendship was a prime value, is also a counter-weight.

At the furthest point in the spectrum that the author considers are the moral relativists and the radical post-modernists such as Rorty. (He seems to leap-frog over the non-cognitive moral philosophers of an earlier day, such as Hare and other British figures.) The author has a short way with the moral relativists. Much of their position, he avers, is due to simple sloth and ignorance—and also to a fear of universalism, a fear of its implications for themselves and their lives, what they might be required to do! And if they actually did more work and 'got out there' a bit more, moral relativists would not find it so easy to maintain that diversity of cultures destroys any notion of a common core. Their indolence is therefore self-serving. The author calls them 'armchair moral relativists'. Quite right too! People working in the field, in dangerous situations, have found and reported, among many horrors, examples of what can only be called 'common humanity', in cultures that do not

ostensibly support such a notion.

The radical post-modernists are a harder nut to crack. Yet Kirkpatrick seems to have a strange sympathy for Rorty and his predicament of a very restricted 'ethnocentric solidarity'—a small group of people 'huddled against the dark', in the absence of any possibility of a larger unifying meaning. Clearly it is waste of words trying to persuade Rorty to re-consider his position. The author perhaps writes here for his own satisfaction, to show, for his own supporters, the incoherence of Rorty's standpoint, and to borrow some of the content of post-modernist 'Context' for his own creative uses.

To return to Kirkpatrick's own core-positions, which he allows the Quaker philosopher John Macmurray to expound in the latter part of the book. Mutuality and trust and a reasonable expectation from each other are as natural as breathing for us, and persist in the face of much experience of our own and others' selfishness and distrust and betrayal of expectation.. Persons come into being and exist only in relation, and make a good relationship with God on the basis of good relations with each other. God has created us with this nature, and for these ends. We learn more about these ends through action and interaction with others. Action is a prime source of knowledge. Persons are best realised in communities of trust, which are not the same thing as societies. However, a good society, based on justice, is a precondition for a community based on love and trust, and Rawls' values are given a surprising vindication.

There is a distinct Left-leaning in the politics that are implied, which is again surprising, and certainly refreshing considering its American source. At times his communitarian ideal sounds almost Christian communist. This is possibly a residue, in his book, of Macmurray's earlier Utopian and Marxist and USSR sympathies, (or rather, total identifications!), which were never fully changed in Macmurray's later membership of the Society of Friends. The sub-title of Kirkpatrick's book is 'Gathering the Nations in Love and Justice', and this provides a field-day for Macmurray's Utopian and secular progressivist tendencies (which are all too easily accommodated in present-day secular Quakerism, and which indeed Macmurray largely created.)

This creates a problem, as I see it, when it comes to Kirkpatrick's other core position, the expectation of fulfilment for Creation, in the context of his Biblical understanding of God's promises and continuing activity. For in allowing Macmurray to dominate the exposition at this point, an ambiguity is created about the nature and extent of the fulfilment. Although Macmurray believed in a real God, he thoroughly rejected another world, in any shape or form, as the locus for his vision of fulfilment. This means that for Macmurray, full human flourishing is simply for a future generation or generations on earth, with the millions of tragically wasted lives on the way a matter of no ultimate concern. A secular Utopian Socialist has, of course, to swallow this down and be grateful—and from that point of view there is no contradiction and no moral harm, rather a kind of dignity. But for a Christian who has espoused a caring God such a limited outcome is both a contradiction and morally repellent. Fitzpatrick does not sufficiently distinguish his own outlook here from that of Macmurray. He allows Macmurray to be a kind of Virgil to his own Dante for a large part of his exposition in the latter part of the book. But at a certain point he needed to dismiss Virgil, and meet with his Beatrice—Berdyaev, whom I mentioned earlier, would surely have been ideal, as a Personalist like Macmurray, but with a far larger vision. Or, better still, he could have spoken for himself if he has vitally important things to add to Macmurray's position, which I hope, but am not sure, is the case.

From another angle entirely, it is not self-evident, to me, that a full human flourishing, even if it is allowed that it is in a Kingdom in another world, must have as its precondition a perfected society and a 'gathering of the nations' on earth. Perhaps as an ultimate outcome we must hold to this, as such a vision holds together earth and heaven in a moral unity that seems intrinsic to the author's whole intent (I mean Kirkpatrick, not God, though indeed the vision is shared!). But in the interim, what are we left with in this absolutist Biblical view of things? A violent and unjust world, thwarted lives by the billion, and no other world of the Soul for persons to develop in, and to at least begin the process of a full flourishing.

The fear I suppose, is that by teaching a world of the Soul, the moral unity of things will be disrupted, and people will be encouraged to seek individualistic Soul-salvation without regard to the great prophetic message of social justice as proclaimed in the Judaic-Christian tradition. But such a fear, while having real foundations, should not in the end be allowed to inhibit the welcoming of the Soul-dimension and the Soul-worlds, which ,after all, are quite often represented as linked with various forms of embodiment (see, for instance, the work of Gregory of Nyssa). For the other element of an absolutist Biblical position such as Kirkpatrick's seems to be, is the notion of the Person as a seamless garment of body soul and

spirit, which cannot be disrupted in reality, and which Thought must not therefore attempt to disrupt. It is maintained that such is the Judaic-Christian tradition, with all its hopes centred on Resurrection, and none at all on a surviving Soul. Yet, in historical fact, many Jews gave up this absolutist position over 2,000 years ago, and most Christians never adopted it! And it is not the proclamation of the Soul which is an outrage to the 'seamless garment' of our Person, it is death itself which is the outrage! This simple terrible fact is in danger of being forgotten in certain theological circles.

These criticisms, even if they are relevant to Fitzpatrick's position, do not spoil for me the pleasure and profit to be found in the book, and the creative possibilities that have been opened up through the bringing to bear on each other of secular moral philosophy and theological understanding. It is another and fruitful venture into the domain of natural theology.

David Britton

A Natural Theology of the Arts: Imprint of the Spirit.
Anthony Monti
Ashgate, 2003. 193pp ISBN 0-7546-3073-0. Hardback . £45.

I warmed to this book from the first short paragraph of the Preface, for it is based on two searches which I, and I'm sure many others, have in common with the author: the first '… for some intellectually defensible understanding of the profound sense of meaning and truth that I had experienced in literature, music and the visual arts', the second 'the search … for some ultimate ground of meaning and truth to life itself … after the first search had taken me … into the Slough of Despond that is deconstruction' (p. xi).

It begins with two cheers for George Steiner's book *Real Presences* (1989) which is praised for its noble and sympathetic rhetoric in pursuit of the transcendent, but which Monti, and the present reviewer, find insufficiently argumentative. Steiner's erudition and flowing sentences are impressive, and one is immensely relieved to have such an ally, yet the allusive tone and refusal to engage directly with the argument leave one feeling dissatisfied.

This cannot be said about this book, though one may not feel that one can give total assent to every one of its conclusions, arguing as it does for that problematic notion of a natural theology which aims to make the existence of God credible whilst at the same time using the nature of art as a means of attaining this credibility. Initially one may even feel that a certain special pleading is taking place. Yet Monti has produced an admirable book which releases lots of interesting arguments, explores burning issues and makes God at least plausible. It also shines light upon the complex nature of art and is very much aware of the pitfalls involved in his metaphysical and theological project: and keeps a beady, even wry eye, upon it.

He begins by 'Addressing the Crisis in the Humanities' (Title of Chapter I) where the humanities are seen to be lost in theory and relativity, where contact with and belief in 'veritas' and 'the Real' has been lost along with the consequent loss of belief in themselves. Here all is a function of 'discourses' and 'ideologies' and it is merely language which constructs the illusion of the 'real'. Monti gives due credit to the ingenuity of Derrida and deconstruction but attempts another 'way' where art is seen as that which relates us most directly to the other, (Steiner's view) and where the other is seen to be more than a mere 'construction'. This emphasis on art's power to relate us to the other may seem to fall into the Romantic view, a powerful one for some, where art becomes a substitute for religion, but this is seen not to be Monti's view when, among other examples, he disagrees with Peter Fuller, where the latter argues, in his book *Theoria*, that art can be a possible mode of transcendence, a 'natural theology without God'. For Monti the meaning of art, and all else for that matter, finds fulfilment only in God, rather than as a substitute for Him.

The ambitious aims and claims are spelled out thus:

> … to set out the epistemological, metaphysical and theological grounds for maintaining that artistic creativity can most adequately be understood as an expression of the 'real presence' of God, and that this is the ultimate meaning and truth of such activity. In so doing, it will go on to argue [in disagreement with Steiner] that the God who is present in works of art can best be understood in a Trinitarian way.

He addresses those outside Christianity, especially those who see deconstruction as 'the hermeneutics of the death of God'. His argument, he says, must fulfil three functions:

(a) An Educative one—to introduce others to the hermeneutics of Christianity. Where may revelation be found?
(b) A Hermeneutic one. Where can faith seek for understanding? How can faith be made comprehensible?
(c) An Eschatological Function, which sees this world as a metaphor for the world to come—and where the function of art is to provide such

'metaphors'.

Monti not only admits, but insists upon, the circularity of both a) and b), but this he points out is the very nature of the hermeneutic circle: Chapter Two is concerned with showing how fruitful this circularity can be—and that it is not 'vicious'—if it is set within the epistemology of what he calls 'Critical Realism', which he claims is derived from the experience of the natural sciences, and which can be seen as providing a link with his notion of natural theology. He quotes John Polkinghorne in the Introduction apropos this circularity, which he sees as an 'epistemic circle' with real knowledge claims, which shows that '… how we know is controlled by the nature of the object and the nature of the object is revealed through our knowledge of it'. Chapter Three is concerned with the 'Metaphysics of Flexible Openness', or 'how art can be the vehicle of spirit and of the Spirit'. Chapter Four is concerned with something of especial interest to readers of this journal: the notion of 'metaphor as the key to the 'presence' of the divine Other in art, by situating it within an expanded version of Michael Polanyi's aesthetic theory'. In fact Polanyi's presence is palpable and influential throughout the book. Chapter Five explores this divine presence in some detailed analysis of illuminating examples of actual art works. Chapter Six is concerned with eschatology and how art offers an anticipation of 'the knowledge of God in glory'. He also argues here that art ultimately expresses the presence and activity of the Trinitarian God.

Art then, when seen in the light of this theory, is thought to provide a challenge to much of our epistemology, metaphysics and theology. A natural theology of the arts can therefore have fundamental implications for all three of these disciplines.

Monti virtually accuses himself of excessive quotation from many sources, but this seems entirely justified as it indicates evidence of knowledge of the field, which assures the reader of Monti's scholarly credentials, and provides us with a rich bibliography. To arrange all this in a meaningful and clear narrative is a feat in itself, and the myriad quotations and the author's text read almost seamlessly.

One cannot, of course, offer nearly an adequate analysis of such a richly argued book, but the reviewer would like to touch upon one or two aspects which seem indicative.

The theory of Critical Realism is central to Monti's argument, and in Chapter Two Monti offers what he considers 'critical realism's most succinct definition' in a quotation from N.T. Wright:

'This is a way of 'knowing' that acknowledges the reality of the thing known as something other than the knower (hence realism), while also fully acknowledging that the only access we have to this reality lies along the spiralling path of appropriate dialogue or conversation between knower and the thing known (hence 'critical').

The last part of this definition shows that this is not a species of naïve realism, but takes on board the 'provisionality of all its statements', while the first part affirms the aim to discover 'and bring to expression how things are'. This is clearly the method embraced by working scientists with its theoretical roots in Kant's 'as if' philosophy of science and in notions of Michael Polanyi's, whose aim was 'to achieve a frame of mind in which I may hold firmly to what I believe to be true, even though I know that it might conceivably be false'. (From Polanyi's *Personal Knowledge*). Without this deconstruction's 'play of signification to infinity' is inevitable. What Critical realism aims for is 'anti-foundationalist foundations', which can be engaged in by 'fallible, finite and fallen human beings'. (This seeming paradox, of course, shows that critical realism is neither foundationalist nor anti-foundationalist). One might observe that foundationalism (eg Cartesianism) and anti-foundationalism (eg deconstruction) are flip sides of the same coin with their obsessive attitude to knowledge: if the former cannot obtain then the latter sees no recourse other than to embrace pure scepticism. But, as Monti argues, all knowledge is based on hermeneutic circularity, where 'We must understand in order to believe but we must believe in order to understand'. Obsessive certainty, which much of western philosophy yearned for, is impossible: as it should be.

This is of a piece with several insights of twentieth century theory, e.g. Godel's Theorem, where even maths must presuppose an axiom that it cannot prove in order to maintain consistency; or Wittgenstein's notion that no rule can contain a rule as to how it is to be applied; ie there is always a 'gap' between a rule and its application. (One might hazard that it is in this 'gap' that we find the necessity for ethical choice—lying at the heart of logic itself—with which the 'necessity' of logic cannot help). As Monti says, understanding itself depends upon this 'intellectual bootstrap'.

But what justifies this hermeneutic 'foundation'? Well, it is based on successful practice. (And it is only future practice which can 'establish' a better theory). Only this allows us to separate the real from fantasy (theory). The hermeneutic circle is seen to depend upon the epistemic circle in which practice is essential, and where 'how we know is

controlled by the nature of the object and the nature of the object is revealed through knowledge of it'. (See *The Self as Agent* and *Persons in Relation* were this notion is seen to be at the heart of John Macmurray's philosophy of 'agency').

The concept that underpins this epistemology, Monti argues, is Polanyi's notion of 'tacit understanding', which, put in a nutshell, states that 'we know more than we can tell' and which has much in common with Wittgenstein's emphasis on the importance of 'context', the necessary background against which the 'foreground', Polanyi's 'focal awareness', makes sense. (And with which the readers of this journal will be very familiar). Tacit understanding's relationship to focal awareness is an example of the epistemic circle at work.

However, this tacit knowledge (or 'subsidiary awareness') can only be gained by sympathetic attunement with a tradition, which can, at first, only be transmitted by prescription, socially, from person to person. Only when we have mastered the tradition can we really criticise it. However, deconstruction (or postmodernism in general), tries to operate outside any tradition—hence the crisis. No discipline, especially in the humanities, can have faith in its 'canons'. All becomes mere 'criticism'. Yet deconstruction itself seems to be the inheritor of a tradition about which it is generally unconscious; and one which, ironically, it treats as an absolute; the tradition of materialistic scientism. Critical realism clearly avoids this in its hermeneuticism which embraces a working tradition and a non-absolutist stance. In the dialectic of materialistic scientism we see the rigid necessities of Logical Positivism flipping, or collapsing, into the uncontrollable possibilities of deconstruction which, because there is no possibility of tacit understanding, are robbed of these very possibilities of ever becoming real. Such notions as intuitions, which are implicit in tacit knowledge, would no doubt be condemned by Derrida as a species of 'presence', the arbitrary card which stops the pack from 'deconstructing'. But tacit intuitions are not the absolute foundations that Derrida might think: 'Far from being an all-or-nothing absolute, intuitions are perceptions as understood by Polanyi … are themselves subject by tacit understanding to the same processes of revision and reflection that all thoughts are'. Therefore, 'tacit understanding turns deconstruction on its head. We can now see that, in celebrating … the 'logical gap' as the fissure that leads to destabilizing, infinite and indeterminate free play, deconstructionists miss the whole point. For far from leading to the undermining of all claims to knowledge, the 'logical gap' is precisely where knowledge of reality takes place, through [what is described] as the 'leap' that is tacit understanding. By means of this leap, epistemology (the study of knowledge) opens out onto ontology (the study of being).'

There are seen to be four features which links Critical Realism to art.

(a) Like Critical Realism, art must grasp the whole to understand the parts, at the same time that it must grasp the parts to understand the whole. Both have the epistemic circularity examined above.
(b) Tacit understanding is characteristic of the arts and may in fact derive from them. (Kant's comments on the faculty of Judgement might support this). ' … the deeper, and therefore less tangible—that is, more personal —the level of reality, the more the field that inquires into it must rely upon tacit understanding'.
(c) Art's depictions, or 'stories', follow the essentially 'storied' nature of human knowing. Such stories lead us, via tacit understanding, 'to grasp a reality that transcends the specifiable'. These aesthetic notions can, in principle, provide access to the truth.
(d) Art, like Critical Realism, according to Monti, opens out onto an ontology which finds its completion in God.

The 'Metaphysics of Flexible Openness' takes up Chapter Three, and begins with Polkinghorne's definition of Natural Theology, which 'may be defined as the search for the knowledge of God by the exercise of reason and the inspection of the world'. But how can the world be the carrier of such meaning? Well, art finds its role here, for we need a metaphysical scheme to show how matter in the form of art can be a vehicle for the spirit in a manner compatible with science and empiricism. Polanyi's notion of a necessary transcendent reality is helpful here, which implies an indeterminate range of intelligibility, which implies unending questions through its intimations of hidden dimensions of order and meaning, to which we must be constantly open. Such questioning leads from levels of focal awareness to levels of tacit awareness upon which focal awareness depends. According to this argument each level of growing tacit awareness becomes a higher level of reality, a 'whole' greater than the sum of all the lower levels which are more focally aware. But the lower levels cannot explain the greater reality of the higher levels. As Polanyi puts it

> … all meaning lies in the higher levels of reality [the 'wholes'] that are not reducible to the laws by which the ultimate particulars of the universe are controlled.

One could say that the human mind is higher than

the reductionist elements that positivists try to reduce it to and, beyond the mind, and higher, is the realm of interpersonal relations, the realm of ethics and responsibility. Thus the higher reality is seen to be the least tangible—and God the most high and least tangible. The lower one goes in the hierarchies, the more deterministic is the realm; the higher the hierarchy, the more free and meaningful becomes the realm. Monti is acutely aware that this does not prove the existence of God, but it does turn deconstruction upside down and shows the habit of reading the universe from the 'bottom-up' to be a 'mere trick of intellectual perspective'. Perhaps, in this way, Nietzsche's perspectivism can also be seen as merely arbitrary.

One can only hint at the richness of the continuing argument in a review, but the connections between art, religion and such notions as tacit understanding in the creation of a natural theology are indeed bracing. The discussion on Polanyi and metaphor is a particularly interesting application of his ideas, and the argument that without a belief in or comprehension of God certain dimensions of thought and creativity are not available, is also telling; but the critical side of Critical Realism never allows Monti to forget that plausibility does not mean certainty.

It is refreshing to find a theorist who can relate what to many would appear to be distinct realms of knowing and to provide a detailed and often moving description of notions which are of the utmost importance to being human. Even the devout atheist, who would certainly have problems with Monti's belief that art is an anticipation of God's aim for the universe, should be stimulated, challenged and perhaps even grateful for Monti's illuminating insights as to the nature of art and that there might be more to the universe than the 'free flow of signifiers'. In short Monti makes credible much of vital importance to us all, even if all the atheist can take, man of integrity that he no doubt is, must remain somewhat lower than the angels.

Alan Ford

Asger Jorn
The Natural Order and Other Texts
Translated, with an Introduction, by Peter Shield, Ashgate, Guildford, 2002; 382 pp.; ISBN 0 7546 04292; hbk £40.

Asger Jorn (1914-73) was a Danish artist who in 1961, soon after he had gained international recognition, began 'the first complete revision of the existing philosophical system', having previously written a book, posthumously published, and articles on art. What pre-occupied Jorn was the question of how society and the economy could be more congenial to the life of art. That is what gives his writings their interest to the reader who is not *au fait* with, nor really interested in, the specific cultural, artistic and intellectual landscape of Denmark in particular and Scandinavia in general, and the revival and and extension of a specifically Scandinavian way of thinking, to which there is continued reference throughout this collection.

For the theme of art and society easily disappears, in the current departalisation of Anglo-Saxon philosophy, between aesethics and political philosophy (but contrast Collingwood's *Principles of Art* and various unpublished MSS), and there is a study yet to be written of how each has impacted upon the other: of politics orientated to the fostering of art (as with Jorn) and to aesthetic orientations in politics (e.g. the aesthetic element in the construction of many Utopias).

Apart from the local references already mentioned, Jorn's works are not easy reading. He is passionate and assertive, and liable in enaging with one issue to affirm positions to be contradicted when engaging with another (a lesser vice than that of simplistic consistency). He has perhaps not properly digested the various authors he has read and the ideas he has absorbed. He attempts in *The Natural Order* to go beyond both Hegel and Marx, and either to employ or to revise even radically (I am not sure which) Bohr's Principle of Complementarity, and to formulate his own accounts of language, signs and symbols, and a new logic, 'triolectics', of three factors rather than the two (opposed ones) of dialectics. This, too, could be forced upon phenomena, but it deserves serious consideration as a schema that could organise and illuminate at least some areas of our experience.

The second, and also substantial, text is *Value and Economy* ('Report No. 2 of the Scandinavian Institute of Comparative Vandalism'—Jorn did not take himself too seriously), which, *inter alia,* argues that idleness is the root of art—an attack on what Josef Pieper (in *Leisure the Basis of Culture*) called the 'world of Total Work', and a view from the Left (where Jorn seems to reside) at odds with most Socialism. Art is not a necessity but a luxury, but is not be devalued because of that. Indeed, 'freedom is unjust, and it is only that positive injustice called art and beauty which gives the system of rights any justification at all' (p. 209). A provocative challenge to many contemporary assumptions!

The third and final text is *Luck and Chance*, a collection of paragraphs on art, aesthetics, and other topics.

R. T. Allen

CONTINUATIONS

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96. ibid. p. 204. I take it that it has its ordinary meaning, not that of the theological *desperatio,* the unforgivable sin when a person deliberately turns his back on the hope of forgiveness; cf. note 98 below
97. ibid. p. 204.
98. *Desperatio* and *obstinatio* are traditionally the twin unforgivable sins against the Holy Spirit: cf. Peter Lombard, *Sent*., Lib. II, Dist. XLIII (Migne, PL, ser. 2, 192, col. 754-6); cf. Augustine, *Lib. de natura et gratia*, cap. XXXV, para. 40 (Migne, PL 44, col. 266); *Serm*. CCCLII, cap. III, para. 8 (Migne, PL 39, col. 1558-9).

    The inference to be be drawn from these passages is that, without *obstinatio, desperatio* can be overcome and grace attained, for hope is boundless.
99. cf. *Essai de phil. concrète,* pp. 209-10.
100. ibid. pp. 174-201.
101. ibid. pp. 212-49.
102. ibid. pp. 296-312.
103. ibid. pp. 250-60.
104. ibid. 261-74.
105. ibid. pp. 275-95.

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36. Hallie is particularly sensitive to the suffering that is generated in morally de-responsibilising hierarchical structures of decision such as the army, the State, and society at large. Moral responsibility, which is tied to but distinct from causal responsibility, goes a long way.
37. In my aforementioned Ph.D. thesis I show how all the authors who have written philosophically about cruelty imply that the detriment involved by cruelty affects life at one of its levels of being i.e. biological, perceptual, or cognitive.
38. In my aforementioned Ph.D. Thesis I provide a number of prudential reasons to invite to cautiousness when it comes to deny a claim of cruelty, which is usually made by the victim, whereas the perpetrator is much more prone to suggest that no cruelty is in fact occurring, but something else, which is totally justified and acceptable. It is often the perpetrator (or potential perpetrator), in fact, to claim that a certain physical, psychological, moral, or other threshold has not been surpassed, and that further conditions should be fulfilled in order to speak properly of cruelty.
39. Interestingly, even in the cases of 'natural' cruelty there seems to be some sort of *mens rea* involved, which may be God's evil mind, as in de Sade'?s case, or Nature's indifference to our destiny, as in Leopardi's, or, in more recent times, the personification of the social order as an Anal Oedipus, as described by Deleuze and Guattari in their *Anti-Oedipus*.
40. Dr Hamblet and I will debate whether violence is always cruel in a future issue of *Appraisal*.
41. Plato. *Protagoras* 345b, *Theatetus* 199e, *Laws* 9.863c, and 5.731c.
42. Aristotle, *Problems*, Book XVI, 928b23 to 929a5; *Metaphysics*, Book V, 1022b4 to 14; *Nichomachean Ethics*, Book VII, 1148b18-34; *Eudemian Ethics*, Book II, 1220b18, 1222b5-14.
43. See especially Emmanuel Levinas, 'The Ego and the Totality' in *Collected Philosophical Papers*, Alfonso Lingis, translation, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993), pp. 25-46.
44. This is in fact the new notion of responsibility that marks the transition in Levinas'? thought between *Totality and Infinity* and *Otherwise Than Being*.
45. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, Alfonso Lingis, translation, (Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 1969), p.134.
46. Finally Britain came up with a plan to share the refugees among several countries and Britain, France, Belgium and Holland each took a portion of the homeless victims.
47. R. Baumeister, *Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty*, (New York: Freeman, 1997).