

# APPRAISAL

A Journal of Constructive and Post-Critical Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies

Vol. 2 No. 4 October 1999

ISSN 1358-3336

*Editor and Publisher: Dr R.T. Allen*  
20 Ulverscroft Rd, Loughborough, LE11 3PU, England  
*Tel. and fax: 01509 215438; E-mail: appraisal@rtallen.clara.co.uk*

© Copyright R.T. Allen, 1999

## CONTENTS

This issue's contributors .....	149
Editorial.....	150
Index to Volume 2 .....	150

### **Papers from the 1999 Appraisal/Polanyi Conference:**

<i>James Lund</i> What are we to make of one another?.....	151
<i>Percy Hammond</i> Models of reality.....	155
<i>R.J. Brownhill</i> Polanyi and the development of qualitative research.....	161
<i>Sue Watkinson</i> Tacit knowledge and professional judgment.....	166
<i>Hans Popper</i> The interpretation of literary texts: an exercise in understanding.....	170
<i>David Kettle</i> On the primacy of indwelling.....	191

### **Book reviews:**

R.T. Allen: <b>Beyond Liberalism:</b> <b>A study of the Political Thought of F.A. Hayek and Michael Polanyi</b> — <i>Chris Goodman</i> .....	198
D. Boucher and B. Haddock (eds): <b>Collingwood Studies, Vol. V: Explorations</b> — <i>R.T. Allen</i> .....	198
R.G. Collingwood: <b>An Essay on Metaphysics, The New Leviathan, The Idea of History,</b> (rev. eds. with new materials); <b>The Principles of History</b> — <i>R.T. Allen</i> .....	199

### *This issue's contributors:*

**James Lund** taught history in school, philosophy of education at a College of Education, and in retirement is studying early Greek philosophy and the relations of philosophy to history.

**Prof. Percy Hammond**, has worked in electrical engineering and taught in several universities, and is a Fellow of the Royal Academy of Engineering and of the Institutions of Electrical Engineers and Mechanical Engineers.

**Dr Bob Brownhill** Senior Lecturer in the School of Educational Studies at the University of Surrey, was recently also Acting Director of, and Director of Studies in, the Centre for Continuing Education.

**Miss Sue Watkinson** is Senior Lecturer in Research and Programme Leader for the MSc in Advanced Nursing Practice at Thames Valley University, and has recently completed her PhD thesis on the relation between knowledge and practice.

**Dr Hans Popper** read German at Bristol University, wrote his PhD thesis on Jacob Boehme, and was Senior Lecturer in German at the University of Wales, Swansea, specialising in mediaeval German.

**The Rev'd David Kettle** is an Anglican Priest living in Cambridge. He is co-ordinator of the Gospel and Our Culture network for the Bible Society.

# EDITORIAL

No, although it is the last issue of Volume 2, this is not the last issue of *Appraisal* in this millennium (one does not clap a batsman for scoring a century when he is on 99), and students of Eric Voegelin and Norman Cohn will know just how much harm millennial speculations have done, especially in this century.

Readers can take refuge from the vacuities of the Millennium Dome by this issue's selection of papers from our April conference, three of which in particular apply philosophical ideas to other domains: Bob

Brownhill's and Sue Watkinson's to qualitative research and professional judgment, especially in nursing; while Hans Popper, having surveyed the success or failure of philosophers from Plato, Aristotle, the Church Fathers to Dilthey to grasp the real individual, applies individual understanding to two mediaeval texts, along with a wealth of general background, especially on conceptions of the emotions. We encourage escape, not only from the Dome, but from the ivory tower of any philosophy that can think only about itself.

## INDEX TO VOLUME 2

*4 issues with continuous numbering; issue number followed by page number*

### *1 Articles (including Working Papers and Discussion items)*

Advising .....	1/14
Beyond Nihilism .....	3/133
'Common Faith' .....	2/100
Elements of a personalist conception of state and society .....	1/12
Fuzzy logic .....	2/86
Genesis of technology .....	2/60
Idealism or realism? Polanyi's epistemology compared with that of Kant.....	3/115
Interpretation of literary texts: an exercise in understanding .....	4/170
Jottings on personalism .....	1/13
Kolnai and the metaphysics of political Conservatism.....	1/26
Kolnai's 'Inchoate sketch of a theory of morality' .....	1/20
Leavis and Polanyi on meaning .....	1/43
Models of reality.....	4/155
Oldham, Temple and Polanyi .....	3/143
On the primacy of indwelling.....	4/191
Philosophy and paideia .....	2/69
Polanyi and Blaga as philosophers of knowledge .....	2/93
Polanyi and the development of qualitative research .....	4/161
Polanyi and the philosophy of science .....	3/107
Polanyi and psychology.....	2/51
Polanyi and the teaching of literature .....	3/128
Self-reference and the loss of meaning .....	1/37
Subject and object .....	2/97
Tacit knowledge and professional judgment.....	4/166
Technical knowledge .....	2/66
Three riders of apocalypse.....	1/4
What are we to make of one another?.....	4/151

### *2 Books reviewed*

R.T. Allen: <i>Beyond Liberalism: A study of the Political Thought of F.A. Hayek and Michael Polanyi</i> .....	4/198
D. Boucher and B. Haddock (eds):	

<i>Collingwood Studies, Vol. V: Explorations</i> .....	4/198
R.G. Collingwood: <i>An Essay on Metaphysics, The New Leviathan, The Idea of History</i> , (rev. eds. with new materials); <i>The Principles of History</i> .....	4/199
Collingwood Society Publications.....	2/104
Dorothy Emmet: <i>Philosophers and Friends</i> .....	1/48
Kevin Mott-Thornton: <i>Common Faith: Education Spirituality and the State</i> .....	1/48
Majorie Reeves (ed.): <i>Christian Thinking and Social Order: Conviction Politics from the 1930's to the Present Day</i> .....	3/145
J. Searle: <i>The Mystery of Consciousness</i> .....	2/104
Daniel Shaw: <i>Reason and Feeling in Hume' Action Theory and Moral Philosophy</i> .....	3/146

### *3 Authors and Reviewers*

R.T. Allen .....	1/48; 2/104; 3/145; 3/146; .....	4/198; 4/199
Angela Botez .....	2/93	
R.J. Brownhill.....	4/161	
Paul Dean .....	1/43; 3/128	
Francis Dunlop .....	1/20	
Chris Goodman.....	3/133; 4/198	
Percy Hammond .....	2/66; 4/155	
John Pollard Hittinger .....	1/26	
Robin Hodgkin .....	2/60	
David Kettle .....	4/191	
Aurel Kolnai.....	1/4; 1/12; 1/13; 1/14	
Joseph Labia .....	2/97	
James Lund .....	2/69; 4/151	
Martin X. Moleski .....	2/86	
Kevin Mott-Thorton & R.T. Allen .....	2/100	
Georg Neuweg.....	1/37	
Hans Popper .....	4/170	
Norman Sheppard .....	3/107	
Harold Turner .....	3/143	
Sue Watkinson.....	4/166	
Norman Wetherick.....	2/51	

---

# WHAT ARE WE TO THINK OF ONE ANOTHER?

James Lund

## 1 *The question of human being*

Amongst other things, we say of ourselves that we are all human, sharing that mode of being we so designate. Human we may be but to be so, we all know, comprehends being inhuman, one form of which is to deny that some of us are human. Women and children, for instance, have often been thought not to be fully human.

The being we share is generally thought to belong to the category of the animal. Yet, human beings who seek to deny the humanity of others of their kind allege that the latter are animals. Given the innocence of animals, this seems a curious misnomer. What often seems to be meant in such instances is devilry rather than animality.

On the whole, philosophers have preferred not to involve themselves in the question of being human, or inhuman, as the case may be. Man has been their preferred topic: what we are from the theological standpoint of the divine; from the scientific standpoint of nature; from the philosophical standpoint. The idea of the species rather than the men, women and children we actually encounter has tended to preoccupy philosophers.

Sometimes it appears that philosophers do not know the difference between a 'who' and a 'what'. The prevailing idea of human being, contributed to public life by western philosophy in the course of the modern age, has been that of the relation of the material to the mental; two systematic abstractions form the actuality of our experience of one another and seemingly far removed from what is to be human. This is to be a singular being, one who does and says this or that. Despite its perennial, readily manifest incoherence, the body-mind model has survived the modern age and continues to infest public life. Whatever rea-

sons there are for its remarkable philosophical persistence in the face of its evident inadequacies as a representation of human being, they seem to be sufficient to discourage other than marginal attention to the question of thinking of ourselves more adequately and coherently. It ought not, for instance, to be too difficult, one might think, to come to an agreement concerning what each of us self-evidently is to one another, which is a living organism, both many and one. As for who we are, it is true that there has been a sustained attempt to comprehend our individual singularity of being as the sole authors of whatever we do and say by identifying what it is to be a person with what it is to have a mind, whatever such entities might eventually turn out to be. However, this is precisely to confuse a 'who' with a 'what', since we are all supposed to 'have' minds.

If we incline to such confusion reflectively speaking, mistaking devilry or inhumanity for animality, for instance, we are unlikely to do so actually. It is not necessary to figure in the pages of *Who's Who* to be conclusively aware that, living as we do in a continuum of human transaction, more often called 'the world' or 'history', who does and says what is what chiefly determines our lives from beginning to end. It is this continuum that constitutes much of what we mean when we refer to human and inhuman being, that is, to our relations with one another, to which we must add our relations with ourselves.

## 2 *Rabossi and human rights*

The difficulties that such being presents to philosophy world-wide were made apparent in the course of last year's World Congress in Philosophy, held in the US. Its theme, you may remember, was what the Greeks conceived and referred to as

Paideia. Advance publicity for the Congress interpreted this, very narrowly, as 'Philosophy Educating Humanity'. There was and is much more to the practice of paideia as education than philosophy, comprehending as it did, and does, every form of literary cultivation. As things turned out, the proceedings of the Congress served to reveal a general philosophical acceptance of the impossibility of saying what we think of one another in respect of our common humanity.

One of its sessions, open in principle to all who attended, had the title, 'Paideia and Human Rights'. This was formally addressed by three speakers, one of whom was Eduardo Rabossi, an Argentinean jurist and philosopher. Rabossi, who has written on human rights in Spanish, is probably quite widely known in philosophy worldwide. He figures in what Richard Rorty, whom everyone reads and comparatively few acknowledge, had to say on the subject in an essay in 'Truth and Progress' entitled 'Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality'.

Rabossi refers to what he calls 'the human rights phenomenon'. By this he means the rapid growth worldwide of a voluntary movement in support of human rights, particularly among younger people. This phenomenon is exemplified by Amnesty International. First founded in this country in 1961, Amnesty now claims more than a million members worldwide and supporters in more than a hundred countries and territories. Deriving its mandate from the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* issued in 1948 by the United Nations, Amnesty seeks the release of non-violent prisoners of conscience; the fair and prompt trial of political prisoners; abolition of the death penalty, torture and all degrading and cruel treatment or punishment and an end to extrajudicial executions and

disappearances. The organisation proceeds by making representations on behalf of victims of injustice, on whose fates it seeks to focus public opinion world-wide.

The 'phenomenon' to which Rabossi refers is also the degree of success which the human rights movement has enjoyed. It seems that no government or organisation with pretensions to govern can allow itself to be represented publicly as persistently lawless in its conduct towards those whom it claims to rule. Also involved is the balance of humanity and inhumanity, and of respect and disrespect for the law, in those engaged in denying and infringing human rights. A former torturer in El Salvador is reported by Amnesty as saying: 'If there's lots of pressure, like from Amnesty International, we might pass political prisoners on to a judge. But if there's no pressure, then they're dead.' Letters written to prisoners and on their behalf are continuing reminders that they are not forgotten, and that where the letters come from there may some day come retributive justice.

Whether there are human rights and whether there is equality of human beings, which the claim to the universality of such rights supposes, are highly disputable issues of a reflective kind, particularly in philosophy. All three speakers on human rights at the World Congress thought it impossible to justify human equality in the face of, say, Nietzsche's denunciation of the truth of that claim. However, it is, of course, clear that this fact has not hindered the development of the human rights movement as a course of action, intended to remedy injustice as between human beings. Those who join and support this movement are strongly convinced in what they feel, that one set of human beings should not do certain things to other sets. It is these considerations, I think, that Rabossi has before him when he contends that 'the world has changed, that the human rights phenomenon renders human rights foundationalism outmoded and irrelevant.' No theoretical justification is needed to bring about an

active movement against predominantly political injustice. Moreover, it makes no sense to plunge an active movement of this kind into reflective dispute concerning the validity of its purposes, given that these are felt to be self-evidently valid. This is an active, not a reflective, standpoint on the issue, and it is relevant to recall that Rabossi is a jurist, a man of action, as well as a philosopher.

Rorty is, I think, mistaken in his belief that Rabossi's position is more or less identical with his own. The fundamental difference is that between action and reflection. Rabossi recognises that what is done in human affairs that constitutes a new venture, such as the human rights movement of the last fifty years, does not arise because it is rationally justified. Only when the new form of doing has been more or less perfected does it become possible to say what is being done and why. What he calls 'the human rights phenomenon' is an instance of this kind. It is one thing, however, for someone actively engaged in such a venture to set aside the issue of rational justification and indeed to suppose that one might proceed indefinitely without such a justification. In the circumstances of the global village and the age of information, it is not unreasonable to suppose that conviction at the level of feeling, in respect of cases of injustice world-wide, would be sufficient to arouse and sustain support for a movement upholding rights of comparable magnitude, indefinitely. It is, however, quite another thing to suppose that such justification can never be forthcoming in any circumstances. What we feel, and what we think in a rational way, ought not to be finally divorced, if we esteem integrity in human being. Moreover, there is a need for rational justification of human rights and of the conduct necessary to uphold such rights. Feelings among human beings are as strong, if not stronger, when inhuman. To quote a recent, well known instance of inhumanity as a felt hostility of monstrous inclination: 'I reckon that every nigger should be chopped up, mate, and they should be

left with nothing but f\*\*\*ing stumps.' Is the inhumanity of such a pathological remark incapable of rational demonstration? If it is not, how can education proceed, which, arguably, has to be ultimately grounded in rational acceptance of what is represented as true. If that element is not ultimately there, then proceedings of teaching and learning become merely behavioural and manipulative. Those who learn are lodged with the opinions of others which they strongly endorse at the level of feeling but have not made their own in reflective thinking.

### 3 Rorty and Pragmatism

Rorty's position is, by contrast with that of Rabossi, that of a pragmatist philosopher whose disposition as such requires him to deny that human rights can be justified in relation to a philosophical account of human nature as something unchanging and, therefore, beyond any historical consideration. It is fundamental to the position that Rorty has adopted that no account of human being can be possible which does not suppose that there is a human nature, a rational form known to intellectual intuition independently of all sensible and, therefore, historical human experience. What Rorty does not consider is whether it is human being rather than human nature that concerns us and whether such being, while always changing, yet remains continuous and recognisable as such, a relation of what may be characterised as the 'what' and 'who' of such being. Whereas Rorty may be right about human nature, he is not necessarily right about human being, a form of representation which, inasmuch as it has persisted in our discourse concerning ourselves, may provisionally be supposed to exist.

Pragmatism represents a valid, if incomplete, philosophical response to Darwinism. This response is of particular interest to philosophers in the medium of the English language, in as much as they were shielded from the

impact of Darwinism on philosophy by the advance of the new realism, initiated by Moore and Russell at the end of the last century. The consequence of that exclusion of the influence of Darwinism was that Anglo-Saxon philosophy did not have to take serious account of the Darwinian claim that all species of living being, including man, had evolved from relatively simple to more complex forms of existence over a very long period of time. They had done so, Darwin maintained, in ways ultimately determined by the random play of circumstance or natural selection, in which there was interaction between the hereditary endowments of different species, including variations, and the changing exigencies of environment, in which scarcity and a struggle for continuing existence universally prevailed.

This understanding struck a destructive blow against what had become, and still remains, the tradition of philosophical thinking in the west, in which it has been fundamental to think of *eidōs*, species, form or structure as a metaphysical entity, beyond change and, hence, knowable, whether wholly objective, mental or linguistic in location. By contrast, all forms of living being were held by followers of Darwin to be what they were in consequence of evolutionary change and were to be expected to continue to change indefinitely in relation to changing circumstance. This was held to be true also of man, whose being, always changing, both individually and collectively, lay partly in nature, partly in history. In respect of the historical being of man, there was nothing very much, or so they thought, for pragmatists to say. What was good and what was true in human affairs would no longer be determined through rational reflection in relation to ideas or forms of truth and goodness, whereby actual outcomes were to be judged in those respects, but by actual proceedings and their outcomes and what these revealed of truth and goodness in actuality. *Ta ton pragmata* or actions and deeds and what they revealed were what ulti-

mately concerned pragmatists philosophically in human affairs.

#### 4 Human being, not human nature

What then is there to be said concerning human being as a mode of actual existence that has a bearing on humanity and inhumanity and on the educational issues raised by human rights? The first thing to dispose of is the belief that it is human nature that we must consider. Hannah Arendt observed:

It is highly unlikely that we, who can know, determine and define the natural essences of all things surrounding us, which we are not, should ever be able to do the same for ourselves—this would be like jumping over our own shadows. Moreover, nothing entitles us to assume that man has a nature or essence in the same sense as other things. In other words, if we have a nature or essence, then surely only a god could know and define it and the first prerequisite would be that he should be able to speak about a ‘who’ as though it were a ‘what’.

What is Arendt saying here? That a human being is both a ‘who’ and a ‘what’. Who we are is manifest in our power of agency, of beginning or refusing to begin all we do and say. The being of the human agent is singular: he or she is one, one alone. Inasmuch as such agents have the power of self-determination, what they become will not depend solely on their inborn nature, what they were literally born to be. That human agents do not have a nature in the sense that they ascribe to other modes of being which they encounter, is evident in the fact that they cannot be objective when thinking about themselves. As Arendt puts it, they cannot jump over their own shadows. Nor is it possible to say of any agent who they are by, say, listing everything one knows about them as a set of qualities. Such qualities are what they are, which they share with other human beings and, it may be, with all other living organisms and with all other entities. Who anyone is, by contrast, is revealed in everything

*What are we to think of one another?*

he or she does and says, which is why agents are also persons. They appear through action, expression and reflective self-determinings to one another in the way that an actor’s voice in the theatre of antiquity sounded through all the masks he wore in consequence of the roles he played. The only other way to form some idea of an agent-person is to tell their story, so that the narrative becomes a revelation of the singularity of being of the person so represented.

We are not human in virtue of our agency and personhood alone: the singularity of our being as such ultimately isolates us from all others of our kind and from everything else.

Being human is sharing and disputing the mode of being we have, even when this goes no further than to acknowledge or to deny what we have in common. What we share and dispute, when we choose to do so, are the natural and historical conditions of our singular being as agents. Our powers of self-determination as agent-persons, our capacity to act, to express ourselves and to reflect on all that we have undergone in what we and others have done and said, are only possible in virtue of the organic mode of being that is the natural condition of our power of agency or beginning. The natural powers that are presupposed in the above action-reflection powers are those of self-movement, expressive utterance, and sentience or feeling. In no way is the natural condition of our active, expressive, reflective mode of life more evident than in the fact that the organ of the brain is brought into functioning by what we do and say. There is no ‘who’ of human being independently of the ‘what’ of our natural condition as organisms, but the ‘who’ is never reducible to the ‘what’.

The historical as distinct from the natural ‘what’ of our human being is constituted by all that we have learned in the course of time to do and say as a species of being, part of which we learn individually in the course of being brought up and educated. Thus,

whatever is my mother-tongue, for instance, is a historical condition of my being as an agent-person. It is shown to be such a condition, an outcome of learning, by the fact that I may cease to speak it for some reason and always speak some other tongue or tongues, albeit I shall not forget all the words I once knew that I no longer speak.

What is singular and what is common or shared are both integral and opposite dimensions of being human. As a singular being, I may, so far as it is possible to do so, whilst continuing to live, forswear the company of other human beings or be deserted by them. Every human being knows what it is to be alone in virtue of his singularity as agents. Yet when this has been acknowledged, it is also true to say that as agent-persons we constitute one another in our being, inasmuch as much of what we learn to do and say is learned by voluntary imitation of some example or by being taught, formally or informally, by another, who thereby becomes exemplary of what he or she is teaching. In imitation we become the being of those we imitate, so although we do and say what we do, the actual doing and saying derives from some other being. Much of philosophy, curiously enough, is learned in this way. Hence the educational importance, not only of knowing what to do and say, but of knowing what we are doing and saying and why. It is the contention of this paper that the human rights movement ultimately requires such education.

Human rights presupposes human equality. It has been said of such equality that it is for the graveyard only. One understands what is meant. The disparity in qualities and scope of performances of the same kind as between individuals can be, and frequently is, enormous. Those who are deeply impressed by the singularity of human being, but not by its humanity or inhumanity, commonly perceive the differences between us in respect of what we are able to do and say as decisive in this issue. Yet it is a fact that where our inequality lies, there is

also our equality. Being human is primarily being a 'who', an agent-person, and we are all that, despite our performative differences. Consequently, a major source of inhuman conduct as between human beings is for one to deny the singularity of being of another or others such. Yet, when this all-important fact has been observed, it remains true that, if we are all 'whos', many of us are not primarily conscious of the fact and, it might be added, are not encouraged to be so. Our sense of our identity, which is generally something that fluctuates to some degree, is more commonly a sense of what we are rather than who, and hence of ourselves as the instruments of other men's purposes. I am inclined to think that the ubiquity of the body-mind model of human being is a concomitant of such a sense of identity.

Whether the indubitable fact of human equality as an equality of agent-persons constitutes the ground for the claim that human rights are universal is, I find, questionable. For there to be rights, there has to be law. There is no law that governs human being. Nor do I believe there ever could be in the sense that it pertained to human beings in consequence of their humanity. Such being is fundamentally indeterminate or free and hence pertains to agent-persons, whose power of beginning anew it presupposes. It is because this is so that the idea of human nature is so questionable. We do not share a naturally determined programme of being, but only certain natural conditions of our lives, which, in some instances, are universal, such as natality and mortality. If there is no such thing as human nature, there is no natural law governing human being, from which human rights might be derived.

What is the source of the idea of human rights? Since it is governments that are commonly oppressive in ways that the human rights movement seeks to prevent, the movement can be conceived as so named in order to remind them of the illegality under their own laws of what it is that they do to those

they oppress. Yet the indeterminacy or freedom of human being and the singularity of the episodes that constitute the continuum of human transaction called history imply that human conduct between human beings is not generally specifiable in law or statements of rights. The latter are intended to prevent inhuman conduct. Probably only a certain sort of philosophical education would afford the desirable reflective refinement of actual human conduct.

Any such education in what we are to think of one another as human beings, who are so readily disposed to be inhuman, will have to take into account the importance of identity in human being. 'Who' and 'what' we continue to be and think ourselves to be, in the continuing proceedings of change which are our lives, is perhaps the most pressing question we all encounter. How we answer it for ourselves and others is determinative of the way we live. Commonly, it tends to be answered in terms of 'what' rather than 'who', and judgements of 'what' anyone is are commonly the origin of inhuman treatment, of killing one another, for instance, in consequence of what colour we are or what we believe. Yet our humanity is in fact inherent primarily in who we are as manifest in what we do and say.

London

### *Bibliography:*

- Arendt, Hannah      *The Human Condition*, Chicago University Press (1958).
- Macmurray, John      *The Form of the Personal: Vol. 1, The Self as Agent; Vol 2, Persons in Relation;* Faber (1957 & 1961).
- Rorty, Richard      *Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers*, Vol. 3; Cambridge (1998).

# MODELS OF REALITY

*P. Hammond*

## *Introduction*

This article is based on the epistemology of Michael Polanyi's book *Personal Knowledge*. It is a response to that work and is intended as a contribution to Polanyi's post-critical philosophy. The author's background is in electrical engineering, a subject that is briefly mentioned by Polanyi, but with which he had very little contact. It is hoped that the advantage of looking at Polanyi's work from a somewhat unusual angle will offset to some extent the disadvantage of the author's lack of philosophical training.

## *1. Objectivity*

In the first chapter of *Personal Knowledge* Polanyi discusses the objectivity of scientific knowledge in the context of the change from the Ptolemaic geocentric view of astronomy to the Copernican heliocentric view. The popular interpretation of this change is that it involves the lessening of human importance because the earth with its human inhabitants is no longer at the centre of the universe, but has become merely one of several planets orbiting the sun. Later developments in astronomy are thought to reinforce this view, because even the sun is only one of many similar stars and our galaxy is only one of many such collections of stellar objects. The Copernican revolution is taken as a paradigm of scientific progress in the direction of impersonal scientific knowledge. This popular view is reinforced by historians of science such as C. C. Gillispie whose book *The Edge of Objectivity*<sup>1</sup> takes as its main theme the vast impersonality of nature. Although recently this attitude has been questioned by writers on the *Anthropic Cosmological Principle*<sup>2</sup>, this change of outlook has so far made little impression on the popular perception of science. In that perception scientific advance has stripped away the personal and human features of knowledge. Polanyi argues that such a

view of science is mistaken, because for example the change from the geocentric to the heliocentric view is an achievement of human reasoning, which has replaced the anthropocentrism of the senses by the more ambitious anthropocentrism of human reason. Is this replacement an arbitrary change? Polanyi does not think so for two linked reasons. First the Copernican theory has greater objectivity because of its greater intellectual satisfaction and secondly it is more objective because it led Kepler to the laws of planetary motion and these led Newton to the underlying general theory of gravitation. These subsequent discoveries were unknown to Copernicus and they reinforce the objectivity of his conjecture. Thus his theory is shown to be more than a human construction, but it is human none the less.

Polanyi's account of the Copernican revolution has echoes of Kant's so-called Copernican revolution in philosophy. Under the pressure of Hume's scepticism Kant struggled with the problem of the possibility of scientific (synthetic) knowledge. He came to the conclusion that such knowledge was available because of certain a priori categories which the human mind imposes on the sense-data. Kant therefore located objectivity in the structure of the human mind, whereas Polanyi locates it in the external world described by the discoveries of the human mind. It is only a short step from Kant to the subjectivism of Kuhn's<sup>3</sup> theory of scientific paradigms and the radical views of Arbib and Hesse in their Gifford lectures: 'The Construction of Reality'<sup>4</sup>. It is interesting that both Polanyi and Arbib and Hesse quote extensively from the work of Piaget on the development of consciousness in infants. For Polanyi that work illustrates how small children begin to understand the world around them, whereas Arbib and Hesse quote the title of one of Piaget's books, *The Construction of Reality in the Child*, as support for their own thesis that

knowledge consists essentially in the construction of 'control strategies' or 'schema' related to the evolutionary development of human beings. It is likely that Polanyi's emphasis on objectivity was reinforced by his first-hand experience of experimental research in science, whereas Arbib and Hesse have a background in computation and philosophy. For them there is hardly any difference between artificial and human intelligence.

Polanyi stands between such subjective theories and the view that science deals with the objective facts given by sense-data and by scientific laws embodied in mathematical formulae. He does not refer explicitly to Popper's idea of a 'third world' of objective knowledge<sup>5</sup> contained in well-tested scientific laws stored in libraries, but the importance he attaches to a shared tradition in scientific work shows that he would have regarded such written laws as being incomprehensible in the absence of experienced scientists. Engineers are closer to Polanyi than to Popper on the one hand or to Arbib and Hesse on the other, although they have a different emphasis. They have no misgivings about the existence of an external world or of knowledge about it but they are less concerned with the intellectual satisfaction to be obtained from its study. The proof of objectivity in engineering arises from the question 'does it fulfil its purpose?' This purpose is related to the quality of life of human beings in the environment of their external world. Thus there is both an objective and subjective aspect to the engineering purpose. Arbib and Hesse's control strategies and the artificial intelligence of computers are means towards the fulfilment of purpose, but they are not the whole story. For example, the development of wings for human beings might have evolutionary advantages, but the properties of the external world make this impossible. The engineering solution for the problem of human flight lies in the construction of aeroplanes, which uses the available properties of the

external world as well as the ingenuity of human minds.

## 2 *The Art of Knowing*

Polanyi's account of scientific knowledge combines objectivity with subjective human endeavour in an extremely close relationship. The hallmark of a good theory is its objectivity. It has to fit the facts. On the other hand facts are theory-laden. They have no meaning in isolation.

Polanyi achieves a remarkable synthesis in which he is able to affirm both the discoverer and the discovery. From the human side scientific research requires skill in the selection of problems, connoisseurship in detecting value which can be sharpened through interaction with others and above all commitment to the inherent truth and order of the natural world.

Unlike Kant he does not make a distinction between the appearance of the world and its unknown reality. This does not mean that human discovery exhausts that reality, because as already mentioned the reality is confirmed by as yet unspecified patterns of order. Polanyi has strong sympathy with the views of Einstein as against those associated with Bohr's 'Copenhagen Doctrine' of complementarity. Einstein's misgivings about quantum theory arose from his belief in objective reality: 'The Secret of the Old One', whereas Bohr wrote: 'there is no quantum world ... It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature'<sup>6</sup>. Polanyi recounts that Einstein was led to relativity theory by considering the nature of light as an electromagnetic wave and not by the negative result of the experiments of Michelson and Morley. He uses this historical example to argue against the positivist understanding of science as solely based on sense data.

## 3 *Focal and Tacit Knowledge*

Polanyi discusses two kinds of awareness. In focal awareness the attention is directed to a particular object or process - for example the playing of a particular piece of music. The

process requires tacit skills in handling the musical instrument, but the attention is not focused on these skills. Indeed tacit awareness is necessarily tacit because otherwise it would interfere with the process. Polanyi mentions self-consciousness and stage fright as causing such interference. Another very telling example he gives is in the use of language. Although the meaning of a document is embodied in words and rules of grammar, someone skilled in several languages uses those languages tacitly while focusing on the meaning. The reader may even be unaware of the language in which the document is written. Polanyi enlarges the notion of tacit knowledge to include traditions and the whole of one's mental background. It is impossible to free oneself from this background, because focal knowledge depends on tacit knowledge and is unobtainable by itself. The meaning of something relies on a subsidiary awareness of its parts, so that mental recognition of a meaning cannot be analysed into those parts. Nor is there a logical process, which leads from the parts to the whole, because the parts derive their meaning from the whole. The process is irreversible. Similarly the process of scientific discovery cannot be defined in terms of logical steps, because it also is irreversible.

These insights are extremely valuable. Amongst other matters they suggest that explanations in terms of fundamental particles must always be incomplete. They also suggest that the postmodernist intention of seeking underlying detachable meaning is bound to fail. From an engineering perspective it seems that Polanyi does not go far enough in showing that in personal knowledge there cannot be a single meaning nor a single whole object. Engineering is inevitably connected to human purposes and the meaning of such a simple thing as, say, a bicycle is different for each user as well as being different for manufacturers of bicycles and for town planners. Every meaning is a meaning in context. It uses both focal and tacit knowledge. The meanings overlap, so that there is

a continuous field of meaning rather than an interconnected lattice of discrete meanings.

## 4 *Completeness*

Polanyi sees similarities between the limitations of analytical procedures applied to personal knowledge and the limitations of logical processes set out in Gödel's undecidability theorem. Any system for which a set of given axioms is known can be used to construct and assert a new set of axioms. The assertion of new axioms enlarges the system, so that it is never complete. However, since the new axioms are not deducible from the old ones (by definition), their assertion requires an act of judgement. In Polanyi's view such judgement is essentially an act to be performed by a mind, because it involves the purpose entertained by the mind. As an example he discusses the modelling of the nervous system in terms of the laws of physics and chemistry. The model consists of three parts:

1. The mind of the neurologist;
2. The nervous system of the subject studied by the neurologist;
3. The intellectual purposes attributed to the subject by the neurologist.

Part 3 perforce omits the informal unspecifiable personal functions and is incomplete. Polanyi holds that such a tripartite arrangement applies also to the modelling of machines, where consideration must be given to the mind of the operator, the machine itself and the functions and purposes entertained by the mind. Thus artificial intelligence is always dependent on human purpose. The personal mind denies personal qualities to the model (e.g. neurology) although it exercises its own personal qualities. There is no reciprocal relation between the mind and the machine. Engineers would agree with this but go further, because they deploy a multiplicity of models for the same machine, where the choice of model depends on its use. In engineering, unlike pure science, there is little likelihood of confusion between a model of a machine and an actual machine.



## 5 Knowledge and Purpose

Polanyi is equivocal about purpose. In his discussion of artificial intelligence he ascribes a key-role to it as an essential feature of personal knowledge, whereas in other parts of his work he seems to disregard it and even treat it as a hindrance to scientific discovery. He is anxious that the pursuit of truth should be free of externally imposed purposes, although he concedes that occasionally the scientific purpose may run parallel with a technical one. Thus he writes that the discovery of insulin as a cure for diabetes was both a contribution to science and a technically useful help in the treatment of disease. The usefulness in this instance did not interfere with the scientific study. Such a separation of pure and applied knowledge is unconvincing, particularly in view of Polanyi's analysis of learning in animals and infants, where all knowledge is applied to a useful purpose. There seems to be also a conflict between his classification of learning into trick-learning, sign-learning and latent learning and the more general classification of focal and tacit knowledge, since all three kinds of learning rely on both focal and tacit components. Polanyi is desperately concerned to separate pure from applied science, so that pure science will escape from the trammels of usefulness as defined narrowly by governments or by the operation of the market place. In order to succeed he not only distinguishes between pure and useful knowledge, but also invents two kinds of epistemology for the attainment of knowledge. This comes close to dividing mankind into pure scientists and the rest. Such an idea is a particular failing of academic scholars. An extreme example is given by the mathematician G. H. Hardy, who in his autobiography, *A Mathematician's Apology*,<sup>7</sup> glories in the fact that none of his work has ever been useful or can ever become useful. Polanyi would not go as far as Hardy, because he knows that the objectivity of knowledge brings with it unspecifiable results, so that even

Hardy's discoveries in pure mathematics may lead to useful applications. Also Polanyi does not decry usefulness. What he seeks to show is that scientific work has standards of its own. It seems best to regard Polanyi's defence of pure science as well-intentioned but fundamentally mistaken. He is trying to have his cake and to eat it.

## 6 Operational Principles

Because Polanyi is ambivalent about the purpose of scientific knowledge he seeks to isolate it in terms of what he calls 'operational principles'. In language he identifies two such principles, the first is its order including rules of grammar and consistency in the use of words. The second is manageability, which involves the possibility of using a language flexibly without loss of meaning. Polanyi relates language to the highest form of learning, which he calls 'latent learning' and which he puts on the same level as scientific discovery. It is interesting that for him technology is essentially a wordless skill shared by human beings with animals not possessing language. He writes that technology teaches action using implements according to specifiable rules. It is strange that he regards the operational principles of technology as different from and inferior to those of language. The difficulties inherent in these views become even more apparent in his discussion of operational principles in mathematics. He holds that pure mathematics resembles natural science because it is presented in a set of declaratory sentences, whereas applied mathematics operates with rules of procedure and operational principles. Hence pure mathematics can be true or false, while applied mathematics can only be right or wrong. Polanyi here puts his finger on a real conflict between those mathematicians who strive for ever-increasing rigour and those who find their satisfaction in the relationship between observation of the natural world and mathematics. Nevertheless the distinction is altogether too sharp. In view of Gödel's theorem rigour is

limited by the conflict between completeness and consistency, so that Polanyi is in danger of defining pure mathematics as a meaningless game. Moreover his account of applied mathematics does not square with the actual use of mathematics in technology, unless technology is equated with computation.

Even greater difficulties arise in Polanyi's account of operational principles in nature. He speaks of fixed operational principles guiding the behaviour of animals, which are impelled by their unspecifiable inventive urge. It is difficult to see the significance of a combination of fixed operations and flexible urges. Polanyi appears to be aware of the difficulty and he seeks to resolve it by positing additional conceptual terms like morphogenesis and equilibration. However in these the roles of operational principles and physico-chemical laws are inverted. Previously, operational principles were well-defined machine-like operations, whereas the laws were statements about the natural world. Now these laws can be related to well-defined processes, while the operational principles require 'Gestalt' information which cannot be made explicit. Purposeful useful behaviour is seen to be not at all inferior to the statements of pure science.

In a footnote Polanyi admits that all is not well with this discussion. There can be an abstract technology akin to science. He cites electrotechnics as an example and says that it can be detached from the technical study of materials. However in chemical technology the theory cannot be separated from the properties of materials. Hence in chemistry the subject matter requires a fusion of certain operational principles with the material conditions of their success or failure. Thus he concedes that there is no essential difference between pure and applied chemistry. It is very significant that his deep knowledge of chemistry has forced Polanyi to abandon the distinction, which he seeks to apply to electrical technology with which he was less familiar.

The last chapter of *Personal Knowl-*

*edge* opens with the frank admission that the discussion of the 'nature of things' has been incomplete and will remain so. The chief purpose of the book has been to renew the confidence of the reader in the use of faculties which centuries of critical thought have taught him to distrust. Polanyi has invited us to have renewed faith in ourselves and in our fellow men and women. In this he has been eminently successful.

However in this chapter he continues his quest of finding a structured theory of knowledge, in which the operational principles of systems play a major role. He takes an idea, which arose in the study of machines and applies it to living systems. The problem here is how to account for the evolution of new operational principles. Long-range developments such as human consciousness require more than the adaptive advantages conferred by natural selection, because the ordering of consecutive evolutionary steps needs a further ordering principle. Polanyi's solution is to posit a new ordering principle which can cross the gaps between successive operational principles in an upward evolutionary direction. He calls this principle an 'emergence' and says that it is exemplified by the fact of human consciousness.

### 7 Hierarchical Systems

The difficulties encountered in the previous section are due to the variety of Polanyi's epistemological models. First there is the model of co-operative focal and tacit knowledge linked with skills and resulting in achievements. Secondly there is a model which separates well-defined machine-like operations from laws of nature discovered by scientists. In this model a distinction is made between pure science and technology. Pure science is superior to technology because it involves deep understanding, whereas technology is akin to the learning of tricks. Moreover technology involves motives and purposes which are alien to the disinterested pursuit of knowledge. Thirdly there is the model of operational principles

defined as whole-system parameters, in which natural laws govern the behaviour of the parts of the system. In this model the parts are subsidiary to the whole and the meaning of the system as a whole cannot be inferred from the parts. The role of the natural laws is therefore subsidiary to that of the operational principles. This relationship is in conflict with the second model in which the operational principle features as an 'invention', whereas the natural laws are 'discoveries'. An extension of the third model is provided by the evolutionary principle of emergence which establishes a hierarchy of operational principles. A fourth model, which Polanyi rejects, is the reductionist one in which Biology is reduced to Chemistry and Chemistry to Physics. It is interesting that this model is sometimes advocated on the grounds of the intrinsic simplicity of the parts of a system as against the complexity of the whole. The properties of a system can then be regarded as a consequence of its complexity. This is the view held by Dawkins<sup>8</sup>.

A very clear account of a hierarchical model is given by Peacocke<sup>9</sup>. He distinguishes between a hierarchy of natural systems in terms of increasing complexity such as is given by the sequence: atom-molecule-macromolecule-subcellular organelle-cell-multicellular functioning organ-whole living organism-populations of organisms-ecosystem; and a hierarchy of theories such as physics-chemistry-biochemistry & biophysics-cell physiology-cytology-cell biology-physiology-population genetics & ecology. He concludes that in the hierarchy of theories there is 'theory autonomy', because the concepts of the higher theories are irreducible to those of the lower ones. However there is no equivalent autonomy in the processes of natural systems, because the processes in a less complex system apply also in the more complex ones. Peacocke regards the hierarchy of natural systems as an observational fact, which is undisputed among scientists and needs no further elaboration. In this he differs from Polanyi for whom such facts arise

from human personal knowledge which involves a network of ideas. This implies that a natural system cannot be detached from its supporting theories. Peacocke's detachment of the systems from the theories does not solve the problem of the existence of the systems and their connections. However, such a hierarchy of systems has an important reference to evolution and to what both Peacocke and Polanyi describe as emergence.

The idea of hierarchy is related to the directionality of temporal processes. It replaces a temporal sequence by a spatial one, so that 'later' becomes 'higher in level'. Representations of dynamic processes in terms of statics take us back to the Newtonian view of the world in which time is a universal parameter independent of space. In Newton's world physical events take place in an independent space which acts as an immovable container. Maxwell's discovery of the constant relationship between space and time in terms of the velocity of light and Einstein's subsequent development of relativity theory show that space-time is not so much a container of events as an active participant in them. Moreover any description of temporal sequences in terms of static ones cannot account for the direction of time. It is also important to notice that the simple spatial sequences used by Peacocke exclude all non-trivial topological features. Since topology plays an essential role in all dynamical phenomena its omission from hierarchical models seriously limits their explanatory power.

### 8 Representations of the Natural World

We have mentioned that Peacocke regards the hierarchy of natural systems as an undisputed observational fact. It will be helpful to explore carefully what this statement implies and Polanyi's analysis of what he calls 'articulation' will help us.

Polanyi begins with the way in which language becomes an instrument of articulation. He distinguishes between two operational principles of language: representation and

operation. Language must not only denote something but it must also act as a manageable instrument for human thought. Hence it must allow the mind to reorganize its experiences and must then allow the reorganized material to be interpreted and understood.

As an analogy Polanyi refers to a geographical map. This denotes a part of the earth's surface. It allows the traveller to find his way from place to place by reorganizing experience obtained in travel and it enables someone skilled in reading maps to plan a route.

A necessary feature of both the use of words and of maps is that the representation must be large enough to be informative and small enough to be manageable. In the case of a map the accuracy can be increased by an increase of the scale, but a map of scale unity would be useless as an instrument for finding one's way. Similarly an increase of vocabulary allows greater accuracy, but the number of words must be limited to allow effective inter-personal communication. Another feature of maps which Polanyi does not mention is that they can only be used in the description of a continuous space. The geographical map relies on the continuity of the earth's surface. Continuity is by no means a universal attribute. A scale model of a machine may be regarded as a map, but not all models are maps. For example, the model of an electric motor in terms of electromotive forces and impedances represents the external behaviour but is useless as a map of its parts. The purpose of the model is to give understanding of its electrical characteristics as seen by someone outside the motor.

Let us now return to Peacocke's sequence of natural systems mentioned in the previous section. He writes that 'it represents a series of levels of organization of matter, in which each successive member of the series is a whole constituted of parts preceding it in the series'. If this implies, as it seems to do, that there is continuity in the series, then the series represents a continuous evolutionary

space and it maps that space. The space is one-dimensional, so that evolution and level of organization are equivalent. Moreover every term in the series describes something called 'matter', so that the series consists of the same substance in different patterns of organization.

However, Peacocke is not satisfied with this conclusion, which he regards as unsatisfactorily reductionist. Instead he resorts to a second series which he calls a hierarchy of theories. This series possesses 'theory autonomy' and is discontinuous. It is therefore not a map but a model illustrating the evolutionary development of natural systems.

The chief difficulty with this arrangement is that the two hierarchies are interdependent. Terms such as molecule, organ or ecosystem are much more than descriptions of patterns of matter. They derive their meaning from the theories and experimental laws in which they are embedded. It is difficult to see how both continuities and discontinuities can be accommodated in the same hierarchical structure.

### 9 The Construction of Models

Polanyi's examination of language shows that although the possible number of words is indefinitely large, this number is restricted in order to make the language manageable for inter-personal use. This restriction is a general property of all models. In the scientific and technical uses of language words are used which do not occur in ordinary speech and ordinary words are used with specially restricted meanings. To the outsider this is an irritating introduction of jargon, but its purpose is the clarification of specialist meaning. Technical language is a mixture of technical terms with ordinary speech, so that it can encompass both discontinuities and continuities.

The structure of linguistic models is complicated by the intricate relationships between different specialisms and between each specialism and general human experience. Moreover the objectivity of knowledge of the natu-

ral world results in unspecifiable further uses of language. Two simple examples from electrotechnics are the terms 'electromotive force' and 'electrokinetic momentum'. Force and momentum are well-defined in Newtonian mechanics, but the compound electrical terms are needed to describe phenomena, which in some sense are analogous but not identical. There is a link between mechanics and electromagnetics, but the link is not a one-to-one relationship.

The construction of models exhibits closely interwoven objective and subjective features. Objectively the model must fit some observed behaviour of the natural world and subjectively it must be constructed for a particular purpose, which will determine the choice of the 'variables' to be studied by means of the model. There is an inevitable conflict between the desire to increase the range of applicability of a model and its closeness of fit to the properties it is to represent. The idea of a 'theory of everything' is an illusion just as is a map of scale unity. It arises from a confusion, which identifies the model with the process being modelled.

Polanyi's distinction between focal and tacit knowledge throws light on the construction of models, inasmuch as a model gives focal knowledge in a setting of unspecified tacit knowledge. The mistake of regarding the model as identical with what it models is equivalent of attempting to cut a piece of focal knowledge out of its tacit environment. What he does not stress, however, is the purpose of a model which determines its construction. Polanyi's distinction between science and technology is based on disregarding purpose in scientific representations of the natural world and confining purpose to technology, where it appears as a malign influence due to external forces. As we have already noted he seeks to protect scientific research from commercial and political interference. In postulating different levels of learning, based on trick-learning, sign-learning and latent learning Polanyi erects a hierarchical model of learning and knowledge.

The purpose of this model is clear, but like Peacocke's hierarchy the model assumes what it seeks to demonstrate. Also it disregards the multiplicity of models and of the purposes which govern their construction. The passionate commitment which Polanyi ascribes to scientists in their pursuit of scientific truth is a very strong purpose. Moreover this approach to truth requires a multiplicity of variables and the scientist has to select these in his construction of models just as the technologist does. The limited range of each selection results in specialist disciplines with their own technical languages all of which contain untranslatable terms set in a matrix of common usage. There is in any modelling procedure a necessary mix of continuous and discontinuous features just as there is a necessary combination of tacit and focal knowledge.

A danger in separating pure science from technology and assigning purpose only to technology is that science then appears as simply a game played by scientists. Such an approach does no service to science. If it is adopted, the construction of scientific models becomes the construction of a virtual reality like that of a computer game.

### 10 Emergence and Achievement

In our discussion of operational principles we briefly mentioned Polanyi's sketch of a 'theory of the nature of things' in the concluding chapter of *Personal Knowledge*. He faces the problem of how to construct a model, which will include human consciousness. Peacocke deals with this problem by a hierarchy of models in which the links between the various levels are provided by matter and its complexity. This does not satisfy Polanyi who regards it as impossible that an explanation of something at a higher level can be provided by its parts at a lower level. Although the entities at the lower level provide the possibilities of existence for the higher level, they do not provide the 'wholeness' of the higher level with

its operational principles. In Polanyi's view this implies that the mechanism of natural selection is insufficient to account for the emergence of human consciousness.

Instead of using matter as the continuous element between evolutionary levels he develops the idea of a 'heuristic field' associated with personal knowledge. This field provides access to opportunity and impels an organism to grasp that opportunity. It provides the link between all the partial discoveries embodied in models. There is a cosmic field that calls into existence centres of individual being and offers them the possibility of achievement. A cause emergent in time has directed itself at aims, which are timeless.

This new terminology sounds excessively strange. The word 'field' has echoes of Maxwell's electromagnetic field. Maxwell like Polanyi was looking for links between centres of action and found the explanation in terms of a field. However, this field was not only an idea but also an observable quantity, which acts as a store and transmitter of energy. Einstein's equivalence between energy and mass shows the field to be some sort of material object, whereas Polanyi's field is an organizing principle and as such cannot itself be a material substance. The trouble is that Polanyi has introduced this field to explain consciousness and this makes it a self-referencing term. It cannot be a model because, as Polanyi has pointed out, a model has to be constructed by a mind. We are again faced by the Gödelian sentence which denies the possibility of completeness and consistency. Another feature of the heuristic field is that it is finalistic and is concerned with purpose. Although previously Polanyi has been reluctant to include purpose as a constituent of scientific discovery, he now makes the purpose of the field into the central feature of the whole system. To deny the difference between human consciousness and such processes as chemical reactions requires in Polanyi's words a 'truculently bigoted mechanistic outlook'.

If the cosmic field has purpose and if it embodies consciousness, it would seem that Polanyi should have grasped the nettle and referred to the Creator. Surely this is in any case the inevitable conclusion of the study of personal knowledge. There cannot be a 'theory of everything' because such a theory fails to include the mind constructing the theory and the purpose of the theory. There are only two choices: either the world is closed and meaningless or it is an open system existing by and for the purpose of its Creator, a purpose that includes human existence as persons having personal knowledge. From the viewpoint of engineering it is clear that 'purpose' and 'fitness for purpose' are basic to all activity. It would be strange indeed if this were to be illusory. Even philosophers prefer electric light to candles and piped water to open wells.

Southampton

### References:

1. Gillispie, C. C. *The Edge of Objectivity* Princeton University Press 1960.
2. Barrow, J. D. and Tipler, F. J. *The Anthropic Cosmological Principle* Oxford University Press 1986
3. Kuhn, T. S. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* Chicago University Press 1970
4. Arbib, M. A. *The Construction of Reality* Cambridge University Press 1986
5. Popper, K. R. *Objective Knowledge* Oxford University Press 1972
6. Pais, A. *Niel's Bohr's Times* Oxford University Press 1991
7. Hardy, G. H. *A Mathematician's Apology* Cambridge University Press 1940
9. Dawkins, R. *The Blind Watchmaker* Penguin Books 1988
10. Peacocke, A. R. *Creation and the World of Science* Oxford University Press 1979

Bob Brownhill

A characteristic of all research is to improve our understanding of the nature of reality, and to consider the possibility of obtaining a correct account.

## 1 Polanyi in his work challenges the orthodoxy of scientific research

The post-war orthodoxy was that propounded by the logical positivists. The British version of logical positivism was developed by A.J. Ayer in 1936 in his book *Language, Truth and Logic*<sup>1</sup>. He argued that in order to be meaningful a statement needed to be empirically verifiable or analytically verifiable (the verification principle). It could be verified by the facts or shown to be a tautology or a geometric type of argument, where the conclusion can be derived from the premise. It is inherent in it and one looks at the consistency of the conclusion with the premise. Statements that could not be verified either empirically or analytically were meaningless. It therefore followed, as Ayer argued in chapter 6, that both ethical and religious arguments were literally meaningless as they could not be verified. They were based on irrational beliefs or prejudice. Ayer was stating that a rational argument had to consist of a series of statements which could be verified.

The eighteenth century Scottish philosopher, David Hume, had produced an even stricter definition of rationality<sup>2</sup> which denied Ayer's concept of empirical verification. He argued that, even if throughout our experience we observed B follow A, then this was not an indication that a logical relationship existed between them. Our belief arose through custom or habit. It was not a matter of logical necessity that B followed A. The future is not necessarily like the past. Indeed it may be that at some future date B did not follow A. Hume was making a number of points: he was making a distinction between logic and the real world; he was confining

the notion of rationality to deductive logic; he was indicating that there can be no absolute certainty in the real world only irrational belief.

Karl Popper, the modern philosopher of science, agreed with Hume<sup>3</sup> that we are not justified in reasoning from repeated instances which we have in experience to other instances (conclusions) of which we have no experience. But disagreed with Hume that we were left with irrational belief. Popper developed his theory in the following way: we need to regard all empirical theories as hypothetical or conjectural<sup>4</sup>, i.e., a guess; a hypothesis has to be put in a form that will allow it to be tested, and by this he means falsified. He recommended it should be put in a negative existential form, e.g., 'there are no sea serpents' rather than an existential form, e.g., 'sea serpents exist'; a good scientific hypothesis would be put in a negative existential form, it would be very bold and specific, i.e., have a high information content with a probability approaching zero, if it was able to stand up to tests and be corroborated, it would be an excellent hypothesis. Nevertheless it would still be tentative. His major point is that science is highly critical, it always challenges a hypothesis, and always scientific hypotheses are tentative. He also makes the point that from a logical point of view we can falsify a negative existential statement by one counter example but in practice we cannot<sup>5</sup> and a general agreement of the research community is needed that a hypothesis has been falsified.

Popper then:

1. Retains objectivity.
2. Insists on the testability of a hypothesis.
3. Provides an explanation of how science develops by trial and error but also by overcoming error.
4. He confines science to the material world (Kantian appearances).
5. Certain problems still exist, as facts need to be organised and interpreted.
6. He is suspicious of the use of interpre-

tative frameworks, for everything must be open to challenge and criticism. A possible problem with an interpretative framework is that it provides a method of organising facts and then producing answers which are not open to challenge.

## 2 The Polanyian challenge

The thrust of Polanyi's work is not to destroy objectivity but to make it more sensitive and sophisticated in such a way that, with development, allows others to understand both the nature of the physical world and the social world as well. He provides the link between qualitative and quantitative research. Polanyi, in fact has received numerous criticism for advocating subjectivism in science. For instance Karl Popper stated, 'I saw in it [*Personal Knowledge*] only a symptom of a far deadlier disease—the dissolution of the most objective of all sciences, physics'<sup>6</sup>. Imre Lakatos wrote of 'Polanyi's pseudo-mystical post-critical method'<sup>7</sup>. The criticism was developed and for a time became the orthodox reaction to Polanyi's writings on the philosophy of science<sup>8</sup>. It was not until the publication of John Brennan's argument that Polanyi transcended the distinction between objectivity and science<sup>9</sup> that some defence of Polanyi against the accusation occurred. It was reinforced by my article 'Objectivity and Subjectivity in Polanyi's *Personal Knowledge*'<sup>10</sup>. The response was interesting, for it appeared a number of Polanyi's own followers wanted his arguments to be classed as subjective and pseudo mystical and that this was his attraction.<sup>11</sup> This seemed fatal for Polanyi's arguments, for if he advocated subjectivism and if his own arguments were subjective, then his arguments could be dismissed as the whim of an eccentric scientist and ignored.

The accusation of subjectivism lay in three areas: his concept of indwelling, his rejection of testability, and his notion of commitment. He argued that we are likely to make a discovery only if we are passionately

immersed in our research. He stated:

We may say for example that we know the clues of perception by dwelling in them, when we attend to that which they jointly indicate; and that we see the parts of the whole forming a whole by dwelling in the parts. We arrive thus at the conception of indwelling.<sup>12</sup>

This is really Polanyi's epistemology. We 'indwell' or we immerse ourselves in the clues of perception in order to gain a knowledge of the whole. This does not mean we concentrate on the particulars and that this would give us a knowledge of the whole, as this would have the opposite result. It would prevent a picture of the whole being formed. What we do is assimilate the particulars, and make them part of ourselves, and then we are able to achieve a knowledge of the whole.<sup>13</sup> He argued that by indwelling in things or by interiorising things we come to view them not as particulars but we use them to attend to the comprehensive entity which they form.<sup>14</sup> The idea of assimilating particulars has another function within the Polanyian system which is tied up with his ontology. He believes that reality has a hierarchical structure, and that because of this science cannot be concerned with the study of appearances, the lowest level of reality,<sup>15</sup> but must be concerned with higher levels of reality. The act of assimilation, then, as well as being a necessary step in the perception of patterns (*gestalten*), enables us to forget about the particulars and automatically use the knowledge of the whole which we have gained. We use it to progress to the next level of reality. The knowledge gained becomes part of our tacit knowledge which we no longer try to break down or analyse. In a sense we are able to look from it towards a new pattern. It becomes a particular in the next stage of discovery.

Polanyi believed that each level of reality was subject to a dual control: by the laws that apply to it elements in themselves, and by the laws that control the comprehensive entity formed by them. He used the analogy

of speech to show how we progress from one level to another.<sup>16</sup> He made the point that the operations of the higher level cannot be accounted for by the laws governing the particulars forming the next lower level.<sup>17</sup> His analogy is intended to show how we progress from one level of reality to another and why we are able to progress in such a way. When used as an explanation of the scientific task it is indicative of Polanyi's belief that a scientist is not solely concerned with the study of appearances but by the process of indwelling is able to move beyond our knowledge of physical and chemical appearances to the world of things-in themselves: from the phenomenal world to the noumenal.

The theory, then, is a direct challenge to the neo-Kantian concept of science as the study of appearances. It is also a rejection of the idea that scientific ideas are testable. The empirical data we can collect in the world of appearances cannot be used to refute or verify our beliefs about the higher realms of reality, although they can be used to cast doubts on or corroborate our conjectures. They are not testable in principle. The notion of perceiving *gestalten* also challenges the notion of testability, particularly if the patterns perceived are highly personal. It would always be open to discovering scientist to declare that in rejecting his theory the critics had failed to perceive the relevant patterns, and that they never could perceive them unless they had gone through the same process of indwelling. Nevertheless, the conflict between Polanyi and Popper remained in theory. In practice Popper agreed that a hypothesis could only be refuted after a general agreement of scientists and not by one instance: a view which coincided with Polanyi's view of consensus.

Polanyi attempted to strengthen his notion of indwelling by an idea of commitment, and, in fact uses the element of commitment to differentiate between subjective and personal knowledge<sup>18</sup>. He produced a picture of a passionate scientist, using his

experience, and relying on clues—a work-a-day skill—who is able to progress from one level of reality to the next. He relies on his own judgement as a mature<sup>19</sup>, and experienced scientist working within an interpretative framework he implicitly accepts. The resultant discovery is a discovery he is committed to, as he has gone through an arduous intellectual process to arrive there, and at each stage has had to rely on his own judgement as to the correct understanding. It is Polanyi's claim that it is only by this intellectual commitment that a discovery is made. Polanyi was very much looking at the practice of science as a skill practised by scientists who are committed to the truth and through their education and training have established their own contact with reality. It is not just an intellectual exercise but a task which concerns the whole person.

It is heuristic passion that leads to discovery but it is a passion that is led by a desire to reveal, and a commitment to a universal truth. The piece of knowledge that we grasp is not just something that satisfies our subjective cravings but is something we make a universal claim for—we claim that it is objective, that it is the truth. It is this passion-soaked objective claim which he called personal knowledge.

An obvious objection is that a commitment however strong, cannot guarantee the truth. Polanyi did not argue this but argued that commitment is important in the process of discovery and that we should expect it to be associated with truth claims.

### *3 He did in fact set out his own notion of objectivity*<sup>20</sup>

Part of his argument was that theoretical knowledge had greater objectivity than a knowledge gained through the senses. He opened *Personal Knowledge* with a discussion about the comparative objectivity of the Ptolemaic and Copernican theories, and pointed out that the former depends very much on the evidence of our senses while the latter is developed in a far more abstract way. He argued that we could only accept the Copernican sys-

tem as more objective if we accepted this shift in intellectual satisfaction as the criterion of greater objectivity. This implied that of two forms of knowledge we should consider as more objective that which relies to a greater measure on theory rather than a more immediate sensory experience.<sup>21</sup> He produced three arguments to support his contention:

- (a) A theory is something other than myself. It may be set out on a piece of paper as a system of rules, and it is more truly a theory the more completely it can be put down in such terms . . . all theory may be regarded as a kind of map extended in space and time. It seems obvious that a map can be correct or mistaken, so that to the extent to which I have relied on my map I shall attribute to it any mistakes that I made by doing so. A theory on which I rely is therefore objective knowledge in so far as it is not I but the theory, which is proved right or wrong when I use such knowledge.
- (b) A theory, moreover, cannot be led astray by my personal illusions. To find my way by a map I must perform the conscious act of map reading and I may be deluded in the process, but the map cannot be deluded and remains right or wrong in itself, impersonally. Consequently, a theory on which I rely as part of my knowledge remains unaffected by any fluctuations occurring within myself. It has a rigid formal structure, on whose steadfastness I can depend whatever mood or desire may possess me.<sup>22</sup>
- (c) Since the formal affirmations of a theory are unaffected by the state of the person accepting it, theories may be constructed without regard to one's normal approach to experience. This is a third reason why the Copernican system, being more theoretical than the Ptolemaic, is also more objective. Since its picture of the solar system disregards our terrestrial location, it commends itself equally to the inhabitants of Earth, Mars, Venus or Neptune, provided they share our intellectual values.<sup>23</sup>

Polanyi was arguing that a good theory has an explicitness as a system of rules, impersonality, and separateness from our sense experience. It becomes an entity in itself, like a map, with its own independence and rationality. Or, as he stated:

When we claim a greater objectivity for the Copernican theory, we do imply that its excellence is, not a matter of personal taste on our part, but an inherent quality deserving universal acceptance by rational creatures.<sup>24</sup>

Polanyi's concept of objectivity is quite orthodox here: a theory should be free from personal whims, it has logically an independent status, and has communicability—we can understand it whatever our location or situation. He has two other criteria to determine the objectivity of a theory:

- (i) It should reveal an independent reality;
- (ii) It should lead to further discoveries.

Polanyi believed there was an independent reality, and that it is the task of the scientist to reveal it. That reality had a rational structure and that a good theory can be considered objective because its own rationality reveals the rationality of nature. The question remained as to how we were to determine the rationality of a theory. He produced a number of criteria to answer such a question: beauty which included the concept of simplicity. He stated,

It is legitimate to regard simplicity as a mark of rationality . . . but great theories are rarely simple in the ordinary sense of the term . . . simplicity in science can be made equivalent to rationality only if 'simplicity' is used in a special sense known solely to scientists.<sup>25</sup>

Coherence is another criterion but he argued that by itself it could not guarantee rationality or truth. Such terms as beauty, economy, simplicity, coherence,

stand for those peculiar intellectual harmonies which reveal more profoundly and permanently than any sense experience the presence of objective truth<sup>26</sup>.

The mature scientist through his experience and indwelling knows when he is in contact with reality, and this knowledge is further confirmed when his theory gives intimations of further discoveries.

John Brennan<sup>27</sup> argued that we can look at things from different points of

view and get different interpretations: for instance, a doctor may look at the symptoms of a patient from one point of view and arrive at a certain diagnosis but another doctor will look at the symptoms of a patient from a slightly different point of view and get a different diagnosis. What is happening is that the doctor is using the point of view to provide him with rules which he uses in the diagnosis. The rules indicate to him that certain facts are relevant and others are not: the chaotic facts are organised and given meaning by the application of the rules from differing points of view. The doctor arrives at his decision to use a certain point of view, by his experience of similar cases. The symptoms do not determine the point of view to be used but lead the medical practitioner to delve into his experience and make a judgement about the most likely reasons for the symptoms. Once he has decided on this he can apply the point of view and then make a diagnosis and suggest treatment. He may, of course, be wrong and will need to re-assess his judgement, and start again. The good doctor is the one who on the whole chooses the right point of view and arrives at a correct diagnosis. It is all a matter of fallible judgement. The practice of medicine is very much based on skills which have been acquired over a considerable period of time. It has another feature and that is that because it is practice oriented it gives the practitioner considerable leeway in making choices but at the same time makes the correct choice far more difficult to achieve. We can explain the process as a series of judgements. The facts are at first examined, the facts (symptoms) lead to a judgement within the doctor's experience about the likely cause. The judgement is firmed up and a decision made. The judgement is then applied and a series of judgements made about what symptoms are relevant and what not. A judgement is then made as to what it all means (a diagnosis). A series of judgements are then made about what treatment is needed. A series of judgements then need to be

made about the success of the treatment, and adjustments made (a further complication is that all patients do not react in the same way). At some point a major decision (judgement) has to be made as whether the treatment is a success or not, and then a decision as to whether the diagnosis should be abandoned. It is possible to get a situation where the point of view and diagnosis are correct but the treatment does not work<sup>28</sup>.

Polanyi developed this type of argument in studying science. He argued that a theory can only be properly understood and have meaning if it is understood within a whole framework of other theories and beliefs which are themselves tacitly accepted. If one does not accept the same framework as the discovering scientist then, although it may be possible to recognise in a limited way the rationality of a theory—its coherence, one will not be able to recognise its veridical qualities. Polanyi argued that all judgements take place within a particular interpretative framework, and in *The Study of Man*<sup>29</sup> he developed in detail his concept of an interpretative framework.<sup>30</sup>

It is the case also that to exist as a scientist the scientist must have a similar interpretative framework as his colleagues.<sup>31</sup> This is the basis for Polanyi's use of consensus in the scientific community as his criterion for the acceptability of a theory. They are taking place in the same ball game, and are able to judge each other's theories as they have similar interpretative frameworks.

Many of these ideas have been picked up and sometimes developed within qualitative research. The critique of positivist and associated approaches to research have generally been accepted particularly in the area of social research.

The paradigm case of qualitative research is that of phenomenology. A problem it has met is the question of how a researcher influences his research. Phenomenologists argue that not only is the human situation complex but the way researcher's interpret

their data is complex as well and raises questions about the possibility of objectivity<sup>32</sup>:

... that true reality is, and will forever remain, both unknown and unknowable to us. Instead, that which we term reality, is inextricably linked to our mental processes in general, and in particular, to our in-built, innate capacity to construct meaning. This is the starting point of phenomenological inquiry.<sup>31</sup>

This means that the research to some degree will be biased as it will always be affected by the researcher's personal perspective. Yet the purpose of any research is to gain a correct and reliable understanding of reality as possible. Phenomenologists do claim that a degree of reliability and objectivity are possible.

Phenomenology uses a technique called bracketing to minimise the distortion that a researcher's own view brings to analysis. The technique was first described by Husserl<sup>33</sup>. It consists of two distinct processes: epoché and reduction<sup>34</sup>. Epoché is a strategy for bringing to the researcher's attention any assumptions that he or she has about the topic under consideration. It helps distance the researcher from the object of study. Once this is done then the data is studied through reduction;

... the researcher holds the phenomenon up for serious inspection ... it is not interpreted in terms of the standard meanings given to it by existing literature. In bracketing the subject matter is confronted as much as possible, on its own terms.<sup>35</sup>

The whole process is really based on the researcher being self aware which is heightened by the researcher's interest in and immersion in the subject matter of the inquiry. Often associated with this type of research is what is known as heuristic inquiry. It was created in response to perceived inadequacies in general phenomenological theory, and puts great emphasis on the role of intuition. Heuristic researchers argue that tacit knowledge always is a factor in the analysis of data and that therefore room must be made for it so that

it can be recognised, '... giving birth to the hunches and vague formless insights that characterise heuristic discovery.'<sup>36</sup>

Heuristic researchers make use of all aspects of human understanding and in order to allow for tacit knowledge and not just the cognitive aspects of understanding the normal process of bracketing has been modified. The epoché/reduction system has been replaced with a set of phases which clearly reflect Polanyi's work. They are described as immersion, incubation, illumination, explication and creative synthesis<sup>37</sup>.

1. Immersion 'is the stage of steeping oneself in all that is: of contacting the texture, tone, mood, range, and content of the experience'. The researcher needs to be fully aware of his or her situation and subject. The researcher becomes immersed and involved with the experience being studied.
2. Incubation is the period where the researcher contemplates the subject as his mind considers the experience. This is the process which allows intuitive and tacit insights to emerge. It is a period of reflection on the material gained. 'In the incubation stage the researcher deliberately withdraws, permitting meaning and awareness to awaken in their own time.' The understanding the researcher has of the experience is not yet complete and remains a collection of thoughts which have not yet coalesced.
3. Illumination is the phase when disjointed understanding actually come together and do coalesce. It is at this point that the experience 'takes on a vividness ... the experience is known in all its essential parameters' (Polanyi at one time called this a vision of reality.) It is at this point the researcher brings to bear the cognitive aspects of understanding and moves from speculation to analysis, looking for consistency and coherence.<sup>38</sup>
4. Explication is a further stage in the bringing together of the material and its checking to estimate whether it can be put forward as a correct understanding.
5. Creative synthesis is the point where the process is complete, the speculation has been checked by the rational part of thought and it can now be put forward as a universal claim and communicated to others.<sup>39</sup>

The different stages do not provide



a template for a correct understanding, as the stages do not explain how to listen to, or utilise, intuition or tacit knowledge. They represent the response of the mature experienced researcher to his or her study. They provide a rationale for research rather providing a formula for arriving at the truth.<sup>40</sup>

In another work the common characteristics of qualitative research are set out and again reflect some of Polanyi's ideas. It is argued that there are four ways of knowing in nursing: empirical knowing, aesthetic knowing, personal knowing, and ethical knowing.<sup>41</sup> Empirical knowing is the traditional way of science, an example of this is the knowledge derived from the biological sciences that describes and explains human function and through that knowledge we have been able to predict and control certain aspects of human structure and function. Aesthetic knowing is the art of nursing. The understanding and interpretation of human experience leading to the creative development of nursing care. Personal knowing is really self reflection, an understanding of oneself. It is an understanding of one's personal commitments may have on research. Moral knowing is concerned with reflecting on the moral dimension of the research and its relationship to others. Another important dimension is mentioned<sup>42</sup>. Reality is considered to be multiple. It is constructed by practitioners and is their representation of reality and not reality itself. Many of these ideas can be found in Polanyi's work, partly, of course, because he looked on science as a skill. He always accepted the importance of empirical knowledge, aesthetic knowledge he saw also as a skill in interpretation known only to the master practitioner, and aesthetic knowledge he saw as very similar to scientific knowledge. Self reflection and awareness were very much part of his work, it was connected to the desire to achieve the truth and therefore challenged and checked all one's speculations. Morality lay at the heart of his theory, and without it his 'Republic of Science' would fall

apart: it not only meant honesty in the dealings with colleagues but a commitment to contact and reveal the truth. Multiple realities seem not to fit in with his thought for he certainly believed there was only one reality. However, reality was known through our theories and interpretations and there could be arguments about the truth of theories. Certainly theories were put forward as revelations of reality, and backed up by rational commitments but they could be wrong even though we made universal claims for them. He argued there was one reality although we may proclaim the truth of many different claims. In that sense there were many different interpretations of the one reality, and the interpretations where personal constructs.

Polanyi's work was of fundamental importance for the development of qualitative research for it showed that in even the most rational and objective of all pursuit, viz. physics, faith, commitment, transcendental values, self-awareness and self reflection, as well as skills and the creativity to develop intuitions were all important to its development. He replaced the impersonal scientist by the committed scientist who was obsessed by and committed to his research. He also changed the view of objectivity. Objectivity was no longer a God-like attribute possessed by the impersonal scientist but a matter of judgement by a committed practitioner who was attempting to reveal the truth. He made a universal claim which he had checked to the best of his ability then offered it to the community for further checking. It was part of his commitment to the truth that he should be as clear as possible to his colleagues as to how he had arrived at his judgement so that they could check it and perhaps repeat it (a forerunner of the audit trail used in qualitative research). Once it was accepted a pure physical scientist operated like this then the way was open for a similar analysis to be made of the social researcher's task without it being considered too disreputable.

School of Educational Studies  
University of Surrey

Notes:

1. Ayer, A.J., *Language, Truth and Logic*, Gollancz, London 1936.
2. Hume, D. *Treatise on Human Nature*
3. Popper, K.R. *Objective Knowledge*
4. *ibid.*
5. *ibid.*
6. Popper, K. R., 'Replies to my Critics' in Schilpp, P.A. *The Philosophy of Karl Popper* (Open Court), La Salle, Illinois, 1974, p.1067.
7. Lakatos, I., 'Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes' in Lakatos, I. and Musgrave, A., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, CUP, 1970, p.163n.
8. Cf. A. Musgrave, *Impersonal Knowledge: a Criticism of Subjectivity in Epistemology*, PhD, London
9. Brennan, J. 'Transcendence of the distinction between objectivity and Subjectivity as Applied to the Philosophy of Science', *British Journal of Phenomenology*, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1977.
10. Brownhill, R.J. 'Objectivity and Subjectivity in Polanyi's Personal Knowledge', *New Universities Quarterly*, Summer, 1981.
11. Scott, D. *New Universities Quarterly*, 1982.
12. Polanyi M., *The Modern Mind: Its Structures and Prospects*. Lecture delivered at Bowdoin College, Brunswick Maine October 19th 1964.
13. Polanyi, *TD* p.16.
14. *ibid.*
15. *The Modern Mind*, op.cit
16. *ibid.*
17. *ibid.*

*Continued on p. 169*

*Sue Watkinson*

## *1 Introduction*

This paper aims to explore some of the philosophical issues surrounding the nature and role of intuition and tacit knowledge in professional decision-making with specific reference to Polanyi's concepts of tacit knowledge, tacit integration and the use of an interpretative framework. It will show how such issues are related to and arise within professional practice with reference to relevant examples taken from nursing practice.

## *2 'Intuitive' professional judgement*

Rew (1986:23) suggests that intuition leads to knowing a fact or truth as a whole; secondly, the getting of this kind of knowledge is immediate; thirdly, the knowledge we gain is independent of the rationalistic linear process of reasoning, and we are unlikely to be able to explain how we came to know it.

Clearly, the expert practitioner is one who has to be able to use intuitive knowledge alongside analytical reasoning. Easen & Wilcockson (1996), however, argue that for a number of professionals, the experience of making an 'intuitive' professional judgement is both disconcerting and in some way 'unprofessional' since it compares unfavourably with 'rational', 'scientific', professional decision-making.

## *3 The capitulation to scientism*

The adoption of this rationalistic attitude has been seen as a capitulation to scientism, based on the assumption that only the 'objective' mind can generate significant questions and answers. Thus, in the areas of nursing knowledge, practice and research, the rationalist, positivist, deductive paradigm dominates in the search for 'true' knowledge. This is reflected in the pursuit of evidence-based practice and education. Nursing desires to be seen as a profession in

its own right and thus the 'professionalisation' strategy has placed a strong emphasis on a positivist approach to developing the knowledge base and a rationalistic view of decision-making. Nurses are deemed to be professional practitioners who are able to justify their practice with reference to a scientific knowledge base. Gerrity (1987) argues that as a result of this the scope of enquiry within nursing has become unduly narrowed to processes that are amenable to investigation by direct measurement. Gerrity (1987) further argues that scientific enquiry is the most logical of our pursuits, but could not exist without personal knowing. Indeed, Polanyi (1958:26) states that there is 'an unavoidable act of personal participation in our explicit knowledge of things ...'. Thus, the dismissal of 'intuition' from professional enquiry and decision-making might be seen to distort the practice of nursing. Indeed, Marks-Maran (1997) argues that the emphasis on factual and objective measurement has led to intuition being undervalued, but also that much of successful and useful nursing has little factual or objective research base except that it works. An example might now be given of the role of intuition in the decision-making process related to a patient in pain. Pain has been deemed to be measurable by the use of pain scales. Thus, the practitioner adopting a scientific approach would assess the extent of pain on a scale of 0-10, as indicated by the patient, and administer the appropriate drug. However, this approach may not be as effective and complete as that of the practitioner who knows intuitively that instrumental to the overall success of treating the patient's pain is the need to allow that patient sufficient time to express any underlying fears or anxieties, which might be compounding the pain, and the need to give verbal reassurance.

## *4 Intuition and performance*

Easen & Wilcockson (1996) argue that whilst intuition may be seen as an irrational process, this does not make the basis of any intuitive decision itself irrational. They believe that intuition has a rational basis and suggest that of primary importance is a sound, relevant knowledge base and the ability to recognise patterns in the presenting problem. Such pattern recognition is rooted in past decision-making and experience is essential for this linking of similar past events to the present. They argue that within the intuiter's performance is implicit thinking and the use of the professional's 'know-how'. Gilbert Ryle (1949) coined the expression 'know-how' and made the distinction between 'knowing-that' and 'knowing-how'. Polanyi (1958) describes their difference by using the example of learning to ride a bicycle. The rules of the art of cycling ('knowing-that'), can be useful as a guideline when learning to cycle, but only if this knowledge is integrated with the practical knowledge of that art. A cyclist, while keeping balance on the bicycle, does not scan his or her memory for guidelines to maintain balance but with experience s/he just does it. Thus, the cyclist is using 'know-how'. Similarly, as an example, for the professional nurse practitioner, the rules governing the administration of an injection can be useful when learning this procedure, but only if the practitioner integrates this knowledge with the practical knowledge of performing this skill.

A professional practitioner does not give an injection by making a step-by-step reference to the guidelines, but with experience simply performs it. Thus, the professional practitioner is using 'know-how'. Importantly, however, as Polanyi (1959) argues, practical skills and practical experience contain much more information than the people possessing this expert knowledge can

ever tell.

Brownhill (1998) argues that the ability to make good judgements is in itself a skill which can only come about by constant practice. However, the judgements lie within a framework, for there can be no judgement without a framework (Polanyi, 1959), and the framework will be largely derived from the conversations that are being dwelt on, which means the conversation or discourse of the group which one shares. Thus, Brownhill (1998) argues that put into a social context, judgements come about from within a discourse (Shotter, 1993) and a from-to structure (Polanyi, 1959), from the discourse to the object of attention when a decision or judgement is made.

#### *5 The concept of an interpretative framework*

Polanyi (1959) argues that all judgements must take place within an interpretative framework and be understood and assessed only by reference to it. An interpretative framework is a way of looking at things in order to give some stability to our perceptions (Brownhill, 1997). The concept of an interpretative framework might be seen to be relevant to professional practitioners who need to be able to call upon a stable frame of reference when making professional clinical or educational judgements.

The use of an interpretative framework, however, can certainly be criticised for its subjectivity. Indeed, Brownhill (1997:38) points out that subjectivity lies at the heart this approach because of its self-confirming nature, its protection against falsifiability, its uncritical nature and its failure to get to grips with reality except through the interpretation of the framework. Essentially, it is not objective. Yet, as Brownhill (1997:38) further points out, although Polanyi accepted much of this criticism, he did not reject objectivity. However, he did reject pure objectivity. Basically, Polanyi did not rely on faith, but he did rely

on faith for good reasons. Indeed, Brownhill (1997) further argues that the concept of the impersonal observer as a cool, calculating machine is not possible or even desirable. Discovery comes about through passion, obsession and commitment controlled by the desire to get at the truth. It is a matter of human judgement and such judgement can be fallible and open-ended.

In applying this concept of an interpretative framework, it might be argued that professional practice is subjective since an individual interpretation of the various frameworks is involved, which is based on both individual and professional values and belief systems. Such frameworks are also protected by professional validation and are seldom questioned or challenged. Professional philosophy is underpinned by the concept of holism and the 'planned, individualised care' approach, which are implicit within such frameworks as the Code of Professional Conduct and models of care. However, can the practice of holistic, individualised care ever become the reality when working within professional frameworks, or do such frameworks constrain that possibility? Thus, it is difficult for the professional nurse to be a pure, objective and impersonal practitioner since s/he is involved in making professional judgements, and, as already conceded, such human judgement can be fallible and open-ended. Indeed, Marks-Maran (1997) argues that professional nursing decision-making is disordered within a certain orderliness. Nursing decisions are made in random, intuitive ways because patient care is not linear and orderly and, therefore, a linear and orderly framework for explaining it will never be effective.

Polanyi (1959) argues that the very process of thinking involves making judgements and suggests that judgements can be understood only by looking at them in the context of different frameworks of ideas. He advances four possibilities when making a judgement which are:

- 1) A correct judgement in a correct interpretative framework.
- 2) An incorrect judgement in a correct interpretative framework.
- 3) A correct judgement in an incorrect interpretative framework.
- 4) An incorrect judgement in an incorrect interpretative framework.

If these four approaches are applied to nurse education and practice, it might be argued that within the Code of Professional Conduct, representing a correct interpretative framework, the practitioner can make either a correct or incorrect judgement. Basically, the underlying philosophy of the Code of Conduct is that of professional accountability and the registered practitioner is personally accountable for his or her practice. Clause 15 of the Code of Professional Conduct (1992) might be cited in relation to making a judgement. It states:

refuse any gift, favour or hospitality from patients or clients currently in your care which might be interpreted as seeking to exert influence to obtain preferential consideration.

Thus, the practitioner might be said to be making a correct judgement by adhering to Section 15 of this interpretative framework and not being prepared to accept any gifts, monetary rewards, or favours, although, clearly, takes the risk of offending the patient or client. However, the practitioner might be said to be making an incorrect judgement by accepting gifts, monetary rewards, or favours even though in so doing the risk of offending the patient or client is avoided.

Similarly, within an inappropriate professional model of care, representing an incorrect interpretative framework, the practitioner can make both a correct and an incorrect judgement on behalf of the client. Examples might be cited using the application of the Roper, Logan and Tierney's Model of Nursing to mental health patients, specifically situated within a forensic mental health setting. Thus, having identified the problem of poor personal hygiene in a

schizophrenic patient with a tendency towards aggressive and violent behaviour, the mental health practitioner might be said to be making a correct judgement by deciding to discuss with the patient the need to improve personal hygiene. However, an incorrect judgement would be for the practitioner to arrange for the patient to be physically assisted to have a bath or wash, the consequence of which might be the manifestation of a violent response from the patient. Therefore, within this setting this particular interpretative framework is incorrect mainly because its emphasis is on physical intervention for improvement, which is too simplistic and linear as an approach to be effective within such a disordered sphere of professional practice.

#### *6 The concept of tacit knowledge:*

Brownhill (1997) advances the argument that Polanyi's idea of the interpretative framework is made more interesting by his development of the concepts of tacit knowledge and tacit integration which give further insight into the nature of knowledge and the development of our understanding. Polanyi (1959:12) states, 'we always know tacitly that we are holding our explicit knowledge to be true' and thus argues that all of our explicit knowledge exists within a tacit framework, which provides the framework for our judgement. He argues that although we can make some of this tacit knowledge explicit, we can never make it all known. Polanyi (1959:12-13) suggests that tacit knowing appears to be a doing of our own, lacking the public, objective, character of explicit knowledge. It may therefore appear to lack the essential quality of knowledge. Thus, it might be argued that this is why professional nurse practitioners find it difficult to articulate and justify the tacit knowledge underpinning their practice. Nevertheless, Polanyi (1959:13) denies that any participation of the knower in the shaping of knowledge must invalidate knowledge, although concedes that it

impairs its objectivity.

The concept of tacit knowledge, however, raises an important issue that an individual can never be absolutely certain in his or her knowledge claims since explicit knowledge is part of the tacit framework. Therefore, all knowledge claims are a matter of judgement and interpretation. Furthermore, no matter how much professional nurse practitioners feel that their judgements are correct and that they are therefore committed to them, based on what they know, those judgements are still open to argument and debate. In order to be as objective as possible and demonstrate a commitment to the truth, arguments need to be subjected to public debate. As Polanyi (1959) points out, the essential logical difference between explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge lies in the fact that we can critically reflect on something explicitly stated, in a way in which we cannot reflect on our awareness of an experience.

If this logic is applied to professional practice, it might be fair to suggest that professional practitioners need to communicate with their governing statutory bodies and with other members of the nursing community so that their explicit statements can be critically reflected upon. Thus, they need to develop a public language in which to express their ideas and be understood by the members of their professional community. As Polanyi (1959:24) points out, articulation not only makes us better informed, it also enriches us even more by increasing our mental power over any given piece of information. Professional practitioners also need to be as objective as possible in presenting their arguments in a form which allows public debate. Knowledge claims can be assessed in public debate and the professional nursing community can then decide on which claims to confer the status of truth. However, the public debate is never completely closed, and, as Brownhill (1997) argues, the public can sometimes be wrong in making its assessment.

#### *7 The concept of tacit integration:*

Polanyi (1966) explains that the process of knowing comes about through a process of 'tacit integration'. This integration happens when we attend from one set of objects to another. It has a from-to structure. He thus identifies it in terms of a relationship between subsidiary knowledge and focal knowledge. It is a functional relationship, which means that through being aware in a non-explicit way of the subsidiary aspects of our knowledge, one integrates these aspects and attends to the resulting focal object of knowledge. In confronting a situation, Polanyi(1959:30) makes a distinction between a subsidiary awareness of the particulars, and a focal awareness which would fix attention on the particulars in themselves, and not as parts of the whole situation. Polanyi (1959:30) correspondingly speaks of a subsidiary knowledge, representing tacit knowledge, and a focal knowledge, representing explicit knowledge. Judgements come about when the individual begins to concentrate on a problem, to focus the subsidiary knowledge on that problem (Brownhill 1997:39). Thus, an example of the use of tacit integration in the process of professional judgement might now be given. In practice, in assessing an insulin-dependent diabetic client complaining of tiredness, blurred vision and a numbness in the extremities, and deciding on the best course of action to take, the professional practitioner would employ a subsidiary knowledge of the overall problem, which is hyperglycaemia (a raised blood glucose level), as opposed to a focal knowledge of the particular symptoms. Thus, the judgement made would be to assess the blood glucose level immediately and then determine the appropriate amount of insulin to be given to restore equilibrium and then to relieve the particular symptoms presenting.

#### *8 Conclusion:*

In conclusion, this paper has sought to

explore some of the philosophical issues surrounding the nature and role of intuition in professional decision-making within nursing practice with reference to Polanyi's concepts of tacit knowledge, tacit integration and the use of an interpretative framework. Although there is the belief that intuition is an irrational process, it has been argued in this paper that it has a rational basis. Intuition has a place in both the art and science of professional practice. Intuitive thinking involves the use of a sound, rational, relevant knowledge base in situations which, through experience, are so familiar that the person has learned how to recognise and act on appropriate patterns. This was shown to be particularly applicable to the professional nurse practitioner.

However, in the course of professional judgement, the nursing community also has a duty to continue to develop professional knowledge and practice through discovery, exploration and a new understanding of

knowledge. Often, professional practitioners experience the need to take individual initiative as a result of discovery and a new understanding. In so doing, they also need to appreciate that initiatives lie within the traditional framework of the nursing community and are controlled by it. Whilst wishing to advance the frontiers of knowledge and practice within the community, at the same time, practitioners must fulfil their obligations to maintain its coherence and stability.

Thames Valley University

References:

Agan, R.D., 1987 'Intuitive knowing as a dimension of nursing', *Advanced Nursing Science*, 10 (1), pp. 63-70.  
 Benner, P., 1987 'How expert nurses use intuition', Tanner, C., *American Journal of Nursing*, 87(1), pp. 23-31.  
 Brownhill, R., 1987, 'Objectivity and

Aesthetic Education in its Social Context', *The Journal of Aesthetic Education*, Vol. 21, No. 3, Fall, pp. 29-44.

Brownhill, R., 1997, 'Polanyi and interpretative frameworks', *Appraisal*, Vol. 1. Supplementary Issue, pp. 37-40.  
 Brownhill, R., 1998, 'Developing aesthetic judgment: art', Brown, K., 'History in the context of adult education', *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, Vol. 17, No. 1, January-February, pp. 41-50.  
 Easen, P., 1996, 'Intuition and rational decision-making' in Wilcockson, J., 'Professional thinking: a false dichotomy?' *Journal of Advanced Nursing*, 24, pp. 667-673.  
 Rew, L., 1986, 'Intuition: concept analysis of a group phenomenon', *Advances in Nursing Science*, 8 (2), pp. 21-28.  
 Schön, D., 1983, *The Reflective Practitioner*. London, Temple Smith.  
 Shotter, J., 1993, *Conversational Realities*. London, Sage

Continued from p. 165

18. Polanyi makes the distinction in PK, p. 303.  
 19. A mature scientist is one who has become independent of his teachers and makes his own contact with reality.  
 20. PK Introduction.  
 21. PK. p.4  
 22. PK, p.4.  
 23. PK.  
 24. PK.  
 25. PK.  
 26. PK.  
 27. Brennan, J. *Open Texture Of Moral Concepts*.  
 28. Cf. Polanyi, *Study of Man*  
 29. *ibid.*

30. Cf. Brownhill, *op. cit.*  
 31. *ibid.*  
 32. Spinelli, E., *The Interpreted World: an Introduction to Phenomenological World*, Sage London, 1989.  
 33. Husserl, 1913.  
 34. Douglas, B. and Moustakas, C., *Heuristic Inquiry: The Internal Search to Know*, MI Centre for Human Studies, Detroit, 1984.  
 35. Denzin, N. *Interpretative Interactionism*, Sage, London 1989  
 36. *Heuristic Inquiry*, *op. cit.*  
 37. Moustakas, C. *Heuristic Inquiry Design, Methodology and Applications*. C.A. Sage, Newbury Park, 1990.  
 38. Patton, M.Q., *Qualitative*

*Evaluation and Research Methods* (2nd Ed.), Sage, London 1990.  
 39. *ibid.*  
 40. Cf. Swan, S.R. *Christian Ministers: Perceptions of Adult Maturity and Their Impact on Parish Education* Ph.D., Surrey, 1999. for an application of the heuristic method.  
 41. Carper, B. 'Fundamental patterns of knowing in nursing', *Advances in Nursing Science*, 1 (1), 1978.  
 42. Streubert, H.J., 'Philosophical Dimensions of Qualitative Research', in Streubert, H.J. and Carpenter, D.R., *Qualitative Research in Nursing*, J.B. Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1994.

# ON THE PRIMACY OF INDWELLING

David Kettle

## 1 Introduction

I want to pick up two expressions of concern by writers in recent issues of *Tradition and Discovery*. Both of them reflect a conviction that Michael Polanyi's epistemology poses a radical challenge to Cartesian dualism and express a concern that this challenge is being missed. In this paper I explore the nature of such concern by portraying the conflict between a 'radical' Polanyian paradigm and the Cartesian paradigm in a way which lays open the dynamics of this conflict. For this purpose. I shall briefly frame this conflict in terms of a spatial-visual image which rules the Cartesian imagination, and then go on to envisage an argument between two people holding to these respective paradigms. This argument will range widely, and in so doing repeatedly leave loose ends—or rather, hopefully, leads—resulting in a paper which sits oddly with normal academic writing. However, it seems to me that such an approach holds some promise of breaking through the spell of Cartesianism in some cases where more standard treatments have not.

Firstly I recall Dale Cannon's concern (T&D Vol. XXIII No. 3) that a particular account of Polanyi's theory of knowledge 'leaves his reader's critical intellectual sensibility intact and unchallenged, as if Polanyi's argument entailed no radical criticism of this sensibility and posture. By the reader's critical intellectual sensibility, I mean first of all the habitual tendency tacitly to assume the posture of an anonymous, detached (in the third person), noncommittal, sceptical assessor of propositions regarding matters of knowledge, truth, and reality, which are to be doubted unless one is given sufficient reason for believing them. .. If, as Polanyi contends, truth can be thought of only by believing it, then

such a posture is incapable of truly thinking truth, its protestations notwithstanding.'<sup>1</sup>

Secondly I recall J. S. Pflug's concern that a particular attempt to develop further Polanyi's theory of knowledge seems to deny the universality of the *from-to* structure of knowing described by Polanyi. (T & D Vol. XXV No. 1). Pflug reminds us that Marjorie Grene regarded this universality as essential to the promise in Polanyi's epistemology of 'adequate concepts through which to overcome Cartesian dualism'.<sup>2</sup> She defended this universality in the face of Polanyi's own late introduction of *from-at* knowing alongside and in seemingly primary distinction from *from-to* knowing. By contrast, the theoretical development Pflug is concerned about seems to him rather to accept and build on this distinction as primary.<sup>3</sup>

Both Cannon and Pflug are convinced that Polanyi's epistemology offers a paradigm alternative to the paradigm of Cartesian dualism, and express concern that this has not been adequately reflected in particular articles. For them, Polanyi's epistemology invites a conversion the scope of which is not apparent from those particular articles. However, it is not my intention here to discuss whether their concern is well founded in the cases in question. My interest is rather in what might be involved in general in the conviction that Polanyi offers a paradigm which challenges the Cartesian one, in the denial of this, and in the conversion from denial to conviction.<sup>4</sup>

A key consideration when exploring this question is the universal reach of these two alternative paradigms—a universality which extends in each case to self-reference. This means that in the act of considering either one of these paradigms, this act itself is framed either within the paradigm in question or within the other. That is,

we are bound to see 'from within' one or other paradigm even as we attend to them. Indeed the very meaning of seeing 'from within' is determined by the paradigm which in this case frames it. An implication of this is that the conflict between the two paradigms is potentially irresolvable. They offer two ways of seeing things, which includes seeing or understanding everything the other says. They always 'have an answer' for each other, in their own terms, which rejects the terms of the other. This is not to say that the choice between them is a relative one. It remains logically possible that one paradigm truly represents to itself, from within itself, both the other and itself, while the other misrepresents to itself, from within itself, both the other and itself.

The competition between these two universal paradigms extends, we should note, to how we understand the very description just offered of the dynamics between them. There is simply no vantage-point from which we can look on at the two of them in any regard.

In terms of what content should we portray the conflict between the Polanyian and the Cartesian paradigms? I shall describe this by reference to a simple spatial image which rules our imagination in Cartesian dualism. This is not to deny that Cartesian dualism is nourished by rich and varied experiences of interaction between people, and between people and their environment. Nor is it to deny that, were we to portray the conflict in such terms, we might gain a richer personal feel for what is at stake. It is simply to recognise that in Cartesian dualism, when in an argument about epistemology the chips are down we make recourse to a certain simple spatial image which rules our imagination, and here we stick.

What is this spatial image which rules our imagination in Cartesian

dualism? Enunciated within the paradigm of Cartesian dualism itself it will sound a commonplace, even tautologous. Nevertheless, we need to enunciate it here; its appearance will change when a new paradigm dawns in its place and relativises it.

The spatial image which rules our imagination in Cartesian dualism is that of *looking on at the knowing subject as in every instance a determinate reality set among the realities of the world*. It therefore offers a picture of the act of knowing as such. What are the elements in this picture?

Firstly, ruled by this image, whenever we think of the act of knowing we picture a knowing subject before us on the one hand, and something (or someone) real known on the other hand, and the act of knowing as putting the former in touch with the latter.

There is a second, tacit dimension to this picture: we place ourselves apart from the knower and the known alike so as to look at one and then at the other, side by side before us. Tacitly we have placed ourselves on the one hand *apart from the knowing subject* before us, in our act of viewing this subject himself; and in the act of viewing what is known we have placed ourselves on the other hand *apart from the act in which it is known by the knowing subject* before us.

Now this tacit understanding is problematic. Should we advert consciously to ourselves as we have tacitly placed ourselves in this picture. we meet a contradiction. For the ruling image itself requires us in this moment to place ourselves a second step back, so to speak. Now, whereas we had tacitly placed ourselves apart from the knowing subject, we see ourselves precisely as having been ourselves a knowing subject; and whereas we had, in the act of viewing what is known, placed ourselves apart from the act in which it is known by a knowing subject, and seen it apart from as it is thus known, now we see that we have seen it precisely in the act of ourselves knowing it. and seen

it precisely as it is thus known.

But as we looked on at a knowing subject in the first place we imagined to see the real apart from involvement in any such act of knowing ourselves. The recognition now that we are ourselves involved in an act of knowing even as we look on therefore contradicts our original picture: it takes away the real. We have two basic ways of responding to this: we can either grant this, and say that all we can know is our own knowing, or else suppress this challenge. In which case it will remain to haunt us as a self-referential inconsistency. Nor will anything be achieved by taking any further steps back, so to speak; we stand here at the head of a potential infinite regress.

To recognise this, and to accept that it signifies an inescapable contradiction despite all efforts to resolve it by introducing distinctions and refinements (of which philosophy has of course introduced many) is to acknowledge that Cartesian dualism is an inadequate account of human knowledge.

## 2 Polanyi and indwelling

Now Michael Polanyi offers an account of human knowledge in which the knower 'indwells' what is known. The act of knowing is no longer seen as a purely detached exercise, but one in which the knower indwells what is known in such a way that the attention of the knower is from subsidiary clues towards a focus of integration. This account of knowing describes both the exercise of skills and the act of symbolic representation. It also describes the kind of attention through which knowledge arises in the first place. And it describes how knowledge is imparted, questioned and shared within a community of learning.

The question is, does this offer anything to replace the spatial image which rules the Cartesian imagination? We may not think so. We may claim to appreciate Polanyi's epistemology and yet still be ruled in our imagination by the Cartesian paradigm in the very way we

understand this. Thus we may, in Cartesian fashion, continue in our imagination to look on at a knowing subject. at what is known, and at the act of knowing, while now thinking of this act of knowing as achieved by indwelling. Here the same old problem arises: when we advert to ourselves looking on, the image which rules our imagination invites us to take a second step back. And we are again caught between affirming reality at the expense of suppressing our own act of knowing it, and affirming our act of knowing at the expense of negating the reality before us.

But could this reading of Polanyi itself involve suppression? Perhaps Polanyi does in fact offer something to replace the spatial image which rules our imagination in Cartesian dualism, *even as we now interpret Polanyi?*

The Polanyian paradigm does indeed offer something to replace this spatial image. This will, of course, like the Cartesian picture, be nourished by rich and varied human experience. In particular it will draw upon the knowledge and action which comes about as people work responsibly together to understand and do what is right and good. However, our interest here is more narrowly in what might replace the ruling spatial image of Cartesianism, and the terms in which this may be resisted, and such resistance overcome.

Because what we are concerned with here is a conflict between two paradigms which embrace each other and themselves (in self-reference), and embrace each other's embrace of themselves, and so on in self-referential regress) a promising approach is to envisage a conversation between one person, P, who seeks to commend the Polanyian paradigm, and another, C, who resists this from the Cartesian paradigm. By this means we can reflect how the Cartesian imagination interjects at every point, not in order to develop and follow through a specific argument but rather simply to register at every point the block presented by that imagination

The resulting conversation, as I envisage it, will range widely. It will not afford a detailed treatment of any one area of knowledge; nor would it achieve much by doing so if it left intact the Cartesian paradigm elsewhere. On the other hand, this is not to imply that the Polanyian paradigm must be made explicit at every point otherwise the Cartesian one remains intact. Rather we are concerned with a conversion to the Polanyian paradigm, which involves a tacit dimension. Such a conversion does not wail upon the explication of this paradigm at every point; rather it concerns our indwelling this paradigm so as to recognise and challenge the Cartesian one wherever it distorts our knowledge and self-understanding.

### 2 *Unfolding another picture: a conversation*

**P:** In order to commend to you an alternative to the Cartesian paradigm, let me start by recalling a parable told by C.S. Lewis.<sup>5</sup> He recounts the experience of standing in a dark tool shed which is lit by a single shaft of light from outside, striking and spilling off the objects which it strikes within the shed. He describes the experience of placing his eye to the chink through which this beam of light shines, and looking along it towards its source, and he compares this with looking at objects within the shed. Lewis' suggestion is that there is a certain kind of knowledge which is analogous to the former. Only by placing oneself correctly—committing oneself to a certain view-point—can one know what is here to be known. Lewis had in mind, above all, our religious knowledge.

It seems to me that the knowing of which Lewis speaks here—the knowing analogous to looking along the shaft of light towards its source—is the paradigmatic ease of what Polanyi calls 'from-to' knowing, which involves indwelling at its deepest, and which Polanyi himself found in our religious, moral, and aesthetic knowing, and in our most lively research. The commitment entailed in the act of 'indwelling' is

analogous to that of placing oneself in the shaft of light. The other knowing, which is analogous to our view of the objects around us in the tool shed, is of what Polanyi calls a 'from-at' kind. However, I want immediately to add that this too is at root a kind of 'from-to' knowing. For when we see any such object within the shed, we see it by *looking along* the beams of light which radiate from, or rather are passed on from, objects which the primary shaft of light strikes within the shed. And of course without the primary light source we should see nothing at all. Therefore our looking along the primary shaft of light provides a paradigm and context within which we can understand all our looking; it is our primary act of *looking along*. And it indicates by analogy our paradigmatic 'from-to' knowing, in terms of which we can understand all our knowing.

A second, related point concerns our perception, from within the shed, of the shaft of light itself into which we must step if we are to look towards its source. Compare this with any oriented location from which we may look at some object, say a spade, within the shed. Now there are many such oriented locations within the shed, from which we could choose to look at the spade; and how the spade looks in us will be determined by this choice of oriented location. So when we step back, so to speak; and *look on at* any such oriented location, we see *something which accounts for* what we see when as a subject we *look from* that location towards the spade. But the matter is different with regard to the primary shaft of light. It is not true that when we *look on at* this shaft of light, we see an oriented location *which accounts for* what we see when as a subject we *look along* it towards its source. It is rather the case that the source of light itself accounts for this oriented location as one from which as a subject we can (rather than can't) see it. *The light itself accounts for the place of our seeing it as a subject.* In an analogous way, *that which we know in our paradigmatic knowing accounts itself for the place of our*

*knowing it as a subject.*

I suggest that these two points together offer a radical first challenge to the Cartesian imagination with its assumption of always looking on at a knowing subject and at what is known.<sup>6</sup>

**C:** But let's take this special oriented location which Lewis found, from which one can look along the shaft of light to its source: you have to grant that this oriented location remains a particular one: it is only one of many places I can stand within the shed. And although it enables me to see something I cannot see from elsewhere—something distinctive, no doubt, among the things I can see—equally there are things I can see in the shed from elsewhere, which I cannot see from that particular oriented location. So how can this particular looking be paradigmatic? How can we understand all our looking, and all that we see, in terms of this one act?

**P:** But remember that all those locations to which you refer, from which we may see things, are such only by virtue of light being passed on to them from objects struck by light. There is therefore a sense in which they arise 'within' that primary emission of light—even though we look at what it strikes 'from outside'. We certainly don't ourselves bring light to it 'from outside'. In analogous fashion, the settings in which our knowledge arises are constituted in the first place by acts of 'from-to' knowledge, and in a sense arise 'within' the paradigmatic case of this, analogous to looking along the shaft of light in the tool shed.

Spatially, we are presented here with a paradox. We begin by thinking of ourselves in an empty space, looking on at a shaft of light, a line; and then we are asked to see that in reality it is the line which opens up space within itself, space which we occupy, and that this is the only space there is; there is no space 'outside' the line. This, of course, represents another, second radical challenge to



the Cartesian imagination.

Note that we're now talking about a different kind of space to the empty space from which we imagined to look on. This space has a direction which we participate in; and it arises for us precisely through this participation, in our deepest, most personally self-giving indwelling, and enlarges for us through this participation, and in the process we ourselves are enlarged. This space is the world of other persons, of religious, moral and aesthetic engagements at their most lively. This is our paradigmatic world, and our participation in it through questioning, knowing and acting is our paradigmatic knowledge.

I am saying that this is the largest world we inhabit, and it is the measure of us who inhabit it. Contrary as this is to the Cartesian imagination, the kind of knowing which can be called 'from-at' knowing involves our participation in a *smaller* space within this primary space.

**C:** Well, for a start I don't see how we can make sense of 'from-at' knowing in terms of indwelling a space, whether it be small or large.

**P:** If we're really talking about knowledge (rather than about a merely involuntary response to stimuli) then we have to be talking about such indwelling. For an illustration, take one of the experiments which Goldstein performed with 'aphasic' men.<sup>7</sup> An experimenter would present such a patient with many strands of wool, varying in colour, thickness, length etc. She would then start to pick up, one at a time, strands of a particular colour. She would then invite him to continue, following the 'direction' of the process she had initiated. This he could not do. Yet if she began picking up strands of wool identical in every respect, he could continue the process. The difference lay in the fact that in the former case he had to indwell all the strands selected together, in such a way that a characteristic—the one we call 'being red'—stood out from

them. To master the process—that is, to see 'red'—he needed to indwell the indeterminate space represented by these strands together in such a way that the symbolic act of 'seeing red' cohered. This was not a case merely of identifying a common denominator 'red' among the strands; this would already presuppose an ability to 'see red'. Rather, it would involve an activity more like that in which, indwelling our bodies in motion, we learn to keep our balance.<sup>8</sup>

**C:** But suppose that I grant you this: so what? What you are describing here is merely a subjective activity. The objective fact of the matter is that there are red strands of wool in front of him, whether or not he can recognise them as such. In every case the redness is there; in every case we can see it ourselves.

**P:** Sure; and yet the indwelling to which I have referred precedes the distinction you make here between his 'subjective activity' and what is 'objectively present'. This indwelling is already there in your own perception of the objective presence of 'red'; you could not have this perception without having first indwelt the meaning of 'red' in the way I have described. Here you come up against the familiar Cartesian regress, of course.

**C:** Let's go back then to your talk of relatively large and relatively small spaces, and of 'indwelling' opening up the largest possible space for us. How can 'indwelling' possibly open up a bigger space than that from which we look on at the act of indwelling? Indwelling involves committing oneself. When we question such a commitment, we stand outside of it, in a wider space.

**P:** There is a fundamental issue here which concerns the nature of indwelling. I want to suggest that your description of indwelling reflects the shape which indwelling takes when we are addressing questions of routine theoretical knowledge. Here it

operates rather like a theoretical presupposition. Either you adopt a presupposition, you are committed to it and do not question it, and you build on it; or you question a presupposition, without commitment to it. These are two strictly alternative options.

But in our more lively engagements, our commitment and our questioning are not alternatives; they are inseparably one. Consider, for example, the ease of the infant's groping into intentional behaviour, and into mastery of language; or consider the case of research, in which as Polanyi says we reach as much towards promising questions as towards their answers. Our intention here is at once one of receptivity—of trying to own an act of knowing—and of testing—of trying out whether we can own any such act. Again, consider how we test a new tool. We question it (more precisely, we question whether we can do something with it) as we commit ourselves to it (we by to do something with it).

Speaking as Polanyi does of us indwelling subsidiaries as we attend towards the focal, I am saying that in our deepest, paradigmatic engagements the subsidiary and the focal mutually interanimate each other in the most lively manner. This is what 'deep' indwelling means: not something akin to sinking quietly into a kind of all-enfolding armchair, but rather being caught up to our very depths in self-involving engagement with reality. Out of this, as I have said, arises a space which we indwell and which enlarges us as we indwell it. So the images of liveliness, depth and space apply together to this paradigmatic knowledge.

The character of indwelling as a matter of lively interanimation, and of our primary intention as at once of receptivity and appraisal: these together pose a third radical challenge to the Cartesian imagination.

**C:** But how can you have interanimation without this being between two givens? Or again, you still want to talk of subsidiary and

focal and of the 'from-to' structure of knowing. You still maintain there are two elements in the act of knowledge, even if they cannot be specified. Now whatever goes on between them, surely at least the former, the 'relied upon' element 'from' which we attend is simply taken as given in this situation, and is not itself questioned?

**P:** I would say rather that even it both can be specified, the 'from-to' relation between them is a relative one. That is to say, we do not adopt one and then attend from this to the other. Rather we attend through both subsidiary and focal. Both are a matter at once of our receptivity and responsible appraisal. The direction of our attention is from subsidiary to focal; but these are *relative terms*.

This relativity explains how the from-to structure of knowing applies in cases where there are not just two aspects but rather a logical hierarchy of aspects to knowledge. Imagine, by way of illustration, that a neighbour says to me 'That tile is loose'. I need to indwell his roughly pointing arm as I identify his referent. I also need to indwell this referent as I own the meaning of his statement. Moreover I need to indwell this statement as I own its truth. And finally I need to indwell this truth as I own its appositeness, the point of his speaking as he does to me. Each aspect of my act of knowing here is subsidiary for me as I attend focally to the next. In the actual situation, however, I attend 'from' and 'to' all of them, that is, 'through' them all, in both receptivity and appraisal.

**C:** But we may want to question one of these aspects in particular. We may want to ask 'which tile do you mean?'. Or we may want to ask, 'Is this really true? What makes you say this?'

**P:** Sure; but in everyday conversation we do not start knowing what we want to question, if anything. Rather, it is as we attend through all these aspects of what our neighbour says that one particular aspect may stand

out in tension with the overall sense of what he is telling us. Our attention 'through' all such aspects is the primary thing.

**C:** But what is the direction of this primary attention? You seem to offer no general terms in which it can be described.

**P:** In the most general terms, we can describe the direction of our primary attention as from the logically prior to the logically emergent. By way of illustration, consider the example of an infant as she learns the meaning of a word. Her mother repeatedly picks up a doll and says 'doll'—meaning, 'this is a doll'. Now, until the infant has grasped the meaning of 'doll' she cannot ask herself the question, of an object. 'Is this a doll?'; for this question does not arise for her until the meaning of 'doll' is understood. The question of the meaning of this statement is *logically prior* to the question of its truth. Nevertheless, if it is true to say that what she is learning is the *meaning* of 'doll', it is equally true to say that what she is learning is to say 'doll' *truthfully*. What her mother has been doing is teaching her the truth, 'this is a doll'. If her mother had instead picked up objects at random, saying 'doll', her child would never have learnt its meaning. Thus it is only as the infant attends to the *logically emergent* possibility of owning it as a truth that the question arises of her owning it as meaningful. As she learns to attend, in particular situations, 'through' the statement 'this is a doll', from the question of its meaning to that question of its truth, she learns to attend from the logically prior to the logically emergent.

**C:** You have claimed that when, in the process of indwelling, we rely on something this does not preclude our questioning it. Rather, everything gets questioned, within the whole, in a kind of in-house critique. But surely this still cannot incorporate the questioning which may be addressed from outside it altogether?

**P:** There is no 'outside it'; as I say, this indwelling gives us our largest context. When you imagine to question it from outside, you are applying a model you have taken from routine theoretical knowledge, where you can question presuppositions from outside, that is, from a position of non-commitment towards them.

**C:** I still don't see why I shouldn't apply this model.

**P:** Well, this model only works in the first place for a particular kind of knowing. It cannot be applied to our paradigmatic, most lively knowing.

**C:** But I would say rather that the 'lively knowing' you talk of is a particular (and somewhat problematic) kind of knowing, which cannot offer a model which works for knowing in general, which is theoretical knowing. How can theoretical knowing be the particular case?

**P:** I have described how, in our most lively indwelling, our intention is at once one of receptivity—of trying to own an act of knowing—and of testing—of trying out whether we can own any such act. You are asking how theoretical knowing can be understood in these terms. Theoretical knowing originates in the particular case when, in the act of indwelling, we find that the question of further receptivity does not arise, and only the question of further appraisal remains. It originates more particularly when we find that the question of further meaning does not arise, so that our indwelling meaning becomes a routine affair, and all that remains for our attention is the question of further appraisal of truth. That is to say, when I ask myself, concerning a particular utterance in particular circumstances, 'Can I say this meaningfully and truthfully?' (trying to do so), I find that the only question alive for me is 'Can I say this truthfully?'. I do not need to attend further to what it might mean to own this utterance in these

circumstances; the question of meaning lies dormant. Nevertheless, it remains the ease that fundamentally I am pursuing this question from within, or through, the questions both of meaning and truth.

What may happen now is that we may assume *as a matter of presupposition*, that the question of meaning arises no further. We indwell this meaning in an automatic or unreflective way. The effect of this is to turn the statement before us into something given, a fixed point, rather than something through which we attend in receptivity and appraisal. The question of 'its' truth now becomes a contingent question about 'it', which we see ourselves as addressing from a position outside of 'it'. This is where the Cartesian image of 'looking on' comes from. What we fail to recognise here is that we constitute this fixed point as such by that meaning which we indwell even as we look on. And if we advert to this, we find ourselves in that familiar Cartesian dilemma and regress because we see our own indwelling in turn as something given, a fixed point which we can look on at. The problem is generated because we make, of meaning, a starting-point we can look on at, rather than something through which we attend. It is this which sets up 'from-at' theoretical knowing as a model for all knowing, instead of leaving it as a special case of 'from-to' knowing.

**C:** I'm not sure where this takes us. Suppose, for example, that someone says something which puzzles me. I, from my 'outside' position (call it what you will) look for questions to ask which should help to clarify matters. How does this account differ from yours?

**P:** In your account, by picturing yourself 'outside' you already assume that your questions demand an answer in your own terms. But in normal conversation it would be arrogant of us to assume this, and we do not normally do so. For example, we do not normally assume that we know

some fact which the other does not know, and that the explanation for their puzzling remark lies in their ignorance of this fact. Rather, while we do allow this possibility, we also allow the possibility that the other knows something which we ourselves do not know, and that it is our ignorance which explains why we find their statement puzzling. With this aim we indwell what they say and our own understanding of the situation together, and ponder which way round the truth is. Is what they say properly understood from our viewpoint, or does what they say properly open up our viewpoint to a new understanding from theirs? <sup>9</sup>

**C:** And yet the kind of interrogation which you call arrogant in the setting of normal conversation has produced the vast, complex world of scientific data and technological skills we possess today. 'Putting nature to the question' and all that. Surely it has its place. <sup>7</sup> The problem is where the deeper, indwelling knowledge you describe fits into this. All that you have said only brings home to me that this 'deeper knowledge' is problematic in all its respects—in its referent, its meaningfulness, its truth, its purpose. It doesn't fit into the world we know analytically, in a 'from-at' way.

**P:** If our deepest, most lively 'from-to' knowing is paradigmatic, then you need to see things the other way round, and ask how the world of theoretical knowledge fits into the world we indwell in this way. And you need to see the move from the former to the latter not as a move to something problematic and marginal, but as a recovery of the full vitality of our primary attentiveness, and its direction. This is, incidentally, how paradox and metaphor work in religious language, isn't it? In a logically odd move they break open for us the cast of our routine theoretical knowledge and draw us into deep, primary attentiveness. As we indwell them—attending through them, from vehicle to tenor—our

world is opened up, enlarged, and we with it. <sup>10</sup>

**C:** It sounds to me as if you are granting here that this deep indwelling is not about knowledge after all, but about our encounter with the utterly unknown and unknowable, which we can indicate only by inadequate comparisons and in riddles.

**P:** Again there can be no theoretical answer to this, but only a paradox which leads us beyond a theoretical stance and the paradigmatic status we give to theoretical knowledge, Martin Buber gave such an answer in effect when he said 'You cannot talk about God: you can only address Him'—or in the vocabulary he coined famously, 'God is the Thou which by nature can never become an It'. <sup>11</sup> In Polanyi's language, God cannot be known in the act of 'from-at' knowing, but only in 'from-to' knowing. Now we need not hear Buber as ruling out knowledge of God. What he does rule out is theoretical knowledge of God. This includes any theoretical knowledge which we might think to have precisely in his words: his words rather point enigmatically, drawing us to attend through them to the mystery of one whom we cannot know theoretically: drawing us to address him.

**C:** This sounds to me a personal, private affair: something we each do for ourselves. Not something we should ask others to agree with, or indeed to comment upon.

**P:** My whole argument has been that there is a knowledge in which we indwell and engage the world in a very full, personal, self-involving way, and that this is the paradigm and setting for all knowledge. To testify to this knowledge is not to invite other people into something private, but to challenge them to enlarge their world and themselves by re-awakening to these in their origins.

Cambridge

Notes:

1. Dale Cannon, 'Sander's Analytical Rebuttal to Polanyi's Critics, with Some Musings on Polanyi's Idea of Truth', *Tradition & Discovery*, Vol XXIII, No.3, pp.17-23, p.21.
2. Marjorie Grene, 'Tacit Knowing: Grounds for a Revolution in Philosophy', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Vol.8, No.3, October 1977. pp.164-171, p.169.
3. J. S. Pflug, 'Stephanie Jha's Integrative Interpretation of Polanyi', *Tradition & Discovery*, Vol XXV No.1, 1998-99, pp.21-24.
4. Strictly speaking I ought to reflect Marjorie Grene's recognition of Polanyi's ambiguous position *vis-à-vis* his own most formative insights by speaking throughout this paper of a 'radical Polanyian paradigm'. However, for the sake of brevity I will speak simply of the 'Polanyian paradigm'.
5. C. S. Lewis, 'Meditation in a Toolshed', printed in Walter Hooper (ed), *The Business of Heaven: Daily Readings from C. S. Lewis*,
6. Observe that the challenge offered here to Cartesian dualism arises in time course of re-introducing the analogy of light to epistemology (and ontology), where it was long found. In Cartesianism light is in effect located in the observer, as a matter of his rationality, or constructive activity, or perspective, directed towards that which is observed.
7. Kurt Goldstein, 'The Problem of the Meaning of Words', in Goldstein, *Selected Papers*, The Hague, 1971, pp.345-57. For an account of how we construct a world of meanings and logical spaces from such primary attention see Karl Heim, *God Transcendent*, Nisbet, 1935, Chapter 2.
8. The same distinction arises between mastery of a voluntary skill and its automatic, sensori-motor equivalent. See the work of Hughlings Jackson and Henry Head recounted in Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Form* (3 Vols), New Haven, 1965, Vol.3, pp.2134
9. Another way of framing this question 'Which way round are things to be properly seen here?' is in terms of the 'horizon of questionableness' (Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, Sheed & Ward, 1975, p.273, 325-341). Gadamer's account, however, tends towards relativism, conceiving the goal of conversation as a 'merging of horizons'. In our present account, however, the question arises of a 'proper way of seeing things', which may involve reducing one horizon to determination within the context of the other.
10. Janet Soskice argues that the creativity of metaphor extends to the creation of a new referent: see Soskice, *Metaphor and Religious Language*, Clarendon Press, 1985. She also writes of the relation between vehicle and tenor in metaphor as one of 'mutual interanimation'.
11. Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, (trans) 1937.

## ALAN TURING COMPUTERS AND MINDS FIFTY YEARS ON

A One-Day Conference

SATURDAY MAY 6TH 2000

Friends' Meeting House, St Giles, Oxford

9 am for (9. 30) to 5 pm

*Speakers:*

Dr Andrew Hodges, Wadham College, Oxford: *Biographer of Turing*

Dr Wolf Mays, Metropolitan University of Manchester

Dr John Preston, Dept of Philosophy, University of Reading

Tickets : £3 each (incl. tea and coffee) or £8 each (including buffet lunch) are available from Dr R.T. Allen, 20 Ulverscroft Rd, Loughborough, Leics. LE11 3PU.

Please make cheques payable to 'R.T. Allen: Conference Acc.'

# THE INTERPRETATION OF LITERARY TEXTS: AN EXERCISE IN UNDERSTANDING

Hans Popper

## PART I THEORETICAL BASIS

### 1 Aristotle

Dilthey's 'understanding' of literary texts necessitates us actually to undertake such an exercise, because we are participating in the rehearsal of human motivation and behaviour. This is radically different from the operation of 'understanding' natural phenomena which seeks to exclude the role of the observer. Here the aim is to arrive at a system of classes and subclasses of which any one object, any one event, is a particular instance. No object or event is explained satisfactorily until such subordination is achieved.

Thus, Socrates, belonging to a hierarchy of classes, from 'animal' down to 'human', '5th century Athenian', 'married', . . . . 'victim of the death sentence by poison', together with a number of sociological and psychological universals, will, ideally, yield a scientifically satisfactory account of a class of which he is the only member. This one-member class will answer many questions; but we would not say that we really *understood* Socrates: something—indeed, the essential point—is missing, because we have not heard him *speak*; until his words, puzzling over Simonides' definition of justice might be <sup>1</sup>, resonates in our soul, the apparatus of physical and other classes, necessary as these are, will yield only an automaton without importance, not unlike Athanasius' description of the Epicurean products of coming into being without the conscious thought of *pronoia*, all resembling each other, without differentiation or individuality. <sup>2</sup>

To be sure, the understanding to be achieved in the humanities needs the empirical framework of scientific classes, otherwise the object of enquiry will not be understood, or be understood wrongly. But, once established, we change over from the

*logic of classes to the logic of the singular.* <sup>3</sup> Hence, already Aristotle distinguishes between two types of secondary substance <sup>4</sup>: one that *attaches to* a subject ('kath' hypokeimenou'), such as whiteness, and one that necessarily *inheres in* it ('en hypokeimenō'), like a man's speech. <sup>5</sup> This allows him to single out specific individuals in themselves, e.g. a doctor who prescribes what is good for all eyes universally, not only for a certain eye <sup>6</sup>, so that he can discuss the one certain eye, or the class, eyes (the opposing pair: 'katholon'—'hekaston' / 'universal'—'particular'; as against 'this one individual': 'en hypokeimenō'). Since the subject of a proposition might be either a class (e.g. 'animals which are not men') or a unique individual (e.g. 'Callias'), the inherence-type substance, as distinct from the contrasting pair of universal and each particular ('kath' hypokeimenou'), is needed. <sup>7</sup> But it is never developed into a systematic discipline of singularity. The reason is that Aristotle's central concern is systematic knowledge, *epistēmē*, the truth about the structure of a universe which is *kosmos*: orderly—and-beautiful. Hence, traditional logic includes both substances, 'kath' hypokeimenou' and 'en hypokeimenō'. Kant's table of forms of judgment includes, under the quantitative group, 'universal', 'particular', 'singular' ('allgemeine', 'besondere', 'einzelne'); the first two obviously correspond to Aristotle's 'katholon'/'hekaston': 'kath' hypokeimenou'; the third, 'einzelne', 'singulars', 'judicium singulare', must correspond to Aristotle's 'en hypokeimenō'. Kant explains that the singular judgment has no extension ('gar krinen', 'Umfang', 'no extent at all'), so that a predicate applies to it altogether, or not at all; in other words, the singular judgment is non-quantitative: whatever you say about Callias inheres in him essentially, 'en hypokeimenō'. Such a type of

judgment is needed, for we observe singular phenomena, before we ever apply concepts of classes and particulars to them. <sup>8</sup> And it is along this line of enquiry that *epistēmē*—continues to be sought, so that the crucial metaphysical problem is, whether patterns found in the phenomenal world are constitutive, like organisms, or regulative, like artefacts. It is impossible to prove that the 'supersensual substrate', as the one (singular) universal cause underlying all causality, is not accessible to our powers of insight. <sup>9</sup>

Yet Aristotle does transcend this purely class-based logic, as when he discusses art; for not only is he concerned with categories, like tragedy, comedy, catharsis, for he handles individual literary works with sensitivity, without which none of these general categories could be established and have meaning; sound empirical research, whether in works of art, or in medicine, requires due regard for the singular phenomenon. Thus, the device of *peripeteia* is demonstrated from Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex* and an unknown tragedy, probably Theodetes' *Lyncaeus*. <sup>10</sup> But this method of placing a logic of the singular within empirical research was by-passed for many centuries.

All the same important instances of singularity can be identified throughout the history of thought; thus, Plotinus' *hypostases* are each a singular, <sup>11</sup> very different from the intelligences and souls to which they give rise; or the singular perfection of the God of Augustine, Anselm and Descartes, which is essential in the very operation of their ontological arguments. But a systematic enquiry into its nature and way of functioning occurs, as far as I know, only once before History and Literary and Aesthetic Criticism had become systematic disciplines, as analogous to, but very different from, the natural sciences. It arose when the experience of the One God Bible had become an

intellectual problem of existential importance.

## 2 The Fathers of the Church

The believer who worships Him Who Is (Exod. 3:14) is troubled about what to answer Him who asks him, as He asked Adam, where he is hiding in fear (Gen. 3:9-10); but this is a problem of the will, not of the understanding. But the Christ who is believed to be at one with the Father, who is actually His spoken Word through whom the Universe comes into being and through whom alienated man is given reconciliation, not only challenges the will, but reason also finds itself compelled to make sense of the status of this Word vis-à-vis God. 'God and Lord the absolutely unbegotten (*agenn-tos de oudamon*)', says Basil of Cappadocia, 'whoever admits these will agree with the Jews and with all others; only for the Christians He is the Father of Christ'.

<sup>12</sup> But how are Christians to understand God's Fatherhood of the Logos, responsible for creating and saving man? Arians and Christians alike accept the biblical language; but how to interpret it, if, as all are agreed, belief in the One absolute God must be held inviolate? Any substantial birth, or emergence from the Father, would, the Arians claim, lessen ('minitur') <sup>13</sup> God in respect of substance, divinity and action. Therefore consubstantiality is ruled out. Christ is other in substance, but 'factum non natum' <sup>14</sup>, deserving the title of Son and the commission of creating and saving, 'neque generatione, sed operatione a Deo'. <sup>15</sup> This preserves the doctrines of the Logos and the oneness of Christ with the Father (Jn 10:30), while yet upholding the sovereignty of God. But, Marius Victorinus answers, such quantifying misses the point. God is sovereign ('praestat'); He is Mind (*nous*), truly, utterly existing (*vere on*), He is 'altogether pre-existing (*totum proon*)'; and Jesus, 'in Himself altogether this existing (*ipsum hoc totum on*)'. Creation and salvation are therefore intrinsic to God's nature; <sup>16</sup> God, Jesus is completely fulfilled

being (*teleon on*): 'His est finis, hic principium, hic filius, hic *pas logos*, hic qui apud Deum et in Deo *logos*'.

This contrasts fundamentally with Plotinus, who conceives the *Logos* as no more than an agent, not creating, but conferring reason and order on the Cosmos by the three *hypostases*. <sup>17</sup> 'ZÐ- en autÐ', 'In him is life' <sup>18</sup>: the reference is to the supreme *hypostasis*, the One, and radically departs from Plato's *Timaeus*, whose Demiurge genuinely shapes things. <sup>19</sup> Athanasius <sup>20</sup> attacks this conception of a mere *technit-s* who cannot create out of nothing—a conception condemned by Plotinus <sup>21</sup> who follows Plato's *Timaeus* <sup>22</sup> in giving to the *Nous* supremacy of status within an everlasting universe. For, although the wording of Plotinus ('in him is life' <sup>23</sup>) reminds of Jn 1:4, the meaning is totally different; the *hypostases* belong within the Cosmos, so that agencies like the *Logos*, or the gods, are no different in essence from the non-singular beings, or from the singular *hypostases*; only their status is on higher level of functioning. Plotinus can therefore allow for pagan gods, which is impossible in a Cosmos ruled over by the absolutely transcendent singular Creator, who 'has constructed everything within himself', through the Word, 'the one, the singular Son (*monÐ tÐ hypiÐ*) who is in complete accord (*harmottei*) with Him'. <sup>24</sup> Athanasius here uses Col. 1:15-6, Jer. 31:22 and Prov. 8:22 to bring together the transcendent, invisible Creator with His image, who was born before all creation and who actually constitutes the heart of the creating and saving God. <sup>25</sup> Any compromise position, the identity of the Father with the Son (*monoousios*), which deprives the Son of his distinctive profile (hence patripassionism); or the mere union of will, or similarity (*homoiousios*), which deprives the Son of his substantial unity with the Father, making him into a superior agent within the Cosmos, rather like Plotinus' agencies and *hypostases*, contradicts biblical monotheism *in principle*. <sup>26</sup>

Basil uses Exod. 3:14 and Heb. 1:3: the 'brilliance' ('*apaugasma*') of the glory and the formal structure ('*charakt-r*') of His (the Father's) substance ('*hypostasis*'); in this way he preserves the Old Testament singularity of each *hypostasis*, Father, Son and Spirit ('*heis*', '*monachÐs*') <sup>27</sup>. Upholding the oneness and intimacy of the persons of the Trinity, Athanasius uses Jer. 31:22 concerning the imparting of a new salvation (*sÐt-ria*), or a new creation (*ektise kurios kainon*), where he quotes two Greek translations. <sup>28</sup> The same intimate connection between the *Logos* as creator and as saviour and renewer occurs at the conclusion of Marius Victorinus' answer to an Arian. <sup>29</sup>

The logical theory is developed by Basil <sup>30</sup> and, later, by Boëthius <sup>31</sup>; in both, it is motivated by the trinitarian controversy.

Starting with the name, *anthrÐpos*, man, in its most general meaning (*s-masia*) of referring to all that humans have in common, Basil goes on to personal names with more individual specifications ('*idioteran . . . endeixin*'), not subsumed under the common class 'human' ('*tÐn anthrÐpÐn logos*'). Applying this to the Trinity, he distinguishes between multiform, undefined ('*eskedasm-n-*, aorist-), all-inclusive *community* (*koinÐt-s*) of existence, essence (*ousia*), and what is said exclusively of the unique *substance* (*to idiÐs legonemon t-s hypostaseÐs*). This has the double implication of distinguishing the individual *hypostases* from one another while yet facilitating a vision of their community (*koinos*), where each is seen to work also within the others, the Only-Begotten conveying grace through the one Spirit (I Cor. 12:11). <sup>32</sup> Later, <sup>33</sup> he refers to the NT ancestor of this concept of hypostasis, Heb. 1:3, which describes Christ as the brilliant light of the glory, and the tangible shape of the substance of the Father (*apaugasma t-s dox-s kai charakt-r t-s hypostaseÐs autou*), in this way establishing the close intimacy between Father and Son, while yet distinguishing between their

peculiar profiles. In this way the singularity of God is upheld, while yet given dynamic form in the mutually interacting singular *hypostases*, and this is conveyed to man when meaning and rationality assume concrete form in conversation.

## 2 Dilthey

Such a close encounter between person and person, important as it is in spiritual and in social life, and in creating and relating to works of art, did not lead to the establishment of systematic disciplines until after Bacon's Democritus-based programme<sup>34</sup> and Descartes' construction of a universal system of nature based on the geometrical method of God's geometry imprinted in our souls.<sup>35</sup> But such a hierarchy of classes and particulars cannot yield understanding, for instance, of the acceptance of Nero's self-deification; or the cathartic effect of Oedipus' being either taken away by a messenger from the gods or received by the earth opening up, benevolently and without pain.<sup>36</sup>

Descartes distances himself from such human experiences because, he says, they lack the strength and clarity of conception and communication peculiar to logical reasoning. Yet the foundation of his system is God's perfection which is a value judgment in the face of the singular being who transcends all observed perfections, therefore, like the poetry which he respects and loves, a product of what he calls 'des dons de l'esprit'<sup>37</sup>, by which he must mean the products of the non-rational, howbeit profound, layers of experience of great personal value, but not demonstrably universally valid. The question therefore arises whether the domain of 'esprit' is really alien to *epistēmē*, in principle, therefore inaccessible to it.

With the almost exclusive preoccupation with the *epistēmē*—arising from the logic of classes, the domain of 'esprit' was, until the Renaissance, excluded from systematic research by definition. Its different branches were studied and practised for their theological, moral

or practical value, but not as ends in themselves. But with the phenomenal growth of knowledge, Descartes, Grotius, Vico saw the need for systems encompassing all physical and historical knowledge.<sup>38</sup> Paracelsus initiated a development which finds its apogee in Boehme's fusion of Rosicrucian cosmology and Eckhartian and Kabbalistic mysticism whose influence reaches down to Novalis, Coleridge, Hegel and their successors.<sup>39</sup> In the 18th century, society, therefore language and the arts, become subjects for comprehensive research and for facing, in depth, the relation between creativity and the will and sensibility. The dual method of Aristotle's *Poetics*, empirical research and classification, and live encounter with singular phenomena, now develops to such an extent that, by the time of Dilthey, it has become both possible and imperative to enquire into the rationale underlying the *disciplines of the human spirit*, *Geisteswissenschaften*. *Wissenschaft*, a field of systematic enquiry and knowledge, comprises both, natural phenomena and human life. Philosophers such as Dilthey, Cassirer, Langer, analyse the logical foundation of both types of knowledge. They trace the history of how the aims of the two types of discipline have come to diverge. Is a convergence possible?

'The structure of the natural sciences,' writes Dilthey, 'derives its character from the subject of its enquiry, nature. Images provided by the senses arise and change in a constant flow; they get referred to objects, and these objects fill and occupy the empirical consciousness and it is they'—that is, the objects which have fused with the images (we note the Kantian background)—'which form descriptive natural science.' But the difficulty arising from the disparity between objects and constantly changing sense impressions requires the search after uniformities and to fix these in a system of concepts. Controlled observation and induction are the tool

of this enterprise. Dilthey goes on to construct a pyramid of the natural sciences, with mathematics as its 'most universal foundation'.<sup>40</sup>

This excessive and unnecessary assumption makes any quantitative state or event expressible in mathematical language, which is, after all, only one refined sort of language<sup>41</sup>; although it is true that the natural sciences express, in appropriate quantitative languages, their instances, 'illustrations'<sup>42</sup>, of systems of classes and causal connections between them. They cannot *illustrate* what cannot be publicly observed and repeated. Thus, virgin births occur in certain classes of animals; as man is, biologically an animal, the question regarding the virgin birth of one human person, Jesus, is scientifically viable. But its theological meaning, conferring power on his followers to be one with Christ in life, after being moulded in his death in baptism (Rom. 6:8-9; Phil. 3:10-11), falls outside the scope of science. Having established that this event took place, it is not important whether it was common, rare or unique, but what it means. We are here in the universe or discourse of the *disciplines of the human spirit* (*Geisteswissenschaften*), the humanities, which aim at 'a concrete, objective insight into the concatenation of human experiences in the historical, social world of man.'<sup>43</sup>

Such insight is not gained by 'copying' external reality. Its tools are: *Anschauen*, inspecting, contemplating, reminiscent of Kant's *intuition* (*Anschauung*); then *understanding* (*Verstehen*) and *conceptual thinking* (*begriffliches Denken*); for in what he calls the *Critique of Historical Reason* (*Kritik der historischen Vernunft*),<sup>44</sup> the world of the human spirit presents itself as a tightly-knit system (*Zusammenhang*), constituting a nexus of meaning.

Pure reason uses the intuitions of space and time and the categories of applied logic to establish a system of phenomena—natural knowledge (*epistēmē*—*οὐσιῶν* *καθ'*

hypokeimenōn). Historical reason uses intuition and conceptual coherence to achieve understanding, *Verstehen*, one of Dilthey's key terms. It operates on the plane of private, everyday relationships between persons, in which judgments have to be made about the inner meaning of words and actions, on the plane of public, historical events, and in confrontation with works of art. Certainly, induction takes place, as particular perceptions are joined together to yield a coherent whole; but this only forms the basis for recognising the inner cohesion ('Zusammenhang . . . Lebensverhältnis') of a living relationship<sup>45</sup>; for the individuals observed are not particulars, but singulars, ends in themselves, not acting and reacting, but relating and responding and reliving of what has been perceived and is being recreated, through reflection and empathy, as human truth, 'a finding again of the I in the Thou; the human spirit finds again its own self as it ascends onto ever higher steps and planes of cohesion. It is this realisation of its identity of self by the human spirit, in the I, in the Thou, in every individual subject of a community, in every system of culture, ultimately in the totality of the human spirit and of world history, which makes it possible for the various *disciplines of the human spirit* to join together in attaining their common achievement'.<sup>46</sup>

Empirical research may find similarities and differences in trends and epochs of History, but these are still singulars; and they speak in languages which the critic may find congenial or—as with Dilthey in the case of Reformation theology—uncongenial;<sup>47</sup> but the intellectual and emotional encounter must not be blocked by refusing to listen to what is being said, or of not learning the semantics of its message. However, each I is different and will hear a different message from one and the same Thou, so that many understandings bear witness to the free movement of the human spirit.

Even more intensely is this freedom experienced in the very intimate encounter with the Thou of a work of art in which selections of events, thoughts, feelings are abstracted from life and transmuted to constitute a composition whose connection with life is remote and insignificant.<sup>48</sup> Thus Schiller works on Aristotle's and Lessing's principle that tragedy is more philosophical than History and creates tragedies which violate the facts of History, but which, through an encounter between the spirit of the age of the particular tragedy and that of the poet's own time, explores psychological and moral problems which are universal. Poet and audience *play*—a keyword in Schiller's aesthetic system—by emotionally participating in an action which is an end in itself, without biographical or topical ties; and by thus combining empathy with reflective detachment in play, they achieve deep insight and freedom.<sup>49</sup> Where biographical or topical concern predominates, depth remains unfulfilled—unless fulfilled in spite of the creator's conscious intention, as, for instance, Beethoven realised when he let his *Eroica* symphony stand, even though it no longer celebrated Napoleon.

#### 4 Cassirer and Langer

As Dilthey's Critique of Historical Reason concerns human singulars (*ousiai en hypokeimenō*) the medium of their activity is meaningful communication—language in words, sounds and shapes; and this dimension was developed by two of his distinguished successors, Ernst Cassirer and Susanne Langer.

The I–Thou dimension deepens in the analysis of Martin Buber into evaluating the dialogue between divine and human singulars. But this falls outside the scope of our present enquiry.

Cassirer's starting-point is a radical extension of Kant's epistemology. If our apprehension of reality recasts the noumena, so that our apperception is, so to speak, a translation of their text,

then the duality of perceiver and percept persists as an unresolved paradox. But it is resolved if we conceive the very action of apprehending as one of *presenting*, as knowing is an action which performs meaning; inherent in the foundation is Logos. As we apprehend, we already symbolize, that is, the result of the interplay between us and our environment is already meaningful texture, even before it might yield further expression in visual or sound patterns, although full clarity can only be achieved through such palpable presentation. This applies throughout experience, so that Cassirer sees the semantic coding of presentations as cultural activity. And being global, he harmonizes scientific with spirit-directed disciplines. The difference between them is one of method for attaining specific meanings, rather than of principle, as with Dilthey. For the common basis is the *logos* presented by man the symbolizer.<sup>50</sup>

An example for this is time and space.

Time, as explained in the beginning of Newton's *Mechanics* as the stable basis of all motion and the uniform measure of all things, seems at first sight to have nothing more than the name in common with the time that governs a work of music and its measure . . .

—yet they have the abstract quality of succession in common but the latter's singularity is of a wholly different order. Similarly spatial forms can be viewed as geometrical figures, or as forms in paintings and sculptures, so that spatial orienting can be an exercise in scientific speculation, or in mythical creating.<sup>51</sup>

The underlying dynamic is 'the pre-logical structuring' of the raw material of experience. 'The structureless could not only not be thought, it could not even become objectively seen or an object of awareness. The world of language and the world of art immediately afford evidence of this 'stamped form' which antecedently lies at the basis of logical concepts.<sup>52</sup> The reference is to Goethe's poem, *Urworte. Orphisch*,



which traces the stages in the unfolding of the personality. First comes *Daimon*, the mould necessary for developing —

Geprägte Form, die lebend sich entwickelt.  
(8)

(Stamped form which develops by virtue of being alive.)

It may develop into the discursive logic of natural science, or it may immediately create the shapes and rhythms of art; indeed, human action as a whole is shaped by these *daimon* patterns, and the historian and the artist respond to, converse with them by means of their own *daimon* patterns; and the critic of works of art holds a meta-dialogue with the dialogue shaped by the artist-creator, bringing into play the *daimon* pattern of his own personality.

Susanne Langer has extended and deepened Cassirer's exploration by linking the origins and nature of language and of psychological with modern research.<sup>53</sup> She involves herself in a critical dialogue, this between her own *daimon* and the *daimon* of present-day society<sup>54</sup>; and her meta-dialogue with works of art results in further questioning the nature and the scope of symbols.<sup>55</sup> She attacks the relegation of all non-logical expressions to the realm of non-symbolic emotion, because then a poem would be on the same level of expression as a simple cry of pain<sup>56</sup>; for, ignoring the pre-logical structuring of experience, even of raw perception, precludes understanding structured emotion.

Logical discourse is, therefore, only one form of meaningful symbolizing. But the problem here arises how to regard its articulate forms, in music, or in painting, where symbolism is non-verbal; it is clearly not 'meaning' in the same way as a rational judgment, although it displays the same careful structure; it expresses 'processes of life and sentience'. She

calls this coherent articulation of multi-levelled experience its 'import'.<sup>57</sup> But this also applies to poetry. To return to Goethe's *Urworte. Orphisch*: The stages of the person's unfolding experience—*Daimon, Tyche, Eros, Ananke, Elpis*—are expressed in rational language; at the same time, they present a deeply felt vision of personal conflict in striving, and a terrifying-encouraging question-mark at the end, for we are not whether

In verse three, at the heart of the poem, *Eros, Liebe*, comes crashing down from Heaven (fig. 3)—

We note that, in Platonic and alchemistic tradition, the hermaphrodite is important, and Goethe was influenced by this (e.g. Manon in his novel, *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*); here, she (*die Liebe*) does not absent herself; he (*ho erÐs*) descends in precipitate flight (in *Faust II*), Euphorion's descent is, by contrast, a death like that of Icarus; he is the offspring of Faust and Helen of Troy).

The last word of the poem, 'Aeonen', yields the melancholy and optimistically striving bacchius, 4 6 6, or molossus, 6 6 6. But we have barely touched the fringes of this miracle of inspiration and craftsman!

Poetry, then, achieves significance by fusing meaning with import, and this is not only by their coming together, as in the above example, where rhythm is grafted onto discourse, but also by the inherence of import in the discourse itself, as when reflection, story-telling and dialogue follow each other in

various sequences; where complicated rhetoric alternates with straightforward discourse or story-telling; where first- and third-person speeches alternate; where words and sentences are either straightforward or multivalent; where a narrator becomes a *dramatis persona*, as against an abstract narrative stance. All these, and many other devices, have to be watched in

an exercise of understanding (*verstehen*) a work, if the reader or listener wants to find again his 'I' in the 'Thou' of the text.

Fig. 1

Wie an dem Tag, der dich der Welt verliehen, 1

6 4 4 6 6 7 4 6 4 6 6

4 4 4 6 4 6 6

2 choriamb, bacchius: OR choriamb, dactyl, epitrite; OR choriamb, tribrach, epitrite; OR paeon, bacchius;

*Elpis* is solidly based hope or mere wish-fulfilment. So the intellectual utterance acquires import by its poetic form. For example: throughout the poem, the lines end with feminine,

Fig. 2

Die Sonne stand zum Grusse der Planeten, 2

4 6 4 6 4 6 4 6 4 6 6

5 iambic feet, followed by the unstressed long/heavy end syllable.

unstressed, but long (heavy) syllables. Only in the *Eros* verse, picturing the height of tension and inner contradiction, feminine and masculine

Fig. 3

Die bleibt nicht aus! — Er stürzt vom Himmel nieder,

6 4 4 6 6 4 4 6 4 6 6

6 6 4 6 6 6

choriamb; OR: secondary form of epitrite choriamb, bacchius; OR: spondee, amphibrach, spondee OR: spondee, iambicus, bacchius.

line endings alternate. But this verse also observes the universal cosmos of alternating rhymes, with a rhyming couplet to conclude each verse. Coexistent with the strict five-foot iambic metre, alternative rhythmic patterns provide the subliminal emotional atmosphere. Thus (fig. 1)—contrasting the birth pangs with the mathematically exact behaviour of the heavenly bodies (fig.2)—

## PART II INTERPRETATION OF TWO TEXTS

### 1 Chrétien's *Yvain*

Our first text is *Yvain* by Chrétien de Troyes, a courtly romance written ca. 1180, at a time when the political and social structure of Europe had stabilised itself. This made possible a brilliant secular culture among the aristocracy. In literature there developed, by the aide of the still continuing tradition of the heroic epic, lyrics and verse narratives ('courtly romances') which dissected the emotions; their idealisation of love has prevailed down to our own day. Love is depicted as kindling the most violent impulses, but also the most ideal sentiments, so that it challenges the heart—according to psychological theory from the *Timaeus* to Augustine, the organ for the formation of a person's basic attitude, enabling the will to make decisions<sup>58</sup>—to do justice to the basic moral imperative which, in a feudal society, is loyalty, hence to be truthful to oneself, to other people, and to one's values. Love and loyalty become, therefore, the acid test for integrity and the fulfilment of oneself as a person, both, from within, and in relation to other persons and to one's formal social responsibilities.

The romance<sup>59</sup> opens with a longish prologue (1-40) in which the narrator—not, of course, the historical Chrétien, for within the fiction only *dramatis personae* speak—expresses his pleasure (33) at relating a story connected with Arthur of everlasting fame.

Artus, li boens rois de Bretaigne 1  
la cui proesce nos enseigne  
que nos soiens preu et cortois,  
tint cort si riche come rois  
a cele feste qui tant coste, 5  
qu'an doit clamer la Pantecoste. 60

'Buens' means, not goodness of heart, but all-round excellence, which is spelled out, as 'proesce' has the double meaning of courage and of practical wisdom (Lat. root: 'prodesse'), qualities required of a model ruler who has to succeed in

war and diplomacy and as administrator and a just judge, a function which Arthur carries out later in the action<sup>61</sup>, where the narrator highlights his astuteness<sup>62</sup>. His *proesce* teaches us to be *preu* and *cortois*, that is, to be gracious and generous in character, hence, outwardly, well-mannered, pleasant in society. But Arthur is not only a model ruler of his subjects, whose outward splendour accords with his exalted social status, he also harmonises with the rhythm of the macrocosm—it is spring—and of the spiritual order, for Pentecost celebrates the descent of the Holy Spirit.

The idyllic scene at Arthur's court is contrasted with the deceitful courtiers of today, who talk of love, but only for the sake of their reputations, without anything<sup>63</sup>. 'But let us speak of those who lived then, let us ignore those who are still alive now, because, in my opinion, death filled with graciousness ('uns cortois morz') is of greater worth than a life which is vile'<sup>64</sup>.

The backcloth, then, is a society in which Arthur radiates the inner values of strength tempered by sound thinking and of a gracious regard, especially in love and loyalty between woman and man. But even the members of that court find that following this teaching is problematic. Yvain, one of the knights, involves himself in an exploit—the special term is *aventure*<sup>65</sup>—in which, for the sake of his reputation, he kills Esclados, lord of a domain and in it of a magic fountain, which unleashes a tempest when water is poured on its pediment; when calm returns, the birds sing a service of praise<sup>66</sup>, and Esclados appears to challenge the intruder. The battle between Yvain and Esclados releases frenzied, uncourtly hatred<sup>67</sup>, and at the end of Yvain's pursuit of the dying Esclados, he finds himself trapped in a hall close by the entrance to Esclados' castle<sup>68</sup>. He is saved by Lunete, lady-in-waiting to Laudine, Esclados' widow, to whom he had once been respectful and of service ('enorastes et

servistes')<sup>69</sup>. She gives him a ring with which he can make himself invisible<sup>70</sup>, much needed, as he now falls in love with Laudine, who is in deep mourning and still madly in love with Esclados<sup>71</sup>. Lunete shows deep affection and loyalty, but also astuteness which borders on the sinister when, at the end, she successfully negotiates Laudine's second conversion<sup>72</sup> to loving Yvain and accepting him back. Lunete's advice is level-headed: with Esclados' death, she needs a ruler and defender of her subjects and of the fountain, in which the human world and the macrocosm meet. Excessive mourning, violates 'droit san et reison'<sup>73</sup>, as if Esclados were a unique icon<sup>74</sup>; and hatred of Yvain, who has conquered him in fair battle—therefore the most suitable champion to succeed Esclados—is quite unjustified<sup>75</sup>.

Laudine's conversion is as rigid and single-minded as her intense love and grief over Esclados, and hatred of his killer<sup>76</sup>. If this is emotionally unsatisfying—indeed, it elicits special comment from Hartmann's narrator<sup>77</sup>—it alerts us to Laudine's immaturity. When Arthur arrives, as anticipated, Yvain and Laudine receive and host him and his court royally. Arthur invites him to his court for tournaments and feasting; Laudine gives him leave of absence for exactly one year<sup>78</sup>. When he transgresses by a day, she curses and rejects him.<sup>79</sup> After a period of madness, he is cured, and his further exploits—including rescuing a lion from a snake, who becomes his close friend<sup>80</sup>—are motivated, not by glory (*enor, enorable*), but to help those in distress. Finally, again helped by Lunete, Laudine receives him back. Yvain repents and she forgives him, while she feels 'trapped' by Lunete's advocacy<sup>81</sup>. But is she converted by Lunete out of prudence, or does she love Yvain? Has she matured as a personality, like Yvain? He evolves from naive love of glory, through madness, to loyalty out of affection for those whom he rescues, especially Lunete and the lion<sup>82</sup>; and his first

infatuation with Laudine grows into love and loyalty, so that his repentance proves that he is 'preu et cortois' by inner conviction<sup>83</sup>. And Laudine? When Lunete persuades her to receive the 'Chevaliers au lyon' without knowing his identity, then shows that he is, in fact Yvain, she trembles with rage<sup>84</sup>: 'You have well and truly trapped me'<sup>85</sup>; but, true to her solemn oath, she makes peace with him<sup>86</sup>, and, later, we are told 'that he is loved and cherished by his lady and she by him'<sup>87</sup>, and at the end, they and Lunete lead an idyllic existence. In a brief epilogue, the narrator adds: 'I have not ever heard of anything further being told about this, nor will you hear anything further being told about this, and no one wants to add a lie'<sup>88</sup>.

Does this mean that their love is as deep as it is mutual, so that Laudine has, somehow, undergone a catharsis, and there really is no more to tell, and anyone wanting to add anything is a liar? Or does it mean that all appearances suggest a perfect love and happiness, but, as far as the narrator is concerned, the issue is open-ended, as he has not been told anything further? I am more inclined to the latter view, as the word 'mançonge', 'lie', in the last line (6808), is taken up from the prologue which speaks of the deceitful courtiers who say that they love, 'but they lie' (27); in other words, the narrator implies, if there is any doubt about Laudine's change of heart from conviction, this cannot be decided either way, in view of lack of evidence; better not judge than tell a lie.

## 2 Hartmann's *Iwein*

This probable open-endedness contrasts with the version which, some thirty years later, Hartmann von Aue composed, and whose prologue and epilogue constitute a positive, not a negative, circle.

But first a warning against a methodological trap. Hartmann's work has been called a translation, or an adaptation of Chrétien's work<sup>89</sup>. But in view of the radical changes—

e.g. a completely different prologue and epilogue, dialogues between narrator and Lady Minne—it is manifestly not a translation<sup>90</sup>. Nor is it an adaptation which assumes close adherence to the original, unless practical considerations require changes, e.g. 'adaptation *for*—the stage, for a special occasion or audience'; but Hartmann's changes are too radical and bear witness to further poetic exploration of the material, rather than a tampering with the text for extraneous reasons. Jean Fourquet has coined the technical term, 'adaptation courtoise', by which he means that, allowing for changes of detail, the essentials of meaning and inner action are left intact<sup>91</sup>. Is Hartmann's *Iwein* an 'adaptation courtoise'? The central issue is certainly still that of realising the fullness of personality; and the story is, in general, kept intact; but does *Iwein*, does Laudine, undergo true catharsis?

The work starts with an aphorism which, the narrator claims, contains the unerring lesson taught by 'künec Artûs der guote' (5); as in French, *guot* is not confined to morality, but refers to all-round excellence, and this is spelled out for us in what follows: 'who knew how to strive for praise with the *muot*'—*pathos, animus*: the attitude of the will<sup>92</sup>—'of a true knight. In his times, his life style was so brilliant that he wore the very crown of high reputation'—*der êren krône* (as in French, *êre* means 'reputation', without moral connotation)—'and his name still does so; hence his countrymen know this and the truth when they say that he is still alive today . . . . A person who lives according to his manner of living in our day'—*site, ethos*—'is safe from the disgrace of evil'<sup>93</sup>.

Arthur's brilliance is not empty show, but comes up to the standard of true chivalry; his fame challenges the audience to emulate his manner of living. This is summed up in the introductory aphorism—

Swer an rehte güete  
wendet sîn gemüete,

1

dem volget saelde und êre.

'Whoever (*swer*: generalising 's') applies his *animus* (like *muot*: attitude of will: *gemüete*) to what is truly excellent (*rehte güete*: fulfilling moral and social responsibility, like Arthur), he has long-term blessedness (*saelde: beatitudo*, as in Psalm 1) and high reputation (*êre*) following in his wake'.

The unusual coupling of the most superficial with the most profound runs parallel to, but also contrasts with, a reflection in the *Tristrant* by Eilhart von Oberg (ca. 1170), where the narrator contrasts Tristrant's evil-minded enemies with—

wer von hertzen minnet  
ere und dar nach ringet,  
dem volget seld und hail.3115

Here love of reputation (*minnet ere*) brings with it blessedness and salvation (*seld un hail*); but it must be more than a cliché, it must come from the heart (von hertzen), where, since the *Timaeus*, thought and feeling fuse to form a person's master sentiment<sup>94</sup>, which determines what the will decides. Here, then, a person's existential commitment is challenged to strive for a reputation which will harmonise with 'seld und hail': *beatitudo et salus*. In the *Iwein*-prologue, the paradoxical coupling is not between the heart and reputation, but between blessedness and reputation given to an *animus* committed to true excellence. But the outcome is the same; unless the reputation is worth striving for, neither heart nor *animus* will obtain the reputation with the qualities of *salus* and *beatitudo*. Hartmann's narrator then underpins this challenge by introducing himself as a learned knight who has used his *otium* by practising the sublime arts of philosophy (in Hartmann's age: the Trivium) and poetry<sup>95</sup>. He is the *doctus poeta*<sup>96</sup> who aims at transmuting the excellence of Arthur's Pentecostal court into a *maere* (30), that is, a significant *mythos*<sup>97</sup>, a story with the objective of benefiting ('vol wesen . . . taten . . . vil wol'<sup>98</sup>) his audience; they, with the poet-narrator (the fictionalised Hartmann) are to

attain the same state of well-being as King Arthur and his court, that is, the *saelde und êre* of the introductory aphorism, or of the last line of the romance, when the narrator's framework closes a circle with a blessing ('God grant us *saelde und êre*')<sup>99</sup>; this stands in sharp contrast to the Chrétien circle, which is overshadowed by *mançonge*<sup>100</sup>. Like Chrétien's narrator he says that, after describing the happiness of Iwein and Laudine, he has nothing more to tell<sup>101</sup>. But the reason for their happiness is not mere pragmatism, because they both confess being guilty and ask forgiveness of each other<sup>102</sup>. And this is how anger was brought to reconciliation—

sus wart verstüenet der zorn. 8136

There is nothing ambiguous about this. The *passio*, the *anima perturbatio of ira* is also one of the seven deadly *vitia*, flaws of character, so that not only an external conflict, but also a state of psychological and spiritual alienation is overcome. And this is metrically underlined.

The standard metrical line of the 12th-13th century romance has four stresses (counterpart of the contemporary French eight-syllabled line), with an unspecified number of unstressed syllables, usually interspersed between stressed syllables; often this achieves, loosely, a trochaic or iambic type of rhythm. But this crucial line EITHER scans // x // x /, i.e. five stresses, OR // x / x x /. The first alternative has two units of spondaic weight separated by an unstressed syllable (6 6 4 6 6) followed by an iambic-type unit (4 6). The second alternative again has a spondaic type of unit, followed by an unstressed syllable, and this is followed by a choriambic type of unit (6 6 4 6 6). It is certainly a line of great weight, indicating an inner change of existential import.

Like the Yvain of Chrétien's romance, Hartmann's Iwein experiences catastrophic changes. The full force of macrocosmic fury at the

magic fountain (the birds' service of praise is not mentioned) destabilises him also to such an extent that, pursuing the dying Askalon (Esclados), he also breaks all bounds of chivalric self-discipline ('âne zuht')<sup>103</sup>. At the end of the further series of misfortunes and lucky breaks—imprisonment in a hall between two portcullises in Askalon's castle; release by Lunete; falling in love with Laudine, followed by marriage; overstaying his one year's leave of absence by one day; curse and rejection by Laudine (in Hartmann's version the messenger is Lunete)<sup>104</sup>—he has proved himself to be almost a man who has lost his bearings. But there is a saving grace: a train of thought stimulated by love<sup>105</sup> makes him realise that he has outstayed the one year; melancholy seizes him so that, after Lunete's speech, he feels disgraced, because still in love (3254: 'meistert', i.e. emphasis on the *passio of libido*), therefore guilty, so that his sense of total deprivation of Laudine and his general confusion cause his reason to lose grip over his subliminal forces (*path-passiones* active below the diaphragm<sup>106</sup>) and he is driven into insanity, running amok in the wild forest<sup>107</sup>, totally dominated by *ira* ('anger and raving'<sup>108</sup>). Gradually he regains enough rational control to keep alive<sup>109</sup>. Perhaps the question, 'Are you Iwein, or who are you?'<sup>110</sup>, when he eventually wakes up, indicates recovery from amnesia, and not mere confusion after sleep (not in Chrétien). His cure is completed by a magic ointment (another mediator between subliminal forces and rationality, after the magic fountain, Lunete's magic ring, a herdsman and his flock in a primaeva forest in a state of pre-Adamic innocence), gift of Morgan the faery and administered by three ladies-in-waiting to the Lady of Nârisôn, whom he now helps as she is threatened by Count Alliers<sup>111</sup>. Henceforward, his exploits only aim at helping those in need, thus doing deliberately what he had originally done for Lunete spontaneously, out of *hövescheit/cortoisie*. After leaving the lady of Nârisôn (Norison in Chrétien),

he defends a lion against a snake, in spite of doubts about his own safety, because of his nobility (Chrétien's text adds: pity, the *passio of misericordia*); it is almost human, in its total fusion of understanding (calling for help, even without words) with subliminal forces, and, like Lunete, it will show utter loyalty and deep affection for Iwein after ritually offering to become his follower. The snake, by contrast, is simply an agent of the uncontrolled, hence destructive *passiones* the macrocosm, exhaling fiery, poisonous, evil-smelling breath<sup>113</sup>.

Chrétien's lion is called 'preuz et deboneire' (3388): *preu* (2), just like King Arthur (2-3); *deboneire*, just like Yvain's close friend, Gauvain (3966; Hartmann's Gâwein, who is loyal: 'der getriuwe man': 2767), which is the equivalent of possessing *hövescheit*, like Hartmann's Gâwein (2714) and Lunete (3387), who combines astuteness with affection and loyalty. When Hartmann's lion enters Iwein's service, he sheds *ira* and replaces it with love—

hie liez er sine grimme  
und erzeict im sine minne 3873

—and we note that *minne* has the root meaning, 'remembering', 'bearing in mind', thence specifically: 'in love', thence 'loving': the *passio of libido* is therefore transformed by reflectiveness.

In both versions, therefore, the psychological interplay of forces as basis for moral attitudes is universalised as it applies to the macrocosm as well as to man.

In the battle on behalf of the lion, Iwein is said to display another equivalent to *proesce*: in spite of *zwivel* (3846, 3866: the meaning ranges from intellectual doubt to the sin of *desperatio*; here, Iwein wonders, in case the lion is like a feudal superior who cannot be trusted: 'gedienet . . . dem ungewissen manne' 3856-7), he shows faith in the lion's nobility: he is *preu* (Lat.: *prodest*), here: 'em vrumer man' (3861), and this emotional, moral and practical maturity he now displays throughout his exploits<sup>114</sup>. His first visit to

Laudine proves to be an acid test for both lovers; it occurs after he has rescued Lunete from enemies at the court, showing the deep affection which he has developed for her <sup>115</sup>. Hence the personal maturity which he has attained. When he finally returns to Laudine, it is Lunete who engineers their reconciliation <sup>116</sup>.

Iwein's relationship with Laudine starts with the sudden upwelling of the *passio* of *libido*, though from the outset it transcends a mere *perturbatio animi* and because it has already begun to mature before he leaves with King Arthur and his court, her rejection, followed by *ira*, *dolor* and insanity, only drive his love underground, so that, after recovery, he aims single-mindedly at making himself worthy to receive her grace after returning; for she is his heart's delight ('durch die mîn herze vreude enbirt': 6811) <sup>117</sup>.

Yet when he speaks to Laudine during his first (incognito) visit, he says that his falling short of being worthy to receive grace is not his doing—

der mangel ich âne schulde 5471.

But we must remember that 'schult' has the broad meaning of responsibility in general, not only the specific meaning of 'guilt'. Here he complains that he is not the cause of her considering him inadequate, so that her granting or not granting grace ('hult') is purely arbitrary <sup>118</sup>. As a true courtly lover, he does not question Laudine's over-eagerness to see him back exactly within a year, and immediately taking the ring from him; yet he feels that the emotional situation is not clear. Therefore the question of his moral responsibility must be attacked from within his own personality. Only when he faces his own shallow outbursts of violent feelings, his drifting thoughtlessly into the lure of worldly pleasure at Arthur's court, can he acknowledge his moral inadequacy; he now hopes for acceptance as he confesses—

vrouwe, ich habe missetân: 8101  
zwâre, daz riuwet mich.

and Laudine kneels before him in contrition; he bids her stand up, the responsibility is not hers, his loss of her grace was due to his *animi perturbatio* ('mînen muot') <sup>119</sup>.

Chrétien's Yvain, confessing his guilt, ascribes it to his senselessness ('folie'); he asks for mercy, the positive *passio* of *miser cordia*, rejected by Seneca, admitted by Cicero and the Bible, both taken on board by Augustine <sup>120</sup>. Laudine answers that, true to her oath <sup>121</sup>, she grants him 'pes' (peace, reconciliation: 6783), which is very different from Hartmann's Laudine, who also says that she must keep her oath <sup>122</sup>, but then, in her turn, asks him for his grace—

nû begêt genâde an mir. 8123

We note, at this crucial point in the action, that the rhythmic flow is arrested by heavy (long and stressed) syllables:

/ x / x / 4 4 /  
6 7 6 7 7 6 .

The difference between Chrétien's and Hartmann's Laudine can be observed in depth during her interview with Yvain/Iwein, after he has defeated Lunete's enemies in a fierce battle in which he receives terrible wounds. He relieves his feelings by telling her of his rejection. Chrétien's Laudine says that the lady's evil-heartedness (4589 'mal cuer') and lack of the gracious (4588: 'cortoise') disposition expected of a lady grieves her (4569: 'ce me poise': strong language); she ought not to close the door to a knight of his high quality, 'unless he had held her in excessive contempt' (4592: 'se trop n'eüst vers li mespris'). Neither here nor at her parting blessing (4621-23) does she go beyond a courtly lady's graciousness.

Hartmann's Laudine also blames the lady for not granting him grace, unless she had accused him of 'intense grieving of the heart' (5478: 'grôz herzeleit'); Chrétien's 'mespris' (4592) is a matter of public reputation; Hartmann's 'herzeleit' (5478) touches the core of the

emotions, as the heart, the central organ of the personality, is attacked by the *passio* of *dolor/tristitia*. On parting, Iwein blesses her with the prayer that God might keep her and give her 'true blessedness and high reputation' (5531: 'saelde und êre'), the high perfection of the narrator's introductory aphorism (3). She answers by invoking God's blessing and the wish that his misery (5538: 'ungemüete') may be turned to 'happiness and high reputation' (5540: 'ze vreuden und ze êren'). Certainly, Iwein's blessing is on a higher level: his *saelde* (*beatitudo*, *gaudium*) as against her *vreuden* (*laetitia*) but it still shows her deep personal concern, for she wants God in His 'perfect nature' (5557: 'güete') to remove from him his 'grievous misery' (5538: 'swaerez ungemüete'; strong language!). This is not the lady of unyielding emotions, as when she had taken back her ring (3193-99; Chrétien: 2778-89); nor of the distant politeness of Chrétien's Laudine. She shows compassion (*miser cordia*). Her development has thus taken a decisive turn towards, at the end, kneeling before Iwein and asking his forgiveness (8127). It agrees with the positive closed circle of Hartmann's, as against the negative circle of Chrétien's framework ('saelde und êre'—'mançonge'). It therefore lies outside the agreement between the two versions demanded by Fourquet's *adaptation courtoise*.

### 3 Conclusion

Dilthey's programme of understanding (*verstehen*) demands strict regard for historical, semantic and stylistic correctness. But even when this is the case, it does not mean that an interpretation will attain the universal objectivity that compels the assent of every intelligent and reasonably well-informed reader, nor is that the intention; for it results from a selection of features from each of this inexhaustible poetic creations, arranging them in meaningful, significant patterns which reflect the semantic meaning and the import yielded by the pattern of symbols

elicited from the work in its totality. And this operation—selection of features, arranging them in an all-embracing symbolic pattern, interpreting (*understanding*) it—depends on the questions put to the work according to the individual critic's point of view.

If, as I hope, my understanding is intelligible, indeed, illuminating, to fellow-critics with very different points of view, then this constitutes an invitation to the participation in a cathartic dialogue with the, in the present exercise, two works under consideration. The necessary precondition for this is the complete fusion of Langer's *semantic meaning* with import.

Swansea

### Notes:

1. Plato, *Rep.* I; 332b-c.
2. Athanasius, *Or. de incarnat. verbi*, para. 2; *Patrologia Graecia* [PG] 25, 97/98D-99/100A.
3. cf. J.V. Langmead Casserley, *The Christian Philosophy*, Faber & Faber, London, 1949; especially relevant to present purposes, pp.30-47, 55-71, 126-60, 172-95, 202-27.
4. Aristotle, *Cat.* V; 2 a 11-18.
5. *ibid.*; also II; 1 a 20-1, 28; cf. further: Sir David Ross, *Aristotle*, 6th edn., Routledge, London, 1995; p. 24, with note 20 (p. 60).
6. *Post. Anal.* II, XIII; 97 b 26-27: 'pas horos katholou, ou gar tini ophthalmō.'
  7. *ibid.*, I; 77 a 15-22.
  8. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, I *Elementarlehre*, II *Transzend. Logik* 7, 1, para. 9; (text as in the second edn., 1787); in: *Kants ges. Schriften, Werke* III, ed. Konigl. Akad. d. Wissenschaften, Reimer, Berlin, 1904; pp. 86-87; *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. F. Max Muller; 2nd edn., Macmillan, London, 1920; pp. 58-59.
  9. *Kritik der Urteilskraft* II, 7, para. 77; in: *ibid.*, vol. V (1908), esp, pp. 409-10; *Kant's Critique of Judgment* trans. J. H. Bernard; 2nd edn., Macmillan, London, 1931; esp. pp. 325-6.
10. Aristotle, *Poetics* II; 1452 a 22 - b 15.
11. Plotinus' hypostases are treated frequently throughout the *Enneads* but cf esp, II, 9,1-2 and V as a whole; for *nous*, esp. *ibid.*, treatises 3-5; in 4, 2, 9, *nous* is discussed as a collective entity.
12. Basil, *Adv. Eunom.* IV, para. 2; PG 29, 677-78b.
13. *Candidi. Arianini liber de generatione divina. Ad Marium Victorinum; Patrologia Latina* [PL] 8 (the vol. containing Marius Victorinus' works) para. IV; col. 1016 A-B.
14. *ibid.* para. IX; col. 1018 C.
15. *ibid.*, para. X; col. 1018 C - 1020 A; cf. further: Athanasius, *Expos. fidei*, esp. paras. 2-3 (PG 25, 203/4a, -205/6b).
16. Marius Victorinus, *De generatione verbi divini*, para. II; PL 8, esp. 1021 A-B.
17. Plotinus, *Enn.* II,13, esp. 5-6; 15-24; II, 9,1, esp. 18-65; III 2, 1, esp. 18-9; 38-9.
18. *ibid.*, V, 4,2, esp. 16-9.ÍN, para. 11; PG 25, 495/6B-C.
21. Plotinus, *Enn.* III, 2, 1, 15-35.
22. Plato, *Tim.* 52a.
23. Plotinus, *Enn.* V, 4, 2, 16 ('in him is life': 'zð— en autð, kai panta en autð, kai hñ katanoñsis autou autð koinonei sunaisthñsis ousa en stasei aidið kai nð—sei heteros — kata t—n nou no—sin.') — Jn. 1,4: 'in him was life' ('en autð zð— —n'): imperf. (as against Plotinus' pres.) which, though long-term, is historical, i.e. the creating and saving Logos creates, and makes a bridge between eternity and time.
24. Athanasius, *Expos. fidei*, paras. 2-3; PG 25, 203/4c-205/6a.
25. Cf. Basil, *Adv. Eunom.* I, para. 18; PG 29, 551/52 C.
26. Basil, *De hominis structura*, Or. I, para. 3; PG 30, 13/14c: 'The one . . . divine nature in the Father, the same one in the Son, and . . . the same . . . in the Holy Spirit'. ('hen', 'taut—n', 'theot—ta' are the crucial words); when, in *Lib. de trin. sancto*, cap. 18, para. 47, PG 32, col. 153/54C, he speaks of the Greek error (t—s hell—nikes plan—s) of polytheism, is he thinking of Neoplatonism (perhaps specifically of Plotinus)?—bearing in mind that he is speaking of philosophical paganism, not religion (cultic practice) in general.
27. Basil, *Adv. Eunom.* IV, para. 2; PG 29 677/78B-C, *Lib. de trin. sancto*, cap. 18 para. 45; PG 32, 141/50B-151/52A: the all-pervading singularity of God, both in essence and in each hypostasis, rooted as it is in the piety (*eulabeia*) of the Hebrews, is not concerned with numbers: he is thinking of the hierarchy, giving No. 1 (Father) priority over No. 2 (Son), and No. 2 over No. 3 (Spirit), which would separate the persons, as if they were three gods; his immediate references are: Isa. 44, 6; 48,12; 41,4; with Rev. 1,8.
28. The Septuagint and Aquila: *Expos. fidei*, para. 3; PG 25 ,205/6A.
29. Marius Victorinus agrees with his Arian correspondent about the intimate connection between the creating and the Saving function of the Logos; the latter concludes his letter (para. X; PL 8, 1020A-B in *Lib. de generatione divina*) with: 'per quem effecta sunt omnia ... Salvator noster, universorum emendator'); the radical disagreement arises from the Arian rejection of consubstantiality (*ibid.*, para. VII-VIII; PL 8, 1017- 18A); for the Arian, the Logos was made by God (*ibid.*, para. IX; PL 8, 1018C: 'factum est, ergo non natum'), his creating and saving action is derived from God because God works in him (*ibid.*, para. X; PL 8, 1018C: 'neque generatione a Deo, sed operatione a Deo', which is his interpretation of I Jn. 4,3 and Jn. 1,3), hence he wills what the Father wills (*ibid.*, para. X, PL8 1018C-1019A, he quotes Mt. 26,39). For Marius Victorinus, God is 'totum *proon*' Jesus 'ipsum hoc totum *on* . . . universale omnimodo *teleon on*. Hic est finis, hic principium, hic *pas logos*, hic, qui apud Deum et in Deo *logos*'. (*De generatione verbi divina*, para. II; PL 8, 1021A-B). He concludes the letter (i.e. preceding his concluding prayer,

para. XXXII.; PL 8 1036B-C) with the argument that, if God created through the Word, then the Word must precede the activity of creating, so that it is God who gives birth to his Son: 'Generat enim *ho nous* verbum. Generatio igitur Jesu, qui *Logos* est.' Thence he concludes with a résumé of Trinitarianism (paras. XXX-XXXI; PL 8, 1035B-36B).

30. Basil, *Epist.* 38 (to Gregory of Nyssa), paras. 2-3; PG 32, 325/26B-329/30A.

31. Boethius, *Contra Eutychem*, esp. II; PL 64, 1543B-C; in Loeb edn.: 82,1-85, 52 (pagination and line numbering the same in both first edn., ed. H.F. Stewart and E.K. Rand; Harvard U.P., Cambridge, Mass. & Heinemann, London, 1918 and repr. and in the 2nd edn., rev. S.J. Tester; 1975, 1978; Boethius, *The theological tractates with an English trans.*; ser.: *Loeb class. library.*) Boethius' approach is Aristotelian; in his (Latin) terminology, *singulae* are *kath' hupokeimenou*, *particulares* are *en hypokeimeno*; his explanation of the two types of substance occurs in the discussion of *persona*.

32. Basil, *Epist.* 38, para. 2-4; PG 32, 325/26B-333/34A; esp. para. 2 (327/28A); para. 4 (329/30B).

33. *ibid.*, paras. 6-7; 335/36C-339/40A.

34. *Novum Organum, partis secundae summa*, LI; however, Democritus' views arise from the metaphysical speculations of his predecessors, so that modern empiricism is very different from, even when inspired by him; our sense experience is not to be trusted, being the product of our physical condition, and this depends on the atoms, as they come towards, or resist each other (Diels-Kranz, fragm. B 9-11; pp. 139,7 - 141,4 in vol. II, sec. on Democritus); sense experience is the outer surface (the product?) of atoms and emptiness (fragm. B 125; p. 168, 4-6); he leaves, acc. to Galen, the dilemma, sense experience (*aesth-sis*) v. reasoning (*dianoia*) unresolved (*ibid.*, 11. 6-7). His

systems of atoms is, therefore, a conceptual system, in its way as metaphysical as that of his predecessors: cf. ch. XVII (pp. 342ff in: Jonathan Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers*; ser.: *The Arguments of the Philosophers*, Routledge, London, 1979, and repr.)

35. Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*, Pt. 5; in: *Oeuvres de Descartes*; ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tanbery; Cerf, Paris, 1897-1910; vol. VI (1902), pp. 40-1.

36. Sophocles, *Oed. at Colon.*, 11. 1661-65.

37. Descartes, *Discours* (op. cit. in note 35), Pt. 1, pp. 6-7.

38. For an excellent survey of the intellectual trends which influenced Vico, cf. Peter Burke, *Vico*; ser.: *Past Masters*; OUP, Oxford, 1985. For the emergence of the historical disciplines cf. further: E. Cassirer, *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit*, 4 vols, 3 Buch, *Grundformen und Grundbildungen der historischen Erkenntnis*, Vol. 4 *von Hegels Tod bis zur Gegenwart* (1832-1932); Sonderausgabe; repr. (1994) of 2nd edd. (1957).

39. For a survey of the research into these topics, I have selected some of the most important works (an adequate list of the primary sources would break the framework of this study).

**Paracelsus** in the context of humanist intellectual trends: Walter Pagel, *Paracelsus: An introduction to philosophical medicine in the era of the Renaissance*; Karger, Basel, 1958.

**Mysticism and cosmology.** Kurt Ruh, *Meister Eckhart. Theologe, Prediger, Mystiker*, Beck, Munich, 1985; C.F. Kelley, *Meister Eckhart on Divine Knowledge*, Yale UP, New Haven, 1977.

A comprehensive study of the Kabbala and its historical evolution: Gershom O. Scholem, *Major trends in Jewish Mysticism*, Thames & Hudson, London, 1955; on Boehme as a Christian Kabbalist: cf. pp. 237-8.

On the Christian Kabbala: François

Secret, *Le Zôhar chez les Cabbalistes chretiens de la Renaissance*, ser.: *Études juive I*; Mouton, Paris & La Haye, 1964.

**Boehme:** I studied his essentially word- (hence singularity-) based system and traced some of the historical trends in my Ph.D. dissertation, *Jacob Boehme's doctrine of a natural language* ('Natur-sprache') (*with special reference to its influence on Novalis and others*), submitted to the University of Bristol, Sept. 1955; the centrality of the word, especially in the *Election of Grace*, in a series of two articles: *Schöpfung und Gnade. Betrachtungen ueber Jacob Boehme & 'Gnaden-Wahl'* in: *Antaios III*, 1962: Jan. (I 'Das Wort in der grossen und kleinen Welt') and Mar. (II: 'Freiheit und Vorsehung'). His use of Paracelsan and Rosicrucian cosmology and of the Kabbala are quite explicit as from 1618/19 (*Three Principles, Forty Questions*), and of speculative mysticism (esp. the *Theologia Germanica* and the Weigelian corpus (i.e. Valentin Weigel and Benedikt Biederman ('pseudo-Weigel') certainly as from 1621/22 (*Von wahrer Gelassenheit* and other tracts in the collection, *Weg zu Christo*) Weigel and his circle synthesized cosmology and Eckhartian speculative mysticism (cf. Fritz Lieb, *Valentin Weigels Kommentar zur Schöpfungsgeschichte und das Schrifttum seines Schülers Benedikt Biedermann*; EVZ-Verlag, Zurich, 1962) to which Boehme was indebted.

Important studies of Boehme in the hist. context: Alexandre Koyré, *La philosophie de Jacob Boehme*, Vrin, Paris, 1920; Hans Grunsky, *Jacob Boehme*, ser.: *Frommanns Klassiker der Philosophen*; Frommann, Suttgart, 1956; John Joseph Stoudt, *Sunrise to Eternity. A study in Jacob Boehme's life and thought* Pennsylvania UP, Philadelphia, 1957; John Schultz, *Jakob Bohme und die Kabbalah. Eine vergleichende Werkanalyse*; ser.: *Europäische Hochschulschriften*,

Reihe XX Philosophie 370; Peter Lang, Frankfurt/M., etc., 1993.

**On Rosicrucianism** in its hist. setting: Francis A. Yates, *The Rosicrucian Enlightenment*, Paladin, Frogmore, 1972.

Influence of this complex of mystical and cosmological traditions on Goethe and Romanticism: Agnes Bartscherer, *Paracelsus, Paracelsisten und Goethes Faust*; Dortmund, 1911; Hugo Friedrich, *Die Sprachtheorie der französischen Illumination des 18 Jahrhunderts, insbesondere Saint-Martins*; in: DVjs XIII, Hft, II, 1935; pp. 293ff; Helene Richter, *Die philosophische Weltanschauung von S.T. Coleridge und ihr Verhältnis zur deutschen Philosophie*; in *Anglia* XLIV, NF XXXII, 1920; pp. 261-90; 297-324; Auguste Viatte, *Les sources occultes du romantisme. Illuminisme-Theosophie. 1770-1830*; 2 vols.; ser.: *Bibliothèque de la revue de littérature comparée*, 46-7; Paris, 1928. Jacques Roos, *Aspects littéraires du mysticisme philosophique au début du Romantisme: William Blake, Novalis, Ballanslie*, Heitz, Strasbourg, 1951.

40. *Wilhelm Diltheys gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Bernhard Groethuysen et al.; Teubner, Leipzig & Berlin, Vandenhoeck R Rupprecht, Göttingen, 1922-90: for present purposes vol. VII is of special relevance; cf. VII, 89-91, sec.: *Die Verschiedenheit des Aufbaus in Naturwissenschaft und den Geisteswissenschaften*.

41. Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophical Sketches*, Mentor Books, New York, 1964 (1st edn Johns Hopkins UP, Baltimore, 1962); 3. On a new definition of 'symbol', p. 61 (penultimate para. of study).

42. Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key. A study of reason, rite and art*, Harvard UP, Cambridge, ~4a3s., 1996 (3rd edn. - 1st edn.: 1942); pp. 274-75.

43. Dilthey, op. cit. VII, p. 3 (beg. of first study of the group, *Studien zur Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften (Studies to*

*establish the foundation of the disciplines of the human spirit): Der psychische Strukturzusammenhang (The structural coherence inherent in the human spirit): 'eine gegenstandliche und objektive Erkenntnis der Verkettung menschlicher Erlebnisse in der menschlich-geschichtlich-gesellschaftlichen Welt.'*

'Zusammenhang' ('cohesion') is one of Dilthey's key terms. As a strict empiricist (cf. H.P. Rickman, *Wilhelm Dilthey. Pioneer of the human studies*, Elek, London, 1979; esp. pp. 9-10 ('Zusammenhang'); also pp. 116-19, 145, 152), he cannot accept a transcendently imposed structure; he therefore finds structure emerging, as events and situations converge into patterns due to their own inherent nature: in human affairs, it is man's psychological make-up which effects the meaningful concatenation into long-term coherence. This is the counterpart, within the *Geisteswissenschaften*, of the 'laws of natures' in the natural sciences; but, being *singulars*, the elements of human events and situations are qualitatively different from *particulars* which the natural scientist subordinates to *universals* ('classes', 'ousiai kath' hupokeimenou'); cf. *Entwürfe zur Kritik der historischen Vernunft*, esp. sec. *Bedeutung*: VII, 232-41; Ilse Bulhof, *Wilhelm Dilthey. A hermeneutic approach to the study of history*; Nijhof, The Hague, etc., 1980, esp. pp. 34-54, 65-72; Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Dilthey. Philosopher of the human studies*, Princeton UP, Princeton, 1975, esp. pp. 59-73 (psychology); 210-46 (Bergson, *Windelband*, Kant: 'reflective experience').

44. VII, 191-291: *Entwürfe zur Kritik der historischen Vernunft* (a collection of essays); *Verstehen (comprehend; acquiring and possessing insight)*: pp. 205-27; comprehensive study by Michael Ermarth, *Wilhelm Dilthey: The critique of historical reason*, Chicago UP, Chicago & London,

1978. The shift of attention from mainly the realm of inner experienced to the outer world: Theodore Platinga, *Historical understanding in the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey*, Univ. of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo, London, 1980; esp. pp. 31-6, 47-9.

45. VII, 212: sec. 4: *Die höheren Formen des Verstehens*, in I, II of: *Entwürfe* (cf. note 43 above).

46. VII, 191: *Entwürfe* (as in notes 44 and 45 above): I *Erleben, Ausdruck, und Verstehen*. I,1 *Aufgabe einer Kritik der historischen Vernunft*: '... diese Selbigkeit des Geistes im Ich, im Du, in jedem Subjekt einer Gemeinschaft, in jedem System der Kultur, schliesslich in der Totalität des Geistes und der Universalgeschichte macht das Zusammenwirken der verschiedenen Leistungen in den Geisteswissenschaften möglich.'

Buber follows on from 'my teacher Wilhelm Dilthey, who had founded the discipline of philosophical anthropology' which Kant 'absolutely fails to achieve' and which Buber develops in the direction of an existentialism rooted in Augustine; cf. Martin Buber, *Between man and man*, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1939, 2nd impression 1949; this is the fifth of a collection of studies 'brought together for English readers ... arisen in connexion with my little book *I and Thou*' (Buber's Foreword, p. viii): *What is man?* (pp. 118-205); *Section One: The progress of the Question* (pp. 118-56).

47. cf. Platinga, *Historical understanding* (op. cit. in note 44), pp. 19-23: passage quoted from Briefwechsel 125; VII, 215-6 in: *Entwürfe zur Kritik der historischen Vernunft*, I, 2, sec. 5: *Hineinversetzen, Nachbilden, Nacherleben*.

48. VII, 56-7.

49. cf. Friedrich Schiller, *On the aesthetic education of man. In a series of letters. English and German facing*; ed., trans., comm. by Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L.A.



- Willoughby; Clar. Press, Oxford, 1967, repr. 1982; esp. letters 6, 9, 14, 15, 22, 23, 26, 27; also cf. vol. V, pp. 570-669 in: *Friedrich Schiller, Sämtliche Werke*; ed. Gerhard Fricke and Herbert G. Göpfert; 6. Aufl.; Carl Hanser, Munich, 1980; also in other theoret. writings, e.g. *ibid.*, pp. 360, 445ff, 514, 530, 687, 726-7.
50. Ernst Cassirer, *The philosophy of symbolic forms*; I *Language* trans. Ralph Mannheim, Yale UP, New Haven & London, 1955; cf. the development from the concept of the symbol, in science to general cultural activity, more especially to language and the 'miracle' when an aggregate of particular sensations . . . takes on a new and varied life . . . as language with meaning': pp. 85-94.
51. *ibid.* pp. 96-7: 'the *problem* of the origin as such is common to science and myth; the type of character, the modality of the origin changes as soon as we move from the one province to the other . . .' — further *ibid.*, p. 107; passing 'beyond passive receptivity to an independent outward material,' we 'begin to place upon it our independent imprint which articulates it for us into diverse spheres and forms of reality. Myth and art, language and science, are in this sense configurations towards being: they are not simple copies of an existing reality but represent the main directions of the spiritual movement, of the ideal process by which reality is constituted for us as one and many—as a diversity of forms which are ultimately held together by a unity of means.' This imprint, this 'stamped form' (cf. the following note) comes about 'through the freedom of spiritual action . . . the chaos of sensory impressions begins to clear and take on fixed form for us.' (*ibid.*, p. 107). The Goethean reminder is to the Lord's speech at the end of the *Prologue in Heaven* of *Faust*, esp. 11, 344-9, which finishes with (11. 348-9): 'Und was in schwankender Erscheinung schwebt,/Befestiget mit dauernden Gedanken' (something like: whatever is perceived by the senses moving this way and that, you are to tie down into the solid shape of lasting thoughts). Text as in vol. 3 of the Hamburg edn. (op. cit. in note 52 below), pp. 18-9.)
52. Ernst Cassirer, *The logic of the humanities*, trans. C.S. Howe, Yale UP, New Haven, 1960, and refs. p.65. I use the text of the Hamburg edn. of Goethe's works: *Goethes Werke. Textkritisch durchgesehen . . . mit Anmerkungen versehen* ed. E. Trunz et al.; Wegener, Hamburg, 1961-5 and repr.; vol. 1, pp. 359-60; Goethe's own comm.; pp. 403-7.
53. Susanne Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key*, Harvard UP, Cambridge Mass. & London; 3rd edn. 1996 (1st edn. 1942); pp. 25-98, 197-202; cf. p. 90: perceiving is already a symbolizing process; the word 'Gestaltung' reminds us of Schiller's use of the term 'die Gestalt': cf. Aesthetic education, esp. letter 15, and the wonderful poem, *Das Ideal und das Leben*.
54. *ibid.* pp. 278-9.
55. *ibid.* pp. 83-90. The closeness of Langer to Cassirer in the essentials of the activity of thought as symbolizer may be gauged from a comparison between the two contributions, by Cassirer ('Spirit' and 'Life' in contemporary philosophy, pp. 855-80) and Langer ('On Cassirer's theory of language and myth', pp. 379-400) in a splendid symposium: ed. P.A. Schlipp, *The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer*, Tudor, New York, 1958.
56. Susanne Langer, *Feeling and Form*, London, Routledge, 1953.
57. *ibid.* esp. p. 31.
58. For the emergence, in the 12th century, of the conception of the 'Platonic idealization of love', albeit of man for woman, cf. Eva-Maria Carne, *Die Frauengestalten bei Hartmann von Aue. Ihre Bedeutung in Aufbau und Gehalt der Epen*, Marburg, Elwert, 1970; esp. pp. 2-14, which provides a further bibliography. In general the lovers get married at the end of courtly romances (the Tristan tradition is altogether different; here the illicit secret passion leads to tragedy), whereas lyrics generally rehearse extra-marital love, whether spiritual-physical or spiritual only or physical only: *ibid.* pp.130-1.
- Different types of love are discussed in: P.G. Walsh (ed., trans., comm.) *Andreas Capellanus on Love*, London, Duckworth, 1982. Cf. further, H. J. Weigand, *Three Chapters on Courtly Love in Arthurian France and Germany. Lancelot, Andreas Capellanus, Wolfram von Eschenbach's 'Parzival'*, New York, AMS Press, 1966, pp. 18-25. F. Schlosser, *Andreas Capellanus. Seine Minnelehre und das Christliche Weltbild um 1200*; Bonn, Bouvier, 1960.
- The tradition*: In Homer's psychosomatic psychology, the heart is the fundamental organ-and-function for fundamental decision-making; e.g. *Od.* XVIII, 344-5; *IL.* I, 188-9; XIII, 280-3; and esp. *Od.* XX, esp. 5, 10-21, commented on by Plato, esp. in *Phaedo* 94D-E, and followed in this by Jacqueline de Romilly, '*Patience, mon coeur*'. *L'Essor de la psychologie dans la littérature grecque classique*, Paris, Soc. d'ed. Les belles lettres, 1991, pp.11-2.
- Inner conflict when a choice has to be made: e.g. in Sophocles' *Antigone* (1105), but this already in a period when theoretical analysis systematized observation and its poetic realization. In Plato's *Tim.* 69C-71D, the heart (centrally situated in the body) functions as the mediator between thought (situated in the brain) and the noble impulses in the breast (just below the neck, through which rational control is maintained), and, in the diaphragm, the purely physical and nervous impulses and emotions, so that here the choices take place which are communicated to the will for actually deciding on a given course of action. — Aristotle had considered the heart (as being at the centre of the body) to have the function of receiving all feelings and sense impressions and, being the

organ for thinking (i.e. not the brain), formulating emotional and rational stances for choosing and actual decision-making (*De sensu* I, II; 436 b 7; 438 b 33; *De part. anim.* II, X; 656 a 10ff; III, III-IV; 665 a 10ff; III, VIII-IX; 432 a 10 ff; but this applies to all living beings: *De iuv.* III; 468 b 20 ff). But Erasistratos' research proved that the thinking function resided in the brain (*De placit. Hipp. et Plat.* 1,6 in Galen's works: Kühn V, 184-9). However, the overall unity of physical and mental operations (howbeit on different levels) is common to both. Hence, Plotinus (4th *Enn.*) built Plato's more dualistic anatomical structure into Aristotle's continuity, as a basis for his hierarchy from the One, through the Nous, man's combination of perceiving, feeling and thinking, down to the elements. The heart, as a physical organ, is the source of the blood; here Plotinus follows Aristotle; and the blood flows through the veins (which start in the liver; IV, III, 23, 39), and they carry the *thymos* (vital force, desire, anger); its rational control enters from the soul which enfolds the body and which conveys rationality to the physical functions: from the brain to the nerves, giving rise to perception (to *aisthētikōn*) and to imagination (to *phantastikōn*); in it the will (*boulēsis*) and the intelligence (*phronēsis*) are identical: *Enn.* IV, III, 23, 39 and 44; IV, IV, 12, 46. Thus, perceiving, feeling, thinking and deciding 'somehow' (*pōs*) co-operate (IV, III, 23, 33) in forming a total disposition to decide and to act; and this becomes live reality as it is carried in the blood, generated by the heart (third and fourth treatises of *Enn.* IV). The exact process whereby physical and non-physical co-operate remains—then as now—a mystery. In any case, they preserve their character, which makes it possible for souls (V, I, I, 1-6) to forget their Father God and be ignorant of him and of themselves, while yet belonging properly to Him as their origin; its cause is *tolma*, wilful, excessive audacity, which desires,

not only individuality as such, but also to exist unto themselves (*heautōn einai*). But since their God Father is a fellow-citizen of the cosmos, the spiritual-moral radicalism which is essential to a Christian perception, is missing. Augustine finds this in the biblical understanding of alienation from a transcendent God and its conception of the heart as the organ for expressing thoughts and feelings and for producing the outlook which issues in decision-making, but within the context of the Christian life, desires arise from the desire to be close to God. Thus, when he comments (*De Trin.* I, 8; PL 42, 831-2) on the contrast between physical sight and trust (Jn. 14, 9-11: 'ego in Patre, et Pater in me'), not to be grasped through visible evidence, but by believing (*credere*), that the Father speaks and works, 'in me manens'; II Cor. 5, 7-8: Paul's 'per fidem enim ambulans, et non per speciem'; Act. 15, 8-9: Peter's 'qui novit corda Deus, testimonium perhibuit . . . fide purificans corda eorum', Augustine concludes that the reward ('merces') for trust is the looking on God ('contemplatio'), as 'per fidem corda mundantur'; the test for such *contemplatio* is that the hearts are purified, so that, as in the promise of the Beatitudes (Mt. 5, 8), 'beati mundicores . . . Deum videbunt': and this fulfills the promise of Ps. 91 (Vulg. 90), 16: the gift of long life and the vision of salvation. This is the existential answer to Philip's request (Jn. 14,8) to show them the Father; it contains the oneness of Christ with the Father (Jn. 10, 30) and entails that 'Pater solus vel Filius solus adimpletur nos "laetitia cum vultu" (Ps. 16 (Vulg. 15), 11) suo'. This last reference (to Ps. 16, 11) shows how, already in the Bible, the parts of the body are often used metaphorically, not, as is also frequently the case (as also in Homer and earlier Greek thinkers), in their literal sense, which is also psychophysical (e.g.: Exod. 14, 5; Prov. 14, 10; Mt. 2, 8; 15, 19). Augustine, existentialist Christian

thinker, is only concerned with the heart as metaphor, and for him it designates the basic attitude of the person who, when a believer, trusts, non-physically, a God who, in his turn, makes it pure, so that it arrives at the spiritual answer to Philip's request. We note that Augustine does not use the heart as an existential metaphor when, in *De Trin.* lib. 11-2.; PL 42, 983-1012, he writes a purely discursive analysis of the human will, thought and memory as an analogy to the persons of the divine Trinity. But when he uses the Bible for spiritual exegesis, references to the heart are very frequent. An illuminating example (*Ennarr. in Ps. 139, 14* (Vulg.) = 140, 13b. cap. 18; PL 36-7, 1815) arises from asking in what way the promise of that he will disclose himself ('ostendam meipsum') to those who love him and keep his commands (which also ties in with the subject of the concluding sec. of this *Ennarratio*). The restriction applies to those who crucified Jesus: although they saw his human shape, the divine shape (*formam hominis - formam Dei*) was reserved to the 'pii', those who are of pure heart ('mundo corde') and those who have been purified ('mundatis'); he therefore indicates a twofold process (Jn. 14, 21), that of listening to him, ceaselessly watching out for him and loving him; and that of those who are the sons of God (I Jn. 3, 2, quoted earlier) and who will see what He is and what they are, which is as yet hidden from them, but will be disclosed, 'quia inhabitabunt recti cum vultu tuo'; now, the face (presence, direct confrontation) of Father, Son and Spirit is/are simultaneous, and it is promised by the Son; 'sine vultu non nobis daret laetitiam.' But there is no factual distinction among: the active watching and loving; the being that which has been promised; and the receiving what has been promised. All three are constituted by the mutual disposition (the heart) of God and man, and its actualization in the intimacy of being in immediate

- confrontation with God's presence 'ut gaudeamus ad vultum ipsius.' But this disposition is not automatic. Persons like the crucifiers have adopted the opposite *cor*, so that they see the human, but not the divine form.
59. The texts here used: Mario Roquos (ed.), *Les romans de Chrétien de Troyes . . . IV Le chevalier au lion (Yvain)*, ser.: CFMA 89; Paris, Champion, 1960. G.F. Benecke and K. Lachmann, rev. Ludwig Wolff (ed.), *Iwain, Eine Erzählung von Hartmann von Aue*; 7th edn., Berlin, de Gruyter, 1968.
60. The romance is not constructed as an allegory of theology; it is a comment on human emotions and social behaviour. Yet many biblical reminders (e.g. here: Pentecost; or later, Yvain's cure in the form of a (very unbiblical!) resurrection: Chrétien: 2861-3135; Hartmann: 3345-3697) reveal the underlying assumption that mundane and spiritual existence have analogous structure and, in fact, constitute a unity which is only broken by the Fall; hence also the 'spiritual ( as well as the psychological) import of reconciliation, preceded by repentance and forgiveness, and seen as reconciliation by the overcoming of *ira* (cf. note 84 below), highlighted especially in vocabulary and rhythm in 1. 8136 ('sus wart versüenet der zorn') discussed later in the text. The very positive emblematic value of the lion (royalty: Gen. 49, 9-10; Hebr. 7, 14; Mic. 5, 8; Hos. 5,14; 13, 7; Prov. 30, 30; — Christ type: Rev. 5, 5, used in C.S. Lewis' novel, *The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe*) is the exact reverse of the lion as the devilphantasy in I Petr. 5, 5; the snake also traditionally ambivalent: Gen. 3, 1-5, 13-5; Jn. 3, 14-15; Num 21, 6-11.
61. Chrétien: 6315-6437; Hartmann: 7282-7726. cf. the *Index des mots relatifs à la civilisation et aux moeurs* in M. Roques' edn. (CFMA 89), pp. 231-63.
62. Chrétien: 6359-65; 6414-22; Hartmann: 7647-52; 7687-7728.
63. Chrétien: 'Qui s'an vantent et droit n'i ont'. (28).
64. Chrétien: 29-32. Hartmann speaks generally of a perfect life ('wunschleben') which has been lost ('selch vreude niemer werden mac'); we note that, at this stage, the superficial laetitia/vreude (beatitudo/saelde does not yet arise) is used; but with a tale ('maere' about Arthur's era this could be remedied (43-53).
65. Yvain/Iwein repeats the exploit of Calogrenant /Kâlogrenant, the difference being that he is unhorsed by Esclados/Ascalon, whereas Yvain/Iwein is the victor.
66. Chrétien: 472; not in Hartmann where, instead, Kâlogrenant rejoices, as if he had been in a second Paradise (687). They are both directed to the fountain by a primaeval, but peaceful man, guarding an equally peaceful flock of wild animals. He is black as a moor (Chrétien. 286/Hartmann: 427); Iwein (not Yvain) is also 'gelîh einem more' (3348) during his madness: two types of savagery are thus contrasted, the first in primaeval innocence, the second the effect of regression due to insanity and a sense of guilt. Combined with the contrast between Arthur's teaching of true 'guete' (1. 1) and contemporary decadence, the Hartmann exploration (two blacknesses; Paradise) hints at a reminder of the Fall.
67. Chrétien: 815-79; cf. esp. 'Felenesemant . . . plus angrés/ne furent de lor mort haster.'(835, 838-59); motif of desire to inflict death also in 817, 874. Hartmann: 1002-61; motif of desire to inflict death: 1008-9; 1036-37; the killing: 1051-59; here 'hövesch' (1040) only refers to prowess in battle, not to the quality of chivalrous self-discipline, as their bitter enmity (1003-11: 'groz ernst unde zorn': black *ira*) results in their discarding chivalric self-discipline ('ane zuht' 1056; much stronger than Chrétien's 'angrés': 838).
68. Chrétien: 956-69; Hartmann: 1075-1150.
69. Chrétien: 'enorastes et servistes' (1013); Hartmann: 'gruoztet . . . erbutet ir mir die ère' (1194, 1196).
70. Chrétien: 1026-37; Hartmann: 1201-104.
71. Chrétien: Laudine: 1146, 1204-42, 1288-1301; Yvain: 1309—42; 1360; 1544; Hartmann: Laudine: 1307-31; 1381-1402; 1446-75; Iwein: 1332-54; 1419-38; 1478-82.
72. (1) Chrétien: 2038: 'Sachiez donc, bien acordé somes'; the whole episode: 1593—2093; followed by the, Council of State: 2040-50; (2) 6783-84: 'la pes feire antre vos et moi;/s'il vos plest, je la vos otroi'; the whole episode: 6517-6803; Epilogue: 6804-8; Hartmann: (1) 2556-7: 'sit unser ietwederz giht/ez sî des anderen vro' (we note; in Chrétien, the transaction is primarily political; in Hartmann, mutual love has already taken root: 2332-2357); the whole episode: 1783-2360; Council of State: 2361-2420; (2) 8127: 'das ir mochet mir vergeben'; 8136: 'sus wart versüenet der zorn'; the whole episode; 7805-8159; Epilogue: 8160-6.
73. Chrétien: 'droit san et reson' (1776): hatred breaks the code of her 'grant gentillesce' (1677); cf. 1788: 'son latin'; Hartmann: 'iuwer vrüemekheit' (1797); 'rehte und 'redelîche' (1799).
74. Chrétien: 'Cuidiez vos que tote proesce/soit morte avoec vostre seignor?' (1678-9); Hartmann: this is exactly Laudine's claim: God never could make a more perfect knight ('tiern man') than Ascalon; - 'du tobest' ('you are raving mad' — Chrétien: 'desraison': 1714): 1807-18. Lunete takes her up on this claim, because, under the threat of King Arthur approaching the fountain, Laudine's high reputation ('ère'; 1843) is lost, if she cannot find an efficient defender of her domain; if he cannot be found among Laudine's knights, then she has been cheated (1846) of her *ère*— unless someone else can be found; taking up the first question: 'do you think that all chivalrous excellence (1953: 'vrüemekheit'—Chrétien's 'proesce') has been buried with him (Ascalon)?' The man of superior

- 'vrumeckheit' is none other than he who chased Ascalon: 'der in da jagte unde sluoc,/der ist der tiurer gewesen;' (1955-69); Chrétien: 1696-1713.
75. On the danger to the fountain through the approach of Arthur, previous note 74; the perennial need of a champion, according to tradition (Chrétien: 2830), although she is at present at peace with Arthur (Chrétien: 1828-33), is still an important part of Lunete's plaidoyer (also: Yvain's/Iwein's guiltlessness, having won in fair knightly combat: Chrétien: 1762-74; Hartmann: 2039-50); and Laudine, meditating, admits that Lunete is right; 'but what is, in the end, decisive, is Yvain's reputation and royal descent (1817-20); we note the conditional: 'Se il est tax . . . je le ferai' (1805, 1807); Hartmann 2101-14: her reputation will be enhanced—this *follows* her acceptance: 'daz ir den muot/sô schône hât verkêret' (2102-3).
76. Which motivates her impatience at the delay of Yvain's arrival (1834-43); Hartmann: 2118-23.
77. Hartmann (1863-88; based on Chrétien 1642-48): having understood ('verstuont') Lunete's advice, she follows, the narrator comments, the feminine habit (1866) of contradicting what they yet know to be correct; this is not disloyalty/inconstancy ('unstaetekeit': 1874), but the struggle of what is truly right and assented to in their fundamental attitude to get to the surface; we note at this crucial stage one of Hartmann's favourite devices: frequent repetition of a word, or complex of words, often orchestrated by repetition of certain vowel sounds—in this case, 'guot' and 'muot', and the rhyme with 'uo'.
78. Chrétien: 2564-2615: if he does not keep the term, her love will turn into hatred; 2566; this detail is not in Hartmann: 2924-2955; Hartmann has omitted the power of the ring to restore memory of the wearer's beloved (2609-10)—why? Is it because love is in no need of magical power?
79. Chrétien: 2706-2775; Hartmann: 3102-3200.
80. For further discussion of this topic cf. later in the text and note 112 below; — Chretien 3337-3411; Hartmann: 3828-3882.
81. Laudine feels trapped by Lunete's 'au hoquere1 prise' (Chrétien: 6751); Lunete is called an astute diplomat and exemplary courtier: Chrétien 6589: 'vostre conseil et vostre san'; 6620: 'cortoise'; in Hartmann, the emphasis is on her qualities as a person, though not without taking her accomplishments on board ('sich underwant vrou Lunete/der reise die si gerne tete./ hin reit diu guote/mit vroelîchem muote;': 7939-42); at the same time, Yvain/Iwein and Laudine both have deep affection for Lunete: Chrétien: 6683-9; Hartmann: 7983-7.
82. Lunete. cf. above note 81; the lion: Chrétien: 'preuz et deboneire' (3389), like a knight (cp. Lunete: 'cortoise': 6620); Yvain loves him like his own person: 'l'aim come mon cors' (3792;—'cors,' is the whole self; similar, M.H.G. 'lip', related to Eng. 'life'). Hartmann: the 'noble animal' ('edelentiere') is loyal/steadfast (3880-2), as opposed to the untrustworthy feudal lord ('dem ungewissen maune': 3857); his love ('mime') and respect ('êrte'): 3873-9; mutual love: 3936-60, 4814-7.
83. Following Arthur's example (1.3).
84. Laudine raging: the passio of *ira* (Chrétien: 6749: 'tressaut')—as against Hartmann's Laudine who welcomes him like a lord of high standing ('gast': 8040).
- The *path-/perturbationes animi/motus animi/affectus* are violent macrocosmic (e.g. *Lib. de mundo* III, XVIII, 331 in: *Apulei opera quae supersunt*, vol. III; ed. Paulus Thomas; Leipzig, Teubner, 1921, p154; referring to the pseudo-Aristotelian *Peri kosmou* 4; 395 b 30 - 396 a 12) or emotional disturbances (cf. Quintilian, *Inst.* vi, 2, 20-21; frequently discussed by Plato (supremely in *Tim.* 41E-43D; 48B; 52D-E; 69C-71D), they may also extend to seductive sense experience, as opposed to reason
- (e.g. Aristotle, *De an.* I, 4; 408 b 1-15, used by Plotinus: *Enn.* I, I, 1-7) and to morality (e.g. Gal. 5,24; I Thess. 4,4-5). Radical Stoics regard all *passiones* as diseases, not admitting positive or therapeutic *eupatheai* (*constantiae*); Christian theology, though to some extent divided, upholds these, especially *miser cordia*, and condemns indiscriminate suppression of all feeling, including anger and love (*apatheia*): cf. esp. Bks. VIII, IX, XIV of Augustine's *De Civitate Dei* in VIII, 16-7 (PL 41-42); IX, 4-6 (PL 41, 258-62); XIV, 6-9 (ibid., col. 409-17) he discusses the whole tradition, esp. Apuleius (*De deo Socratis*) and Cicero (Tusc. III—V; *miser cordia*: Lig. 12, 37 and Tusc. IV, 20, 46; but limited; Tusc. IV, 8, 18).
- Augustine does not mention Seneca who only admits *clementia*; *miser cordia* is condemned as a *vitium animi*: *L. Annaei Senecae opera quae supersunt*, ed. F. Haase; Leipzig, Teubner, 3 vols., 1852-4 (and repr.): *De Clem.* II, VI, 1-4 (vol. I, pp. 502-3); *De Ben.*, II, V, 3 (vol. II, p. 17); *Ep.* 9, esp. 2-3; (Vol. III, pp. 15-6); as Seneca's concern is a person's long term condition, not particular crises, he uses *affectus*, and not the other terms, except in specific references (*De const. sap.* IX, 1; XIII, 1: vol. I, pp. 25, 28); therapeutic function of philosophy ('caret autem ira sapiens'): ibid., IX, 3 (vol. 1, p. 25).
- Augustine's frequent use of the traditional four main *passiones*, as in Vergil's *Aen.* VI, 733 ('metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque', i.e. *metus, cupiditas, tristitia, laetitia*; though some variation in terminology): *Civ. Dei*, Lib. XXI, 3, 2; PL 41, 711; ibid., cap. 13: col. 727-28; frequently in Lib. XIV, cap. 3-9, determining the shape of his line of argument regarding the Christian pilgrimage (PL 41, cols. 405-17).
- There is no absolutely fixed table of *passiones*, but Vergil's four are often regarded as four basic groups, so that *ira* belongs within the outgoing class, like *cupiditas*

(*libidinosus*), as opposed to passive, inward turned *metus* and *tristitia* (Cicero, e.g. *Tusc.* I, 10, 20; IV, 26, 57; 36, 77 - 37, 84).

Early Stoic texts have been collected in Ioannes ab Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, 3 vols.; Leipzig, Teubner, 1903, 5: secs. De affectibus (II, 234-5; III, 92-133).

Works on ancient and mediaeval psychology: A. Ed. Chaignet, *De la psychologie de Platon* (Durand, Paris, 1862); *Essai sur la psychologie d'Aristote* (Hachette, Paris, 1883): both these works photogr. reprod. by Culture et civilisation, Bruxelles, 1966; *Histoire de la psychologie des Grecs*, 4 vols.; Hachette, Paris, 1887-93 (glossary for all three works only here in vol. IV); Hermann Siebeck, *Geschichte der Psychologie* (Greek and early mediaeval); 2 vols.; Perthes, Gotha, 1880, 188; A.H. Armstrong, *The Cambridge History of the later Greek and early mediaeval philosophy*; CUP, 1967. - symposium on the emotions: Jacques Brunschwig and Martha C. Nussbaum ed., *Passions and perceptions. Studies in Hellenistic philosophy of mind. Proceedings of the fifth Symposium Hellenisticum*, CUP, 1993.

85. cf. note 81 above.

86. She makes peace: Chrétien: 6783-84; Hartmann: 8097-8156; cf. further the above note 75 and the following note 87.

87. I agree with Helen C.R. Laurie (in: *Two studies in Chrétien de Troyes*; Droz, Geneva, 1972; the second study: *Yvain and the Romantic tradition*, pp. 156-8) that Lunete is working for 'a better covenant', i.e. 'no longer temporary'; but the comparison between the gracious God of Hebr. 6, 15-19 and Laudine, still 'at her most inexorable' is one of contrast, rather than of analogy! The comparison is even more remote in the Hartmann exploration, where both lovers repent, having matured as persons and finding themselves in a relationship of mutual respect and love. The Chrétien narrator realizes

that the outward structure of the event does not reveal the inner nature of their love. The Hartmann narrator makes the mutual change of heart the lynch-pin of the inner action. Jean Frappier is right to refer to Laudine's (as far as she knows at the time) continuing resentment, which, however, she will no longer express, like fire covered by cinders (6763-6); but this would mean that her granting of love and reconciliation (6793-8) is play-acting, and will remain so (i.e. not allowing for the narrator's open-endedness): Jean Frappier, *Étude sur Yvain ou le chevalier au lion de Chrétien de Troyes*, Soc. d'édition d'enseignement supérieur, Paris, 1969: p.58 in his study of the text in *Chrétien de Troyes, L'homme et l'oeuvre*, Hatier-Boivin, Paris, 1957; p. 168, he still thinks that the reconciliation is 'une victoire du chevalier et de la dame sur eux-mêmes . . . elle a fini par renoncer à l'orgueil au fond de son coeur.' Myrrha Borodine, *La femme et l'amour au XIIIe siècle d'après les poèmes de Chrétien de Troyes*; Slatkine reprints, Geneva, 1967, pp. 232-3, calls Laudine 'idole adorée au sourire cruel'.

As regards Hartmann's Laudine, to which reference later in the present study is made, at the time of Iwein's first return (esp. 5521-40): she has already evolved in her character, so that her repentance (8121-31) is manifestly the climax of a development; but although only these two *kairoi* are described, and much remains hidden, we may guess at something of the causation, as arising from her very passionate, but profoundly caring nature; Carne, *Frauengestalten* (op. cit. in note 57 above) finds this 'sudden' (!) change at the end unconvincing, although it is the second of two *kairoi*.

88. Chrétien, 6804-8.

89. Is some such conception implied in Henry and Mary Garland, *The Oxford Companion to German Literature*, OUP, 1997: art. on Hartmann, col. .558b? Anthony Thorlby (ed.), *The Penguin Companion to Literature*, 2

*European*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1969; col. 7984a, art. on Heinrich von Veldeke: the *Eneide* is called a 'free rendering' of the *Roman d'Eneas*; cols. 830a-b: art. on Wolfram von Eschenbach: his *Parzival* is 'based on' Chrétien's *Perceval*, and his *Willehalm* is 'based on a French *chanson de geste* which tells the story of the famous crusader William of Toulouse;' col. 772b: art. on Tristan, where 'Thomas' poem was imitated in a German version by Gottfried von Strassburg and in a Norwegian version' (although the latter is a prose romance!). Beroul is called a 'remanieur'—but of which work? Eilhart 'appears to have used the same source as Beroul' (we have no written versions older than Beroul, Eilhart and Thomas, so that nothing certain can be postulated about the relationship between these three works and their source(s)).

The procedure of using an original text, yet reflecting further on its action, sometimes making significant changes, sometimes either explicating, or departing from the inner meaning in depth, has obviously puzzled mediaevalists; furthermore, in the cases of works like the Tristan poems and the slightly later Norwegian, French and considerably later (15th century) German prose romances, we are further hampered by gaps in the manuscript material extant (so that we extrapolate from episodes as depicted by these late 12th and 13th and 15th century works what their source(s) might have been like, as none of these have come down to us). Whilst I admire the work of Jean Fourquet and his school who postulate the 'adaptation courtoise' as a genre in its own right (cf. note 91 below), I would wish to put more emphasis on the creative imagination of each poet than appears to have been done (or have I misunderstood these scholars?)

90. A 'translation' or 'rendering' we surely mean that, however close or further away the translator moves to/away from the original text in

detail, the *meaning* is preserved; thus, when the Hartmann version substitutes one prologue and epilogue for another, interpolates the narrator's dialogues with Lady Minne (2971-3028; 7015-74), or introduces the motif of Laudine being startled by the incursion of love when first meeting Iwein (3411-2357), where, in Chrétien, she expected only political and social factors (Chrétien: 2037-8; 1813-20; 1844-75), so that a totally different picture of Laudine's character emerges, one can only speak of a radically different conception of the subject matter, although, in many other respects, the Hartmann text follows very closely that of Chrétien; translation is therefore used as a device, but within a totally new conception of the meaning.

91. The term, 'adaptation courtoise', was first used and expounded by Jean Fourquet in his introduction to: *Hartmann d'Aue. Erec. Iwein. Extraits accompagnés des textes correspondants de Chrétien de Troyes. Avec introduction, notes et glossaires*, Aubier, Paris, 1944. He was followed by Danielle Buschinger, *Le Tristrant d'Eilhart von Oberg . . . Thèse présentée devant l'Université de Paris IV le fev. 1974*, Service reprod. des theses, Univ. de Lille III, 1974; and her edition: *Eilhart von Oberg, Tristrant. Edition diplomatique des manuscrits et traduction en français moderne avec introduction, notes et index*, Kümmerle, Göppingen, 1976; and by Michel Huby, *L'adaptation courtoise des romans courtois en Allemagne au XIIe et au XIIIe siècle*, Klincksieck, Paris, 1968.

In his introduction, Fourquet distinguishes between: (1) the *adaptation courtoise* which confines itself to making changes which concern the style of life of the characters and the exigencies of style (e.g. from Celtic to French, then to German aristocracy; hence into French and German verse) — but we must interpose a *caveat*: these very shifts may, as in Eilhart's *Tristrant*, be exploited poetically in depth, and

not be mere linguistic-sociological transposition!; (2) where the subject matter remains unchanged, but nuances of meaning are woven into the new text, so that 'un sens moral nouveau' emerges; by this he means, not ethics, but sensibility — e.g. when Chrétien's realism is soft-pedalled ('sourdine') and the impetuous forward movement gets slowed down by pauses with long passages of reflection, by which the meaning is preserved, but deepened ('psychologische Vertiefung'). The difficulty about this is that our two romances may, in a general way, explore the problem of moral and psychological maturing (in terms of King Arthur: the Iwein prologue transposes onto its plane of reflection the exhortation of the Yvain prologue that we should follow the example of Arthur to be 'preu et cortois': Huby, pp. 379-82); but this leaves open the question of how, in concrete action, this is exemplified by the characters. Fourquet implies (if he means merely 'Vertiefung' = 'greater depth') that no significant psychological modification takes place; Huby says so (p. 221); I have tried to show that, on that level, the Hartmann exploration goes well beyond the open-endedness of Chrétien's narrator; if, therefore, we wish to maintain that Hartmann's romance is an *adaptation courtoise*, then its characterization needs to be modified; otherwise (as I have done towards the end of the text), we must say that Hartmann's work goes beyond the genre as defined by Fourquet, Buschinger and Huby, although (as Huby shows with a wealth of fascinating details), the procedures of composing an *adaptation courtoise* are in large measure followed by Hartmann.

92. For texts used cf. note 39 above.

'. . . des gît gewisse lêre/küenec Artûs der guote./der mit ritters muote/nach lobe kunde striten./er hat bi sinen zîten/gelebet alsô Schône/daz er der êren krône/dô truoc und noch sîn name treit./des habent die wârheit/sîne lantliute:/sî jehent er lebe noch hiute:/ . . . (4-14).

Parallel with this reflection is the narrator's further reflection just before the marriage between Laudine and Iwein is concluded: Laudine's excellence (2421-25) broadens out into God's endowment of: 'truwe und andern guoten sin, volle tugent' ('loyalty and all other intention of real worth, complete excellence': 2426-8), to anyone who (2426: 'swen': generalized 's') is worthy of a woman of excellent quality, 'who desires only what he wills' (2429-30: 'den eins guoten wîbes wert,/diu niuwan sînes willen gert'); such excellence is the precondition (2431-2) for a long life characterized by 'liebe' (double meaning of 'joy' and 'love'), so that they receive 'vil vreuden' (*laetitiarum abundantiam*). On the *passiones* cf. note 84 above and the following note 93.

93. 11.5; 6-20. — 'lobe' (7), like *êre*, generally refers to public recognition; the point made by the great poets of the period (cf. the *locus classicus* in the prologue of Gottfried's *Tristan*, esp. 11. 13-28; ' . . . der mich und iegdlichen man/nâch sînem werde erkennen kan . . . ' ('who knows how to recognize me and everyone else according to his real qualities . . .'): edns. of text: (1) ed. K. Narold, rev. W. Schröder; de Gruyter, Berlin; 1st edn. 1906, 3rd edn. 1969; (2) ed. F. Ranke; Weidmann, Berlin & Frankfurt/M., 1949, which is used by Rüdiger Krohn in the Reclam edn.) is that recognition should be accorded to all real, personal qualities, rather than to mere glamour; cf. F. Mosselman, *Der Wortschatz Gottfrieds von Strassburg*, Excelsior, 's-Gravenhage, 1953, p. 110, where 'êre (honestum)' is listed with the moral and social qualities of a knight, together with 'moraliteit, staete, tugent, zuht' ('obeying the rules of correct social conduct, loyalty, all-round ability or excellence, self-discipline'); hence, in *Yvain* and *Iwein*, the cured Yvain/Iwein undertakes *expleito* to help those in need, not to enhance his own prestige.

The original meaning of

'muot' has only been preserved in modern German as the second part of compounds like 'Gleichmut', 'Hochmut', 'Wanelhmut' etc.; is originally the reaction to outside stimuli, hence the state of emotions and the inclination to act in a certain way; Cicero translates; *perturbatio animi*. (*Tusc.* III,10, 22 - 11,25); it is only an illness when not moderated by reason; when looking to the future with a view to ends worth striving for; 'eius modi adpetitionem Stoici *boul-sin* appellant, nos appellamus voluntatem' (ibid., IV, 6, 12); cf. further the tradn. of linking *pathos* with *ethos*, noted in the Stephanus Greek Dict., art. *pathos*: VI, 24 B-C.

94. Cicero and the Stoics (and after them, *inter alios*, Augustine) take their cue from Plato's *Timaeus*: cf. notes 84, 92, 93 above.

Eilhart: for edn. used cf. note 91 above; in the passage quoted, I have omitted Buschinger's punctuation in order to highlight the *liaison*: 'minnet ere' and the close connection between 'hertzen' and 'ere', so that the latter is not mere striving after glamour, but recognition of what comes from the depth of the personality: 'he who loves reputation/recognition of the kind that comes right out of his heart and strives for it, he will have blessedness and salvation as his escort'. The heart mediates between physical and instinctive impulses (*path-*, *epithymiai*) located below the diaphragm and the rational function (*logos*, *phron-sis*) located in the brain; cf. further note 58 above.

95. It is a commonplace of classical literature and letter writing to extol the life of *active, creative leisure* ('multum autem interest utrum vita tua otiosa sit an ignava': Seneca, *Ep.* 55, 4), devoted to literature, philosophy and the arts, as against the life of frenzied action in a frenzied craving for influence and power; instead: 'otium ipse suscipiat traditum litteris', so that the spirit should turn away from the outside world and retreat into itself: 'animum ab externis ad sua

reversum' (ibid., *Ep.* 94, 72), to emulate leisure and the pursuit of letters and to escape into the safe port, away from navigating the dangerous sea of public affairs (Seneca, *De tranquill. an.* V, 5). *Otium* facilitates the writing of the best poetry (Sidonius Apollinaris, *Ep.* II, 10, 3); it resembles most closely the life of the gods and is therefore most suited to the life of the *sapiens* (Cicero, *De fin.* V, IV, 11); cf. further Cicero, *Ad Att.* II, 16,3; *otium* as a sanctuary of the Muses: Pliny the Younger I, 9,4; for a general survey, of the tradition cf. J.N. André, *Recherches sur l'otium romain, Annales de l'Université de Besançon* 52; Paris, 1962.

On the consoling, therapeutic function (cf. note 99 below) of poetry and song cf e.g. Ovid, *Trist.* V, X, esp. 21-120; Lucretius, *Rer. nat.* V, 1376-88.

96. Traditionally, the *vir doctus* is the man of wide and deep knowledge, more specifically, he is 'Graecis litteris eruditus (Cicero, *Brut.* 30, 114; or 'Gaecis litteris et Latinis'; ibid., 46,169); and as regards philosophy: '*doctus ex disciplina Stoicorum*' (ibid., 25, 94); *sapientia* puts more emphasis on a person's attitude to life, his self-control and fearlessness, hence his happiness (Cicero, *Tusc.* IV,17,37), for the highest of Plato's four marks of excellence is *prudentia* and *sapientia* (i.e. *sophrōsyn-*: *De off.* I, V,15-17). At the same time, *sapiens* and being *doctus* are intimately connected; thus, the seven *sapientes*—and, greatest among them, Pisistratus, 'qui primus Homeri libros, confusos antea, sic disposuisse dicitur, ut nunc habemus . . . ita eloquentia floruit, ut litteris doctrinaque praestaret.' (*De or.* III, XXXIV,137). But the poet is not only 'sapiens' (Homer: 'sapientissimus': Aulus Gellius, *Noct. Att.* 5, 1, 6), he is also divine (Vergil, *Ecl.* 5,45), so that learning, thought and inspiration unite to make up the figure of the *poeta vates*; the basic meaning of *vates* is that of a 'seer': thence it is extended to mean 'poet', until it fell into contempt, to

be replaced by 'poeta' (like Greek *poi-t-s*, originally any maker, then specialized to literary creation), but restored by Vergil (cf. art. 'vates' in Lewis and Short); Ennius, the first Latin poet, counterpart of Homer: Lucretius, *De rer. nat.* I,114-20. Horace typically sees himself in this tradition: *Carm.* IV, 9; by that time, it has become a commonplace: Ovid, *Trist.* III, VII, 20 *Ars am.* II, 181-2; Vergil, *Ecl.* IX, 30-4; Ovid, *Heroid.* XXI, 182; *Pont.* II, 5, 52; Martial, *Epigr.* I, 61 (62); VII, 29; in fact, a mediocre poet is neither man, nor god, nor an item in a bookseller's catalogue: Horace, *Ars. poet. ad Pis.* 372-3.

The tradn. surveyed: Quintilian, *Inst.* X, 1, 46ff; 81: Plato: 'facultate divina quaedam et Homericā'; 85ff; cf. further: Macrobius, *Sat.* I, 17, 2; *Comm. Somn. Scip.* I, 9, 6 ff.

In German literary tradition, the first self-consciously Christian *poeta doctus* in the tradition of Vergil, Ovid, Prudentius, et al., is the 9th century *vates*, Otfrid von Weissenburg, who wrote a verse version of the Gospel story, which includes meditations and interpretations, his intention being 'divinorum verborum splendorem clarissimum proferre propria lingua' (*Ad Liutbertum; Otfrid's Evangelienbuch*, ed. O. Erdmann; 3rd edn. rev. L. Wolff; ser.: ATB 49; Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1957, p. 4). His invocation of God (11. 1-2; p. 14) is in the tradn. of epic poets. Hartmann uses these same two perspectives, i.e. reflection on the subject matter and setting the work within a framework of intercession — the latter very brief in Iwain (end of epilogue: 8166), but at length in the epilogue to *Gregorius* (3989-4006).

97. *maere* is an action, a story, whose events can be related orally, informally (e.g. in Gottfried's *Tristan*, when the two lovers, marooned in the love grotto, tell each other the classic love stories (*senemaere*) of Phyllis of Thrace, Dido, and others (text: ed. K.

Marold, rev. W. Schroder; de Gruyter, Berlin, 1969; 17186-17203); or it can be composed as a literary work, such as a poem, as in the case of *Iwain*: ‘der tihte ditz maere’ (30: ‘he [Hartmann] composed this story in the form of a poem’); or e.g. Heinrich von Veldeke (13505-13575: ed. Gabriele Schieb and Theodor Frings; ser. *Deutsche Texte des Mittelalters*; Akad. Verl., Berlin, 1964) composed (‘tihte’) his version of the *Eneide* which he found in French written sources (‘den walischen buochen’, i.e. the *Roman d’Eneas*), which, in its turn, had been composed out of the Latin (‘Daz uz latine getihtet was’, i.e. Vergil’s *Aeneid*).

*Mythos* (cf. Augustine, *De civ. Dei* Lib. VI, cap. 5: ‘quoniam mythos Graece fabula dicitur’): Aristotle (Poet. IX; 1451 b esp. 23-32) distinguishes between facts (*praxeis*), their enactment (*mim-sis*) as a coherent story (*mythos*) and the verse form (*metron*); the facts can be historical or fictitious, stories traditional or new.

98. Hartmann: 44-58; this is also a well known topos: cf. Hartmann’s *Gregorius*, whose ‘getihte’ was composed to please all listeners and readers (3959-95), so that they might pray for *beatitudo* (*saelde*: 3996-97); *solatium/comfort/hage* for lovers who are ‘noble hearts’: Gottfried 46-7, based on Thomas’ *Tristan* (text: Bartina H. Wind (ed.), *Les fragments du roman de Tristan . . .*; ser.: *Textes littéraires français*; Droz, Genève & Minard, Paris, 1960; fragm Snyder 836: ‘Aveir em poissent grant confort’; Quintilian, *Inst.* VI, Proem. 14; Vergil, *Aen.* VI, 377; Ovid, *Trist.* IV, X, 116-22; *Fasti* I, 441-44; Eilhart (op. cit. in the text; for edn. cf. note 91 above): ‘solch red . . . die man gern hört/und nutz ist’ (28-29): ‘such a recital as one takes extreme pleasure in bearing, and which is useful’ — i.e. the Horatian ‘delectare’ and ‘prodesse’: *Ars poet. ad Pison.* 333).

99. Hartmann: 44-52: their perfect life has gone forever; but telling their story yet gives us a state of well-

being (56-58: ‘maere . . . rehte wol wesen sol’), ‘indeed, these accomplishments gave them well-being’ (‘dâ têtē in diu werc vil wol.’: 58); the perfection of the bygone age is to benefit listeners and readers of this poem; the Chrétien text speaks of love and right conduct, and does not make it more general; but deeper levels of *solatium* are hinted at, as the narrator is *glad to tell* (‘plest’ — like Eilhart’s narrator; 1. 28: ‘gerne’) of king Arthur ‘who is spoken of far and wide’ (33-36); for background cf. further notes 97, 98 above.

100. Hartmann: 11.3; 8166; Chrétien: 11. 27; 6808.

101. We note the contrast between the obscurity of the Chrétien source (‘nonques plus conter n’en oï/ne ja plus n’en orroiz conter’: 6806-7) and the designation of an informer by the by the Hartmann narrator: ‘ezn wart mir niht beneheiden/von dem ich die rede habe: durch daz enkan ouch ich dar abe/iu gesagen niuwet mēre’: 8162-65 (‘enkan’ ‘I do not know’).

102. Hartmann: 8097-8113: Iwein’s happiness is spontaneous, but his speech is formal, quasi-religious (‘sünde vergehe . . . ze hulden’); Laudine asks for God’s sake to be forgiven; she kneels down, as he has also done when first coming into her presence: 8042; 8121-8131. He says that she is not responsible (8133), as, earlier (5470), he had stated that he was free from responsibility.

103. On the *passiones* cf. note 84 above.

The connection between the psychological (*affectus, passiones*) and moral (*vitia*) dimensions is Pauline (Tit. 1, 7; II Tim. 3, 2-5; Gal. 5, 19-21; although codification does not occur until later in patristic tradition, and shows variations before Gregory the Great. Nevertheless, they frequently discussed (*passio* and *vitium*), both singly and together, in various groupings; e.g. Leo Magnus, *Epist.* 106, 1 (PL, 52, 2001A-4A); *Sermo* 42,2 (PL 54,276A-77A); *Sermo* 44, 3 (PL 54, 287D-88A); but the tradition goes back, before the New

Testament, to the Apocrypha e.g. Sap. 12, 5; 14, 24; IV Macc. 1, 20-30; 2, 15-16 (vol. II, pp. 545, 546 in: J.H. Charlesworth (ed.), *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, Darton, Lorigman & Todd, London, 1983, 1985); in the New Testament, outside the Pauline corpus; Jas. 4, 1-6; Rev. 21, 8; thereafter: Hermas, *Similitudo* IX,15 (PG 2, 993-94); Evagrius, *Altercatio inter Theophilum Christianurn et Simonem Iudaeum* (PL 20, 1174A); Augustine, *Contra Adimantum Manichei discipulum* 17, 4-5 (PL 42, 159-61); *Epist.* 1118, 22 (PL 33, 442); *Ennarr. in Ps. 118: Serm.* 9, 1-2 (PL 37, 1522-23); *in Ps.* 8, 13 (PL 36, 115-16); *in Ps.* 79, 13 (PL 36-37, 1026); *De civ. Dei* XII, cap. 8 (PL 41, 355-56); XIV, cap. 12-16 (PL 41, 420-25); Cassian, *Collatio* V, cap. 6-27 (PL 49, 617-647C) uses the terms *vitium* and *passio* interchangeably, the list of seven *vitia*, which became standard in subsequent tradition, was taken over by Peter Lombard (*Sent.*, Lib., II, Dist. 42: PL 192, 1069) from Gregory’s *Moralia super Iob*, Lib. XXXI, cap. 45, paras. 87-90 (PL 76, 620C-623A); the list (621A): *inanis gloria/ superbia; invidia; ira; tristitia, avaritia; ventris ingluvies; luxuria*. Each *vitium* engenders the next in the order as listed and itself engenders secondary *vitia* (cf. esp. paras. 88-89; cols. 621A-622A); they overlap to some extent. Thus, *invidia* (No. 2) engenders *ira* (No.3), plus its own secondary *vitium, odium*, a ‘tumor mentis’, originator of ‘odium Dei, affectus proesentis saeculi’, shows, like *luxuria* (No. 7), that the *vitia* also overlap with the diseased emotions (*passiones*: cf. note 84); in fact, the *passiones* are the consequences of the poisoning of the heart (centre of the personality, basic disposition) by the seven *vitia* (‘cum ad cor veniunt’), resulting from the fundamental *vitium, desperatio*, engendered by *tristitia* (No. 4, itself one of the four basic *passiones*) and *luxuria* No. 7). *Invidia* (No. 2), intimately connected with *superbia* (No. 1) and *ira* (No.



- 3), gives rise to discord, quarrelling and hatred (the exact reversal of love and trust) and, with *tristitia* (No. 4) and *luxuria* (No. 7), leads to *desperatio*, thus reversing the three theological virtues of *fides*, *spes* and *caritas*; *desperatio*, *obstinatio*, *duritia cordis*, the unforgivable sin (Mt. 12, 31-32; Mk. 3, 28; Lk. 12,10), ultimate despair, is discussed by Peter Lombard in the following *distinctio* (43, esp. paras. 1-2), *De peccato in Spiritum Sanctum* (PL 192, 754-55); the background is Augustinian (cf. *Epist.* 185,11, 48-9; PL 33, 814-15; *De Trin.* I,11, 22; PL 42,836; *De civ. Dei* XXI,13; 24, 2; PL 41,78; 738); cf. further: Fulgentius, *De remissione peccatorum* I, cap. 23-24; PL 65, 547A; Hugo of St. Victor, *De vitiis et virtutibus*, cap. I (PL 176, 525A-526C).
- Modern studies: Carl Clemen (transl. R.G. Wisbet), *Primitive Christianity and its non-Jewish sources*, Clark, Edinburgh, 1912; pp. 63—64; gen. survey: Morton W. Bloomfield, *The Seven Deadly Sins. An Introduction to the history of a religious concept, with special reference to mediaeval English literature*; ser.: Studies in language and literature, Michigan State College Press, 1952, repr. 1967.
104. Chrétien: 2706-7: Yvain's thoughts of shame and the arrival of Laudine's messenger are parts of the same sentence. Laudine, remote, closed in on herself, sends a lady-in-waiting. Hartmann: 3090-3103; Iwein is already out of his mind (3091: 'sîn selbes vergaz'), followed by the narrator's comments and the arrival of Lunete as Laudine's messenger, as she is also a victim of Iwein's disloyalty; 3122, 3141.
105. Hartmann: 3083 ('seneden gedanc'), not in Chrétien, where Yvain weeps in an agony of guilt and shame; 2704.
106. cf. note 84.
107. Chrétien: 2783-2815; insanity: 2806-7; Hartmann: 3201-3238; insanity: 3233: caused by Lady Minne, making him mad with love for 'a weak woman' (3251-56).
108. Chrétien: 2806: 'torbeillons'; 2865: 'rage'; Hartmann: 3215; 'beide vreude unde den sin'; 3233: 'tobesucht', and adds (3234) that he broke away from 'sin' ('good sense', 'rational will'), 'site' ('decorum'), 'zuht' ('self-discipline'); (on *ira* cf. note 84 above).
109. Chrétien: 2821-2883; Hartmann; 3261-3344.
110. Hartmann: 3509: 'bistuz Îwein, oder wer?'
111. Chrétien: 2948-3309; Hartmann: 3419-3790.
112. Chrétien: 882: comparison of battle against Esclados with hunting with a falcon: this is not in Hartmann, as the battle is in deadly earnest from the start (1011: 'groz ernest unde zorn'); courteous treatment of Lunete on her first visit to king Arthur's court: Chrétien: 996-1019; Hartmann: 1172-1200; his first exploit after recovering his sanity and health: helping the lady of Norison (Chrétien)/Narisôn (Hartmann) against the threat of count Aliers: cf. previous note 111.
113. Chrétien: 3350-59; Hartmann: 3841-3864.
114. cf. especially his rescue of the 300 ladies from the castel where they have been imprisoned and reduced to work like servants: Chrétien: 5101-5835; Hartmann: 6085-6854; his expression of pity: Chrétien: 5331-38; Hartmann: 6407.
115. cf. note 81 above.
116. Chrétien: 6516-6766; Hartmann: 7791-80140.
117. Hartmann: 6811: 'she is the source of all my joy/happiness.' Being the centre of his life, love gives him both joy and suffering; 'vreude' (*laetitia*) can be the preparation for long-term bliss (*beatitudo*, *saelde*), unless it is corrupted by mere worldliness.
118. Chrétien: 6770-88: 'misericorde' (6770); 'corpable' (6775); 'merciz' (6785): religious language, including invocation of the Holy Spirit (6786): rather too solemn to be taken as a mere cliché! On the other hand, he says (6774) that he was compelled by 'folie', therefore not really responsible; *or*: 'I was crazy to stay', in which case he is responsible. No kneeling. Hartmann: 8041-8136; not in Chrétien: both kneeling, both repentant; Iwein's silence on first kneeling down (8043), and Lunete urging Laudine to make him rise and to forgive: it is entirely up to her: 8057-58.
120. cf. note 84 above.
121. The oath in Chrétien: 6780-84.
122. The oath in Hartmann: 8114-17; but she is struggling with herself to the last minute: 8074-96: 'gevangen': goes back to Chrétien's 'hoquerel' (6751).

## BOOK REVIEWS

### *Beyond Liberalism : The Political Thought of F.A. Hayek and Michael Polanyi*

Richard Allen

Transaction Press (1998) ISBN 1-56000-355-3; pp. 266.

From its earliest days modernity has had its critics. Because few people sought a return back to the life of the Middle Ages, these critics made little headway. It would be a mistake however to ignore their writings on the grounds that they are reactionaries. The most able of them made penetrating criticisms of modernity—and in the C 20th many of their darkest fears proved all too accurate. Richard Allen unashamedly allies himself with the reactionaries. His mentor Edmund Burke, however, is a thinker who can be viewed either as a reactionary defender of traditional ways of life, or as a persuasive advocate for the modern liberal state. Although the rhetoric of *Beyond Liberalism* is consistent with the former interpretation, his arguments support a liberal vision of modernity. The tradition which Allen wants to preserve is that of a free society. Instead of seeking to define liberty in theoretical terms, Allen claims that liberty can only be comprehended by situating it within the actual practices of a free society. By trying to alienate the individual from all existing institutions, rights, and practices, and directing our attachments instead to the workings of a rational state, liberal theorists far from helping to secure a free society served only to lay the foundations of modern totalitarianism. Describing a free society as a contractual arrangement within which individuals live as they please, so long as their actions do not interfere with the liberties of others, forgets that all our activities infringe to a lesser or greater extent upon the liberties of others. Allen points out that the attempt to defend a free society by making a distinction between negative and positive freedoms neglects to acknowledge that all liberty is both a

liberty from restrictions, and a liberty to pursue desired ends. A dedication to the concept of liberty therefore does not in itself lead to a limitation of the power of the State to interfere in the life of its citizens. The assertion that freedom ought to be an end in itself ignores the dependence of liberties upon those practices which render a free society possible. Even the process of negotiating a contract relies upon the existence of a practice of contract making. A free society requires us to accept those practices which render possible liberal forms of life. In his defence of a free society Polanyi does not start with the liberty of the individual to do as his pleases, but with the liberty of communities to pursue their own purposes. While a free society is dedicated to both private and public liberties—i.e. to both personal and institutional freedoms—it is damaging to public liberties that their protection is grounded upon a defence of the freedom to do as we please. In the pursuit of ends in themselves we do as we must. Polanyi defends liberal practices because he claims they facilitate the pursuit of transcendent ideals—ideals that is which transcend both the individual and the State. His defence of the role played by dedicated communities serves to counter the Communitarian argument that a free society produces rootless individuals in a selfish and ultimately nihilistic quest to satisfy immediate desires. For Polanyi a free society is a society which desires to render it possible for a plurality of communities to pursue their own ideals. Allen notes that Polanyi in opposition to Hayek does not claim that it is a sufficient justification for a market order that it is the mechanism which is best able to match up individual desires and finite resources. He instead takes the market order to be a reduced form of the spontaneous order which is generated when individuals dedicate themselves to the pursuit of transcendent ideals. The pursuit of justice within the legal

community for example or the quest for truth within the academic community generate spontaneous orders which cannot simply be explicated in terms of market forces. Living as we do within an age which is preoccupied by market reforms this is an important insight. In accordance with Hayek, however, Polanyi takes the power of the State—a power which liberals have sought to use to liberate the individual from the authority exercised by dedicated communities—to be as much a potential source of oppression as it is a potential guarantor of liberties. For both Polanyi and Allen the key source of liberties are the practices of a free society—practices which both the individual and the State are required to respect. Liberty is justified not as an end in itself, but as a practice which facilitates the pursuit of transcendent ideals. As a political practice liberalism therefore transcends itself. As a source of insights this book should be required reading for all students of liberal theory.

Chris Goodman

---

### *Collingwood Studies Vol. V: Explorations*

ed. David Boucher and Bruce Haddock.

Swansea, Collingwood Society, 1998; ISSN 1356-0670, ISBN 0 9524393 44 The delay in publication meant that this, the latest, in the annual series of *Collingwood Studies* arrived too late for the March *Appraisal*. (Likewise, Vol. 6, 1999, has yet to arrive.) But the delay does not detract from the interest and value of this addition to the series.

James Lund pursues the theme of the beginnings of philosophy (see *Appraisal* Vol. 2, No.2) and Collingwood's account of it, which he finds not wholly satisfactory because of Collingwood's own failure to achieve a *rapprochement* between his Romantic conception of man as an expressive being and his acceptance of mod-

ern natural science, with its mathematical basis. In particular, as well as recognising that for the Greeks *phusis* was an organic unity, he also read back into the beginnings of Greek philosophy a concern with a differentiated natural science and not with the current political situation, which also signifies that split between thought and action, and the priority given to theorising, which Collingwood tried to overcome but never wholly healed.

Peter Lewis compares Collingwood and Wittgenstein on language, with I.A. Richard's causal theory of meaning as the common enemy, and an emphasis on activity and context as their common bond.

Philip Brown tackles the question of Collingwood's alleged relativism, and thinks (rightly) that commentators have paid insufficient attention to his examples of absolute presuppositions which is more complex than his explicit theory of them.

Angela Requate compares Collingwood and G.H. Mead on the concept of time in history, and surveys Collingwood's successive attempts to show how the historian can know that which no longer exists, and concludes that the theory of re-enactment provides an answer.

Hekki Saari rightly criticises Collingwood's emotivist theory of 'magic' for ignoring the obvious instrumental intention of magic (that a rain-making dance is meant to induce rain, whatever other effects it may have), but is wrong to infer that for Collingwood arousing emotion ('craft') and expressing it ('art') are dichotomous. On the contrary, in *PA* he makes it clear that any work can be both (turning distinctions into dichotomies was one 'Realist' error that he never had to overcome). Equally, though without their magical beliefs the magical practices of natives will decline, it does not follow, that without magical beliefs we cannot have practices that are 'magical' in the sense that they still have the secondary function (of sustaining emotions needed for practical life) in common with the former (that which Colling-

wood wrongly made primary or exclusive).

Rex Martin, using Collingwood's unpublished papers (some now being published: see below), suggests that his account of *absolute* presuppositions in *EM* is not essentially, and was not actually, connected with his logic of question of answer which may not have existed until the autumn of 1939, and not, as has been supposed, in *Truth and Contradiction* in 1917.

Among other items, there are also reprints of three book reviews by Collingwood.

R.T. Allen

---

### R.G. Collingwood:

#### *The Principles of History*,

ed. with and Introduction, W.H. Dray and W.J. van der Dussen, OUP 1999, ISBN 0 19 823703 0.

#### *The New Leviathan*

with Introduction and additional material by D. Boucher, OUP, 1999, ISBN 0 19 0823981 5 (hbk), 0 19 823880 0 (pbk).

#### *An Essay on Metaphysics*

rev. ed. with Introduction and additional material by R. Martin, OUP, 1998, 0 19 823561 5.

#### *The Idea of History*

rev. ed. with Lectures 1926-8 and Introduction by W.J. van der Dussen, OUP, 1994, ISBN 0 19 285306 6.

A special offer by the Collingwood Society and OUP has enabled your reviewer to purchase five of Collingwood's books (*The Principles of Art* is yet to arrive), one a wholly new work and the others containing new material.

In recent years parts and summaries of some of Collingwood's unpublished MSS have appeared in print, and now more are being added to these revised editions of his books, for the benefit of those of use who cannot get to the Bodleian to read them.

Thus *The New Leviathan* contains Collingwood's lectures on ethics, 'Goodness, Rightness, Utility' (1940)

and 'What Civilisation Means' (no date); *An Essay on Metaphysics* 'The nature of metaphysical study' (1934), which concludes with praise of Bradley's overcoming of the dichotomy of appearance and reality that was invoked to explain the possibility of modern science but which has created other problems, 'Function of metaphysics in civilisation' (1938), and 'Notes for an essay on logic' (1939); and *The Idea of History* 'The idea of a philosophy of something, and, in particular a philosophy of history' (1927—a particularly valuable piece, for Analytic philosophy has spawned 'philosophies of' without any suggestions to what any limits there may be on them: 'philosophy of leisure'?, yes, I have contributed to such a volume; 'philosophy of sport'? I doubt it; 'philosophy of football'? never! but Roger Scruton's 'philosophy of hunting' in *On Hunting* (Yellow Jersey P., 1998)?, I'm not so sure), 'Lectures on the philosophy of history' (1926) and 'Outlines of a philosophy of history' (1928).

Collingwood distinguished between works prepared for publication and those not prepared, which has led to reluctance to publish many of his MSS. Yet some are more carefully written than, say, *EM* and *NL*, and those newly published contain material worth having in its own right as well as material that throws light on the development of, and different strains, in Collingwood's thought. Anyone with an interest in the subjects covered, and not just in what Collingwood wrote about them, will find it worth his while to read them.

*The Principles of History* is almost wholly new (Chap 1, 'Evidence', missing in the recently discovered MS, has been supplied from *The Idea of History* and the sections 'Freedom' and 'Heads or tails?' of Chap. 2 also appeared in *IH*). It was meant to be Collingwood's crowning achievement but was never finished: what was written was not even the first third of the scheme for it (pp. 245-6), the first three chapters of Bk I on the nature of history as a science today (evidence, action, re-enactment) to be followed

by one on history as self-knowledge of mind. Bk II would trace the relations of history to other disciplines, and Bk III those between history and practical life. (All these are themes which we have become familiar from what had previously been published.)

Even so, the actual MS departs from the scheme: there is no preliminary discussion of the meanings of 'history'; Chap. 2 does argue that history is about human action but it does not discuss process, change and pseudo-history as intended but adds to what had already been written on evidence in Chap. 1; and, surprisingly, Chap. 3 does not mention re-enactment but does argue that all history is history of thought. But in Chap. 2, the argument that action expresses thought is developed to the conclusion that all historical evidence is, or is like, language expressing that thought and thus to be reconstructed in imagination, whereby the historian 'reconstructs as an experience of his own the thought they express' (p.49), and on the next page Collingwood states the historian must also re-envisage the agent's situation, and estimate the success or failure of the action. That surely is re-enactment *sans la lettre*. Moreover, as against what he stated in the *Autobiography*, Collingwood rightly allows that error and failure are recognisable and to some degree intelligible.

A perennial flaw in Collingwood's philosophy was his failure fully to acknowledge the intentionality of mind (with the sole exception of mere moods that simply 'come over' one). Hence the question whether emotions can be re-enacted and be part of history. Emotions are essentially a complex of felt beliefs and attitudes, and not mere sensations, and so they are inherently intelligible and re-enactable. In Chap. 2, p. 68, Collingwood distinguishes between the emotions essential to an agent's action and for which there may be evidence, indeed, will be evidence if the action is to re-enacted, and those which are not. But this applies to all mental acts and states and not just to emotions. We can know only about those which

have left some trace, and much that goes on inside us does not: if there are no witnesses nor any confession, then we shall probably not know if X killed Y with gloating, triumph in getting his revenge, anxiety about being discovered, or guilt at the wrong he was committing.

Another new item, in Chap. 2 pp.69-75, is a sharp distinction between history and biography and a devaluation of the latter because it is determined by non-historical factors, the birth and death of the subject, in contrast to actions, and so consists of scissors-and-paste and gossip.

After Chap. 3, two short fragments, 'The past' and 'History and philosophy' complete the MS.

In addition, other MSS relating to history, or relevant extracts from them, are included but not Collingwood's studies of folklore which the editors hope to be published later. Firstly, there are historical sections from Collingwood's 552 page MS on a constructive cosmology (1933-4), an MS that this reviewer would like to see published in full. After that come 'History as the understanding of the present' (3 pp., no date, but probably 1934); rough notes for the Inaugural Lecture (27 pp., 1935); 'Reality as history' (39 pp., 1935) which explores what would be involved in taking all reality as historical and the true and full-blooded sense which otherwise and elsewhere Collingwood reserves for the study of *res gestae*. 'Can historians be impartial?' (10 pp., 1936) allows that they cannot be that their very partisanship opens up questions and aspects of the past that otherwise would be missed. 'Notes on the history of historiography and philosophy of history' (16 pp., 1936) has five and a part of the ten sections: 'Human nature and human history' (2 pieces), 'Historical events as eternal objects', 'The idea of historical efficacy' (also on the selection and importance of historical events), and 'A note on evidence and certitude' which argues that probability in historical studies can mean only that the evidence shows that something was possible and not

that it did happen, or that the historian is betting that evidence will turn up to show that it did. 'Notes on historiography' (16 pp., 1938-9 on his voyage to East Indies) contains many short passages, especially on Collingwood's resolution of all knowledge of man into history, including philosophy (the passage quoted by Knox in his Introduction to IH is to be found on p. 238). But as Collingwood says, the contention that something has been left out, results from a false idea of history, specifically, that history includes the present, so that an exposition of the principles of science or logic or ethics, is an historical one, i.e. of *what we now hold* to be the right way to investigate nature, to think generally or to live our lives. Philosophy is, in effect, history of the present and existential; while history, as usually understood, is history of pasts less closely like the present, and so less existential in that, in *critically* re-enacting them, we find less to endorse as our own. It also studies the changes from one state of things to another, whereas philosophy expounds only the present, and thereby is more likely to state them for the first time or to elaborate them in detail. (That is my answer, in brief, to claims that Collingwood landed himself in historicism and relativism.)

The volume ends with the two earlier conclusions (1935, 1934) to Collingwood's lectures on Nature and Mind which Knox did not include in IN, where moves from the more obviously historical to the more obviously philosophical approach. That of 1935 raises but does not answer the question of whether the new conception of nature is genuinely historical, and that of 1934, much the longer, summarises the new conception of the world as process and evolution from outwardness to inwardness, and the theology, rather Hegelian than purely theistic, which Collingwood takes to be presupposed by it. (Again I for one would like to see Collingwood's fuller exposition noted above.)

R.T. Allen