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Editorial

Articles

E. John Hackett: ***The becoming of the personal sphere: A proposed framework for personalist philosophical anthropology.***

Soren Engelson: ***A phenomenological critique of attitude-dependent accounts of value inspired by Max Scheler***

Abigail Klassen: ***Saving Churchland's eliminative materialism***

Jane Kisby: ***Are psychopaths morally responsible for the harm they cause*****?**

Alan Ford: ***Tales of Despair and Integrity***

Daniel Paksi***: Medium Emergence Part Three: The Darwinian Theory of Natural Selection and Michael Polanyi's Theory of Emergent Evolution***

Discussion

R.T. Allen: ***The Uncommon Good***

Book Reviews

Gábor Biró: ***The Economic Thought of Michael Polanyi***

Daniel Paksi:***Personal Reality: The Emergentist Concept of Science , Evolution and Culture***

eds James Beauregard, Giusy Gallo, and Claudia Stancati: ***The Person at the Crossroads***.

'Gânditurol'
'The Thinker'



'Le Penseur'

CONTENTS

VOL. 12, NO.S 1 AND 2, SPRING AND AUTUMN 2020

Notes on this issue's authors p. 2

Editorial p.4

Articles

J. Edward Hackett: The Becoming of the Personal Sphere: A Proposed Framework for Personalist Philosophical Anthropology p. 5

Soren Engelson A phenomenological critique of attitude-dependent accounts of value inspired by Max Scheler p.19

Abigail Klassen: Saving Churchland's Eliminative Materialism by Invoking Non-Reductive, Causal Mental Events p. 29

Jane Kisbey: Are Psychopaths Morally Responsible for the Harm They Cause? p.41

Alan Ford: Tales of Despair and Integrity p.49

Daniel Paksi: Medium Emergence Part Three: The Darwinian Theory of Natural Selection and Michael Polanyi's Theory of Emergent Evolution p.63

Discussion

R.T. Allen: The Uncommon Good p.79

Book Reviews

Gábor Biró: *The Economic Thought of Michael Polanyi* p.81

Daniel Paksi: *Personal Reality: The Emergentist Concept of Science, Evolution and Culture* p.83

Eds James Beauregard, Giusy Gallo, and Claudia Stancati: *The Person at the Crossroads* p.89

NOTES ON THIS ISSUE'S AUTHORS

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Jane Kisbey is a Midlands4Cities funded PhD candidate at the University of Birmingham. I am interested in psychopathy and moral responsibility and my research sheds new light on whether people diagnosed with psychopathy are morally responsible for their actions.

Daniel Paksi is a Bolyai János Postdoctoral Research Fellow of Hungarian Academy of Sciences(HAS) at the Department of Philosophy and History of Science of Budapest University of Technology and Economics (BME) where he received his PhD in 2010. His thesis was on 'The Meaning of the Concepts of Evolution and Emergence in the Philosophy of Michael Polanyi'. His main fields of interest are the different theories of emergence and evolution. He recently (2014) published his first monograph in Hungarian on Polanyi's post-critical philosophy and emergent ontology with the title of 'Personal Reality'.

Alan Ford has been a member, committee member and Chair of the British Personalist Form for sometime, having to relinquish the Chair and active participation owing to ill health. His research interests include the relation of the self to modernism, particularly in the visual arts, the writings of Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, John Macmurray, Gilbert Ryle, PF Strawson, Lawrence Cahoone among others, who have illuminating things to say about the nature of the self. He is particularly critical of much of what is termed 'postmodernism', especially the self as seen by 'deconstruction'. My PhD, awarded by Bristol University, is called *Art, Persons and the Avant-Garde: The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Modernism in the Visual Arts*. He was a committee member and Newsletter Editor of The John Macmurray Fellowship for some years.

R.T. Allen founded *Appraisal* in 1995 and published it single-handed until 2009 when a committee was formed. He has published articles and books on most aspects of philosophy. He is currently working on a short book on the tacit dimensions of language, truth and formal logic, and next he will

concentrate on a much larger book which will combine the principal items of his more important publications with new additions, into a general personalist philosophy and applications of it in philosophy itself, metaphysics, theology, ethics, politics and economics.

EDITORIAL

Welcome to the first and second regular issues of Vol. 12, 2020-2021 of Appraisal which is now wholly 'open access'. It seems, and is, a long time since Vol. 1, No. 1, 1996. Then, and until 2009, I produced Appraisal and organised annual conferences all by myself, until I was able to shed most of my responsibilities to other members of what eventually became the British Personalist Forum. But now I find myself editing it again! I shall insist that after the next issue I shall give it up for good.

We owe a vote of thanks to David Jewson who, having taken the Treasurership from me, has added that Webmaster in time for the end of the printed version of *Appraisal*, and its transformation into a wholly online and completely Open Access journal, which charges no fees for accepted articles to be published nor subscriptions for reading it.

Because we have no university or other institutional support, we depend wholly upon members subscriptions, for which we shall offer certain privileges, in order to finance *Appraisal*, conferences and other ventures, with the aim of spreading interest in personalist thinking. So, if you enjoy and learn from our articles in this joint issue, and intend to read further issues, then please consider becoming a member and paying the appropriate annual subscription.

What do we offer in the present combined issue? First a rich dish of six full articles: one by Soren Engelson on attitude-dependent accounts of value, and Edward Hackett on 'The Becoming of the Personal Sphere: A Proposed Framework for Personalist Philosophical Anthropology', both inspired by Max Scheler, the great German personalist philosopher; Abigail Klassen defending 'folk psychology' against the Churchlands' eliminative materialism, but with a twist at the end; Jane Kisbey on the moral responsibility of psychopaths; Daniel Paksi's final instalment of his 'Medium Emergence'; and Alan Ford on despair and integrity in Kierkegaard, Dostoyevsky and others. Next comes my own short Discussion piece, urging caution about the 'the common good' lest it excludes much needed uncommon ones, and finally reviews of three important books.

All these have clear relevance for personalist thinking. Yet I find that, while personalists of all streams and schools oppose scientistic reductionism, only Michael Polanyi, using his own experience as an internationally recognised Professor of Physical Chemistry at the Max Planck Institute and then at the University of Manchester, has shown its hollowness on its own grounds, the natural and especially the physical sciences. But outside the societies dedicated to him in the USA, Hungary and our own Forum, he is barely mentioned, while Karl Popper is still taken to be an authority although he never went near a laboratory, nor saw what scientists actually do, and never knew how full personal engagement is required of them in their work.

Six thousand years separates the two objects pictured on the front page, both used separately in previous issues: the anonymous blue-clay figurine (about 3-4 inches high if I correctly remember from 1975) from the Neolithic Hamangia Culture, now in the Romanian National Historical Museum in Romania, with female sitting companion, from Rodin's sculpture of the same subject in different sizes in Paris. We can know quite a lot about Rodin and we can make plausible guesses as to what 'Le Penseur' might have thinking, but we can hardly guess what 'Grânditorul' (literally 'Thinkerthe') is thinking, in what language, and with what range of words. Indeed, can he think without speaking? Is he simply resting and experiencing inchoate emotions which he does not clarify by articulating them? We shall never know. But there is no doubt that he is one of us, a person whom we can recognise across the ages.

R.T. Allen

THE BECOMING OF THE PERSONAL SPHERE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR PERSONALIST PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

J. Edward Hackett

Abstract:
In this essay, I outline the metaphysical nature of reality of persons as the confluence of four modes of relating-to that I propose exist as the scaffolding of personal being. In effect, I am outlining the conceptual sketch of a philosophical anthropology that situates all forms of philosophical and scientific inquiry given that there is no perspective outside of being a person. While only a conceptual sketch, this article begins the speculative process to work toward such an account.[1] I would venture the bold assertion that all forms of personalism must assume the existence of all four modes of relationality that I am speculating about herein. My account attempts to capture the process-oriented view of the activity of being a person ('personing').[2]

Keywords:
Personalism, Whitehead, James, radical empiricism, philosophical anthropology

There are four basic modes of relational activity that constitute the becomingness of persons and these modes of relating-to radiate outward from the person's personing. Just like phenomenology's account of intentionality, these modes of relating-to are relations that can be read from the personal sphere outward to the object and to the object intending and constituting the sense of the act in the personal sphere. In this way, these four modes of relating-to run constitutively backwards and forwards. My attempt to render these four modes of relating-to intelligible is a work in speculative philosophy, not phenomenological description despite the fact that I am not rendering a description of these relations as much as attempting to articulate a vision in which such phenomenological descriptions would presuppose these four modes of relating-to. In the next section, I develop some basic propositions about reality and the process-orientation to my approach herein before explaining the four modes of relationality exhibited by all persons. These four modes of relating-to (personing) are: (1) Persons-to-Culture, (2) Persons-to-Nature, (3) Persons-to-Others, and (4) Persons-to-Self.

Let me describe how I will proceed. In the first section, I give a brief account of the assumptions that foreground my theorizing. By doing so, I cannot treat any one assumption exhaustively. Instead, I am letting the reader know why such assumptions have been made that inform the speculative efforts. In the second section, I outline the importance of what it means to theorize about persons. While such theoretical grounds about persons is content rich with thousands of years of reflection, the fact that I came at this question with a sense to move beyond Scheler should be highlighted for the importance the third section is making. Finally, the third section is where I describe the backwards-and-forwardness of the four modes of personing. One may be tempted to read my efforts there as a way one becomes a person as if personal being were not already underway even as I write and you read these words. One should not take it as the way we become persons as if persons is some Archimedean arrow of final becoming. Instead, the view here is to take seriously a Jamesian ontology

[1] This inability to transcend the perspective of personal being is the basis of metaphysical personalism, and to which even my version of integral personalism largely based on the Schelerian interpretation of sublimating drives, Jamesian freedom, and Brightman's processive notion of experience, must assume. See my *Persons and Values in Pragmatic Phenomenology: An Exploration of Mortal Metaphysics.* My conception of Integral personalism is given in Chapter 6: 'Persons Realizing Values,' p.116-123. Moreover, the date of this publication on which this chapter is based uses the term 'integral personalism' much earlier than Juan Manuel Burgos does in his article 'Wojtyla's Personalism as Integral Personalism: The Future of an Intellectual Project' p. 91-111.

[2] I owe these terms of art to Randall Auxier who brilliantly outlined these terms more concisely than anywhere else in personalist literature at a presentation he gave at the last Personalism meeting in 2016. The four modes of relating-to also harken back to discussions of Scheler's philosophy of culture and the selving process with Ken Stikkers

that the only things that are real are aspects of ongoing onto-relationality of experience to which all metaphysics must answer.

1. Postulates of Process

Personing is the basis on which process approaches relate. The first line of John Cutting's translation of Max Scheler's *The Constitution of the Human Being* cuts straight down to the issue, 'Since every sort of knowledge and all sorts of cognitions are a participation by the knowing subject in a being which is independent from him himself, and actually exists, then metaphysics is equally the eternal attempt of human beings, by virtue of their spontaneous reason, to participate in the absolute reality of things themselves.'[3] Scheler's error, however, resides in reifying the absolute, to insist upon the object relating-to as ontologically separate and absolute from the depths of participation. His accurate assessment was in the fact that all cognition is, thereby, an ontological participation in the universe from which the science of metaphysics seeks to render a conceptual whole by the limitation and view from within the part it inhabits.

However, Scheler has always been half-accurate. For him, phenomenology allowed him to arrive at the essences of those interconnections that open up conduits of intuition into the absolute reality we participate within. For Scheler, intuition was immediate and revealed the immanent acts of the personal sphere and the entire immanent onto-relationality expressed by and in the existence of the person. This immanence might be best described as being within and amongst relations. The withinness is almost always forgotten; persons almost always forget the very condition upon which the metaphysician is claimed to transcend the very own condition—the sphere of the personal. But can we?

This personal sphere is the ground of experience, the experiencing experiencer, and there is no position or speculation that ever is divorced from inhabiting the personal. Personing is, then, the ontological term that preserves this sense of ontological participation of the whole person in relation to that which they attend. By contrast, most phenomenologists, who have done so much to preserve and sustain an awareness of the personal sphere through systematic bracketing and description, lose sight of the personal sphere and the ground of mediation from which all perspectives obtain. In short, the point of speculative philosophy is to move past the descriptive limit. Scheler is no different as just one example. Much later in the same work, Scheler gives us a hint of his theistic, if not panentheistic commitment about the special place human beings inhabit in relation to their very own ontological participation. Scheler says, 'the human being's most profound sort of existence at all times is anchored in an absolutely superior and absolutely holy, but invisible, actuality.' However, Scheler commits no real interpretation of it, but calls it the origin of metaphysics. 'Whatever can fill this absolute sphere is remarkably varied…but whatever it is, it makes no difference to the fact that the absolute sphere is pregiven to human beings.[4] Scheler reifies givenness and the relationality of the phenomenological field to legitimize some aspect of the flux.

For Scheler, the problem of immediate experience, then, takes centre stage, and what follows are postulates of process that circumscribe my speculative efforts to move beyond what Scheler opened up. Since most of my work has been grounded in trying to reclaim aspects of Scheler's work in a positive light, I am now trying to speculate beyond its confines. In moving beyond those confines, then, let us introduce some postulates of process and not fall into the trap of reifying the "flux of life" as James calls it. The purpose of sharing these following postulates is not to give any specific proposition exhaustive treatment, but to be open of those assumptions that are working in the background of my speculative efforts.

1. The problem of immediate experience is a way into understanding reality as active and processive, and not only characterizing our own experiences but a clue into the ontological nature of reality as the whole. More succinctly put, the problem of immediate experience is a way to understand the problem of reality since it is in the part through which we characterize the whole. Partly, the background of Whitehead in this speculative attempt rings true. 'Speculative philosophy is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every

[3]Max Scheler, *The Constitution of the Human Being*. p. 11.

[4] Scheler, *The Constitution of the Human Being*, p. 206-207.

element of our experience [personingin] can be interpreted.'[5] Personing consists of four modes of relationality, and the world of experience constitutes as much of us as we do of it. By contrast, Scheler denied that existence arises out of the constitution of immanent acts of intentionality. For him, existence transcends the immanent, so no matter what immediate intuition reports about in terms of a mode of possibility about an experience, Scheler assumes the realism of the world[6] Since immediacy is where and how we must navigate the concern of daily life (there is no perspective outside being a person), we should be open to the idea that the irreducible content of experience folds into the parts of the world and the parts of the world fold back in the same relation-to. The implication again for moving past Scheler is that I deny the separability of distinct ontological spheres of the external and internal.[7] John Dewey in his *Experience and Nature* goes through great pains to show that philosophical reconstruction of the past and the present for all problems assumes the continuity of nature and the immediacy of experience as the primary datum from which all philosophizing occurs. While I am no Deweyian, I can appreciate the refocused attention to experience and its overall onto-relationality, and what it means to begin and reconstruct philosophy anew by urging us to take the creative and generative aspects of experiential activity as our starting place for metaphysical inquiry.

2. Metaphysics starts with the immediacy of experience and is limited by experience. For this reason, speculative metaphysics is a construction and interpretation of the most general elements of reality that we may experience and starts with the positing that all metaphysical claims are about relations. Again, I am taking inspiration from the opening of Whitehead's *Process and Reality*.

> The elucidation of immediate experience is the sole justification for any thought and the starting point of any thought [let alone Whitehead's speculative philosophy] is the analytic observation of components of this experience.[8]

There is no single atomic unity in life or the cosmos that is not constituted by a field of relations on its own, nor are there modes of access to reality beyond the activity and process by which experience occurs. Whitehead began his elucidation in thinking that analytic observation could break down experience into component parts with what he called "imaginative construction." In imaginative construction, likened to an airplane taking off and landing at many runways, our imagination takes flight to construct ideas. These constructions must find their bearing at observation of particular and immediate experience, Like Whitehead, I follow James in thinking that reality and experience are almost interchangeable terms. Like Whitehead, I embrace the role of imaginative experimentation and construction, and while acknowledging the role of logic and coherence in these constructions, Whitehead's weakness is to move beyond and outside the onto-relationality of immediate experience to the play of the imagination unwittingly without abiding by the wise phenomenological constraint to which all speculations should arise. Many will come to defend Whitehead here, and they will appeal once again to logic and coherence in the very opening definition of *Process and Reality*. Through Whitehead, these speculative philosophers may imagine possible conceptual schemes about what reality is like and how human beings are situated in that larger reality.

The problem with following Whitehead entirely is that in presupposing his simultaneous embrace of imagination while thinking that a 'synoptic vision has been gained' by the embrace of the imagination without first thinking what the very ontology of experience looks like in terms of how

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[5] *Process and*, Reality, p. 3.

[6] Max Scheler, 'Idealism and Realism' in *Philosophical Selected Essays* trans. David Lachterman (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973): p. 288-356. Here, I cite Scheler, 'Idealism and Realism', p. 290. "Existence can never be in mente" despite the fact that existence can be given in phenomenological intuition. In this way, Scheler's intuitions report about the pre-volitional and pre-cognitve disclosure of the world that is already there in existence. The impersonal arises in thinking that existence can be set apart from the onto-relationality participation that declares otherwise. This tension of indeterminacy of the ground of onto-relationality is just one more reason we must move past Scheler.

[7] See 'Idealism and Realism', pp. 300-303.

[8] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, p. 4.

reality is given to the person.[9] To put it in terms of the imagination is to also seek a synoptic vision that could be concealed over in the rigidity of methodological adherence to logic, not so much the coherence of experience's own intelligibility. In effect, we follow James as he ends *A Pluralistic Universe* since in desiring so much to interpret immediate experience through general categories of a conceptual scheme that the existential need of that adherence to logic may come at the very expense of what the imagination generates in its very construction. Hence, the artistic play of the imagination is more important to the metaphysician than simple adherence to logic. Consider James when he calls out the rule of logic of identity in Appendix C. Since reality is in flux and changing, the terms of any concrete series as contrasted against abstract concepts cannot be assumed to hold for all reality for all time. Our relations terminate and stop as our interest draws our attention to another aspect or new relation. What undermines the law of identity as a principle of all reality to which the Neo-Hegelians would have us believe otherwise is that reality is thoroughly logical in the presentation of how relations unfold, no matter if they external to the person or ones which we are undergoing. James insists that in rejecting a logical law as a principled part of reality will come down to adopting a metaphysics in which novelty may arise.[10] In reality's unfolding and becoming nature, the only thing that may be said then is a phenomenologically-guided speculation that preserves novelty of how we live through our experiences rather than imposing our want through imagination. For this reason, we follow James on this point rather than Whitehead.

3. Given that the problem of immediate experience is our entrance into the speculation of totalities, a vocabulary drawn from experience and its temporal flow must privilege becoming over static being. Totality is what James called the all-at-once, and the ideal to which all metaphysical efforts attempt. Metaphysics aims for a vision of the whole, even if such vision can never be obtained. We should speculate as if our proposals about reality describe it but never in principle be so committed that what I offer as a speculative conception of reality is a finished product. The truest totality cannot be viewed, and the analogy of viewing our own relative position in the Milky Way Galaxy comes to mind. Whenever we want to imagine our galaxy, the very idea of the galaxy cannot get passed the fact of our vantage point conditioning the positionality from which we seek to reconstruct a totality of it. In this way, the true dynamism of reality is rendered in any conceptual scheme we propose. That which does exist must exist at the time of experiencing it. All concepts and understandings are within the temporal flow of time and space just as much as the analogy of devising a picture of a spiral galaxy is still within the galactic plane from which we are picturing and yet some of the complexity may be missed in my personing to which reality may in principle be flowing but my language and perspective cannot fully render adequate.

While certainly not as a heavy-handed interpretation to see oneself in the history of philosophy, I would like to warn of a tendency of human thought to reify aspects of our relations. This mistake has been made since Plato who regarded both the subjective act of knowing faculty like Nous from the object known like Eidos. Overturning this dangerous tendency is the goal of the speculative philosopher who must reawaken in all philosophy the absolute relationality of persons as the very condition of speculative metaphysics. Reifications of speculation and passing them off as the only dogmatic truth breeds a tribalism and inhospitality that damages our ability to live alongside each other peacefully, and this is especially true when the object of speculation is God. In this way, speculative philosophy qua radical empiricism is always a way into peace, a reminder of the necessity of a shared cosmopolitanism because of the limit of our shared intellectual imagination and subsequent metaphysical faculties to never be able to transcend the positionality and relationality of personing. To prevent such tendencies, let us then try and speculate from the personal sphere where I undergo experience and maintain intellectual modesty of all speculative impulse.

4. Relative-stability is never absolute-stability. There is no pure stasis, no immutable essence, except the description of the varying degrees of relative stability. Relative stability is the quasi-permanence of a structure relative to personal experience and inference about its structure must be taken as they are experienced within time. For instance, a river may cut and alter the landscape. To us, the river is relatively-stable since such changes do not drastically change our experience in our

[9] Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, p. 5.

[10] William James, *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 395-400.

lifetime. The quasi-permanence of the river in relation to us may even generate a constant possibility that we must confront. The same fictitious river flows in such and such a direction and any attempt to ford the river must confront the current moving in said direction. The problem of reification occurs when people abstract relative-stability as an example of a stable and finished block universe as if all possibilities are known or could be known in principle. Relative-stable structures will change, however, to entire ecosystems. Given that the event of its structure is in constant relation to geophysical changes that take place for us in the inferences of geologic time, our river should be regarded as an unfolding and changing being.

There is an implication to such a postulate. Materiality thus expresses varying degrees of stability in which change manifests at varying degrees of intensity and experience. Some relations are more easily recognized in terms of the varying degrees of process and change inherent in what is being described and the relative sphere of our own becoming. Processes that last longer than human lives can only be posited by an accurate and scientific assessment of the change and effect relations that gives rise to the becoming and perishing that humans cannot see in their own temporal limits. Like metaphysics, such becoming must be imagined within a scientific frame of reference whereas our practical needs may reify the abstracted idea from the concrete instance of it. When regarded through such abstraction, the relations lose the lustre of their explanatory appeal.

5. Relatively-stable entities are made up of relations and causally in relation to the entire multiverse. By multiverse, I mean the many different qualitative ways and richness in how our relations may be experienced (and thus interpreted) from which differences of practice may result but from which no access to the totality itself can adjudicate more appropriate or less appropriate ways of practice. In that way, some may go to Catholic Adoration and be with Christ whereas the atheist janitor may come into the same space washing and cleaning before a piece of leaven bread. The Janitor may not have any shame in swearing before the bread in the monstrance since for him the claim of its sanctification is but pure myth. In this way, I observe along James that connections interpreted in the same changing flux of experience and activity may result in similarly repeated practices for some and not for others. There is no one single thread of privileged interpretation that runs through the experience of the same bread, yet there is some degree of sameness to which some communities may establish and stand in the same relation-to the bread. In more general terms, "Taken as it does appear, our universe is to a large extent chaotic. No one single type of connection runs through all the experiences that compose it."[11] The only commonality between them will be the causal relations of how bread brakes down organically. The many different ways in which the same irreducible content may be interpreted generates a pluralism on its own.

6. There is no absolute pluralism in which reality is completely incommensurable. Complete incommensurability is undermined by the manner in which our shared human experience tends (but does not have to) focus on present existential needs. What makes existentialism somewhat true is the shared attention to what we all have a selective interest in focusing the fields of our attention on, and thus generating cultural ways of coping with those same existential needs that cut all the way down into the personal sphere. The philosophical differences are the various manners in which various systems - whether religious ways of life like Christianity, Buddhism etc. and philosophical ways of being, say Stoicism, or more secular and creative ways like artistic exploration map onto our lived-experience. Given that these systems speak to some without causing harm to others, then there is a degree of pluralism. As James asserts his own belief, "that a pluralistic and incompletely integrated universe [is] describable only by the free use of the word 'some.'"[12] This incompletely integrated universe demands of us what is also in constant flux. In fact, we do not have access to reality in a static form to privilege any of these forms of life. We can only pragmatically assess them in terms of how they generate consequences and thus ethics, not metaphysics, is what limits the incommensurability we often find between the various orthopraxies generated in culture and within religion.

7. Built into human experience are the various forms of life. Forms of life generate particular applications of universal moral principles that are discovered by the rational form of human

[11] William James, 'A World of Pure Experience'. 24.

[12] *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 106.

experience, which we may call the form of personal life. The form of personal life is the phenomenologically constitutive feature of all human experiences that is reflected at the level of moral consciousness inside time. Many people confuse forms of life and the application and the moral principles that describe, at bottom, the form of personal life. In a way, morality is more closely known than forms of life, which are not the same. Morality is the form of personal life, and cannot ever be exhaustively prescriptive. Instead, morality is, at best, a regulative set of principles that are primitively basic to the form of personal life, detectable by phenomenological intuition of our shared affective experience and then reflected upon in terms of its coherence.[13] Morality is an expression of human intrapersonal relations, common lived realities of our shared embodiedness, and the vulnerability we all share in relation to each other. The form of personal life is the absolute containing set of all other forms of life that inhabit the form of personal life. Forms of life refer, then, to the socio-political and economic arrangements that delivers the necessities of civilization and all conceptual tensions and ruptures the principles of the form of personal life generate in terms of how we organize the very materiality of our societies.

8. Given the limitations of experience and the tendency to reify aspects of experience, which may also change, we must be open to the possibility that the universe may change in some fashion beyond our ken to know. For this reason, we must be open to the proposition that just because something is not actual does not mean that the actuality is never possible. Instead, an openness to reality and experience must lie a conception of growth. All possibilities are, therefore, actual, even if not actualized. In this way, contained at the kernel of the universe is an organicity unearthed by Whitehead and James. The universe is James's stream, the Heraclitean river which may cut this way or that, and our humility in acknowledging this fact is a metaphysical recognition in the vast cosmological streams ability to flow differently than we might suspect or anticipate

II. What is a Person?

In this essay, so far, I have taken granted the ontological nature of persons. Given the overwhelming complex nature of this concept, let me review in a sense how persons have been understood historically and how this response to see the person as a set of ongoing composite relations in personing in the next section differs from those attempts that have existed to define its scope. Since much of this work is in contrast to a Schelerian framework, I find myself similarly fascinated as was Scheler on the question: What is a person? For this reason, I also ground my discussion of those past philosophical frameworks as Scheler understood them.

Scheler starts his *Human Place and the Cosmos* with three conceptions of the human person. In each conception, then there may be an element of truth. However, these three interpretive trends only refer to the problem of the person in Europe and European civilization. In this way, we should remain open that there are other interpretive renderings of the person in other philosophical systems the world over (for example like Buddhist interpretations of life as 'mind only' or as the natural state of being a spontaneous loving embodied creature). Scheler's clustered categories are not as set and rigid as Scheler's categories pretend. For him, they are irreconcilable and he is accurate that they are in constant tension with each other on a cultural level. Whether or not the tension in the cultural level of these categories is maintained philosophically is another matter. These categories of the person are:

(1) The Created persons interpretation is a result of the Jewish-Christian tradition. Scheler does not mention Islam as contributing to this conception of the person even though it is an Abrahamic religion like the other two just mentioned.

(2) The Rational persons interpretation is a result of Scheler painting with a large brush of our Ancient Greek tradition. Let me reproduce the entire passage,

…the human being is what he is through his possession of what is variably called "reason," logos, phronesis, ratio, mens—'logos' meaning here the possession of speech as well as the ability to grasp the "what" [the essence] of each and every entity. Closely connected with this view is the theory that there is also a reason above the human being that underlies the whole universe and with which the human being alone is in a state of participation.[14]

[13] For the best articulation of this methodology, see Edgar S. Brightman's *The Moral Laws*.

[14] Scheler, *The Human Place in the Cosmos*, 5.

In this passage, we participate in a rational universe. This ontological participation harmonizes with the larger sense or order and purpose in it. Thus, we can see how and why Scheler may find the participation of persons within purpose meaningful since his phenomenology discerns the ontological relations through which we apprehend our involvement in meaning-making from beginning in an experience all the way through to an experience's end.

(3) The Naturalistic persons interpretation embodies a conception in which the human person "represents a late stage in the evolution of our planet."[15] In this conception, persons are the product of energies and animal abilities we have inherited from our shared ancestral and evolutionary past. This naturalistic person view uncritically arrives at its ontological interpretation of the person from scientific categories up to and including evolutionary theories that define the human being as a toolmaker (homo faber) and nothing more.

Now, I would like to suggest the metaphysical direction of my speculative efforts. I think there is strong enough reason to see this possibility as a fourth conception of the person, even though it is not supported in Scheler's overall narrow view of Western philosophy. We can call this the onto-relational view being developed that incorporates the four relational modes of personing. While I cannot in this sketch fix the permanent mystery answer for all time which of these conceptions must be or how they extensively different from what I am proposing here, I will only say at this point that if someone were to take up and argue for any of these interpretations of the human person, then they must make clear how Being becomes in the personal sphere as I indicate in the next section.

III. The Four Relational Modes of Personing

In the first part, I gave some postulates that condition and give rise to some thoughts regarding the four modes of personing. Other times, I have called these four modes: modes of relating-to. While one may be inclined to abstract persons out of these relations, there are only these relations. Like James, I am inclined to accept that relations exist thoroughly and while we may abstract *relata* from these relations, even to the point of analysis or some other creative endeavour, there is no true abstraction of one end of the relation in experience from the entailed end. Persons are thoroughly ontologically related, and any philosophical anthropology investigating persons must regard persons as developing expressions of these fundamentally ontological relations. Whenever I talk about the person singularly and do not mention the opposite object of its relation, then that should be understood as a convention. Lurking in back of my mind constantly is the fact that only a relational ontology of persons captures the unfolding essence of personing.

These relations are not phenomenological descriptions. They are the various modes in which phenomenology takes place internal to each of the ways these modes of relating-to occur. In other words, my onto-relational hypothesis of the four modes is a necessary precondition for phenomenological reduction and the epoché. Part of my problem with phenomenology has always been its inertia. When the phenomenologist has completed her descriptions and she has figured out how much of the description prefigures our pre-theoretical understanding of the appearances of phenomena. However, the phenomenologist never asks what lies beneath whatever word they use for 'intentionality.' Instead, no matter the phenomenologist and no matter the Husserlian heresy of the phenomenologist some aspect of the description becomes reified, and phenomenology then becomes a narrow ontological interpretation of some type of relation it exposes as ontologically basic to experience. I propose then that these four modes of relating-to are either the devolution [16]16] I am open to either interpretation of the four modes of relating-to, though I am currently favouring the latter over the former.

These fundamental personing relations are:

1. Persons-to-culture: In this relational field of inquiry, the social sciences study the various way these relations manifest at the level of aggregate intrapersonal relations. In philosophy, this relation

[15] idem.

[16] I know this is a rather robust claim to make. This claim is a characterization of the entire phenomenological tradition whether we are talking about the bodily intentionality of Merleau-Ponty or the care structure of Heidegger's being-in-the-world. This claim also reveals my dissatisfaction with phenomenologists who claim their descriptions are ontologically neutral.

entails assessments about the social and political conditions of society's design and the ends to which it aims. With persons relating to culture, questions of philosophy of religion and art also belong since art and religion are modes of culture that inform questions about the end to which society aims. This relation presupposes the personal ground of freedom inherent in personing. To question the end or set of ends to which society aims requires freedom.

2. Persons-to-nature: In this relational field of inquiry, the natural sciences study the various ways these relations of the person relate to the environing world and to what implications obtain with the causal knowledge of those natural objects that do not possess any freedom. In the person-to-nature relation, we can also discern the metaphysical questions about the status of objects, our embodiment, and the questions that have long belonged to philosophy of mind and previous philosophers positing unchanging substances to account for some natural objects. In a process-based account, however, natural objects are in constant relation to other modes of other natural objects or to me. One should understand the perishing and rising of natural objects appear and are given phenomenologically more as an emerging event, and for this reason, I do not understand natural objects through older more antiquated conceptions of substance, or even to describe matter itself as a substance.

The difference in the passive relations of non-life is in their inability to affect change, appearing as it were to be wholly complete in their determination, though these natural objects are still in active physical relation to other processes, even processes that unfold in geological or stellar time. When contrasted to persons, these natural objects are actively undergoing mostly passive relations to other causal objects and laws proximate to the object and others remote from it. The physical relation and processes may even be blind to the human eye. This contrast reveals the stark division persons feel towards the inert objects of experience and how the basic constituents of space, time, and our most developed science at the time inform this relation. In addition, life manifests as the potential for freedom to manifest at the most basic levels of being an embodied and affective organism.

This freedom is characterized by the complexity and embodied organization of the type of cognition and relations an organism may have with the world. One should not think as a speciest and privilege the human sphere of the personal over the ability of living animals to have similar if not different levels of freedom and relational possibilities. The human sphere is only a limit of our ability to relate to the world (and conceive of it), a mediating field from which our Being expresses its Becoming. Given that life is simply Being expressing its Becoming in embodied materiality, our personal sphere is a limit to our relation to other personal spheres of the many ways in which life can become. As a limit, it may blind us to the personhood and manifestation of the personal in other forms of life.

3. Persons-to-others: In this relational field of inquiry, ethics studies the various ways persons relate to and reciprocate such that every other is also a person. One might even venture to claim that ethics consists in proposing principles to judge the best type of human conduct, and these principles define the scope of the best relations Persons-to-others may take[17] This relation manifests in the activity of living in community with others, and also reveals the basic laws of ontological vulnerability and interdependency inherent in the human condition. The reason why we question what we ought to do in intrapersonal relationships with others is because we are in community with others. Inherent in community is also the freedom to question which judgments we should value, and how the affective dimension of experiencing these relations uniquely situates us to call into question constantly the manner in which our freedom manifests in these ethical relationships. The exercise of this freedom in terms of the cultural modes of religion, art, science, and politics and the constraints of practicality and institutionalization of habit underlies questions of ends in the person-to-culture relationship.

4. Persons-to-self: In this relational field of inquiry, the person becomes an object of self-examination, description, and evaluation. The person-to-self relation is the study of self-conception as it matters for the actualization of freedom into concrete and possibly ideal conceptions of faith, vocation, and duties of self-perfection that confronts the projected unity of our own becoming self. In this relation, persons confront the basic nullity existentialists rightly insisted

[17] This sense of ethics takes its inspiration from Edgar S. Brightman's *Moral Laws*.

upon, and they identified the very freedom at the ground of all mediation and personal activity of life. The personal sphere cannot help but experience itself as that which can freely relate-to in the manner the person decides. This freedom becomes from its very form we enact. Persons decide upon the relational self-image of projected possibility in this fundamental relation. In this way, every choice is seizing upon and taking a relation to the ideal and possible formations of our own projections in our individualness, otherness, and culturalness. At the heart of the person-to-self relation is a type of striving, wrestling with desires, the potential to realize them, and the actuality of success and failure.

To end the person-to relational side of the four modes, the very freedom that underlies the manifestation and activity of personing in all spheres of personal life are generative of meaning inside time. In the dynamic unfolding of these relations, meaning and values are generated. The space of meaning, the space of reasons, the meaning of art, and the communicability of language all manifest in the in-betweeen-ness of being a person in the space and time of the modes of relating-to. Persons are their very activity manifesting in the very intentional acts; each person a personal sphere of generativity. The transcendence of the world is achieved in the aggregate coalescing of every person's freedom both authentically or inauthentically expressed, and only in reciprocal relation of personning does the concrete world find existential density between us to be shared.

As in Edmund Husserl's co-constituting relationship of intentionality, the intended objects also constitute the first-personal dimension of experiencing the world. Therefore, there are corollary relationships based on the four fundamental relations above. These are:

1. Culture-to-person: An inauthentic freedom is one in which the freedom of the person is overtaken by the sociality and burdens of already decided modes of being. Habits can become so engrained that they become tradition, and tradition can be so oppressive in this form that the practical exercise of cultural freedom in terms of art making, religious ritual, and any other cultural activity (even secular modes) may be banned or strictly controlled. Culture can also enliven the ends to which persons are gravitating, and when we see the authentic bursting forth of freedom, we see the richness that culture can provide as often is the case with many sources of identity, community, history, and tradition. Pluralism is just the recognition of the many sources in which personal freedom and interpersonal communities intersect. The more free we are, the more a reservoir of possibility underlies how culture can inform the ground of freedom for persons in community, and the greater range of experimentation societies may explore. As with anything, persons also constitute the possibility of culture itself, and so the cultural spaces come back to enliven, empower, or deaden and harm. Persons are the immediate locus of value-creation of persons inhabiting these cultural spaces.

2. Nature-to-person: Nature has a givenness that constrains the realization of meaning and value. Nature provides the very physical precondition of how bodies interact, the set of capacities our bodies possess, the energy of psychic drives and the manner in which persons exist as an embodied and affective organism. The natural sciences lift up the very environing world, and illuminate the many ways in which nature is an organized chaos. The natural sciences give us knowledge of the environing world's scaffolding in terms of causal relationships, generalized laws, and powers inherent in relational bodies, and eventually what limits to embodied existence circumscribe our practical realization of a person's freedom. In this way, nature affects us often in explicit ways in which causality manifests in the order of our lived-body. Our lived-body is part of the environing world coalescing as a nexus between many different modes of relating-to. The environing world is the nexus of causal relationships that all sciences help to discern (both natural and social sciences), and it's in the expression of the unity required to be a science that often makes us think of personing in relationship to only causal laws. Moving into the 21st century, our interconnectedness to this causal structure of nature may unfold in new ways as epigenetics discerns the stimuli and material conditions that gives rise to changes in the lived-body produced by more exact models.

The problem of phenomenology and the natural attitude only arises when we think of nature is exactly the same orientation we have to every other fundamental relation. For the non-philosopher, this means that we think of the entire field and sphere of being a person from the third-person and impersonal view of science, describing the relationship of persons through the imagined view of God's perspective looking in upon the world. In this way, we think of the natural objects and include the human person among them, generalizing away from the inescapable first-personal point of view

that gives rise to generalized and impersonal views in the first place. When we do so, the natural attitude to see subjective life impersonally takes over, filtering out the proper perspective of persons relating to the world—that is, personing. In my language of relational ontology, when nature is emphasized beyond the relation to be all that is, we often see persons as merely a distanced and separate physical object divorced from the modes of relating-to that constitute every position persons could take.

3. Others-to-persons: Given the reciprocity of persons and the mutual ontological interdependency between persons, one person's other becomes a person to your otherness. In other words, the terms of this very relation are in complete reciprocation. For Emmanuel Levinas, this occurs in a type of transcendence, a givenness in which the metaphor and analogy of height stand for the more general personalist truth that persons are of absolute dignity and worth. In being so absolute and unique, there is a radical givenness to which others truly possess since in being transcendent in relation to others, persons are the origination of value and ultimate source of meaning. All persons in their relation transcend in value the object of their relation, and if this object of one's relation is another person, then they transcend in value equally. This givenness can be limited by the cultural ethos that conditions and socializes us in varying social, political and economic systems to be blind to this radical and transcendental givenness of all persons. One mundane piece of evidence for such phenomenological truth is readily apparent whenever we fill out paperwork to be hired. We go to "human resources," and in that department's namesake stands the ultimate truth that we are not persons before the institutions that govern us in Western and capitalist developed countries.

4. Self-to-person: Given that the self is a unified projection of possibility in relation to myself, it constitutes a sense of what might be and this can completely overtake a person in much the same way that I relied earlier on an existential vocabulary in the Culture-to-person relation. One can easily become deluded by self-ideals to the point they hinder rather than enhance and facilitate one's own becoming. The ground of freedom can intimidate even the possessor of such freedom. In the face of our overwhelming lack of determination persons flee from the very freedom that is the source of that mode of relating-to. The existentialists called this inauthenticity, a lack of possessing ourselves, and here, I think, persons are thrown upon themselves in ways that our cultural resources might not anticipate. Self-imposed projections often come with the institutional resources and habits that can undermine or enhance the person's exercise of freedom. Habits may also anesthetize us to the exercise of our very own freedom. In this way, I am unsure if the existentialists capture inauthentic resolve and interpret a lack of freedom correctly in de-personalized representations.

In these relationships, then, there is a back-and-forthness to the personing. Personing is being-in-the-world-as-a-person and in that relation there is also being constituted by the generative realities of culture, nature, the self, and others. There is no perspective outside of being a person and in relation to these four modes. We may be temporarily confused as to taking aspects of our relation at face value, seeing culture or nature as distinct things apart from the persons that inhabit them. Such a view is illusory, however, even if natural and social scientists are trained to conceive of their regional field of inquiry as ontologically privileged. Disciplinarily focusing your attention on some natural or cultural aspect does not cut off that phenomena from being mediated through the personal sphere. As persons, we are always in relation-to. In fact, there are only varying degrees of selective attention directed outward and then communicated to other persons about the aspects of these relations. All concepts are derived from percepts, perceptual particulars and aspects of experience in order to interpret and make sense of the particulars derived from these four modes of relating-to. In other words, there is never a time where concepts about culture or nature are constructed outside of my personing. All knowledge and science issue forth from the sphere of personal acts and the relational aspects of act-objects.

While I have attempted to propose a sketch for a personalist framework for philosophical anthropology, much turns on the concept of relation. The two most likely candidates are that relations manifest externally in the world or that they manifest inherently in the mind. My silence on the ontology of relations is due in part to what phenomenological analysis requires to claim neutrality. I have also indicated in this essay how fraught with difficulty such claims about the neutrality of phenomenology are. The consequence of this lack of neutrality is inevitable. A reification will occur

in the attempt to describe what we experience, some assumption will become so essential to the background that all else will centre on it to receive its light. For me, the concept of relation is that concept. The initial reviewers of this essay were right to point this assumption out.

One will note that all four modes of relation-to take their cue from the person. For any person, there is no perspective of relation outside the personal sphere. In this way, a consequence of my idea of relation must at least be consistent with this fact. Relations may be impersonally constitutive of the universe beyond my ken or they may not be. The fact is that relations are limited to how they become in the person and I could not know those impersonal relations constitutive of the universe beyond my ken. The implication is a twofold dilemma. I cannot in principle know such relations at all or in imagining relations externally independent from me is to still arise within the generative play of the imagination within me. If we go with the latter, then my very personal sphere is still constituting what we abstract from us as an external relation. For now, I am dedicated to this latter hypothesis.

So far I have said nothing concerning where the ontology of relations falls. Initially, I took my cue in thinking of relations from the types of phenomenological domains I felt were describable by many phenomenologists such as Husserl, Levinas, Scheler, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre and De Beauvoir[18] In this way, I am at least provisionally dedicated to the fact that only relations exist and that to focus on the reified side of the subject for an idealism or the to focus entirely on the external for a realism is to miss the point. What both a realism and idealism would still require is the presupposition of a processive account of experience that is the precondition for all philosophical speculations[19]

My lack of commitment now also does not rule out in principle that various answers to the question 'What are persons?' can be supplied. Ready-made interpretations such as evolutionary, theological, or the Greco-Roman rational animal are all answers to what persons are, yet there is no decisively satisfying one answer since in answer in any one of these ways, the scientist, theologian, or classical philosopher has pushed one salient mode of relating-to as the conception that which we should be privileging, rather than exploring the fact that persons are ontologically relational through and through and becoming in those relations through and through. Philosophical and conceptual disagreement still ranges between these conceptions, and these are not the only interpretations of human life compatible with this personalist framework for philosophical anthropology.

Another impression my efforts here may suggest is that these four modes of relating-to are the ways that one becomes a person—that is thinking that the personal sphere was not already underway and that the process is co-constituted by the field of relations with others such that becoming a person is a crescendo in an overall process, an event in itself. One might think of my efforts here resembling something like the Ubuntu perspective. Unlike the Ubuntu perspective in which one acquires value by developing into a person because the development of *ena* (selfhood) is an achievement, persons always possess the inviolable dignity because the ontological status of being a person is something

[18] The omission of Heidegger from this list is on purpose. As personalism is both a metaphysics and an ethics of what it means to be a person, no respectable personalist who is inspired by phenomenology should ever draw an account from Heidegger. Heidegger purposefully avoided values as part of his fundamental ontology and that weakness is in part responsible for his choices. As a Jamesian, I believe philosophies are always generated by the felt needs of those who build them. A phenomenological ontology not concerned with ethics is abominable. Let this footnote be a testament to my lasting intellectual judgment that Heidegger is a Nazi stooge, an abomination whose fundamental ontology contains within it the avoidance of the ethical from which history should forever condemn him and the failure of *Being and Time*.

[19] Much of this essay takes its inspiration from Whitehead and James as one reviewer noted. I have been silent on where the metaphysical reality of personing resides in the hopes that whatever conception of the whole proves to be true, these four modes of relating-to will be constitutive of that open conception. In light of this attempt, the reader will have to wait to see exactly where James and Whitehead differ with respect to where the reality of the world resides in both process thought and radical empiricism. In the meantime, in a recent book by Gary Herstein and Randall Auxier entitled *The Quantum of Explanation: Whitehead's Radical Empiricism,* Auxier and Herstein have engaged this question directly and probably can do the relation between James and Whitehead better than I ever could.

nobody can take away from individual persons, even if some person decides by their own agency to reject the source of that dignity they share in and become a moral monster. All moral monsters still and will always in my ethical system to which this ontology of relations undergirds, always be persons. Dignity is a value that no human community can ever take away from the personal sphere. The personal sphere is that which is no object, not determined in any way that the person could ever be an object despite some people treat other personal spheres as objects. The reason for this inability to turn a personal sphere into an object is because the ability the personal sphere has to transcend its very own immanence in the freedom to take on the relations is evidence that it is the source and constitution of all meaning and value in the world in the first place.

One will also note that this personalist framework is silent on God, and nowhere in the four modes of personing is God located. At present, this author is confused about the nature of God. I can offer a tentative hypothesis that may be true given the limits outlined herein and the consequent pluralism of those limits. The reader must understand that this author is not orthodox regarding the hypothesis of the Divine. Instead, I use the term 'God' because that is how I grew up Catholic, and being in the United States that term is interchangeable and a limit to which most people conceive of the Divine. With that said, I wish to embrace James's sense of the fringed more offered at the end of 'A World of Pure Experience.' Like me, you may be dissatisfied with that answer of James's later writings. He gives us glimpses of a system that calls for completion. In that essay, he writes:

> [W]e at every moment can continue to believe in an existing beyond. It is only in special cases that our confident rush forward gets rebuked. The beyond must, of course, always in our philosophy be itself of an experiential nature. If not a future experience of our own or a present one of our neighbour; it must be a thing in itself in Dr. Prince's and Professor Strong's sense of the term—that is, it must be an experience for itself whose relation to other things we translate into the action of molecules, ether-waves, or whatever else the physical symbols may be. This opens the chapter of the relations of radical empiricism to panpsychism into which I cannot enter now.
>
> The beyond can in any case exist simultaneously—for it can be experienced to have existed simultaneously—with the experience that practically postulates it by looking in its direction, or by turning or changing in the direction of which it is the goal. Pending that actuality of union, in the virtuality of which the "truth," even now, of the postulation consists, the beyond and its knower are entities split off from each other. The world is in so far forth a pluralism of which the unity is not fully experienced as yet. But as fast as verifications come, trains of experience, once separate, run into one another; and that is why I said earlier in my article, that the unity of the world is on the whole undergoing increase. The universe continually grows in quantity by the new experiences that graft themselves upon the older mass; but these ever new experiences often help the mass to a more consolidated form.[20]

In the passage above, there is a sense of more, a sense of beyond to which the relations in my system point. They intend this deep sense of more at the fringes of experience. Perhaps, I speculate that the totality of this more indicates that the divine is either a growing totality to which all relations aim and facilitate growing in the fact that they intend the proximate and the distal remote beyond from which also comes in its own way by way of relation to us. In this way, we exchange relations in mutual reciprocity with a sense of this beyond and more, the Jamesian unseen order. The simple fact that we grow in proportion to that which we experience and accumulate them means in mutual reciprocity that while we are not together with that sense of the more we may yearn – separated as individuals – there may exist a time where we acquire more depth and feeling of relating to the beyond. What this beyond is cannot be said, but it is there and so for now let the Jamesian hypothesis stand where I have been silent.

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[20] James, *A World of Pure Experience*, 46-47.

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A PHENOMENOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF ATTITUDE-DEPENDENT ACCOUNTS OF VALUE INSPIRED BY MAX SCHELER

Soren Engelsen

Abstract
This article presents a phenomenological critique of attitude-dependent accounts of value in contemporary axiology and argues that the notion of objective value is unproblematical if understood correctly. Through a phenomenological critique of ideal-typical versions of dispositionalist and fitting attitude accounts of value, the article argues that a careful phenomenology of evaluation can clarify some fundamental issues about the nature and existence of objective value. The critique draws inspiration from classic phenomenological analyses of evaluation found in Max Scheler's *Formalismus in der Ethik und Materiale Wertethik* (*Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*). Through a phenomenological critique of ideal-typical versions of dispositionalist and fitting attitude accounts of value, the article argues that a careful phenomenology of evaluation can clarify some fundamental issues about the nature and existence of objective value. The critique draws inspiration from classic phenomenological analyses of evaluation found in Max Scheler's Formalism and Edmund Husserl's genetic phenomenology. Considering how values phenomenally present themselves in lived-experience, the article investigates the relation between evaluative attitudes, such as propositional judgments, beliefs, preferences, and intentional emotions, and the objects of such attitudes. The article argues that any attitude-dependent account of value faces the problem that at least some experienced value properties are objective in the sense of being precisely independent of evaluative attitudes.

Keywords
Phenomenology of value; Max Scheler; objective value; fitting attitude accounts of value

1. Introduction

One of the most critical issues for a theory of value that analyses values in terms of their necessary relation to subjective attitudes is to account for the objective feature of experienced value. Both dispositionalist and fitting attitude accounts are promising attempts to solve this problem. They aim to reconcile some notion of objective value with the conception that values are necessarily dependent on human attitudes. Through a phenomenological critique of this argumentative strategy, I argue that such compatibilism has fundamental problems. This is due to the feature of at least some values: their experienced objectivity is characterised precisely by attitude-independence. I argue that nothing mystical is implied by this feature, as is often assumed in the debate. We are motivated to see this if we are careful in our reconstructive analysis of evaluative experience, and thoughts in Max Scheler can help clarify this point.

I sketch the contours of ideal-typical versions of a dispositionalist account and a fitting attitude theory of value in the context of the phenomenology of value (2). The two accounts presented are meant to exemplify typical positions that account for value in terms of their necessary relation to evaluative attitudes. They function in the article as means for highlighting systematic points about the broader issue as such, i.e. the relation between evaluative attitudes and values, considering the phenomenology of evaluation, including not least the experienced objectivity of values. The following phenomenological critique (3), inspired by Max Scheler and Edmund Husserl, addresses the relation between evaluative attitudes and intentional objects of value as such and serves as a general criticism of any account that depicts all value as essentially dependent on attitudes. Based on the points established in the phenomenological critique, I then suggest a possible phenomenologically consistent answer to the ontological worries about the notion of objective value (4) and end the article with some brief, concluding remarks (5).

2. The phenomenology of evaluation and attitude-dependent accounts of value

That value has an 'objective phenomenology' has been accepted by many in the metaethical literature, even by prominent anti-realists, although they claim this feature of experience can be explained away (Mackie, 1977; Blackburn, 2001). What is widely recognised is not that values are objective in a robust sense, but that we experience values 'as if' they are objective: Just like we experience the colour, shape, and weight of things as something belonging to our world, we experience the world as bestowed with value. The goodness and badness of things, events, and persons are not experienced as merely products of arbitrary subjective or cultural projections upon the world.

However, one can easily miss the crucial details of this characterisation of evaluative experience. This is unfortunate since it can lead to confusion about what 'objectivity' amounts to in the case of values. A genetic phenomenological reconstruction of value can bring significant details to the discussion that avoids this problem, as I aim to illustrate in the following: Whether we experience aesthetic, prudential, or moral values, values are given in experience in a way that presents them as if they are, in a sense, objective. Phenomenologically, this point relates to the way we experience the relation between our intentional objects of value and the acts or attitudes in and through which values are presented.

To illustrate, let us consider some examples. Take a simple case in the context of aesthetic value: Drinking my coffee, I have a unified, Gestalt-like experience of the flavours of the coffee. They present themselves as having positive and negative value qualities for me given their sensational, phenomenal qualities, and as a result, I am prompted to acknowledge this. The property of being positive or negative (or a complex of positive and negative) is the minimal individuating feature of value in the phenomenological sense. The aesthetic value qualities presented seem to shape my opinion about the taste, they do not present themselves as something contingent upon my higher-order opinion about them – or contingent upon anyone else's opinion for that matter. In other words, whether the coffee has these non-instrumental value qualities for me in this minute is not experienced as up to me to decide. Even if my taste for coffee is an acquired taste, the qualities are just there as phenomena and parts of my lived-experienced world. This point echoes what Max Scheler refers to when he emphasises that value is, as a matter of brute fact, part of the 'richness' of our direct experience of the world (Scheler, 2007, I. Teil, II., A). Even my fully formed desire for the coffee seems derived from the fact that the coffee presents itself experientially or has been presenting itself in experience (perhaps anticipated) as positive to me. Having propositional desires is in other words not experienced in an axiological vacuum, and we do not experience evaluations to be the results of such desires – a crucial phenomenological point too easy to miss in contemporary discussions.

I desire that X because X presents itself as good; X does not present itself to be good in experience given that I desire it. A propositional desire is only formed in experience on the background of something being given to be somehow of value, whether present or anticipated, although such value experience is often occurring in the periphery of attention (the neglect of which might explain why some would not recognise it as a case of genuine evaluative presentation). This is arguably no different in prototypical examples from other and more complex domains of value than simple aesthetic cases, examples such as other-regarding and morally significant value experiences. If I witness someone on the street brutally attacking a perfectly innocent person, the experienced disvalue of this event, the unique brutality and negative quality of what is there in front of me, presents itself to be an essential part of the intentional object of the observation itself and not merely something I project upon the situation.

Of course, we cannot rule out a priori that what presents itself to be of positive or negative value is, in fact, nothing but the result of my projection, and experience verifies that sometimes this is the case, just like in cases of non-veridical sense perception. Phenomenologically, it is crucial to be aware that reaching such corrective conclusions are the results of modifying, corrective experiences, often through recontextualising acts of abstraction and deliberation. Corrective experience does not alter the fact that value is originally given as independent of the cognitive or conative propositional attitudes and stances we take towards the value. The fundamental phenomenological point is that my desire to make the violence stop or to help seems to be a result of intended value properties of the situation, rather than vice versa – just like it is the case with my negative opinion and perhaps my emotion of indignation formed about the situation. Put in different terms, higher-order attitudes such as

propositional beliefs and desires and intentional emotions are constitutively dependent on simpler forms of evaluation (Tappolet, 2012; Engelsen, 2018), just like there is in general, to phrase it in phenomenological terms, a hierarchy of constitution between predicative judgments and the simpler experiences grounding them. (Ferran, 2008; Husserl, 1966, 1999).

A further aspect of evaluative intentionality, whether aesthetic, prudential or moral, is a normativity attached to the intentional object of the experience. (This does not imply, however, that we can adequately understand experienced value as such in terms of normativity, a point to which we return). As Max Scheler emphasises, it is an aspect of any experience of something of value that the value is presented as having the feature 'ought-to-be-realised' or 'ought-not-to-be-realised' (Scheler, 2007, p. 214). Experiencing the positive aesthetic qualities of my coffee, the bitter-sweet taste and the perking qualities present themselves as of positive value, and a structural aspect of the phenomenon is that the qualities themselves seem to give me a good reason to drink the coffee all things being equal, i.e. considered in isolation from the broader spatial and temporal context. The latter point is crucial and neglecting it can be the source of much confusion about values and the reasons they provide. Analysing value qualities and the normative reasons they provide phenomenologically, we abstract from the broader context in which they are always given. They cannot be said necessarily to give decisive or categorical reasons for specific actions, beliefs or decisions before considering them in their relations to the broader spatial and temporal context of other values and normative reasons in which they are always given (cf., Husserl, 1988). If we consider the matter in the broader context of my life, too much coffee could be bad for me in the long run, regardless of its positive aesthetic (or other) value qualities; or better coffee to drink could be available to me instead. Nevertheless, when we consider the value quality as it is given in isolation, at least a pro tanto reason must be recognised as a constitutive moment, an essential abstract aspect, of the object of the evaluative experience.

Experienced value does not by necessity outline what is categorically required to do, but it does speak in favour of specific actions and form the constitutive, lived-experienced background for any consideration of decisive normative reasons. That is why it makes sense to ascribe to evaluative experience the property of being at least proto-normative (Klawonn, 2004) if we take 'normative' to denote something that prescribes decisive reasons. The same point applies to the experience of morally significant value: The brutal violence is experienced to be having in itself a 'requiredness' attached to it, to use an expression from Wolfgang Köhler or simply an ought all things being equal (Köhler, 1966; Monticelli, 2013). I experience the violence as 'calling' or 'demanding' me to do something; to intervene, to get help, to call the police, etc. – although something else in my horizon of experience may provide me with better reasons for doing something different. In general, we do not experience values, whether positive or negative, as neutral with regards to our actions. On the contrary, values are experienced as founding our correct actions, if not in a categorical sense then at least pro tanto.

Even though the fundamental objective feature of the phenomenology of value has been widely recognised in the metaethical debate, John Leslie Mackie's classic so-called 'queerness-argument' still seems to strike many to be convincing (Mackie, 1977, Joyce, 2001). It says that the existence of something which can have normative and motivating properties, independent of our human attitudes, is incompatible with a sensible contemporary picture of the world; and values seem to have these exact properties.

Given that the objective phenomenology of value is nevertheless typically recognised, a prevalent tendency in contemporary metaethics is that prominent accounts of value seem to be specifically designed to embrace this quality or at least explain it. The objective character of evaluative experience is combined with the idea that value is nevertheless essentially dependent on our attitudes in one way or another. Such accounts thus accept the basic premise of the queerness argument that value independent of human attitudes is problematic, but insist that even on this premise, the objective phenomenology of value can be taken seriously. Many versions of dispositionalism and fitting attitude accounts exemplify such an attempt to construe compatibilism between attitude-dependence of value and value objectivity.

Attitude-dependent accounts of value have often been formulated as a form of dispositionalism about value (e.g., Lewis et al., 1989). Dispositionalist accounts of value that analyse value in terms of their relation to specific attitudes claim that an object has value if and only if it disposes to particular

kinds of attitudes in given subjects under particular kinds of circumstances. Each account differs with regards to what it takes to count as the relevant type of attitude, the relevant subjects and circumstances. The value-constituting attitude can, e.g., be claimed to be a desire, a belief, a judgment, an intentional emotion; the value-constitutive subjects can be specified as, for instance, normal or rational; and the value-constitutive circumstances can be claimed to be normal circumstances, ideal epistemic circumstances, or the like. For instance, beauty as a value could, according to an ideal-typical dispositionalist, attitude-dependent account, be described as constituted by that which rational subjects would judge to be beautiful in circumstances where they were fully informed. The relevant value-constitutive attitude is here taken to be a judgment performed by a rational subject in normal circumstances. Constraints such as rationality and ideal epistemic circumstances typically serve the function of accounting for the objective features of value. Not any arbitrary, subjective disposition to judge, desire, or believe that something is beautiful can count as constituting the value of beauty, the argument would go, only the attitudes of certain idealised subjects under certain idealised circumstances would. This way, the typical idealised version of attitude-dependent dispositionalism can embrace a sort of objectivity – not any arbitrary value attitude is constitutive of value – while maintaining the core idea that human attitudes are constitutive of value since they insist that value as such is necessarily related to (perhaps idealised) human attitudes.

However, one worry about the ability of dispositionalism to account for the objectivity of value is that, despite the efforts, this analysis still seems to leave relevant properties of value too arbitrary. Fallibility, for instance, is often plausibly seen as a necessary feature of our epistemic condition when dealing with objective properties, not least value properties. We must recognise our necessary epistemic limitations when trying to understand such objects; we must recognise our fallibility. However, fallibility with regards to evaluation seems ex hypothesi to be out of the question for the idealised subject, according to the idealised dispositionalism, since this subject's dispositions to have particular attitudes are taken to be constitutive of values in the first place.

In order to make room for fallibility, many attitude-dependent theories are instead construed as fitting attitude accounts. In addition to the positing of a necessary relation between value and certain (perhaps idealised) attitudes, a further constraint that one can lay on an attitude-dependent account of value is that the attitude suggested to be constitutive of value is described as not only actually present, but something which ought to be produced. If this is the case, that particular attitude-dependent account of value is a version of a so-called fitting or appropriate attitude-account. Brentano is often seen as one of the original proponents of a fitting attitude account of value. Brentano expresses the basic thought of this approach to the analysis of value in his The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong / Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkentnis:

> In the broadest sense of the term, the good is that which is worthy of love, that which can be loved with a love that is correct (Brentano, 2012 [1889])

According to the Brentanoian fitting attitude account, something is not worthy of love (or another kind of emotion or another attitude) because it is good, something is good because it deserves our love (or another relevant attitude taken to be essential). In other words, it is the appropriate attitude which constitutes what is good rather than the good being that which prescribes normative attitudes that fit given situations, or rather than individual attitudes being necessary means to bringing values to attention, as one would perhaps tend to think. According to fitting attitude theories, something is basically of value if it ought to produce some specifiable attitude. Since the given value is not constituted by the given subject's actual response, but by a "fitting", "appropriate", "required" or "correct" (etc.) response, unlike the 'pure' dispositionalist account, the fitting attitude theory can allow for the responding subject's attitude to be fallible, even in ideal circumstances. This solves the problem of fallibility.

Dispositionalism and fitting attitude-accounts of value avoid relativism and pure subjectivism by providing necessary non-subjective criteria for what can sensibly be called valuable. However, as I will argue in the following, even though some kind of objectivity of value is thus recognised, considered phenomenologically, they nevertheless turn things on their head.

3. A phenomenological critique inspired by Max Scheler

Through the critique below of the two ideal-typical attitude-dependent accounts of value, I aim to show that taking the phenomenology of objective value seriously and scrutinising what this more precisely amounts to without letting a veil of over-sceptical abstractions obscure the perspective, leads to conclusions that do not support the attitude-dependent accounts. Further, the phenomenological critique does not at all imply anything mystical, as is often supposed when one departs from attitude-dependent accounts of value. An attentive phenomenology of value and evaluation points in the direction of an ontology of values that recognises their property of being essentially independent of subjects' higher-order attitudes and intentional states, be it propositional beliefs, judgments, desires, or emotions. The two ideal-typical attitude-dependent accounts of value above both fail to properly embrace the objective phenomenology of value they were designed to integrate – basically because the experience of value as being objective is first of all characterised by being the experience that value is independent of our attitudes. The experience that there is a kind of independent axiological 'fact of the matter' when we are struck by value in experience, to use an expression by Kevin Mulligan (Mulligan, 2009) is the result of an experienced presentation of attitude-independence, a feature of evaluative phenomenology too easily overlooked by a veil of abstractions or simply ignored.

Consider the dispositionalist account first. This kind of theory, as so many theories, often make an analogy between value and colour, and this analogy can serve as the point of entrance to a phenomenological critique – of simple forms of dispositionalism about colour as well as value: An object's property of being red is arguably relational and dispositional, i.e. a disposition to be seen as red by normal observers in normal circumstances. We can grant this, but a crucial point about the formation and meaning constitution of colour-dispositions remains: There is something essential about colour that has not been accounted for by such dispositionalist account. Redness as such qua seen is arguably irreducible and a sui generis feature of redness insofar as we cannot account for it in simpler terms. It just makes no sense to try to explain to a natural-born blind person what the quality of redness as such is like to experience; redness considered as a phenomenal property must be seen to be adequately grasped, and this point is crucial. Without explicit or tacit reference to the phenomenal property, one fails to apprehend a constituting aspect of colour as such, either because one is simply unable to do so (as in the case of the natural-born blind person), or for the reason that one abstracts from the phenomenon to the extent that one forgets or neglects the original mode of presentation of colour. A vital phenomenological point here is that the phenomenal property has meaning-theoretical priority over any disposition, it is foundational, and must be considered necessary to an adequate analysis of colour properties and concepts. Basically, in order to adequately account for red qua dispositional property of an object, reference to the intrinsic property of redness qua phenomenal property must be implied: When we refer to red objects, more or less tacitly, we refer to the disposition to be experienced as red (by normal observers in normal circumstances, in bright light, etc.), not merely judged. Any higher-order attitude referring to red without this reference to the phenomenal property, e.g. one that reduces colour to dispositions to judge about it, is an abstraction from the original mode of presentation of the colour, leaving a constitutive quality of it out of the picture. Thus, the phenomenal property of redness has a grounding function in the formation of the concept of a red object; and therefore, such dispositional account cannot be adequate.

We can make a parallel analysis of value and a corresponding parallel phenomenological critique of attitude-dependent dispositionalism about value: Take it that the rational subjects under ideal epistemic circumstances, whose attitudes are supposed to constitute values according to the ideal-typical dispositionalist account, are disposed to judge that sunsets are beautiful. According to such account, rational subjects are not disposed to judge sunsets to be beautiful due to the fact that sunsets are beautiful; sunsets are beautiful because such idealised subjects judge them to be so. In other words, on a standard dispositionalist account of value, such judgment is constitutive of the aesthetic value of a sunset. The critical phenomenological point is that such account of value cannot be fundamental and adequate since an experienced quality is necessarily implied; any disposition to evaluate in the form of a judgment presupposes a distinct kind of experience which is more fundamental. We can reasonably ask these critical questions: what quality is phenomenally given to these rational subjects under ideal circumstances supposed to constitute value as they experience the

beautiful sunset? What is the value of a beautiful sunset like qua appearing quality? The general point is that the phenomenal value quality has priority with regards to an analysis of value; it is always at least tacitly presupposed in evaluative dispositions, which is why it makes perfect sense at all to ask such questions.

That the phenomenally given value quality has priority is the reason why the attitude-dependent dispositional account cannot amount to be an adequate account of value per se, that is, of value considered in its own right: We lack a reference to the phenomenal property of value. As an analysis of established norms as well as of things of value, a dispositional analysis might well be accurate, if this necessary reference to possible value experiences is part of it. However, as Scheler emphasises, only on the background of a superficial phenomenological analysis does one fail to distinguish between value properties per se and the objects having these properties, the goods in Scheler's terminology (Scheler, 2007, p. 42). The things which can have beauty can vary with circumstances; that the value of beauty considered in its own right is aesthetically good and positive and that beauty is aesthetically better than ugliness is on the contrary examples of invariable evaluative features presupposed and tacitly referred to whenever something is actually held to be beautiful. Any determination of a thing of value, a good, makes reference to an experienced quality of value, in- or explicit.

A similar phenomenological critique applies to fitting attitude theories of value: As already emphasised, fitting attitude accounts describe value as constituted by normativity, the good as constituted by the ought; what is valuable, according to this analysis, is constituted by the attitude one ought to apply, or the attitude fitting the given situation which amounts to the same. However, to say that such relations to a given appropriate, correct, fitting, or reasonable attitude are constitutive of given value qualities – be it the tastiness of the coffee, the beauty of the sunset or the brutality of the violent action – is also to turn things on their head. Basically, when an attitude is experienced to be something one ought to adopt, reference to an experience of something of value is always presupposed. As Scheler formulates it in his *Formalismus* in his criticism of Brentano:

> Whenever one speaks of an ought, the comprehension of value must have occurred. Whenever we say that something ought to happen or ought to be, a relation between a positive value and a possible real bearer of this value, such as a thing, an event, etc., is co-intuited. That a deed 'ought' to be, presupposes that the 'ought' is grasped in the intention of the value of the deed [...] every ought has its foundation in a value (and not vice versa) [...] (Scheler, 2007, pp. 182-183)

The main phenomenological point against the fitting attitude account of value is that nothing can ever be given as fitting or appropriate if not presupposed as more or less valuable, positive or negative. Moreover, this relation between axiological and deontic phenomenal content is not merely a contingent one; it is a necessary structure of the formation of axiological meaning in experience: When we reconstruct the experienced formation of the ought we see that it cannot possibly occur without reference to something of value or disvalue. Nothing is possibly presented in experience as being reasonable, correct, or fitting to do without being co-presented as worthy of doing. Whether a moral or an aesthetic object presents itself as something requiring specific actions, the object must be co-given as something being positive or negative, of value or disvalue, at least tacitly or in the 'margin' of one's attentive experience. The axiologic-deontic relation is, in other words, a relation of meaning-constitution, a relation between possible givenness. Just like no disposition to have a particular attitude can be the foundation of any colour or value, no fitting or appropriate attitude can be fundamental to the analysis of value, since a phenomenal content of value is constitutive of the normative attitude, rather than the other way around.

Max Scheler expresses a connected point in his analysis of preference and the apprehension of relations of value (Scheler, 2007, p. 84). According to Scheler, the understanding of the fact that one value is higher or lower than another is originally given in what he calls an 'a priori preference'. The essential point of this concept is that there are necessary relations between certain evaluative phenomena always given prior to or tacitly in our particular empirical preferences of goods. Moreover, the apprehension of these relations between values, given the name 'a priori preference' by

Scheler, is constitutive of our empirical preferences of goods. To take a simple illustrating example: It does not make any sense for a human being to prefer disagreeableness to agreeableness, or ugliness to beauty as such, i.e. considered per se in abstraction from any broader context. On the contrary, we would assume that something was terribly wrong with a person always or generally having positive attitudes towards disagreeableness or ugliness if that case is even possible. The genetic-phenomenological point is that in its original mode of appearance, the act of distinguishing better from worse cannot be understood as an act of actively deciding or willing what to prefer: Instead, there is a distinct aspect of passivity and receptivity to its apprehension, since it is first and foremost an immediate presentation of relations of value taking place prior to any active choice of will (Engelsen, 2013; Husserl, 1988). This experienced presentation constitutes the necessary content founding the actual preferences, i.e. it is the meaning based on which any active empirical preference, decision, or wilful choice can be constituted.

This genetic-phenomenological point can be broadened to other evaluative attitudes as well. Higher-order axiologically laden attitudes are not formed in an experiential vacuum. They always form in and through experienced presentations of relations of value qualities: The value content, the value 'material', of evaluative attitudes, is always pre-given our empirically formed attitudes, be it evaluative preferences, desires, beliefs, emotions, or judgments. Such attitudes are axiologically laden and thus presuppose a pre-attitudinal grasp of value. Again, the essential point is: That which according to Brentano and others is supposed to account for values – i.e. normative attitudes – actually presuppose a more or less tacit reference to presented value material.

It is essential to the original mode of givenness of at least simple and 'primary' values (on which more complex values are construed) and their relations that they are experientially presented as independent of what we may believe, judge, desire, or prefer concerning them. This point holds even though such attitudes can function as essential ways of making values thematic objects of attention, and even though the attitude-founding presentation of value often occurs tacitly and pre-reflectively. Regardless of whether evaluative or deontic intentional states intend their objects as something to be actualised in the world or as something in the world to be correctly presented (i.e., regardless of their 'direction of fit') (Searle 2005), considered in the perspective of genetic phenomenology, they are higher-order acts of consciousness that take certain values and their relations to be part of their thematic object of attention. Whether we have to do with propositional desires of the form 'S desires that X' or propositional beliefs or judgments of the form 'S ought to do X', the phenomenal value quality of X is necessarily presupposed and part of the intentional object. In both cases, a value quality is part of the intentional object as something to be realised in the world. This, if anything, is the mark of the objective phenomenology of value: Value qualities are something given to and presupposed by evaluative and deontic propositional attitudes, not something constituted by them. That agreeableness per se is preferable to disagreeableness, and that beauty per se is desirable to ugliness, is precisely given in experience as independent of any intentional attitude taking these properties as their thematic object, i.e. entertaining an object to be agreeable, beautiful, and the like. This crucial point is inconsistent with any account of value that makes all value necessarily dependent on propositional attitudes, whether actual, idealised, or normative.

One possible line of reply for the proponent of a fitting attitude account of value is to deny that the phenomenology of value ultimately dictates our conclusions. However, I do not claim that how things appear should always be taken at face value; only that phenomenology establishes an explanandum for any theory. As long as the fitting attitude account cannot account for a core feature of many experiences of value – their attitude-independence – it fails to provide an adequate account. Another, and perhaps more promising, line of reply is to argue that the phenomenological analysis presented here is inadequate and insist that value is experienced as being dependent on normativity; our concepts of value make no sense without acknowledging their inherent normative features, and we can only understand the feature of 'oughtness' in relation to at least possible attitudes. I have no counter-response to this reply in this article, aside from the phenomenological analysis I present: Following Max Scheler and other phenomenologists, I take it that an 'oughtness' is indeed a constitutive feature of value. However, to pass the buck and make it the constitutive feature is to ignore the other side of the coin, as far as I can see. The phenomenological description should recognize that the axiological and deontic elements are, in fact, co-constitutive moments of the

experience of the intentional object of value. I have already mentioned the Gestalt-like nature of evaluative and normative experience, but a full exposition of this point exceeds the scope of this article. I have elaborated further on the original mode of presentation of value elsewhere (Engelsen, 2018).

It is worth to consider whether we should acknowledge that at least some of the more complex forms of value can be argued to be essentially attitude-dependent. For instance, some complex prudential values seem to be phenomenologically closely related to reflective attitudes. Consider this example: A person is forced to retire and experiences a loss of identity and meaning since her work life was very valuable to. However, after a period of reflection, she adapts to her new circumstances, recontextualises her priorities, and comes to see her new life to be better. One may argue that there is a necessary relation between her attitude of reflection and the complex prudential value of her new life circumstances. After all, without it, she would not have experienced the positive value of her new life and would still have experienced her retirement as unfavourable. However, one could also argue that this is only an epistemic condition, a way to bring the complex value of life into experience, not a necessary relation between the reflective attitude and the value itself; the overall positive value of her new circumstances was there to be recognized all along as a life possibility to be actualised. The details of this discussion exceed this article. In any case, I have not argued that all kinds of value are attitude-independent, merely that some are; this makes any account of value per se in terms of necessary relations to attitudes inadequate.

4. Overcoming value scepticism

The idea that attitudes constitute values, and the widely acknowledged scepticism about the very existence of values as represented by Mackie's queerness argument, might originate in part from a too-quick reconstructive analysis of some basic features of the experience of evaluation. The most promising way to counter the queerness argument is in my view to try and make intelligible a theoretical outlook on value realist premises which deflates the claim that values are mystical by de-mystifying the concept through careful phenomenological reconstruction. The attitude-dependent accounts of value that I have dealt with – ideal-typical versions of dispositionalism and fitting attitude theory – as well as proponents of value scepticism in various theoretical forms, may all be characterised by their lack of attentiveness to such very fundamental phenomenological distinctions and foundational relations. The following points echo some classic phenomenological distinctions, between acts and their objects and between higher- and lower-order phenomenal properties in hierarchical orders of constitution (cf., Husserl, 1966, 1999).

A first step in the demystification of value is, I think, to grant the point that simple values must have a necessary relation to phenomenal properties, that is, a necessary relation to at least a possible subjective first-personal experience. I think we can grant this essential point, i.e. that insofar as they exist, values seem to have a necessary relation to living conscious beings. Without sentient beings in the world, values would probably not exist. This point actually seems to be in perfect accordance with the phenomenology of value: The kind of objectivity we can sensibly attribute to values is not objectivity in the exact same sense as, for instance, physical objects. Their mode of being is just different. As phenomenologists have often emphasised, the constitution of meaning is an achievement which is distinctively different for each kind of object (Husserl, 1966). Value scepticists often mistakenly suppose that claiming the objectivity of values implies that the kind of objectivity meant is the exact same as what is meant when we refer to the objectivity of objects in physical nature. On such false premises, it is easy to get convinced that objectivity cannot be right with regards to values, and it can seem a logical step to become a value scepticist. The point is, however, that the fact that an object is dependent on consciousness or living beings for its existence does not necessarily imply that it is not objective in the relevant epistemic sense.

There can be objective truths and facts of the matter concerning objects which are nevertheless dependent on the domain of the ontologically subjective, i.e. the experiences of sentient beings (Klawonn 2004, Searle 2005). Simple conscious-immanent objects are clear cases in point. A person making a part of her own stream of experience a thematic object of attention – for instance, a person reflecting on her own stomach-ache all the while it appears – is a simple and clear example of something which exists as an intentional object that constitutes a fact of the matter in the relevant

epistemic sense, even though it depends for its existence on being experienced. For any attitude directed at the stomach-ache qua its phenomenal givenness, e.g. a judgment or a belief about it, there are conditions of satisfaction determined by the subject-matter at hand itself. The nature of the subject-matter is precisely objective in the sense of not being dependent for its features on the propositional attitudes taking it as an object. Its 'objectivity' has nothing to do with being an experience-transcendent object, but this does not cancel out the fact that it is a genuine intentional object with conditions of success determined by the subject matter itself and not our attitudes towards it. The example illustrates that, unless one is willing to deny the phenomenologically obvious, there is no queerness about such kind of objectivity as such. In such cases, it is precisely attitude-independence (rather than, e.g., conscious-independence or experience-transcendence) which constitutes the objectivity of the subject matter in question. Basically, attitudes presuppose consciousness, not vice versa; and a higher-order intentional evaluative attitude is distinguishable from its value object, even if the object is necessarily related to consciousness or lived-experience.

Much more needs to be said about the ontology of value. Nevertheless, the above points suffice to establish that a notion of objectivity as attitude-independence is viable even though a necessary relation to someone's experience (not necessarily the experience of the person evaluating) is granted. With this notion of objectivity, there is nothing mystical in recognising that values are objective in the sense of being genuine intentional objects to deal with (Scheler, 2007, p. 41). That there exist such value properties which in themselves give experiencing subjects motivating and normative reasons for acting in specific ways and for believing certain things, strikes many in the debate to be queer. However, from a non-speculative and phenomenologically sensitive perspective, we consider value qualities in their original mode of givenness rather than imposing upon them a kind of objectivity akin to physical objects. In that light, the charge of queerness strikes to be unwarranted: That something is normatively reason-giving is a perfectly normal feature of experience, and the world of lived-experience is as real as anything – and something which contains objective evaluative properties in the relevant attitude-inde pendent sense.

It should be emphasised that acknowledging attitude-independence as a core feature of at least many kinds of value is consistent with certain forms of dispositionalist and response-dependence accounts of value. One can argue that it is a feature of the phenomenology of value that primary values supervene on actual or possible states of mind of sentient beings. In other words, we can acknowledge that there are necessary relations between the formations of value meaning and certain kinds of mental states. Various thinkers in the phenomenological tradition have long argued for a necessary relation between emotions or feelings and the existence or the presentation of value properties, although it is not a trivial question how this relation is to be correctly understood (Drummond, 2008; Ferran, 2008; Husserl, 1988; Scheler, 2007; Engelsen 2018). It is perfectly compatible with the phenomenology of value to acknowledge that we ascribe value to things in virtue of their relations to how they are experienced, and this point amounts in itself to be an acknowledgement of a kind of dispositionalism about value. My coffee can be said to be black, even when no one is currently seeing it as such, but its disposition to be seen as black is a necessary feature of it. In the same way, my coffee has aesthetic value qualities, even if no one is currently drinking it, yet the disposition to be experienced as having certain aesthetic qualities might be constitutive of the qualities. It might be valuable in virtue of its disposition to be experienced as such. The problem arises if we reduce these states of mind which are co-constitutive of the value properties to be propositional or other higher-order attitudes. This reduction neglects the more robust attitude-independence of many kinds of value, which is a mark of their objectivity, and it neglects how such higher-order attitudes are necessarily formed through simpler value presentations.

5. Concluding remarks

Through a phenomenologically based critique, I have argued that at least some values and their relations are originally presented in experience as objective, in the sense that their nature is not given as contingent upon our attitudes. This analysis causes fundamental problems for ideal-typical versions of dispositionalist and fitting attitude accounts of value that intend to provide an account of the objectivity of values while maintaining a necessary relation between values and subjective attitudes.

Further, I have argued that much scepticism about value objectivity is based on a phenomenologically ungrounded notion of what counts as 'objective' in the domain of values. If we, following the phenomenology of value, denounce the idea that the objectivity of values has to do with values being objects transcending sentient experience, there is no ground for the scepticism. Instead, we can acknowledge the phenomenological point that values are genuine intentional objects that outline conditions of success for our evaluations. This point fits well with values being attitude-independent and is entirely consistent with acknowledging that values are dependent on (actual or possible) experience.

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SAVING CHURCHLAND'S ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM BY *INVOKING* NON-REDUCTIVE, CAUSAL MENTAL EVENTS

Abigail Klassen

Paul and Patricia Churchland's eliminative materialism (hereafter EM) considers folk psychology (hereafter FP) and other (presumably non-reductive) propositional mental events to be, or to be features of, radically false theories. As such, they will therefore be eliminated by what the Churchlands' project to be a descriptively complete neuroscience.[1] In what follows, I shall elucidate the Churchlands' position and respond to a few common criticisms lodged against EM. I do so by means of an examination of Paul Churchland's early paper, 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes' (hereafter EMPA), originally published in 1981. The decision to focus on what some might consider a rather dated publication will be defended in due course and the particular importance of this 1981 paper revealed.

The statements and predictions of EMPA were made nearly 40 years ago, and yet the main framework, principles, and predictions of the Churchlands' EM remain fundamentally unaltered.[2] While their collaborative and independent interests have changed with the times and tides, the basic tenets articulated in EMPA continue to form the backbone of EM. Consequently, EMPA remains the best source for a clear and concise expression of EM and its framework whether one wishes to challenge, attack, or champion EM. While Patricia Churchland's work remains relevant, accessible, and accessed,[3] it is the Churchlands' infamy and their supposedly laughable positions that motivate me to defend what, I suggest, are actually the simple, but fascinating consequences of EM. Moreover, there are, I propose, a number of surprising implications, interconnections, and even points of agreement between their work and those of other, perhaps unanticipated, philosophical thinkers.

In EMPA, Churchland[4] outlines EM's projections concerning the future of FP and its components – i.e., the propositional attitudes and the conception of rationality in which they feature. Although EM has been criticized on several grounds,[5] I shall restrict myself to what I regard as three important and

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[1] Herein, all references to Simon Smith in footnotes are from personal correspondence, July and August 2020. I thank Simon Smith for pointing out that that no such complete description can be achieved. Descriptive language always allows room for the 'possibility of vagueness' or for the porousness of language use. As Smith reminds me, Friedrich Waismann called this porousness *Porosität der Begriffe* or 'Open Texture'. More simply put by Smith, 'the empirical sciences do not admit of an End Date: Knowledge by experiment simply does not work like that.' See also Waismann F. 'Verifiability' in *The Theory of Meaning*, edited by G. H. R. Parkinson. (Oxford: OUP; 1968) 35-60; and Waismann F. 'The Resources of Language' in *The Importance of Language*, edited by Max Black. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall; 1962) 107-120.

[2] See, for example, Patricia Churchland's interviews and recorded presentations (2015-2020), most easily accessed from user 'Serious Science' on www.youtube.com.

[3] Mostly, I suspect, her views are relevant and accessed in a spirit of morbid curiosity, in the sense of 'What *is* Patricia Churchland up to these days anyway?'

[4] Unless otherwise specified by 'the Churchlands' or 'Patricia Churchland,' 'Churchland' refers to Paul Churchland. Use of the terms 'eliminative materialism' or 'EM', however, is a broader, if implicit, reference to both Paul and Patricia Churchland. This is because the thesis or project of eliminative materialism is shared between them, and often with no clear divergence or disagreement between them.

[5] One major criticism is that eliminative materialism is self-refuting. This is the criticism to which I attend within this paper. Another major criticism, coined the 'theory-theory' criticism or 'theory-theory' problem, pertains to and challenges the manner in which folk psychology is characterized by eliminative materialism. Following Wittgenstein, Ryle, and Dennett, contra eliminative materialism's characterization of folk psychology, folk psychology is not even a quasi-scientific theory. This is because some take the view that folk psychological attitudes are not best understood as discrete causes of behaviour, but rather, as akin to dispositional states that we utilize as heuristic stances toward others. Folk psychological attitudes are thus not candidates for elimination by any possible future findings of neuroscience.

interrelated issues. First, Churchland clearly believes that the empirical sciences[6] undermine the legitimacy of FP. Evidence supplied by the special sciences tells a different story, however. Disciplines such as social psychology, biopsychology, biogenetics, etc., suggest that Churchland is misguided in treating much that is current scientific hypothesis as buttressing the future status of EM's predictions. Second, it is both possible and plausible that, strictly speaking, nothing neurophysical or psychological picks out FP categories or non-reductive mental events. The reasons for a lack of one-to-one token-token or type-type correspondence will be examined below. At this point, it is enough to note that should it turn out to be the case that there exist no token-token or type-type correspondence between FP attitudes and brain states, this alone would not be sufficient to negate the epistemological and metaphysical legitimacy of FP categories or other 'free-floating' 'anomalous'[7] mental events. That is to say, FP phenomena may, nonetheless, possess explanatory power and do causal work in the special sciences, both social and empirical. Furthermore, and *contra* Churchland, the explanatory usefulness (and perhaps, so far, the ineliminability) of FP phenomena may be far from confirmatory, but it is prima facie evidence in favour of their metaphysical legitimacy.

These first and second issues I address aim to defend the epistemological and metaphysical ineliminability of FP and propositional attitudes within extant special sciences.[8] Nevertheless, my position on these two issues is not intended to serve the larger goal of undermining EM. To put the point differently, it is not my aim to provide independent grounds for rejecting the coherence or future possibility of EM's predictions. Rather, my defence of FP and propositional attitudes serves primarily to expound the complicated relations between FP and EM and, perhaps more interestingly, to demonstrate that should the thesis of EM be vindicated by some future neuroscience, then FP and its propositional attitudes will have played an ineliminable role in their own elimination.

The third of the interrelated issues I explore will be an attempt to defend EM by exploring what I take to be the strongest and most interesting argument against it, namely that it is self-refuting. I argue that if the EM project fails, it will not be because it is a self-refuting program. Instead, (i) I suggest that if EM fails, it will be because future scientific discoveries will deem the usefulness, as well as the explanatory and predictive power of what EM predicts the sciences to one day eliminate, to be, *contra* EM, 'scientifically respectable' – i.e., to be empirically legitimate events/processes.[9] To put the issue more simply: EM predicts that X will be eliminated. Suppose X is not, as a matter of fact, eliminated; therefore, EM would fail in its program. It *is* possible, of course, that what EM predicts to be eliminable may turn out to be ineliminable. Yet, whatever the future reveals, a project's abductive inferences being proven false in a time to come is not synonymous with a project's being self-refuting.[9] I note that this issue raises questions about the relationship between 'usefulness' and 'truth'. For instance, is it possible that EM might fail because its predictions are not useful, but EM is nevertheless true? While this is a serious question in need of further exploration, the question is beyond the scope of this paper.[10]

On a different but related note, and one which I think is far more interesting, I attempt to defend EM from the charge of self-refutation. I attempt to do so by underscoring that the success or failure of EM's projections about what future, 'neuroscientifically-informed' human-to-human communication might be like or which mental processes end up on a master list of what is considered 'neuroscientifically respectable,' is actually independent of EM's general metaphysical and epistemological framework. Contrary to misattributions and mischaracterizations of EM, neither Churchland in EMPA or Patricia Churchland in her most recent interviews concerning EM suggests

[6] It must be acknowledged that Churchland writes of 'the sciences' in far too imprecise a manner in EMPA. Unfortunately, however, this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.

[7] Here, my use of 'anomalous' is consistent with that of Donald Davidson's Anomalous Monism.

[8] Though I would perhaps also argue for such ineliminability in other descriptions/discourses, this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.

[9] Thank you to Simon Smith for pointing out, quite succinctly, that self-refutation is a matter of meaningfulness while predictions concern (putative) facts.

[10] Thank you to Simon Smith for pressing this question.

that FP attitudes or other mental categories/phenomena/events (to-be-refined or rejected by some future neuroscience) are *currently* causally inefficacious or *contemporarily* non-contentful. In other words, the Churchlands seem to be suggesting or implying that intending or act-ownership could be causally effective and meaningful today, but that this could change in the future, and also, that concepts or categories like 'intending' and 'act-ownership' might be causally effective and meaningful today, but may not be in the future. Indeed, in EMPA, Churchland implicitly acknowledges that *only* minds that currently use what EM deems to be apparently unsophisticated intentional, conscious capacities and modes of human-to-human communication (to be updated by some future neuroscience) can transform themselves into electing to move towards understanding how to begin to, and continue to think and communicate partially or maybe even solely, by means of EM-sanctioned states of mind and linguistic exchange. This process can only be undertaken through reason giving practices, which take the form of propositional exchanges, the very attitudes EM projects will, *one day*, be eliminated by us through means of propositional exchanges.

According to EM, propositional attitudes will be replaced by EM-sanctioned states/languages. In EMPA, Churchland entertains the possibilities of languages, which the Churchlands predict will supplant our current intentional, conscious cognitive processing and interpersonal communication. Hence, I argue along with, but in a manner different than Churchland himself, that (ii) if EM's predictions come true, FP attitudes will have played a starring role in future, neuroscientifically-updated human cognitive processing and human communication. It would seem that, in accordance with the implicit argument of EMPA, it is both human cognitive processing that will become 'neuroscientifically updated' and our *understanding of* human cognitive processing that will become 'neuroscientifically updated'. The first position seems to entail some quite radical alterations to how we behave and, as a corollary, what we are. The second may not have radical implications if future understanding does not lead to radical changes in our lived and practised cognitive processing. My argument is that the use of FP attitudes to one day usurp FP and propositional attitudes is not tantamount to a performative contradiction. Rather, it would be a performance of fancy mental footwork representative of a move on our part towards replacing FP attitudes with another or other forms of cognizing.

In EMPA, Churchland emphasizes that to argue for FP is to argue for an empirical *theory*. FP, as described by its defenders, ascribes to subjects propositional attitudes and presupposes laws or generalisations about those attitudes to explain and predict subjects' behaviour – for instance, *ceteris paribus*, (x) (y) ((x loves y)à(x does not wish y harm)).[11] According to Churchland, the structural features of the generalisations or laws of FP and the natural sciences are identical, the difference consisting only in the type of abstract entities involved – 'numbers in the case of mathematical physics and propositions in the case of psychology.'[12] He grants that FP is somewhat successful in explaining and predicting behaviour since we share a tacit understanding of 'the same integrated body of lore concerning the law-like relations holding among external circumstances, internal states, and overt behaviour.'[13] Churchland remains silent on the aetiology of this shared tacit understanding. The issue with FP, as Churchland frames it from 1981 forward, is how the ontology of FP is related to that of some future neuroscience, or to put his point differently, what 'future research will reveal about the

[11] Though the following challenge does not attack Churchland's position, but rather serves, in a way different than Churchland's manner, to cast doubt on the reliability/cogency of many taken for granted folk generalisations, I take the challenge posed by Simon Smith to be worth glossing in full. Contra the FP generalisation that, *ceteris paribus*, (x) (y) ((x loves y)→(x does not wish y harm)), 'people being what they are, it is perfectly possible and, I suspect, really rather commonplace to both love and hate the same person at the same time.' The generalisation that, *ceteris paribus*, (x) (y) ((x loves y)→(x does not wish y harm)) 'is a generalisation, but it is a generalisation designed to support a particular argument. It is also an idealisation, the sort we all agree *ought* to be true but quite possibly is not.'

[12] Paul Churchland. 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.' p. 71.

[13] Ibid. p 69.

intertheoretic status and integrity of folk psychology.'[14]

Unlike identity theorists, dualists, or functionalists, Churchland's brand of eliminativism argues that our ordinary FP categories will prove 'too confused and too defective' to remain scientifically respectable, and accordingly, will be eliminated and replaced with better entities in the course of intertheoretic reduction.[15] For Churchland, since coherence with the rest of the total body of knowledge[16] constitutes 'the final measure of any hypothesis,' FP will prove inconsistent when viewed alongside evolutionary theory, biology, and neuroscience.[17] It is worth noting here that it is unclear whether Churchland actually intends the 'total body of knowledge' to be tantamount to the findings of evolutionary theory, biology, and neuroscience. In any case, Churchland underscores that there is much that FP has not explained like sleep and 'the faculty of creative imagination,' for instance, and hence, he characterizes FP as, at best, a highly superficial theory 'only negligibly better at explaining human behaviour in its terms than was Sophocles.'[18] Churchland, in other words, is sceptical of the notion that rationality in particular, but also a host of other cognitive states (and many other non-EM champions also agree), is exhausted in the form or at the level of propositional attitudes. Language, for instance, is a 'peripheral activity,' learned and used 'by a brain already capable of vigorous cognitive activity that evolution has shaped for a great many functions, language use being only the very latest.'[19]

In EMPA and post-EMPA, the Churchlands seem to think that FP, and by extension, any purportedly 'causally efficacious and non-reductive' proposals of mental events, must be transcended and a more 'serious' study by means of neuroscientific investigation must commence. Churchland's speculations concerning what a neuroscientifically-informed picture of cognition might be like in EMPA are aimed to 'break the grip on our imagination' held by the hang ups of neuroscientists and philosophers of mind on FP, as well as on any other supposedly causally efficacious, but

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[14] Ibid. p. 72.

[15] Churchland. p 72. Thank you to Simon Smith for raising the plausible question of what or who is at stake here. To put the point differently, one might press Churchland with the following questions. Is he claiming that the sciences, and specifically neurosciences, will have to give up FP talk? Alternatively, is he claiming that we all have to give up FP talk (and use)? In the latter case, Churchland would be, perhaps implausibly, suggesting that giving up talk of FP in the neurosciences should and could regulate the use and development of human language and cognition writ large.

[16] Once again, thank you to Simon Smith for acknowledging an ambiguity in Churchland's use of the term 'knowledge' here. As Smith argues, if by 'knowledge,' Churchland means 'science,' then it seems that quite a lot of knowledge might have to be left out as 'incoherent'. If it means something like 'all the knowledge we have as a species,' then it is not obvious that the 'total body of knowledge' really coheres very much at all.

[17] Churchland. p. 73.

[18] Ibid. p. 74.

[19] Ibid. p. 83. Thank you to Simon Smith for the following insight, which is worth quoting in full, as it lodges a strong objection against the eliminative materialist program. 'We are not just talking about a brain, however well it is allegedly evolved, but a particular kind of creature, which we might, for want of a better word, call a 'person' or a 'human'. That is to say, the reduction by eliminative materialists of persons or humans to brains appears to have already taken place right here, since, presumably those who favour folk psychology also assert a conception of persons as being, in some sense, *more* than an evolutionarily shaped brain. That is, one might fairly make the case that language use – more properly, symbol use – is at least part of what makes us human and conscious in the special sense that we appear to be (i.e. in a way different to non-human animals). However, if we are to start by describing language use as a 'peripheral activity' and therefore, presumably not an essential one, then we have done the work of eliminative materialism before we have even got started.'

non-physically reductive processes of the mind.[20] Entertaining, for example, the possibility that human cognition will mesh with evolutionary biology and non-equilibrium thermodynamics, Churchland notes that we might one day ascribe cognitive states 'as figurative solids within a four- or five-dimensional phase space' with laws governing those states' internal relationality, motion, and change, as well as their relations to the system's sensory and motor transducers.[21] On such an account, propositions to which speakers would give assent represent *but one-dimension* of the internal economy and thus fail to represent 'reality in *all* its kinematically, dynamically, and even normatively relevant respects.'[22]

EM does not seem to seek to eliminate, or necessarily think it possible, to eliminate meaning or intentionality from cognition, but rather, appears to aim to emphasize that FP attitudes are but one manner in which to cognize and by which to communicate, and are, moreover, likely replaceable by more effective languages.[23] Churchland's claim in EMPA is that any future neuroscientifically updated, and thus respectable, generalisations and normativity would need to be defined, not over the propositions of FP, but 'over different and much more complex kinematical states and configurations.'[24] A host of other possible scientifically updated transformations are perhaps possible. I note, of course, that the only things we might know to be possible at present are those things that are actual. This is to say that the things which really exist (in whatever sense) are the only things we *know* to be possible existents. In the context of the philosophy of mind today, the status of the actual is itself far from settled. While the Churchlands are indeed proposing 'neuroscientifically-informed' forms of human cognition and language that are not yet actual or do not seem to be forms of cognition or language which exist (or are perhaps meaningful) in the present, it follows, strictly speaking, the we cannot know whether the Churchlands' proposal concerning language are possible, but nor can we know that they are impossible. Only the future might vindicate or damn the current proposals of EM or any other theory postulated in the philosophy of mind.[25]

One need not advocate for EM to argue that, in attempting to uncover human cognitive architecture (i.e., true propositions about the philosophy of mind), especially relating to behavioural explanation and prediction, propositional attitude ascription alone is too narrow to capture the totality of minds' and a given person's practices and internal mental processes. It seems we do more than attribute mental states *qua* propositional attitudes to others to explain or predict their behaviour. For instance, we may attribute personality traits such as being lazy, selfish, and so on.[26] This is to say that people are usually more than a collection or a series or sequence of propositional attitudes. We also ascribe to others such attributes as character, motive, history, aspiration, etc.[27] Of course, FP does not and need not claim to have 'the theoretical purpose of describing the ultimate nature of human psychological organization' as a goal in order to retain metaphysical, and less contentiously, epistemic

[20] Churchland. p. 84.

[21] Ibid. pp. 84-85.

[22] Ibid. p. 85. My italics added for emphasis.

[23] Simon Smith notes the following: 'This is a much more subtle view, I think, than we usually get in these kinds of discussions. Whether that is the nature of academic debate or because one or both sides prefer to caricature […,] I do not really know. However, it is really very obvious that this is the sort of thing our species has been doing all along. For example, although we *can* still describe the world in terms of spirits and small gods, the Romans' *lares* and *penates*, very few people would take such descriptions literally. It is entirely possible that folk psychological talk will go the same way and it doesn't seem unreasonable to suggest it.'

[24] Churchland. p. 85.

[25] It is worth noting that in the philosophy of mind, simulation theory postulates that nothing can determine, once and for all, the ultimate truth about the metaphysics and epistemology of the mind.

[26] Kristin Andrews. 'It's in Your Nature: A Pluralist Folk Psychology.' p. 26.

[27] Thank you to Simon Smith for reminding me of this important point.

legitimacy.[28] This is because FP may have the important practical epistemic goal of explaining, describing, and predicting (at least approximately) human behaviour.

Novel theoretical considerations or musings need not trump practical concerns. For elucidation of this point, suppose I am a FP proponent (as a theorist and/or an everyday user of FP attitudes). What am I trying to do with FP attitudes? Am I attempting to capture and present a cogent theory of the philosophy of mind? Am I attempting to diagnose a person's psychological difficulties? Am I attempting to decide on an appropriate gift for my wife? These questions might seem to point to a difficulty in the EM project, namely the implication that EM and FP do the same job(s) and that, therefore, FP can be replaced by EM. However, it is not entirely clear, perhaps, that this is plausible. FP appears to have a wider and, often, more practical and ordinary range of applications than EM. If so, and on such grounds, the elimination of FP may be argued to be inappropriate.[29] However, Churchland emphasizes that it is not inconceivable that some and eventually all of the population might become familiar with 'the new [i.e., non-FP reliant, non-propositional] vocabulary,' giving the new, EM mode of cognition and language currency, and, in turn, gradually reducing or even eventually banishing FP's ontology and epistemology entirely.[30] The Churchlands are not arguing that the ways in which we have thought and talked about the human mind for millennia will turn out to be wholly at odds with whatever really explains the way the mind works. If this were their position, they would have a hard time explaining why, so far, modes of human cognition have proved successful (i.e., we manage to communicate between one another, have produced amazing artefacts, have seemingly made progress in the sciences, etc.). But this is not their position. Rather, the Churchlands are suggesting that human cognition and language might be *transformed* and *improved*.

In EMPA, Churchland anticipates objections to his program's predictions, framework, and assumptions. He also considers the existence of competing programs and their relative respectability despite their reliance on FP. One attempt to defend EM undertaken by Churchland is thus to underscore what he takes to be the shortcomings of a very popular competing program, namely functionalism. Since it is a real possibility that heterogeneous physical bases give rise to states occupying the same functional role (i.e., pain, goal-directedness, empathy, etc.), the functionalist argues that one cannot eliminate functional characterizations since they are individuated, not at the level of neural instantiation, but at a 'higher level,' namely, the level of functionality. Churchland's complaint in EMPA is that functionalism defines itself in such a way as to make it impossible for empirical evidence to ever impinge upon functionalism's territory, therefore, *by fiat*, preserving the legitimacy of ordinary FP categories.[31] According to Churchland, the irreducibility of intentional idioms is not sufficient reason to celebrate their *bona fide* 'functional' status or the '*sui generis*' nature of FP. This is because to suggest that it *is* sufficient is to beg the question and presuppose that it *is* the 'intentional idioms of FP… that express the important features shared by all cognitive systems' and so, also to presuppose that if the language of a future, more 'enlightened' neuroscience fails to conform to functionalism's or to FP's dictates, then so much the worse for neuroscience.[32] A proponent of EM argues that one could just as well eliminate functional characterizations and all of FP itself for failing to correspond to any real (read: physical) kinds or syntactic processes.

In response to Churchland, while it is indeed possible that nothing neurophysical or even psychological plays the single role of say, fear, as outlined by FP,[33] it does not follow that the psychological category of fear should therefore be eliminated. One might suggest instead, for instance, that this recognition simply calls for 'finer-grained distinctions among different types of

[28] Barbara Hannan. 'Don't Stop Believing: The Case Against Eliminative Materialism.' p. 170.

[29] I thank Simon Smith for the spirit and letter of this objection.

[30] Churchland. p. 86.

[31] Ibid. p. 78.

[32] Ibid. p. 82.

[33] Muhammad Ali Khalidi. 'Against Functional Reduction in Cognitive Science.' p. 326.

fear.'[34] To drop the category altogether would irresponsibly ignore the similarities that different kinds of fear have in common.[35] And, as the biologist or social scientist might claim, generalisations about fear (understood as a broad category encompassing fear1, fear2, and so on) may have explanatory value and feature in causal explanations in larger useful and predictively respectable theories regardless of the category's metaphysical status.[36] In other words, even if a psychological category corresponds to nothing particular at a psychological level (never mind at a neurophysical level), elaboration of finer-grained distinctions among psychological categories may contribute to the sophistication of our explanatory and predictive practices as opposed to serving as a reason to eliminate the category entirely.

Similarly, Churchland argues throughout EMPA that evolutionary theory serves to vindicate the legitimacy of EM and points to the incoherence of FP and causally efficacious non-reductive or emergent mental states. However, the basic theory of evolution as described by Darwin and especially its various modern branches (evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, etc.) may actually serve to undermine the case for EM. Take one example from evolutionary biology: When complex systems are at issue, it seems some problems cannot be 'got around even by spectacular breakthroughs in more basic sciences.'[37] Some facts about sickle cell anaemia, for instance, cannot be reduced to the laws of chemistry, since while it is true that 'normal parents produce abnormal offspring because they reproduce sexually,' one cannot recast this claim in purely chemical language.[38] Some properties and causal processes are capturable *only* at a 'higher level' of description.

Turning to a different theme, Churchland points out that FP is sometimes defended on the grounds that it is not an empirical theory, or less strongly, is not refutable by empirical considerations and hence, cannot or ought not 'be transcended in the fashion of a defunct empirical theory.'[39] Characterised by normativity, FP characterises 'an *ideal*, or at least praiseworthy mode of internal activity' that explains in what the having of propositional attitudes consists and 'what it is to be rational in their administration.'[40] In other words, FP presupposes what human rationality amounts to using the language and framework of FP. Insulating itself by recourse to the terms it has already set out in the language and framework of FP (what it means to count as rational, for instance), it is insulated from external (non-FP theoretical) criticism. Churchland argues that the regularities attended to by FP are 'predicated on certain logical relations among propositions is not by itself grounds for claiming anything essentially normative about FP' since otherwise, one might as well say that the classical gas law is normative in the sense of being praiseworthy.[41] In other words, 'logical relations between propositions are as much an objective matter of abstract fact as are arithmetical relations between numbers;' the normative dimension of FP only seems to capture the sense that *we*, current users and holders of FP attitudes, happen to value the logical relations between propositions (because we are current users and holders of FP attitudes).[42]

For Churchland, the logical relations between propositions are merely constitutive of our non-ideal conception of rationality – none of us even has any notion of what *bone fide* rationality amounts to since we are, on his view, epistemically stuck, quite literally, in our heads and their processes and

[34] Ibid. p. 328.

[35] Ibid. p. 329.

[36] Ibid. p. 331.

[37] Patricia Kitcher. 'In Defense of Intentional Psychology.' p. 107.

[38] Ibid. p. 103. As Simon Smith reminds me, the logical positivists had the same problem when they tried to translate talk about objects into sense data reports.

[39] Churchland. p. 76.

[40] Ibid. My italics added for emphasis.

[41] Ibid. p. 82.

[42] Ibid.

with the results of data that can only be interpreted by our heads and their processes.[43] Here, one might object that it is not heads and processes that interpret things, but rather *people* that do. Interpretation undertaken by people requires a whole social, cultural and physical context. Moreover, knowledge (if we have any) is a function of our interactions with the world. Knowledge acquisition and analysis is a social activity insofar as all the tools we use are internalised forms of external dialogue. Knowledge acquisition and analysis take place in communities. Indeed, the very writing of this paper is evidence that one's knowledge or beliefs need not remain in one's head. The writing of this paper has made my thoughts public.[44]

Still, we have arrived at perhaps no more than an epistemic and metaphysical cul-de-sac. With no view from nowhere from which to determine how to proceed in philosophy of mind, philosophy of mind seems nothing more than a philosopher's game. Being unable to do anything other than play the game, however, I suggest that what is particularly fascinating about EM is that it, in principle, provides a way out of the cul-de-sac (even if not out of the status of a 'mere' philosopher's game). The implicit ladder out of the cul-de-sac is Wittgensteinian in style and is specifically *Tractatus*-like in spirit. Furthermore, the ladder out, relates, I think, to the misunderstanding that EM is self-undermining or even self-refuting. Thus, let us turn now to the issue of the supposed self-contradiction that is often argued to be the very articulation of EM.

Churchland takes the most pressing objection against EM to be that it is self-refuting. If it is pressing, it is also common. Specifically, the objection, as Churchland states it, is that EM can only be expressed as a belief, or as an account or theory, which is *intended* to be communicated and *understood*, and 'damningly,' *using* knowledge of grammar and natural language.[45] Churchland articulates the charge as follows:

> If the statement of [EM] is true, then there are no such states to express. The statement at issue would then be a meaningless string of marks or noises. It would therefore not be true. Therefore it is not true. Q.E.D.[46]

Churchland responds that such a *reductio* simply assumes a particular theory of meaning, begging the question of the legitimacy of FP over EM.[47] Here, one might add that whatever theory of meaning we adopt, we still must contend with which theory of action, too, is intended or in play since on some theories, all statements do, or intend to do, something. To cash out Churchland's own response to the initial objection, however, he analogises the *reductio* to the seventeenth century debate about the existence of vital spirits. If the anti-vitalist argued that vital spirits did not exist, his claim was taken to be self-refuting since if his claim is true, then he must be dead and, hence, his claim is not meaningful.[48] Churchland's argument is that the propositional attitudes, like vital spirits, are not a priori insulated from empirical considerations; their transcendence is both possible and representative of a very interesting theoretical displacement.[49] But this quick analogy on Churchland's part fails to really engage with the objection.

Jürgen Habermas' long-standing concern with the participant's perspective, the perspective from which the exchange of reasons *qua* propositional attitudes takes place in scientific inquiry, adds an interesting twist to the question of whether EM is self-refuting. Contrary to popular opinion, Habermas' program is not one which recommends the philosophically unsatisfying position of only a

[43] Ibid. p. 83.

[44] Thank you to Simon Smith for offering these important insights.

[45] Churchland. p. 89.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid. pp. 89-90.

[49] Ibid. p. 90.

mutual non-aggression pact between neuroscience and FP, non-reductive, or other 'emergent' and yet purportedly casually efficacious brain states. Such a mutual aggression pact would hold that FP and EM continue to operate in different discourses or that they can both have explanatory value within the same discourse. Instead, as is most clearly articulated in *Between Naturalism and Religion* (2008), Habermas, much like John McDowell, recommends that what qualifies as 'natural' be extended from the grip of scientistic standards, which as we shall see, amounts to a philosophically and scientifically responsible position. Let us be clear, however: This Habermasian insight does *not* refute EM, but, perhaps surprisingly, elaborates on what can be said about the intimate connection between EM and status of propositional attitudes even if, in the end, *we* (theorists of cognitive science, neuroscience, or the philosophy of mind and/or everyday people) eliminate the latter.

À la Habermas, our practices, such as our use of FP, are at once contingent in the sense that they arose out of the natural evolution of the human species and also, in a weak sense, are transcendentally necessary – this is to say that they have, *thus far*, been unavoidable. In 'The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will' (2007), Habermas claims that, with respect to the project of scientific inquiry itself, sociality (the participant's perspective) and the game of giving and asking for reasons in the form of the exchange of propositional attitudes with meaningful content cannot be, or to state the point more weakly, has *thus far* not been avoided. Habermas does not therefore present a rigorous challenge against EM's program. Rather, his program seems to complement EM's projections insofar as Habermas' position does not argue, and is not intended to present arguments against, EM or against any other possible theory or future modes of human cognizing/forms of language that might come to emerge in time. Before attempting to save the, in principle, viability of EM's project via Habermasian insights, let me first, in a slightly different way than Churchland presents the *reductio* against his own position, put forth against EM a roughly Habermasian-spirited charge of engagement in self-refutation. While this charge is indeed a charge, it is admittedly weak, and later, I will ultimately seek, not to undermine the Habermasian-themed objection so much as turn the objection on its head to reveal how what initially seems like an objection can indeed also act as a buttress for EM's project and perhaps even as a condition of EM's success.

To reiterate, EM is a theory that aligns itself, as EMPA repeatedly proclaims, with 'the results of scientific inquiry' and is a project that seeks to undermine FP attitudes. Using Habermas' emphasis on the transcendental ineliminability of the participant's perspective in the process of scientific inquiry, I will now elucidate the manner in which EM is involved in a performative contradiction.

Let us examine this new performative contradiction carefully. First, à la Habermas, scientific inquiry is conducted by means of cooperative effort in which the exchange of reasons, in the form of propositional attitudes, has currency. Second, '[r]eality is not exhausted by the totality of scientific statements that count as true according to current empirical scientific standards.'[50] Reality's reach extends from the physical to the symbolic, whether the latter be reducible to the physical or not, since both are part of, and arose out of, nature. A full account of nature must include explanations regarding everything from 'how the elephant got its trunk… [to] how the West got particle physics.'[51] Echoing Robert Brandom's program, reasons are inferential and criticisable: They are amenable to evaluation from other reasons. Even our decision to count certain things as laws is dependent on *our* non-strictly nomological reason-giving practices. The reasons we give in the form of natural language are causally efficacious insofar as anyone who understands or aims to understand or evaluate a reason was caused to initiate attempting to understand or evaluate the reason by the actions of another. Turning to Quinean scientific confirmation, the degree of confirmation assigned to any hypothesis is sensitive to the properties of the entire body of knowledge and confirmation is isotropic. When abduction or theory acceptance occurs in science – or any other form of enquiry – it requires a *community* of thinkers to consider the empirical evidence, i.e., a community that engages in the exchange of contentful reasons (in the form of propositional language) about how best to explain it. Hence, it seems that EM utilizes contentful statements (*intended* to be understood), but also that the findings of

[50] Jürgen Habermas. *Between Naturalism and Religion*. p. 153.

[51] Richard Rorty. 'The Very Idea of Human Answerability to the World: John McDowell's Version of Empiricism.' p. 152.

the sciences to which EM points as evidence for FP's banishment require, for now, the exchange of casually efficacious propositional attitudes or mental states to be formulated and their findings to be discovered or accepted. To put the point differently and to repeat a claim made earlier in this paper: Knowledge acquisition and analysis is a social activity insofar as many or maybe even all of the tools we use are internalised forms of external dialogue. Knowledge acquisition and analysis take place in communities. If EM is to be vindicated, this would require the practice of giving and asking of reasons between thinkers, which, at least initially, would be conducted in the form of propositional attitude exchange.

The first horn of the problem, specifically, that EM itself utilizes contentful statements (*intended* to be understood), does not pose a strong challenge to EM. One might object here that the Churchlands' counter that 'EM may not seem plausible or make good sense now, but one day it might' is itself a weak position, but whether or not their position is weak is not my main interest. My interests are, rather, to show that EM can avoid the charge of self-refutation and, moreover, that other programs (such as that of Habermas) complement and bolster EM's ability to avoid the charge. The Churchlands only *predict* the eliminability of FP; they do not dismiss the current existence, use, or necessity of FP and propositional attitudes in our current cognitive processes. The second horn – the ineliminability of FP from current scientific practice[52] – presents a more serious challenge to the Churchlands. In EMPA, Churchland is entirely silent upon the current ineliminability of FP and the exchange of propositional attitudes between thinkers within the practice of science itself. Since his program relies heavily on the results of scientific inquiry – current and especially future – this oversight, is more damning.

To flesh out this last problem EM faces, let us turn to an exchange between Habermas and John R. Searle in their respective papers, 'The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will: How can epistemological dualism be reconciled with ontological monism?' (2007) and 'Neuroscience, Intentionality and Free Will: Reply to Habermas' (2008). In this exchange, Searle seeks to counter the Habermasian characterization of the seeming cannot-be-gotten-aroundness, at least for the time being, of human propositional attitudes. In this context, Searle writes, 'on our little planet, there exists intentional and conscious beings that have created meanings and these beasts investigate nature and have stances toward it,' but the stances generally do not affect the things they are stances toward.[53] As Searle continues, 'the fact that a view is always from somewhere implies nothing about the reality [a reality which, *ex hypothesi*, is epistemically always out of reach] that is always viewed from somewhere.'[54] He argues that 'this confusion of epistemology and ontology... is... very much a part of the phenomenological tradition.'[55] However, contra Searle, the fact that a view is always from somewhere does say something about 'the reality that is viewed from somewhere.' It says something about the experience of human beings who are themselves part of nature, who, incapable of taking a view from nowhere, notice that the situatedness of perspectives is something that cannot be got around. It is *as* human beings 'situated in the world and capable of speech and action… [that we] seek out, from within the horizon of our own lifeworld, the best possible cognitive access to the objective world.'[56]

Contemporary scientism counts as real and as explanatorily necessary only that, which is entirely subject to strict micro-physical causal relations. However, accommodation in nature must be found for, and a full metaphysical account of all that exists must include, scientific and even scientistic practice, where even in the latter case, reasons and meaningful statements made to articulate the very positions, *so far*, take the form of propositional attitudes. Scientism seeks to reduce that which is

[52] Or, as Simon Smith aptly reminds me, as Austin Marsden Farrer put the point in his 'Gifford Lectures' (1958), 'meaning governs the formation of discourse.'

[53] Searle. 'Neuroscience, Intentionality and Free Will: Reply to Habermas.' p. 74.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Habermas. 'The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will: How can epistemological dualism be reconciled with ontological monism?' pp. 34-35.

'natural' or 'real' to whatever meets the criterion/criteria of neural or physical reduction. Certainly, human beings are shaped by causes, but they are also shaped by symbolic relations. As McDowell refers to this state of the being of human beings in *Mind and World* (1994), this is a 'second nature,' which is part of the natural evolution of our species. As many personalists have been stressing for hundreds of years, human beings are socialized into being agents with propositional attitudes. In this sense, while FP may indeed be a contingent practice and a social construction (perhaps to be updated or even supplanted by future conscious or unconscious cognitive mental habits/processes), this is not tantamount to declaring FP or FP attitudes as epistemically void or illusory. One must recall that Churchland himself holds the position that, currently, FP is *one* dimension of the totality of what is going on inside our heads, though he fails to emphasize that propositional exchange is a large component of human-to-human communication in scientific and non-scientific contexts alike. Perhaps time and tide will reveal that paying attention to the other dimensions and/or creating new dimensions (at the expense of FP) is a better, i.e., a more cognitively virtuous course of action.

As Searle argues, there is 'no problem in general in proceeding on the basis of a presupposition which, in the end, the investigation proves to be false.'[57] Using this principle, one also finds an argument to save Churchland from the charge of committing a performative contradiction. Whether or not Churchland's predictions about the fate of FP and propositional attitudes turn out to be accurate, Churchland has no other option in the here and now but to *use* propositional attitudes to argue that a *replacement* of FP with a better theory is possible. Just as Wittgenstein claims in 6.54 of *The Tractatus* that anyone who understands his propositions must use them as steps to climb up the ladder and then throw the ladder away, if EM's projections are true, then, ironically and in a fascinating manner, FP and the use of propositional attitudes and language will have played a starring role in the demise of FP and propositional attitudes. FP and propositional attitudes will also have played a starring role in developing new and better 'neuroscientifically-informed,' EM-approved language(s) and new inner mental states/conscious/unconscious processes.

This is all to say that, perhaps one day, there will be a story that begins with 'once upon a time, our ancestors became bipedal and got bigger brains.' If EM is correct, the story will then continue with a chapter in humans' evolutionary history devoted to describing a time when humans used FP, and its propositional attitudes, as well experienced non-reductive mental events (if there are any). The story might then continue: Because the stances of people *can* affect some of the things that they are about (including people's own modes of cognitive and linguistic processing) and because perhaps non-reductive mental events (if there are any) such as FP's propositional attitudes are causally efficacious (whether or not they are non-reductive), humans willingly and intentionally eliminated from their cognitive abilities both FP and other purportedly non-reductive categories. Moreover, they did so by using those very categories in favour of transforming their mental processes, mental 'inner' experience, and language into something else. The question of why humans would willingly do this remains an open one, but my interest does not lay in attempting to provide reasons or motivations for such a move. I have aimed only to defend EM, in a manner different from what has so far been offered in extant literature, from the charge of self-refutation.

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ARE PSYCHOPATHS MORALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HARM THEY CAUSE?

Jane Kisbey

Abstract
There is controversy in the philosophical literature about whether psychopaths have moral responsibility. Prima facie, psychopaths are morally responsible for the harm they cause. This is the shared consensus of the lay public and is indeed the position of some in the debate (See, for example, Godman & Jefferson: 2017, Pickard: 2011 and Greenspan: 2003). However, many participants in the debate are sceptical of the psychopath's moral responsibility. Some argue that because psychopaths lack moral knowledge they are not responsible, and others argue that because they lack impulse control they are not responsible (See, for example, Levy: 2007, Duff: 2010 and Gillett: 2010). In this paper, I argue that the psychopath is not morally responsible. My argument is to say that impulsiveness and deficits in moral understanding cannot be separated, and these together are sufficient to excuse the psychopath from moral responsibility. The account that I give is similar in many respects to the account given by Levy (2014), and I will draw upon some of what he says to substantiate my account. The structure of this paper is as follows: In section 1, I outline psychopathy and the cluster of characteristics which are used to diagnose the disorder. In section 2, I consider the relevant conditions for moral responsibility. Finally, in section 3. I conclude that psychopaths are not morally responsible for their actions.

Keywords:
Psychopathy, Future discounting, Impulsiveness, Empathy, Moral responsibility.

1. **Psychopathy**

1.1: Diagnosing psychopathy

Psychopaths have a specific cognitive and emotional profile which is captured by the diagnostic criteria. One diagnostic test is 'The Psychopathy Checklist' (See Hare, 1999: 34). This measures pathological personality traits and antisocial behaviour. According to this checklist, psychopaths have the following kinds of personality traits: They tend to exhibit superficial charm, they are egocentric and grandiose, they are deceitful and manipulative, they are impulsive, they are prone to boredom, they lack remorse or guilt, they lack empathy, they have shallow emotions and they engage in adult antisocial behaviour (Hare, 1999: 34).

The *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, Fifth Edition (DSM-5) does not use the psychopathy diagnosis. However, most psychopathy researchers think that psychopathy is a subtype of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) i.e., some people with psychopathy also meet the ASPD diagnosis. ASPD is a cluster B-type personality disorder, and is characterised by specific deficiencies in personality functioning and pathological personality traits. Psychopathy and ASPD overlap considerably because the disorders share many of the same characteristics. The DSM-5 states that psychopathy is closely tied to ASPD as follows:

> The essential feature of antisocial personality disorder is a persuasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others that begins in childhood or early adolescence and continues into adulthood. This pattern has also been referred to as psychopathy, sociopathy, and dissocial personality disorder (APA, 2013: 659).

ASPD has a number of different characteristics such as being egocentric, failing to conform to norms, having self-gratifying aims, having a lack of empathy, lacking guilt or remorse, being incapable of intimacy, exploiting others, and being deceitful, manipulative, callous, impulsive, and prone to boredom (See, American Psychiatric Association: 2013).

However, the two aspects of psychopaths that I think are central in the debate about responsibility (and so the ones I will focus on) are impulsiveness and a lack of empathy. As such, the question as I will deal with it in this paper is: Are those who are incapable of impulse control and incapable of empathy morally responsible for the harm they cause? I will be arguing that these two features of psychopaths in fact stem from the same underlying key problem. In fact, the guiding hypothesis in this paper will be that we can best understand psychopaths if we view them as living in the moment and being incapable of caring about their future selves and others. I will argue that all of their behavioural symptoms follow from this. The hypothesis is that psychopaths are extreme future discounters, in the sense that they count only their current interests as being important and entirely discount their future interests. To a certain degree it is rational to future discount because there is uncertainty about the future, but to future discount too much is irrational. For an explanation on future discounting (See, Broome: 1994).

1.1.2: In what way do psychopaths lack lmpulse control?

One reason why people may experience problems with impulse control is because they just have extremely strong, hard to resist impulses. This is where one gets a growing urge to do something, struggles to resist the impulse inside them, enjoys performing the action and is relieved once the action has been performed. Impulsive acts in this sense may trigger guilt. Those who lack impulse control in this sense include, for example, Kleptomaniacs. However, psychopaths do not lack impulse control in this way. Instead they fail to have any countervailing desires that prevent them from acting upon their current desires. To illustrate this, consider a quote from Cleckley:

> She did not seem to be activated by any 'compulsive' desire emerging against a struggle to resist. On the contrary, she proceeded calmly and casually in these acts. She experienced no great thrill or consummation in a theft nor found in it relief from uncomfortable stress (Cleckley, 2015: 69).

It is in this sense that the psychopath is impulsive, not like the kleptomaniac who fails to overcome an impulse. To a certain extent, we all suffer from a lack of impulse control in this sense. For example, consider what happens when one wishes to fulfil a relatively trivial desire (e.g. the desire to make a cup of tea). It is not as if an urge builds up inside, and it is not as if one feels any countervailing desires that one has to struggle against under normal circumstances. The desire arises and one gets up and goes to make the cup of tea. It is only when we have more problematic desires (e.g. a desire to steal or desires which are against our own long-term self-interest), that the countervailing desires come in to prevent us. So, psychopaths lack impulse control in the sense that they fail have any countervailing desires arise, no matter how problematic their current desires are.

Psychopaths live in their present (i.e. it is only their own current feelings that matter to them). If they are in a situation where they immediately feel discomfort then they will want out of it. For example, Cleckley describes the case of 'Max' who was perfectly happy in a psychiatric hospital for a couple of weeks and then once he got bored, he immediately thought "I do not want to be here", and then started to plan to get out (Cleckley, 2015: 47-66). There was a sense here in which Max cared about his future self in this case, but only because this impacted upon his current self. I think there is a link here with criminal recidivism, which is typical for psychopaths (See, Campbell et al: 2006). My hypothesis is that upon getting out of prison or psychiatric facilities, psychopaths immediately go straight back into their criminal behaviours because the fact that they got out satisfied them. As such, I think it's plausible that in that moment, because they are no longer inside anymore, they no longer care. Psychopaths plan can short-term because to go through with the plan is itself what they want in the moment, (e.g. they might have an urge to be nasty to someone but stop themselves because they know if they are nice to them they will be able to manipulate them). Nonetheless they may have difficulty following plans because psychopaths can plan only when based upon what they now want. That is to say so long as they keep wanting something, they will execute a plan to get that thing. But as soon as they no longer want that

thing, they will abandon the plan.

Levy (2014) makes a similar point. He argues that psychopaths do not have even their own self-interest at heart in the sense that they will do something that seems immediately gratifying but bad for themselves in the long-term. I agree with Levy because psychopaths do seem to do what they want in the moment, irrespective of whether it harms them in the long-term which suggests impaired impulse control.

1.3: In what way do psychopaths lack empathy?

Psychopaths understand people's emotions to the extent that they can manipulate them. For example, psychopaths have the ability to play people, and are capable of realising and exploiting people's emotional weaknesses and insecurities. There is a sense in which in order for someone to be a good con artist, they must have some idea or understanding of what other people's buttons are otherwise they cannot push them, and psychopaths can read emotions to this extent (See, Shoemaker: 2011). However, there is data in the literature which is used as evidence to suggest there is a reduced ability in psychopaths to recognise fearful or other emotional expressions in others (Baren-Cohen, 2011: 78-87). The psychopath's difficulties characterising others emotions on the basis of facial expressions, is a problem with their cognitive empathy. Psychopaths also have a problem with their emotional empathy, which is the ability to care about others emotions (Shoemaker, 2011: 115-7).

However, although the lack of empathy is the main aspect that is often spoken about in the philosophical literate, the matter seems to be somewhat deeper. They seem to lack any "deep" emotions whatsoever (of which empathy is one). Instead they have only short-term 'proto-emotions: primitive responses to immediate needs' (Hare, 1993: 53). As such, they seem to lack a concern for their own well-being and in particular their future selves as well as for that of others.

To illustrate that psychopaths cannot feel deep emotions (e.g. no fear or worry), consider a quote from one psychopathic rapist:

They are frightened right? But, you see, I don't really understand it. I've been scared myself, and it wasn't unpleasant (Hare, 1993: 44).

An example of a short-term proto-emotion that psychopaths experience is the boiling up of anger. However, referring back to my hypothesis, I believe that this anger arises purely because psychopaths dislike their current situation. Once they are in a situation that they like, the anger disappears and they simply do not care about it anymore. In addition, psychopaths also might use aggression as a means to an end. This is because they may know that if you act in a certain angry manner, it gets you what you want. The patient mentioned earlier, Max, is an example of someone who used instrumental violence often (i.e. he got angry, but when he realised it was not going to help, he quickly turned back to normal) (Cleckley, 2015: 47-66).

Furthermore, it is plausible that it is as a consequence of having only 'proto-emotions' that psychopaths lack a concern for their future selves.5 Consider the case of 'Roberta' who expresses long-term future plans:

> In speaking of her need for psychiatric treatment, something suggested that her conviction of need was more like what a man feels who looks in the mirror and decided he needs a haircut (Cleckley, 2015: 68).

There is the sense in which psychopaths can have long-term desires for their own future well-being, but when they do it is almost a trivial matter to them. The concern for their future selves is analogous to the desire mentioned before that I might have for a cup of tea. I form the intention and desire it, but it is trivial. I am not committed to it and that is the only way which psychopaths can care about the future. They may do what is necessary to obtain that future, but it is all done trivially. So, it seems to me that even if their aims are thwarted, they do not care about it either because they are only pursuing them in a trivial manner.

I have said that my hypothesis is that psychopaths are impulsive in the sense that they fail to have countervailing desires that prevent them from acting on their current desires. But here in fact there is a link between their lack of deep emotions and their lack of impulse control. To explain this further, consider why one might resist acting upon an immediate desire to do something. It seems the most common reason to not act upon an immediate desire to do something, is that it is going to harm me or somebody else in the long run. However, if one did not care about oneself in the long run, or anybody else then there would be nothing to stop one from acting upon one's immediate desires. And so, if one lacked concern for others and one's future self, then one would act upon their immediate desires in the way that psychopaths do and therefore lack impulse control. Another way of looking at this is that psychopaths not only lack empathy for others, but also lack 'empathy' for their future selves and it is this that gives rise to the lack of impulse control. So, impulsiveness is a consequence of their not only lacking concern for others but also concern for their future selves. Here a quote from Cleckley seems to substantiate this idea:

> There was no question of Pete's, having been, in the ordinary sense, merely thoughtless or impulsive. He was not negligent in reason…but somehow the obvious, and one would think inevitable, emotional response that would inhibit such an act did not play its part in his functioning…The consequences occurred to him, but rather casually (Cleckley, 2015: 108).

My hypothesis that I am putting forward on how we can best understand psychopaths is that impulsiveness and a lack of empathy go together and the other behavioural symptoms follow from this. For example, psychopaths deceive others because it does not matter to the psychopath that lies tend to be found out later because he lives in the moment. Psychopaths disregard financial obligations because psychopaths can make a promise easily, but the fact that they have got to follow through is in the future and so psychopaths do not care. Psychopaths boast and coerce others because they like to be in control at that moment because that gives them pleasure, and they manipulate people because they have self-gratifying aims. Whilst you are manipulating another person they probably like you and it is a pleasant social interaction. There is a sense in which psychopaths manipulate themselves. They do to themselves whatever they need to do to themselves, in order to get the immediate gratification of their desires and they do not care about the consequences. So, psychopaths will even self-destruct because that is to bring about the current state of affairs that they want and to damn the consequences because that is the future.

2. Moral Responsibility

2.1: Why should impulse control matter for moral responsibility?

It is often thought that in order to be responsible for your actions you must be free. So, no matter which account of what it is to be free we take, a lack of impulse control is going to matter to our freedom . On the view that I find most plausible, to say that somebody lacks impulse control is to say that they lack a capacity to act in accordance with second-order desires. This is based on Frankfurt's account of free will and responsibility. Impulsivenessy in this sense can mean either that(i) you have a first-order desire and a second-order desire not to have that desire, but struggle to act in accordance or (ii) simply that you have no second-order desires regarding your first-order desires, and so act immediately upon your first-order desires. Frankfurt's wanton is an example of somebody who has no second-order desires (and so has no stable preferences regarding his life as a whole), and so is led by their moment to moment impulses (Frankfurt, 1971: 11). My hypothesis regarding psychopaths is that they lack impulse control in the second of these senses (i.e. that they have no countervailing desires that prevent them from acting on their current first-order desires), in this sense they are very much like Frankfurt's wanton.

Much of what Levy (2014) says is consonant with my hypothesis. For example, Levy argues that because psychopaths are unable to 'project themselves in the future', they have an impaired

understanding of morality and personhood. If we consider Locke's definition of personhood, the thought is that personhood requires more than merely considering yourself as yourself but having concern for yourself, in the sense of considering yourself as a unit over time. Levy says that psychopaths do not see themselves as a 'persistent being', or at least if psychopaths did, they would not care about their future self. And so, killing another person for psychopaths, because they do not see their own future as particularly important, they cannot appreciate that other people have those sorts of long-term goals and plans (Levy, 2014: 362).

2.2: Why should lack of empathy matter for moral responsibility?

If we assume for responsibility that a person has to have certain knowledge of what they are doing, a lack of empathy matters with regards to moral knowledge. It is not that psychopaths do not know what they are doing under factual description, but rather that they do not understand the moral component of it. There is empirical evidence which suggests that psychopaths cannot appreciate the wrongfulness of their acts. In other words, psychopaths cannot tell the difference between things that are wrong independently of what anybody says, and things that are wrong dependent on what people say (i.e. some rules are only conventional and others are imbued with something more) (See, Levy: 2007 and Blair: 1997). We are supposed to be able to figure out the difference between them, whereas 'psychopaths fail to grasp the distinction; for them, all transgressions are rule dependent' (Levy, 2007: 131).

An analogy might be drawn here between a person with autism who is able to mimic humorous behaviour. They can figure out what kinds of things people find funny in terms of when they say certain things, people tend to laugh. So, they understand descriptively in some sense what counts as a funny joke without being able to understand humour and in a similar way, a psychopath can descriptively pick out an action is wrong. They can categorise things into right and wrong, but they do not understand why it is wrong. So, Levy is right that psychopaths do not understand morality, because they are not picking up on the features of morality.

It seems that for psychopaths, there is no force behind moral reasons, other than the force behind conventional reasons. If psychopaths are born such that they literally cannot understand those reasons, then it seems they are not responsible. For a person to be responsible they have got to understand why they are not to do something. So, it does look like you need moral knowledge for moral responsibility. If it is the case that psychopaths do not have the capacity for moral knowledge, then psychopaths might try as hard as they possibly can to understand, but they would still be incapable of this.

Guilt is the appropriate feeling to have when you have done something wrong to others. It is not quite so clear that guilt is the appropriate emotion to have when you have done something bad to yourself. However, it seems like you ought to feel regret which at the very least is an analogue of guilt but centred on yourself (Williams, 1981: 20-39). It is interesting to note then that although psychopaths cognitively regret harming themselves (insofar as it effects their current self), they do not seem to do so in an emotional sense. Again, my hypothesis would make sense of this (i.e. psychopaths do not feel emotional regret because they are incapable of forming deep emotions regarding themselves too). The problem for psychopaths is not only that they lack empathy for others, it is that they lack empathy for themselves. They are not selfish in the traditional sense because they do not only care about themselves, it is rather that they do not see any reason to do anything that is not directed at their own current mental states. Even at a later time when they have done something that puts themselves in what we would ordinarily think of being a bad position, they do not care about that either unless it has an immediate impact on them. The diagnostic criteria states that psychopaths fail to feel regret for harming others, but my suggestion is that they fail to feel regret for harming themselves too.

3: Conclusion

In the above I have outlined a hypothesis about how we can best understand psychopaths (i.e. as suffering from an incapacity to care not only about other people but about their future selves). I have argued that this is also responsible for their impulsiveness (in the relevant sense). I have also outlined why this

matters for moral responsibility (i.e. because it seems that in order to be morally responsible for our actions we must be capable of emphasising with others and controlling our impulses).

In my paper I have drawn upon Levy's (2014) account to substantiate my hypothesis. However, the main difference between mine and Levy's account, is that whilst Levy thinks that psychopaths are unable to imagine what it is like to be a future person, it seems that this is not the case. It is rather that they cannot see why they should care about their future self, because for psychopaths, it is only what happens now they should care about. In other words, Levy says that psychopaths cannot imagine themselves in a future state, but I think psychopaths can imagine themselves in a future state it is just that they do not see why they should care about that future state. It strikes me that psychopaths seem to be able to conceive of themselves as a 'persistent being, with plans and projects of one's own' (Levy, 2014: 362). The problem is not being unable to imagine this, but instead that they do not care about those future projects. So, it seems that psychopaths conceptually know that they will be a future being with plans, but they just discount that. They care more about the state they are in now. They do not care about the future because they are unable to see the value or why anybody should care about any state other than the one they are currently in. So, it is not an inability to imagine what it is like to be a future being. Rather, it is assigning a lower value to that future than the value of your current states. So, it is not a conceptual problem.

The reason why my hypothesis is interesting is because it seems clear that psychopaths do not fail to care for others for selfish reasons, it is precisely because they also fail to care for themselves. So, it looks as though their deficit is a genuine inability to form a conception of feelings outside their current mental states and therefore they cannot be morally responsible. If they cared about their future selves but not about others, then that would be a different matter. But, if psychopaths do not care about themselves in prison tomorrow, why should they care about anyone else today. The basic thought can be summed up by considering the following: If someone is so insensitive that they literally cannot care about themselves, then you cannot blame them for not caring about others. It is for this primary reason that I have argued that psychopaths are not morally responsible for the harm they cause.

This concludes my paper, however before finishing I want to briefly consider some comments about further issues arising that I have not had space to go into in detail. The first is that there is an interesting conceptual connection to be drawn by Thomas Nagel (1970). Thomas Nagel (1970) argues that being sensitive to reasons of prudence are entirely analogous to being sensitive to reasons of morality. Nagel says the question why should I be moral is analogous to the question why should I do something that is in my self-interest. That question is just as puzzling, because it amounts to the question why should I care about my future self. You can give the same bold answer to both questions (i.e. you ought to be moral, otherwise there is going to be a bad state of affairs occurring in that other person. The same as you ought to do what is in your self-interest, otherwise there is going to be a bad state of affairs occurring in your future self) (See, Nagel: 1970). Nagel argues the same thing that gives you reason to take the interest of others as providing reasons for action, is exactly the same as taking interests in your future self. So, if psychopaths lack caring about their future self it makes sense that they would lack moral understanding too. To fully articulate this conceptual connection is for future work, but it promises to tell us something about moral reasoning in general.

Secondly, I have not had chance in this paper to look at the practical side about how we treat psychopathy. It might be the case that you might not be able to help psychopaths in the sense that you might not be able to get them to care about their future selves. But one possible way you might help treat psychopathy is to gradually extend delayed gratification in a controlled environment. For example, one way might be to make psychopaths wait for a reward for extended timed intervals in a controlled environment (e.g. 5 minutes, then 10 minutes, then 15 minutes and so on), to extend the sort of delayed gratification. This is a treatment that is suggested by the philosophical conception of psychopaths, but whether it would work is not a philosophical issue but rather an empirical issue.

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TALES OF DESPAIR AND INTEGRITY[1]

Alan Ford

Abstract
We begin with an analysis of Kierkegaard's description of the self in his Sickness Unto Death, pieced out with comments by Gilbert Ryle and those made at the end of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. This will develop into a critique of the Mind\Body problem and a proffered solution.

Parallels are established in Dostoyevsky's *The Devils* and *The Brothers Karamazov* with Rowan William's writings on the nature of the 'diabolical'. Much is made in relation to the above of Wittgenstein's statement, at *Tractatus* 5.64 which tells us that the self of solipsism must flip into materialism, its logical opposite. John Macmurray, in his *The Self as Agent*, is introduced and integrated with the above, especially as to his claims that: (a) The self is agent and exists only as agent; (b) The self is subject but cannot exist as subject; (c) The self is subject in and for itself as agent; (d) The self can be agent only by being also subject. Such a self, it is argued, resolves the perceived instability of the human self, which has haunted philosophy since Descartes, and in some quarters still does.

Key Words
Despair, facticity-transcendence, freedom-necessity, narcissism, self-realisation.

I am the spirit that negates.
And rightly so, for all that comes to be
Deserves to perish wretc.hedly;
'T'were better nothing should begin.
Thus everything that your terms, sin,
Destruction, evil represent.
That is my proper element.

Mephistopheles from
Faust: Part One by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.[2]

1. Introduction to *The Sickness Unto Death* (1849)

Kierkegaard opens with a tortuous description of the nature of the self. Some even think it was done to parody Hegel's philosophical style and not to be taken seriously. I do take it seriously. He writes:

> Man is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation which relates itself to its own self, or it is that in the relation [which accounts for it] that the relation relates itself to its own self; the self is not the relation but [consists in the fact] that the relation relates itself to its own self.[3]

This reminds one of Ryle's comments about the systematic elusiveness of the 'I', in his *The Concept of Mind*, when he says that self-referential notions like self-admonition, self-ridicule, self-deception, self-knowledge are all 'logically condemned to eternal penultimacy'[4]. In other words

[1] 1. This article is based on a paper presented to The Gloucestershire Philosophical Society on 14th February 2018, subsequent to an outline version presented to the British Personalist Forum at York St Johns University 21-24 June 2016.

[2] *Faust.*

[3] Soren Kierkegaard *The Sickness Unto Death,* in *Fear and Trembling and Sickness Unto Death*, 146.

[4] *The Concept of Mind*, 186.

the self is not like a thing, to be discovered and related to as are thing-like things e.g. by position, weight, length, density etc.. Selves, who can relate things to each other, relate things, but this relating depends upon a self, which can relate to itself.

This strangeness is conveyed in the *Tractatus* 5.631 – 5.633,[5] e.g.:

> *The subject does not belong to the world; rather it is a limit of the world* (5.632),
> *Where* in *the world is a metaphysical subject to be found?* (5.633)

Kierkegaard continues:

> Man is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity; in short it is a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between two factors. So regarded, man is not yet a self.[6]

Above we have just an unselfconscious, perhaps pre-conscious, *combination* of the factors. The self is not relating to itself.

> In the relation between two, the relation is a third term as a negative unity, [a mere combination of factors] and the two relate themselves to the relation, and in the relation to the relation; such a relation is that between soul and body, when man is regarded as soul.[7] (My emphasis)

Is this Descartes' self of pure consciousness, which is unrelated to the other?

> If on the contrary the relation relates itself to its whole self, the relation is then the positive third term, and this is the self.[8] (My emphasis)

This is a synthesis, not a mere combination. Here we have a being conscious of itself as in all the above factors, e.g. Mind and Body etc.. and are all one, and integrated. Now we can take a stance on what to do with our lives: how to act. We might compare Descartes here, where the disembodied self could not possibly act: hence the strange invention by Descartes of psychophysical parallelism.

A negative relation is when one relates and identifies only with one factor of the self (mind or body) by repressing the other half. (This will become clearer below) The self exists when the relation relates to the whole self: is integrated. One can't have one without the other, since in this state of a synthesis, self-consciousness hasn't yet dawned, which would enable us to go beyond a reactive being into a human being: a person. We can, and invariably do, try to destroy this synthesis by repressing one of the factors, enabling self-deception, bad faith, delusions – and all those features, which make it possible, and frequent, for man to be divided against himself. This will be argued more fully below.

I hazard that these two factors are, in a different guise, our old friends mind-body, subject object, self-other etc.. But let us explore this in Kierkegaard's terms, which will flesh-out this account. The 'sickness' in question is the despair at not being able to become oneself, to integrate these factors into a unity, a united person. He analyses this in two broad ways: a) as an analysis of 'the factors of the synthesis' of the self (mentioned above) and b) from the point of view of consciousness. The factors of the synthesis can be seen as the basic parameters of the self, but, as such "… man is not yet a self", he is only potentially a person/self. To achieve self-hood one must do so within the context of consciousness of the self's unity, where the factor are transparent to and acknowledged by the self.

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[5] Op. cit., 146.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid. 165.

The Parameters of the Synthesis are *Infinitude/Finitude*, *Possibility/Necessity*, and the *Temporal and the Eternal*.

2. The 'Synthesis'.

According to Kierkegaard, despair is a universal fact for human beings, resulting from the failure to become oneself, made virtually inevitable owing to our necessary constitution by the factors mentioned (as explored below).

The factors of the synthesis of the self are:

(a) Despair of finitude is owing to lack of infinitude.

(b) Despair of possibility is owing to lack of necessity.

(c) Despair of necessity is owing to the lack of possibility.

For simplicity and clarity I'll tend to couch all these in the broad terms of Possibility and Necessity.

The despair of possibility (is owing to lack of Necessity or Finitude) is where the self tries to *negate* necessity in pursuit of freedom, where action in the real world is put on hold, where one becomes lost in the infinitude of thought and logical possibility. Feelings, which could restrict freedom, owing to feelings of responsibility, of love etc., become abstracted and reduced so that one does not feel either for oneself or others, but e.g. for great abstractions, like 'love of the masses', the perfectibility of Man etc.. Thought becomes a matter of logical possibility, an absurd freedom, rather than a guide to action in the real world, where true freedom can be found. The only castles ever built are in the air. For if one is totally free, a possibility only within imagination, one cannot be free, for freedom depends on action, and one cannot act if there is no resistance from the other. Freedom depends on resistance, from what one is not, which this ploy of escape into 'freedom' is designed to avoid. Freedom, like action is not an abstract absolute. It is not merely theoretical, but totally practical, and depends on wisdom, which comes from the ability to *apply* these parameters in a *concrete* situation. Outside action for some worthwhile and realisable scheme knowledge becomes a mere expansion of itself, or thought doing no work, as Wittgenstein once put it. The logical conclusion to such an endeavour seems to be solipsism, (the logical implications of the Cartesian self) free from and therefore irresponsible to the personal and impersonal Other.

As Kierkegaard puts it:

> The self thus leads a fantastic existence in abstract endeavour after infinity, or in abstract isolation, constantly lacking itself, from which it is merely further and further away.[9]

But, this evaporation of the self may not even be noticed:

> The greatest danger, that of losing one's self, may pass off quietly as if it were nothing; every other loss, that of an arm, a leg, five dollars, a wife, etc., is sure to be noticed.[10]

Thus the self lacks reality by evading necessity. No projects are realised, no real choices made, few real actions committed. Perhaps the only action is in avoiding actions that make a difference; and making a difference is surely what action is about – and accepting responsibility for it. All is generally kept in a fluid state of possibility, and as soon as one possibility is thought up, another replaces it. Here one has lost view of the fact of one's limitations, of our contingent state based in necessity, the ability to realise the finite actuality of one's potential. Therefore one goes in pursuit of that for which one merely yearns without taking into account what its pursuit – and capture – might entail. One does not allow for real failure and real success: and this ploy of evasion is no doubt used to avoid the pain and shame of such a state of tension.

If everything is possible, then nothing is possible. The above turns thus into its opposite (a characteristic we shall see below). Possibility becomes necessity – and vice-versa. Both end in the

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid. 171.

same place because they are motivated by evasion of the real.

In the despair of necessity, owing to lack of possibility/freedom a person might avoid becoming a person in losing himself in everyday 'reality', suppressing imagination and thus possibility. He merges with the crowd and becomes in Sartre's phrase 'a person for others', behaving as if he were a thing, a cog in a machine, but 'free' from the responsibility to act as a person. Above we saw expansion into impotence and oblivion, here we see contraction into narrow-mindedness and meanness of spirit. He merges in the crowd as if a thing with no freedom and hence no responsibility, to act as a perfect citizen in a totalitarian state, fitting neatly into the party machine. Such a being aims at the condition of a robot: deterministic, mechanical and irresponsible. His life and morality is based upon being propelled by the thought of others. So 'adjusted', and maybe successful within the 'machine' (one thinks of Eichmann), such a person will almost certainly not be aware of despair.

Kierkegaard likens the despair of necessity, to being dumb:

> Necessity is like a sequence of consonants only, but in order to utter them there must in addition be possibility.[11]

Possibility, so to speak, provides the vowels. He continues: 'The self of the determinist cannot breathe, for it is impossible to breathe necessity alone'.[12] This is clearly the world as seen by materialism, which implies that action is not possible: which seems incoherent.

One could see this, less radically, as the world of the philistine, who glories in his lack of imagination, even embracing a philosophy of 'common sense'. It is fortunate that such a person has no imagination, and is incapable of taking these materialist notions to their logical conclusions, for philistinism is the tranquilised version of fatalism, un-awakened to the real horrors of total contingency. The philistine is so objectionable because, not only does he dismiss possibility in himself, but wishes to control it in others. Perhaps this is because, in this suppression he can remain unaware of the emptiness, and absurdity, of his position and the barbs of possibility that may otherwise awaken him to the necessity of becoming a person. One thing seems clear: both sides evade the real, for all kinds of existential reasons: and no doubt we all do to varying extents, (as Kierkegaard argues) because 'being real', becoming a real person, calls us to responsibility, and this can be disturbing. Again, both the above ploys make it possible to evade responsibility but, importantly, it is only persons, faulty though we are, who can be responsible. Only those who can fail morally can also be good. This shows the necessarily paradoxical nature of persons, which will be enlarged upon below.

These oppositions should, of course, be seen dialectically, since otherwise they slip into absurdity and contradiction in what I have called 'philosophical narcissism', after Lawrence Cahoone[13]. The pursuit of freedom implies necessity, since total freedom would make action, or the freedom to do something, impossible. I can walk only because the ground resists me. Necessity lays down the laws of what is, which make action possible – and hence freedom itself. But one can slip unaware into fantasy, of too much freedom on one hand; or into too much necessity on the other. The fact is that this dialectical relation means that an escape from self is constantly open and often accepted, both routes leading to irresponsibility, which, no doubt was the initial, self-deceiving aim. Yet this leads to erosion of the self.

The despair of too much freedom is a fantasy of hope; that of too much necessity, a fantasy of fear: which is the mere flip side of the former. In fact both are *afraid* of relating and being responsible to the self and other. Thus the self needs both 'sides' of the synthesis:

> The self … is just as possible as it is necessary; for though it is itself, it has to become itself. In as much as it is itself, it is necessary, and in as much as it has to become itself,

[11]Ibid. 173.

[12]Ibid., 168.

[13]*The Dilemma of Modernity*

it is a possibility.[14]

Thus, we start from what is the case, the past , and have the freedom of choice to act in the future: and to be responsible for those actions. Perhaps Kierkegaard emphasises the relation of the self with itself too much to the exclusion of its relationship with the personal other. We shall return to this.

So, for Kierkegaard :

> …despair must be viewed under the category of consciousness: the question whether despair is conscious or not, determines the qualitative difference between despair and despair.[15]

Consciousness is involved in the notion of despair, although the person involved need not be conscious of his despair. He goes on:

> Generally speaking, consciousness, i.e. consciousness of self is the decisive criterion of self. The more conscious, the more self, the more consciousness the more will, and the more will the more self.[16]

To will implies intention in which the person becomes explicitly aware of his relationship with himself, and the other, and the actual possibilities within which to act, which constitutes his freedom. The failure to relate oneself to oneself in this way produces evasion and 'double mindedness', and self-deception.

What follows is a simplified version of Kierkegaard's argument, I hope adequate for the purposes of a paper. Thus there are several categories of despair where consciousness is the central feature:

(A) Despair that is not conscious of despair;

(B) Despair that is conscious of despair and in which there is:

(i) Despair of weakness: which consists of a feeble awareness of despair and one tries to hide from it; or where one is really aware of despair and does not know what to do.

(ii) And then the 'highest' form of despair, where one wills despairingly to be oneself.

3. Despair as examined from the point of view of consciousness, exemplified by characters from Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky's works.

Ivan Illych, in Tolstoy's *The Death of Ivan Illych*,[17] spans the first two categories: unconscious of despair and then, when consciousness arises, wants to hide from it. At first he is unconscious of despair, being caught in immediacy: happiness and sorrow come directly from circumstances, based on good and bad luck. Good luck restores him to happiness and his despair is forgotten. Yet the possibility of self-knowledge enters, despite himself, when his death approaches. At first he sees it as an unfair blow, with no consolation or escape. Yet the real companionship of the young peasant who sits with him quietly and merely holds his feet in fellowship, enables Ivan to become real at the very end of his life, in relation with his family and friends, and to face death selflessly by seeing through and repenting of all the lies and evasions that his life had been based upon.

Kierkegaard implies that it is possible to be fully conscious of despair and make the 'leap of faith' in what he calls 'the power that posits me', but the structure of the self, as described, makes it difficult to sustain this. For Kierkegaard the power that posits is God. To avoid the thickets of theology and to depart, crucially, from Kierkegaard's rather subjective musings, I would suggest this power is also the personal and cultural context of the person: all those that 'I' am not and to whom I might relate with integrity – or evasion.

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[14] op.cit., 168

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] *The Cossacks and Other Stories.*

3.1 The Despair of Defiance is the highest form of despair: in which the person is despairingly determined to be himself.

Here the self relates itself to itself in the most merciless way, but refuses to relate itself to the power that posits. The enterprise of self-knowledge is taken on as an individual – in isolation. It is essentially egotistic, a DIY road to salvation. All dependence is refused, the ego is inflated and pride becomes devilish! Stavrogin, the anti-hero in Dostoyevsky's *The Devils*, with his meaningless glamour and emptiness, and Peter Verkhovensky, his more active and cynical reflection, are examples who both are, in Rowan William's analysis '… seeking invisibility, seeking to be beyond the scope of any other's gaze. It is a mark of their inhumanity.'[18]

They are both strikingly inhumane and despise others. They refuse the next, necessary step to relate to that personal other, for it would be too demeaning to see themselves alongside and in solidarity with their fellow human beings: hence their seeking 'invisibility': freedom from the Other and hence in isolation. Stavrogin detaches from the other in pride, losing himself in infinitude and arbitrary freedom; Verkhovensky manipulates persons as if he were a malevolent force of nature, and persons were mere things. Like Mephistopheles, they negate the power that posits, no matter how conceived, and, in their arrogant isolation, negate themselves: in pursuit of either absurd, absolute freedom or iron necessity.

They attempt to take upon themselves the power that posits in infinite egotism: in principle, to replace God. As Kierkegaard says, this is despair 'by the aid of the eternal', since they are willing, with some insight, to face themselves, but not to see themselves as 'merely' human like the rest of us. Such despair has insight, but in its refusal to relate, is an abuse of it, and thus infinitely remote from it. They prefer unrelated, deluded, egotistical magnificence, as exemplified by Stavrogin – or invisible influence and power over the other, as seen in Verkovhensky. Despair of Defiance negates the integrity of the self and at the same time the integrity of the other.

The self now becomes an abstraction, unable to love, bereft of boundaries that the other would provide. It moves into infinite freedom and possibility, a supreme and perfect being: the illusion of Lucifer at the Fall. The arrogance is devilish, the consequent charisma seductive! Kierkegaard adds:

> He is not willing to attire himself in himself, nor to see his task in the self given him; by the aid of being the infinite form he wills to construct it himself".[19]

Although searching for significance, despite his magnificence, and because of his detachment, he is fundamentally lacking seriousness, because he is in illusion – unreal and isolated:

> … and is able only to conjure up a show of seriousness when the self bestows upon his experiments its utmost attention. [20]

Since all is possible for this self, nothing is possible, for:

> …just at the instant when it seems to be nearest to having the fabric finished it can arbitrarily resolve the whole thing into nothing.[21]

It is this arbitrariness that seems to resolve Stavrogin to commit suicide, his freedom dissolved into the ultimate necessity of death. It is a rage against the fundamental fact that we are, necessarily, limited beings, constituted by others in relation. The ultimate indignity is that God's world (or the world as it is) is not as perfect as Stavrogin's abstract one, which he sees as a great injustice. He clings to his hurt so he can put God (the world/other) in the wrong: he plunges from the dizzy heights of infinite possibility, Satan-like, to the depths of necessity: a 'flip', characteristic of this condition.

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[18]Rowan Williams, *Dostoyevsky: Language,Faith and Fiction.*

[19]op.cit. 202.

[20]Ibid. 201.

[21]Ibid. 203.

Since he can't be God, he will put God in the wrong, making Him an unjust tyrant. In this way he still remains special: this pain marks him out. To relinquish it 'he … might rid him of his … infinite advantage over other men…'. He clings to it '… in order with this torment to protest against the whole of existence.[22] (cf Mephistopheles)

Williams comments on this in relation to mutuality:

> Dostoyevsky's characteristic insistence on the acceptance of limit, and therefore of suffering, as against the diabolic temptation to seek for an identity not bound by limit and therefore supposedly invulnerable, is a translation of the principle of mutuality into the most uncompromising terms of narrative risk, self-venturing, and self loss.[23]

Williams makes much of the demonic, and in doing so provides an apt description of the despair of defiance. He says about *The Devils* that it is: '… an exploration not of freedom denied but freedom perverted, seen as the essence of the diabolical'.[24] He associates the diabolical with the urge to end narrative, history, to create a world without dialogue as each of the anarchists are locked into their very private versions of freedom and revolution.[25] This is the diabolism of Mephistopheles, who wants to end existence itself, with all its imperfections, injustices, uncertainty, pain, sadness, risk ad inf.

Solipsism and quasi-materialism hovers over their enterprise, which makes impossible the freedom of persons to shape their identities over time, for in time we are introduced to chance, change, the unknown, lack of control and responsibility. In these states of evasion from time and speech the absolute freedoms sought flip from freedom into a paralysis of decision and commitment, as in Stavrogin; while Verkhovensky accepts such paralysis joyfully, seemingly identifying with the force of nature, manipulating people as ciphers within it, and thrashing about in meaningless activism, whose motivations no one can quite grasp. Their narratives seem to be missing: they don't seem to inhabit a form of life. They don't inhabit a communal and dialogical reality. William's adds:

> Paradoxically, to emphasise the absolute liberty of the choosing ego is finally to eradicate that freedom to go beyond the given: because the isolated will can only ever return to itself and is impervious to otherness.[26]

Thus, in the demonic:

> … the true profaner has elevated his or her will against reality, chosen isolation from what is commonly known and acknowledged. Blasphemy becomes a sort of trial of strength between the will and the real.[27]

Williams believes, and I concur, that Dostoyevsky's demonic types:

> … are characters who have been brought to their own individual post-cultural moment, brought to a situation in which they are isolated and powerless, where they cannot create any meaning out of their own resources.[28]

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[22]Ibid. 206.

[23]op. cit., 210-1.

[24]Ibid. 221.

[25]Ibid. 210.

[26]op. cit. 210-1.

[27]Ibid. 226.

[28]Ibid. 231.

It could be argued that we are all, more or less, now living in post-cultural times. Williams think so and argues for his position persuasively.

3.2.1 Despair as seen in The Brothers Karamazov

Although not such a total egotist, like Stavrogin, such a person reminds one of Ivan Karamazov in Dostoyevsky's great novel,[29] where Ivan, in conversation with his brother, the saintly Alyosha, announces dramatically that, after all, it is not really a matter of not believing in God, but since God allows cruelty, Ivan most respectfully returns his ticket to paradise. Yet he is not quite lost and the above shows he exists in a moral dimension, but his dramatic rejection of what is the case marks him out.

Ivan is the family intellectual, who falls gradually into a world of abstractions and logical possibilities as he moves toward possible insanity. We never quite know what becomes of him, but his intellectual erosion of the, albeit thin, ethical layer in the soul of the psychopathic half-brother Smerdyakov, causes the latter to murder their father: since if there is no God then all is permissible. Indeed, the novel can be seen as an exploration of humans according to Kierkegaard's categories. Old Karamazov and Smerdyakov represent the totally unconscious despairers; Dimitri, the passionate sensualist, is a man in despair at not willing to be himself as he tries to lose himself in the orgiastic; Ivan is the despairer of defiance, escaping into an abstract self as the Faustian rebel against God; whilst Alyosha, who with all his acknowledged faults, knows himself concretely in relation to the 'power which posits him'. The book ends, not in the sense of a tale of moral retribution, but as a logical and spiritual conclusion to lives led according to certain modes of despair. Death for Old Karamazov and Smerdyakov; prison for Dimitri; probable madness for Ivan, and what seems will be an active life in relation to others for Alyosha.

What seems evident is that humans are a synthesis of their freedom and the necessity of what is the case; but these must be integrated, It is the attempt to escape into inauthentic existence that dissolves this synthesis, the basis of integrity. Sartre adapts these very notions in his central theory of 'bad faith', where he calls the escape into too much possibility/freedom, 'transcendence', and into too much finitude/necessity, 'facticity'. He gives the example of the girl who, when her would-be lover takes her hand, escapes into transcendence by dissociating from her hand, seeing her true self as her disembodied mind and the hand as a thing for which she is not responsible – it's only a hand, a material object! His other example is the homosexual who says that he is homosexual only because of his genes, and is therefore not responsible for his sexuality. He thus escapes into facticity, into his body. But he too can switch into transcendence by saying: "I'm not just an homosexual, and in this sense my true nature is not homosexual", as a chair is a chair. "If I'm not an object, I must be a subject – and only a subject". One can see how easily this logic can be thrown in reverse for convenience. The self, the person, is a unity of the factors, mind and body etc., and the integrated self acknowledges this transparently and responsibly.

3.2. Despair and the Mind-Body Problem.

What is striking here is that despair and bad faith depend on those concepts fundamental to western philosophy: the distinctions between Mind and Body, Subject and Object, Form and Content, even Fact and Value etc.: that ingrained distinction that we see as the logical bases for knowledge: 'I think, therefore I am' is a powerful version, that makes integration of mind and body impossible, leading to the dualisms of Idealism v Materialism. I've discussed this elsewhere, under the name of philosophical narcissism,[30] and I would like, albeit briefly, to relate this to my discussion.

So I claim that the non-relationship between mind and body etc. is related to Kierkegaardian despair and Sartre's bad faith, and more to the point enables despair and self-deception. The source of original sin?

Kierkegaard certainly shows the ethical and religious consequences of the opposing isolations of

[29] *The Brothers Karamazov.*

[30] Cahoone, op. cit.

mind and body in his discussions of possibility and necessity, but I believe Wittgenstein shows the logical consequences for this structure. Wittgenstein writes at *Tractatus* at 5.64:

> Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.
>
> Solipsism = Materialism:
> and vice-versa.
>
> Subject=Object:
> And vice-versa.

In both instances the integrated self and other, along with sense, collapses. Radical, unintegrated difference ends in identity!

This applies to possibility and necessity too, since it's the material (including the body) that ushers in necessity, and the mind that makes possibility possible, that is, in this un-integrated state, one, as above, can flip into its opposite. The only thing that prevents this is the integrated self, which can choose freedom or necessity according to reality, but which for reasons of its structure, can fall into the excesses of subjectivism and objectivism, which enables it to ignore what is the case and therefore reality and responsibility. This situation can lead to sins of omission, (by going along with the crowd to do evil. 'I was just following orders' etc.) as in those motivated to remain unconscious of despair; and of commission, as in cases of those fully conscious about their despair, but who won't accept deliverance from anyone but themselves in their solipsistic grandiosity and/or their sly manipulation of the other for reasons of power.

I'm arguing that this is the conclusion that must arise from the structure of the Cartesian self, because it insists that the self is essentially a thinker. Fortunately the responsibilities of life make very few take this seriously. It's the necessity for action that is real, not the theory.

But Kierkegaard's self is essentially active, and makes choices as to the life the person chooses by relating subject and object etc., those factors constituting the syntheses, and the consciousness of what is the case which takes us necessarily into the moral realm, and in this way avoids all those pseudo problems of Mind and Body, Subject and Object and Fact and Value etc.. These are important distinctions, which only a self can make, but that is because they are concepts within a self, not logical foundations for creating a world, as phenomenalism and other versions of materialism seem to suggest. They are, so to speak, 'negatives' within the self, which constitute the 'positive', but cannot exist without it, nor can the self be reduced to them.

Kierkegaard's theory also resolves, by implication, lots of seeming contradictions that seem integral to human experience: for example self-deception, which Sartre considered impossible, since to deceive myself means that I persuade myself to believe what I know to be untrue. Although 'impossible' I find I manage it regularly: and it is clearly part of human nature.

This could be because the unconscious part of the self can repress unwelcome thoughts from coming to consciousness in the first place, because those factors of the syntheses can, as we have seen, offer evasion from what is the case by escape into possibility or necessity, which implies that consciousness contains the unconscious as a constituent element, which can negate it. Again, Aristotle defined man as a rational being, although some might not always live up to it. Yet this does not gainsay Aristotle, because only a rational being can behave irrationally. The irrational is necessary to the constitution of the rational whole, which the irrational can negate. And again, thinking is about drawing true conclusions, but a thinking that could not be incorrect could not be correct either. If I could not think incorrectly, I could not think at all, but the irrational can negate the rational, as we can see.[31]

All this indicates that the self is constituted by its capacity for self-negation: a positive that

[31] See John Macmurray, who develops such thoughts in his 'The Form of the Personal' in *The Self as Agent*.

includes its own negatives, as John Macmurray puts it. Those 'contradictory' elements in Kierkegaard's 'syntheses' enable us to go in two directions according to convenience, and form the contradictory choices that the self often maintains – and can negate the self. (The source of original sin?) It is the integrated self that can become aware of these negations and act accordingly.

4. John Macmurray and the form of the personal

Based on such considerations, John Macmurray argues in detail that the self is constituted by a positive, the 'third term', used by Kierkegaard, which contains these two broad negatives as described in the above syntheses of factors.[32] He states that the Self is essentially an agent (the *positive*) containing, in broad terms, those contradictory notions Kierkegaard calls the factors of the syntheses, which he too considers to be constituents of the self (that Macmurray calls 'negatives'). Descartes' self as thinker limits itself to just one of these negatives: the other being the body (a feature of necessity). And, because the self is reduced to subjectivity only, makes the self, along with the ethical etc., incoherent and a total mystery. The equal and opposite version, that of 'identity theory', which says that consciousness can be reduced to material processes, is the equal and opposite mistake. Like Macmurray, Kierkegaard sees the self as an agent, engaged in moral activities, which applies, relates these 'negatives' by choosing its way of being, in action.

So the Self relates Mind and Body in Action: or a Positive (the self) containing two negatives (Mind and Body[33]), and that the self and these 'negatives' relate in the following ways, which Macmurray describes as 'The Form of The Personal'[34], whose structure he describes under four headings.

A. *The Self is Agent and exists only as agent.*

This has already been argued above both from Kierkegaard and from Macmurray's viewpoints. Yet, as has been stated briefly, Kierkegaard tends to leave out the role of the personal other in the creation of personal identity and puts the emphasis on one's relations with God – the power that posits the person. It is Macmurray who makes much of the relation with the personal other, which, although Macmurray is a religious writer, makes what he has to say about the nature of the self as congruent with the atheist as the believer. Persons as such, *related* in a culture of their making, can be seen as the power that posits us: and much for good or ill turns on this relationship.

In this context we can see what is lacking in Descartes' position, for, as the *Tractatus* at 5.64 shows, a self, based on thought as pure subjectivity cannot exist, since there is nothing to stop it flipping into the material - *and vice-versa*, ending in mere, contentless phenomena, signifying nothing.

Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.

Descartes yearned for the indubitability of logic, but logic can exist only in a realm of embodied persons who invent it and put it to use.

There are other reasons for denying Descartes self e.g. Lichtenberg pointed out that all Descartes could say is 'there are thoughts', since it is not a logical conclusion that there must therefore be a thinker with identity involved in 'I think therefore I am'. PF Strawson[35] following on Lichtenberg, showed that the Cartesian position cannot create an identity, because from this ultra-subjectivist position there is no way that one could know that the thoughts 'one' was thinking belonged to a self: how do we know that each thought one has does not belong to a separate self – or any other number of selves? Pure thought cannot provide identity nor, consequently, the concept of the other. In a

[32]Ibid.

[33]And also allied aspects of the self-other, subject-object, fact-value, etc. that have caused so much fruitless philosophising.

[34]op. cit. 100-3.

[35]*Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays*, Chap. 8 from 'Self, Mind and Body'.

Cartesian world there is no way of distinguishing between subjects and objects. Descartes makes integration and identity logically impossible, whilst Kierkegaard and Macmurray describe the necessary structure of a self, which *does* have identity.

The distinctions, mind-body, self-other, subject-object, value-fact etc., are necessary distinctions, but, for the reasons given can make sense only in a world of persons who *make* these distinctions, since such distinctions can exist only in an integrated person who, because of this, has a re-identifiable self which can relate to a re-identifiable other, personal or impersonal. These distinctions are fundamental, only because the self is more fundamental. They are necessary but not sufficient aspects of the self, (i.e. 'negatives') which make thought possible: but without the identity of the self they are nonentities:

Why is it so difficult to shake off subliminal Cartesianism? It could be because the subjective/objective distinction seems to us to be so fundamental – and indubitable: but this is, as argued, a piece of logical legerdemain. Yet Kiergegaard, at least implicitly, and Macmurray explicitly is denying that the distinction is fundamental, and that it leaves out this 'third term' – the self. It is the self which, when mature, makes the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, and puts them to work in action.

Perhaps Kierkegaard's tortuous 'definition' of the self, below, might now become less tortuous:

> But what is the self? The self is a relation which relates itself to its own self, or it is that in the relation [which accounts for it] that the relation relates itself to its own self; the self is not the relation but [consists in the fact] that the relation relates itself to its own self.

Here the self, the 'positive', (a) relates itself to its 'negative' aspects (e.g. subjectivity/objectivity, mind/body, freedom/necessity etc. – even fact and value) (b) but *does* something with them by being that in the relation that relates these elements; c) but the self is not the mere relation of parts for it has its own identity, albeit *constituted* by these 'negatives', as being greater than the sum of its parts – which enables action. Or it can now, as described by Kierkegaard, enable evasion of one aspect in order to escape from what is the case. But all this can take place only in an existent and re-identifiable world where action is possible.

Macmurray then adds:

B. *The Self is subject but cannot exist as subject. It can be subject only because it is agent.*

As already argued, subjectivity cannot exist on its own: it has to be related to the self and the other. Pure subjectivity cannot constitute identity. This is the Cartesian error, which *assumes* existence and identity: which make subjectivity and thought possible. In other words the self would be impossible without a body in a material world, which introduces necessity and makes action viable. The self relates these two 'negatives', and so action is possible. The Mind-Body problem, founded on Cartesianism, is incoherent and an illusion.

To quote Macmurray in this context:

> When therefore we indicate the experience to which the idea refers, we have to point to the fact that the Subject can exist only as an aspect of the Self as agent. It is the negative aspect of the existence of the Agent.[36]

The Self is subject in and for the Self as Agent

It must be said though, that these 'negative' aspects enable the enrichment of the self, being necessary constituents of thought and provide the possibility of culture itself, in which persons swim like fish.

The self as subject, as we have seen, is a *necessary* aspect of the self as agent and thus of action:

[36]op. cit. 101

> … and consequently it is not merely *in* action but also *for* action. This signifies that knowledge, in its primary aspect at lease, arises in action; that is to say, in an activity which does not *aim* at knowledge.[37]

This is congruent with Heidegger's ideas, when he says that thought only begins when the person runs up against a practical problem, and this presupposes a prior knowledge gained in experience and action, and thought must be, logically, based on such. We can only think about what we already know. This primary knowledge is the knowledge that arises in action, apart from any theoretical intention.[38]

Once more we see the logical priority of the self as agent, the self of choices, moral and otherwise, the positive self in charge of its necessary, though insufficient 'negatives'. It is also worth remembering that:

> … theoretical activities, in which the intention is knowledge, fall within action and have an essential reference in action… In other words, the question which a theoretical activity seeks to answer can only arise in practical experience, directly or indirectly; and the answer can be true or false only through reference to action[39]

It is not that thought is a criterion of truth, but only that thought can point to the correct, (or incorrect), process of thinking.

C. *The Self can be agent only by being also subject*

This vouches for the importance of thinking as a necessary, though insufficient, aspect of the self. The self can be an agent *only* by also being able to be a subject and not an agent, by isolating the self from action in thought: 'the Self exists in virtue of its own self-negation'.[40] **(** This *isolation* is ushers in possibility, imagining what is not: thought itself. Macmurray writes:

> To act and know that I am acting are two aspects of one experience; since if I did not know that I was acting I should not be acting.[41]

Action implies knowledge and is logically prior to it, for if there were no knowledge in an activity, it would be just a reaction to a stimulus, or similar to sleepwalking. So, from what has been said, we can see that persons (selves) can, owing to the structure of thought, escape from the real, and in the process become unreal themselves, owing to the need to believe their own illusions. This clearly has moral and ethical implications, especially if those 'negatives' become negations, as described in the passage from Goethe's *Faust*, which heads this essay.

It is interesting to ponder the major theme in Karen Horney's seminal book *Neurosis and Human Growth: the Struggle Toward Self-Realisation* which argues that neurosis is like the selling of the true self for the illusions of neurosis: just as when Faust sells his soul to the Devil's henchman, Mephistopheles. It might be useful also to return to just what Mephistopheles is saying:

I am the spirit that negates.
And rightly so, for all that comes to be
Deserves to perish wretc.hedly;
'T'were better nothing should begin.
Thus everything that your terms, sin,
Destruction, evil represent.

[37]Ibid.

[38]Ibid.

[39]Ibid. 102.

[40]Ibid.

[41]Ibid.

That is my proper element.

And then compare this with what Kierkegaard says is the highest, yet most dangerous, form of despair, the Despair of Defiance, and then compare those characters selected from Dostoyevsky as exemplars. Ivan, who blames 'the power that posits' for not making a better world; Stavrogin who, in his pride, rejects the world in suicide; Verkovhensky who, in his desire to negate what is good, inhabits the socio-political in order to destroy, to negate. All this is nihilism, the negation of what is. It also inhabits religion itself in many forms e.g. in the case of the Cathars, who hoped to become so pure that procreation and consequently humanity would come to an end, since existence is evil; or the equal and opposite medieval sect, the Bogomils, who raped and pillaged, believing that they were greater than God, and consequently could do anything they wished.[42].

In short the desire is to reject or negate the other, the whole of that which one is not, and to blame it for not pandering to one's needs. Of course, the sin expressed here is that of Pride, as spelled out by Kierkegaard, and by Karen Horney as that which invariably lies behind all neuroses. Most Christian theologians see it as the source of all those Seven Deadly Sins. One could see such as this in terms of a negation of the real, a settling for the comfort of the fake, a selling of what is for an illusion of grandeur and perfection in an act of seeming and a lying – but which the other, the real, constantly denies and reveals.

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[42]See Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium.*

MEDIUM EMERGENCE, PART THREE: THE DARWINIAN THEORY OF NATURAL SELECTION AND MICHAEL POLANYI'S THEORY OF EMERGENT EVOLUTION

Daniel Paksi

Abstract:

According to Michael Polanyi's theory of emergent evolution, the Darwinian mechanism of natural selection is not the fundamental driving force of evolution, merely its primary lower-level condition. It follows that Polanyi does not reject Darwin's theory at all, it is part of his theory of emergent evolution too, he merely rejects the neo-Darwinian theory which denies even the possibility of higher-level principles in evolution. In Polanyi's view, according to the logic of emergence, both lower-level conditions (natural selection) and higher-level principles (mainly the ordering principle of life and evolution) determines the process of evolution, but the fundamental driving force of evolution is the living beings themselves that realize the ascending evolutionary achievements. This means that the essence of evolutionary emergence is nothing more but the emergence of (tacit) knowledge through the successive generations of living beings. If Polanyians do not accept his theory of emergent evolution and reject neo-Darwinism, which, unfortunately, they usually do not do, then his theory of tacit and personal knowledge will lose its meaning utterly.

Keywords:

Natural selection, evolution, emergence, Charles Darwin, Michael Polanyi.

1. Preface: Emergent Evolution

In the First Part of this paper, I argued that the concept of medium emergence is the proper personalist ontological theory. In the Second Part, I showed that Michael Polanyi's understanding of emergence comports with this concept and that materialism is not a valid ontological conviction.

The point of medium emergence is that emergence has two faces: there are epistemologically emergent higher-level phenomena which can be reduced synchronically at the moment to their material conditions, and there are ontologically emergent higher-level phenomena which cannot be reduced in this way because these phenomena were arisen through time according to higher-level principles. This means that the process creating higher-level ontologically emergent phenomena is nothing else but *emergent evolution*.

Emergence is a medium ontological position between dualism and materialist monism. According to dualism, which is the ontological conviction of the European Christian tradition, there are two different kinds of reality, generally described as mind/soul and matter/body which are independent, fundamental substances. It follows that man, whose essence is the mind/soul, is the creation of God.

According to emergentism, which is a new, alternative ontological position, there are also two different kinds of reality as dualism claims, but only one of them is fundamental, while the other is emergent. It follows that emergent realities are dependent on fundamental matter and have to evolve from it and so they do: *man is the achievement of emergent evolution*.

According to materialism, which has become the ontological conviction of modern European, 20th and 21st-century science, there is only one kind of reality: one fundamental substance, matter. Since in this view, there are no real higher-level realities, neither there is creation nor emergent evolution.

See Fig. 1: The structures of the three basic ontological convictions. on p.78.

Michael Polanyi's concept of emergent evolution is the re-established version of Samuel Alexander's concept of emergence within the *logic of achievement*. The point of this approach is that Polanyi regards living beings as active knowers that try to solve the problems they have to face during the long course of evolution, and these personal achievements of living beings are the driving force of evolution.

According to the logic of emergence that emergent realities are dependent on and thus have to rely

on lower-level processes, but they have their own higher-level principles according to which they act, the process of emergent evolution itself has lower-level, in the end, material conditions and higher-level principles. The only fundamental lower-level mechanism (condition) of emergent evolution is natural selection. In consequence, Polanyi does not reject Darwin's theory; *it is part* (lower-level condition) *of his theory of emergent evolution too*. He merely rejects the neo-Darwinian theory which, according to its materialist ontological conviction, denies even the possibility of higher-level principles of evolution.

I will show in section 2 that in this regard Darwin himself is rather on Polanyi's side than on the neo-Darwinians' one, and that evolution is either emergent evolution or there is no evolution at all. Then in section 3, I will interpret Polanyi's concept of the ordering principles of life and evolution which lead to the evolutionary emergence of life and show that the process of evolution in its essence is nothing more but the emergence of (tacit) knowledge. I hope that in section 4 it will become clear what the Polanyian view of evolution is and that if we do not accept his theory of emergent evolution and reject neo-Darwinism, then his theory of tacit and personal knowledge will lose its meaning utterly.

2. The Meaning of Evolution and the Darwinian Theory of Natural Selection

Since Charles Darwin, the notions of evolution and natural selection have become widespread, but the real meanings of them are not well-known at all. Philosophers usually think that evolution is not part of their field or they simply accept the ruling neo-Darwinian view without even considering its philosophical consequences. On the other hand, biologists do not care about general philosophical questions and problems and, of course, it is not their job. Generally speaking, we have no idea how many different theories of evolution were proposed and even exist today; for example, the classical neo-Darwinism represented by, e.g., Ernest Mayr that emphasizes natural selection of individual beings; the radical gene-centric understanding of Richard Dawkins; James Lovelock's holistic Gaia-theory; or Vilmos Csányi's general theory of evolution that emphasizes the different evolutionary levels. The most notable past theories include J.-B. Lamarck's vitalistic view; Henri Bergson's notion of evolution by time; and the concept of emergent evolution from the British Emergentists. Naturally, one of these latter theories is Michel Polanyi's concept of emergent evolution, which, according to him, is the origin and source of human personal knowledge and reality.

'Evolution' is a Latin term meaning a kind of development between at least two different things/states. It is, of course, a truism; everybody knows it. Nevertheless, we do not really understand the true meaning of the notion of evolutionary development. Imagine, for example, one of our progenitors, a prokaryote that lived, even without a nucleus, over three billion years ago. Ponder for a moment. What kind of knowledge did our progenitor possess? Compare that level with ourselves. What kind of knowledge do we possess? We should then ask, what is the relationship between the knowledge our brave prokaryote progenitor possessed and our own knowledge? Whether the prokaryote had more advanced knowledge? Are we equally developed? Or we have the more advanced knowledge, in which case there is an evolutionary relationship between the prokaryote and us.

If one accepts the ruling neo-Darwinian theory perhaps he does not know but, in fact, he *denies* that we are more developed than our prokaryote progenitors. According to the neo-Darwinian theory, there is no any single *objective*, *explicit* criteria on the basis of which such a statement could be formulated, and other criteria cannot be acknowledged because those are 'subjective' and 'anti-scientific.' For example, the fact that humans can ride a bicycle and speak, while our prokaryote progenitor cannot, means nothing in the neo-Darwinian theory. Both our prokaryote progenitors and ourselves successfully adapted to our respective environments and possessed the skills necessary and sufficient to survive. These respective environments differ from each other so completely and randomly that the skills of our prokaryote progenitor and our knowledge are not commensurable by objective, explicit, and independent standards.

According to the neo-Darwinian theory, there is only one fundamental mechanism of evolution, the Darwinian notion of *natural selection*. It is the driving force behind the environmental adaptation of living beings. On the one hand, during inheritance, new variants are created by mutation and, at the same time, there are generally, but not necessarily, *limited environmental resources*.

See Fig. 2: The logical structure of Darwinian notion of natural selection, on p.78

With this mechanism, Darwin successfully explained how new life forms are created from old ones; however, he did not explain why living beings come to be more and more developed. The selective pressure on living beings is determined by the environmental resources that, in turn, ultimately depend on such contingent (random) material processes as the thermal radiation of the Sun, the inclination of the Earth's axis, or the drifting of the continents, etc. Although, these variables can be described very objectively and precisely (scientifically), they do not and can*not* configure any developmental processes since they are entirely random. The other factor, mutations, is also random, and in most cases, it does not lead to more developed variants but, in fact, generally lead to especially weak, or even unviable, individuals. It means that over time, an adaptation process governed by natural selection can be reversed and a species might, for example, lose the ability to see or to fly, abilities that most biologists regard as the greatest achievements of evolution. Darwin himself was precisely aware of this problem and did not even use the term evolution for his theory of natural selection.

So, a process by Darwinian natural selection can be *just as likely to cause regression* as it is to cause development; 'evolution,' according to the neo-Darwinian theory is, therefore, not the developmental process anybody would at once imagine from primitive prokaryotes to, e.g., highly developed primates, but it could be the complete opposite of this, the total regression of higher life forms to primitive bacteria. This is the reason Polanyi wrote the following:

> However, if we are to identify—as I am about to suggest—the presence of significant order with the operation of an ordering principle, no highly significant order can ever be said to be solely due to an accidental collocation of atoms, and we must conclude therefore that the assumption of an accidental formation of the living species is a logical muddle. It appears to be a piece of equivocation, unconsciously prompted by the urge to avoid facing the problem set to us by the fact that the universe has given birth to these curious beings, including people like ourselves. To say that this result was achieved by natural selection is entirely beside the point. Natural selection tells us only why the unfit failed to survive and not why any living beings, either fit or unfit, ever came into existence. As a solution for our problem it is logically on a par with the method of catching a lion by catching two and letting one escape. (Polanyi 1962: 35)

Polanyi formulates three essential claims in this quotation. Firstly, any significant comprehensive order—including, of course, highly orderly living beings—is the consequence of an *ordering principle*. Therefore, evolution and the emergence of life have their own ordering principles. Secondly, since natural selection is not an ordering principle but a *mechanism*, it cannot explain the process of evolution only its mechanical conditions, how, for example, environmental resources affects the composition of a population. Thirdly, natural selection in itself also can*not* explain how living beings came into existence from inanimate primordial matter. This third claim can again be surprising at first sight because neo-Darwinians tend to pretend that the clue to explaining the origin of life lies in Darwinian natural selection alone. However, contrary to them, Darwin himself explicates the following claim in the last sentence of *The Origin of Species* when he concludes the main point of his theory of natural selection:

> There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being evolved. (Darwin 1872: 429)

Darwin's claim is not necessarily that God created life, but he clearly states that his theory of natural selection *does not explain the first formation of life*—as well as it does not explain the

evolution of more advanced, higher-level living beings, only the formation of new species. The Darwinian mechanism of natural selection, as we have seen, works by two factors, and one of these factors is the existence of new variants—using Darwin's word forms—that can transmit their typical features to the next generation. Since variants are naturally living beings, it means that the Darwinian theory of natural selection *presupposes life*: without any initial life forms the first factor of natural selection and, thus, natural selection itself cannot be realized. Therefore, if we accept that that fundamental mechanism of evolution is natural selection, then it will be *logically impossible*—even a logical muddle to use Polanyi's words—to explain the formation of life and the real process of evolution with the Darwinian theory of natural selection alone. This is one of the most ignored facts of modern science. Oddly enough, Neo-Darwinians go against Darwin himself by not acknowledging that other fundamental principles are needed besides natural selection to explain the emergence of life and evolution.

So, the neo-Darwinian theory of 'evolution' is not the theory of evolution. From this two different conclusions can be drawn. Fist, if we accept the explicit scientific dogma that the neo-Darwinian theory essentially is complete then we hate to say on the one hand that life just happened randomly and on the other hand that *there is no evolution*, no one is more developed than his/her prokaryote progenitors there is no need to find further fundamental principles to explain the wonderful phenomenon of life. Second, if we insist on our personal experience that we know more and we are more developed than our prokaryote progenitors, that is, there is evolution, this means on the one hand that the neo-Darwinian theory is not complete at all and on the other one that at least one other fundamental scientific principle is needed beyond natural selection to explain the developmental process in life and perhaps another to explain the first formation of life.

Persons who accept the notion of evolution generally believe in evolutionary development and do honestly think that they are more developed than their prokaryote progenitors. Perhaps, the reason the neo-Darwinian theory seems so attractive in their eyes is that it is highly explicit, exact, uses much mathematics, is as mechanical as Newton's theory, and most of all, uses such *deceptive substitutions* by which it extremely misleads them what it, in fact, means. The most typical example is the fact that the neo-Darwinian theory is usually presented as the theory of evolution explaining our evolutionary origin and development from our primitive prokaryote progenitors, while it is, in fact, only the *theory of change*—which, moreover, rejects any personal criteria by which any real evolutionary development could be determined. Yet, the scientists and biologists who explicitly acknowledge the neo-Darwinian theory believe in evolution very much; *tacitly they understand from the neo-Darwinian 'theory of evolution' what evolution really means*. The fact that the neo-Darwinian theory itself does not explain any evolution at all will be clear only through a detailed and explicit analysis of the theory and the tacit motivation of the neo-Darwinians.

So, what does the notion of evolution really mean? What kind of criteria does a process need to correspond to in order to be considered a process of evolution? For now, let's think over: is it possible to find a living being more developed than another using only the objective, entirely explicit, exact criteria employed by the neo-Darwinians? This is a philosophical question, and my answer is no. *There are no such perfectly objective, explicit, exact criteria by which we can consider our own knowledge more developed than that of our prokaryote progenitors*.

The other, ontological side of the problem is that on the material level, there are no essential differences between the material structure of a prokaryote and a man. Both of them have their own DNA which determines the other material structures they are comprised of, and in both cases, the actual structure of that DNA resulted from the process of natural selection. We can precisely specify the base sequences of DNA and, therefore, can assign them perfectly exact numerical parameters, but by what criteria is it possible to decide which sequence of numerical parameters is more developed than the other? There are no such criteria. The array of 13012321322231 . . . where each explicit number represents a nucleotide base is not more advanced than the array of 23123011212313 . . . This is the reason that, according to the neo-Darwinian theory, it cannot be stated that we are more developed than our prokaryote progenitors; that would be an ungrounded, 'unscientific,' anthropomorphic statement.

However, we see ourselves as being more developed, not because of any explicit numerical parameter or as a result of our specific material structure, but because *we possess such personal*

knowledge both biological and cultural which essentially transcends the poor knowledge of our prokaryote progenitors. We see ourselves more developed because we can ride a bicycle, we can speak, we have culture, and we practice science. This is the reason that our personal reality is much deeper than a prokaryote. We know this. But this knowledge cannot be defined by perfectly exact, objective parameters in the same way we can represent the base sequence of DNA, so the neo-Darwinian theory following the objectivist ideal of modern science simply *ignores* these facts.

We can find the criteria and the additional principles of evolutionary development, not in the material structures of living beings and in the exact parameters of those structures, but in the *biological* reality of living beings and *cultural* reality of man, that is, in our personal knowledge and in our personal reality. Evolution is not only successful adaptation by natural selection to the environment to survive and reproduce *but the emergence of life from inanimate matter to gradually possess more and more advanced knowledge*. The most primitive ancient prokaryote can sustain its metabolism and can reproduce. Development does not stop at this ancient tacit level but goes on to reach the specified skills of multicellular beings, the amazing abilities of primates, and, eventually, to the articulated knowledge of man encompassing, for example, man's cultivation of the science of evolution as a theoretical framework in which we may understand both our past and our future opportunities. Every major transition is unprecedented and creates new levels of knowledge comprised of their own principles and actions, which are essentially different from the previous ones. This is the reason that there are no equally valid and applicable laws and methods for every level; biology is not physics.

It means that there is *emergent evolution* or there is *no evolution at all*. Natural selection is only the fundamental mechanism and condition of the emergence of more and more developed living beings that possess more and more knowledge to survive and reproduce.

> Darwinism has diverted attention for a century from the descent of man by investigating the conditions of evolution and overlooking its action. Evolution can be understood only as a feat of emergence. (Polanyi 1962: 390)

Polanyi's statement is a clear philosophical principle. However, natural scientists are reluctant to face it because it is considered 'frivolous' and 'non-scientific,' but the real reason they try to reject it is that it contradicts their *materialist philosophical commitment*, whether it be explicitly pronounced or just tacitly believed and concealed. In consequence, although their theory explicitly excludes even the possibility of evolution and enables only a theory of change, they are still speaking about evolution and, in explicit contradiction with their materialist conviction, they often tacitly mean what they say. This contradiction, deeply rooted in today's science, is one of the cases of the intellectual forms of moral inversion. (Polanyi 1962: 233)

Nevertheless, the philosophical situation is clear concerning the concept of evolution. If materialism is true or at least a person who believes it to be true can *consistently* speak solely about change by natural selection at the material level exactly in the same way as a chemist discusses how the movements of the molecules change in a gas due to rising temperature and not as we speak about the development of living beings. However, if emergentism is true, then there is a possibility that life emerges from primordial inanimate matter and the evolutionary development of knowledge starts culminating later in the emergence of human culture and human souls. It is the real meaning of the notion of evolution, and those who truly believe in evolution understand it, at least tacitly, in this way.

Now the question is what the ordering principles of the formation of life and evolution are because natural selection, according to the logic of emergence, is only the fundamental mechanism and condition of evolution. But first I would like to double back shortly to a problem we explored earlier. For neo-Darwinians, the first formulation of life was an instantaneous random event. Moreover, it has often been emphasized that even 'evolutionary development' itself is a random process driven by random mutations and natural selection. With this example, I would also like to shed light on why they believe in this falsity.

In his book, *The God Delusion*, perhaps the most well-known, neo-Darwinian biologist, Richard Dawkins depicts a telling metaphor of how life started according to neo-Darwinism. (Dawkins 2008: 137) He uses the legendary aphorism of Fred Hoyle who argued against the neo-Darwinist concept of

the origin of life. Imagine a junkyard where every part necessary to building an operable Boeing 747 can be found. Then imagine a hurricane that sweeps through that junkyard and leaves an aeroplane ready to fly. According to Fred Hoyle, the likelihood that life could emerge through a random lightning strike into the so-called primordial soup—where, of course, every necessary ingredient for life (water, sunlight, favourable temperatures and pH balances, amino acids, etc.) were also could be found—was *even smaller* than the likelihood for an operable Boeing to be assembled during a hurricane out of some leftover junk. Dawkins still claims that as unlikely as it may be, this is precisely what happened and how life originated. The argument stands that there was so much time and the never-ending primordial soup was so vast that it still just happened without any divine intervention.

Now it seems that this problem is all about chance: what is the probability for the creation of life by a random event and was there enough time to realize such a small probability or not. And if this is true, then the secret of the origin of life can be solved by very exact probability calculations all we need is 'highly advanced' and explicit mathematics such as the Drake-equation used to calculate the probability of life on other planets. My claim is that this problem is not about chance at all. A real scientific answer *has to be based on empirical evidence and scientific principles* and not on chances. The only result of the very exact and scientific probability calculations is the concealing of the real nature of the problem, just as the use of the term 'evolution' conceals the fact that the neo-Darwinian theory is not about evolution at all.

The real nature of the problem is: Do we really think that it is possible for an operable Boeing 747 to be created instantaneously from junk by a random hurricane? Similarly, do we really believe that it is possible that a viable living being can be created instantaneously only by a random material event? If this is the case, then you can start calculating the probabilities. But if not, the calculations are meaningless.

My claim is that on the basis of hard *empirical evidence*, we have to say that *it is not possible*. Hurricanes and lightning destroy structured things; they do not create them. Everyone has seen evidence of this little simple fact because nobody has ever observed lightning create houses instead of destroying them, and nobody ever will because the nature of random material processes is that over time they break down every comprehensive order. This phenomenon, of course, corresponds entirely to the physical principle that the entropy (the lack of order on the fundamental level) of a system is necessarily growing until an *ordering principle* changes the process; for example, due to an external and stable energy flow, some kind of new structure starts to grow in the system.

So, my explicit claim that the *nature* of random material processes ensures that over time every comprehensive order is broken down is based on the conviction that, in reality, it is simply *impossible* that a random hurricane can create a Boeing 747. It is not the question of chance and, thus, a matter of making exact probability calculations to explain how life was formed at the beginning, but instead, it is our conceptualization of the *principles* of the process *on the basis of our natural human and scientific experiences of this kind of processes*.

It is necessary only due to logic that there is a possibility for a random hurricane to create a Boeing 747. As it is also necessary only due to logic that if I jump out the window, then there is a possibility that I will fly. Logic, however, is not reality. In reality, it is a question of empirical evidence and not logical possibilities. Therefore, if we set aside the empirical evidence and immediately attempt to answer the question by chances and probability calculations, then, in reality, we do nothing else just making the impossible possible. With a deceptive magic trick, we substitute the logical possibility into the place of an impossibility of reality. Or to be harsh, thanks to the magic of numbers and to the so exact and scientific probability calculations, we start to believe in the magical power of random winds and lightning—or random mutations. And since any lightning, wind, or genetic mutation in the DNA are strictly deterministic physical process, even the meaning of our words 'random mutation' becomes blurry. (Paksi 2015)

So, the question is: Why do Dawkins and the neo-Darwinians so 'scientifically' look over the empirical evidence and deal with the problem as a question of chances and probability calculations? And why do we tend to believe them?

First, in their eyes, this approach of exact probability calculations due to the Laplacian ideal of objective knowledge is far more scientific than to ask what we believe based on our natural human experiences and personal facts.

Second, starting in the 1960s, experimenters have attempted to recreate life in the laboratory from non-living chemicals by random events, for example, by random electric discharges. But no matter how many times they tried, the experiments always failed. It is serious scientific evidence against the neo-Darwinian concept; however, they look over it by claiming 'it has not yet succeeded, but it does not matter because the next experiment might.'

Third, most importantly, they think in a *false dichotomy*. They say that there are two options: creation by a Higher Intelligence or creation by a random material process. God or randomness, there is no third option. It means that every other explanation easily becomes God himself which, of course, cannot be accepted in scientific discourse. It is also the reason that the hard empirical evidences of failed experiments to recreate life do not matter because if these negative results would be really accurate (which they are, of course) that would mean in their eyes that life was created by God; and that is obviously not possible, so the negative results of the experiments have to be false.

But ponder a moment, what is the real difference between *God as a magical factor* that cannot be scientifically observed and examined and between a supposed, once happened *mysterious random event* that cannot be repeated? Which, by the way, also means that it cannot be scientifically observed and examined. The picture of a random lightning bolt striking down from the sky and creating life or the image of a random, mysterious hurricane sweeping through a junkyard and leaving an operable Boeing 747 ready to fly, eloquently portrays the logic and real meaning of the neo-Darwinian concept regarding the origin of life. Logically, due to the dichotomy, it is precisely the same as God breathing the secret power of life down from the skies. Only they do not worship God but the demon of Laplace.

Finally, as we have seen, and this is the real point, they have materialist philosophical conviction. According to dualist creationism, life and man were created by God; according to materialist neo-Darwinism, life and man were created by random material processes, the mystical first event, mutations, and the mechanism of natural selection; and according to emergentism, life and man were the achievements of emergent evolution, which means both the workings of mutations and natural selection as well as the free acts of living beings according to the ordering principles of life and evolution. It is the reason that I dare to say that emergentism alone conveys the true meaning of evolution.

In most cases, in *Personal Knowledge* Polanyi speaks about plainly Darwinism. It turns out only from the context that to which kind or level of Darwinism he exactly refers. Nonetheless, to understand his critique it is enough to see and always remember the above fundamental difference between Darwinism and neo-Darwinism and, in consequence, when he harshly argues against explanations by random genetic mutations, or he states that the theory of natural selection as a lonely fundamental mechanism cannot explain any real comprehensive evolutionary orderly phenomena of nature, he, in fact, does not even contradict Darwin, because Darwin himself never claimed these things.

So, if we do not identify Darwinism with neo-Darwinism as neo-Darwinians do for obvious reasons, then Polanyi could and *should be* regarded as a Darwinian because in the limited original sense he completely acknowledges Darwin's theory of natural selection. Moreover, I dare to say that he is more faithful to the original spirit of Darwin's work because Darwin did not close the questions about, for example, the comprehensive orderly phenomena of evolution and its ordering principles as neo-Darwinism did due to the philosophical beliefs of materialism and positivism. Of course, Darwin was not an emergentist, but he was not a materialist too. I believe that he did not know yet what to think about these fundamental questions and left the door open.

3. The Meaning of Emergence and the Ordering Principles of Life and Evolution According to Michael Polanyi

We have seen in the previous section that the evolutionary development and the origin of life cannot be explained only by the lower-level mechanism of natural selection; we need further principles. Polanyi as an emergentist states the followings about the ordering principle of life:

> It is clear that for such an event [the first formation of life] to take place two things must be assured: (1) Living beings must be possible, i.e. there must exist rational principles, the operation of which can sustain their carriers indefinitely; and (2) favourable

> conditions must arise for initiating these operations and sustaining them. In this sense I shall acknowledge that the ordering principle which originated life is the potentiality of a stable open system; while the inanimate matter on which life feeds is merely a condition which sustains life, and the accidental configuration of matter from which life had started had merely released the operations of life. (Polanyi 1962: 383-384)

Life is the precondition of evolution; and the formation of life from inanimate matter, according to Polanyi, has two preconditions:

First, *living beings have to be possible*. This means, according to the logic of emergence, that if living beings come to existence, then beside the necessary lower-level material conditions *there will be such higher-level rational principles* (rules of rightness) *the operation of which can sustain these living beings*. Living beings are not material; their (tacit) knowledge works in accordance with these higher-level principles.

Second, favourable material conditions have to be formed. This means that if this happens, then these favourable lower-level conditions, according to the logic of emergence, will initiate and then sustain the operation of those higher-level rational principles which, in turn, sustain the living beings that have come to existence during the process.

It follows that 'the *ordering principle* which *originated* life is the potentiality of a *stable open system*.' Life itself is a stable open system. It has (1) emergent *knowledge* (skills) which works due to higher-level rational principles and (2) fundamental *material conditions*.

Before the first formation of life, there were no living beings merely the primordial material conditions and their random fluctuations in space-time. These material conditions and their random fluctuations, however, in themselves cannot initiate the formation of life. As a matter of fact, in themselves, the fluctuations of the material conditions are entirely deterministic because they can be said to be random only in relation with other levels as it is the case with mutations in the process of evolution (Paksi 2015). In an entirely material world, as materialism conceives it, *there is no randomness, and there is no potentiality*. In such a world, there are merely the mechanical processes of the fundamental material substance and, in consequence, there is no possibility for the emergence of life at all: living beings are just not possible.

It follows that the first precondition of the emergence of life—i.e., living beings have to be possible—is not a vacant logical necessity without any existential meaning, namely that if they are going to exist, then they will simply have to be possible. As just the first formation of life is not merely a question of chance and exact probability calculations about random material processes. The first precondition of the emergence of life is about the true hidden nature of reality. Before the emergence of life, that is, in a material world, according to the real nature of reality, there was already possible that certain favourable material conditions could be formed over time which would initiate the operation of higher-level rational principles and the formation of life. This concept describes the real material world already emerged from space-time during the so-called Big Bang and Cosmological Inflation but still before the emergence of life and not the false concept of materialism.

So, the origin of life is a *potentiality*: life is the consequence of this potentiality by time. The origin of life is not randomness or a logical necessity. It is not a material process or a vital substance. *Life is a possible new, emergent aspect of reality which arises from the randomness of fundamental material conditions according to the logic of emergence*.

In the ontological sense, before the emergence of life, actually there is merely the primordial inanimate matter in space-time; but potentially there is life itself because matter is only one aspect of reality. This is the meaning—or more precisely one of the primary meanings—of emergence: reality is more than the fundamental material substance but what is more is not another substance. Reality is more than matter because it has emergent aspects too. Space-time itself is the emergent aspect of reality and emergence is not a substantial process because it is a process by time. (Alexander 1920) This is the reason that the reduction of life cannot be done synchronically only in space at the moment but diachronically in time (see Part One and Two) because any emergence happens in/by time. Even the emergence of matter at the beginnings happened in/by time. At the time of the Big Bang there was no matter yet. However, this is another problem with which I cannot deal hear.

Nevertheless, we can say more than the origin of life is a potentiality by time because it is the

nature of emergence that every process of emergence has it own lower-level conditions. According to the second precondition of the emergence of life, also favourable lower-level material conditions have to be formed for the emergence of life. This means that *before* the emergence of life, the potential ordering principle of life is actually nothing more in space-time but a *favourable order of material conditions* which by time as a possibility-condition initiated the emergence of life. This potentiality of the real, emergent nature of reality and these favourable material conditions *together* lead to the first formation of the stable open systems of life.

Although the ordering principle of life is not an independent ontological existent before the emergence of life just a potentiality in a specific order of matter, *still cannot be identified* with the fundamental material substance. In this epistemological sense, no order of matter can be identified with matter itself. The (synchronic) reduction and thus the ontological elimination of the higher level, of course, in this case, can be done, but the reduced higher-level epistemic phenomenon of the specific order of matter is the precondition of the reduction process, therefore, cannot be eliminated (Part Two). This means that any favourable order of material conditions initiating the emergence of life is an *epistemologically emergent* phenomenon of the higher level, *a new space* created by this favourable order of material conditions in which the emergence of life can take place by time according the logic of emergence.

See Fig. 3: The structure of epistemologically emergent phenomena on p. 78

So, the conclusion is this: the ordering principle of life is certain, in the epistemological sense emergent comprehensive order of the fundamental material substance which by time as a new kind of space due to the logic of emergence initiates the realization of the possibility of life. The favourable comprehensive order, as I called it in Part One, is one of the two faces of emergence. This emergence originated life, that is, such stable open living systems which, in turn, are emergent in the ontological sense. This means that by time the weaker face of emergence initiated the emergence of the other, stronger face. This is the point and real meaning of emergence: reality unfolds its different aspects by time.

I have spoken of the philosophical meaning of the ordering principle of life. There are many details mainly concerning the material conditions about which it can also be talked and science, of course; however, my goal in this paper is to turn back to the problem of evolution: so, what the ordering principle of evolution is according to Polanyi? He continues the above quotation in the following way:

> And evolution, like life itself, will then be said to have been *originated* by the *action* of an ordering principle, an action *released* by random fluctuations and *sustained* by fortunate *environmental conditions*. (Polanyi 1962: 394)

He does not say much just indicates that the point of the process is the same. (1) First of all, evolution has to be possible. (2) Second, favourable random fluctuations of material conditions have to happen. (3) Third, favourable environmental conditions have to be formed. Then we can say that evolution is originated by the action of an ordering principle, and this ordering principle of evolution is the *potentiality of the evolutionary emergence* of stable open systems.

The most significant difference stems from the fact that before the emergence of life, there was only the primordial inanimate matter in space-time, but before the evolution of life, life itself was also already there: life is an emergent aspect of reality and the subject of evolutionary emergence. The presence of life is the reason that in this case the two different aspects of the second precondition of the emergence of life—here the second and third preconditions of the process—can be easily isolated.

To better understand the process I quote Polanyi once more: 'Novel forms of existence take control of the system by a process of *maturation*.' (Polanyi 1962: 395) Novel forms of existence mean the higher and higher levels of emergent knowledge of living beings by which they act according to higher and higher-level rational principles: for example, 'face the direction of the wind while you are approaching the prey.' The system about which Polanyi talks is the evolutionary system of the whole evolutionary process.

So, evolution has to be possible, that is, (1) there must be *life* and (2) there must be an *evolutionary system* which provides the needed space and energy flow (resources) for the evolution of life. Actually, this means nothing more than at the beginnings such random fluctuations of material conditions happened in a nebula which led to the formation of the stable open evolutionary system of Earth in the Solar System. Shortly afterward the action of the ordering principle of evolution was '*released* by random fluctuations and *sustained* by fortunate *environmental conditions*.' This means that for the evolution of life: (1) favourable random fluctuations have to happen in the material conditions of the body (space) of living beings; (2) favourable environmental conditions have to persist during the process outside (in the outside space of) the body of living beings. The first leads to the creation of *variants* by mutations which can be the subject of evolutionary emergence and the second to such *environmental resources* which, on the one hand, sustain life and, on the other hand, limit the acts of living beings. These are, of course, the factors of natural selection identified by Darwin so well, but these only 'released' and 'sustained' the action of the ordering principle of evolution and nothing more. Now, the question is what this ordering principle is the action of which was 'released' and 'sustained' by the factors of natural selection?

The answer is that this ordering principle is nothing else than the evolutionary system itself, that is, the Earth. It is a stable open system, in the epistemological sense emergent comprehensive order of the fundamental material substance which due to the logic of emergence initiates the evolutionary emergence of life, that is, initiates the realization of the possibility of evolutionary emergence in living beings.

Earth has the potentiality for evolutionary emergence, and by time this process has been realized. Life is the part of Earth. At the beginnings only a small part of it. Life is an emergent existent in the ontological sense which spreads and develops. Therefore, evolutionary emergence is the maturation process of Earth by which an epistemologically emergent stable open system becomes more and more emergent in the ontological sense. 'Novel forms of existence take control of the system' by their higher and higher levels of emergent knowledge as information accumulates in the genomes of living beings. This is the way in this case too as reality unfolds its different aspects by time in the specific spaces of the evolutionary system of Earth.

4. The Meaning of Emergent Evolution: Personal Knowledge and Natural Selection

Living beings develop their specific structures, fixed functions during ontogeny. This is one of their definite goals. The process complies with the logic of achievement, and it is controlled by the centre of the organism due to its coded knowledge. This process via generations and generations of living beings—called phylogeny—and at the higher level of the evolutionary system appears as the gradual organizations ('maturation') of the whole system. The process of phylogeny, of course, also complies with the logic of achievement; however, contrary to ontogeny, it is not controlled by a definite centre due to pre-coded information but by the limited resources and energy source of the system through its basic mechanism called natural selection.

> It is a fundamental property of open systems, not described before now, that they stabilize any improbable event which serves to elicit them. R. A. Fisher's observation of the way in which natural selection makes the improbable probable is but a particular application of this theorem. (Polanyi 1962: 384)

This means that open systems as higher-level ordering principles can regulate and harness the lower-level random processes. In the case of evolutionary systems, this action is realised via, of course, the Darwinian mechanism of natural selection.

Now, the questions are these: (1) how an epistemologically emergent order of material conditions, that is, the limited resources and the energy source (primarily the heat of the Sun, of course) of the evolutionary system can initiate and sustain the evolutionary emergence of life; (2) why the mechanism of natural selection does not describe this process; and (3) what the meaning of the claim is that the main driving force of selection is the heuristic efforts/achievements of individual living beings?

According to Polanyi, the most obvious facts of emergent evolution are the deepening of sentience

and the rise of thought, but these specific facts of natural human experience can become scientific facts if and *only* if we accept the concept of personal facts on the basis of the theory of personal knowledge. Otherwise, by explicit, objective criteria these are just naïve, subjective impressions. However, by these facts and only by these personal facts 'we can acknowledge that certain lines of evolution have been more effective than others.' (Polanyi 1962: 384) As we have seen in section 2, without these personal facts, we cannot speak about any real evolution, and the term itself will lose its original meaning and become a deceptive substitution. Nonetheless, in reality, we do not really care about the severe lack of exact scientific criteria but inevitably accept our natural, tacit convictions determined by these personal facts that we know more than our prokaryote progenitors; for example, contrary to them, we have eyes and can see.

It is trivia from the days of Lamarck and Darwin that these comprehensive achievements of evolution like the formation of the eye cannot be observed within a short period of time; however, it is a far more important fact that along with these crucial but rare evolutionary achievements thousands and thousands of other, random processes take place simultaneously which by their pure numbers could easily conceal these real evolutionary achievements from the eyes of the biologists. Nevertheless, the scientific observation of these random phenomena based on lower-level and quite exact criteria is, of course, not in the least unnecessary because these random processes are the direct possibility-conditions of every real comprehensive evolutionary achievement. For example, in this way geneticists have achieved wonderful successes analyzing the diverse and random conditions of evolution in the past decades, but in the meantime they, unfortunately, have ignored the sparse but real evolutionary achievements which are not merely the consequences of lower-level random processes, i.e., mutations but the actions of living beings according to different ordering principles. This means in respects to the theory of natural selection the following:

> . . . the theory of natural selection, by subsuming all evolutionary progress under the heading of adaptation as defined by differential reproductive advantage, necessarily overlooks the fact that the consecutive steps of a long-range evolutionary progress—like the rise of human consciousness—cannot be determined merely by their adaptive advantage, since these advantages can form part of such progress only in so far as they prove adaptive in a peculiar way, namely on the lines of a continuous ascending evolutionary achievement. The action of the ordering principle underlying such a persistent creative trend is necessarily overlooked or denied by the theory of natural selection, since it cannot be accounted for in terms of accidental mutation plus natural selection. (Polanyi 1962: 385)

The Darwinian theory of natural selection regards *every* process of selection as an *adaptation*. Even if a species loses its eye, as it happened with several species that now live underground, which is an apparent regression, of course, yet, this process of regression is also regarded as an adaptation to the actual environment. Nevertheless, the process of evolution is adaptive not merely in this narrow sense but *also in the sense of comprehensive evolutionary achievements*. For example, the formation of defensive coloration in a species, e.g., the green skin colour of the European tree frog can indeed be explained only by mutation and natural selection, since it is not under the control of higher-level ordering principles, and it does not lead to further, higher-level skills and knowledge, consequently, it is not a comprehensive evolutionary achievement, only an occasional adaptation to a random, local environment. However, this cannot be stated about the formation of the learning skills of mammals or about the development of the human mind which all established genuinely new higher evolutionary levels.

The point is that only those kinds of adaptations lead to evolutionary emergence which are under the control of higher-level principles and correspond to the logic of achievements in regards to the comprehensive evolutionary system, while other kinds of adaptations only by natural selection which do not meet these criteria do not. The ordering principle of evolution is not present or, more exactly, is not realized in every process of the evolutionary system, while the mechanisms of mutation and natural selection in themselves as conditions only 'release' and 'sustain' the actions of higher-level ordering principles. This is the reason Polanyi says that 'Darwinism has diverted attention for a

century from the descent of man by investigating the conditions of evolution and overlooking its action.' (Polanyi 1962: 390)

Polanyi calls the process which leads from the first primitive prokaryotes via so many generations to an actual living man *anthropogenesis*. This process is a clear chain of particular living beings—which because of sexuality diverged at higher levels but at the asexual beginnings was entirely linear,—and it has nothing to do with actually living peoples or with other different species of the past, the formation of which was explained by Darwin so successfully. From the viewpoint of evolutionary emergence, it does not matter at all that our thirty-thousandth great-grandfather was already a Homo Sapiens or still a Homo Erectus or whether he had a brother whose offspring later became Homo Neanderthals or had not. In regards to a particular process of evolutionary emergence, the examination of every side branch—there are and were billions of them!—of that particular descent, which realized the given evolutionary achievement in question, merely distracts the attention of the biologist from the real comprehensive evolutionary achievement.

Therefore, real evolutionary achievements are not about species or concrete living beings and certainly not about mutations and side branches of these mutations but about a comprehensive accumulation of 'novel forms of existence,' which gradually take control of the evolutionary system and which are decoded in the continuously surviving genome as (functional) information. This means that the foundation of real evolutionary emergence is nothing more but the continuous accumulation of information in the genome—later in human culture—which are adaptive in the sense of comprehensive achievements. However, since information (like randomness) is a relational phenomenon, it means nothing without living beings which use and apply this information. A lonely DNA in itself means nothing. It functions as coded knowledge only in the bodies of living beings. Consequently, *evolutionary emergence is, in fact, the continuous accumulation of the tacit knowledge and personal reality* of living beings developed from this coded information in each generation. By this tacit knowledge, we can solve problems, control our body, and harness our environment. By this knowledge, we can see, for example.

Now, we can understand the further deficiencies of natural selection and its real role in evolutionary emergence; nonetheless, we still have to precisely answer the central question that how an epistemologically emergent order of material conditions as an ordering principle can initiate the evolutionary emergence of life. Actually, this is the primary problem which always entails the accusation of vitalism even in the inner circle of the so-called Polanyian thinkers. For example, Philip Clayton expressed his opinion concerning this question at one of the events of the American Polanyi Society, and then he wrote in his book the followings:

> The causal powers of non-existent (or at least not-yet-existent) objects make for suspicious enough philosophy; they make for even worse science . . . The doctrine of vitalism that Polanyi took over from Driesch meant, in fact, a whole-scale break with the neo-Darwinian synthesis, on which all actual empirical work in biology today is based. (Clayton 2004: 21)

Yes, Polanyi used Driesch's concrete results but did not take over his conceptual and explanatory framework at all. These are different things. Nevertheless, in the eyes of the neo-Darwinians using scientific data which are against their theory is usually and unfortunately regarded as vitalism which, in fact, means 'bad' and 'unacceptable' science. Also, most of the actual empirical works in biology are not based on the neo-Darwinian theory, *only understood and explained* within this framework—which, in reality, is not needed at all to observe and classify the deceptive colours of different species or to identify and analyze the DNA sequences of a concrete living being. These various scientific examinations and their results can also be done and explained in the conceptual and explanatory framework of emergent evolution.

To answer our main question that how an epistemologically emergent order of material conditions can initiate and sustain the evolutionary emergence of life, Polanyi tries to elude the false dualism vs. materialism dichotomy, according to which, during the major transitions of emergent evolution either (1) a new, creative agent determined the process over and over again, that is, a vital force or a Higher Intelligence, or (2) the whole process was determined mechanically by fundamental material

conditions which, in consequence, as a kind of synchronic reduction would eliminate the real achievements of living beings thus at the end emergent evolution and living beings themselves.

In Polanyi's definition during the maturation of the evolutionary system, two different types of determining factors work: an *a fronte* and an *a tergo* types of determinism.

> We shall have to reconsider the concept of maturation in order to reconcile these alternatives. The argument will fall into two parts, the first dealing with determinism *a fronte* by the universal target of a commitment, the other with determinism *a tergo* by the bodily mechanism of the person entering on a commitment. (Polanyi 1962: 395)

The *a tergo* determinism is the mechanical effect of the lower-level material conditions which release and sustain the higher-level processes of life. These are necessary conditions for evolutionary emergence, but cannot and do not determine the active, dynamic acts of living beings entirely. They can be pictured as conditions which anchor the acts of living beings from behind.

The *a fronte* determinism is defined by a goal, and it works according to the logic of achievement. The terrestrial environment, which surrounds living beings and provides the necessary resources for them, is a stable open evolutionary system. This means that it incorporates many different kinds of comprehensive orders at many different levels both in the epistemological and in the ontological sense. The proper *recognition* of these different kinds of orders, the correct *solution* of the problems which stem from the situations created by these orders, and the *utilization of the opportunities* arising from these situations and orders are all fundamental and necessary goals of living beings if they want to survive, if they want offspring. It is the question of success or failure, life or death that a prey in a particular situation recognizes a comprehensive emergent order as a lion or as tall grass ruffled by the wind. *These acts of living beings are not merely mechanical processes or the consequences of some vital force but real achievements by the tacit skills and knowledge of living beings*. They have to use their knowledge to be able to solve the problems they have to face.

> We may say that the animal has seen a problem, if its perplexity lasts for some time and it is clearly trying to find a solution to the situation which puzzles it. In doing so, the animal is searching for a hidden aspect of the situation, the existence of which it surmises, and for the finding or achieving of which the manifest features of the situation serve it as tentative clues or instruments.
>
> To see a problem is a definite addition to knowledge, as much as it is to see a tree, or to see a mathematical proof—or a joke. It is a surmise which can be true or false, depending on whether the hidden possibilities of which it assumes the existence do actually exist or not. To recognize a problem which can be solved and is worth solving is in fact a discovery in its own right. (Polanyi 1962: 120)

These acts of problem-solving in some instances could become the dynamic adaptation of living beings to the terrestrial environment in the sense of comprehensive evolutionary achievements. However, many acts of problem-solving are, of course, only simple routine activities, or merely lead to adaptations to the accidental local conditions which in themselves do not evoke genuinely new skills and knowledge in the given living being but only new kinds of application of the existing ones (side branches of evolutionary emergence). If there are no hidden rational relationships in the comprehensive orders of the evolutionary system, then there will be no genuinely new opportunities, the recognition and utilization of which, according to higher-level ordering principles, could evoke genuinely new skills and knowledge in living beings. However, the point of the comprehensive evolutionary system is that due to its highly complex nature there are enormous numbers of hidden relationships in its different spaces which are rational because they can be recognized, solved, and utilized. For example, by the help of a rod, a chimpanzee can reach the termites through the heat dissipation holes of the termite mound which is the acquiring of a new skill and a primitive example of tool use. However, my point is that these kinds of new skills/knowledge are such adaptive achievements which can trigger real evolutionary emergences by their unforeseeable new opportunities as it was happened with the Homo habilis, for instance.

In this sense Polanyi claims that rational problems (and minds) are more real than tangible cobblestones:

> Persons and problems are felt to be more profound, because we expect them yet to reveal themselves in unexpected ways in the future, while cobblestones evoke no such expectation. This capacity of a thing to reveal itself in unexpected ways in the future I attribute to the fact that the thing observed is an aspect of a reality, possessing a significance that is not exhausted by our conception of any single aspect of it. To trust that a thing we know is real is, in this sense, to feel that it has the independence and power for manifesting itself in yet unthought of ways in the future. I shall say, accordingly, that minds and problems possess a deeper reality than cobblestones, although cobblestones are admittedly more real in the sense of being tangible. And since I regard the significance of a thing as more important than its tangibility, I shall say that minds and problems are more real than cobblestones. (Polanyi 1967: 32-3)

For Polanyi, according to the concept of emergence, reality is not just strict substance and tangibility but the constantly unfolding rational aspects of reality too. Cobblestones usually are not going to surprise us and face us with new problems. But the higher-level, functional relations, interactions, and connection of our evolutionary system as they are unfolding during the long course of evolution will do. At a higher intellectual level, a problem could be a vital anticipation of a significant rational relations, for example, a prescience of a fundamental physical law in exact sciences, but animals also have to solve problems, for example, to recognize and evade a well-placed trap or to find a way to reach the pray in the swamp. Problem-solving in all cases means *the proper recognition and understanding of the different comprehensive features of the evolutionary system*,—of course, for all living beings at its own intellectual level. When living beings solve problems, they do it for the reason to adapt to their environment, and this leads them to the *better understanding* of the evolutionary system at their own level of personhood, of course, as it is important to emphasize again and again. This means two things.

First, living beings reach *deeper contact with reality* manifesting itself in the comprehensive features of the evolutionary system. This deeper/new contact can be described as the accumulation of information in the system.

> We have seen already that whenever we make (or believe we have made) contact with reality, we anticipate an indeterminate range of unexpected future confirmations of our knowledge derived from this contact. The interpretative framework of the educated mind is ever ready to meet somewhat novel experiences, and to deal with them in a somewhat novel manner. In this sense all life is endowed with originality and originality of a higher order is but a magnified form of a universal biological adaptivity. But genius makes contact with reality on an exceptionally wide range: seeing problems and reaching out to hidden possibilities for solving them, far beyond the anticipatory powers of current conceptions. (Polanyi 1962: 124)

Polanyi speaks about us as living beings, more precisely, about the genius, but he makes clear that the wonderful acts of a genius are only one kind of the many other kinds of achievements of 'a magnified form of a universal biological adaptivity' like, for example, a cat's new adaptive skill to stalk its prey. We are all living beings, we possess the same ancient tacit skills, and our ultimate motivations are also the same.

Second, the ordering principle of evolution (that is, a stable open evolutionary system) provides a continuously unfolding *space* and *direction* for the achievements of living beings in a way that cannot be described as a direct mechanical or vital effect. Therefore, the ordering principle of evolution is indeed only the *possibility* of evolutionary emergence: in itself it cannot cause any acts of living beings and thus the process of evolutionary emergence because it is not an independent/substantial reality like a vital force or a Higher Intelligence, 'only' the sum of the various, unfolding spaces of the comprehensive emergent orders of the terrestrial environment (partly in the epistemological and partly

in the ontological sense). It follows that living beings *themselves* by their active, dynamic nature have to recognize, utilize, and occupy these spaces and thus realize the possible further comprehensive evolutional achievements.

Nevertheless, in living beings there works an aspiration, an active, emergent principle, the actual manifestation of the principle of life which spurs them to explore and understand the comprehensive emergent phenomena of the evolutionary system, to solve the problems they have to face, and to utilize the possible opportunities; this drives evolution from inside, and nothing causes it from outside.

At the basic level of replication of primitive prokaryotes, where there is no real ontogeny during reproduction yet, comprehensive evolutionary achievements can happen only in the sense of *phylogenetic emergence*—which is called by Polanyi the highest 'stage of originality.' (Polanyi 1962: 399) Primitive prokaryotes can face and solve problems only indirectly due to their coded knowledge at their most primitive level of personhood. Accordingly, a fortunate mutation could lead to such new acts and individual achievements in the life of the primitive prokaryote which at the level of the evolutionary system appear as indirect solutions and utilizations of rational problems; therefore, these fortunate mutations could initiate and sustain real comprehensive evolutionary achievements. So, the active knowledge of the primitive prokaryote refers to the comprehensive features of the system only indirectly through the evolutionary process thus it can be described only at the higher level of the system.

At higher levels of reproduction, where there are ontogeny and sexuality but no real perception yet, living beings can face and solve problems also only indirectly, but now there is a process of *ontogenetic maturation* too, the next stage of originality by which living beings also can develop new acts and individual achievements—which at the comprehensive level of the evolutionary system could also appear as the indirect solutions and utilizations of problems and thus initiate and sustain real comprehensive evolutionary achievements.

By the emergence of perception and memory living beings became able to recognize and solve problems directly by their own individual skills (lowest stage of originality in Polanyi's term) and their individual achievements as the achievements of ontogenetic maturation also could lead to the comprehensive evolutionary success of their lineages. At this level, we can claim that their knowledge (tacit skills and concepts) due to their individual personal experiences directly refers to the features of the comprehensive system and not only through the evolutionary process. A cat can directly recognize a dog and act accordingly. However, this new kind of individual knowledge of living beings becomes a really forceful power only when its developmental basis does not have to be recorded randomly in their replicative code anymore but can pass through from one generation to another in new ways by a fundamentally new information recording and transmitting system called cultural transmission.

So, to sum up in Polanyi's words: 'No new creative agent, therefore, need be said to enter an emergent system at consecutive new stages of being. Novel forms of existence take control of the system by a process of *maturation*.' (Polanyi 1962: 395)

The epistemologically emergent evolutionary system of the beginnings partly becomes emergent in the ontological sense by the maturation process of emergent evolution, that is, by the active comprehensive achievements of living beings. Reality unfolds its hidden aspects, genuinely new skills and knowledge of living beings emerges, and as 'novel forms of existence take control of the system' the Earth becomes a planet rich in life. There comes no more matter to the surface of Earth, 'merely' the knowledge of living beings which emerges at the different spaces and levels of the comprehensive orders of the evolutionary system due to the active nature of time working in the centre of all living beings.

5. Conclusion

There is no personal knowledge without personal reality. Dualism implies creation and absolutism concerning our knowledge. Materialism, in turn, questions even the most obvious facts of evolution 'to avoid facing the problem set to us by the fact that the universe has given birth to these curious beings, including people like ourselves.' (Polanyi 1962: 35)

Our knowledge is personal because of one reason: we are the children of evolution. Everybody sees the world from a unique place, a unique time, and a unique body: 'we must inevitably see the

universe from a centre lying within ourselves.' (Polanyi 1962: 3) Here lie the tacit roots of our knowledge helped us to survive in the evolutionary system of the Earth.

The authority and power of materialism in science are enormous. But if we want to be personalist following Polanyi, we will have to preserve our consistency even in the case of the hardest topics. Every scientific fact has a personalist/emergentist explanation. And many of them have only emergentist one. The origin and evolution of life are two of them.

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Fig. 1



Fig. 2



Fig. 3



DISCUSSION:

THE UNCOMMON GOOD

R.T. Allen

The Special Issue of Vol. 12 of Appraisal was devoted to reviews of Jonas Norgard Mortenson's *The Common Good: An introduction to Personalism*. I had read the book and I still feel uncomfortable with the title, which could easily be taken to imply that personalism (better, personalisms) is all about the common good rather than persons. I do not mean that personalists or others, should ignore the common good, but that, not only is it an application of any personalism and not the core, but, more importantly, that it can be understood in several ways, some of which are antipersonal. I aim solely to warn against some of those ways

An obvious formal definition is that it consists of what all members of the public have in common. At least four 'material' accounts can be given which would fit that definition.

1. The 'libertarian' account: that what we all share is a desire to choose for ourselves what we may do. To this is usually added the rider 'so long as we allow the same freedom to others'. This account is often the result of a value-scepticism which holds that there are no objective values and so we may all think and do as we please. This is the legacy of Locke and J.S. Mill whose case for liberty is explicitly based on scepticism about religion, ethics and politics. So also is the contemporary trend of much Analytic philosophy, as with discussions of 'the meaning of life' in which any such meaning is denied and therefore individuals can each look for and find some meaning.[1] But this contains a fatal contradiction: viz. precisely because we cannot know the truth in these matters, therefore we should not interfere with the like liberties of others. Why not, if all values are 'subjective'? For these reasons any personalist would reject it.

2. Another account is that of listing concerns and desires which we all share, such as health, security, and sufficient income to maintain or achieve a satisfactory way of life, which often translates into the public policy of a welfare state. This leaves open the choice of how we each pursue happiness.

3. Since personalists value the freedom of the individual, some may be content with that, but it could be taken to mean that the rest of life is just a matter of doing as we please as in (1). Thus (2) would easily become the proposal that the *only good* of individual and collective action is what is proposed for the common good.

4. From that could easily emerge a more aggressive and reductive egalitarianism, inimical to anything of higher value and out of reach, and motivated by envy: 'What I cannot have or do, no one else shall have or do'.[2] Hence because I cannot be a scientist, artist, musician, writer, etc., or by my

[1] See for example:

Baier, K., (1957), *The Meaning of Life*, Canberra. [publishers not known].

Britton, K., (1971, especially Chap. 8), *Philosophy and the Meaning of Life*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Edwards, P., (1967) 'Life: Meaning and Value of', in Edwards, P., (ed.) *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, New York, Macmillan and The Free Press.

Hanfling, O., (1987), especially, Chap. 10), *The Quest for Meaning*, Oxford, Blackwell.

Klemke, E.D, (2008), 'Introduction' in Klemke, E.D and Cahn, S.M., eds. (2008), *The Meaning of Life: A Reader*, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press

Seachris, J., (2013), ed., *Exploring the Meaning of Life: an Anthology and Guide*, Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester.

Also Mises, L. von, *Socialism: A Economic and Sociological Analysis*, trans. J. Kahane, London, Jonathon Cape, 1936. Ludwig von Mises, despite holding all values to be 'subjective', was a passionate defender of freedom and democracy.

[2] Kant's formulae of the Categorical Imperative—'Act only on that maxim through which you can act at the same time will that it should become a universal law', and 'Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a law of nature' (*Grundlegung*, 2nd ed., 52, Royal Prussian

own efforts attain to a better way of life, 'to get up, get out and get on', no one else should.[3]

Aurel Kolnai, a younger associate in Hungary of Karl and Michael Polanyi, when in 1940 he arrived as a refugee in New York, became worried by the prevalence in America of the idea of 'the Common Man' who embodies these attitudes. He was at pains to distinguish him from the 'Plain Man', who, while not being interested in the arts and sciences, does respect them.[4] In his reply to the trade union official, John Hands also mentioned his father who had no interest in intellectual pursuits but was appalled at the behaviour of some academics in their private lives, and thought they especially should know better. He was a good example of the 'Plain Man'. This is a part of Kolnai's overall argument that without 'privileges' democracy can cease to be liberal and become totalitarian, the 'Common Man' being a pale version of the Marxist 'proletarian'. In short, a free society and any civilisation arises, lives and grows because of 'uncommon' persons and their pursuits which go beyond those of physical welfare, and who need the respect, protection and often the financing of sponsors, governments and the general public, because their achievements do enhance in one way or another and sooner or later, everyone's life. If we were all exactly the same, who would take initiatives, be a discoverer, pioneer or inventor? Welfare can make life more comfortable, or, at least, more bearable, but only uncommon persons and their activities can make it worthwhile. Indeed, 'uncommon' persons can promote greater welfare: consider the vast improvements in medical treatments and surgery. But the applied sciences of medicine, engineering and the like, would themselves be stultified if the pure natural sciences and mathematics were limited to what could be immediately applied to welfare and other practical applications, as in Marxist theory and practice and by democratic governments with a narrow outlook. True, the Ivory Tower can become self-enclosed and unproductive of anything except repetitions of what is already known and minute examination of mere details, but without it life generally would eventually follow suit.

There is also another sort of 'uncommon man', the 'oddity', 'eccentric' or 'character' who may need to be cherished simply because he brings colour to what may otherwise be a rather dull and drab uniformity of life, as well as possibly being an inventor or discoverer of something that could turn out to be a further contribution to the common good.

Thus, my argument is that 'the common good' must clearly include 'uncommon goods' which 'uncommon' persons pursue and which personalists in particular should cherish and protect against the reductive uniformity of collectivisms and envy.

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Academy, 421).—also entail that to do what not all can do is a breach of the Categorical Imperative, therefore it is definitely immoral. This means that self-sacrifice to save others is immoral because if everyone one does so, then they cannot possibly succeed. Likewise, for some to devote themselves beyond the common good, if it is the *sole* good, could never be allowed. That Kant's reasoning prohibits heroism and requires envious levelling down, has not, to my knowledge, be shown before.

[3] At an annual meet of the John Macmurray Fellowship in Oxford some years ago, a trade-union official praised the 'community' (i.e., collectivism) of mining villages. In reply, John Hands, a quiet and serious man, told us of his own experience of such 'community': its opposition to anyone who, instead of following the other men down the pit or marrying a miner, did get up, get out and get on. Alan Ford then briefly mention his similar experiences

[4] 'Privilege and Liberty' in *Privilege and Liberty and Other Essays in Political Philosophy*, ed. by D.J. Mahoney, Lanham MD, Lexington Books, 1999, Part One especially I, 19-23, and VII-VII, 83-9

Gábor Biró
The Economic Thought of Michael Polanyi.
London & New York, Routledge, 2020; ISBN 978-367-24563-4 (hbk),
978-0-429-28317-8 (ebk), viii and 178 pp.

As one who has republished Polanyi's articles on economics, written articles on the subject and edited books containing articles on it, but has been unable to read any of the vast amount of his unpublished work and correspondence about it, I heartily welcome this book which uses those materials to show how his economic thinking developed, the other strands of economic thought at the time, his aim to enlighten the public about economics, and especially his own version of Keynes' policy of counter-cyclical deficit spending to increase the money in recessions and higher unemployment and budget surpluses to control expansions and the risks of inflation. Against Keynes' advocacy of direct government financing of specific projects and industries, Polanyi wanted the government simply to cut taxes and leave it to businesses and individuals to decide how the additional money would be invested or spent, and how he pioneered moving diagrammatic films to make these ideas and proposals more intelligible to the general public (Biró uses the contemporary term 'masses' which I regard as demeaning). All this is covered in some detail. For example, whereas as I knew that the final film *Money and Unemployment*, of which there is a copy at the London Film Institute, was shown only a very few times in cinemas, Biró uncovers its much wider use by adult education and similar groups.

Biró rightly emphasises that Polanyi rejected the ideologies of both socialism (and other collectivisms) and the *laissez-faire* and utilitarianism of extreme liberalism. In respect of the last, Biró mentions four faults that Polanyi found with it:

1. The principle of the just reward factors of production is taken to be that of those who dispose of them.
2. It stresses the limits of the state with respect to the market, which in any case is not applicable to all relations among persons, and that *laissez-faire* is not always the answer to the central planning of the economy.
3. It cannot explain the trade cycle of boom and slump, but Keynes can and also can show a way out of depressions.
4. It is also necessary to address the general public.

Some similar items are:

1. That 'the invisible hand' is not just out there but also exists in the minds of the public, who therefore need to have some understanding of it via appropriate means such as visual ones and thus his films.
2. His criticisms of academic economists who are concerned with their theories and rigorous discipline, and neglect the enlightenment of the public.
3. Similarly they reject anything that does not fit their basic assumptions.
4. Both socialist planning and *laissez-faire* have a purely mechanical view of the participants in the economy, with no room for personal sentiment and metaphysics (i.e. general world-and life-views).

The Epilogue is titled 'Towards a Polanyian personal economics', which would open itself to communication with the public and thus be an ally of democracy.

To some items I would like to add some qualifications:

1. A clearer distinction by the author between the influence of the social contexts of what and how we know something and their determination of the truth or error of what we know, as Polanyi drew in the important letter to Karl Mannheim on April 19th, 1944.
2. Likewise one between Polanyi's 'post-critical' philosophy and the relativism of 'postmodernism' with which Biró connects him.
3. Polanyi's refusal to separate economic theory from economic policy. Much confusion over 200 years has been created by confusing economic theory itself with utilitarianism, both by the utilitarians and their critics, so that the latter often advocated uneconomic policies. Policy requires theory and also adaptation to circumstances such as the ways of life of different populations, and professional judgement how to implement policy. Louis IV and Louis V wrecked their economies

and France itself by ignoring the costs of their wars, and by following a misconceived mercantilist economic policy, of accumulating gold by aiming continually to export more that they imported, the latter still followed by Germany, against EU rules!, and China.

The author has put a lot of effort into this valuable study and the reader will wonder how Polanyi had the time for four decades when still fully engaged in his scientific work to engage in such a great correspondence, reading books on economics, working on animated diagrammatic films and the reform of patent law, to the last of which I have found only a brief mention on p. 140, and his first attempts to articulate his own thinking on society and his philosophy.

R.T. Allen

Daniel Paksi: *Personal Reality: The Emergentist Concept of Science , Evolution and Culture.* Two Volumes.
Eugene, OR, Pickwick Publications, 2019.

1. Overview

I found it difficult properly to review these two volumes, partly because there is so much of importance in both, and especially because I am not competent to review the numerous and strictly scientific contents. Hence I shall give a brief overview of the two volumes, some idea of the contents and structure. Next I shall add Dr David Jewson's review of the more scientific passages. He is a retired medical doctor who now studies physics as well as personalist philosophy. Finally I shall comment upon the more philosophical items.

These two volumes build upon and extend recent articles by the author in *Appraisal*, which to which I have responded. In brief, the author employs the philosophy of Michael Polanyi, which he summarises sufficiently for those new to Polanyi, and gives plenty of references to, and quotations from, mostly *Personal Knowledge*, and especially the final chapter, 'The Rise of Man'. He also employs contributions from Samuel Alexander and others, in order to explain how evolution has produced a multi-level universe culminating in the emergence of persons and their cultures.

Each volume has two parts. In Vol. 1 Paksi sets out the main themes and their basis in the philosophy of Polanyi, which he summarises as required, and in Vol. 2 he enlarges them.

In Vol. I. Pt 1, 'Personal knowledge', he shows the limits of Darwin's 'natural selection' and Neo-Darwinism, to account for the real emergence of higher and more complex levels or orders of reality, notably life which Darwin's theory presupposes. Our own emergence as intelligent beings is shown by the unspecifiable nature of our knowledge compared with the specifiability of our DNA, the incoherence of Laplace's universe with no one in it who could apprehend it, and the tacit roots of scientific discovery, doubt and our personal knowledge beliefs and commitments.

Randomness, on which Darwinians depend for the emergence of higher orders, is the effect of the deterministic material upon an existing higher order, and so it can account for breakdowns and in a higher order and eventually its destruction. A higher order is an unspecifiable whole resting upon and harnessing its specifiable parts.

Pt 2, 'Emergence' is a more detailed examination of emergence and accounts of it, its relations to reduction and materialism. Emergence results in two different kinds of reality but only on one multi-level entity, and not a dualism of two entities. 'Weak' or 'epistemological' reduction (that higher levels can be explain by the concepts and categories of lower ones) entails materialism, and both require a *person* to perform and believe in them. The difficult (for me) Chap. 6 on the roles of space, time and matter, I shall leave to Dr Jewson and to a comment at the end. Boundary conditions, the limits within which a process operates, are used by Polanyi's and Paksi's to explain the action of a higher level upon a lower. A piece of wood leaves open many ways in which it can be shaped and the uses to which it can be put, and bars others, as by the greater weakness if shaped across and not with the grain (my example). Paksi applies this conception to the natural sciences and engineering. (It can also be applied to personal life: good manners and moral laws set limits to what we can think, say and do; grammar sets limits to the construction of meaningful sentences.) Time is real, and the proper answer to dualism and vitalism is the 'diachronic reduction' of tracing emergence back to its origins. What higher levels depend upon has to emerge after the lower and they in due turn.

Vol. 2. Pt 3 'Evolution'. begins with Polanyi on 'The Logic of Achievement' in all forms and levels of life and machines, plus Paksi's own addition of computers. What distinguishes all of them is that they manifest 'rules of rightness', which are formulations of their success or failure, health or disease, life or death, the correct or impaired or total failure of their operations. These are the emergent 'ordering principles' of all levels above that of the physical. Thus the study of them requires evaluation of the success or failure, health of disease, etc., of entities and processes on those levels. The emergence of personal knowledge (and the subpersonal knowledge of animals) can be understood only by our use of our own personal knowledge and its tacit and unspecifiable roots, and not by the specifiable measurements of the physical sciences nor Darwinian natural selection. Likewise cultural

evolution and transmission, cultural organisations and their emergence, individuals, groups and persons, and writing as a recording and transmitting system, have be understood in the same way.

Part 4, 'Personal Reality', starts with examination of scientific revaluations, evolutionary views of science, relativism or absolutism, personal knowledge and truth and demolished idols, and proceeds to moral and intellectual reality, with reference to Polanyi on modern dynamic societies, Marxism, moral inversion and its spurious and new forms. Finally, Paksi considers the future of personal reality with respect to truth and morality, God and matter, evolution and emergence, science and wisdom, and a general conclusion.

There is much detailed examination and development of the matters discussed, and which I cannot mention or comment upon here.

2. The scientific aspects

I have been asked by Richard Allen to review the scientific parts of Daniel Paksi's book as I am both a Personalist philosopher and have a particular and deep interest in physics, but like Polanyi, I am a medical doctor and not a physicist. I am, therefore, going to concentrate on Chapter 6 of Volume 1: 'Space, Time and Matter', although a lot of the concepts in this chapter are explained or discussed in other chapters as well. This might seem a rather confined approach, however, the key theme of the book is to do with time and space, and so to understand this chapter helps to understand the whole book.

I have been particularly pleased to do this as I soon discovered a lot in common between what both Daniel Paksi and I find interesting and indeed what we both see as solutions to the real conundrum about how Nature (the world, reality, physics) is actually working. I apologise for the length of this review, but I couldn't say what I wanted in a shorter space.

Perhaps the first thing to say is that there are a huge number of ideas in this book crammed into a very small space. Daniel Paksi clearly loves ideas and has tried to build a very comprehensive picture, but that makes it hard to review as a thorough review on its own would take another book. Philosophers will also struggle with a lot of it as, in order to be concise, Paksi uses a lot of scientific jargon. So, although, for example, I understand the Lorentz transformation, a lot of philosophers would not and, due to the density of rather technical physics, many would give up almost before they began which is a shame because the main ideas are well worth getting to grips with. So, one of the main ideas is that Nature (the world, reality, physics) is emergent. This is an absolutely lovely idea. I think it means that if you take some very simple things and apply simple rules to them you can get some very complicated things. So, if you were to take lots of identical Lego bricks, which have some very simple rules about how they can be attached together, you can make some very complicated things, like, for instance, a giant model of a giraffe in a park. People might wander past that giant model for years and never realise that it was made of Lego bricks or that such simple rules for connecting Lego bricks together could make such a complicated thing. One might then draw a parallel with how Nature (the world, reality, physics) is actually working by wondering if all the beautiful complexity we see actually comes from something simple. The nice thing about this idea is that if you did find that simplicity it would be quite easy to prove that you were right by, for example, programming a computer with those simple ideas and rules (and those simple ideas and rules alone), setting it going and seeing if it came up with the complexity of Nature exactly as it is. Now with most scientific theories it is easy to bodge them to make them fit the facts by adding exceptions and working around etc. so, essentially by making your theory more complicated. But if you are only allowed only a few simple ideas and rules which are then to be repeatedly applied to produce Nature, you can make your theory more complicated so you can do the bodging. Also if you did want to bodge a rule to try to make your theory fit a particular thing you found Nature, as that same rule would be applied many times and affect all parts of Nature, you might find your change had fixed the thing you wanted it to, but caused a multitude of things that didn't fit in all the other parts of Nature. So, the idea of emergence is well worth exploring.

As a Personalist there are some other ideas that I find attractive and I mention them here only as a way that I can personally judge Paksi's book by comparison. So, I experience the world. I experience time and I experience space, but I experience them as different things. Rather than 'time' it might be

better to say 'change' and therefore not to say 'time passes' but to say 'things change' I also experience lots of other things such as different colours, for example. I can imagine things happening and my imagination uses the same things as I experience in the real world, e.g. space, change and colour. So the ideal description or theory of the world would, for me, consist of the same things. To perhaps put it more simply, if you have a good theory of the world you need to be able to imagine exactly what is going on. No theory of physics has every managed to do this, although people keep trying. To understand why this has been such a big problem it is useful to think about some of the very strange basic things physicists have discovered about the world so far:

1. When trying to predict what small things like atoms do, it seems you can only give probabilities about what will happen. A way of being exact has not so far been found. Why should this be? A lot of small things seem to occur in packets, so, for example, light seems to be divided up into little packets of energy. Why should this be?
2. There are good ways of predicting what small things (like light packets) will do, but these involve rather strange and bizarre ways of working things out that don't seem connected to reality at all. Let me give you a flavour of this. So one way you can work out where small things might go is by drawing lots of waves. I wont go into how exactly how to do this, but it depends on the fact that waves can either add together (two crests add together to make a large crest) or can cancel out (a crest added to a trough makes nothing), so if you have an area full of lots of waves there will be some places where there are large waves (where all the crests are added together) and other places where there are no waves (crests cancel out a troughs) and you can see this with water waves, say on the surface of a pond (you need to throw several pebbles into the pond at the same time to get several waves that can mix). So, as I say, you use these waves to predict where small things will go, and the answer is they are more likely to go where waves are large. Rather surprisingly this works very well, but these waves are not real, they are just drawings, and if the drawings do represent something real there is no explanation as to where these waves come from, what they actually are or why this barmy method of adding waves together works. So you start with small things, which are easy to imagine, but then you have to add in some barmy method of working out where they go. That is why physicists will also say they don't understand it. They mean they have a barmy process they can use to predict what will happen but have no idea why it works. This frustrates many of them as much as it frustrates philosophers.
3. When something, like a pocket watch, for example, is given energy by being thrown, it starts to move. But it will also start to tick more slowly, and so run slow (whatever mechanism it has), and it will also shrink to be slightly smaller. Even more oddly gravity causes exactly the same effects, so a watch will tick more slowly on the surface of the earth, where gravity is strong, than when it is in space well away from Earth, where there is no noticeable gravity and again this happens whatever type of mechanism it has to make it tick. This all has the rather unfortunate consequence that if different people, who are travelling at different speeds (or experiencing different amounts of gravity), make measurements, they will all disagree because their watches are running at different rates and their measuring sticks have shrunk by different amounts, and it is difficult to say who is right. They do, however, all agree on the speed of light and that, as something approaches the speed of light, more and more energy is needed to get it to go any faster, so it is actually impossible for it to reach light speed as it would take an infinite amount of energy to get there.

Paksi is clearly undaunted by this task and starts by deciding what fundamentals of our experience should form the basic elements of a theory of reality. Following Samuel Alexander he decides to choose space and change (time). This seems a big ask, but actually I think it could work. Other personalist philosophers like Austin Farrer have had similar ideas. Farrer, I believe, linked existence to action which is much the same as linking existence to change. I won't go into the details of how Paksi puts it all together, which is rather complicated, but I might present something which I am guessing is similar to what Paksi is saying:

Consider Space and then imagine at every point in space there is a number and this number is constantly changing. It would be like a vast sea of changing numbers, each number being at a fixed point. Also imagine that one changing number can affect its neighbours and that there are simple rules that govern how this happens and that this influencing of one point of space upon another spreads throughout the system at one fixed speed. This could produce an interesting sea of interlinked

constantly changing things, and you might say that this could model the world, as the world is nothing more than a sea of interlinked changing things, but then this is hardly our personal experience of the world. We don't experience numbers, we experience things. Where, for example, do things like the colour red come in? So, in physics red light can be thought of as a wave which means it can be represented by a number that goes up and down repeatedly at a particular rate (just like waves go up and down at a particular rate). Red at a particular point in space could then be represented by a changing number that cycles up and down. Hey, Presto! This means all our changing numbers could be transformed into things that we personally experience, or, to put it another way, those changing numbers are a code for something we do personally experience.

So space and change alone could describe Nature. But, rather paradoxically this gives a world that can both be described very simply using space and change, but is also very complicated as each changing number can be decoded into what is really experienced. There is clearly an infinite number of rates at which a number can change and therefore an infinite number of experiences (the colour red being one of them) that those changing numbers can describe.

So does Paksi succeed? Well, given the fundamental rules that he starts with and nothing else, I'm not sure a computer applying those ideas repeatedly would actually come up with a world that includes all the oddities listed above, one reason being that the rules are not very clear or detailed. Also the link between the theory and real experiences, such as the colour red, is not a major focus of the theory, indeed I'm not sure it appears at all.

Paksi also, quite naturally, seems keen to make his theory fit in with Einstein's ideas. I prefer to think that Einstein was really struggling with the implications of his theory and never found a satisfactory explanation for them. For example, although, probably in the minority of one, I find it difficult to agree that speed is only relative to other moving objects. This is not some reactionary longing for classical physics but paradoxically from Einstein's own theory. So, if we were all travelling at different speeds and all carrying identical watches, then, according to Einstein's theory, the watches would all run at different rates. We could then tell who was travelling at the slowest speed by whose watch was ticking the fastest.

In the above model I gave of Space filled with fixed points with a changing number at each point, there is clearly a fixed grid of points, so something against which to judge speed, and then the values at each point can influence their neighbours (increase or decrease how fast they are changing), so that influence can move across points in space, but at only at the same, single speed. A water wave is similar in that water moves up and down where a water wave starts and that moving water influences the water next to it and so on and the wave spreads out at a single speed. In Einstein's universe there are many speeds but speed is relative to other objects in the universe that are not fixed; in contrast, in the universe I put forward above there is only a single speed, and that speed is relative to a fixed background.

My own hope would be that all the odd things that are currently explained by Einstein's theory would actually emerge naturally from a very simple set of rules about how things change in Space, repeatedly applied and so Einstein's view of things, along with complicated concepts like space-time, would no longer be necessary.

So, in summary, well done Daniel Paksi. I really think your basic ideas about each of us having a personal reality and that that reality emerges from space, change and a set of very simple rules is interesting, thought provoking and could well be spot-on. I would say the details do need some considerable re-crafting and development, but that it is such challenges that make philosophy itself worthwhile.

3. Philosophical aspects

First, a minor discomfort: I think that 'evolution' is not an apt term for the rise and history of human cultures and civilisations, because it suggests that they are continuous with the emergence of the non-personal levels, and thus are the results of impersonal forces, whereas human life and its histories are the more-or-less intended or unintended results of human discoveries, efforts, plans, mutual self-adjustments and creations.

Now for the really important items. Paksi follows Polanyi in rightly insisting that radically new orders and levels of reality have come into existence, especially those of life, then perception and

intelligence, and finally that of self-responsible persons. Again, he is rightly critical of Darwin and Darwinism which can only explain the micro-evolution of changes within species, and not the macro-evolution of new orders or levels. In any case, 'natural selection', like the *'*artificial selection' of plant and animal breeders, can *'*select' only from what exists. Hence it is explicitly a theory of survival and extinction, and not of how something quite new comes into existence. That Neo-Darwinism assigns to the random mutation of genes. But how have genes emerged? As Paksi rightly says, Darwinism presupposes life and cannot account for its emergence. Again, he rightly argues that evolution presupposes the reality of time and thus the 'diachronic reduction' of tracing the stages of emergent entities back to their physical source (But is that a confusing new use of 'reduction'?), whereas the *'*synchronic reductions*'* of materialism deny its reality. But, surely, the physical level of the universe is also constantly in motion and undergoing changes. Moreover while the equations measuring its processes can be reversed, there are innumerable processes that cannot be reversed: splashes of liquids, diffusion of energy, heat and light, all biological processes especially those from life to death. It is only an infatuation with mathematics that leads the deniers of irreversible change and time to ignore the realities of the world around them and their own life experiences.

But he does not deal or even mention the serious and evidenced arguments that higher levels and new forms within them do not evolve from lower or previous ones, such as land animals from marine ones and homo sapiens from earlier hominds. Rather, throughout he takes the fact of continuous evolution for granted.

Paksi also rightly rejects the substitution of mathematics for the realities it is used to measure. But at this point (Vol. I, Chap. 6, 'Space, Time and Matter'), Paksi, having rightly rejected, with Einstein, Newton*'*s absolute Time and Space (a pre-existing cosmic grid) then invokes Samuel Alexander's reinstatement of their pre-existence, but with Time, as a successive whole, irreversible, transitive and ordering, and possible only in Space. Although he recognises that both are conceptual abstractions, he then follows Alexander in treating them, not only as entities, but also as active agents, each making the other possible: time makes a three-dimensional space possible and only space can make time manifest itself. Space is therefore the lower-level condition of the emergent higher level of Time. To be frank, this looks like a combination of a mythology of the old all-inclusive and self-generating cosmos and of the Hegelian trick of turning logical relations into real and causative ones. It really ought to be demythologised. Also, though Polanyi did mention it (with respect to equipotentiality, when one part of an organism takes over the operations of another but defective or absent one, *Personal Knowledge*, pp. 337ff.), events on higher levels can disturb the operations of lower ones, as when chronic worry can cause stomach ulcers. It also means that randomness can occur even in the lowest level, and therefore that all levels are *'*open*'* ones and none are wholly deterministic and therefore not completely closed, contrary to what Paksi claims in Vol. Chap. 4.4.

I now come to the central question of what brings into existence all the novel higher levels, each with its own autonomous *'*operation principles' and *'*rules of rightness'. The whole point of the refutation of scientistic reductionism is that the operations of any lower level cannot account for the emergence and operations of the next higher level, though, as Paksi and Polanyi rightly show, they can account for disruptions and breakdowns in and of them, as certain drugs disturb our mental operations while others can prove fatal. Therefore how can their existence and autonomous operations be explained? Every theory of evolution has to answer this question. But purely intramundane attempts fail to do so in one way or another. Some frequently used pseudo-explanations are: to deny that emergence and higher levels do not exist; to hold that they can be explained by those of the physical level; to use equivocal words such as 'élan vital', 'nisus', 'feeling' and 'decision' across the levels of existence; or say it happens slowly as if yet more of the same at longer intervals could amount to something radically new.[1]

At this crucial point Polanyi and Paksi, being determined to avoid any divine creation and intervention, and, in Paksi*'*s case also to avoid any 'dualism' of body and soul while allowing that both exist, resort to claiming that the operation principles of each level bring those levels into existence![2] Nor, as already mentioned, can Alexander's Space and Time create each other, nor can Stephen Hawking's 'law of gravity' create the universe,[3] let alone do so necessarily. But operational principles, like the laws of nature are not entities, let alone causative agents, but are human

formulations of actual relations among real entities, which do not 'obey' them nor are 'governed' by them. Such talk needs to be recognised as the anthropomorphism that it is, as does the 'harnessing' of lower levels by the higher. Instead a clear recognition of the daily facts of 'downwards causation', as I now compose this review, is needed. Frankly, I am surprised that the lengths to which very clever people can go to avoid questions about the absolute presuppositions to which they cling at all costs, and am pained that Polanyi, of all people, should do so, in spite of everything he rightly says about the reality, distinctiveness and autonomy of higher levels. The only coherent conclusion is that they cannot 'emerge' at all from the existing ones, and thus only an extramundane and creative agent can bring about a genuinely multilevel universe.

Richard Allen and David Jewson

***The Person at the Crossroads*, edited by James Beauregard, Giusy Gallo, and Claudia Stancati**.
Vernon Press, Wilmington, DE, ISBN: 978-1-62273-888-5, 312pp. ¦ $65 £49 €56.

Personalism is a pluralistic movement with deep historical roots. In light of the loss of any consensus around how we can identify a being called a 'person' and in the face of reigning reductionisms that claim we cannot, it also has a particular contemporary urgency. That makes it exhilarating to gather the work from the movement stalwarts and others who convene at the International Forum on Persons biannually. The latest crop, from the 2017 Conference at the University of Calabria, Italy, and is published in this volume.

Of course, the urgency is not new, but it is more pointed than at any time since the rational, systematic, and objective approach to persons, often called 'critical thinking', came to hold sway in modernity. Even in the late 19th century when Borden Parker Bowne made Boston University the centre of American personalism, the use of 'soul' to describe what made persons was not particular problematic. No such luxury is allowed today. The fifteen essays in this book approach our situation variously. Some look to the guidance provided by pre- and post-critical thinkers, others look to the misgivings of modern thinkers like Hume and Kant for clues to what they were least able to accommodate about personhood, and still others confront reductionist schemes directly and in original ways.

Long before the era of critical philosophy, St. Augustine developed the first rational conceptualization of persons in the course of defining the trinity. Matteo Scozia takes us through the theological reasoning that found in a human person's memory, intellect, and will an image of God's trinitarian life.

Critical thinkers like Hume and Kant were aware of the elusiveness of personal being to their rationalistic grasp. Spartaco Pupo explains Hume's attempt to analogize a person's being with that of a political system, while Laura J. Mueller explores the tension in Kant's ethical teachings about suicide.

Among post-critical thinkers, the contributors to this volume find useful guidance in a variety of thinkers. Husserl and Merleau-Ponty celebrated the ambiguity in our awareness of our body—in Husserl's terms, the *corps sujet* and the *corps object*. Peter Reynaert asks what this same ambiguity means for our right to determine what happens to our body. For Marc Djaballah, Merleau-Ponty's philosophical anthropology is unstable in its account of the registries of our somatic awareness. It seems to foreclose an appreciation of the ways bodily experiences are changing as we appropriate digital technologies in our active lives. Bianca Bellini uses Max Scheler's model of personhood to illumine the way others influence how we shape our lives.

More recently, Christine Korsgaard's Kantian approach to identity issues depicts a person as an activity of self-constitution, but Xiaoxi Wu faults this model for failing to solve a problem that Kantian ethicists have long wrestled with, that of conflicting obligations. Rational reflection, she argues, cannot decide between them. We need to embrace the ambiguity and admit that an existential resolution rather than an appeal to universal principles is called for. Finally, R.T. Allen invites us to look beyond the usual themes in Michael Polanyi's personalism. Personalists find in his epistemology and critiques of scientific reductionism a firm basis for post-critical thought, but they pay little attention to his contributions to economic thought, which, Allen provocatively reminds us, advocate free market and free trade as the default economic policies which need to be modified for higher purposes.

Reductionisms of various kinds have challenged our common sense appreciation of what it means to be a person, particularly our sense of being morally responsible, free agents. Epistemology, which has dominated the concerns of philosophers since Descartes, has sought ways of guaranteeing the veracity of our grasp of reality by filtering out what is distinctively personal in our perceptions. Carlo Vinti examines the neo-empirical approaches of Carnap and Popper, the more nuanced views of Bachelard, and the gold-standard for personalistic epistemology, Polanyi. He displays the range of contending positions on the relationship of epistemology and person. Grzegorz Holub considers one model for relating persons to their biological antecedents: the person as an emergent reality. This is a non-reductionist model but, in the end, a naturalistic one. By that he means it cannot account for the meaning and mystery of personhood. The elusive meaningfulness of persons—elusive to

formulations of actual relations among real entities, which do not 'obey' them nor are 'governed' by reductionists, that is also the topic of James Beauregard, himself a neuro-psychologist. He explores the ways technology fosters forgetfulness, drawing from Spanish personalist, Juan Manuel Burgos, Erazim Kohák, and Paul Ricoeur, as well as virtue ethicists Alasdair MacIntyre and Shannon Vallor. These figures highlight the sense of the narrative unity we experience as individuals and communities, and recall our sense of the goals and purposes that make our lives irreducible.

One of the other debilitating legacies of scientific modernism is a regard for persons as isolated individuals whose relational lives are incidental to who they are. Endre J. Nagy explores Polanyi's 'indwelling' as one line of rehabilitation. We dwell in symphonies, theories, and even God, all transcendental meanings. He finds in Calvin O. Schrag's 'transversality' another blind spot that makes the modern model is deficient. Yong Lu discusses both the affinities and differences of Confucian and personalistic thought. Elizabeth M. Yang considers the 19th century educator Horace Bushnell's views on the 'organic' connection between children and their parents, a view that problematized the then current views of child-rearing and education. Carol J. Moeller finds in the practice of moral attention a way to escape the limitations of one's entrenched perspectives, particularly regarding race. She encourages us to see the practice as the cultivation of different perspectives that would then support wider and less parochial attitudes.

This is a rich and rewarding collection of essays and a delightful sampling of work being done on the many fronts of our movement's recovery of the personal.

Richard Prust