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British Contributions to Personalist Philosophy
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Elizabeth Drummond Young
Aurel Kolnai: The Contours of Morality and the Problem of Supererogation

John R. Gibbins
John Grote and the Shaping of Cambridge Personalism and Idealism

Jan Nilsson
Rowan Williams on Dostoyevsky and Personalism

Karl Simms
The Personalism of Stuart Hampshire

David Treanor
John Macmurray and the Form of the Personal

Appraisal

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- Please see inside rear cover regarding references to the works of Michael Polanyi.
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Notes on this issues new contributors

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Introduction

The Golden Dawn of a New Republic

Salutations all and welcome to the first of two Special Issues of *Appraisal* in which we are delighted, at very long last, to present papers from the **British Personalist Forum Conference 2015: British Contributions to Personalism**.

That the presentation is long overdue is, I concede, undeniable; that the paper's herein shall prove, nevertheless, to have been well worth the wait is, I am certain you will agree, unquestionable.

The conference itself was a great success in every way imaginable, as those who were there will testify and those who read my conference reports (at britishpersonalistforum.blogspot.co.uk) may be dimly aware. Over three days in 2015, bright blue and sunny-spring golden days, philosophical discussion ranged widely and freely. We came to do philosophy, which is as good a thing to do in Oxford in the springtime as any; we came to share ideas, make nuisances of ourselves, and generally lark about. All this we did also, with considerable vim and verve.

Richard Allen was, in every way, the founder of this particularly toothsome intellectual feast. More than a little gratitude is owed him for his efforts in bringing everyone together and providing us with such a fine space – physical and personal – in which to assemble. Thanks are also owed to the **British Society for the History of Philosophy** for the financial support, which enabled us to stage the whole thing in the first place.

Thanks, too, to Oriel College, Oxford for hosting us? Grudgingly perhaps, given the fact that the accommodation looked more like a Battered Women's shelter than digs in one of the oldest and wealthiest institutions in the world. As I said at the time, and stand by now, the perfect setting for a suicide.

However, I am not writing a travel review. The "where" is hardly as important as the "who" and the "s/he said WHAT?!".

A very fine collection of papers was presented to a crowd eager with anticipation and positively vibrating with excitement. Brows were furrowed, heads were scratched, and notes were scribbled. We were, as Dr. Beauregard would say, one giant ear. No sooner had the speakers gasped out their last syllable than discussion and debate flowed energetically – on one occasion, almost violently so – as giant ears opened their big mouths and jumped in with both feet. Any sore eyes witnessing the event would have felt entirely soothed, no doubt.

All our favourite heavy-weights – Farrer, Macmurray, and Polanyi – were, of course, well represented. David Treanor, James Beauregard, Tihamer Margitay, Endre Nagy, and, of course, your humble editor stepped boldly forward to remind our colleagues of the great wealth of ideas still to be mined from the work of those great thinkers. Collingwood and Kolnai were also given due recognition, thanks to Anna Castriota and Elizabeth Drummond Young. Thanks to Francesca Norman, John Gibbins, Jan Nilsson, and Richard, a few new names were also brought to the table; names such as, John Grote, Rowan Williams, and W. R. Sorely, for example. Personally, as it were, I was delighted to see Stuart Hampshire and P. F. Strawson represented by Karl Simms and Charles Conti respectively. I cut my philosophical teeth on Hampshire and Strawson, thanks, as it happens, to Dr. Conti. Their anti-Cartesian conception of the "self" as physically embodied, socially embedded, was the ladder I climbed to reach the difficult and subtle heights of Farrer's *Finite and Infinite*.

Alongside the papers and discussions, events took a decidedly historic turn. Before the Americans had even thought of Trump, the **British Personalist Forum** had acquired its first and, so far, only president. Thanks to our charming and persuasive chairman, Alan Ford, Professor Raymond Tallis made the leap from keynote speaker to Big Cheese. The title remains, for the time being, purely honorary. Consequently, Professor Tallis does not have the launch codes for any nuclear arsenals (as far as we know) and cannot declare war on other countries or philosophical societies (for now; so just watch it, USA and the Macmurray Fellowship). Nevertheless if all goes to plan, you may expect to see the town halls of Great Britain adorned with giant posters of Professor Tallis, while members of the BPF, dressed in alarmingly smart uniforms, march through the streets.

¡Viva El Presidente! ¡Viva La Revolución!

KOLNAI:
THE CONTOURS OF MORALITY AND THE PROBLEM OF SUPEREROGATION

Elizabeth Drummond Young

Abstract: The paper demonstrates how Kolnai's philosophy can contribute to the current discussion surrounding supererogatory acts. Kolnai's philosophy is at odds with much contemporary moral philosophy, resisting ideas of equality and homogeneity. Ridge and Archers' recent discussion of supererogation provides the critical backdrop for elucidating Kolnai's view and the paper shows how he engages with pluralism as part of his overall personalist view, whilst still retaining universal principles.

Key Words: Kolnai: supererogation; personalism; equality; moral depth

1. Introduction

The aim of this short paper is to illustrate how the philosophy of Aurel Kolnai can represent a valid contribution to the contemporary discussion about the questions which surround supererogatory action. In doing so, it has been found necessary to bring to the fore Aurel Kolnai's view on morality. Kolnai is overlooked by contemporary scholars; one reason for this could be that he writes in a dense style and has many references to ordinary language philosophy and British intuitionism, both now unfashionable. A Hungarian Jew who converted to Catholicism, he left Vienna in 1940 and travelled to America, thence to Canada and finally ended up in London as Visiting Lecturer at Bedford College, University of London. Kolnai had been influenced by phenomenology while in Vienna and had also developed an interest in the philosophy of value from sources such as Hartmann and Scheler. This blend of axiology and phenomenology, together with his later British influences, make his philosophy distinctive. Some of his philosophical ideas were taken up by Bernard Williams and David Wiggins and Kolnai's philosophical blueprint is very clear when reading these two philosophers. However, despite this, it appears that his own philosophy has not received the attention that deserves.[1]

Kolnai can be thought of as a Personalist and his Personalism is most immediately evident in his anti-utopian perspective on political philosophy. In the present discussion on supererogation, I aim to show how aspects of Personalism can be detected in his moral philosophy. Before turning to the discussion of supererogation, let me try to capture the character of Kolnai's Personalism:

> To the 'common man' every human face in which he does not recognise his own reflection as in a mirror appears crazy, uncanny, in some way impure: in short, it might be said that any face endowed with a personal character, with 'contours' or a 'profile' is an irritant to him.[2]

It is the failure to recognise that there can never be an instantiation of a common man that is the downfall of utopian projects. We all have contours and profiles, and for Kolnai this applies to the shape of our lives and our connection with values, as well as to our faces. Marxism and other utopian creeds subvert the 'individuality, plurality and contingent inequality of men', as he puts it. An adequate moral philosophy must include these elements. (Notice how contentious the phrase 'contingent inequality of men' would be these days, when the concept of equality underlies most moral and political philosophy in the Western world, to say nothing of political projects.)

If the common man perceives a contoured personalised face in the mirror as irritant, then it isn't long before he wants to hit it. Kolnai thinks morality's chief role is to stop that from happening. The negative precepts of morality are the most important leading to what he describes as the 'thematic primacy of evil'. There are many ways in which we may choose to be good but evil is the same for all of us and we must avoid it or restrain ourselves from doing it. Before we have any conception of morality, we see the world as good in a general sense and the primary role of moral rules is to address any disruption to this good.

Both these themes – the individuality, plurality and contingent inequality of men which results in morality being heavily contoured, and the dominance of the negative precepts of morality, with good as the 'default position', have a bearing on the issues of supererogation. Kolnai addresses the subject of supererogation only indirectly and not at length and I am primarily using the concept to demonstrate his perspective on morality rather than to suggest that he himself claims special insights on the topic.

2. The Issues of Supererogation

There are two key philosophical issues associated with supererogation. First, why is an action which is so good optional and not required? Secondly, there is frequently a discrepancy between the agent and the observer in how they view the moral status of the act. There are many clear cases of heroic acts where the hero is typically modest and claims that he was doing no more than his duty. Yet the observer considers that the hero has indeed done something supererogatory and optional.[3] How can there be a legitimate difference in view about the status of moral acts, when moral rules are universal? The issues can be linked. Perhaps the heroic agent is right in that the

action is a duty; observers merely lack the necessary moral perception to see this, or they lack the moral stamina to carry out the action. Kolnai's philosophy can make a contribution to both the optionality problem and the agent/observer discrepancy problem, although it is on this last point that it is most valuable and original.

I shall maintain that the optional nature of supererogatory acts is understood and accepted.[4] It is worth noting that Kolnai's philosophy is well suited to account for the optional nature of supererogation. His emphasis on the thematic primacy of evil and the 'taking for granted' approach to the good, means that, within this background, the kind of good he has in mind is very much everyday non-disturbance, rather than spectacular deeds, as this extract where he discusses a pre-moral assumption about the general good shows:

> What matters in the present context is the *secondariness* of evil by reference to a framework of life somehow presumed 'good' (not an epitome of moral virtue and splendour but a matrix of satisfactions, mutual sustenance and things and modes of being worthy of appreciation; an order inviting assent).[5]

In other words, there will be room for supererogatory actions, at least in some cases, in Kolnai's morality. I will say more on how that may be so below.

Turning to the agent/observer discrepancy puzzle, here is a contemporary example of supererogation which demonstrates the puzzle. A soldier who was awarded the Victoria Cross for valour in Afghanistan, Josh Leakey, commented that he didn't see the award as being 'about me in particular'; he wanted to see it as a reflection on his unit and battalion. This moral modesty and the idea that the action amounts to no more than one's duty is a frequent characteristic of brave and saintly acts. The point of such awards, however, is that they single out exceptional performance by one agent (in this case valour, but other moral values might apply) which is not obligatory. Dutiful soldiers would not be required to do the same and there is therefore something special about the person who performs them. As the Prime Minister commented in this case:

> When you hear how events unfolded and the intensity of enemy fire, it is difficult to imagine how one wouldn't be frozen to the spot and yet L/Cpl Leakey risked his life to run across that barren hillside not just once, but multiple times to turn the battle and save the lives of comrades.[6]

As part of the incident for which he was awarded the medal, Josh Leakey gave first aid to a wounded American soldier under heavy fire and in his report of his action, he claimed that he was in the best position to do this and that if one of the wounded soldier's comrades had been in the same position, then they too would have had an award. It was just he 'who happened to be there'.

Of course, the precise purpose of such awards is to pinpoint extraordinary valour and thereby to suggest that if someone had been in his position and hadn't responded in the same way, no blame or shame would have been attached to him, but I shall return to the issue of the context of the act and the nature of the person performing it below.

In a recent paper, Mike Ridge and Alfred Archer have discussed what they term 'the Heroism paradox', where they deal with the agent/observer discrepancy problem.[7] The bare bones of their argument is as follows: in the normal supererogatory situation as I have described it above, heroes have moral virtue because they perform a heroic deed, but lack moral wisdom because they claim that their act is obligatory – they misclassify the act; it is really supererogatory and therefore optional. Observers correctly classify the act, and they are deemed to have moral wisdom in that regard, according to Ridge and Archer. Supposing someone who thinks that the act is supererogatory performs the act? If we consider that moral wisdom is a constituent of moral virtue, then that agent will be more virtuous than the first: they have both performed the act, but only this last has understood the correct deontic status of the act. The pressure of the paradox is that we probably feel uneasy about arriving at the conclusion that the person with the correct understanding of the moral status of such acts is wiser and thus more virtuous than the ordinary hero who thinks his act is his duty, yet if the computations of moral wisdom are correct, that is the conclusion to which we must arrive. I am not concerned here with criticising the formulation of the paradox as put forward by Ridge and Archer, but I think that the interpretation of Kolnai which I provide differs considerably from the solution which they offer and better reflects the ordinary moral understanding of supererogation.

I wish to stress three points which Ridge and Archer highlight in the solution to the paradox and relate them to Kolnai's work. Firstly, the authors assume that distinguishing supererogatory from obligatory acts is an important piece of moral wisdom. Secondly, they decide to appeal to a notion of moral depth to explain why the heroic agent sees his act as obligatory. Thirdly, they claim that in performing a heroic act, the hero is more aware than observers of the truth that he is just one person among many, no more or less important than anyone else.

3. How Kolnai Sees the Shape of Morality

I will attempt to situate these topics: optionality, moral depth, moral wisdom and equality within the context of how Kolnai sees the shape of morality and how he thinks it interacts with the rest of our lives. Firstly, I will outline Kolnai's view about the scope and reach of morality.

Morality is closely tied up with practice and some philosophers consider that everything we do has moral import. Kolnai thinks that not all our actions are necessarily morally relevant; however; putting on the kettle for coffee, changing my printer cartridge may all pass without morality intruding but there will be subtle points to look out for. If, for example, I have a devil-may-care attitude to packing my case in advance of a journey there may be no moral implication to that; there may be substantial practical import, of course – perhaps I always forget one important item, for example. But imagine that my attitude becomes distressing to my family – they know how it is going to end. In that event, a faint moral tone makes itself heard. I need to think again about how I prepare for my journeys.

In Kolnai's view, my careless preparation is quite a different matter from my deliberately packing goods which I know are forbidden by airlines and then lying about it at the check-in desk. Here there is not a faint moral tone, but a moral emphasis instead. I must not do this. Moral emphasis is something of a technical term for Kolnai; it is 'the peculiar sharply characterised tone attaching to every experience of what strikes us as morally relevant'.[8] It tends to be noisier on the prohibitive side. So morality is not a dominant, ever-present feature of our lives – it is not a first-order object of attention – but it makes itself heard with the emphasis on what we should not do, as well as faintly suggesting how we improve ourselves. Morality is tonal, and when it calls, it does so in varying degrees of volume or pitch.

We can contrast Kolnai's view that morality does not map onto practice exactly with his thoughts on aesthetic value. Unlike morality, Kolnai thinks that aesthetic value is potentially around us at all times; the most mundane thing might be beautiful or it might be ugly, it will certainly have some sort of expressible aesthetic value; he abhors the deliberate attempt by some artists and sociologists to introduce utility as a primary value. Rendering something mundane beautiful has value for Kolnai, and the world is consequently better off as a result.

For Kolnai, the strongest calls for moral action arise when a duty or prohibition is in question, as we have seen in the luggage packing example. This is related to Kolnai's view on the thematic primacy of evil. Along with many other philosophers, Kolnai recognises the peculiar external voice of morality. We experience a call from outside ourselves, but there is a difference in quality between the call which utters a prohibition and one which prompts us to do good. To understand the primacy of evil it is helpful to ask what Kolnai considers the source of morality to be.

Although Kolnai was a religious believer, he does not make much play of this in his writings, apart from an assumption that the Ten Commandments were the underlying base for most universally held moral precepts. He certainly does not espouse naturalism as the base for morality, but he does think that there is a connection between our natural desire to value our lives and well-being, such that we put prevention of harm to ourselves and to others at the top of the moral agenda. Killing someone is the worst we can do – interestingly, Kolnai thinks that there is no such archetypal act of benevolence which has the same weight on the counterbalancing side of morality. So saving someone's life at great cost is a very good thing to do, but would not appear to have the same moral emphasis as killing someone.

What about the call of the good? Kolnai talks of the ambiguity of the use of the term 'the good'. He thinks that we are quite happy to parcel many different concepts under 'the good' – projects which are 'good for me' – it would be good if I could learn to pack my bags more efficiently – project with obvious moral import – it would be good if I could do more to help those less fortunate than me. Kolnai doesn't think that this ambiguity is a problem or a mistake. It reflects the asymmetry in morality. There are specific universal prohibitions, but there are many particular ways in which we may choose to realise the good. Depending on who I am and what I have chosen to be in life, I will have very different ways of being good in both a moral and a practical sense. If I am a doctor, I can choose to be an excellent doctor with particular skills and I will also face a particular set of moral issues which might not arise if I weren't practising medicine. But I must at all times obey the strictures of the universal moral precepts not to kill, to lie and so on. My goodness can flourish in many different ways, but my behaviour must not drop below certain standards which are agreed on by everyone.

Finally, Kolnai has a view about how we reason with regard to ends and means. He disagrees with Aristotle that deliberation is only ever about means. (Aristotle made the suggestion that there was one major end in life to which we should direct ourselves). Kolnai thinks that moral reasoning is more complicated; that when we consider what to do both morally and from a purely practical point of view, we frequently find ourselves comparing ends as well as means and assessing their relative importance in our lives at that moment. A doctor may choose to redirect his/her skills toward emergency relief in a disaster area far from home, but will also have to consider how this fits in with the rest of his/her life. His/her moral concerns are not just about how he/she serves sick people, but how this service will affect other aspects of his/her life such as those he/she loves.

So if we imagine Kolnai's view of morality as portrayed through a satellite navigation device, we must simultaneously keep our ears tuned for calls about prohibitions or encouragement, the tonal aspect whilst considering how we are progressing toward our destination and from time to time, re-adjust the destination. Provided that we don't infringe any rules

of the road, we are free to choose those destinations and how we get there.

We can see how Kolnai's view on morality allows for individuality and plurality. There is plenty of choice about how to be good, but we may not choose any of the ways by which we can be bad. Now I want to say something about Kolnai's view on values and and how his overall view on morality connects with the problem of supererogation.

4. Kolnai on Value and the Puzzles of Supererogation

Kolnai subscribes to the idea that there are different types of value in addition to moral value: intellectual, religious and aesthetic values. He offers a brief critique of Hartmann's scheme of values from which we can draw some points about supererogation. Hartmann thought that the 'lower' values; those values which are closely related to our natural state (such as the value of food to sustain us) always had a stronger pull than 'higher' values – the value of giving someone else something to eat. The higher values were engendered by the lower values – there is no point in valuing giving food to a starving person if food is not what is required by humans but their call was weaker. Hartmann's view is too naturalistic, thinks Kolnai, but he concedes that this picture of values has some worth, reflecting as it does, at least at first glance, his idea of the tonal and asymmetric aspects of morality. It has a common sense feel and sets up the context for explaining supererogation; if all the higher values are weaker, then they can be optional and only the saints and heroes need to comply. But then we enter the usual mystery of why should something that is very good only have a weaker claim on us. What happens when heroic agents such as Josh Leakey choose to answer the weaker call of higher values? Kolnai explains how this might be:

> Psychologically speaking, the impact of higher values is *sometimes* definitely *stronger* than that of lower values; men's awareness of higher demands *may* take on the form of an *imperative* that overrides the *imperiousness* of more primary urges or universal postulates. It sometimes occurs that a man voluntarily sacrifices his very life or at any rate his basic comforts for the good of his family, his country or a close or admired friend.[9]

This extract brings home Kolnai's sensitivity and awareness of the optional but compelling nature of heroic and saintly deeds. We need only to add here that someone may feel that he has to sacrifice his life for the good of a stranger to have the perfect model for a supererogatory act.

Kolnai goes on to explain how we might establish a universal principle which allows the primacy of service of the higher values over the lower values. To live honestly is a duty, to live well is not, he says. To live on a high spiritual level (with the saints and heroes, we might say) is not a duty, but constitutes 'as it were an incommensurably more valid value, than to live in comfort and security let alone to live in luxury'.[10] To live plainly, but to espouse high values is a good but optional way of life; it is a noble way of life. Morality at this level goes beyond the cleanliness which is brought about by obedience to universal precepts and attains something like the richness which aesthetic values add to life. Noble behaviour is beautiful, thinks Kolnai, and arguably it is the purity and beauty of the actions of saints and heroes to which observers respond, rather than merely acknowledging the deontic status of the act. A philosophy of value is well placed to recognise that.

In addition to providing additional reasons for observers to respond to supererogatory acts in the way that they do, Kolnai's philosophy of value also provides a way of distinguishing saintly from heroic deeds. He thinks that saints (rather than heroes) have scarcely any need to refer to the universal moral precepts – they are not having to remind themselves of the stringent aspects of morality, but instead are frequently in a position where they are living plainly and espousing high values. In the heroic example I have cited, it seems as though the heroism is a case of carrying a duty beyond its limit. Some duties, such as the duties of loyalty, carry plenty of pre-moral inclination with them; it is natural, Kolnai thinks, for people to be loyal to those they love or identify with, so that defending your family and being patriotic are easy duties in the sense that they run in line with inclination.

This might prompt a worry for my consideration of supererogation. Should we consider the heroic action of Josh Leakey as 'merely' a hard duty, rather than supererogatory.[11] After all, Josh Leakey was concerned not to let his regiment down; that was one of the uppermost thoughts in his mind and there would have been a natural inclination to do his best for his fellow soldiers out of loyalty. Is the agent/observer discrepancy to be explained by saying that the agent understands his duty through the prism of loyalty and is able to extend his action to the extreme because of his natural (and very strong) inclination to be loyal; the observer, on the other hand, is not in the psychological grip of the inclination and therefore can classify the action as supererogatory, rather than a hard duty?

One response to this worry is to re-categorise supererogatory actions, slim down the category, and exclude all actions which might be thought of as hard duties. There are many examples of people who give up or risk their lives for complete strangers, where there is no obvious suggestion of inclination in play at all. They, too, think that they are only doing what they have to do and the observer considers their actions supererogatory. I am not convinced that it is

easy to make a clear distinction between actions following inclination and those without, however. Whilst I think that there is something in the idea that the difference in the moral categorisation which arises between the agent and the observer in cases of supererogation may well be associated with the fact that the agent is psychologically 'in the thick of it' and the observer is not, there is more to be said about the agent/observer discrepancy problem. Kolnai thinks that when the going gets tough and it looks as though we may have to pay a high price to stay loyal, then such duties which had hitherto run as inclinations now assume a moral call, but he leaves it free for us to draw the line as to when this becomes too much to be obligatory. Much will depend on both the context and the agent and I comment on the relevance of this for supererogation a little later.

Ridge and Archer show some sympathy for the interpretation that supererogatory agents are following their inclinations to the extreme. They suggest that one way of explaining supererogatory behaviour is to say that heroes typically get so carried away by their enthusiasm for certain [moral] values that they fail to recognise their own very real sacrifices, and thereby mistake what is actually supererogatory for a moral obligation. But their whole hearted acceptance of such values constitutes a form of moral depth, which compensates for the lack of moral wisdom in failing to distinguish the supererogatory from the obligatory. Ridge and Archer think that moral wisdom is to do with being a good judge of the moral status of actions. They think that it is an important piece of moral wisdom to know whether it is your duty or merely optional to make a huge sacrifice for someone else's sake. They claim that there is some value to the whole moral community in knowing when acts are optional, as this will prevent moral 'busybodiness' and demandingness; the attitude that everyone should be nagged to perform moral deeds at all times and chastised when they do not do so.

Kolnai would have taken their point about undesirable moral coercion. He would also have agreed that we have to be familiar with the deontic status of acts to the degree that we know what is prohibited. This is a body of moral wisdom with which we should all be acquainted, both because it is universal and because of the thematic primacy of evil. But Kolnai would not think that distinguishing the moral status of supererogatory actions was all that important. If we think such actions are good and right to do, this will all form part of our very personal and particular view of the good and it would not be at all surprising for Kolnai that heroes think certain acts are duties for them but not for others. It is also the case that on Kolnai's view of morality we are engaged in a process of weighing up ends rather than just means. Some ends will be particularly important to us, rather than being important generally and will have more urgency at certain times rather than others. Moral wisdom will consist in the correct deliberation of ends, allowing for all the particularity of our temperaments and where we find ourselves in life. Josh Leakey, in the midst of battle, felt that he was particularly well placed to carry out a rescue – he felt that because he could do it, he should do it, we might say. The end of saving a life became particularly salient to him at the moment and he assumed that anyone who shared his values and who was similarly situated would feel the same.

We can say a little more about how Kolnai thinks agents identify with value and how this plays out in making moral decisions. He insists that the concept of hierarchy is a feature of both our practical and moral lives. We have to 'rank' values when we consider action, but we also have to make a correct assessment of the situation: for Kolnai, the axiological meets the phenomenological in the consideration of how to act. As Bessemans puts it:

> The strength of a consideration is dependent on its emphasis, which itself is dependent on the persons involved and affected, the circumstances, etc. Thus the dynamic hierarchical gradation of values means that what one should do is determined by the strength of the moral emphases involved. This again means that deliberation about what to do is informed by the agent's thorough discernment of what matters and to what extent….the moral emphasis is the compelling appeal of a moral value…., while the degree of influence of this value or morally relevant fact is dependent on the circumstances.[12]

Bessemans correctly insists that Kolnai's contextualising, and his stress on grading and emphasising certain values does not lead to moral relativism. There will be a moral truth of the matter, albeit that every moral judgement may be contextualised. When assessing moral action, more needs to be taken into account than just circumstances and the scale and emphasis of values; as if that weren't complicated enough! Importantly at this juncture, Kolnai's Personalism combines with his axiology and phenomenalism to give a distinctive view of the agent perspective of moral action and what sort of considerations a bystander should take into account. Kolnai says that the correct assessment of a moral action should take the agent into consideration:

> This is where the importance of the moral agent himself comes into its own: for value emphasis is none other than his 'right' devotion to values, *itself in objective conformity to value*, but still *his* devotion. There is then a correlation between subject and object…. Objectification does not imply that

> the subject is left out, but that account is taken of his situation when he turns to the object.[13]

Bessemans considers this point in relation to an observer making a judgement on an agent's actions. In assessing whether an action was right or not, the observer must take into account the relevant considerations of the situation as if he were the agent in that situation, taking into account the agent's personal position and not the observer's position as if he were in the agent's place.

Although this might at first seem to help with judgements about supererogation, it seems to take us back to the previous situation where the observer should truly try to understand the heroic agent's actions from the hero's viewpoint; from whence he would presumably understand that the hero sees the action as something which he 'must' do. So the observer's classification of the act as supererogatory would be wrong. But this is too hasty. The fact that the observer has to understand the act from the agent's point of view and therefore to understand that the agent sees it as a duty, does not mean that the act can be classified objectively as a duty. Rather, it is a reflection on the character of the agent that he sees such an action as a duty, when the observer (and, he assumes, others) would see it as optional.

There is some recognition of this theme in the account of Ridge and Archer. They claim that to possess moral depth is to possess a vision of what it is to lead a good life. Heroes, who supposedly have more moral depth than others, have a deep emotional and practical identification with certain moral values and have managed to align their self-interest with moral values, so that the sacrifice which others see does not register with them. This seems fine and would accord with what I have said above, but they then go on to make a strange leap: a hero, Ridge and Archer claim, recognises more than most of us the important moral truth that he is but one person in a much wider moral universe and that he ultimately counts no more than anyone else.

This strikes all the wrong chords for Kolnai in terms of what constitutes morality and for me, at least, as a characterisation of what it is to be a hero or a saint on the Personalist view I have outlined. Someone who is willing to sacrifice himself for others does not see himself as counting equally as one person among many – indeed his reflection, if any, is not on himself but on the other on whom he places more value. The saint or hero places themselves a little lower than the other whom they wish to serve or save. And the saved person is not saved in an effort to bring them to a greater sense of equality, but because it is good to do so. Saving someone's life or acting bravely in a situation is what Kolnai would describe as a whole hearted response to value has also an important aesthetic as well as moral aspect to which observers respond.

5. Conclusion

Kolnai's moral philosophy is provocatively at odds with current trends in moral philosophy, at least in the English-speaking world. Once we have agreed or understood what is prohibited, Kolnai thinks that each of us must pursue the good in our own way. We have other goals apart from moral ones, and it is good that we pursue those. Kolnai's morality allows for individualism, contextualism and a personalist approach to the good. Although he doesn't explicitly address the question of supererogation, his views on morality help in understanding what modern philosophers see as puzzling in this phenomenon. They are hidebound by an attraction to equality as the fundamental moral value and by and large have an unwillingness to encompass plurality and incommensurability. The emphasis on the equality which so often translates into the homogeneity of the common man and the single goal of the common good are exactly the themes which dominated the utopian political landscape of which Kolnai was so critical. Kolnai sought to bring the Personalist perception of the good in his morality so that we might avoid villains, allow the ordinary man to continue on his way, whilst letting the saints and heroes flourish.

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Notes

1.The Kolnai Nachlass is stored at St. Andrews University. I am grateful to Chris Bessemans, one of the first research scholars to have access to the facilities there for his help.

2.Kolnai (1977) 73.

3.There may be cases where the hero acknowledges the supererogatory nature of his deed, if only to his self. I comment on this situation later.

4.There are well known challenges to this position, amongst them Shelly Kagan's extreme utilitarian position as expressed in 'The Limits of Morality'. See Kagan (1989).

5.Kolnai (1977) 85.

6.See http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/pa/article-2969537/Paras-VC-Keeping-family.html

7.See Archer and Ridge (2015)

Notes continued on Page 38

JOHN GROTE AND THE SHAPING OF CAMBRIDGE PERSONALISM AND IDEALISM

John R. Gibbins

Abstract: This essay takes us beyond the normal action of reporting that the first, distinctly philosophical, coining of the term 'personalism', is attributed to Professor John Grote, Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge University (1813-66). We must not read back and attribute later twentieth century adaptions and re-coinings of the term to Grote. While Grote's phenomenological approach begins within the experience of being, of the ego, self or person, he argues that the combined effects of conversation and critique, entail that the true and right are essentially shared and public. Minds move beyond subjectivism into objectivism, requiring we move from personalism and subjectivist idealism into objective or absolute idealism.

Key Words: Cambridge, Cambridge personalism, ego, Ferrier, idealism, immediate, judgement, Kant, knowledge of acquaintance, knowledge of judgement, language, mediate, personalism, self, not-self, sociality.

1. Introduction

John Grote is widely acknowledged to have coined the term personalism in his hastily written volume *Exploratio Philosophica: Rough Notes on Modern Intellectual Science,* Part I, (Deighton, Bell and Co., Cambridge, 1864). The Longer Oxford English Dictionary entry, written by Leslie Stephen, states this with the confidence of one who knows John Grote intimately, as well as the activities of philosophy and philology. What is less well known is why, how and to what use it was put in his writings and those of subsequent Cambridge authors. My argument is partly a response to the account of 'Grote's Personalism' made by Lauchlin D MacDonald in his *John Grote: A Critical Estimation of his Writings*, (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1966), originally a 1950 doctoral dissertation at Boston University. My argument is that while Grote grounds his idealism on the personal ego, he soon moves on to explore the reasons why knowledge and morality are more objectively grounded in practices, custom, tradition and society, and, all of which presume contingent rules, standards and ideals. Grote's epistemology, metaphysics and ontology are personalist at base, all grounded in the personal experience of being, but this experience of being is then discriminated in judgement, socialized through conversation, and embodied in conventions. Knowledge and morality, he argues in his *Treatise on the Moral Ideals* of 1876, are premised upon presuppositions about ideals and absolutes, such as truth, right and the good. Grote's analysis, in brief, passes beyond personalism, into objective idealism and aspires or develops towards an absolutist position. To describe Grote as a personalist is correct, and indeed points us in interesting directions, but is a partial analysis.

So what sort of idealist is John Grote (1813-66), the Cambridge philosopher, not to be confused here with his more famous elder brother George Grote (1794-1871)? In chapters five and six of my book, *John Grote, Cambridge University and the Development of Victorian Thought* (Imprint Academic, Exeter, 2007) the transcendental, personalist, subjective, objective and absolute idealisms in Grote were examined, and Grote's idealism was judged to be objective, tending towards the absolute (Gibbins, 416-431). Grote, I contended, considered that mind expresses itself, embodies and finds itself, in objects; he posits an absolute reality and considers it knowable by finite mind. Most concepts presume reflexively, that there is something tangible to which it refers. So truth statements presume that truth lies at one end of a scale with error at the other. Right statements presume there is some ideal standard, against which it is judged. Grote argues that absolute reality is both the totality of human personal realities and truths, and at the same time, from the other directions, a logical prerequisite, and an indication of Gods mind or Spirit. Does this conflict with the central thesis of Lauchlin D .MacDonald in his book *John Grote: A Critical Estimation of His Writings* (MacDonald 1966)? For MacDonald, Grote is a 'personalist' and an 'idealist', he is a 'personalist idealist' (MacDonald 1966, 118-121, 188-208).

MacDonald's definition is vague, being so broad as to embrace almost all empiricists as well as idealists, because all consider consciousness, the idea side to predominate, and consider Being to be dependent upon subjective consciousness. Personalism is used only once by Grote and then as an equivalent for idealism generally,

> The idealism, personalism, or whatever it may be called, which lies at the root of all that I have said, is not simply a doctrine or opinion, but seems to me to have been my earliest philosophical feeling, and to have continued, if not so vivid, yet not less strong, ever since (Grote 1865, 146).

By personalism in the context of the passage quoted Grote means to re-express what he describes elsewhere as 'egoism', 'thinking for oneself' and

intellectual 'rejuvenation', the idea that the universe we explore is what it is for us, that we must start with our consciousness, explore it for ourselves, and to assist in this we must return to that fundamental unity of knowing and being, self and not self combined implicit in our primitive consciousness. To MacDonald, Grote's idealism is personalistic in two main senses,

> First, this personalistic idealism engages the whole person in aspiring after an objective or ideal, the summum bonum, which in Plato is *the Good* and in Aristotle *eudaemonia* or happiness akin to ecstasy. Second, this personalistic idealism is evident in the emphasis Grote lays upon the 'philosophical' consciousness, or 'idea' side if his epistemology without which there is no being of any sort. All existence must be such for persons: there in no other existence (MacDonald, 243; also 198).

Now in these senses (baring the conclusion), Grote is sharing a thesis inherent not only in Hegel but in the whole German idealist movement - wider still in the European romantic movement and the *aufklaerung* or counter enlightenment. Grote's personalism is also shared by almost all later idealists and many other non idealist philosophers and even psychologists. Unfortunately, however, the term personalist has served other usages and meanings, many of which are highly technical and restricted, and most of which are of more recent origin.

Two dangers exist then in defining Grote as a personalist idealist. The first, that his very general statement about the logical point being immediate consciousness, and his preference for egoism and personal thought is conflated with one or more of the more technical uses. The second, is that Grote's concerns of 1864-5 are muddled up with the concerns of the later personalists, namely Andrew Seth and the Oxford personalists from 1887 and the American personalists starting with Bowden Parker Bowne (1847-1810) through to Edgar Brightman (1884-1953) in the 1920's, and onto MacDonald himself. MacDonald's arguments flirt with both dangers, become muddled as a result and leave us confused as to the nature of the claim, let alone its substantiation. The same thing happens, as W. H. Werkmeister notes in his review of MacDonald's book, in the authors account's of 'Kantian idealism', 'epistemological monism' and 'pluralism' (MacDonald, 192-196). Werkmeister concludes his review as follows, 'Unfortunately I am in no position to say who is more responsible for all the confusions - John Grote or Lauchlin MacDonald' (Werkmeister 1969, 218). My answer is that it is the latter, and that MacDonald's efforts at exposition have not helped much in the recovery of Grote's philosophy, a judgement supported by Ernest Gelber (Gelber 1954, 8-9).

The list of family resemblances that make up personalism include the following: the only things that are real are persons or selves (Brightman, 1951); all true being is personal (Brightman 1925); persons are ontologically fundamental; personality, not nature or the absolute, contains reality (Sturt 1902); personality represents the highest value within the field of our experience (Copleston 1967); knowledge originates in consciousness within the self (MacDonald 1966); selves have value independent of God and the absolute (Seth 1912); God is a community of personalities or selves (Rashdall, in Sturt ed., 1902); God is the primary manifestation of personality, reality is spiritual, an expression of God's personality, reality is a community of selves without God (McTaggart in Broad 1966). Grote's corpus would allow both contrasts and comparisons with this family of ideas.

What the Boston network liked in Grote, was his ability to link persons to God, as Grote describes thinking as 'mind meeting mind' coming from the other direction. As these various premises above are woven together so we can have, according to MacDonald, monistic personalism (dominated by either oneself, one God or the community); pluralistic personalism (many personalities); theistic personalism (the personality is God's) or non-theistic personalism (McTaggart). MacDonald also separates 'epistemological personalism'; and 'metaphysical personalism' the first being concerned with the origins of knowledge in the self, the second with the origins of reality in the personality (MacDonald 1966, 192-194). That, Grote argues that 'there in no other existence', than persons, is very misleading as Grote's perspectivalism allows him to distinguish modes of being and reality; and his 'scale of sensation', allows him to identify a scale of being, existence and reality from the imagined to the Absolute.

MacDonald ignores the vast variety of often conflicting strands in personalism, and in regard to comparisons with Grote, he restricts himself almost entirely to the American Personalist tradition and then almost exclusively to Edgar Brightman (Schneewind 1968, 171). In so doing he ignores a more fruitful line of descent through Grote's successors at Cambridge, James Ward, McTaggart Ellis and W. R. Sorley (Passmore 1966, 75-84; Copleston 1967, 267-283; Gibbins, 1998), and two other philosophers who quote Grote, Andrew Seth (Pringle Pattison) and Hastings Rashdall (Passmore 1966, 72-75) who appear in *Personal Idealism: Philosophical Essays by Eight Members of the University of Oxford*, edited by Henry Sturt (Sturt, 1902). In fact Grote is a personalist primarily in the sense of that term which he defines for himself. He was an epistemological personalist, along with Hegel, the romantics and many others, in treating our immediate consciousness as the basis for knowledge,

but that tells us very little. He was a metaphysical personalist in the general sense of seeing reality as essentially spiritual, but so did absolute idealists. Grote was certainly a monist and not a pluralist in both epistemology and metaphysics but these categories cover his whole idealism, not narrow personalism. Human reality was a community of selves conversing with the ultimate reality that is God, the Absolute.

Amongst later philosophers it is for this particular and early version of idealism that Grote is most remembered and where he had his greatest influence. From his *Journa*l we know that Grote read texts of and about German idealists, as did his colleagues at Trinity and his Society friends, Mayor, Sidgwick, Mozley and Venn. Both in his personal library and at Trinity he found the primary and secondary sources he needed and with a knowledge of German the whole Hare collection was available to him after 1855, and he was informed of the work of J.K. Ferrier. But Grote, like many colleagues, came to literature to fill out and bring out their own thought not to learn or absorb ideas unchanged. Kant's influence is present in Grote, especially the formative role of mind and the synchrony of subject and object, thought and phenomena in experience and knowledge in metaphysics; the insistence that duty is worth doing for its own sake; and that worthy motive adds moral value to acts in ethics. Grote's idealism is authorial not derivative, thought out and not learned.

What I have come to know about American Personalism, from MacDonald especially, leads me to direct some attention to a group known as the *Boston Personalists.* Identified with theology departments at several Boston Colleges from the late nineteenth century, their founder and leading light was Borden Parker Bowne (1847-1910). Bowne was linked to the education of potential Baptist and Methodist Ministers - intending that theology can be grounded on philosophy, understood very much in a Grotian manner. His basic suggestion is that all consciousness, thought, judgement and knowledge are generated from a common germ in the experience of being or Immediacy. Only experienced as a person, his ontological position was that only persons were real; epistemologically that personal experience of being was the raw material for knowledge brought out by judgement; and that metaphysically, only entities that were constituted by a plurality of persons were valid and true. Born, living and dying near Boston, he influenced generations of students, amongst them Edgar Brightman and Martin Luther King with his commitment to the dignity of persons. His *Theory of Thought and Knowledge*, 1897, and *Metaphysics* 1943, set out the foundation of his liberal theology. Links to the present were in the writing and teaching of Peter Berlocci (1910-1989) in his *The Empirical Argument for God in Late British Thought* (1938), Harold Oliver, Thomas Buford, George Waller Mueller and John Lavely.

But the closest members to Grote were Edgar Brightman (1884-1953) and Lauchlin D MacDonald (MacDonald, 118-121, 188-208). Brightman studies at Brown, Boston, Berlin and Marburg before teaching around the country and returning to the Borden Parker Bowne Chair in Philosophy at Boston in 1919. He knew about Grote, considered him an early exponent of personalistic idealism and referred to his work on occasions (Brightman 1928, 222; 1951, 293; Gelber 1954, 9), but his commonality of concern and approach in his *Metaphysics* (1882), *Theory of Thought and Knowledge* (1897) as well as in Edgar Brightman's *Introduction to Philosophy* (1951), and his *Manual for Students of Philosophy*, 3rd. edition, (1940), that are most marked. Respecting personal rights to think, act and converse with God, brought him to the defence of conscientious objection and passive disobedience. He was a close confident and mentor of Martin Luther King while studying for his PhD at Boston. Knowing God, to Brightman, was a personal experience and adventure, that could be shared, but only with and by fellow disciples. All had a common drive to challenge and dethrone positivism and materialism, to cherish and promote human personality as an active agent for the good, achieved by knowing a moral doing. Grote would have sympathised with their venture but demanded more of himself and of philosophy. Daring to presume that there are some ideas shared by personalists, how does Grote compare?

2. The Ontological Argument

Grote is at one with personalists in arguing both that persons are real and that reality is personal. He agrees that all of experience, thought and knowledge grow from a basal fact, intuition of being. Immediately aware the *self* gradually awakens to the existence of *not self* - via an intermediary stage where the self for its self (the *self-self*) becomes periodically aware of its self. The unity of consciousness, awareness, thought and judgement in the immediate self is unsettled from the first as the self thinks about itself rather than of its self. This is similar to Hegel's, 'unhappy consciousness' (Plant 1973, 88-89, 144). That all experience begins with an unqualified, immediate, intuition of being is shared with most personalists.

> The original fact to us, the one thing of which we are, before all others, certain, is not the existence of an universe of which we, as organized beings, form a part, but the feeling, thinking, knowing, that this is so, and the knowing that we do know it, or, in other words, that we who know it, are anterior, in our own view of ourselves, to it (Grote 1865, 84).
>
> [T]hat this first and original consciousness (to keep that word still for a moment) is *double*: that is, those we no more, and no sooner, feel

> ourselves to exist than we feel something to exist besides ourselves (Grote 1865, 22).
>
> [A]ll that we call existence is for us a thought of ours, which it belongs to that philosophy to discuss the nature, meaning, validity of (1865, xiv).

3. The Epistemological Argument

Grote is insistent that all future knowledge arises from Ego - an unpacking of this experience of being that is unique to the Self and other Selves. The process of growing knowledge is the unpacking of what is known in existing experience and not gained from external sources. Brightman did not quite get hold of Grote's account according to Ernest Gelber in his very reliable and intense study and understanding of Grote's work (Gelber 1954, 196-8). The process of knowing is not empirical - the addition of new sense data - the 'bucket theory of knowledge', but by distinguishing, discrimination of what is in experience already, by a process of articulation, analysis and judgement. Grote coined the distinction between 'knowledge of acquaintance' and 'knowledge of judgement', knowing of and knowing about, many decades before the concept is made popular by William James and Bertrand Russell. Knowledge is 'self awareness' growing out of 'self consciousness'.

> The important fact is that even our rudimentary consciousness, so far as it is intellectual, *i.e.* a seed of intellectual development, is a distinguishing ourselves from something (Grote 1865, 23; 1876, 372).
>
> [K]nowledge is first, involving or implying the existence of what is known, but logically at least, prior to it... (Grote 1865, 59).

Grote rejects materialism, phenomenalism and empiricism as well as positivism.

4. Metaphysical Personalism

Grote is adamant that the world of things, from a philosophical standpoint, is carved out of self experience. The external world is produced in minds by the process of experiencing, judging and knowing. It is fallacious to argue that objects exist without their being known, that we can have objects without subjects, that phenomena exist without being experienced.

> [T]the basis upon which all rests - being not that things exist, but that we know them, *i.e.* think of them as existing: the order of things in this view is not, existence first, and then knowledge with regard to this on to parts of it arising in whatever manner; but knowledge first, involving or implying the existence of what is known, but logically at least, prior to it, and conceivably more extensive than it, and not all meeting with application (Grote 1865, 59).

5. Theism

Grote offers several alternative accounts of how reality is constructed in the mind by knowers, one of which is the Theistic account - that one's own mind in knowing is meeting the mind of the one supreme Creator of all things - God. But he also offers the following: coming to know is mind meeting the mind of other fellow knowers who have thought and expressed and argued similar things; that mind in knowing is meeting the minds of those who embodied their thoughts and purposes in things, as with laws and their makers; buildings and their architects; music and its composers; families and their members; also that in coming to know you are coming to know the ancestors who created, maintained and reformed the institutions and cannons of knowledge we accept - as when we accept a proposition of Euclid taught by your school maths teacher. Theism was not a necessary nor sufficient requirement to understand persons and knowledge, as it was for the Boston personalists, it was just his favoured option (1865, xiv)

6. Persons as Unique and Inviolable

Each Person is unique, and inviolable. This is stated in the opening statement of Grote's that asserts his personalism. Grote speaks of the 'egotism' that is at the bottom of all experience, thought and action - by which he means selfhood and personality. Only selves are real, only selves can think and act, only selves can be free and responsible. Many mistakes arise from not following out these truths. We do think for ourselves but adopt others thinking as ours. We follow authority and custom when we know it to be a poor guide on an occasion. We defer to popular opinion and belief rather than trust evidence and judgement.

Grote also places high store on that part of the self that the self rather than society fashions - our characters. In his Treatise several chapters develop the Socratic arguments about arête - the duty to develop our own authentic being, our personal character. In a rare manner for the time, he also explores aretology and aretaics, the balance of virtues, dispositions, attitudes that a good person needs to act rightly (Grote, 1876, Ch XVIII, XIX On Character, Will and Education; and 4 Appendices on Character pp 419-476). Character is ever in three stages of development: 'original, made and making' (464). Being true to yourself is his requirement for all persons as persons.

In all cases the subjective takes priority over the objective - he refuses to allow the sublimation of the self to the will of others, though he fully accepts that the will and minds of others embodied in rules, laws, institutions, practices like customs, should generally be followed. But selves are *not quite inviolable*. Selves share the world with other selves hence respect for others, their dignity and freedom and rights,

accompanies the expectation of these for the self. Grote is no individualist who believes we are all entitled to get what we can with no regard to others. He rarely speaks of right; often speaks of our duties to others that are conferred by our common humanity and our actual relationships.

7. Free Will and Personal Responsibility

Grote commits to these effusively:

> The great fact of the kind is human freedom, liberty, choice ... generically human ... for we have a free view around us ... we have human powers ... a choice going beyond known or proper humanity... (1865, xvi).

Grote rejects determinism in all its forms as an abstraction. Within the narrow confines of a legitimate scientific discourse it has meaning and sense but not in philosophy nor in moral nor political life. That we are responsible to others he takes as foundational, 'can means should' in moral life.

8. Sociability over Individuality

Despite all of this Grote supports the usual personalist case against individualism. We are essentially social beings, society's gifts like language and education making the self and its development possible. While opposing collectivist impositions, Grote saw that we became persons via relationships: as in the family, the community, clubs, Colleges, the State itself. Grote sets big store in inter personal relationships as the social acts that when unpacked made implicit moral duties explicit.

Duties were little more that the responsibilities attached to the various roles we had in society, some chosen, others a matter of birth (to parents and State). Grote speaks approvingly of individuality on occasions, but it is clear he means by this the need and drive of persons to be true to themselves, to recognise unique personal needs and traits, to develop a distinct and different character to those becoming massified and equalized by capitalism.

9. Democracy and Responsible Government

Grote distrusted mass society and the process of grinding down differences he saw going in Victorian society. Yet he promoted the full rights of all citizens to participate in society, empowered by education and knowledge. Grote promoted the active over the passive self, promoted the value of conversations and debate as agents of change. Unlike his elder brother George, John eschewed Radical Utilitarian political agendas for a Liberal Anglicanism with a distinctive Christian Socialist hue.

10. Actors or Authors

Persons are actors and authors not roles or persona performances as in the Roman Theatre. Here Grote anticipates much of what later European existentialists and phenomenologists argue in depth. His concern is that citizens are losing faith in humanism, the emotional, moral and spiritual dimensions of character under the dual influence of Enlightened Rationalism and Positivist tendencies including materialism, phenomenalism and psycho-physiology. Loss of confidence in the self's abilities, freedoms, capacities and opportunities will debilitate society as well as persons. His philosophy, is to restore belief and hope in our capacities for activity, active life, engagement with social and political forces, ability to identify and know 'what we ought to be', what is right, good and useful and to turn that into real improvement by work, self development and politics.

11. Objection to Impersonalism

In all its forms bar one - human embodiment as stressed by Objective Idealists and Hegel. Grote argues that the whole known world is imbued with mind: as said above, either or all the mind of authors, members of traditions, social members and/or that of God. What we know is an inheritance; doing geometry we are engaging with Pythagoras and Euclid; when studying science with Bacon and Newton, when building we are conversing with the cannon of western architects, when studying religion or politics we are engaging with our historical forefathers whose ideas are now embodied in everything from traditions, to books, to things, practices and institutions. In this Grote is downplaying the unique role of each person and recognising the collective effort of generations of contributing persons. So many things external to person are indeed personal and human, requiring human thinking and language to understand. Grote even understands nature in this way as a sphere imbued with human mind. Hence, Grote's strategy is not to reject the impersonalism but to make it personal and human - imbued with mind.

In more traditional veins however, Grote does reject a raft of currents opposed by personalists - individualism, utilitarianism, determinism, materialism, pantheism and unqualified Absolute Idealism.

12. Opposition to Enlightenment Rationalism?

Grote's position on the Enlightenment is complex and balanced. He holds to a faith in knowledge and in particular, the new sciences from physics to philology in his *Old Studies and New* of 1856. He looses no faith in reason but wishes to balance this with recognition of other vital human capacities such as understanding, feeling, appreciating, and loving. Grote is an advocate of the projects of education and self realisation - but not in the deterministic forms of progress witnessed in the positivism of Comte, Buckle and Mill. Like Vico, the Liberal Anglicans in Cambridge and Hegel, his understanding is that history is an unfolding of human minds; a historical construction, a historical house made by many minds, peoples, movements and times. In this Grote shared much with later Oxford scholars such as T. H. Green and Edward Caird.

13. Language as Thinking

In his essays *On Glossology* (1872-4) Grote develops a significantly new claim about personal thinking that takes Cambridge philosophy towards Wittgenstein and Winch. Languages are inherited; they are historically and ontologically prior to each person. Languages contain all that is known and knowable to a group of language users - it is their dictionary, encyclopaedia, their known world (Grote, (1871b). Conversation trumps both thinking and learning in education and exploration of the world. Indeed language is the form in which we think, as well as converse and write. Thinking is dependent on language and not vice versa. Additionally language is the means by which we signify or convey meanings – *phonems* or sign convey *noems*, meanings or thought words. So like Wittgenstein, as there is no personal language, so there cannot be personal thoughts, meanings detached from the shared language of the persons as users. Finally, words mean, not what individuals ascribe to them but what is agreed between a speaker, the intended audience, adjudicated by knowledgeable other users as umpires.

So there are limits to the supreme significance, reality and autonomy that we can and must attach to individual persons, while collectives of persons as language users, sharing customs and traditions and practices, become more significant as we grow as persons individually and collectively. Grote is here like Michael Oakeshott, ascribing to customs, practices and traditions human qualities, having mind, sharing motives and purposes, aims and ideals. It seems that the basal world of the self-self is very temporary except for moments of retreat. Once opened to language and shared practices, persons are acculturated, and their collective achievements are embodiments of the participating person's life and activity.

14. Cambridge Personalism

Grote was not alone in placing such a priority on the self or person in nineteenth century Cambridge University. During his life, John was deeply influenced with the writings and teachings of Frederick D. Maurice whose idea of God, man and society, were imbued with the same humanistic and idealist views. One of the first *Moral Sciences Tripos* students, James Ward studied under Lotze in Germany before entering Trinity College, Cambridge. He qualified his idealism, but committed himself to exploring the way the selves were able to author their own worlds. W. R. Sorley, another non-conformist, became the Knightsbridge Professor in 1903, developing a new brand of personalism based upon estimates of human moral worth. But the most famous member of the Cambridge Personalist Tradition is John Ellis McTaggart, 1866-1925. Born in the year of Grote's death, the Ellis name was added to commemorate the family of Grote's best friend, Robert Leslie Ellis. Both an idealist and a humanist, he proffered the argument that the Absolute Mind was the plurality of human minds, especially when galvanized by friendship and love. All of the above know and approved of Grote's work and can be identified as members of a tradition, to which Michael Oakeshott may be added (Gibbins, 1998; 2007, 458-469; Broad, 1966; Passmore, 53-54, 81-88).

15. Summary and Conclusions

My conclusion is that while many scholars would be right to identify John Grote within the personalist tradition, the claim must be qualified in four ways. While reality is grounded within the experiences of being of each person, several factors allow them access to apparently, less then personal realms and shared experiences: a) language learning and usage carries persons, unavoidably, into a public world of shared meanings, b) relationships formed within language communities, bestow both external meanings and superior duties upon persons, c) the existence of shared practices, such as promising or church ritual, transport us into a world of shared public meanings, d) following rules, from the customary to the legal, involve us in implicit public practices constructed by previous and present persons. As with Fichte, identities become embodied in social and political practices and institutions, and therefore establish an objective dimension. We may say therefore, that there are things of significance other than persons, things that persons together have created, higher social things and institutions which embody their personhood.

Again, not every power, judgement and value can be claimed as the sovereign concern of each person. Nor are a person's moral choices a matter of complete personal autonomy. As with Kant, once the dignity of all other persons is respected, it follows that you have a duty to treat them according to what your relationship to them demands, or as yourselves (equity). Anticipating Bradley's 'My Station and its Duties', Grote argues that the content of duties derives from the concrete forms of the relationships between persons that are the facts of our lives (Grote 1870, 141-158). Duties, and all other moral precepts, are implicit in social relations between free and rational persons. In a world of persons no individual is inviolable, sovereign and supreme, duty trumps autonomy in moral matters.

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ROWAN WILLIAMS ON DOSTOEVSKY AND PERSONALISM

Jan Nilsson

Translated by Peter Hjorth Vindum

Abstract: In Rowan Williams' studies of Dostoyevsky, the concept of the person is fundamentally understood as an unfathomable being that always contains more than is being perceived. Thus, personal freedom consists in accepting the limitations of human comprehension about the other. For Williams, the always-unfinished dialogue is the primary means for creating new meaning and opening up to the future, leading to an objection to the idea of 'the end of history'.

Key Words: Rowan Williams, Fjodor Dostoyevsky, Michael Bakhtin, Nicolas Berdyaev, personalism, unfinished dialogue, end of history, freedom, apophatic anthropology.

1. Introduction

Rowan Williams, the former Archbishop of Canterbury, has made a significant contribution to our understanding of human freedom and its potential openness towards the future. It is not least through his reading of Dostoyevsky's works of fiction that Williams produces his highly personalist anthropology, and makes visible its implications for human relationships.

In his reading of Dostoyevsky, Williams looks to a range of other Russian thinkers for inspiration. First and foremost he looks to the literary critic Michael Bakhtin (1895-1975), and the key personalist thinker Nicolas Berdyaev (1874-1948). In this paper we will consider how some of their concepts are rediscovered and developed in Williams' work.

The main source I am using for Williams' personalist anthropology is his monograph on Dostoyevsky published in 2008.[1] I could have chosen a different approach but it is worth noticing that it is through a *literary* study, rather than by a philosophical or theological path, that Williams' personalism finds its clearest expression. Perhaps this observation itself contains a point; namely that humans have a character and indefinability which philosophical frameworks do not seem able to capture, but which are best expressed in novelistic discourse and suchlike.

2. The Unfathomable in Each Person

Williams does not use the term "personalism" in his book from 2008, but in an interview in the magazine *Prospect* he makes the following statement with regard to his inspiration by Russian literature: 'The key for me is the concept of "personalism" – a fascination with the unfathomable in each person.'[2] To Williams, personalism is first of all based on a recognition of the 'unfathomable in each person.'

In his work we find a headstrong insistence that humans always contain more than we can know or perceive, never mind express; in other words there is, a profusion of meaning, significance and potential in the human person. Each person contains a complexity that escapes both our mental perception and our language. This assumption permeates all of Dostoyevsky's work, and it is one that Williams regards as central in his unfolding of a personalist anthropology.

Every individual contains something unfathomable; there is 'an essential mysteriousness about the notion of the person in the human world, an essential mysteriousness that one can't simply deal with by listing it in a number of things that are true about us.'[3] As persons we are more than what can be known or said about us. We find here a clear inspiration from Berdyaev's book on Dostoyevsky from 1923: 'Human nature cannot be brought within the oper-ation of reason: there is always "something over," an irrational something which is the very well-spring of life. And human society can never be "rationalized," because there is an irrational principle in it.'[4]

Human life cannot be reduced to mere logic or instinct. This idea might bring to mind Dostoyevsky's anti-hero from *The Underground*, who rebels against the idea that humans are nothing but piano keys, controlled by natural science and mathematical necessity. Dostoyevsky's voice from *The Underground*, accompanied by Williams, is a strong warning against every tendency to reduce the human person to less than it truly is, namely a being in possession of personality and free will. There is, from this perspective, something unfathomable in each person, an element that transcends our perception of the other, and of ourselves.

In his book on Dostoyevsky, Williams acknowledges his debt to Bakhtin, and we do find in Bakhtin's work on Dostoyevsky the same emphasis on the unfathomable in human nature. It is well known that Bakhtin describes Dostoyevsky's works as a polyphony; a multiplicity of various voices in a never ending conversation. And according to Bakhtin there is a connection between this literary form and the implicit anthropology that Williams also detects in Dostoyevsky's writings. For Bakhtin there is a special trait in polyphonic authorship 'that affirms the independence, internal freedom, unfinalizability, and indeterminacy of the hero.'[5]

Bakhtin's understanding of a person's freedom and unfinalizability implies a radical perception of each individual as carrying a dynamism and excess of

significance, which makes it impossible to fix the person, even in our self-reflection. The person is always more than that which has been known and said about the person thus far. So according to Bakhtin the unfinalized *conversation* in Dostoyevsky's polyphony is connected to the idea of the unfinalized *human person*. It is this thought that becomes Williams' primary premise, and we will encounter its consequences in the following passages.

In the wake of this primary premise comes the claim that human beings are always relationally significant to each other, and our lives are always entangled. This thought is at the very core of personalism, but while acknowledging this Williams strongly empasizes a duality: he says in his analysis of *The Idiot* that 'while our "implication" in each other's lives is inescapable, it may work for mutual subversion or damage as well as healing.'[6]

That our lives are entangled can be a source of great joy, but it can also function as an undermining and destructive factor in our lives. Dostoyevsky's authorship is filled with examples of both, and at no point does Williams romanticize the complexity of our relational significance. Rather he insists that the alternative – an oversimplified life in complete isolation – is much worse.

3. An Aura of Uncertainty

Human life can never be fully acknowledged: there will always be things that escape our perception no matter how much we know and understand about the other, for 'the speaking and acting self is not a finished thing; it is not transparent to itself, let alone anyone else.'[7]

Even when we feel convinced that all has been said, there is still more to say than what has already been said, or will ever be said. Accepting the limitations of our perception in relation to the other person is what sets the other person free to be more – or potentially become more – than what I have assumed him or her to be. To not let the other be more than what at the present moment I have understood him or her to be, is essentially a violation of that individual. In order to protect the freedom of the other we must accept an 'aura of uncertainty'[8] as a basic human condition.

Thus the acceptance of this 'aura of uncertainty' implies an ethical obligation towards the other: an obligation to never limit the other, which corresponds to my limited perception of him or her. The freedom of the other will suffer if we discard the possible revelation of hidden qualities within him or her.

However, it is important to stress that these limitations within human perception should never be understood as a reduction of our understanding to mere supposition, in the sense that reality, in any proper sense, escapes our perception. Rather it is the contrary: 'the negative moment is the recognition of excess, not absence or privation.'[9]

Thus, the impossibility of grasping the other fully is not due to a general impossibility in perceiving reality (an absence of reality and meaning). Rather, it is due to the acknowledgement that there is always (infinitely) *more* to perceive than that which has hitherto been understood. The other person contains an excess of meaning and potential that can never be fully uncovered.

4. The Unfinished Dialogue

Multiple times, Williams demonstrates how 'the conversation' plays a crucial part in Dostoyevsky's works. This can be conversations that expand our perspectives as we discover new and unexpected horizons in the words of the other, or moments when the conversation is broken off and the speech is abruptly turned into silence, which Williams finds parallels Dostoyevsky's description of the 'demonic'. The demonic according to Williams is expressed when the opportunity for change and renewal is abruptly and consistently broken off; the point where the conversation is either brought to an end or where 'the other's response was already known and could be dealt with or circumvented in advance, which […] is to be condemned to death.'[10]

The demonic aspect is the reservation and isolation through which the dialogue turns into a monologue (As in *The Underground Man*) or is forced to silence (As Ivan constantly seeks to do it in *The Brothers Karamazov*). When the conversation ceases and the opportunity for change therefore disappears, as everything has already been said, we reach the end of the history. This according to Williams is the unavoidable result when the unrestrained conversation is forced to cease: 'The Devil is out to stop history,'[11] Williams claims in his analysis of one of Dostoyevsky's darkest novels, *The Possessed*.

It almost sounds like a tribute, as well as a correction, to Francis Fukuyama's thesis concerning 'the end of history.' Williams returns to the theme at several points throughout his book, and he always opposes the idea of 'the end of history', at a personal as well as a political level. If we come to terms with the idea of the end of history – that there is nothing left to say – we automatically enclose ourselves and others in isolation. Williams claims that if conversation disappears from the political sphere as a consequence of this claimed end of history, then politics itself will dissolve: 'When dialogue fails, when history is supposed to be over […], there is no more politics: there is nothing to entertain dialogue *about*', which opens up to the dangers of totalitarianism.[12]

The conversation must be kept alive. However that also implies that everything that is being said can be questioned, for if contradiction is prohibited or made suspicious, the conversation becomes restrained, and we end up, once again, in an isolation

which draws us nearer to the end of history: 'So long as language remains possible, so does contradiction. There is nothing sayable that cannot be answered or continued or qualified in some way or another.'[13]

All things considered, it is the recognition of man's 'aura of uncertainty' or Bakhtin's concept of human 'unfinalizability' that constitutes a foundation for the ongoing conversation: The last word has not, and never will be, said, because man is an unfinalized being. The focus on human freedom and unfinalizability implies a radical open-mindedness towards the future. Bakhtin goes as far as saying that 'nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the world and about the world has not yet been spoken, the world is open and free, everything is still in the future and will always be in the future.'[14]

This emphasis on the open future – and its significance in Dostoyevsky's work – can also be detected in the writings of Berdyaev. Berdyaev was an important inspiration to Williams. In his 1923 monograph on Dostoyevsky, he claims that 'It is no use looking to any established order sanctioned by past history (as Tolstoy did); man's eye must be turned towards the unknown future, the Becoming.'[15]

It is the open conversation that makes the future possible. The open conversation is signified by the courage to present ones true opinion, and by the acceptance, and even welcoming, of counter-arguments.

It is essential, even within the religious sphere which Williams represents, that every truth claim must carry in it an invitation to contradiction, if, of course, this contradiction in return allows for further contradiction. Williams goes so far as to say that even 'the authority of the divine Word has to establish itself, in and through the unceasing continuation of dialogue.'[16] Thus there can be no conversation and no words that are not part of the ongoing conversation. This is where meaning is expressed, where new meaning arises, and where we receive our identity and are shaped as persons; this happens nowhere but in the encounter and conversation with others.

Neither Williams, Bakhtin nor Berdyaev will acknowledge the end of history, mainly because this idea would conflict with the personal freedom and the individual excess of significance. As long as we allow the conversation between free persons to exist as an organic polyphony, we will never reach the end of history.

5. Freedom and Engagement

In Williams' reading of Dostoyevsky, freedom is about encountering and engaging with other persons. Freedom and engagement are interconnected, and freedom without engagement can have fatal consequences. This reality comes to light in Williams' analysis of Prince Myshkin's paradoxical guiltiness. In *The Idiot*, Prince Myshkin is completely free; free from the conventions and prejudice of those around him, but he is also without engagement. He is first of all a symbol of purity and innocence: a person without hidden motives, without calculation, without judgment, regardless how much he is despised by others. Also, he is without history: Williams comments on the odd manner in which the Prince suddenly enters the plot (in the most literal sense – by train), and how this is at the centre of his guiltiness: he carries no history (or at least he does not bring it into his encounter with other people), and he creates no history either.[17]

Prince Myshkin, who carries no evil, takes on his guilt by refusing to get his hands dirty, and by constantly, and without engagement, attempting to withdraw from the course of history. It is his innocence that causes his guilt, in the sense that he never exposes himself to the dangers that follow from diving into the encounter with others; with all of its facets, in the social space where we must sort out misunderstandings, respond to lies etc.

Thus the understanding of freedom which Williams finds in Dostoyevsky is not a do-whatever-you-want-freedom. Neither is it an abstract freedom that in practice must be tamed due to the fear of both religious and secular reprisals. To the contrary, it is a freedom that first and foremost becomes apparent in the obligation to engage in communal life and in the responsibility towards the other as we acknowledge his or her value and crucial role in our lives.

The phenomenon of freedom, which in Dostoyevsky's work is so closely related to the demand for engagement, is not merely concerned with individual freedom in an existential sense, but has an equally strong focus on how we, in a community or society, administer each other's freedom. One of Williams' strengths is that he is not afraid to apply Dostoyevsky's concept of freedom to current political issues. In the first part of his book he argues that society must never overrule the individual's freedom to reject what is generally considered rational, even if this limitation is conducted 'in the name of peace and welfare'[18] – an argument that can easily be heard as a comment on present issues of control and surveillance.

Williams presents the viewpoint in a treatment of *Notes from the Underground*, but the exact same reasoning could be made in relation to the inquisitor in *The Brothers Karamazov*, in which Christ is accused of giving man his freedom, leading to conflict and confusion. This narrative also deals with individual's freedom vs. the social demand for prosperity and stability.

Ones again we rediscover a theme that Berdyaev also treats in his studies of Dostoyevsky. Berdyaev was, in his early life in the Czarist era, and later in the totalitarian Soviet Union, very aware of the dangers of putting society's rationality before personal freedom. Berdyaev (and Williams) finds the same

idea in Dostoyevsky's writings. To Dostoyevsky freedom comes before rationality, and furthermore, freedom comes before happiness. According to Berdyaev, Dostoyevsky 'refused to rationalize human society and repudiated all attempts to exalt happiness, reason and well-being above liberty.'[19]

6. Apophatic Anthropology

AlongsideWilliams' main premises for the unfolding of human relationships, conversation and freedom, the concepts of indefiniteness and limited perception play a crucial role. From these negative factors springs the obligation to protect the freedom of the other through acknowledging the excess of meaning that lies within them, which is yet to be perceived.

Williams is not just a philosopher, his main field is theology, and so he creates a link between these negative factors; which relate to *human* nature and the theological idea of man's limitations in his attempt to contain the *divine* nature through acknowledgement, thought, or language. This position is commonly known as 'apophatic theology' or 'negative theology', and has always played a central role in the Eastern Orthodox tradition.[20] Also, apophatic theology suggests that the limitations of human perception of the divine are not caused by the absence of being, but by an infinite excess of meaning, as we have already seen with regards to our ability to understand other persons. Thus there is a clear parallel between apophatic theology and the 'aura of uncertainty' which surrounds all humans.

This parallel is made explicit in the work of the Fourth Century theolgian Gregory of Nyssa. Gregory of Nyssa is one of the greatest thinkers in antiquity who supported an apophatic theology, and in his exegesis of the *Imago Dei* (the idea that man is created in the image of God), he says:

> The image is properly an image so long as it fails in none of those attributes which we perceive in the archetype […] since one of the attributes we contemplate in the Divine nature is incomprehensibility of essence, it is clearly necessary that in this point the image should be able to show its imitation of the archetype […] since the nature of our mind, which is the likeness of the Creator evades our knowledge, it has an accurate resemblance to the superior nature, figuring by its own unknowableness of the incomprehensible Nature.[21]

The idea of 'the negative factor' plays a central role in Williams' writings, and since it is a concept he borrows from theology in order to apply it to questions of anthropology, one might argue that Williams establishes an 'apophatic anthropology' or a 'negative anthropology' in order to protect the freedom of the other, even though he does not use these terms himself. We do however find a terminological parallel in the writings of Berdyaev, who advocates an 'apophatic sociology': 'In order to prepare the structure of consciousness, which overcomes the slavery and the domination, it is necessary to construct an apophatic sociology on the analogy of apophatic theology.'[22]

7. Social and Political Implications

Finally, I will consider a few examples of how Williams draws political consequences from the anthropology that he sees as evident in Dostoyevsky's novels. It is noticeable that Williams' studies of a 19th century writer lead to a concrete critique of society. Obviously, Dostoyevsky's work cannot have specific political consequences for today – this would be a crude anachronism – however Williams' motives are not purely literary. He is also interested in how this implicit anthropology might inform today's society.

In the above we have seen how Williams begins his book by indicating a critique of a society that is marked by exaggerated surveillance at the cost of personal freedom. Towards the end of the book he becomes more concrete. He builds a critique of concepts such as 'consumerism' and the general tendency to quantify the social sector and the health sector: 'The point at which the activity of nursing the sick can be expressed in terms of a producer supplying a customer is the point at which the *culture* of nursing the sick begins to disappear.'[23]

And when 'culture' (in this broad meaning of the word) disappears, meaningful communities also disappear, and then everything is defined in advance; or at last everything which can be determined through quantifiable facts, which brings us back to the end of history: 'At its extreme point, such a dissolution portends an 'end of history', a collapse of the possibility of making any meaningful narratives of individual or corporate experience.'[24]

8. Conclusion

Williams' studies of Dostoyevsky are a combination of literary criticism, philosophy, theology and social criticism. It is clear that a personalist approach easily turns into an inter-disciplinary exercise. Personalism is not just a philosophy, nor only a politics; it is an approach to human life in its fullness, including social organization.

We have seen how human freedom has been foregrounded through the premise of our inherent excess of meaning, which transcends any system. Man is not just a piano key controlled by logic and instinct, as Dostoyevsky's voices from *The Underground* reminds us. Man, all things considered, is surrounded by an 'aura of uncertainty' which makes persons free, and this freedom includes freedom from my conceptions of him or her.

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THE PERSONALISM OF STUART HAMPSHIRE

Karl Simms

Abstract: This paper follows the personalist current in Stuart Hampshire's philosophy. Hampshire defends the person conceived as an indisociable whole. Accordingly, he opposes Cartesian dualism, while maintaining that monadism does not entail determinism. Adopting an intentionalist position, he argues that there is a continuum between embodiment, situatedness within the world, environment, and intentional action. Scientific thinking, being based on external observations, is incapable of perceiving this whole picture, whereas person-centred philosophical enquiry both expresses and demonstrates freedom of thought.

Key Words: action, consciousness, determinism, dualism, embodiment, freedom of thought, Hampshire, Husserl, intentionality, Merleau-Ponty, monadism, personalism, Ryle, Spinoza, volition.

1. Introduction

Throughout his philosophical career Stuart Hampshire promoted and defended the idea of freedom of thought against the deterministic currents underlying much philosophy of mind, psychology, and related disciplines, which were prevalent in the mid twentieth century, as reflected in the titles of two of his works, *Freedom of the Individual* and *Freedom of Mind*.[1] Moreover, as he explains in his major work *Thought and Action*,[2] he sees Cartesian dualism, in its separation of mind from body, as a denial of the whole person, which he wishes to reinstate at the heart of philosophy. It is Hampshire's great philosophical accomplishment to demonstrate that monadism can be consistent with freedom of thought: in other words, that a denial of dualism does not entail a philosophical surrender to the passions. In what follows I shall trace the trajectory of this personalist line of thinking in Hampshire, beginning with his explication of Spinoza, before turning to *Thought and Action*, with some reference to associated essays along the way.

In his first book, *Spinoza*,[3] Hampshire engages in what might properly be called a *hermeneutic* of Spinoza's thought, particularly of his *Ethics*.[4] Spinoza's work is notoriously open to interpretation, and Hampshire steers a deft course between explanation and interpretation. What clearly impresses Hampshire about Spinoza is his monadism in response to Descartes' dualism; what Hampshire – in common with most readers of Spinoza – finds problematic is the determinism which follows from this, at least according to the trajectory of Spinoza's own logic. Hampshire's early attempt at a 'Spinozism without Spinozism' – a monadology without determinism – is what will inform the personalism of his later work.

According to Hampshire's account of Spinoza, 'For every body in nature there exists an idea of that body; for every triangular figure there exists an idea of that figure. Similarly, for everything which would ordinarily be called a human body, there exists an idea of that body, and such an idea is what is ordinarily called a human mind' (Hampshire, *Spinoza* 61). Two ideas important to personalism follow from this. Firstly, 'Every modification of, or change of state in, a human body necessarily involves ... a modification of the idea of that body, and so involves a modification of the mind' (61). This is a point which Descartes himself had acknowledged, and which, according to Hampshire, Descartes had found an 'embarrassment'. However, while Descartes sought to dismiss the effects of the workings of the body on the human mind as being merely that – effects (as if the body *acts upon* the mind in the same manner as an external agent would) – for Spinoza, the mind cannot be construed as separate from the body: in Hampshire's words, 'A human mind has greater or less power and perfection in so far as the body, of which it is the idea, has greater power and perfection; the converse must also be true' (61). From this follows the second important idea to personalism, that there is a continuity, rather than a radical break, between animals on the one hand and humans on the other. Again, this not only flies in the face of Descartes, who famously described animals as 'mere automata', but also has implications for contemporary debates in both psycholinguistics (concerning the linguistic capacities of non-human primates), and philosophy of mind – one thinks, for example, of Chomsky's *Cartesian Linguistics*, in which these various strands are brought together. For Hampshire, as for Spinoza, the difference between humans and animals 'is one of degree of complication in structure and organisation' (61). The idea of an animal's body does not constitute a mind because the animal has 'less power and perfection' than a human. In other words, it is because the animal is capable of a much narrower range of actions and reactions than a human that we do not ascribe a mind to it, rather than being the case that animals have a narrow range of actions and reactions because they do not have minds. This reversal of causality from what has become the Cartesian norm both follows from, and partly constitutes, what Deleuze would call 'radical empiricism' in Spinoza and Hampshire: it is based on what we can empirically observe of humans and animals, rather than on a metaphysical speculation

concerning 'other minds'. A corollary of this, of course, is that occasionally the human body and mind can sink to the level of the animal's, the sad experience of which demonstrates man's foregoing of his complexity in favour of more simple animal organisation.

It is with this in mind that Hampshire finds Spinoza's Proposition VII of Part III of the *Ethics* 'all-important': 'The endeavour (*conatus*) wherewith each thing endeavours to persist in its own being is nothing more than the actual essence of the thing itself' (98). Hampshire's gloss on this is that '[t]he greater the power of self-maintenance of the particular thing in the face of external causes, the greater reality it has, and the more clearly it can be distinguished as having a definite nature and individuality' (98). It follows from this that human beings, as a part of Nature, endeavour to preserve themselves; indeed, they have a particularly strong individuality as a result of a particularly strong *conatus*. This, of course, has profound consequences for ethics, and Hampshire is keen to clear up any misunderstanding in this respect. Hobbes, for example, founds his moral and political philosophy on the 'supposed truism' that 'all men seek first their own preservation and security' (98), while those opposing Hobbes have simply denied the truth of this proposition, as a matter of supposed empirical observation. According to Hampshire, this is irrelevant to Spinoza, since Spinoza 'is not simply making a statement about the observed facts of human behaviour', but rather, 'is deducing a consequence of his own account of individuality, a consequence which is applicable, not peculiarly to human beings, but to all finite things. Therefore, since this is not an empirical question, it will not suffice merely to refute Spinoza's proposition from empirical observation' (98). This is not a *psychological* question, but a *logical* one, and Hampshire goes on to tackle the logic of Spinoza's argument.

Human beings are so complex in their organisation (by contrast to animals) that they may be said to have minds. Now, 'a human mind consists of ideas which reflect the effects of external causes in modifying that balance of motion and rest which constitute a human body' (99). Human bodies interact with other things, and these interactions change the human being's state. In terms of the body, these changes are either increases or diminutions in vitality; in terms of the mind, they are pleasure or pain. It is important to note that, contrary to modern psychology, Spinoza is not saying that there is a *correlation* between increased vitality of the body and an increased sensation of pleasure (an empirical psychologist performs tests to measure such things); rather, 'pleasure' and 'pain' are merely the terms used to describe an upwards or downwards movement in the power or perfection of the mind: upwards towards the infinite complexity of God, or downwards towards the relative simplicity of animals. 'It is important in Spinoza's moral philosophy', says Hampshire, 'that pleasure and pain always represent a change in psycho-physical state; they are the mental reflection of the rise or fall in the power or activity of the organism'; moreover, 'The degree of power or perfection of any finite thing depends on the degree to which it is causally active, and not passive, in relation to things other than itself' (99).

It follows from this that nothing is *a priori* pleasurable or painful, rather, what is pleasurable or painful can only be discovered by empirical observations of the effects on organisms. Working within Spinoza's premises and definitions, says Hampshire, pleasure or pain, being but modifications of the states of the person, 'occur independently of will or judgement' (101). Hampshire summarises Spinoza's argument thus:

> Any individual at any moment of his existence is, regarded as a body, in a condition to be stimulated or depressed in vitality by contact with certain things; this condition or 'determination' is completely explicable by purely physical laws.... The popular terminology of 'will' and 'judgement' is unscientific, or represents confused perceptions, because it does not represent the causes of a person's condition (102).

And so, Hampshire continues:

> Spinoza's theory of *conatus* ... is designed to show the full implications of admitting the possibility of complete causal explanation of human behaviour. He has so defined these basic terms that it follows logically that all men pursue their own pleasure in accordance with the necessary laws of Nature; they necessarily pursue pleasure, not in the sense that they always in fact deliberate about what will give them most pleasure and then choose to act accordingly, but in the sense that their so-called choices, and their pleasures, can always be explained as arising from the *conatus* of the organism ...' (105).

This brings us to the most scandalous aspect of Spinoza's thought, his 'metaphysical determinism'. Just as with pleasure and pain, so with (morally) good or bad: there is no *a priori* good or bad; the words 'good' or 'bad' can be applied equally to persons as to animals or to inanimate objects, they all being things within the natural order susceptible to change as external forces act upon them. From a scientific point of view, nothing is inherently good or bad, but merely a consequence of natural laws. As Hampshire writes, 'it is this disturbing contention which is the core of the metaphysical issue between determinism and free will' (115).

Spinoza's 'hideous hypothesis' is that 'the criterion of distinguishing human beings as exercising rational will and choice is superstition' (116). Spinoza is a metaphysical, not a physical, determinist: thus he does not deny that persons are free to choose between alternative courses of action, and so his argument cannot be refuted on those grounds. What Hampshire calls Spinoza's 'more formidable thesis' is that 'we will necessarily abandon the notion of freedom of choice as our knowledge and understanding of Nature, and of human nature as part of Nature, increase'. 'Superstition', Hampshire reminds us, 'is by definition ignorance of causes', and, according to Spinoza, while 'Men think themselves free, in so far as they are conscious of their volitions and desire', their pre-scientific superstition consists in their being 'ignorant of the causes by which they are disposed to will and desire' (117).

Hampshire gives a Spinozist reply to this, without actually revealing his own position. The Spinozist would have recourse to modern psychology, conceived of as a science. As a result of advances in psychology, we are now apt to replace 'bad' by 'anti-social', 'criminal' by 'delinquent', and so on, as our understanding of the causes of people's so-called 'bad' behaviour become understood: behaviour formerly described as 'wicked' can now be explained in terms of a disease which is curable. This of course leads to moral relativism: nothing is good or bad but what a particular person, or group of people, hold to be so at a particular stage of their scientific enlightenment from superstition. And it concomitantly removes any idea of responsibility, or aim towards the 'good life', from moral philosophy. Spinoza's *Ethics* is a far cry from the 'ethics as first philosophy' of, say, Lévinas, since it founds all morality, which is ultimately illusory anyway, on the scientific observation of natural causes.

Consequently it would be a conclusion unsatisfactory to Hampshire, although he would wait until his later essay, *Freedom of the Individual*, to expound this. In the years subsequent to the publication of his *Spinoza* book, Hampshire developed an intentionalist, and therefore personalist, philosophy of human freedom. Hampshire retains from Spinoza the core idea that agents are free in proportion to the degree to which they are active or passive in relation to the external world. To put it simply, thought is validated through action. But he severs Spinoza's tie between this and the continuous stream of material nature which constitutes reality for Spinoza. In other words, Hampshire accepts Spinoza's monadism (Hampshire remains an implacable opponent of Descartes), but does not accept a determinist consequence.

This is stated most succinctly by Hampshire in his 'Conclusion' to *Freedom of the Individual*: 'My objection to a thesis of determinism is [that] there is a normative element in first-person present and future tense statements about some states of mind and some types of conduct, and this normative element would not be reproduced in the description which a scientific observer would use' (Hampshire, *Freedom of the Individual* 110). Consider, as Hampshire invites us to do, the distinction between 'I regret this' and 'I regretted it'. The former has (although Hampshire does not use the terminology) an illocutionary force of regretting, whereas the latter merely one of reporting: 'I regret this' verbally instantiates the act of regretting in a way in which the past-tense formulation does not. (Something similar may be said of the distinction between first and third person, 'I regret this' *versus* 'He regrets it'.) For Hampshire, what is crucial here is the different types of knowledge involved: I can infer the truth or falsity of both the third-person and the past tense statements from the behaviour of the third person (or my own past behaviour) and the regretableness of the situation, whereas in the case of the first-person present I must know something of my own state of mind. A deterministic vocabulary is objectivising and historicising, but in being so it robs the observer of the additional knowledge that only the first-person viewpoint can bring. The first-person present sentence cannot be substituted by a third-person or past-tense statement without loss; if such a substitution were made, 'there would be no means of relating what a man would say of himself, in explaining, by reference to a norm of appropriateness, why he now has these desires, attitudes, and intentions, to what could be said *about* him in explaining his desires, attitudes and intentions' (111). The 'norm of appropriateness' is important here: Hampshire claims not to be interested in whether intentional verbs can be replaced by state descriptors (although he is actually maintaining that they cannot). The 'norm of appropriateness' is the route to the ethics which Spinoza's scientism abnegates. In short, although he would probably not have appreciated the terminology, Hampshire maintains the Husserlian distinction between the phenomenological and the natural ('scientific') standpoints. Intentionality defines the mental, and deterministic scientific observation lacks the vocabulary – because it lacks the means – to access this, and the adoption of the intentional attitude is the exercise of freedom: 'The man who is comparatively free in his conduct of his life is active in the adoption of his own attitudes and of his own way of life; his decisions and intentions are the best guide to his future actions; and just this is the significance of calling him "free"' (112).

In his review of Ryle's *The Concept of Mind*,[5] Hampshire finds in Ryle the same problem of an inadequate vocabulary leading to false thinking. There is an internal logic to Spinoza's argument that makes it irrefutable on its own terms; therefore, the only way to refute Spinoza is by denying the validity

of the terms which constitute his premises *a priori*. Likewise,

> Ryle has been betrayed into using the weapons of his enemy. It appears that the arguments which are fatal to the assertion in each case must be no less fatal to the counter-assertion: for they are *logical* arguments directed against the form and generality of such philosophical statements, irrespective of whether they are affirmed or denied....

Hampshire and Ryle have a common enemy: Cartesian dualism. But in Hampshire's view, Ryle's critique of dualism is ineffective because it displaces ordinary linguistic usage by a metaphysical vocabulary in just the same way that Ryle accuses Descartes of doing. 'Common-sense language is in fact', writes Hampshire, 'firmly dualistic, in the sense that we do operate – and have operated since the earliest known literature – a distinction ... between mental and physical states and events' (Hampshire, 'Ryle', 90). And 'if ordinary usage is to be authoritative', then we cannot dismiss as 'improper', as Ryle does, 'questions about the relation between a person's body and his mind' (90). As we shall see, it is precisely these questions to which Hampshire turns in his most important work, *Thought and Action*. This he does in a manner much more finely nuanced than Ryle's, whose simple dismissal of the entire question is founded on what Hampshire calls a 'literalist fallacy' with regard to language: that there is an ideal language structured by a purely logical grammar which, being devoid of any metaphorical residue, is capable of describing mental states (which become indistinguishable from physical states), without making inappropriate reference to the 'ghost in the machine'. Hampshire ironically speculates whether our fear of ghosts might 'drive us into pidgin English – which might be the ultimate literal language' (112).

Hampshire's review demonstrates that Ryle's thought takes the same trajectory as Spinoza's: a rejection of Cartesian dualism leads to determinism. Hampshire's overriding concern in *Thought and Action* is to defend the notion of freedom of thought while still adhering to a monadistic connection between body and mind. Here, Hampshire effectively reverses Spinoza's line of reasoning, and derives his monadism from an analysis of the experience of action, rather than the other way round. In so doing, Hampshire transforms Spinoza's ethics into a personalism, by founding philosophy on personal experience, rather than on some abstract *a priori* reasoning: 'that idea of the unity of mind and body, which has been distorted by philosophers when they think of persons only as passive observers and not as self-willed agents', he writes, arises 'from the experience of action' (Hampshire, *Thought and Action*, 74). 'A philosophical dualism, which supposes that my history is analysable into two parallel sequences of mental and physical events' he goes on, 'does not give a possible account of the concept of action' (74). This is because, while human action is a combination of intention and physical movement, 'the combination of the two is not a simple additive one. The movement is guided by the intention, which ... often is not distinguishable as a separate event from the movement guided' (74). Therefore, 'We have ... no reason to look for some criterion of personal identity that is distinct from the identity of our bodies as persisting physical objects' (75). This being the case, when it comes to, for example, the case of my moving, I do not *perceive* that my arm, or whatever, is moving, but rather know it directly. Perception is a secondary mode of consciousness that I apply to the external world; my arm is not external to me (taken as a whole person), and therefore it must require a peculiar way of thinking, or some sort of retrospective analysis, or a misuse of language, to say that I *perceive* my arm moving. (Indeed, the fact that we do talk in such a way when under the influence of some kind of illness or drug or, to use Hampshire's example, when recollecting a dream, indicates that this is not part of ordinary experience.) According to Hampshire, in ordinary life, when I move my arm I *know*, rather than *perceive*, that I move it.

Hampshire thus places the person at the centre of his philosophy, which is to say, at the point from which all philosophising must proceed. But the person is also the literal centre from which all thinking as such must proceed. Such is the essence of Hampshire's central concept of *situatedness*. Being situated within the world gives rise to the relationship between what is internal – known – and what is external – perceived. Hence (and he probably inherited this line of thought through Merleau-Ponty) Hampshire's person-centred philosophy has much in common with Husserl's concept of intentionality. Just as, for Husserl, consciousness is 'consciousness of something',[6] so for Hampshire 'Thinking and the making of statements are the activities of a person who is surrounded by identifiable objects to which he can refer. There is one continuing object about the existence and identifying features of which he is never in doubt and which he can always use as a fixed point of reference: himself' (68-69). Thus it is that a person's movement, as an action brought about by the will, is central to Hampshire's conception of a person's situatedness within the world, and therefore of their knowledge and understanding of that world. 'As I move at will', he writes, 'my point of view correspondingly changes, and it is in this way that I explore the world arranged around me as its centre' (54), and further:

> However uncertain [a person] may be in referring to things in his environment, he can always identify himself as the man who is

> doing, or is trying to do, so-and-so. He is aware of himself as the centre from which all his perceptions radiate, and he is aware that, as he moves or is moved, his perspective changes. Intentional movement gives him his sense of being in the world ... (69).

This makes explicit the unity of thought between Hampshire's concepts of embodiment, situatedness within the world, environment, and intentional action, and there is a seamless continuity between his philosophical description of being in the world, and his conception of what philosophy consists of. The experience of philosophising is but one facet of the experience of being in the world – it is not an 'objective' analysis of what it is like to experience, seen from what Merleau-Ponty, equally dismissively, would call a 'transcendental standpoint', but is, rather, itself a mode of experiencing. Thus it is that intentional movement prevents a person 'from thinking of himself as a neutral point, outside the world, to which things or impressions are presented in one single natural order', just as philosophically we must not give in to the temptation of thinking there is a neutral point external to human experience from which human experience may be described.

This leads Hampshire to an analysis of intention, which he characterises as an attempt, or trying, to achieve some result, which is to say, some change in the world (even if I raise my arm 'for its own sake', the world is changed insofar as my body is part of that world). 'Consciousness', says Hampshire, 'is consciousness of intention' (131), which re-states Husserl's formula, but inflects it more towards the direction of action. Hampshire is not so much interested in intentionality, as a mental attitude that reaches out towards the world, as intention, which leads to an action, such as a literal reaching-out. Since, following Merleau-Ponty, Hampshire insists on the priority of embodiment, his action-directed theory of consciousness and intention does not fall prey to the idealism of which Husserl's theory of consciousness and intentionality is sometimes accused. Action is physical action for Hampshire, not merely a mental event.

'For human beings', then, 'to be conscious is to have active intentions' (169). Intentions, meanwhile, and truistically, are intentions to act. Of course, there are occasions when I do things without realising that I am doing them, and the whole theory of psychoanalysis (to which Hampshire is quite sympathetic) is predicated on the notion of unintended actions. But I am always capable of having actions of which I, as their perpetrator, am unaware pointed out to me, and 'As soon as I realise what I am doing, I am no longer doing it unintentionally' (175). Such awareness is a form of knowledge, namely 'knowledge of the situation confronting me and of the difference my action is making' (175). Attempting an action thereby, through this knowledge (of what I am doing), becomes the exercise of my freedom; its corollary is my responsibility, which Hampshire calls 'the burden of intention' (175). The continuation of my action once I become aware of it (if I were not aware of it from the outset) is not only knowledge of my situation and the effect of my action, but also a decision. Freedom is the possibility of making decisions, which, in Hampshire's terms, is the decision of whether to act, or continue to act, that is, to carry through an intention which alters my situation. Active knowledge of my intention to act is the opening of my consciousness to the ethical, the attendant decision carrying with it both freedom and 'the burden of intention', responsibility.

Now, of course it is very rare that I make isolated decisions to act, or at least, if I did, there would be a degree of randomness about such decisions. 'I shall now stand up!'.[7] What makes this behaviour appear bizarre, of course, is that it has no rational basis (although it is rational as an *example* of irrational behaviour), and by 'rational basis' we mean its continuity with a great stream of other rational decisions within both my personal history and the situation in which I now find myself. For a decision to be truly a decision, according to Hampshire, there is 'the requirement of rationality'; this is 'the requirement that the ... decision should be connected with other ... decisions in such a way that a doubt that undermines any one of them would also to a greater or less degree undermine the others' (265). This requirement of rationality is universal: 'within a single mind', says Hampshire, 'there is no alternative to this requirement of rationality except the abandonment of thought' (265-66). Conversely, the more self-aware I am, the more rational I am (I might have irrationally stood up a moment ago simply without thinking, without being aware of my actions). But, consistent with the theory of consciousness as intending-to-act that Hampshire has developed, 'the more explicit a man is in formulating to himself the ends of his action, and the grounds upon which his decisions rest, the more he is aware of himself as having made choices between specific possibilities' (267). Such is ethical life: a continuous stream of choices of actions to be taken, each one requiring a decision based on our state of self-awareness – the degree of our rationality – at the time. As Hampshire puts it, 'A man's intentions must at any one time be concentrated upon certain specific forms of human achievement, and his choices are made between these specific forms. There is no possibility of his conduct being controlled by any general theory', so that a moral philosophy based only on 'purely moral terms' such as 'good', 'right' or 'ought' is 'vacuous and uninstructive' (269).

The decisions I make, then, 'have a history, and they are changing' (page), as my self-awareness and

awareness of the world change in their interaction with one another. It follows for Hampshire that since human knowledge and understanding consist in the sum total of the knowledges and understandings of all human individuals in their respective situations, constantly changing and expanding as human history and society develops, the concept of mind itself changes, and philosophy, which is based on this concept of mind, is interminable. Hampshire mentions Hegel in passing, and in one respect Hampshire's is a Hegelianism without the teleology: a progressive philosophy of ever-improving collective, historical self-awareness, but shorn of Hegel's immodest discovery of absolute self-awareness in his own philosophy, to be replaced by a certain humility in the face of the history of thought. There is a virtuous circle in Hampshire's thinking, between freedom of thought and philosophical enquiry as such, and it is in celebration of this that Hampshire chooses to conclude *Thought and Action*. 'Any philosophical enquiry into the conditions of freedom', he writes, 'will always need to be revised [according] to the particular conditions of its time', while 'This philosophical enquiry, always resumed, is itself a necessary part of extending men's freedom of thought' (273).

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Notes

1.Stuart Hampshire, *Freedom of the Individual* [1965], Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2nd edn. 1975; *Freedom of Mind and Other Essays*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1972.

2.Stuart Hampshire, *Thought and Action*, London: Chatto, 1959.

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4.Benedict Spinoza, *Ethics* [1677], trans. and ed. Edwin Curley, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1996.

5.Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, London: Hutchinson, 1949; Stuart Hampshire, 'Ryle's The Concept of Mind' [1950], in *Freedom of Mind and Other Essays*, 87-113.

6.Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. F. Kersten, The Hague, Boston and London: Nijhoff, 1982, 72.

7.When this paper was presented at the *British Contributions to Personalism Conference* (Oriel College, Oxford, 18th-19th March 2015) this statement of intention was, of course, accompanied, or immediately followed, by a bodily action.

JOHN MACMURRAY AND THE FORM OF THE PERSONAL

David Treanor

Abstract: Macmurray's philosophical insights offer a disruptive thesis and a challenge to contemporary philosophy. His insights are derived from the nature and mode of existence of human persons and our distinctive purpose. Macmurray's thesis: we are essentially 'persons in relation' is assessed for congruency with personalism. Finally the paper will suggest ways of understanding and applying Macmurray's philosophical insight – the form of the personal – to influence two areas of discourse and practice namely, education and human services.

Key Words: Friendship, Human purpose, John Macmurray, Personalism.

1. Introduction

This paper explores the relationship of John Macmurray's philosophy to personalism in three parts and possible ways of understanding and applying his philosophical insight to influence contemporary life. The first part briefly explores the central constituents of personalism as a philosophy. Part 2 has two sections, the first considers Macmurray's personal experiences and the second presents a reading of Macmurray, which locates his philosophy within the tradition of personalism. Finally in part 3, Macmurray thesis, the form of the personal – is contrasted with current practices in education and social services.

2. Central Constituents of Personalism

A primary and distinctive characteristic of personalism relates to the prominence it gives to a human person in social and political intercourse, as a subject and agent, in action and where a person's identity is discerned and delineated through their relationships. Mounier explains:

> If there is one affirmation that is common to all Personalist philosophers…it is that the basic impulse in a world of persons in not the isolated perception of self (cognito) not the egocentric concern for self, but the communication of consciousness … the adult only finds himself in his relationship to others and to things, in work and comradeship, in friendship and love, in action and encounter, and not in his relationship with himself'.[1]

Notwithstanding this central commonality Brightman,[2] Knudson[3] and indeed Williams and Bengtsson[4] identify further characteristics that are common to personalism. For the purpose of expediency, I will only consider the 5 common themes identified by Williams and Bengtsson. These are (1) The interrelationship between human beings, animals and nature; (2) The dignity of the person; (3) Interiority and subjectivity; (4) Self-determination; and (5) Relationality and communion.5 Many Macmurray's scholars may, better than myself, comprehend and robustly articulate these dimensions with a flawless critical thinking. Accordingly, I will neither argue nor extrapolate the rationale underpinning these dimension; indeed it appears to me that a synthesis or summation might provide a more reliable methodology to understand Macmurray's thesis: we are essentially 'persons in relation' in an attempt to present his philosophy in a framework that might adequately designate it as a form of personalism.

Personalism acknowledges there is an inter-relationship between human beings, animals and nature and indeed support Aristotle's view 'every realm of nature is marvellous'[6] and his methodology for defining a species in terms of its proximate genus and specific difference. However, personalism will argue that persons are neither captured nor immobilized by and within these categories. Moreover, personalism might differ with Aristotle's view and emphasis on a human being as a 'political animal'[7] and understand that a person's ultimate value is determined by the ontological significance of their being. Appropriately with this emphasis on personal ontology, personalism takes seriously the numerous facets of a human person which differ from our animal nature: time, horizon, transcendence, communication, intimacy, sympathy, sense of emptiness, value, liberation and appropriation, to laugh, love and so forth. Mounier explains:

> the person is not an object that can be separated and inspected, but is a centre of re-orientation of the objective universe'.[8]

The dialogical philosophy of Martin Burber is often presented as a form of personalism and his thesis concentrates on human interpersonal dialogue to accentuate the relational aspect of personalism. Burber argues:

> Man [sic person] wishes to be confirmed in his being by man, and wishes to have a presence in the being of the other…. Secretly and bashfully he watches for a YES which allows him to be and which can come to him only from one human person to another.[9]

According to Costello, Buber valued Macmurray philosophical acumen that 'conceptualize[s] the form of the personal'.[10] Indeed Costello further argues:

> Martin Burber, whom Macmurray knew more

> personally, considered himself to be the poet of this project.[11]

The project Burber refers to is giving prominence to the form of the personal in philosophy.

The personalist distinction between persons and non-persons has implications for how the former are to interact with other persons and their environment and other realities. It demands each person honours and affirms the inherent uniqueness and value of each individual person, St Thomas argues 'Person signifies what is most perfect in all nature'.[12] This form of personal interactions is expected and is not contingent upon intelligence, personal skills or behavioural transgressions. There are anti-species arguments, which can support this view nonetheless importantly for personalism is the reality that persons live in a world of value. Values are more than our biological actuality; they are integral of our culture, conception of living a good life, ability to communicate and create and sustain meaningful or intrinsic relationships. Accordingly persons have personal dignity that is inherent with their ontological status. In describing human dignity, Marcel[13] uses a passage from one of his plays, *Le Dard*,[14] where Werner is informing Beatrice that 'Leper colonies are going to multiply here on earth'.[15] Marcel clarifies what he means by this spread of 'leper colonies'; it is an attitude that reveals an:

> Inability to treat a human being as a human being, and for this human being the substituting of a certain idea, a certain abstract designation'.[16]

Marcel proceeds to argue that an 'abstract designation'[17] is found in all political associations when a human being or person is considered 'as a mere unit of production and to judge his worth only in terms of productivity.'[18] In congruence with other advocates of personalism, human dignity is beyond personal intelligence, physical agility, social competence, behaviour, and so forth, rather negating any single aspect of human character distracts from affirming the dignity of our personal ontology.

Marcel also argues the Socratic principle 'know thyself' was based on:

> The identity of the knower and known; and the principle of the identity of the ideal and the real thereby postulated was, in the last analysis, the foundation of the whole of traditional philosophy from Plato to Descartes to Hegel.[19]

This approach overlooks 'know-how' and ends up positing:

> The objective world whose physiognomy is increasing strange and threatening, entail in fact a pulverization of the subject.[20]

He therefore argues this approach comprises human dignity and respect for the truth. Accordingly, personalism does not accept the substance dualism of Cartesian cogito or the Kantian transcendental subject and positions a person as a subject who is more than their actions. Personalists acknowledge that other non-personal beings can act with the underlying difference emanating from self-consciousness, interiority, freedom and personal autonomy. A personalist analysis of this form of personal subjectivity reveals an underlying nature and unity that applies to actions and the inner happenings derived from our human and personal lived experiences. Mounier explains:

> A theory of action therefore is not an appendage to personalism, but is of essential importance to it.[21]

As persons are naturally inclined to engage with other persons what emerges through interactions is our character and our personality, which is influenced by the inner happenings and our lived experiences. Knudson informs us that: 'personalism finds the ontologically real only in personality'[22] and

> It [personalism] lays more stress on the will than the intellect and inclines to the view that life is deeper than logic.[23]

It is not surprising that personalism emphasis on action and happenings supports the belief that persons are by nature free individuals. Brightman notes that personalists have investigated the psychology of personality to exclude analytic views of the mind and behaviourism.[24] Many theorists explore the nebulous nature of freedom with congruency that, it is never a question of acting simply without regard to anyone but oneself. Moreover, unlike Kant, freedom is not an outcome of pure reason nor is it Sartre's power of choice[25] yet it 'can be lived, but not seen'.[26] In personalism freedom is the expression of personal existence on being and accordingly of existence upon being. Freedom is also participating in being, the parameters being set by our capacity to love. For Marcel, this means: 'to say that I am free means I am myself'.[27] The person can then be held accountable for their actions and choices:

> Freedom is … the mode and manner in which the person is everything that is, and more fully because it is freely so.[28]

An overall principle underlying personalism is the nature of interpersonal interactions that reveal the social character of persons. Williams and Bengtsson highlight the distinction that some advocates of personalism articulate about the difference between 'social nature' and 'interpersonal communion'; the latter representing a permanent union established through personal ontology.[29] Nonetheless, for all personalists, a world without personal relations is untenable; a person is a being-for-relation. This leads

to an interdependency, practically through cooperation for sustenance, health, personal, social and skill development. Importantly though this interdependence is viewed as a positive aspect of personalism. Interdependency reveals our capacity to care, be in relationship with another human person and to be valued for our being. Moreover, it is through social intercourse that persons can reach an authentic human existence, which can be self-determined through different forms of relationships. The means of achieving this for Buber is through a life of dialogue. He argues:

> The world of man [sic person] is twofold, according to his twofold image. The attitude of the human being is twofold, according to the twofold nature of the basic words we speak. The basic words are not separate words but pairs of words. One basic word is the word-pair I-Thou. The other basic word pair I-It.[30]

I-It refers to the impersonal meeting of persons, where unconnected persons meet through work, organization and impersonal associations. I-Thou represents the world of relationships, conversations, participation and encounters.

3. John Macmurray and Personalism

3.1 Influences on Macmurray

The early accounts[31] of Macmurray's education indicate he was an excellent scholar with an interest in both science and classics and this was unusual for a student of his era. Although science held a particular attraction for him, he notes his 'schoolmasters had their eyes upon bursary competition and university entrance'[32] and he believed he needed to follow their advice and continued to pursue 'Greats' at Oxford. It could be argued that their advice served him well as Macmurray held a number of significant professorial positions during his career. On graduation he went to the University of Manchester as a Lecturer for a year and then moved to the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg as Professor of Philosophy; then Fellow and Tutor at Balliol College, Oxford. In 1928 he became the Grote Professor of Mind and Logic at University College, London and then in 1944 until he retired as Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. He delivered the Gifford Lectures in 1953-54 at his *alma mater*.

Moreover, his philosophy struck a cord with the general public of the day although his thesis remained outside mainstream academic thought. I would like to suggest some reasons why this might have occurred. There are, in my view, four crucial life experiences that informed Macmurray philosophy in the early phase of his intellectual development. These experiences acted as a philosophical Copernican revolution for Macmurray in such a manner that he diverged from contemporary British orthodoxy and to accordingly understand 'the form of the personal as the emergent problem of contemporary philosophy'.[33] These indelible influences were: (1) Macmurray's continued interest in science; (2) his experience at a lecture on the nexus of science and philosophy in Oxford; (3) his war service and (4) his sermon at a church meeting in 1916.

Duncan notes Macmurray's interest in science and how he 'devour[ed] every scientific book he could lay his hands on'[34] as a young person hence his inclusion of geology in his classical studies. Indeed, Macmurray studies included:

> Mineralogy, crystallography, paleontology as well as geological map-making and laboratory work.[35]

He excelled in these studies and was awarded 'the medal'[36] in his class. Accordingly, for Macmurray his view of science is that we need to:

> Accept the results of science as knowledge in the full sense… that knowledge does not imply certainty.[37]

Macmurray is perceptive when he omits arguing for one particular branch of science rather he suggests it is the methodology of proposing hypothesis, testing through experiences, refutation and reformulating hypothesis that will 'constitute a common knowledge.'[38]

Duncan[39] also notes that while Macmurray was a student at Oxford, he attended a lecture by F. H. Lindemann, Chair of Physics at a philosophical society on Einstein's concept of relatively. A. H. Smith and H. W. B. Joseph, both Oxford professors of philosophy attempted to refute this theory of relatively on weak arguments and the view that scientific knowledge is not knowledge per se as it 'bereft of the element of certainty'.[40] Macmurray[41] was appalled by the narrowness of these senior philosophers view and their desire for certainty. Many other students present at the meeting also shared his views and it confirmed his respect for the scientific method so much so that in 1927 he presented to the Aristotelian Society on the value of science. He argues science is:

> A method of discovery in which overt practical activity plays an essential part …to know we must act as well as think and perceive.[42]

In his mature work he further argues:

> Scientific knowledge, we have seen, is instrumental. It makes possible the development of technology, and so the increase of power in society. This is a matter of fact; and the recognition of this fact is the major reason for the increase in the social prestige of science.[43]

Macmurray was challenged by Britain's declaration

of war on Germany in 1914. He notes he was strongly moved to pacifism however because he had not declared this prior to August 4, he could not now, with integrity, 'suddenly become a pacifist'.[44] His compromise was first to join the Medical Corps in 1914, then in 1916 he served on active duty as a Lieutenant with the Cameron Highlanders until he was injured in 1918 and sent home before the armistice. Importantly Macmurray notes that a crucial experience for him at this time was 'becoming familiar with death;'[45] from his first active military encounter with trench warfare where he saw two soldiers a few meters away die from a shell explosion to the constant view of a dead Highlander suspended on barded wire in no man's land. Macmurray certainly must have lived through tense experiences having participated in the Battle of the Somme and being injured at the Battle of Arras in 1918. Moreover, he was also awarded the Military Cross for bravery. As time progressed Macmurray developed increasing discouragement about the rationale for war, a suspicion of idealism and a concern about the adverse change in the *psyche* of people at home in Britain that he encountered when he returned on leave.

Macmurray had two significant experiences in 1916 in England while on leave. He married Elizabeth (Betty) Hyde Campbell and they lived together happily by all accounts. Later in the year, in October,[46] on leave after being injured at the Battle of the Somme he was asked to speak at a church gathering in North London. To the congregation's dismay, Macmurray sermon emphasized the necessity for each person to reveal the characteristic response of Christianity after the war: forgiveness and reconciliation. Indeed, Macmurray also advocated that the audience hold a gracious spirit in their hearts toward everyone. Macmurray recalls that he could 'feel the cold hostility'[47] as he spoke and nobody engaged with him after the sermon. This experience utterly changed Macmurray to the point that he decided from then onwards he would never become a member of a Christian church; a resolve he held until he retired in 1957. He then joined the Society of Friends and became an active member of the Society.

3.2 John Macmurray Nexus with Personalism

As part of Macmurry's methodology in advancing his philosophical thesis, he considers the nature and mode of existence of human beings. Macmurray identifies three types of nature with three corresponding types of freedom in the world. For Macmurray, nature is the capacity for phenomena to behave 'in a way peculiar to itself'[48] and freedom is the 'absence of restraint upon spontaneously of action.'[49] The trilogy is: material nature; living nature and human nature[50] with material nature referring to the nature of material bodies that behave mechanically, that is with the laws of nature and thus their behaviour can be predicated. Recall Macmurray's passion and knowledge of science. Living nature is more complex, Macmurray notes:

> The idea of adaption to environment, of fitting in to one's place in a complex organization or community; the ideas of progress and purpose, of the end to which the whole creation moves; the idea of service of the species and its development.[51]

...are integral to its essential nature. Accordingly, the type of freedom in this context is understood as organic – the living organism is free to act to realize the intrinsic qualities inherent to their fullest degree. Furthermore, living organisms have life cycles that reveal their symbiotic interaction with their environment that importantly permits them to reproduce their kind while being able to adapt to maintain their species. Living nature is also a type of nature that expresses itself most fully in being able

> [t]o apprehend and enjoy a world that is outside of ourselves, to live in communion with a world which is independent of ourselves.[52]

Living nature is finally capable of knowing, enjoying and engaging with different phenomena in a way that contributes to enhancing its lifestyle. Macmurray argues that when we 'think' or 'feel', what in fact we are doing is thinking or feeling about something or someone and so 'our consciousness always goes beyond ourselves and grapples with what is not ourselves.'[53] For Macmurray, the most tangible and complete expression of human nature is through friendship. Macmurray has a depth to his scholarly discussion on friendship however what is being conveyed in this context is that human friendship is:

> That capacity to live in terms of the other, and so of what is not ourselves, to live in others and through others and for others, is the unique property of human beings.[54]

There are some important outcomes that follow from Macmurray's view on the human mode of nature of existence and its nexus with human persons. First, is the recognition that human nature has a material aspect and basis to it and this is the appropriate place for law in our lives. A concentration on rules, regulation and law is injudicious 'because it thinks about human nature in terms, not of human nature, but of the nature of matter.'[55] Second, our human nature surpasses our role as purely biological beings. If we were to live life according to this nature it would mean living in a way that understands our lives simply as sharing a common humanity of being born, reared and living in societies albeit heterogeneous. In this nature:

> Part of a community of social life, and the

> goodness of our individual lives depends upon our devoting them to the common good.[56]

So our purpose becomes the 'development of humanity'[57] and as individuals our role is only to assist other people and have particular and positive effect on our community and humanity. Ultimately this dimension treats humanity as a means to an end; it reduces and makes people subsidiary to organizations.

Finally, authentic human nature is found through freedom and friendship. In freedom a person thinks, feels and acts in accordance with their thoughts and feelings, as Macmurray states 'human freedom itself consists in the inner quality of a man's [person] life.'[58] The addendum to this freedom is how it is manifested: in acting 'of what is not ourselves,[59] that is, thinking, feeling and acting is concerned with the actual lives that other people are living in. Accordingly, then our personal interactions with other persons need to be genuine. This means, a person must be able to honestly reveal their personal character to another person and to demonstrate goodwill towards him or her for their personal character and the wonder of their being. In the friendship, there must be no insincere or feigned actions or unwarranted claims made. Macmurray then argues true human nature is: 'the reality of other persons, and of persons in personal relation with one another.'[60] Macmurray has an understanding of the society he lives in when he acknowledges the current limitations to friendships when he states: 'personal reality is a matter of degree'[61] nonetheless our role is 'make ourselves a little more real than we are.'[62]

Macmurray's treatment of the different forms of nature and purpose of existence emphasizes and prioritizes human nature over the other forms is, may I propose, coherent with the central claim of personalism. For Buford, this claim might be a sufficient claim for personalism, for he suggests:

> Other than giving centrality to the person, Personalism has no other set of principles or unified doctrine.[63]

Nonetheless, recall I mentioned 5 principles that William and Bengtsson[64] suggest are indicative of personalism and it seems appropriate that I pick up on these themes and propose how Macmurray's philosophy is congruent with them. The principles are: (1) The interrelationship between human beings, animals and nature; (2) The dignity of the person; (3) Interiority and subjectivity; (4) Self-determination; and (5) Relationality and communion.[65] The prior discussion of the nature and mode of existence demonstrates that Macmurray comprehends the interrelationship between human beings, animals and nature while giving priority to the former, he argues:[66]

> To say human life is personal is primarily to deny that human life is organic, or that it can be treated as differing from animal life only in degree and not in kind. It is to assert that the essence of human life is radically different from the essence of organic life, and that relations which constitute the totality of human life are radically different from those which make a unity of the organic world.

In distinguishing the different natures I propose Macmurray is arguing that we humans all belong to the same moral species regardless or our race, sex, physique, intelligence, creed or socio-economic status, in Macmurrian terms:

> Whether we like it or not, we are all enmeshed in that network of relation that binds us together to make up human society.[67]

Humans are conscious, thinking, feeling and acting beings that attribute a value to other humans, animals and material goods. Macmurray wants persons to believe in their own personal and unique value and this intimate and exclusive importance applies to every person. In *Persons in Relation* he states:

> Any personal activity must have a motive, and all motives are, in the large sense, emotional. Indeed an attitude of mind is simply an emotive state.[68]

For Macmurray then, human nature is social;[69] it is revealed through the way we live and conduct our lives through personal relationships. He states:

> There is only one proper ground of relationship between any two human beings, and that is of mutual friendship.[70]

Macmurry argues[71] that we need to move away from forms of human society that maintain a bond of unity that is negative or impersonal to a type grounded in positive personal relations which is best termed 'community'. In this model our human dignity will be realized.

Macmurray continually questions the belief that the self is an isolated and purely mental being:

> Any philosophy which takes its stand on the primacy of thought, which defines the Self as a Thinker, is committed formally to an extreme logical individualism.[72]

This is a fundamental error for Macmurray because it does not adequately describe human nature. This is most clearly articulated in The Self as Agent, the first part of his Gifford Lecture. Macmurray argues that the twofold emphasis from philosophers either priorities persons as thinking subjects (a mechanistic view) or rational subjects (a organic view). Macmurray does not deny these are aspects of human nature nonetheless human beings are persons who acts and lives in relationships with other beings. His own summary is:

> The simplest expression that I can find for the thesis I have tried to maintain is this: All meaningful knowledge is for the sake of action, and all meaningful action for the sake of friendship.[73]

Macmurray believes to be free means being able to act without restrictions, that is, the action occurs from within our being. There is nothing new in this expression except that Macmurray explains being free means 'to express one's nature in action.'[74] I have already stated that for Macmurray human nature differs from other natures and his emphasis on friendship as the essential constituent of human nature. These forms of friendships are personal associations between people who are free, that is they offer and receive from each other something graciously. Accordingly friendships means a person acts outside of their own personal interest. He states:

> The personal is constituted by personal relatedness. The unit of the personal is not the 'I' but the 'You and I'.[75]

Finally, Macmurray's philosophy epitomizes relationality and communion. Indeed he names the second book of his Gifford lectures Persons in Relation, which as I suggest acts as a culmination of his philosophical thought. He established his primary thesis on appointment to the Grote Chair of Philosophy and articulated it to the public through his radio lectures and internationally on his lecture tours. He argues that the infant from birth is a person because 'the mother child relation is the original unit of personal existence'[76] this relationality permeates our entire life cycle because to be human is to live and be in relationship with other humans, he argues: 'we need one another to be ourselves.'[77] Macmurray views this form of need as a positive attribute of our humanity because it permits humans to express and realize their need through friendship; this is the primary characteristic of human nature as persons. Macmurray proceeds to argue that the principles inherent in friendships need to be taken seriously and used to structure community. This contradicts the visions developed by Hobbes and Rousseau; the relations of members in these structures are functional – utility and/or pleasure based. Alternatively in Macmurray's structure, the foundational relation 'is a unity of persons as persons'[78] centered on reciprocal goodwill, while remaining distinct individuals, equal to each other in their own humanity and 'in communion with each other'.[79]

With respect to the branches of Personalism identified by Buford,[80] Macmurray can be identified as belonging to the school of realistic personalism. These Personalists hold in common that Reality is spiritual, mental and personal and propose different hypothesis about the ontological status of the natural order.

4. Contemporary Significance

It is a truism to state that we live in an increasing global, mobile and stratified society that is dominated by multi-national corporations whose telos is to pursue the acquisition of private property and profit. Importantly the character of corporations relies on a set of inherent tenets concerning human nature. This paradigm understands all human behaviour as dominated by personal self-interest from persons who are rational utility maximisers and form contractual or agreed relationships that defines the nature and scope of their relation. The accelerated growth of corporations and their success in achieving their purpose has provided liberal-democratic governments with a power and authority to focus on what might be viewed as a public good (for example, education or human services) into market based systems. In Australia, the National Disability Insurance Scheme is one human service located in a market-based system.

This typology stands in stark contrast to Macmurray's view of human nature. His schema argues that in approaching a topic (for example education, human services), we take the position that humans are socially responsible people, who act outside of themselves and are immersed within a community of other persons. The form of the personal offers two distinct characteristics. First, it offers society a positive vision of humanity. It suggests an explanation to our personal discomfort and anguish emanates from personal relationships, however, this experience of anguish does not have to overwhelm us. Its optimism is in suggesting we engage in outwardly focused interdependent relationships with mutual goodwill that stimulates another's personal flourishing. Finally, it acknowledges agents have many different and changing traits and relations, which are continually in a state of flux, that change and respond to personal and structural dynamics.

This is particularly necessary for education and human services as their first concern is human people. As systems, they function as essential constituents for achieving individual well-being and maximizing personal quality of life. In this context education refers to the transmission of knowledge across generations, which occurs in formal and differentiated social systems. The research is clear that formal education in Australia:

> Has proved to be the silver bullet for Australian workers, directly translating into job opportunities.[81]

And increasing a person's life chances to lead a good life. Human services include the provision of bodily, structural or social support activities to people who are unable to manage the daily tasks of living. Many

people will have received a human service and most people will have experienced education.

Nonetheless, Shotter[82] offers an important note of limitation in suggesting that Macmurray's account of the logical forms are ideals rather than 'practical details'[83] that can guide our actions. Indeed, Macmurray might agree as he states his thesis is a 'pioneering venture'[84] and his intention is 'to construct and to illustrate in application the form of the personal.'[85] Accordingly, his thesis is aimed at our higher level of consciousness and it needs to have this focus because of the continued dominance of the mechanical and organic modes of existence. Nonetheless, I propose that it is possible to extract a set of practical principles from Macmurray that can realize his form of the personal.

These principles are:
1. All individuals or human beings, regardless of gender, limitations, race, or creed are important and valuable, in their own right and are to be respected;
2. The greatest tragedy for an individual is to experience the contempt of another human being that has the effect of dominating and/or repressing his or her human flourishing;
3. If we are serious about enabling everyone to live life in such a way as to flourish, then at some time or in the future all individuals will need each other, or people must be recognized as being interdependent;
4. This need for each other creates a vulnerability and interdependency that holds open the opportunity for a personal transformation from a preoccupation with personal power and holding roles to simply being in relationship with people and having fun; and
5. This transformation creates us as persons in mutual relationships that are sensitive to and aware of each other's interest and need to flourish as well as our mutual vulnerabilities.

This transformation creates us as persons in mutual relationships that are sensitive to and aware of each other's interest and need to flourish as well as our mutual vulnerabilities If these principles are implemented in education and human services they hold the potential to act as the formative glue to permeate the culture, processes, practices and relationships in these systems. The principles establish a shared meaning and a set of ideas with three significant practice implications for people at the societal, the institutional and in the individual sphere.

In the macro sphere we would expect to find a society that legislates inclusively; that is all people have full rights to citizenship, avenues to legal and civil recourse in any event or incidences of discrimination and participatory mechanisms to have their voice heard. Macmurray puts it like this: 'abnormality consists in his [the individual] inability to enter into normal personal relations with others.'[86] Macmurray also suggests: 'any human society is a unity of persons.'[87] In other words, his vision gives people a place to belong. How we feel we belong somewhere, to other people, a neighbourhood or society transcends legal, professional or formalized process, roles and physical presence. We feel we belong somewhere when the people with whom we share society with, are people who create and build places where we can encounter each other and which build positive relationships; I-You rather than I-It relations. Ultimately these principles are visionary and concerned with structuring and enabling society to focus on honouring and valuing all people regardless of their status or capabilities.

In the institutional sphere educational and human service agencies will have a robust form of governance that promote their culture, processes, rules, regulations as essential means to serving the need of people to be in mutual relationships that offer each person meaning and connection with the local and wider community. The primary focus of the agency will also enable maximum personal flourishing. He states:

> Friendship, fellowship, communion, love, are all one way or another liable to convey a false or partial meaning. But what is common to them all is the idea of a relationship between us which has no purpose beyond itself; in which we associate because it is natural for human beings to share their experience, to understand one another, to find joy and satisfaction in living together; in expressing and revealing themselves to one another.[88]

Indeed, the focus will also include: how are the activities contributing to human flourishing? Second, are the means used need to extend the care of humanity and personal flourishing rather than be merely an exchange and finally the people who work in the systems valued in their being and are they focused on human development and emotional education outcomes of the people they serve?

At the individual sphere, Macmurray wants people to be in touch with their emotions because this will determine the quality of your personal life. He argues:

> Feelings can be rational or irrational in precisely the same way as thought, through the correctness or incorrectness of their reference to reality.[89]

MacAllister and Thorburn[90] provide an excellent analysis to Macmurray's account of the emotions and the benefits of shared educational pursuits when carried out for the intrinsic pleasure they offer rather than any utility. They offer meaning to Macmuuray's idiom:

> What we feel and how we feel is far more important than what we think and how we think …because… the emotional life…is the

> core and essence of human life … and …its value lies in itself, not in anything beyond it which it is a means of achieving.[91]

Macmurray does place value on our intellect although he believes that 'our civilization is heavily biased in favour of the intellect against the emotions.'[92] Macmurray argument is that to act in freedom with our emotions is not exclusive of our intellect nor is it unrestrained realization of desires rather:

> The freedom of our emotional life is to be achieved only on the same conditions: that we set out to discover, through feeling, the real values of the world and of our life in the world. We shall have to submit to the discipline of our feelings, not be authority of tradition, but by life itself. It will not guarantee us security or pleasure or happiness or comfort; but it will give us what is more worth having, a slow gradual realization of the goodness of the world and of living in it.[93]

5. Conclusion

Prior to answering the question: Is Macmurray's thesis, the form of the personal, personalism? I might mention that two Macmurrian scholars argue about his adherence to personalism. In referring to Macmurray's Gifford Lectureship, Wren states:

> He has produced a sustained intellectual symphony which, although necessarily "unfinished", is nevertheless an authoritative statement of what is now often called personalism.[94]

Conversely Duncan, a pupil of Macmurray's, does not label him as such. Rather he believes Macmurray stood outside the dominant traditions of his day.[95] Interestedly, Duncan does argue that Macmurray's thesis is a: 'metaphysics of the personal'.[96] I am unsure if Wren knew Macmurray as well as Duncan knew him, however what we do know that the latter respected Macmurray greatly. It may be that Duncan's knowledge of the high regard Macmurray placed on freedom meant that he considered it necessary to defy an exact description to Macmurray's philosophy. Maybe they both take freedom to be such that they might prefer if each person make their own decision. Further, maybe they wonder whether any knowledge label ever gives exact certitude?

Nonetheless, Gerard McCabe[97] presents Macmurray as a personalist through first making brief comments on personalism as a philosophy, then a brief biographical sketch of Macmurray and next his understanding of the nature of the human person. My approach differs from McCabe's and I hope my paper has added to his argument by a further concentration on the personal influences for Macmurray, by comparing how the form of personal has congruency with the constituents of personalism and offering some contemporary practical examples. I suggest we are both interested in understanding Macmurray's thesis as a: 'metaphysics of the personal'.[98] As a philosophy, Personalism receives minimum attention from the philosophically dominant contemporary paradigms, which I quickly add is a gap and tragedy for the latter. However, is Macmurray a personalist? Colloquially, we often say: If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, quakes like a duck, etc., then it probably is a duck. We might apply this to Macmurray: he provides an understating of the human person, animals and nature; he gives reverence and dignity to the human person, he understand persons as agents who act and respond to inner *happenings*, he values our capacity to act with freedom and understands the essential nature of persons is to be in relationship with other persons. This appears to be personalism and meets the criterion mentioned earlier.[99]

The caveat I would like to finish with is that to give John Macmurray's thesis, the form of the personal, its place in personalism needs far more attention than my paper has offered. I would strongly recommend that the John Macmurray Fellowship give serious consideration to approaching a publisher to produce an anthology on personalism and giving priority to Macmurray as a central British proponent of this thesis.

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Notes

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Continued from Page 9: Notes for Elizabeth Drummond Young, 'Kolnai: The Contours of Morality and the Problem of Supererogation'

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11.See Urmson (1958). Urmson infamously disqualifies a mother's sacrifice for her child from the category of the supererogatory, because he claims her actions are prompted by inclination or 'natural affection', but is happy to use as supererogatory examples of comradely soldiers.
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