APPRAISAL

The Journal of the British Personalist Forum

The Boston Issue

Papers from the 2015 International Conference on Persons at Boston University

Lockean Persons and their Properties

Do Lockean Persons Even Exist?

Lexical Mistakes

Moral Persons with and without Tails

Peirce on Personality

Emotional Response Systems

Theology and Cosmology

Emergence and the Sublime

Reported Speech and Textual Persons

Love and Equality in Frankfurt

BOSTON UNIVERSITY
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Appraisal

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- *Appraisal* seeks to develop and promote constructive ways of thinking, from within personalist perspectives, in philosophy and other intellectual disciplines.
- *Appraisal* believes that philosophy should not be a narrow, academic and technical specialism, but should address itself to the general public and to the intellectual and practical issues of the present.
- From time to time *Appraisal* will include *Re-Appraisals*, articles or collections of articles upon 20th C. thinkers whose work deserves to be more widely known.
- *Appraisal* takes a particular, but by no means exclusive, interest in the works of Austin Farrer, John Macmurray, and Michael Polanyi.

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- Please see inside rear cover regarding references to the works of Michael Polanyi.
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The Journal of the British Personalist Forum

Editor: Dr. Simon Smith
www.britishpersonalistforum.org.uk.

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Notes on this issues new contributors

Gilbert E. Fulmer was born in San Diego, CA; educated in Kansas City, MO public schools; BA and Ph.D. in philosophy, from Rice University, Houston, TX; taught at Texas State Univ. 1972-2015; married 39 years to Christina Lynne Fulmer; widowed; published in various journals, including *Analysis*, *The Personalist*, *Journal of Value Inquiry*, and *International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion*.

Mihretu P. Guta completed his Ph.D. in Philosophy at Durham University (UK) under the supervision of Professor E. J. Lowe and Dr. Sophie Gibb. He subsequently worked as a Postdoctoral Research Fellow within the Durham Emergence Project (funded by the John Templeton Foundation). His main research focuses on metaphysics, philosophy of mind and the philosophy of neuroscience, with special emphasis on the emergence of consciousness and its relation to the brain. He recently co-edited with Sophie Gibb, a Special Issue entitled: 'Insights into the first-person perspective and the self: an interdisciplinary approach', the *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 11-12 (2015). Currently he is an adjunct faculty member in the School of Arts and Sciences at Biola University and in the Department of Philosophy at Azusa Pacific University, where he lectures on philosophy and the philosophy of neuroscience. He is also working on a manuscript entitled: *The Metaphysics of Substance and Personhood: A Non-Theory Laden Approach*.

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Sam N. Johnson is a graduate student studying for his Ph.D. in philosophy at the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville. He holds an MA in philosophy from the University of Mississippi. In addition to questions of personal identity, his philosophical interests include metaethics and how moral responsibility can be predicated of persons.

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Cheongho Lee is a Ph.D. candidate at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, IL, USA. He investigates American pragmatic tradition, especially in terms of the relationship between knowledge and normativity in Charles S. Peirce's theory.

Martin Montoya is Assistant Professor of Contemporary History of Philosophy at Ecclesiastical School of Philosophy of the University of Navarra. His work has centered on contemporary theories of action, metaphysics of free will debate, and in particular Harry Frankfurt's propose of the structure of the human will and the role of love in the human action. Montoya received his B. A. in Theology from the Pontificia Università della Santa Croce (2009), his M.A. (2011) and Ph.D. (2014) both in Philosophy from the University of Navarra, and postgraduate work at the Jacques Maritain Center of the University of Notre Dame (2015).

Leslie Murray is a philosophy graduate student at Southern Illinois University Carbondale. He received his B.A. this May and is beginning graduate study this fall. Leslie was awarded the Graduate Dean's Fellowship at SIU and his primary philosophical interests include personalist and environmental philosophy. He plans to explore the connections between these two areas of philosophical inquiry as he continues on his philosophical journey.

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Eleanor Wittrup teaches Ethics and history of philosophy at University of the Pacific in Stockton, CA. She received a Masters degree in Theological Studies from Harvard Divinity School, and her PhD from the University of California in San Diego. She lives in Calaveras County (home of the famed jumping frogs) withe her daughter, horse, two cats and three large dogs. She is fascinated by human beings and why they do the things they do, and how to cultivate virtue.

EDITORIAL

2016 has been a very busy year thus far, not least becuase we have been participating in a vitally important temporal experiment. We have, as more astute readers will doubtless have guessed, been testing out a whole new time zone. Casting off the bonds of Greenwich, we have taken the advice of a trusted member and adopted Tasmania-Time. In the process, we have engaged in the traditional copious and creative swearing with much vigour and vim. The casual racism alleged of our new temporal neighbours is taking a little longer to "bed in," however.

Crucially, our adoption of Tasmania-Time means that the Spring Issue of *Appraisal* is far from being late. Since we are still firmly in the grip of what the Anti-hyperboreans, in their innocence, call "winter", this Spring Issue is actually early.

Despite being upside down, we are, as usual, pleased to present a most excellent collection of articles in this issue. For your edification and enjoyment, we bring you papers from the International Conference on Persons, held at Boston University last August. Any of our readers who have attended previous ICsP will know very well just how much fun they are. Attendees are guaranteed as diverse a range of topics and approaches as they could wish for: everything from neuroethics to neo-classical theology. Our current selection is, we believe, entirely representative, including as it does such subjects as personal properties, Peirce, and, perhaps inevitably, people with tails.

All our authors are new to *Appraisal* and have much to offer; we hope this won't be the last we'll see or hear of them. I'm sure they will not mind, however, if I single out for particular mention Mr. Leslie Murray. Mr Murray attended the conference as a representative of the "Next Generation" of personalist scholars. As such, we are particularly pleased to have him with us here and look forward to seeing much more of his work when he completes his graduate studies.

The ICP is, of course, one of the most important conferences in the personalist calendar. It is also an excellent opportunity to meet and talk with new and aspiring scholars, like Mr. Murray, as well as those venerable thinkers who have been shambling along this path for many years. Attendance at the next one, which is to be held in Calabria, is highly recommended. We hope to have more details of the event in the next issue.

The ICP may be big, but surely it cannot compare to our own BPF Conferences. Indeed it cannot. The most recent of these, as I'm sure everyone knows, was held at York St. John University in June. I'm told that the whole thing went off very well; although I was there, I spent my time running round and organising things, thus I missed most of it. That it was a success – assuming it really was – is entirely down to all our excellent speakers and, most especially, the considerable support of Dr. Anna Castriota and Mrs. Orla Smith.

We were particularly fortunate to have some excellent speakers from across Europe and as far as Russia. We were even more fortunate to have Prof. Tom Buford and his son, Dr. Russ Buford. Prof. Buford is, as readers may be aware, one of the most highly respected of personalist scholars; his son, a Psychologist by trade, is no less interesting a fellow, despite his apparently dubious taste in music. Julian Stern, Dean of Education & Theology at York St. John, also joined us; and very gracious about it he was too, considering we had forgotten to tell him we were holding a conference in his own backyard.

One particularly good upshot of this event was that Dr. Castriota and I have been approached by a publisher. The profoundly sagacious Vernon Press has invited us to put together a collection of papers from York. This process is now well underway; we shall, no doubt, have more information about it in the coming months. Our most important task, as I see it, is to come up with a good title. I favour something attention-grabbing, like "Wuthering Heights II: Lust in the Dust". Dr. Castriota, I fear, would prefer something more soberly and philosophically informative.

The Vernon editor is getting to know us quite well at the moment. Whether he feels honoured by our attentions, as he should, or victimised by them, as he frankly is, I cannot say. Nevertheless, two further volumes will soon be coming your way thanks to Vernon. The first is a collection of yet more choice papers from the Boston ICP entitled *In the Sphere of the Personal: New Perspectives in the Philosophy of Persons*. The remarkably talented editors, Drs James Beauregard and Simon Smith, have selected a fine range of themes. Questions of social justice figure large, as do a variety of perspectives on the meaning and nature of "personhood"; equally, the lover of Germanic endnotes will not be disappointed. Best of all, it comes very highly recommended. Indeed, one commentator who has neither been bribed nor blackmailed went so far as to say that the Introduction is worth the price of the book by itself. Being very modest chaps indeed, the editors could not comment on such rare wisdom and perspicacity or such remarkable taste.

The second collection currently in Vernon's very capable hands is *Freedom, Authority and Economics*, edited by Richard Allen. This collection of essays on Polanyi began life in 2011 as an memorable seminar organised by Dr. Allen and Prof. Klaus Allerbeck at the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung Für die Freiheit. The papers were published by the Stiftung as an introduction to Polanyi's political and economic thought, but they were not made generally available. Thanks to Dr. Allen, they very soon will be.

We shall, of course, have further details of these publications, including reviews in due course. In the meantime, readers are strongly advised to purchase of many copies for themselves and their loved ones. Together, these volumes will make the perfect Christmas and/or birthday present. What impassioned partner, what doting child, what loving parent could ask for more? As there is likely to be a run on copies once they become available, stockpiling copies is highly recommended.

Simon Smith
Haslemere

LOOKING INTO OBJECTS, DISPOSITIONS AND THE LOCKEAN PERSON-MAKING PROPERTIES

Mihretu P. Guta

Abstract: This paper examines certain influential contemporary philosophical analyses of the notion of a person and show why they are misguided. Inspired by the Lockean conception of a person, some philosophers claim that personhood must be attributed only to those human beings who can meet certain criteria required for it. Here the views of Tooley, Dennett and Singer will be discussed against the backdrop of the metaphysics of *powers ontology* as advocated by contemporary philosophers: C. B. Martin, John Heil and others.*

Key Words: Dispositions, manifestations, objects, personhood

1. Introduction

In his seminal book, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Locke introduced two notions of a person.1 According to the first notion, a person is a thinking intelligent being, with capacities such as reason, reflection, self-concept and an ability to track one's own identity over time (*Essay* II, XXVII. 9: 335). According to the second notion, a person is a forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit (*Ibid*. 26: 346).2 For Locke, these two notions of a person are intimately related in that the latter is rooted in the former. That is, on Locke's view, only intelligent agents or persons are capable of obeying a law, happiness and misery (*Ibid*. 26: 346). By 'intelligent person,' Locke has in mind the kinds of features that he listed in his first notion of a person (e.g., reason). Such a Lockean conception of a person has provided a framework within which the contemporary philosophical discussions on the notion of a person are developed. We can see this, most noticeably, in metaphysics (e.g., personal identity) and in bioethics (e.g., abortion).3 Both in metaphysics and in bioethics, the most pressing issue concerns spelling out what constitutes the right conception of a person and if there is one, how to figure that out. In this paper, I will take some small steps in an attempt to shed some light on this important point. In the relevant philosophical literature,4 discussions on personhood are not connected, at least in any direct manner, to the contemporary discussion on the metaphysics of dispositions or *powers ontology*. This paper will remedy that missing connection without getting into the mainstream controversies on the metaphysics of dispositions.5 I will advance my discussion through examining Tooley's, Dennett's and Singer's views of personhood.6

2. Tooley-Dennett-Singer's Conditions on Personhood

Central to Tooley's, Singer's and Dennett's notion of personhood is what I shall call the *Lockean person-making* or *person-constituting properties/capacities*. First, in his influential article, *Abortion and infanticide*, Tooley remarks:

> What properties must something have in order to be a person?...if it possesses the concept of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and believes that it is itself such a continuing entity….which I will call the self-consciousness requirement (Tooley in Singer 1986: 64; see also Tooley in Steven Luper 2014: Ch.15).

Second, Singer remarks:

> I propose to use 'person' in the sense of a rational and self conscious being, to capture those elements of the popular sense of 'human being' that are not covered by members of the species Homo Sapiens (1993: 87).

Third, Dennett remarks:

> The *first* theme is that persons are *rational beings*….The *second* theme is that persons are beings to which states of consciousness are attributed, or to which psychological or mental or *Intentional predicates,* are ascribed….The *third* theme is that whether something counts as a person depends in some way on an *attitude taken* toward it, a *stance adopted* with respect to it….The *fourth* theme is that the object toward which this personal stance is taken must be capable of *reciprocating* in some way…The *fifth* theme is that persons must be capable of *verbal communication*…The *sixth* theme is that persons are distinguishable from other entities by being conscious in some special way….this is identified as self-consciousness….(in Amélie Rorty 1976: 177-178).

Tooley, Singer and Dennett all agree in characterizing a person as a psychological being with capacities such as rationality, self-consciousness, self-concept and so on. As pointed out earlier, these are the sorts of capacities that Locke explicitly mentions in his characterization of the notion of a person. Furthermore, Tooley, Singer and Dennett also agree in restricting the class of personhood to those who meet the sorts of conditions listed in their characterization of the notion of a person. In doing so, they tell us who is (should be) excluded from the class

of persons. In this regard, Dennett's list of the excluded group include: (i) infant human beings; (ii) mentally defective human beings; and (iii) human beings declared insane by licensed psychiatrists (Dennett in Amélie Rorty 1976: 175). Singer's list include: (i) non-human animals; (ii) new-born infants; (iii) some intellectually disabled humans (1993: 101). Finally, Tooley's list include: (i) foetus; and (ii) new-born babies (Tooley in Singer 1986: 60-62).

In light of this, they also argue that the terms 'human being' and 'person' should not be used interchangeably, since these terms belong to members that belong to two distinct classes (see e.g., Tooley in Singer 1986: 60-62; Singer 1993: 86-87 and Dennett in Amélie Rorty 1976: 175-176). The question remains: Who is then privileged to be included in the class of persons? Unlike what they did with the excluded group, Tooley, Singer and Dennett do not give us any explicit list of the privileged group. Of course, were they to give us such a list, their list would probably suffer from the problem of vagueness, since the Lockean person-making properties come in degrees (cf. Williams 1985: 114).7 Yet regardless of such difficulties, Tooley, Singer and Dennett still require Lockean person-making properties as a basis in their attempt to establish the class of persons that does not have as its members anyone from the excluded group mentioned above.8 But in §3 and §4, I will attempt to show why Tooley's, Singer's and Dennett's views in this regard are misguided.9 As indicated earlier, I will advance my discussion within the framework of the metaphysics of dispositions or *powers ontology*.

3. Objects, Dispositions and their Manifestations

Suppose that a certain object *O* exists. What can we know about *O*? Depending on how it is specified, we may know a good deal about *O*. For example: (i) we may know what dispositions *O* possesses; (ii) we may know under what circumstances those dispositions could be manifested; (iii) we may know what sorts of circumstances may hinder the manifestation of those dispositions and so on. If we grant this, then at least initially, following Martin, we can make some assumptions. As Martin remarks:

> A particular disposition exists or it does not. You could say of any *unmanifesting* disposition that it straight-out exists, even if it is not, at that time or at any other time, manifesting any manifestation. It is the *unmanifested* manifestation, not the disposition itself, that is the would-be-if or would-have-been-if anything is. There can be a disposition *A* for the manifestation of acquiring a *further* disposition *B* and, of course, disposition *B* need not itself have any manifestation, but disposition *B* can still be unfulfilled terminus of that for which *A* has a specific directedness (1994: 1-2).

In this passage, Martin has made two critical points with respect to the nature of dispositions. First, the absence of the manifestation of certain dispositions does not in any way show that they do not exist. Second, if for whatever reason(s), dispositions are not manifested, then they can be taken as unmanifested manifestations. Consider a china cup. It has certain dispositions, for example, the disposition to shatter if struck. Here the verb 'struck' stands for what is taken to be a *stimulus condition* and 'shatter' stands for what is understood to be a *manifestation*. So the question remains: will it be the case that every time a stimulus condition is met, that we should necessarily expect to see a manifestation of a certain disposition? More specifically, should we expect to see a china cup shatter when struck? Of course, under normal circumstances, the answer for such questions will be 'yes'. However, consider again a slightly modified scenario whereby a china cup is placed inside a sturdy box, such that when struck, the sturdy box completely absorbs the forceful impact—blocking it from reaching the china cup. In this case, the china cup remains un-shattered. Such is an example that seems to capture Martin's phrase 'unmanifested manifestation.' But is there any other way by which we can take the unmanifested manifestations themselves to be the actual manifestations of a different kind? Following Heil (2012: 120-130), I would say 'yes'. For example, Heil remarks:

> A ball's sphericity endows it with a power to roll. But it is also in virtue of being spherical that the ball has the power to make a concave, circular impression in a cushion, the power to reflect light so as to look spherical, the power to feel spherical to the touch. Talk of single-and-multi-track dispositions or powers is confused from the outset. Powers quite generally are multi-track, if this means that they would manifest themselves differently with different reciprocal partners (2012: 21).10

Here Heil is echoing Martin's two points that concern with the nature of dispositions. Martin is an ardent defender of multi-track dispositions. Originally, the term 'multi-track' was coined by Ryle (1963: 114). These are dispositions that are believed to have more than one kind of stimulus condition or manifestation, or both (Bird 2007: 21). Taken this way, powers or dispositions have many reciprocal partners. That means that negative interfering factors such as absences, preventers, antidotes, blockers, inhibitors, etc., will no longer be taken as stopping a certain power from being manifested. This is because such things themselves are dispositions manifesting themselves with various reciprocal partners (Heil 2012: 126-130). Again as Heil remarks:

> What of scurvy and the lack of vitamin C? A living body's healthy condition is a mutual

manifestation of myriad finely tuned reciprocal disposition partners. When one of these is missing, you have a different sort of manifestation, just as you have a different sort of manifestation when you remove one of the cards from a pair of propped-up playing cards…. An absence is not an entity, not something with properties providing it with distinctive powers. But certain kinds of manifestation require appropriately propertied something as reciprocal partners. When these are missing, the result is a different kind of manifestation (2012: 127).

The gist of Heil's point here is that, once we take a multi-track powers model, the manifestation of dispositions is not a one way street, whereby one thing causes another in a linear fashion. On the contrary, the manifestation of powers is the result of causings, i.e., mutual manifestings of various reciprocal partners (*Ibid*. 120). Such considerations help us to have a good grip on Martin's earlier remarks. That is to say that rather than talking about unmanifested manifestation, now we can talk about manifestations *tout court*. The manifestation of powers is multi-faceted in that the apparent absence of the manifestation of certain powers does not show that no manifestation is taking place. Rather it only means that a different kind of manifestation is happening. So where does all these leave us? I will use the hitherto discussion on powers, to respond to Tooley-Dennett-Singer's conditions on personhood.

4. Responses

In this case, the issue can be examined from two standpoints, namely the *functionalist approach* and the *ontological approach* respectively. The functionalist approach shares a lot in common with a 'functionalist' conception of mind in philosophy of mind. Setting aside the details for now, a functionalist view of the mind describes mental states within the framework of the input and the output causal role that they are said to play. On this view, as Jaegwon Kim remarks, 'a mental kind [e.g., pain] is a *functional kind*, or a *causal-functional kind*, since the "function" involved is to fill a certain causal role' (2006: 119). Suppose for example, yesterday in Belgium, a Brazilian football star, Neymar, broke one of his knees while playing. In this case, the functionalists analyse Neymar's pain in terms of the bodily *input* (e.g., damaged tissues) which they say is responsible for causing the pain. Such pain in turn is responsible for causing Neymar's wincing, groaning and engaging in avoidance behaviour, each of which is said to be a pain *output*. In short, on the functionalist view, the concept of a pain consists in the input-output causal function and nothing beyond. Notice that taken this way, functionalism does not concern itself with the nature of *pain* at all.

But someone who does not embrace a functionalist theory of mind, rejects the analysis of the concept of pain in terms of an input-output causal mechanism. For one thing, a pain experience does not seem to be something that is entirely capturable via an input-output causal mechanism. This can be seen by attending to one's own pain experience(s). In this regard, one of the clearest features of the sensation of pain has to do with one's awareness of the hurtfulness or painfulness of pain. What this in turn implies, among other things, is that one's knowledge of the painfulness of pain is first-personal in nature. But what does the painfulness of pain reveal about what pain is? One answer the anti-functionalist could give for this question can be summed up along the following lines. In talking about the painfulness of pain, at the least, one is implying how one came to know about the property of pain, that it is painful/hurtful. In other words, *painfulness* is what defines what pain is. That is to say that the property of being painful is intrinsic to the pain itself. In short, the intrinsic nature of pain consists in its painfulness. One's knowledge of the intrinsic nature of pain is rooted in one's own first-person knowledge which is private, inner and immediate to its subject. The implication here being that given their experiential aspect(s), any attempt one makes to fully functionalize mental states will be doomed to failure. This is because, what it is like to have a certain pain sensation (subjective experience in general) is not something that can be known primarily via a third-person analysis. Each of the hitherto remarks made raises a lot of reactions from people with a different persuasion. Unfortunately, this is not the place to take up such discussions. I have argued such matters extensively elsewhere (see e.g., Guta 11-12, 2015: 218-245). For now, it is not hard to see why functionalism leaves out the intrinsic/the experiential aspect(s) of mental states of which, a *pain state* is just one example. However, by being indifferent with respect to the intrinsic nature of mental states, functionalism proves to be a deeply unsatisfactory view.

How, then, does the foregone brief discussion on the functionalist theory of mind provide us with a framework within which some of the implications of Tooley-Dennett-Singer's conception of personhood can be spelled out? To answer this question, we need to remind ourselves that on Tooley-Dennett-Singer's view, *X* is said to be a person if and only if *X* exercises/manifests capacities that are taken to be person-constituting (see again §2). If, for any reason, *X* fails to manifest person constituting capacities, then *X* will cease to be a person. Taken this way, the application of the term 'person' is directly related to its function. In this case, the term 'person' functions like a sort of title which is conferred upon a certain entity when such an entity manifests person-constituting capacities. Such reasoning follows a similar strategy to that of the defenders of a

functionalist theory of mind as discussed earlier.

In light of such considerations, the conception of personhood advanced by Tooley-Dennett-Singer can be spelled out via the language of *role playing*. This can be put as follows: (i) *X* is a person if and only if, *X* manages to play certain agreed upon roles by exercising the relevant person-constituting capacities.11 Notice that here, the role in question has to do with manifesting/exercising person-constituting capacities as opposed to figuring out the ontological status of personhood. That is, as it is true in the case of functionalism (concerning mental states), the focus of *the functional approach* in relation to personhood has to do with fulfilling certain functional roles. In light of this, the extension of (i) is open ended allowing both non-human artefacts and biological organisms; for example robots, corporations, computers, dolphins, chimpanzees and the like to fall under the sortal term 'person'. In this case, we can talk about 'robotic persons', 'artificial persons' (e.g., computers), 'biological human persons', non-human biological entities (e.g., dolphins, chimpanzees) or social persons (e.g., corporations) and suchlike.

However, the underlying assumption behind Tooley-Dennett-Singer's conception of personhood is straightforwardly ontological in nature. The assumption I have in mind can be described as follows: (ii) *X* is a person if and only if *X* manifests certain properties that are believed to constitute personhood. So my own focus will be on (ii). Notice that in (ii) unlike (i), the notion of *role playing* is not implicated. In this case, (ii) marks the transition from ontologically non-committal talk of *role playing* to that of ontologically committal. Moreover, the inadequacies inherent in the *functional approach* will be obvious, once Tooley-Dennett-Singer's conception of personhood is examined from the standpoint of an *ontological approach*. What is to follow will draw upon the discussion on the metaphysics of dispositions sketched out in §3.

Going back to the multi-track powers model discussed in §3 which takes the manifestation of dispositions as multi-directional, we can ask the following question. That is: what is the merit of the class distinction Tooley, Dennett and Singer introduced between 'human being' and 'human person'? Tooley, Dennett and Singer think that foetuses, newly born babies and mentally disabled humans are not human persons. This is because, as they see it, humans with various sorts of mental disability have stopped manifesting powers essential for personhood. On the other hand, foetuses, and newly born babies have not yet begun to manifest powers essential for personhood. In light of such reasoning, Tooley, Dennett and Singer freely assume that the class of 'human beings' is different from that of the class of 'human persons'. However, it remains far from clear how Tooley-Dennett-Singer's class distinction can be plausibly maintained, if examined from the standpoint of the multi-track dispositions' model.

Whether it is in the case of foetus or mentally disabled people, the manifestation of powers is always taking place. In the case of a developing foetus or newly born babies, we can understand personhood in light of the concept of potentiality which is often contrasted with actuality. Although I do not speak French, I have a second order capacity to acquire the first order capacity to speak French. Notice that here both the first and the second order capacities are equal capacities. Simply because I do not speak French now, it does not follow that the second order capacity I have to learn French is not an actual capacity (cf. Frankfurt 1971: 1-2). So the notion of potentiality I suggested above should not be understood as docile, since it is an instance of the manifestation of power (cf. Aristotle *Metaphysics Theta*).12 Moreover, in the case of anencephalic infants (i.e., without brains), we can see powers being manifested albeit in a very different way than we normally expect. *Ditto* with mentally disabled people. For example, if a person becomes totally amnesiac, adopting Tooley-Dennett-Singer's conception of personhood forces us to conclude that the amnesiac is no longer a person. However, if we adopt the multi-track powers model, the right thing to say would be that an amnesiac is still a person like the rest of us—despite suffering from a neurodegenerative disease.

The only difference between a normal person and that of an amnesiac person lies in the latter, no longer being able to utilize his/her cognitive abilities. This happens due to an entirely different kind of manifestation that led to the loss of the amnesiac person's cognitive abilities. The same is true of comatose patients and other cases of severely disabled people. So despite the current orthodoxy that attempts to divide humans into entirely conventionally based classes, the powers ontology briefly discussed above shows why there is no justification for such a move. In light of such considerations, the class distinction suggested by Tooley, Dennett and Singer should be rejected.13

To all of these, Tooley, Dennett and Singer might respond in three ways. First, they may reject the multi-track dispositions model altogether. In that case, it is hard to see what compelling reasons there could be for rejecting it. Moreover, in rejecting the multi-track dispositions model, Tooley, Dennett and Singer owe us a better model. Again it is hard to see what that might be. Second, they might insist that the class distinction between 'human being' and 'human person' is not something they originated. Rather, it is the standard view that is accepted by an overwhelming majority of contemporary philosophers. The standard view invoked here primarily takes a person as a *functional concept* in a sense described at the beginning of this section. But

in light of what I have argued so far, the functional concept of a person seems to be deeply unsatisfactory. So the ground for maintaining the class distinction as suggested by Tooley, Dennett and Singer remains to be less than adequate, to say the least.

Third,14 more importantly, they might say, 'All right, we will concede your powers ontology to you, both human beings (which include foetuses, the mentally disabled, etc.) can be said to have the powers of "self-consciousness", "rationality" etc., but now we will just specify that only certain manifestations of those powers are morally relevant. Now we can make meaningful moral distinctions between "mere humans" and "human persons", we just have to do it in terms of the particular manifestation of certain powers.'

For at least two reasons, I remain unpersuaded by this objection: (a) the immediate problem with this objection has to do with the very idea of specifying the manifestation of only certain dispositional properties as criteria on the basis of which one determines between 'mere humans' and 'human persons'. Such proposal seems to be entirely an *ad hoc*. For example, what principled reason is there for one to choose certain manifestations of dispositions as 'human-person constituting' and certain others as not 'human-person constituting'? To properly answer this question, one has to show why a moral relevance has to be contingent on the manifestations of certain dispositions, which is not easy to do; and (b) appealing to moral considerations to establish the status of someone's personhood gives rise to a *Euthyphro* sort of dilemma: is *X* a person because *X* satisfies certain conditions of morality, or *X* satisfies certain conditions of morality because *X* is a person?

In response to the first horn of the above dilemma, one could appeal to a Lockean solution. As pointed out in the introduction of this paper, Locke operates with two notions of the term 'person', namely ontological and forensic/moral respectively. In the case of the latter, Locke claims that only a person is fit for moral accountability or reward or punishment or legal right. In this case, the Lockean assumption is that only persons are the proper objects who can satisfy conditions that morality demands. But if the hitherto *powers ontology* sketched out so far is on the right track, which I believe it is, then the Lockean solution turns out to be less than helpful. But this is by no means to imply that satisfying moral conditions is irrelevant. The point here is that satisfying moral conditions, if understood along the lines of Tooley-Dennett-Singer's conception of personhood, turns out to be deeply mistaken. This leaves us with the second horn of the dilemma. Again if the basic thesis of the *powers ontology* defended so far is adopted, then the proper way to think about the moral notion of personhood is precisely in the sense stated in the second horn of the dilemma. While Tooley-Dennett-

Singer's conception of personhood supports what is stated in the first horn of the dilemma, the position taken in this paper categorically rejects it.

So what should we say about (ii) above? Recall that (ii) states that: *X* is a person iff *X* manifests certain properties that are believed to constitute personhood. As it stands, (ii) is too restrictive in that it only allows something to be included in the category of persons provided that certain properties are exercised. In light of the powers ontology adopted here, (ii) also suffers from an implausible assumption that the idea of unexercised powers implies their absence altogether. As we saw, many realists about powers are perfectly happy with the idea of a power existing unexercised. But here is a more pressing ontological issue. How does an object acquire the powers it possesses? No doubt this question receives different answers in different contexts. But in relation to human persons, we can give a broadly Aristotelian answer for it. In this case, the key assumption that a defender of *powers ontology* brings to the table is this. That is, human persons have both natural as well as acquired/learned dispositions. As I understand it, a disposition is natural, just in case an object has it in virtue of being a kind of entity that it is. On the other hand, a disposition is learned just in case an object has it through learning. There are two qualifications to keep in mind here, however. First, to have acquired dispositions, sometimes natural powers may be prerequisites. Second, to have acquired dispositions, natural powers may not be prerequisites. For example, we may teach a dog certain skills, say of, riding on the scooter, which is a learned disposition. But no matter how hard we try, we cannot teach a dog to speak, since it lacks a natural disposition.

But in the case of the *Lockean Person Making-Properties,* all humans have the natural dispositions for self-consciousness, self-concept and so on, in virtue of being the kinds of entities that they are. So whether or not these dispositions are manifested in normal ways, no human being is more privileged in having them than the other. Therefore, there is no good reason to bifurcate human beings into two distinct classes, namely: 'mere human beings' on the one hand and 'human persons' on the other. If I am right here, then it follows that all humans have equal, i.e., unconditional ontological status. In light of such considerations (ii) above collapses. I conclude15 then that a broadly Martin-Heil type *powers ontology* that shows how the powers objects have can exist even when they are not manifested (due to various reasons) is far superior to the kind of conventionalist and seemingly an ad hoc approach adopted by Tooley, Dennett and Singer in explicating what constitutes personhood.

A lot could have been said in defence of this conclusion. However, for now, space limitations would not allow us to go any further. That said, having cleared one key conceptual confusion out of

the way with respect to how the notion of a person needs to be understood, the most demanding aspect of the ontology of a person has to do with giving an account of an emergence of a person— a bearer of consciousness. When does a person emerge? Another issue that goes along with the emergence of a person is that of the emergence of consciousness. Does consciousness emerge simultaneously with the emergence of a person? If so how? If not, which precedes which or which follows which? This is a homework for another time.

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Notes

*This paper was written partly based on chapter eight of my PhD thesis (2014).

1.Hereafter, *Essay.* Locke discusses this issue in the second edition. It is important to keep in mind that the term 'person' is ambiguous, since it is used to designate different kinds of entities. For example, non-human entities such God, demons and angles, as widely held in Christianity are taken to be persons; higher level animals such as apes and dolphins; artefacts such as robots, computers, corporations as well as extra-terrestrial beings (if there are any) are each said to qualify as persons (see e.g., Puccetti 1968; DeGrazia in Singer 2006: ch.3; and Teichman 1985: 175-185). In this paper, I use the term 'person' exclusively in relation to human beings. I also use the term 'personhood' to refer to qualities or properties that are responsible for being a person. Taken this way, the

notion of a person and the notion of personhood are inter-definable, while maintaining the conceptual distinction between them.

2.The reasons that led Locke to this conclusion primarily have to do with three theological convictions he had, namely personal immortality, resurrection and the last Judgement Day. Locke thought that God, on the Last Day, could only justly punish or reward His people provided that the receivers of His punishment or reward are capable of assuming accountability for their actions (*Essay* II, xxvii. 26: 346-347; see also King 1829: 316-323; Forstrom, Ch. 1). Recently Galen Strawson argued that Locke's theological convictions are entirely peripheral to his central theory of the forensic/moral notion of a person (see Strawson 2011: XX-XIII). But Strawson is wrong and Locke's discussion of the forensic notion of a person does not even get off the ground unless the theological convictions that prompted him to suggest it are taken into account. But this is a discussion for another time and I shall say no more here.

3.To be more precise, in metaphysics, philosophers debate, *inter alia*, about whether or not the notion of a person is co-extensive with the notion of human being/living organism (Noonan 2003; Olson 1997 and 2007) and whether or not the notion of a person is primitive (Strawson 1959: Ch.3). If a person is said to be a primitive notion, then everything else is analysed in terms of this notion whereas the converse does not hold. Here a well-known Peter Strawson's *P-predicate* (e.g., size) and *M-Predicate* (e.g., feeling sad) are a case in point. See also Lowe in Gasser and Stefan 2012: Ch. 7; Lowe 1996 and 2008: Part I for the view that rejects the primitiveness of the notion of a person, see e.g., Shoemaker in Gasser and Stefan 2012: Ch. 6. Moreover, in metaphysics, there are debates about whether or not a person is a sortal concept (Kanzian in Gasser and Stefan 2012: Ch. 11). It was also Locke who first coined the term, 'sortal' (see *Essay* III.III.15: 417). By sortal concepts, following Wiggins, I mean those concepts, 'that present tensedly apply to an individual *X* at every moment throughout *X's* existence,' (2001: 30; also see Lowe 1989: 1). More specifically, Wiggins draws a distinction between phased sortal and substance sortal. An example of a phased sortal would be the titles such as 'president', 'child' etc., whose application to a human entity is time bound. An example of a substance sortal would be the term 'human being' which is used to designate a particular human entity for as long as that entity continues in existence. The phased sortal notion is similar to what is known as a functional concept of a person, which focuses on the role playing notion of a person. My own sympathy lies with those who take the term 'person' as a substance sortal notion. By the same token, in bioethics, there are well-known debates between the pro-abortionists and the anti-abortionists, the point of contention mainly being on what constitutes personhood (Oderberg 2000: 174-184).

4.For the most part, the contemporary debates on the metaphysics of personal identity focus on assessing the merit of a Lockean conception of a person. In this case, the two dominant views are the modern day neo-Lockeanism and animalism. The former view defends a Lockean psychological conception of a person while the latter rejects it (For details see Noonan 2003 and Olson 1997).

5.For an excellent discussion and debate on this issue, see Bird 2007; Choi 2006/2012; Mumford in Beebee,

Hitchcock and Menzies 2009: Ch. 12.

6.Unlike Dennett, both Tooley's and Singer's discussion of personhood takes place in the context of the current debate on the moral status of abortion. Again I am not interested to enter into the mainstream debates on abortion (see e.g., Oderberg 2000).

7.See also Snowdon in Lovibond and Williams, eds., (1996: 36).

8.As we shall see in §4, using the Lockean person-making properties to draw a demarcation between who qualifies as a person and who does not, eventually results in an implausible notion of a person. In saying this, I have in mind a functional notion of a person. For example, Sprague claims that the term 'person' is not a name that stands for a distinctive kind of thing, as 'frog' or 'diamond' may be. Rather as Sprague claims, we use the term 'person' as a sort of title that we bestow on something if that thing satisfies certain appropriate criteria, as 'doctor' or 'policeman' may be (1978: 61).

9.In saying these views are misguided, I don't just mean merely from a pragmatic point of view; rather the misguidedness I want to attribute to these philosophers is first and foremost ontological. This is the claim I want to defend in §4.

10.Following Heil, I also want to understand dispositions as powers (2012: 120-130; cf. Mumford in Beebee, Hitchcock and Menzies 2009: 269-270).

11.This notion of a person directly coincides with the etymological meaning of the term 'person' which derives from the Latin persona: a mask worn by an actor who plays some kind of role or character. The same meaning applies to its closest Greek cognate *prosopon*. This notion had originated in the Roman law, where persons are perceived to be bearers of legal rights. The notion of the person also became associated with moral value through the influence of Christian tradition (see for details Mauss trans., Halls in Carrithers and Collins, eds., 1985: Ch. 1; Peacocke and Gillett, eds., 1987). See again footnote # 8.

12.In light of such similar considerations, Oderberg remarks, 'conception does not bring into existence potential human beings, but an actual human being with a potential to develop, given the right external factors, into a mature human being [human person]', (2000: 21; see also Oderberg 2008: 263-267). Similarly, Puccetti remarks, 'a human infant, for example, is not expected to make moral judgements: but since he can enter the human conceptual scheme he is a developing person and is expected to have a moral character of his own some day' (1968: 9; see also Williams 1985: 114). Both Oderberg's and Puccetti's remarks echo the assumption that underlies the multi-track powers.

13.In rejecting the class distinction, however, one need not thereby also deny the distinction that obtains between a person and the animal body that embodies it. I have argued for this elsewhere, see e.g., Guta 2011: 35-58. See also Lowe 2008: Part I.

14.This objection was pointed out to me by Benjamin Yelle, who had commented on my paper at the International Conference on Persons at Boston University, for which I am very grateful.

A lot could have been said in defence of this conclusion. However, for now, space limitations would not allow to go any further. That said, having cleared one key conceptual confusion out of the way with respect to how the notion of a person needs to be understood, the most demanding feature of the ontology of a person has to do with giving an account of an emergence of a person— a bearer of consciousness, i.e., when does a person exist? Another issue that goes along with the emergence of a person is that of the emergence of consciousness. Does consciousness emerge simultaneously with the emergence of a person? If not, which precedes which or which follows which? But this is work for another time.

MIXED MODES AND THE NON-EXISTENCE OF LOCKEAN PERSONS

Sam N. Johnson

Abstract: I argue that Lockean persons do not exist. Rather, they should be interpreted as mixed modes which are fundamental to the reification of moral concepts which themselves are fundamental to the reification of Lockean persons. The semantic content of a mixed mode derives from its constituent simple ideas, and Locke does not provide a substantive account of what it means to exist as a person. "Person" then is devoid of semantic content because it refers to a mixed mode.

Key Words: Identity, Locke, mixed modes, persons, substance

1. Introduction

Prima facie, the notion that Locke is committed to the existence of persons is indisputable. He introduces his views on personal identity in Chapter 27, Book II of *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, and his conviction that persons exist is seen elsewhere in the Essay.[1] I argue, however, that Lockean persons, or persons as interpreted by John Locke, do not exist. I begin by surveying the basic concepts of Locke's metaphysics and I examine Locke's arguments for why persons do not exist as either material or immaterial substances. I then introduce Locke's account of modes and argue that Lockean persons should be interpreted as mixed modes because mixed modes are fundamental to the reification of moral concepts which themselves are fundamental to the reification of Lockean persons. Next I show how the semantic content of a mixed mode is derived by the mode's reference to its constituent simple ideas. Finally, I argue that Lockean persons do not exist by showing that Locke does not provide a substantive account of what it means to exist as a person, and that the word 'person' is devoid of semantic content because it refers to a mixed mode.

2. Locke's metaphysics

The backbone of Locke's metaphysics is his *principium individuationis*, or principle of individuation. This specifies that multiple tokens of a single substance type cannot be co-located at a place and time (although multiple tokens of different kinds can) and that no entity can exist without existing at a particular time and place. Locke's principle of individuation is also charged with numerically differentiating existing entities from one another and it is in this that each entity's identity consists.

Locke uses the example of an oak tree[2] to show that while it is impossible for two oak trees to be co-located, it is possible, indeed necessary, for masses of matter and oak trees to be co-located if there are to be any such things as oak trees at all. Gideon Yaffe

calls this principle the place-time-kind principle. Regarding substance, Locke says, 'We have the Ideas but of three sorts of Substances; 1. God. 2. Finite Intelligences. 3. Bodies.[3] Because Locke frequently refers to God in the *Essay* as an infinite intelligence or infinite spirit, he does not make the claim that human minds are qualitatively identical to God's. Locke holds that human souls are finite, and accordingly he refers to them as finite spirits, souls, and immaterial substances. Because they are immaterial, human souls are contrasted with bodies, thereby enabling Locke to identify human souls with finite intelligences. But Locke is committed to the thesis that the identity of a person is not determined by the unity of a specific type of substance. The unity of a person's identity consists in the continuity of a subject's conscious experience.[4] Before covering this aspect of his philosophy, it is necessary to discuss Locke's notions on modes and how they inform his views on substance.

3. Modes and mixed modes

Locke claims in the *Essay* that modes are 'complex ideas, which however compounded contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependencies on, or affections of substances.'[5] A mode is therefore a kind of complex idea. There are two different kinds of modes for Locke, simple and mixed, and although there are differences between them, a few generalisations can be made about what they are and how they are produced. According to Locke, both simple and mixed modes are examples of complex ideas. A complex idea is a combination of simple ideas. Unlike simple ideas, which naturally occur in sensory experience, complex ideas are generalisations or abstractions produced by the mind when several distinct, simple ideas are compared to one another. Among other examples of complex ideas are ideas about substances. Substances are understood by Locke as existing entities which are ontologically independent. The existence of modes, on the other hand, depends upon the existence of a substance. A mode, according to Locke, is a feature or variation of a substance and a simple mode is a complex idea whose component parts are variations of a single simple idea.

One example of a simple mode is fathom, a unit of measurement treated by Locke as a mode of the simple idea of space. Locke names similar modes of space, including foot, mile, and diameter of the Earth. Regarding modes of the simple idea of space, Locke writes,

When any such stated lengths or measures of

space are made familiar to men's thoughts, they can, in their minds, repeat them as often as they will, without mixing or joining them to the idea of body, or any thing else; and frame to themselves the ideas of long, square, cubick, feet… and by adding these still to one another, enlarge their idea of space as much as they please. 6

As this passage shows, simple modes originate from a single simple idea as variations thereof. This passage also indicates that while a simple mode is dependent upon its respective simple idea for its existence, a simple mode and its respective simple idea are numerically distinct from each other. Unlike a simple mode, a mixed mode is a complex idea of whose component parts are derived from multiple and sometimes disparate simple ideas. Although the components of mixed modes (simple ideas) refer to substances, *inter alia* mixed modes themselves fail to refer to anything existing in reality, as will be discussed later.

4. Against Lockean persons as material or immaterial substances

There is ample textual support from Locke's own work for the claim that a Lockean person is not a simple substance of any kind.7 Locke is committed to biological organisms as entities which are ontologically distinct from the masses of matter of which they consist. According to Locke, a mass of matter is simply any aggregate of particles irrespective of the order in which those particles are arranged, but a biological organism is an aggregate of particles arranged in such a way as to bestow upon it the capacity for self-regulation, that is, the ability to maintain the arrangement of its particles across time and in the prospect of material change. This capacity for self-regulation constitutes what Locke refers to as the life of the organism. Locke provides the following example to demonstrate:

> We must therefore consider wherein an Oak differs from a Mass of Matter, and that seems to me to be in this; that the one is only the Cohesion of Particles of Matter any how united, the other such a disposition of them as constitutes the parts of an Oak; and such an Organization of those parts, as is fit to receive, and distribute nourishment, so as to continue, and frame the Wood, Bark, and Leaves, etc. of an Oak, in which consists the vegetable Life.8

Accordingly, the idea of a biological organism's identity is acquired by the mind's comparison of a particular arrangement of particles at one moment in time with an aggregate of particles of the same arrangement existing at an earlier moment in time. The fact that a mass of matter is indeed ontologically distinct from its respective organism is reflected in Yaffe's aforementioned place-time-kind principle.

That Locke would likely counter the idea that persons are bodies may be seen in the following scenario. Responding to the idea that a person resurrected from the grave might not be identical to the person who entered it because of changes in bodily form, Locke again points out the conceptual difference between man and person. He uses a thought experiment to argue for the claim that sameness of bodily form is neither necessary nor sufficient for sameness of identity across time. The prince and the cobbler thought experiment conveys its message by illustrating a prince who continues to hold himself accountable for the actions he performs even though his soul and consciousness reside in the body of a cobbler. As Locke describes it,

> And thus we may be able without any difficulty to conceive, the same Person at the Resurrection, though in a Body not exactly in make or parts the same which he had here, the same consciousness of the Prince's past Life, enter and inform the Body of a Cobbler as soon as deserted by his own Soul, every one sees, he would be the same Person with the Prince, accountable only for the Prince's Actions…9

The prince and the cobbler case therefore shows that Lockean personal identity does not consist of bodily continuity.

Turning to the interpretation of Lockean persons as minds, Yaffe says this notion maintains that a person is identical to his or her soul; for a person at one time to be identical to a person at another means that the soul in one is identical to the soul of the other. For Locke, soul is interchangeable with mind or immaterial thinking substance. He claims that the soul is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for the unity of the self and employs a thought experiment to support this view. In this experiment, Locke shows that it is possible for the same person to have different substances, as well as for different persons to have the same substance. Locke writes,

> Let any one reflect upon himself, and conclude, that he has in himself an immaterial Spirit, which is that which thinks in him, and in the constant change of his Body keeps him the same; and is that which he calls himself: Let him also suppose it to be the same Soul, that was in Nestor or Thersites, at the Siege of Troy…which it may have been, as it is now, the Soul of any other Man: But he, now having no consciousness of any of the Actions either of Nestor or Thersites, does, or can he, conceive himself the same Person with either of them?10

The reasoning in this passage is that, under the assumption that immaterial spirits are immortal and therefore capable of persisting past bodily death, it would be possible for the soul of a man who lived in

ancient times to inhabit the body of a man living in the present. Now Locke believes the soul is the source of consciousness (mind). Thus, if it were possible for the soul of a man to persist from ancient times until the present, it would be possible for the man in the present to be conscious of that which the soul was conscious of in ancient times. But as Locke points out, the man in the present does not know what happened in ancient times, and so it must follow that the existence of a particular soul is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of a person. However, some soul is required for the existence of a person.[11] Locke clearly thinks minds should be identified with souls and that sameness of consciousness entails sameness of mind. He writes that thinking, reasoning, and 'other operations of the mind'[12] are produced by a substance that is called spirit:

> Thinking, Reasoning, Fearing, etc. which we concluding not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to Body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think these the Actions of some other Substance, which we call Spirit…[13]

5. Lockean persons as mixed modes

According to Locke, a mixed mode is a combination of simple ideas arranged by the active powers of the mind.[14] Mixed modes, however, are not 'looked upon to be the characteristical marks of any real being that have a steady existence, but scattered and independent ideas, put together in the mind.'[15] This means that a mixed mode does not refer to anything real in reality.

One interpreter of Locke's theory of personal identity who also holds that Lockean persons are mixed modes is Edmund Law. Law begins his argument by reflecting upon Locke's definition of person and states that Locke's definition of person cannot be understood accurately without acknowledging that a person's identity is just one more property a person possesses in addition to his or her metaphysical properties. Law claims that although Locke uses the word person to stand for a rational being, the word person should instead be used to stand for a certain quality or property that is possessed by a thinking substance and which enables that substance to stand in moral relations to other such substances. Law contends that this quality is a mixed mode. In the following passage, Law describes how Locke defines the word person:

> Thus, in the case before us, the word *person* is often used to signify the whole aggregate of a rational Being, including both the very imperfect idea, if it be any idea at all, of *substance*, and its several properties… In which sense Mr. Locke manifestly takes the word, when he says, it *stands for a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking Being, in different times and places*.[16]

In other words, Law claims that Locke uses 'person' to refer to a rational being and thus to an existing thing. Law maintains the word 'person' should be defined as a property of a thinking substance which enables it to exist as a moral thing can be seen in the following passage:

> But when the term is used more accurately and philosophically, it stands for one special property of that thing or Being, separated from all the rest that do or may attend it in real existence, and set apart for ranging such Beings into distinct classes, and considering them under distinct relations and connections, which are no less necessary to be determined in life, and which should therefore have their proper and peculiar denomination.[17]

And

> The word person then, according to the received sense in all classical authors, standing for a certain guise, character, quality, i.e. being in fact a mixed mode, or relation, and not a substance; we must next enquire, what particular character or quality it stands for in this place… The answer is, that here it stands for that particular quality or character, under which a man is considered, when he is treated as an intelligent Being subject to government and laws… and to enquire after its identity, is to enquire, not after the identity of a conscious Being, but after the identity of a quality or attribute of such a conscious Being.[18]

Having argued that a Lockean person must be understood as an aggregate of identity and metaphysical properties, Law draws the conclusion that a person, while a property, is also a mixed mode.

By Law's own account, the difference between his and Locke's definition of person is that Locke uses the word to refer to a rational being, that is, a being capable of having moral motivation. According to Law, the word person stands only for the quality or property which enables a being to be morally motivated, and as noted earlier, he contends that this rationality-enabling property is a mixed mode. Moral motivation is a complex idea comprised in part by the simple ideas of pleasure, pain, right, wrong, etc. And because moral motivation is a complex idea, it is a mixed mode and applicable to the definition of persons as conceived by either Locke or Law.

As noted earlier, Locke maintains that mixed modes do not refer to anything in nature, and he holds that mixed modes should be seen as ideas put together in the mind. Having argued that Lockean persons are mixed modes, it can thus be concluded that Lockean persons do not exist.

6. Conclusion

Because a mixed mode is derived by the mode's reference to its constituent simple ideas, I have argued that Lockean persons do not exist by showing they should be interpreted as mixed modes. I began my argument by surveying the basic concepts of Locke's metaphysics and examined Locke's arguments for why persons do not exist as either material or immaterial substances. I then introduced Locke's account of modes and argued that Lockean persons should be interpreted as mixed modes on the basis that mixed modes are fundamental to the reification of moral concepts, which are themselves fundamental to the reification of Lockean persons. I showed how the semantic content of a mixed mode is derived by the mode's reference to its constituent simple ideas. Finally, I argued that because mixed modes do not refer to anything in nature, Lockean persons do not exist.

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Notes

1. For example, see E. IV. Ix. 3: 618.
2. See E. II. xxvii. 3: 330.
3. E. II. xxvii. 2: 329.
4. See E. II. xxvii. 25: 345-346.
5. E. II. xxii. 4: 165.
6. E. II. xiii. 4: 167-168.
7. For example, see E. II. xxvii. 25: 345-346 and E. II. xxvii. 18: 341-342.
8. E. II. xxvii. 4: 330-1.
9. E. II. xxvii. 14: 340.
10. E. II. xxvii. 14: 339.
11. The word *some* in this sentence should not be taken to indicate that I am using *soul* as a mass noun.
12. See E. II. xxiii. 3: 297.
13. Ibid., 297.
14. See E. II. xxii. 4: 289.
15. E. II. xxii. 1: 288.
16. Edmund Law, Appendix Two, "*A Defense of Mr. Locke's Opinion Concerning Personal Identity*" in Locke On Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, by Galen Strawson, Princeton Monographs in Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 242; original emphases.
17. Ibid., 242.
18. Ibid., 251.

ON THE MISTAKEN LEXICAL LIBERTY OF CONFLATING
SELF AND PERSON IN PHILOSOPHY

M. B. Raehll

Abstract: This paper argues that 'self' and 'person' should be understood as distinct terms that each carry its own set of unique problems. First, I will offer a definition of 'self.' Second, I will show how the terms 'self' and 'person' are often used interchangeably but do not always hold identical semantic value. I conclude by drawing two key distinctions and showing how each term should hold its own space within philosophical discourse

1. Introduction

This paper argues that 'self' and 'person' should be understood as distinct terms that each carries its own unique set of problems. First, I will offer a definition of 'self.' Second, I will show how the terms 'self' and 'person' are often used interchangeably but do not always hold identical semantic value. I conclude by drawing two key distinctions and showing how each term should hold its own space within philosophical discourse.

I will begin by defining the term 'self.' What I mean by 'self' is not that self is a thing, a substance, or a physical entity. Rather, I define it in a similar manner to Thomas Metzinger (2003) who identifies self as a process. This process is one of taking sense data and experiences acting upon an object, for which the object then constructs a model of itself in the world that it is able to manipulate for the purposes of informing intelligent behaviour. I take 'self' to be something akin to self-consciousness or as Lynne Baker (2013) describes it, 'a robust first-person perspective' (33). As such, 'self,' should be understood as a verb. The result of such a transition is that 'self' should operate in a sentence either as the infinitive, 'to self,' or as the present participle, 'selfing.' 'Selfing' is a process of an object reflecting back on itself as an object in the world from a subjective point of view. To define:

> S(x): 'x is selfing' just in the case that x is undergoing a computational semiotic process whose output is a synchronically unified, phenomenally subjective model of itself.

Having provided a definition of 'selfing', I will now tease out two clear distinctions between 'self' and 'person.' While it is the case that the terms are often used interchangeably, much opacity persists relating to the usage of the terms and it does not seem that an identity relation holds consistently among varying theories of personal identity. As commonly used, 'self' often refers to something like self-conscious-ness. My definition of 'selfing' discussed above is essentially what that amounts to but with the clear indication of the nature of the process driving the first-person perspective. However, when looking at the spectrum of options for defining 'person,' it is unclear that what is intended in providing such a definition of person as referring specifically to anything like self-consciousness. In fact, it is the case that some definitions equating person and self are more warranted than others.

To draw out the distinction further, I will briefly summarise three major views in philosophy as it relates to personal identity and compare them to the definition of 'self' provided above to those of 'person' under each view. The three major views are psychological, constitutional, and biological or physicalist. Turning first to the psychological view, those ascribing to the psychological criteria of personal identity hold that persons are psychological states and that, 'the identity of a person over time consists in the holding of the relation of psychological continuity between a person at different times' (Garrett, 1998, 41). If one takes 'person' to represent some aggregate of psychological states that hold the right kind of relationship to one another over time, then the common understanding of 'self' and the definition of 'person' may closely align. The interchanging of the terms 'self' and 'person' under this view would not be so problematic because psychological continuity theorists appear to be using the terms in a manner that largely coincides. Now, there may be some forms of psychological continuity that allow for non-conscious mental states to be part of the psychological 'bundles' that make up the person, but generally, I will maintain that self and person are interchangeable under the psychological view.

Granting that under a charitable interpretation of the psychological view, 'self' and 'person' may be used interchangeably, it is far less apparent whether the two other prominent views of persons, namely constitution and physicalism, should be permitted such lexical liberty. For example, according to Baker's constitution view, a person is constituted by the body but not identical with it (Baker, 2000). Much like with the statue and the lump of clay, persons are constituted by material but not identical with material because there are different essential properties as well as different persistence conditions between the person and the material. Considering 'person' to be 'a primary kind' (2002, 374), Baker holds that 'something is a *person* in virtue of having a first-person perspective' (371). Further, being a human person is to have a first-person perspective as a human animal, but

Baker insists that, 'although I am both a person and an animal, I am most fundamentally a person' (372). So, a person is something that exemplifies a first person perspective under Baker's constitution view.

At first glance, Baker's position seems close enough to the term 'self,' because she specifies that what she means by having a robust first-person perspective is essentially the same thing as being self-conscious (Baker, 2013, 31). She also equates the term 'person' with the capacity to have a robust first-person perspective and ties that into the term 'self' in the following:

> Although I do not believe that there are 'selves' as distinct from persons, I do believe that there are persons, who are essentially first personal, and are genuine subjects of experience … I prefer the word 'persons' or 'genuine subjects of experience' to the word 'self' because 'self' suggests some inner entity; but I'll use all these locutions to mean the same thing. (2013, 83)

In this quotation, Baker prefers to use the term 'person,' but does equate it with 'self,' 'genuine subjects of experience' and, elsewhere, to 'having the capacity for a robust first-person perspective' (2013, 31). Further, for Baker a person is a separate and wholly distinct entity that exists in the world even though it is constituted by (though not identical to) a human biological organism. What this means is that if you took an inventory of the entire physical make-up of the world, you would find persons. This is made clear when Baker states: 'By the term 'genuine subject of experience,' I mean an entity that must be included as such in ontology, a first-personal entity that exists in the world and not just as an artefact of an information processing system' (2013, 83). So, on Baker's view, self/person is equated with some thing having the capacity for a robust first-person perspective which is a real entity that differs from some inner information artefact of a human biological organism.

There is much more to Baker's general argument as it relates to human persons, but there are two key take aways. The first is that, on Baker's view, 'robust first-person perspective' nearly matches the common understanding of self-consciousness. What seems less obvious, though, is that on Baker's view, 'person' and 'self', are interchangeable and a person is an ontologically distinct entity that is not inside some human organism but is only accidentally constituted by a human organism. Instead, Baker identifies 'person' as a first-person property that is 'essentially dispositional … with haecceitistic implications' (2013, 82). Using the term 'haecceity' to mean 'the state of affairs of someone's exemplifying a property' (180), Baker further suggests that the entity that exemplifies a dispositional robust first-person property is 'irreducible' and 'ineliminable' (32). This makes 'person' an instantiated property with a capacity for conceiving of itself as itself in the first person (187).

Taking Baker's definition in view, there is a critical difference between some object simply have the capacity to be self-consciousness and actually looking at what self-consciousness is, in and of itself. A way to highlight this difference is in the case of a newborn. Baker does not think that the robust first-person perspective is present, 'at or near birth' (2013, 44). Instead it comes into existence with the onset of linguistic development and when the human can identify themselves in the first person. But, Baker nonetheless still considers the newborn to be a person because 'it is of the *kind* that develops robust first-person perspectives…' (44, italics mine). Here, she considers a newborn as a person under constitution without actually being self-conscious. So, in this case, 'self' and 'person' seem to be used in different ways. For, the newborn is to be considered a person without being considered having a robust first-person perspective (i.e., a self). The point to make clear is, within the terminological mélange, 'self' and 'person' should remain two different terms under Baker's version of constitution. In the definition of 'selfing' I provide above, best aligns with Baker's 'self-consciousness' or a 'robust first-person perspective.'

Another example of distinct uses would be persons that have lost self-consciousness by dementia, or perhaps even those suffering from Cotard's syndrome (Ruminjo and Mekinulov, 2008). In all such cases, Baker still considers such humans to be persons in virtue of them being a member of the kind that have robust first-person perspective so they are persons essentially. And, yet, they do not seem to have or seek to negate a 'self.' It would be best for Baker to not use the terms interchangeably and, instead, either take Olson's approach and try to eliminate the term 'self' altogether or seek to merely equate it with self-consciousness. As it stands, Baker conflates the terms for which there is an obvious distinction. For Baker, 'selves' don't actually exist, but entities that have instantiated dispositional first person properties do. That alone should be cause for a clear distinction between the terms under Baker's constitutionalist position.

While there is some ambiguity as to whether using 'self' and 'person' interchangeably is warranted under the constitutionalist view, it is quite confusing when proponents of the physicalist view use the common understanding of 'self' and the term 'person' interchangeably. For according to the physicalist view, persons are identified over time by 'the holding of some relation of physical continuity between a person at different times' (Garrett, 1998, 41). Such a definition may be further refined by indicating that it is some particular physical object that continues, such as a brain, a body, or a biological organism. In each case, it is the physical material persisting that establishes both the synchronic and diachronic conditions for persons. Note that under this view, the psychological states or mental capacities of a person take a back

seat to the primacy of identification of persons through some physical criteria. That is not to say there is nothing similar to the common understanding of 'self' as persons may go through periods of self-consciousness; but whether some thing has anything like a self on the common view is irrelevant to whether that thing is actually a person, and so the two terms should be used distinctly within the physicalist framework.

Now, it may be that when a proponent of the physical view uses the term 'self' that they only mean it to be a referent that points out that very thing that is so-called. In this case, when a physical object utters 'I' all that is meant is the thing that it is, and it is not meant to invoke some robust first-person perspective. If 'self' is just equated with demarcating the physical thing then that alternative view should be established in more detail, as it is not part of the common understanding that 'self' does not refer to any cognitive capacities. Alternatively, it could be that there is no such thing as a 'self' that is a genuine problem for philosophy and so, as Olson (a proponent of the physicalist view) suggests, the term should really have no place in discussions of personal identity. What is important to note here is that with all three positions, it is not immediately obvious that 'self' should be equated with 'person.' It is evident even from this brief sketch of positions concerning 'persons' that the terms 'self' and 'person' should be clearly defined. And as far as either relate to 'selfing', neither the common understanding of 'self' nor the term 'person' quite capture what is intended.

To that end, I will draw out two critical differences between 'self' and 'person.' The first key difference is ontological. I have already mentioned that 'selfing' is a process. But typically, when using the term 'person' it is intended to refer to an actual physical substance in the world that endures. For example, under the physicalist view, 'human person' refers to a phase in the cycle of the human biological organism that has the *capacity* to self but may or may not be 'selfing'. Notice that person is a noun, a thing that exists in the world. 'Selfing', meanwhile, is a process that a human person may undergo for a time. To put it another way, if one were to describe a complete categorisation of all substances in the world at a given time, they would not find any object that is a 'self' but they would find persons 'selfing'. And, persons may be persons without 'selfing'. So, there is an ontological difference between the two terms, which I suggest lead to ascribing different properties that may or may not be coupled together.

In addition to 'selfing' being a process while human person is a material substance, the two terms should also be understood as having different persistence conditions. One of the major questions related to persons is diachronic unity. That is to say, that any defence of human persons should not only define what it is to be a person, but to describe what it means

for that person at t1 to be considered the same person at t2. And, although persistence conditions seem necessary for persons because they are considered to be the same (or at least similar enough to be counted as the same) substance over time, such a condition need not apply to 'selfing' as it is understood in terms of being similar to self-consciousness. For selfconsciousness may go in and out of existence as a process, and it may admit of degrees as well. The 'selfing' process outputs an information artefact for the thing itself and need not persist in order to exist. Strawson (1999) describes 'selfing' as synchronically unified by considering how a 'three-brained human' would think of itself as one thing with three brains instead of three separate things. Even in the cases of typical adult human experiences, though many cells are entirely replaced in the human organism, there remains a sense of unity in the human organism's experience. But such synchronic unity need not persist for long. Strawson considers the synchronic unity of a self to last for what he calls a 'hiatus-free period' which is, 'a few seconds at the most, a fraction of a second at the least' (1999, 9). At the end of that time, the self-model is changed and altered. It is mentally torn down and built anew with updated information and sense data acquired. 'Selfing' processes are not continuous but may admit of degrees and also stop and start. Even when the process operates in a continuous mode, the self-model that was constructed fades out and a new one is built. This is, of course, very different from persons, which do not come into existence anew every few seconds.

To underscore the difference between self and person persistence conditions further, Strawson considers a case in which one brain has disparate 'I-thoughts' but none of those thoughts involve awareness of the previous thought (11). Even though at the moment the I-thought occurred to such a thinker (there is synchronic unity) the thoughts that follow do not stand in any relevant relation to one another. This disruption in 'selfing' occurs in many different ways such as when the human person is sleeping or unconscious. Now, even though 'selfing' is not diachronically continuous but only synchronically unified for a few seconds at most, there is still a sense of long-term continuity because it is often the case that the organism that underpins the 'selfing' process persists in a diachronically unified way. So, I suggest that the sense of diachronic unity of the self would be radically disrupted in the case of a human person who undergoes rapidly radical alterations. Nevertheless, as Strawson summarises, 'one can have a full sense of the single mental self at any given time without thinking of the self as something that has long-term continuity' (19). In summary, the persistence conditions required for persons do not and should not apply to 'selfing'.

I have now highlighted two key distinctions and showed how 'self' and 'person' are used in different

ways and should be understood as distinct concepts. Embracing this distinction will not only serve to bring precision and clarity to philosophical discussions but will also carry another upshot. For, fissuring the semantics of the two terms permits for distinct etymological evolution in such a way that new linguistic space is afforded and opportunity for explorations of 'self' that can exist independent of 'person.' This allows 'self' to expand into arenas of non-human persons without assuming the metaphysical baggage of personal identity. But it can also allow for a reinvention of self-identity as being understood in terms of process and not persistence of any single entity.

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MORAL PERSONHOOD AND HUMANS WITH TAILS: EXPLORING THE BOUNDS OF THE MORAL

Sari Kisilevsky

Abstract: I argue that attempts to explain the objective bindingness of morality by appeal to contingent facts about human nature renders the bounds of morality unsettlingly arbitrary. It provides no principled explanation for the bounds of morality and determinations of who deserves moral standing. This can lead to an expansion of the moral universe. But it fails to guard against drawing distinctions among human beings that are ordinarily thought to be morally repugnant.

1. Introduction

One question people can ask about moral personhood is who counts as a moral person. One can ask which creatures have moral standing, who counts as a moral agent and why, by virtue of what is a being accountable for its actions, who ought to enter into a moral calculus and what features are relevant in moral deliberations. Different aspects of this question bear on different moral aims: one might distinguish between beings with a right to life, those whose interests people should take into account, moral agents and the appropriate bearers of ascriptions of responsibility, and so on.

Another question concerns the objectivity of moral reasons. What explains the objective force of morality on moral persons and why are people subject to just those moral norms that bind them? Why does morality prohibit persons like us from cruelty, malice and wanton disregard for the well-being of others?

There is a strand of thought in metaethics that combines these sets of questions and seeks a unified answer to both. Thinkers in this vein argue that humans are objectively bound by moral reasons because of the kinds of creatures we are and we are specially suited to have the distinctive moral status we do; moral personhood just consists in the distinctive way in which human beings are specially subject to the demands of morality. Michael Smith and Philippa Foot exemplify thinkers of this type, though neither explicitly advances their positions in the way I have described. I will argue that both views provide combined answers to the two sorts of questions I have raised above.

According to Michael Smith, people are such that, if they were ideally rational, they would desire the moral good. He concludes that what people (actually) have most reason to do is what they would ideally desire that they do if they were fully rational. This explains the objective force of moral reasons because, notwithstanding people's actual desires, they would desire the good if they were fully rational.[1]

Philippa Foot argues that it is distinctive of human beings that they are necessarily rational, linguistic, willing creatures, and it is the function or end of creatures possessing these distinctive capacities to be good. Humans are bound by the dictates of morality because all creatures must aim for their good and the good for human beings is the moral good.[2]

Morality is understood intensionally, not extensionally (or, as Foot puts it, opaquely rather than transparently)[3] in both accounts. It consists in familiar injunctions to keep one's promises, be loyal to friends, refrain from theft and murder, be truthful, and so on. Both thinkers argue that this set of norms binds people because of the kinds of creatures they are, and humans are specially subject to morality just because they are the appropriate subjects of just this set of norms. This lends a just-so quality to both explanations whereby the natural world and the moral world are perfectly aligned. This on its own is not a problem; it may well be the case that human beings are just such as to be the appropriate subjects of just this set of moral norms. As I shall argue, however, this can lead one to wonder why the boundaries of the moral should be so circumscribed. Particularly, I will press the urgency of this question on the basis that there is no natural fact about human beings in particular that gives us reason to so circumscribe the moral.

I will begin by outlining Smith's and Foot's views and examining the ways in which they seek to answer the question of people's distinctive subjection to objective moral norms. I will then turn to a historical example of a discovery of an island populated by 'humans' with tails. I will argue that, though there is no such thing (at least, not in the manner described in the account), this possibility raises difficulties for the lines of reasoning described above. Specifically, it highlights the ways in which the account is arbitrary. I will then turn to the metaethical significance of this and why the possibility of such creatures threatens the accounts. Finally, I will return to the actual characteristics of humans as a species and argue that there is nothing to ground the idealizations as they are meant to be understood under the accounts offered above. Let us begin then with a closer examination of the two approaches.

2.

Michael Smith's aim is to explain morality's objectivity and its motivating force, specifically how morality can be a matter of objective fact and yet motivate people to act, given human psychology,

namely that beliefs alone can't motivate. He concludes that what people have most reason to do is what they would desire in their actual circumstances if they were fully rational. It is a platitude that if people were fully rational, they would desire the good. This counterfactual holds regardless of the particular desires or ends that an individual has, making morality objectively binding rather than dependent on people's actual aims and desires. The cruel man has reason to stop beating his wife because if he were fully rational he would desire her well-being, even if he actually desires only cruelty.[4] This explains the objective nature of moral norms. Smith writes,

> This answer is in [no] way surprising. It was always the only answer available. For if, when we deliberate, we try to decide what we have reason to do, and to the extent that we are rational we will either already have corresponding desires or our beliefs about what we desire have reason to do will cause us to have corresponding desires, then nothing else but the contingent fact that we are rational to just the extent that we are could explain the resulting matches and mismatches between our beliefs about what we have reason to do and our desires. Our contingent rationality is the only variable. The point is simply that now we know *why* our being rational plays this role. It plays this role because what we have normative reason to do is a matter of what we would desire that we would do if we were fully rational.[5]

Philippa Foot asks about the norms that creatures like us are subject to, and concludes that as wolves need to hunt and birds need to build nests, human faculties of memory, reasoning, language and crucially the will are such as to make the good for human beings the moral good. She writes,

> The root notion is that of the goodness of human beings in respect of their actions; which means, to repeat, goodness of the will rather than of such things as sight, dexterity, or memory. Kant was perfectly right in saying that moral goodness was goodness of the will; the idea of practical rationality is throughout a concept of this kind. He seems to have gone wrong, however, in thinking that an abstract idea of practical reason applicable to rational beings as such could take us all the way to anything like our own moral code. For the evaluation of human action depends also on essential features of specifically human life.[6]

Goodness for Foot is goodness of the will, a distinctive human capacity that is an aspect of human nature. For Foot, humans have special moral status among all other creatures, and are specially subject to the norms of morality because goodness of the will (or practical rationality) is a distinctive aspect of their distinctive natures.

Both thinkers combine the two metaethical questions outlined above by explaining how the dictates of morality can be objectively binding on creatures like us and why human beings are specially suited to be just those sort of creatures that are the appropriate subjects of morality's dictates. They successfully avoid the dangers posed by these potentially competing aspects of morality, namely that morality's objectivity makes it mysterious why it should bind people to the extent that it does, and that if morality binds people because of the kinds of creatures we are then it binds only contingently and subjectively, not objectively and categorically.

These approaches reconcile these aspects of morality by offering idealized rather than individualized accounts of morality and moral force. For Smith, the reasons a person has are those she would desire in her actual circumstances if she were fully rational. Her actual desires do not determine her moral reasons directly. Foot argues that the human good, and the dictates it exerts on people, are those fixed by human nature or essence, not individual human beings in all their particularity. Again, human defects and deficiencies, people's individual irrationality, limitations, vulnerabilities, etc. do not determine the human good except so far as they serve to determine human nature.

This accomplishes two things. It explains why morality actually binds people rather than serving as a wholly independent set of norms, since people's actual selves are importantly related to idealized human beings. In short, it avoids the pitfalls of externalism. And it explains why people are actually bound by objective moral norms – and not just the norms that happen to bind them – since people aren't subject to whatever norms happen to bind them.

This distinguishes these positions from other approaches in metaethics that seek to identify a particular trait or characteristic (or set of traits or characteristics) that qualify beings for moral standing and leave questions of whether all, or most, human beings qualify open, or at least rest them on empirical investigation.[7] Secondly, it distinguishes these positions from subjectivist ones, or positions that deny the objective nature of morality, and hold morality to be whatever a person believes or desires. Reliance on these idealized notions of human beings rather than actual ones helps to avoid troubling conclusions arising from human variability; for example, whether there are some human beings who don't satisfy the threshold requirements for moral personhood or who escape the dictates of morality. Nonetheless, both approaches draw conclusions about people's actual subjection to moral norms and the moral force its dictates exert on actual human beings, including those who desire to be cruel or

wicked, and those who lack full mental capacities.

How do actual human beings relate to these idealized notions? What is it about human individuals or humans as a species that makes it true that under ideal circumstances, they are such as to be subject to this set of norms? What is morally important about such facts, and why should it matter of an actual person that ideally, she is subject to the norms of morality? And why are those norms that idealized human beings are subject to *moral* norms? What is good about them and why do they exert moral force? What about the norms that idealized versions of other living creatures are subject to and why do these fall short of moral norms? What is special about humans and just that set of norms that they, as a species, fall under?

I aim to examine the ways in which accounts like the ones I discussed set the bounds of morality and limit it to just that set of norms that morally binds people like us, because there is something about humans in particular that make them specially subject to just this set of norms. I will argue that, even if correct, such limits are at best morally arbitrary. This can be welcome news, for one consequence of this conclusion is that the moral universe might be much more expansive than was previously thought; other creatures might be specially suited for subjection to other sets of norms, specially binding on creatures like them, making the moral world much broader and more variable than these views allow. However, and far more worrisome, if the limits on the moral are arbitrary in the ways I describe, then there is no reason to stop at the level of the human species and not further *subdivide* humans, drawing moral distinctions among different kinds of humans. This violates a strict moral commitment to the equal moral status of all human beings, regardless of their particular biology, and opens the door for drawing moral distinctions among humans in ways ordinarily thought to be morally repugnant.

I will argue for these conclusions by considering a potential challenge to these views, a case of an explorer who believed he had discovered humans with tails. I will use this case to highlight some of the ways I think that important aspects of our practices are morally arbitrary on the views described above. I will then return to facts about human biology and membership in the human species, and I will argue that there is a set of facts about this that can ground the important conclusions drawn above. I will argue that though this does not make these views false, it renders them arbitrary in the ways I described above, and that this is cause for concern. Consider then the discover made by Nicolas Koping, as recounted by Lord Mondobbo.

3.
In the late 18th century, a Scottish judge named James Burnett (who also was also known as Lord Monboddo) published a six-volume work entitled *Of The Origin and Progress of Language*,[8] which sought to examine the continuities and differences between humans and other animals, and to characterize humanity in its 'natural' or 'brutish' state.[9] In researching his text, he came across the journal entries of a Swedish naval lieutenant named Nicolas Koping who served on the Dutch East-Indiaman in the Bay of Bengal in 1647. Koping's account was reprinted in the treatise of Linnaeus, and recited by his pupil Hoppius in 1760, where Monboddo found it.

In his writings, Koping recounted an incident in which he came across an island with naked human-like inhabitants who had tails like cats and other feline traits. The island natives swarmed the ship as it approached, intent on trade, and were eventually frightened away with a cannon-shot. They expressed familiarity with the arts of navigation, seemed accustomed to trade, and made use of iron. Five crew members eventually ventured ashore in search of provisions. They never returned, and a search the following morning turned up only their bones beside a smouldering fire, and their boat stripped of all of its iron.[10]

Upon reading Koping's account, Monboddo, understandably, wrote to Linnaeus to verify its veracity. Linnaeus vouched for Koping as a truthful and honest reporter, whose reports about the animal and plant life he encountered on his travels were accurate in every other respect. Monboddo concluded that Koping had indeed encountered such creatures with tails on his travels to the island. The only question was whether they were human.

Modern readers are unlikely to be persuaded by Koping's account, even with Linnaeus's recommendation, but Monboddo quickly turns the tables on doubtful readers, reversing ordinary reasoning on this. He wrote,

> I am sensible, however, that those who believe that men are, and always have been, the same in all ages and nations of the world, and such as we see them in Europe, will think this story quite incredible; but for my own part I am convinced, that we have not yet discovered all the variety of nature, not even in our own species; and the most incredible thing, in my apprehension, that could be told, even if there were no facts to contradict it, would be, that all men in the different parts of the earth were the same in size, figure, shape and colour.

The possibility of humans with tails is no more unlikely than humans with different colour skins are humans varying heights and all the other variety that we find within human beings. What would be more incredible, Monboddo argued, is if we thought that we had already discovered all possible variations among humans.

How should a metaethics treat the discovery of

these island inhabitants? If we are willing to treat humans with different heights, shapes, skin colour, etc. as having equal moral standing then we are also to do so with humans with tails. So far as they are just like us but they happen to have tails, then morality demands that we accord them equal moral status. If we follow Monboddo's reasoning, the discovery of humans with tails, though surprising, is of no great moral significance.

The matter is not so simple though. Tim Ingold explains,

> the more closely related individuals are in terms of descent, the more genes they are likely to have in common. Sometimes, when a conspicuous character is controlled by only one or a few genes, the slightest variations in the underlying genetic structure (or genotype) can have major consequences for the outward appearance of the mature individual (or phenotype), so that even closely related individuals can look very different. Other characters, even less conspicuous ones, may be controlled by a very large number of genes, so that the same amount of genotypic variation would be virtually imperceptible in the phenotype. Doubtless if humans had tails, varying from stumpy to pendulous as skin colour varies from white to black, some at least would have cause to wonder which is easier to hide: tail or skin. Fortunately perhaps, we do not have that problem, but for reasons that neither Monboddo nor his contemporary critics could have known. The amount of genetic modification needed to turn black skins into white (or vice versa) is minute compared with the amount needed to lose or gain a tail. The genetic difference between tailed and tailless primates implies a degree of genealogical unrelatedness that is simply incommensurate with their membership of a single species. Thus it is not necessary to invoke an essential form of humanity, or a priori notions of what human beings are like, in order to discount the existence of tailed individuals of the species Homo sapiens, or, more strictly, to regard the probability of their occurrence as vanishingly small.[11]

As it turns out, human ('humans') with tails would be significantly less like us than humans with different skin colours. In fact, humans would have more in common with higher tail-less primates than they would 'humans' with tails (or these human-like creatures). If we accord these island inhabitants equal moral standing to humans, then either we will have a 'gappy' metaethics that treats humans and these beings as moral equals, but excludes higher level primates from moral personhood, but leaves the criteria for personhood intact. Or else we must expand our notion of moral personhood to include higher primates, which could ultimately lead to radical revision of the notion of moral personhood.

From one perspective, there is no problem. If the aim was to set the criteria for moral personhood, then the question of the moral standing of the island inhabitants *applies* rather than challenges theories of personhood. The criteria for personhood are determined by the theory, who satisfies them is an empirical question.[12] Moral persons can include computers, robots, aliens, non-human animals and some humans may well be excluded. Such theories are designed to allow for a 'gappy' metaethics.

But our aim is not to advance a theory of moral personhood. It is to explain why creatures like us – moral persons – are subject to the set of norms we are, namely the norms of morality. The aim is not to provide a test or set of criteria for determining who counts as a moral person, though it may turn out that some human beings are not subject to the demands of morality on the views advanced above. It is to explain why people, adolescent and adult human beings whom people ordinarily recognize as full members of a shared moral community, are subject to just the moral demands that people ordinarily make of one another. The answer, as we have seen, is that morality as we know it is just that which binds creatures like us. It is that set of norms that morally governs creatures whom, under ideal circumstances, are the appropriate subjects of these norms.

The metaethical problem posed by 'humans' with tails is thus not whether they qualify as moral persons for the purposes of a theory of moral personhood. It is whether they are sufficiently like human beings to serve as the appropriate subjects of the dictates of morality, and whether, as its subjects, they are bound by the very same norms of morality that human beings are. For the purposes of this metaethical question though, a 'gappy' metaethics is potentially destabilizing. This is because it is not clear what fact or facts about actual human beings makes it true that under ideal circumstances, they are such as to be the appropriate subjects of morality and why, under ideal circumstances, they are appropriately subject to the demands of morality. The problem arises because there is nothing special, or no distinctive unifying feature of human beings that can serve to render them specially subject to the norms of morality. We can see this if we think more about the criteria for membership in the human species.

4.

Biologically, human beings are nothing more than a 'group of interbreeding natural population[s] that [are] reproductively isolated [though not necessarily absolutely so] from other such groups.'[13] Though they may share many observable traits, these are not those traits by virtue of which they are members of the same species. This holds at the genetic level as

well. Humans have many genes in common, but this commonality is not that by virtue of which they are members of the same species, nor is sharing genetic material (or sharing some proportion of genetic material) necessary or sufficient for membership in the species. Individual human beings may have more or less genetic material, or phenomenological characteristics in common with non-human beings than they do with other humans. Species membership is determined merely by the relevant reproductive relationships. Speciation occurs when successive populations can no longer successfully interbreed.[14]

This is not a sharp divide. Individual members of a population may continue to be able to interbreed with neighbouring populations even when they are considered to be distinct species. Moreover, barriers to interbreeding can include geographic ones, all but abolishing the line distinguishing between racial variations within a single species and different species. Particular organisms can also be members of different species at the same time, making the distinction among them not only vague, but elastic.

Let us assume then that Foot is right to hold that the moral good is that which is good for humans as a species by virtue of their nature, and Smith is correct to say that if humans were fully rational, they would desire to follow morality's dictates. So Smith might be right to hold that morality holds special sway for humans because they are such that, if they were ideally rational, then they would desire the good, and this may indeed explain why humans are objectively bound by the norms of morality; the cruel man indeed has no reason to beat his wife regardless of his actual desires. And Foot can perhaps explain why the good for humans is the moral good and why humans ought not to keep slaves, be cruel, they ought to keep their promises, etc. because of their unique faculties and natures. What can this tell us about the initial questions with which we began? What follows from humans' distinctive subjection to the norms of morality and the unique moral status they possess under its dictates?

First, one might wonder what makes the distinctive norms to which humans are subject *moral*. If the good is just good for humans and they are morally bound by what they would desire if they were fully rational, then what is moral about that set of norms to which human beings are distinctively subject? What about the good for other creatures, and that which they would desire if they had perfect desires? It is no objection to point out that rationality is a distinctively human trait since the account does not depend on what is distinctively moral about human rationality, and even if it is true, it is just one form of cogitation that living creatures possess at a given moment in time; humans may evolve to become super-rational, or may lose their rationality. Are human beings as we exist in this moment of evolution distinctively moral creatures? If so, there is

no account of what is evolutionarily morally significant about the species that exists at this moment. From an evolutionary perspective, the collection of genotypical and phenotypical traits that human beings happen to possess is nothing more than a set of accidental properties.

If not, then we begin to lose our grip on the initial set of questions. Are there other sets of norms governing the behaviour of, and that serve as the good for, other creatures? What is special about those norms governing human behaviour? Perhaps all living creatures are subject to a distinctive set of norms fixing the good for them. Why are those governing human beings singled out as the 'moral' ones? Or are they just called 'moral'? And what is important about classifying norms according to the *species* they govern? There are indefinitely many ways to classify living organisms more or less coarsely or finely, and species-membership is just one of them. What is special about this biological grouping?

There are strong moral reasons to accord equal moral status to all human beings, and drawing distinctions among (rational, autonomous) humans is strictly prohibited, notwithstanding genetic variations; eugenics, brain measurement programs, attempts to distinguish among 'breeds' of humans, etc. are all thought to be morally repugnant. But if there is no special moral reason to take membership in the human species to be morally significant, then what reason is there against further subdividing humans, and drawing further distinctions in their moral status? If the boundaries to the moral universe can be expanded, then they can likewise be contracted, allowing for the possibility of perhaps 'super-norms' governing 'super-humans,' or some subset of human beings, bound by a 'super-good.'

What fact can settle whether the 'humans' with tails living on the island are humans for the purposes of moral evaluation? Few theories of personhood take species-membership to be what matters, even if it was discovered that they are members of the human species.[15] What if they satisfy some independent criterion for moral personhood, like sufficient rationality, capable of acting for reasons, understanding right from wrong, etc.? Why should they be subject to the same norms as humans are? Why would they not be subject to those norms governing idealized creatures like them? There is no independent reason to think that these would be the same as those norms to which human beings are subject.

Even if they are sufficiently person-like to warrant moral status or if they satisfy some relevant criteria for moral personhood, what fact could make it true of them that if they were fully rational, they would desire the (moral) good or could settle what the good is for creatures of their (idealised) nature? Biologists have long rejected the idea that there is any nature or

essence to human beings.[16] On what basis could we discriminate among different human-like creatures? And, as discussed above, on what basis should people refrain from further subdividing among types of humans?

Needless to say, some of the possibilities considered are quite troubling. This does not mean that human beings do not have distinctive moral status under the norms of morality, or that this is not because of distinctive facts about people and human nature. My suggestion is that however insightful and explanatory this analysis is, it is incomplete. What is missing is further moral reason for thinking that this is the relation that matters.

I have aimed to show not that accounts of people's distinctive subjection to the norms of morality like Smith's and Foot's are false nor have I attempted to raise a counter-example or counter-argument to them. My concern is rather that they are unstable in a morally significant way, *viz*. that they leave bounds of the moral unexplained. This leads to a possible expansion of the moral universe, which might be fruitful, but is unintended, but it also leads to the possibility of its constriction in ways that are morally problematic. What is needed is a further account of why these moral boundaries and not others, and, I suggest, this account must itself be a moral one. Otherwise, the very same problems will reappear.

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Notes

1. Michael Smith, *The Moral Problem* (Blackwell: Oxford, UK, 1994).
2. Philippa Foot, *Natural Goodness* (Clarendon Press: Oxford, UK, 2001).
3. Foot, *Natural Goodness*, 64.
4. See T. M. Scanlon, *What We Owe To Each Other*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998), 367 for a discussion of this case.
5. Michael Smith, *The Moral Problem*, 180.
6. Foot, *Natural Goodness*, 14.
7. Many theories of moral personhood or moral status adopt such an approach. Examples include Jeff McMahan, *The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life* (Oxford University Press: Oxford UK, 2002); Regan, Tom, *The Case for Animal Rights*. University of California Press: Berkeley, CA, 1983); Peter Singer, *Practical Ethics*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 2011). This approach can come at the cost of excluding some human beings from moral personhood.
8. (J. Balfour and T. Cadell, Edinburgh and London),1773–1792.
9. This account is taken from Tim Ingold, 'Humanity and Animality,' in *Companion Encyclopedia of Anthropology*, Tim Ingold, ed. (Routledge, London UK, 2002), 15ff.
10. Burnet, 1773, 234-9.
11. Ingold, 'Humanity and Animality,' 18.
12. See Tom Beauchamp, 'The Failure of Theories of Personhood,' in *Personhood and Healthcare,* Thomasma, David C., Weisstub, David N., Hervé, Christian, eds., (Springer, 2001), ch.5 for a discussion of this point.

13. Mayr 1969, cited in Stephen R. Clark, 'Is Humanity a Natural Kind?' in Tim Ingold (ed.) *What is an Animal?* (Unwin Hyman, 1988), 22.
14. Clark, 'Is Humanity a Natural Kind?' 22.
15. Tom Regan argues that

Some there are who resist the idea that animals have inherent value. 'Only humans have such value,' they profess. How might this narrow view be defended? Shall we say that only humans have the requisite intelligence, or autonomy, or reason? But there are many, many humans who fail to meet these standards and yet are reasonably viewed as having value above and beyond their usefulness to others. Shall we claim that only humans belong to the right species, the species *Homo sapiens?* But this is blatant speciesism. Will it be said, then, that all – and only – humans have immortal souls? Then our opponents have their work cut out for them. I am myself not ill-disposed to the proposition that there are immortal souls. Personally, I profoundly hope I have one. But I would not want to rest my position on a controversial ethical issue on the even more controversial question about who or what has an immortal soul. That is to dig one's hole deeper, not to climb out. Rationally, it is better to resolve moral issues without making more controversial assumptions than are needed. The question of who has inherent value is such a question, one that is resolved more rationally without the introduction of the idea of immortal souls than by its use. 'The Case for Animal Rights,' in Peter Singer (ed), *In Defense of Animals* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985), p. 21.

16. See e.g.Clark, 'Is Humanity a Natural Kind?' in Tim Ingold (ed.) *What is an Animal?* (Unwin Hyman, 1988).

PEIRCE ON PERSON:
PEIRCE'S THEORY OF DETERMINATION AND THE EXISTENCE OF PERSONALITY

Cheongho Lee

Abstract: In his theory of determination, Charles Peirce considered two processes of determination, the semiotic process and epistemology. The semiotic process is an extensional process from object to interpretant that consists of an infinite chain of references that can be spatially reversible. The epistemological process of determination is temporal and irreversible, where the idea grows into the individual mind, as the universe is unfolded by the agency of mind.

Key Words: Epistemology, Charles S. Peirce, Personality, Semiotics, Theory of Determination

1. Introduction

In 'The Law of Mind' (1892), Charles Peirce tries to scrutinize the general law of mental action (CP 6.103).[1] Peirce clearly mentions that, in 'The Law of Mind,' he concentrates more on 'continuity,' in Peirce's terminology 'synechism,' than 'spontaneity,' or 'tychism' (CP 6.103).[2] Peirce's interest is thus revealed in his articulation of the law of mind that

> ideas tend to spread *continuously* and to affect certain others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of affectibility. In this spreading they lose intensity, and especially the power of affecting others, but gain generality and become welded with other ideas (CP 6.104, my emphasis).

It is notable, more than the laws themselves, that, after summarizing the general laws of mind, Peirce's articulation of continuity is extended to 'a particular phenomenon which is remarkably prominent in our own consciousness, […] personality' (CP 6.155).

My main attempt in this paper is to delve into Peirce's idea of 'personality' in 'The Law of Mind' from the stance of the general law of mental phenomena. To this end, I will start from Peirce's concept of continuity as revealed in 'The Law of Mind' and then turn to his 'theory of determination,' which, in my consideration, is the backbone of Peirce's philosophy. Finally, I will examine insights into Peirce's concept of 'personality' that can be derived from the theory.

2. The Continuity in 'The Law of Mind'

In 'The Law of Mind,' indeed, in Peirce's entire Philosophy, the quest for the structure of meaningful experience prevails regarding the topic of continuity. Peirce notably concerns himself with the question of how a past idea can be present in the irreversible flow of time (CP 6.107). In reality, a flow of time itself does not allow any connection between ideas, because time is 'the universal form of change,' and,

therefore, ideas, which are subject to the temporal flow, do not seem to be able to absolutely repeat themselves (CP 6.132). Ideas emergent in temporal process are always gone and thus not equivalent to each other. The issue then, is how the connection of a past idea and something that is immediately present to consciousness is possible.

One of the problems that ensue from this problem is the possibility of knowledge. Human beings, as well as other organisms that have consciousness, live in the continuous process that flows from past events to the present consciousness. The process of gaining knowledge is based on the secure connection between past ideas and something present to our consciousness. Without the connection of the past ideas and the present, knowledge could never be possible. To keep past ideas from delusion, Peirce demands that there must be a *necessary* connection between ideas that are continuous in the temporal flow (CP 6.108). In order to have knowledge in the flux of time, for Peirce, we should be conscious of a real interval of time that gives 'continuity' to ideas (CP 6.110). Peirce, however, does not introduce a finite interval of time in his discussion of continuity. According to Peirce, the present is connected with the past by a series of *real infinitesimal* steps (CP 6.110). Peirce suggests that only in an infinitesimally spread-out interval, can we immediately perceive the beginning, middle and end of the temporal sequence (CP 6.111). In this rather mathematical way, a past idea can be continuous to the present.[3]

In my estimation, however, Peirce's theory of determination reveals the *determinate* process embedded in an idea as a continuum and we can glance at the theory from his mention of three elements of an idea. According to Peirce, a continuum of an idea consists of three discriminate elements. As he puts it:

> Three elements go to make up an idea. The first is its intrinsic quality as a feeling. The second is the energy with which it affects other ideas, an energy which is infinite in the here-and-nowness of immediate sensation, finite and relative in the recency of the past. The third element is the tendency of an idea to bring along other ideas with it (CP 6.135).

Thus, the three elements of ideas are 'quality as a feeling,' 'the energy in immediate sensation,' and 'connection of ideas.' Quality of feeling, which is a first in Peircean categories, is subjective extension (CP 6.133). Feelings in themselves do not make any continuum. As time flows, or as processes are

unfolded, the energy of affection, which seems equivalent to a second, is rapidly decreased (CP 6.135). But the energy of affection transforms its power into connections of ideas with other ideas, which is a third. Basically, an idea is a continuum of feelings where '[i]nstantaneous feelings flow together' (CP 6.151). For Peirce, a living idea is hence a continuum of feeling in which ideas influence each other (CP 6.153) and ideas are 'living realities' (CP 6.152) that eventually consist of connections of ideas.

3. A Preliminary Research on Peirce's Theory of Determination

It seems evident that Peirce started his investigation into determination in his exploration of theory of signs, which he calls semiotics. Peirce's inquiry into the fundamental characteristic of determination in his early years can be associated with his effort to give a Kantian answer to this problem in his 'On a New List of Categories' (1867). As he puts it: 'The unity to which the understanding reduces impressions is the unity of the proposition' (W 2: 49).4 But the process of moving from 'precision'5 to the conceptions or categories in Peirce's account is different from Kant.6 The reason is that Kant's determination is the process of determining an object for a subject, and the subject is the only agent of determination. He restricts the work of determination to that which is always carried out by the subject, even when that which is determined is also only the subject (as in Kant's conception of reflective judgment).7 In a similar context, Kant includes an idea of purposiveness in the process of subjective determination.8 Such purposiveness is a subjective principle that does not have any power over particular forms of nature; our feeling of purposiveness is a feeling that has influence only on the subject. Kant's process of determination is thus an interpretive process solely dependent upon subjective powers regardless of the object before the perceiver.

Unlike Kant, Peirce thinks that the determination works in *two* ways. One way is the path from being to substance described by Peirce as that from a 'ground' to the relation with a correlate, and from the relation to an 'interpretant' which is the mediating representation. The ground thus determines its relation which, with the ground, determines its interpretant. Another way runs from interpretant through the ground. An interpretant, which is a Thirdness in his categories, presupposes the reference or relation, which is a Secondness, and the reference presupposes quality or a ground, which is a Firstness. Peirce's conception of determination is hence not the one-way determination that Kant assumes in his articulation from ground to consequence.9 As functions of semiosis,10 the object determines the sign which determines an interpretant, while an interpretant also presupposes reference and object

(CP 2.92; 2.292).11 I would call the former, from object to interpretant, 'objectification' and the latter, from interpretant to object, 'subjectificaiton,' which is definitely beyond Peirce's terminology.

My main assumption about Peirce's intention in his theory of determination is that all modes of determination include both activity and passivity in the process of meaning and creating. Meaning, including knowledge, is created by two determinative processes. If we trace the path of determination from the object to the interpretant, we will find out that the object has 'intelligibility' in its own right, which involves both passive and active processes. The object is thus *not* devoid of subjectivity. The determination of the object is the process by way of which it becomes cognizable for us. Therefore, whereas Kant has a profound logic in which the subject determines all the predicates, Peirce has a semiotics in which the object determines the interpretant, providing external standard of judging as well as internal preservation of meaning.

Another point that demands attention is that Peirce's theory of determination from the semiotic perspective successfully elaborates the very nature of 'interpretation.' As Gérard Deledalle claims, the process of 'interpretation' includes 'the sign's meaning,' which is precisely the interpretant, in Peirce's semiotics.12 In the interpretational process, being itself sign, the interpretant subsists in virtue of another interpretant. This is 'an open-ended chain of interpretants,' which is a process of *creativity* 'dependent upon the potential creativity of the interpretant.'13 This chain of interpretants is the interpretative process itself that stands for the determinative process of signs through mediation.

4. Two Determinative Processes: Semiotics and Epistemology

It should be noted that Peirce's semiotics represents one *kind* of determination, even though it involves two-way determinative processes,14 and that his theory of determination requires a comparison to his epistemology, which for him is another branch of determination. Peirce thus considered two processes of determination, one from object to interpretant, and the other from idea to mind.

In the first branch of determination, a successful occasion of semiosis proceeds from object to interpretant, as mentioned above. This is 'extensional thinking,' which I called 'objectification.' As shown in Figure 1 below, the extensional process proceeds from object to interpretant until it succeeds in its determination. This process of determination consists of an infinite chain of references, where each has its predecessor. For this reason, Peirce's semiotics is *spatial*. In other words, in this determinative process, references are reversible, and infinitely re-arrangeable, in the presentational space.15

Peirce's epistemology, on the other hand,

represents 'intensional thinking,' which I called 'subjectification' above. The intensional work of the mind is *temporal* and *real*. The epistemological process of determination is therefore temporal and irreversible. Unlike extensional processes, this process of determination cannot move backward against the temporal flow. A point that needs our attention is that, in the epistemological process of determination, abstraction is real. In other words, the process of moving from *idea* to *mind* is what we really experience. Our way of getting meaningful knowledge and growth can be explained through this temporal process. Thus we begin to see the distinction emerge between the semiotic process and the processes of mind. We may now introduce a distinction between sign processes and knowledge processes. We should, however, keep in mind that, though these processes are distinguishable, they are symbiotic and interpenetrating.

As Figure 1 shows, the semiotic process enables us to classify reference and extension according to an infinite chain of determinations, each proceeding from object to interpretant, meanwhile the effect of semiosis is experiential and accumulates meaningful relations through time. It is from the latter determinations that we build our knowledge. Still it is important to remember that problems may emerge in either or both processes, spoiling our efforts to make meaningful inferences and/or successful references. Peirce is concerned with the former meaningful inferences in his illustrations of science, whereas he is concerned more with the latter successful reference in his extensive work on science. The categories, of course, apply equally to both aspects of inquiry.

It is legitimate to question how the two determinative processes unfold. It is true that the two processes are different in their nature and the characteristics of each should be handled with caution in terms of 'time' and 'space.' In the case of semiotics, the entire process consists of an infinite chain of determination. The whole, however, can be defined by *any* lesser semiotic process that belongs to the whole. In other words, the whole is present wherever we are now and that is the point to which any included chain leads. At any place in the chain, therefore, every reference that has ever succeeded becomes a sign of the determination of the next interpretant, as well as the present interpretant which is successfully determined by the sign. In such cases, we assume that the sign was successfully determined by the object. Since we could go all the way back to any point in the chain, we could take a certain length of chain as a whole. This is how the 'spatial presentation' works. Because all that falls within the limits of length of chain is simultaneously available in the present moment, and because the present moment contains everything that happened before, we have the presentational space that can be defined as a whole. It is beneficial to quote Peirce's hypothesis about space here: 'space is that form of intuition in which is presented the law of the mutual reaction of those objects whose mode of existence consists in mutually reacting' (CP 6.82). Our agency in such a presentational space operates in terms of semiosis and, for that reason, these presentational spaces hold many occurrences of semiosis. In the presentational space, we can thus select our *own* semiosis, since each involves the successful interpretant determined by a sign. Any selected semiosis includes every operational piece we want to include, regardless of whether it is in the role of sign, or interpretant, or object. In Peirce's view, this operation is 'mutual determination' among signs, as Peirce summarizes this feature of space as its

Figure 1. The Processes of Semiotics and Epistemology

continuity and independency (CP 6.82). In the realm of semiosis, we have continuous space where every object in it independently reacts upon all the others.

In the case of epistemology (see the right side of Figure 1), the limit, from the perspective of knowledge, is the opinion to which ideally situated inquirers in the infinitely distant future are destined to agree. This is the epistemologically stipulated limit of the 'whole,' since the flow of time to the infinitely distant future is not reversible and the distant future contains the whole past within itself. The epistemological determination is thus attainable not in the present but in the infinite future. This feature of the epistemological process genuinely reflects the temporality of the process. For Peirce, at the beginning, all the promise of determination resides in one thought,[16] which is the formal way to define the metaphysical whole for the sake of finite knowledge, if that can be done. The universe unfolds itself from pure flux and, as the universe *is* unfolded, mind is created. The incarnation of mind is thus the beginning of total shift from the space of presentation, in which semiotic processes dominate inquiry, to the physicality in which ideas become mind.

5. Temporality and Determination
Now, Peirce's distinction between semiotic space and epistemological space should be clearer; the semiotic space has *infinite* limiting possibilities, conditioned by the act of selection in the present, while the epistemological space does not have any exclusive limit. It is not clear, however, that Peirce considers both of these processes wholly subject to, or wholly determined by temporality. One is apt to assume that time should be continuous because we cannot reverse the flow of time, and for that reason, the epistemological process is continually temporal.

There then arises a justifiable suspicion that, according to this line of thought, Peirce might have advocated an *idealistic* approach to time, something similar to Hegel's. The commencement of Hegelian idealism is 'The Idea' of the world, which is prior to reality. The world then is an 'abstract' idea at the beginning. The unfolding process of The Idea is a conceptualizing process, that is, the process of the *Begriff*, or 'the concept,' as it is usually translated. This process is wholly dependent on the work of the Absolute Idea, Spirit, according to which the abstract concept eventually becomes concrete, which Hegel calls 'historicization.' For Hegel, historicization is thus real time that is physically lived out. The whole point of Hegel's idealistic appropriation of time is that The Idea is the form of Spirit's possibility as it conceives the world abstractly and then the *Begriff* of the world, becomes concrete history.

Unlike Hegel, however, Peirce thinks that the idea is a *physical* thing. In Peirce's view, Hegel missed the point by thinking that Ideas were just the form of Spirit. Ideas would rather be the form of the 'physical sportings' of the world when they come into relation with one another; when such activity forms a relation, then these relations are less abstract things relative to the semiotic space. But still they are abstractions relative to what Peirce calls Mind. Thus, ideas are historical, not relational. It is therefore absurd, for Peirce, that anyone should suppose that ideas are unintelligible and that any attempt to discern them, including language, leads to illusion. Unlike Hegel, Peirce thinks the flux at the beginning is not an abstract idea but the 'disorganized feeling.' After the beginning, there arises a feeling's of the other feeling. It is notable that Peirce sees such 'feeling of feeling' as the minimum temporal unit that is required for intelligibility. In the moment when a feeling feels the other, nothing is intelligible until we have a moment that is permanently placed and utterly irreversible in the mutually felt relation between feelings. The chaotic feeling is in relation as soon as the mutual relation starts. The moment of each feeling of the other is the 'beginning' and *that* is a 'living idea.'[17] The minimum unit of time thus exists, for Peirce, as one gets the first instances of it. The feeling and felt relation is a mutual relation that does not allow reversibility, since each holds the other *responsible*. It is true that for Peirce, beyond this responsible mutual relation, there is nothing intelligible. It is a mutual response in the sense that the other feeling's the first is a responsible response to the second feeling feeling the other. In this way, mutual response is necessary for accountability and also temporality. The chaotic flux of feeling itself is not mutually accountable and thus not part of time. Whatever is mutually felt by another can be shared *as* mutually felt and endures. Any experience that does not rely on this mutuality eventually comes to nothing.

Interestingly enough, Peirce's idea of temporality above seems to lead to a two-fold conclusion. On the one hand, his idea of temporality is not idealistic in Hegel's sense, because the Idea, or more accurately, *ideas* are located squarely in the intelligible world even though they require mutuality. On the other hand, Peirce's view seems idealistic in the sense that something that is part of the flux and does not become the part of our intelligible world comes to nothing. For Peirce, the flux itself is not time, since time is solely constituted by enduring mutuality, i.e., responsibility. The second conclusion needs to be discussed.

The essence of idealistic conceptions of time is that temporality is the form that enables our experience of time, rather than the reality that we experience. Peirce's doctrines of the universe are not merely 'meta-physical;' they aim at 'metaphysical' foundations of our real experience. In the Peircean scheme, our experience in the universe is subject to the doctrines of the universe. A point worthy of attention regarding this issue is that Peirce presupposes an 'absolute First;' as he says, 'a truth

well worthy of rumination that all the intellectual development of man rests upon the circumstance that all our action is subject to error' (CP 6.86). This can be seen as another manifestation of tychism, the doctrine of absolute freedom. For Peirce, freedom is experienced as real in errors we actually make. In a similar way, we see that Peirce's idea of temporality is couched in terms of 'discontinuity' and 'dependency,' which are the essential features of time (CP 6.86). What we experience as temporality is then not continuity; the continuity itself cannot be experienced. Rather, our experience of time is possible somewhere around the discontinuity. The moment of discontinuity, which lies in the present, is thus the place where the past, which actually happened, is distinct from the future, which is construed as possible. The future for the present moment is thus 'an object of possible experience' (CP 6.96), which should be dealt with by future researchers. In this sense, Peirce sees time as a 'necessitation' dependent on law, as he says, 'time is the form under which logic presents itself to objective intuition' (CP 6.87). It is thus possible to suppose that for the purpose of harmonization of *meta-physics* and physical experience, Peirce introduced a component that seems to be an idealistic conception of time as a basis of our temporal experience.

6. Personality and Determination

Before turning to the topic of personality, two points should be mentioned. Firstly, Peirce never believed that the dualism between subject and object would give a relevant answer to the problem of personality. It is true that, as Vincent Colapietro observes, the personal self of a pure kind is an illusory phenomenon.[18] Peirce rightly knows that a pure kind of self is not possible, since self is a sign that is in the process of developing. For that reason, secondly, Peirce is against the Hegelian scheme of 'absolute personality' (CP 2.223)), according to which person as the idea has an orientation that is detached from the historicization. For Peirce, person and experience are never separate.

Peirce's notion of personality in 'The Law of Mind' is worthy of lengthy quotation:

> When we consider that, according to the principle which we are tracing out, a connection between ideas is itself a general idea, and that a general idea is a living feeling, it is plain that we have at least taken an appreciable step toward the understanding of personality. This personality, like any general idea, is not a thing to be apprehended in an instant. It has to be lived in time; nor can any finite time embrace it in all its fullness. Yet in each infinitesimal interval it is present and living, though specially colored by the immediate feelings of that moment. Personality, so far as it is apprehended in a

moment, is *immediate self-consciousness* (CP 6.155, my emphasis).

Personality, according to Peirce, 'has to be lived in time,' but it is not 'apprehended in an instant' since any finite time cannot 'embrace it in all its fullness.' Yet in each infinitesimal moment, personality is present and living as 'immediate self-consciousness.' What exactly is the 'immediate self-consciousness,' then?

One possible assumption is that the immediate self-consciousness is what Peirce mentions as 'coordination' or 'connection' of ideas (CP 6.155). It should be noted that personality, as coordination or connection of ideas, lives in time as well; it grows and is subject to change. For Peirce, the temporal process goes through the reaction of matter to mind and mind is crystalized in that process. Two kinds of mind thus emerge. Because ideas gain more generality, we have the crystalized Mind. The crystalized Mind is virtually what Peirce calls 'a general idea.' As time goes by, the connection between ideas becomes more generalized, because as ideas spread, they lose intensity but gain generality. In other words, in the temporal process, ideas gain the determinative power of generality.

But what we can call person or personality has to possess something *sui generis*. This is another kind of mind. The idiosyncratic person also emerges in the temporal flux by way of two processes of determination. Peirce would agree that there are quick alternations between semiotics and epistemology and thus the modes of determination are both intensional and extensional, in function. The semiotic determination is the process of extension in which the object that determines a sign transforms itself into an objective datum for the next interpretant. The very next interpretant becomes *subjectified* through the intensional process by which mind is shaped and grows. The problem of personal identity is thus a complex of temporal (internal) and spatial (external) processes.

Figure 2 (below) illustrates the point of contact in time between the processes of semiotics and the processes of the creation of mind. Note that the divergence of mind and interpretant is the result of distinguishing the two processes of determination from one another. It does not mean that mind and interpretant are fundamentally distinct, only that spatialization tends to spread the processes of mind across a limited playing of interpretation. If one folds the diagram in half, such that interpretant and mind touch at one point, one has a sense of the divergence involved. It is never the case that mind and interpretant are exactly the same, but they surely converge in the infinitely distant future.

It should not be neglected that the possibility of unique experience of individual mind can be identified with Peirce's line of thought regarding

Figure 2. Contact of the Processes in Time

of determination. If one insists on the determination of sign-object of persons, then one treats persons in an extremely restricted sense.

In Peirce's theory of determination, the presence of personal consciousness, among other things, is always the power of the source of the determinative process. Personality as immediate self-consciousness is the place where the actual functioning of determination happens. In a moment of immediate self-consciousness, personality is 'objectified' as 'sign' or 'interpretant' through the inference that enables us to realize the particular in the realm of becoming. Personality, at the same time, 'subjectifies' the most primitive real, which Peirce calls *idea*, into this *temporal* world. This process of subjectification enables the continuity of ideas, through which person as idea produces mind as idea. The work of personality is the essential operation of the mind that directs us back to the relationship between mind and idea, as revealed in the process of gaining knowledge, where, in the flux of time, personality enables inferences by anchoring us to the here-and-now context.

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three elements of idea. According to the second element of idea above, the process of personality in time involves the reaction of 'matter.' Against mind that is given as a First, we have a 'subjectified' reactional process that occurs in and near a specific matter, which is one's physical body. Physical conditions of human beings involve context, which results in experience *sui generis*. The uniqueness of the experience of persons is thus derived from the peculiarity of situations where the mind-body complex is located. This point is also justified from Peirce's sense of idea, since he uses idea not in the substantial sense, but in the sense of an event in an individual consciousness (CP 6.105). The personality is in a context which involves semiotic and epistemological processes, since self-consciousness is knowledge of ourselves (CP 5.225). Therefore, Hegel is denied again. The coordination of creativity, which includes epistemological determination, is necessarily separated from the absolute ego of pure apperception of Hegelian sense (CP 5.235).

The significant aspect of the individual consciousness is, then, that in the event of individual consciousness, persons bring the past and the future ideas together. It is notable that Peirce suggests a potential power that leads us to the infinite distant future ideas. The power is a 'teleological harmony in ideas,' which is developmental (CP 6.156). By this developmental teleology, in my estimation, Peirce means a 'personal character.' Because of the character, unlike uncoordinated feelings, personality can have a 'reference to the future' (CP 6.157). It is true that Peirce's person is never reducible to the semiotic system, because the person always overruns it. It is always on *and beyond* our objectifying process

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Notes

1. CP refers to six volumes of the *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1931-35) edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss and the seventh and eighth volumes of the *Collected Papers* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958) edited by Arthur W. Burks. The numbers indicate the appropriate volume and para-

graph number of the *Collected Papers*. This system will be followed in the following pages.

2.For Peirce, metaphysics is the study of 'the general features of reality and real objects' (CP 6.6), which, following his categorical scheme, Peirce divided into three universes, tychism, synechism, and agapism.

3.It is true that Peirce worked again on his conception of continuity, confessing his 'blundering treatment of Continuity' in 'The Law of Mind' (CP 6.174). The continuity redefined, however, is also dependent on mathematics and logic.

4.'W' refers to *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press published since 1982. The numbers indicate the appropriate volume and page number of the *Writings of Charles S. Peirce*. The use of the word proposition here calls to mind Whitehead's unusual definition of the proposition, as a lure for feeling. One might say something similar for Peirce's meaning in this famous essay.

5.Interestingly enough, in 'The Aims of Education' (1911), Whitehead used the term 'precision' in almost same sense as Peirce. The influence between Whitehead and Peirce is extremely difficult to find. My interpretation on that point is that both philosophers are minute self-solvers and find their own way in their own language. After 1911, references to Peirce disappeared from Whitehead's writing.

6.Gérard Deledalle, *Charles S. Peirce's Philosophy of Signs: Essays in Comparative Semiotics* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000), 6.

7.Werner S. Pluhar, trans., Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), 15-18.

8.Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 26-28.

9.See the Kant's articulation in *Critique of Judgment*, 435.

10.It is worthy to note that Peirce distinguishes *semiosis*, *semiotic* and *semiology* based on his division of aesthetics, ethics and logic. This distinction between feeling, action and logic thus allows three types of interpretant, that is emotional, energetic, and logical interpretants. I mention semiotics in a general sense, interchangeably with semiosis or semiology, without recourse to this distinction.

11.The words only stand for the objects they do, and signify the qualities they do, because they will determine, in the mind of the auditor, corresponding signs.' (CP 2.92); 'A *Symbol* is a Representamen whose Representative character consists precisely in its being a rule that will determine its Interpretant. All words, sentences, books, and other conventional signs are Symbols (CP 2.292).

12.Deledalle, *Peirce,* xiii.

13.Deledalle, *Peirce,* xiii.

14.In reality, the process of interpretation is possible only by work of two determinative processes, as I shall say below.

15.However, it should be stressed that the semiotic process from object to interpretant is determinately continuous. In other words, a clear-cut separation between object, sign and interpretant is impossible, because they are *processes*. The minimum successful unit of semiotics thus includes the seamless continuum of object, sign, and interpretant.

16.By 'thought,' I tried to mean an activity of idea that involves 'physical sportings,' without which idea cannot be intelligible, as we shall see below.

17.This is what I expressed with 'thought' in the above. I think this point reveals Peirce's similarity to process philosophy.

18.Vincent M. Colapietro, *Peirce's Approach to the Self: A Semiotic Perspective on Human Subjectivity* (Albany: State University of New York, 1989), 65.

EMOTION MAKES THE PERSON

Eleanor Wittrup

Abstract: As a lens through which to view Aristotle's virtue theory, Jaak Panksepp's model of basic emotional response systems illustrates how empirical work in neuroscience can deepen our analysis of human nature. Considered in a Pankseppian framework, Aristotle's conceptions of virtue, flourishing, and eudaimonia can be transformed into concrete operational descriptions of the natural world. By adopting flourishing as a practical end to be pursued, we can bridge the gap between descriptions of functioning and normative recommendations for improvement.

Key Words: Basic Emotions; Emotion; Flourishing; Moral Psychology; Naturalized Ethics; Person; Personhood; Psychology; Systems; Virtue; Virtue Theory.

1. Introduction

Philosophers historically build their conceptions of morality and personhood on their theories of human nature. Plato famously conceives of human beings as souls inhabiting inferior material bodies. The possession of such a soul renders one a person. The degree to which the rational soul regulates the spirited and appetitive parts of the soul that serve one's material needs renders one virtuous (Plato, 1974.) Plato's model is limited to understanding human beings and does not particularly concern itself with the continuities between humans and other animals. This is an intuitive way of making distinctions about the forces that drive human behaviour that help us make sense of why people act as they do, what is necessary for people to live productively together, and what makes some kinds of life preferable to others. Aristotle (1961) expands the three part soul into a finer grained five part soul – distinguishing the vegetative, locomotive and desiderative souls (in order to be able distinguish between different kinds of life) in the irrational part of the soul, and the calculative and the contemplative in the rational part (in order to distinguish between different kinds of thinking in animals and humans.) This is a slightly less intuitive way of making distinctions that help us understand human and non-human life and behaviour. Because we are the sort of animals that naturally organize ourselves into a polis, an interdependent economic organization of non-familial groups, we are persons who have interpersonal problems that other animals don't have. (Aristotle, 2009.) This model gives us some categories to use in understanding the differences between individual humans and between humans and other animals and living things. On these two views, possession of a (sufficiently) rational soul made one a person.

The conception of a "soul" in Plato's and Aristotle's senses is no longer one that sheds much light on human nature. Although their models are still useful and provocative, they are no longer adequate maps given how much more we know about the biology of human beings and other animals. The breadth and depth of knowledge about human organizations and social dynamics available to us is far beyond their wildest dreams. All of this new information changes the questions we ask, questions we *can* ask, our purposes for asking, and the criteria for finding an answer acceptable. For example, because we now know that humans have deep similarities to other animals biologically and behaviourally we can ask whether there are gradations of personhood; we can ask what physiological processes are essential to personhood, and what interventions might interrupt it? We now want a legal definition of persons that addresses issues of consent and autonomy. Because we live in diverse human communities, there is some urgency in asking; why do we sometimes not recognize other human beings as persons? Our answers will need to conform to criteria of scientific, moral, legal and practical judgement that were not in existence in 350 B.C.E.. New knowledge and investigation may lead to unanticipated criteria as well. Perhaps it made sense to ask what makes a creature a "person" without first explaining what one meant by "person" in ancient Greece, it certainly does not now. The Aristotelian impulse to ground our understanding of the person in a systematic account of human nature that corresponds to our experience of the world, however, remains.

In this paper I shall explain how Panksepp's model of basic emotional response systems (ERS) suggests new empirically grounded ways to understand Aristotle's conceptions of moral virtue and flourishing, and offers insight into some of our difficulties with the notion of a "person." If we look at Aristotle's theory through Panksepp's lense many things spring into focus. It is not my purpose to defend Panksepp's model or approach compared to others. Although his criteria for success, (Ellis, 2013) in identifying a "basic emotion" appeal to me given my affinity for Aristotle and my research interests in moral psychology and ethics, other research agendas generate and prioritize different criteria (Darwin, 1965; Ekman, 1999; Plutchik, 1991; Lazarus, 1984, Ortony & Turner, 1990, Izard, 1992; Koehlsch et.al, 2015.) Given the early state of the science of affective

neuroscience this is as it should be.

Panksepp wants to identify systems that simultaneously make sense in several explanatory contexts. An emotional response system must make evolutionary sense, in that it coordinates behavioural responses to the environment that help us survive. It must make phenomenological sense, that is it has an identifiable "feel" that is positively and negatively valanced. It must make functional sense in that it generates instinctive motor responses, modulates sensory input in response to specific kinds of stimuli and affect, and it must affect and be affected by higher cognition. It must also make neuro-anatomical and biochemical sense, demonstrating consistent patterns of activation, using consistent biochemistry. Finally, it must make sense of social-emotional development and be able to account for a variety of psychiatric dysfuctions. (Panksepp, 1982 and 1998; Ellis & Toronchek, 2013) This is an ambitious agenda, but even it does not cover all the possible aims of a theory.

There is currently no consensus on how to approach the study of affect or even neuroscience generally. There does, however, seem to be a consensus that has emerged that whatever we mean by "person" must at least include normal adult human beings. We adult humans are the prototype "persons." What about us specifically makes us "persons" is hotly debated. Aristotle and Plato had clear ideas about the nature of human persons and wanted that clarity for particular purposes. Although our purposes for wanting a theory of personhood have proliferated, it remains important to base any understanding of personhood on a correct model of human nature. We do not have definitive answers about human nature, indeed we are struggling with the right questions to ask and the right ways to ask them.

Whatever else we might think about personhood it would be good if our understanding of the prototype person at least got *us* right. That is, if we build our conceptual prototype off of a faulty model of what we are it seems likely that the resulting theory of personhood will have some systematic glitches, no matter what we want it for.

2. Basic emotional response systems
Human beings have at least seven, likely nine, and possibly more basic emotional response systems (ERSs.) Panksepp (1998) refers to each system (FEAR, ANGER etc.) in all caps to preserve the sense of the systems' function while clearly distinguishing the ERS from the other colloquial senses of the term. The ERS are the basic modules of response that are turned on and off by metabolic needs and environmental stimuli in order to produce particular types of behaviour to meet the animal's needs. Each ERS feels like something, and drives particular behavioural responses toward a specific end that satisfies the need. All animals must meet their metabolic needs to maintain homoeostasis and reproduce to survive. The more complex the animal, the more varied the behavioural repertoire that enables them to meet those needs in a particular environment is. Animals whose behavioural repertoire is large and flexible can survive in many different environments. Social animals need a repertoire that includes the ability to be attached to and coordinate their actions with others.

The most basic need is to find the resources in the environment needed to maintain our metabolic processes (food, water, shelter, companions.) The ERS system that explores the environment when we need something to maintain homoeostasis is called SEEKING. Interest or curiosity is the basic feeling. Environments, however, are not safe.

We are thus equipped with two other distinct systems FEAR and RAGE. FEAR clenches your guts, makes your hair stand on end, and focuses attention on the locus of the threat, filtering out the rest of the environment. It is activated by clear and present danger – or the indicators that there is one close. FEAR has two modes of behaviour, flight and freeze.

RAGE feels like anger and fights off attackers. RAGE turns off pain and floods the system with adrenaline to enable super strong physical responses. LUST drives reproductive behaviour. It feels like lust. In conjunction with SEEKING it finds a mate, and then drives courtship and mating behaviour. Two lower level proto-ERSs are shorter lived and less complex than these first four. DISGUST repels us from contaminants in our environment or expels them from us. It drives vomiting and avoidance. Nausea is the feeling. STARTLE resets our systems to respond to a sudden unknown change. Typically we jump and look around. "Startled" is the feeling.

In social animals three other systems exist. CARE responds to the needs of another by providing for or protecting them. Grooming, nursing/feeding, protecting are the behaviours of this system. Nurturing love is the basic emotion. PLAY rehearses important complex behaviour and creates emotional bonds between individuals. Rough and tumble play, laughter, tickling, pretend stalking are all varieties of PLAY behaviour. Fun and joy are the basic emotions. PANIC responds to the need to be protected by being attached to others and in a safe place. It has a positive and negative valence. Anxiety is the basic negative feeling, and euphoria is the positive feeling. The behaviours of this system are crying, scanning the environment, hiding, backing up in the negative mode, and cuddling and affection in the positive mode.

In the systems that feel unpleasant the primary impulse is to get them to turn off – RAGE, FEAR, PANIC, and DISGUST all have negative valence. STARTLE is by nature extremely short lived. SEEKING, CARE, PLAY, and LUST all have primarily positive valence. LUST is by nature

temporary and situational. SEEKING, CARE and PLAY are all systems that we prefer to stay on until we need to rest. PANIC is unique in that it is bi-valent, when PANIC is satisfied – when we feel firmly attached to a caretaker or community – there is a kind of peaceful euphoria that occurs. Pleasure and pain in the vernacular are abstract categories. Pains include the feelings of negatively valenced ERSs and more basic physiological signals like hunger, fatigue, cold etc. As a general rule pain motivates us to act to relieve the pain. Pleasures are what we feel when our needs are being satisfied or our positive valenced ERSs are active. Pleasure motivates us to repeat an action or experience in the future.

These ERS's are the building blocks out of which our complex emotions and behaviours are built. As such, they give us a way to organize our understanding and frame our questions in ways that enable systematic investigation. If we look at Aristotle's theory of human nature these are the obvious candidates to be the dispositions that distinguish one virtue from another. A virtue would be the "moderate disposition" (the optimal responsive capacity) (Aristotle, 2009) of a given ERS. If an ERS habitually responds to stimuli at too high a level of activation, or too low an activation its disposition is excessive or deficient, and thus constitutes a vice.

3. Training and integrating emotional response systems, and the unity of the virtues

Each ERS has an ambient level of activation, higher in some people, lower in others. The profile of the ambient activation levels (baseline mood) is what it feels like to be you – it is your temperament. When we are born the systems operate more or less independently of each other –when one is "on-line" and driving behaviour, the others are "off-line." As a baby's brain gets trained, the systems learn how to respond to their environment both by direct experience and conditioning and by mirroring the responses of those around them. In these ways the ERSs get trained to respond to the content of the environment. At the same time each ERS is getting calibrated to react in the right amount – the system is learning to moderate its responses so as to get its needs met with the least amount of energy expended. In this way, an Aristotelian could say, we habituate the moral virtues. (Aristotle, 2009.)

Despite the universal assumption that babies are born with unified consciousness, a growing body of evidence suggests that each ERS initially has its own consciousness that gradually develops neural interconnections with others to fuse into a single unified consciousness. This is crucial to the development of what we think of as a stable personality for two reasons. First, memory is state dependent. When we lay down memories we are able to access them only if the ERS that stored them is activated. The consequence of this is that when we

are, say, afraid (FEAR is the ERS that is fully "online") we only have access to memories of other times when we were afraid. This is why, for example test anxiety is such a problem. When PANIC or FEAR is fully in control we only have access to memories laid down in similar states – if we were not in PANIC or FEAR when we studied, then all those memories are inaccessible. This is also why boring anger management classes don't work. You don't learn new behaviours or cognitive habits while in RAGE, so you don't have access to them when you are. We gain access to more than one ERS system's memory at a time as the systems calibrate and interconnect.

If we are fortunate and our early childhood environments are safe and secure, and we have emotionally attuned and attentive caretakers to mirror, our ERSs can become "calibrated," learning to respond at optimal levels of activation. If activation levels are low enough, more than one can be activated at a time and interconnections can develop – giving us access to all the memories in every ERS that is "on" at the same time. Eventually, the formerly separate consciousnesses of the ERSs merge into a unified consciousness (Van der Hart, Nijenhuis & Steele, 2006). Thus development of virtuous ERS's is foundational to development of a wide knowledge base on which to build intellectual virtue – the capacity to figure out and understand the world around us. Unless we have integrated the ERS's we will only have access to some of our memories at a time.

If we are unfortunate the ERSs do not calibrate properly and integrate, and our behaviours remain rigid and often inappropriate. In cases of severe abuse and/or neglect (emotional and/or physical) the person experiences dissociation along a spectrum from feeling somewhat detached from some of their memories, to having no shared memories or consciousness between ERSs, as occurs in dissociational identity disorder. (In PTSD, a "bit" of a person with an integrated personality can split off as a consequence of a traumatic experience) (Reinders, Nijenhuis, Pans, Korf, Willemsen & den Boer, 2003).

This developmental account is very like Aristotle's account of the development of the moral virtues. The prototype moral virtue that Aristotle describes is courage. Courage is a "disposition lying in the mean" that creates the capacity to "do the right thing, at the right time, in the right way, for the right reason." A courageous person feels the right amount of fear for the circumstances and is motivated (not incapacitated) to do the right thing. Knowing what the right thing is to do depends on having enough knowledge and understanding to make good decisions that promote the flourishing of individuals and the community as a whole. It is easy to see how this Aristotelian virtue maps onto Panksepps FEAR system. The excess of FEAR, its habitual over-

activation is still called cowardice. It is a vice because one is disposed to over-react to environmental threats by freezing or fleeing when this is not necessary or desirable. The deficiency of FEAR, its habitual under-activation, is called foolhardiness. In this case, a person is insensitive to threats and does dangerous things that have no counterbalancing reward. No one is born courageous. In favourable circumstances a child can be trained to be courageous by exposing him to common fearful stimuli without harmful consequences – thus calibrating his FEAR ERS to the environment at the same time he is being taught to understand the world to enable him to construct responses tailored to the specific situation he finds himself in. Obviously Aristotle didn't have any knowledge of neurobiology, but Panksepp's ERS' work in exactly this way.

Courage and good temper are the two virtues in Aristotle's catalogue that directly map on to basic emotions – FEAR in the former case, RAGE in the latter. The rest of Aristotle's virtues are, somewhat confusing to contemporary readers, organized around kinds of activities (speaking with others, presenting ourselves to others, dealing with pleasure/pain, getting and receiving things, gaining honours.) If we think of the moral virtues as being ERS dispositions instead, and understand "lying in the mean" to denote calibration of the response system to the environment and the capacity to feel the full range of the emotion, from its minimal to maximal activation we have a new set of 7 virtues that have the advantage of all being of the same natural kind (see Table 1 below). It is a little difficult at first to think about the excess and deficiency of these dispositions in part because each can apply in many contexts, and a lot of our virtue language has followed Aristotle in defining a virtue relative to a domain of action. The vices of excess and deficiency for the SEEKING and PLAY systems are perhaps the most unfamiliar and thus the hardest to name.

This re-framing of the virtues as basic emotions can shed light on the doctrine of the unity of the virtues. The more integrated and finely calibrated the ERS the more fluid will be transitions between them, and the more complexity will arise in one's emotional experience. Clearly virtuous expression of the emotions requires both sufficient knowledge of the world and calibration of the ERS. Other things being equal a broader knowledge base is better than a less, and increased integration of the ERS's, among other things, ensures access to the broadest range of experiences in a person's history. Furthermore, because some ERS's inherently inhibit or excite others it is important to the exercise of one ERS that the others be appropriately calibrated as well. You can't fully have one virtue unless you have them all.

Aristotle famously said that a man that didn't need other people is either a beast or a god. (Aristotle, 1996.) Presumably beasts are not persons, whether gods are is another question. In any case, human beings cannot develop, or even survive without relationships with other people. The ERS's embody these social drives, CARE, PANIC and PLAY all connect us with other people by making our individual good integral to theirs. Whatever we may ultimately become capable of, we cannot develop our virtues nor can we meet our basic emotional needs as adults in isolation from other people. Aristotle asserts this, and Panksepp shows us some of the deep reasons why it is true. We just are the sort of animals who need to connect to others, and not just as children.

4. What does it take to be a person?

In virtue of what attributes or characteristics are we persons? We have seen that Panksepp's basic emotions fit elegantly into Aristotle's overall schema of virtues and vices. Once we know how to "cut nature at its joints" we can systematically examine which of the component parts are necessary and/or sufficient for inclusion as a person. Different ERS's

ERS	Excess	Mean	Deficiency
FEAR	cowardice	courage	foolhardiness
RAGE	bad temper/touchy	good temper	passive/victim
SEEKING	obsession/mania	curiosity/interest	depression/disinterest
LUST	sexual compulsion	healthy sexuality	asexual
CARE	overprotective/ controlling	nurturing/caring/generous	neglect/antisocial/stingy/indifferent
PANIC	anxiety/ blind loyalty	secure/attached/ loyal	asocial/disloyal
PLAY	frivolous/light-minded	fun/playful	stodgy/humourless

Table 1

might have different statuses in this regard. We might not be inclined to doubt the personhood of an individual who simply lacked LUST or FEAR. Such a person would be odd, to be sure, but it is hard to imagine that possession of either of these sets of dispositions is necessary or sufficient for personhood. More troubling would be the lack of CARE or PANIC and the consequent inability to be motivated to act in the interest of another, or regard connection with another to be essential to one's own security. Perhaps the inability to relate in these ways to others disqualifies one from being a person. I am not taking a position on whether or not the possession of ERS's (or some subset of them) is necessary for personhood. My aim is merely to point out that once we can identify these elements that such positions become possible.

Another dimension that might matter to an account of personhood is the possibility that if certain ERS's are essential to personhood, for the sake of argument let us say PANIC, CARE, and PLAY - that other non-human animals would qualify as persons if they were shown to have these ERS's. Dogs, on such a view, would qualify as persons as they can become attached to us, and we to them, they can care for us (albeit in a limited way) and us for them, and we play with each other. This then raises a further consideration of how sophisticated the expression of these emotions must be, and whether certain cognitive capacities (which Damasio (2000) argues are built on top of emotional capacities) are necessary as well. Is it the disposition or the level of virtue that is decisive of personhood? Or is it something else entirely?

Finally, I have suggested that only (normal) adult human beings are uncontroversially prototype persons, and this immediately raises a problem about when personhood starts and where it ends. These are the familiar questions about beginning and end of life. A model like Panksepp's offers the opportunity for a more fine grained description of human development and dissolution that might reveal a meaningful transition that would delineate the beginning and end of personhood. Again, my point is not to take a position on what such a transition might be, merely to point out that a more robust understanding of what human beings are actually like, and how they work offers at least ethical naturalists fertile ground for substantive reflection.

5. Flourishing defined

Leaving aside issues of inclusion and exclusion from the category of personhood, viewing Aristotle's notion of "flourishing" through the lens of Panksepp's model offers a way to make the ideal of "flourishing" concrete and measurable. Defining moral virtue as the moderate disposition of an ERS makes it obvious how a high degree of overall virtue creates eudaimonia. The more adept we are at responding to our environment, the more likely we are to be able to maximize our well being. How might this work?

In general, more integration and finer calibration of the ERS's is better than less integration and cruder calibration. The ERSs at high levels of activation tend to display very rigid and stereotypic behaviour. More abstract or imaginative cognition is difficult or impossible at high levels of activation of an ERS. In theory, the ideal state would be fine calibration of the ERSs relative to the widest range of circumstances possible, thus maximizing the likelihood of an effective response. This maximizes the possibility of the person flourishing relative to their own actions (Scherer, 2004). Human beings are motivated to maximize their physical and emotional well-being.

Flourishing for individual human beings on this model can thus be defined as:

1) Optimally meeting metabolic needs in a given environment (nutrition, sleep, exercise, shelter)
2) Promoting integration of all the emotional activation systems as a single consciousness with access to the memories of each activation system.
3) Minimizing the (negative) activation of FEAR, RAGE, PANIC, and DISGUST to the extent compatible with sustainable function.
4) Maximizing the (positive) activation of SEEKING, PANIC, PLAY, and CARE to the extent compatible with sustainable function
5) Satisfying LUST to the extent compatible with sustainable function and social cohesion.

Panksepp's model implies that this is just what human well-being IS. There is no question of why it is this. For creatures like us, this is what it means to be well.

Aristotle famously claimed that the virtuous life was eudaimon, literally "good spirited." (Aristotle, 1961) Virtue is distinct from flourishing, because one can cultivate virtue and yet find oneself in difficult circumstances that preclude true flourishing. Still, even in difficult circumstances the virtuous person is better off than less virtuous people because a virtuous person will be more able to adapt and thus make the best of and get a certain satisfaction out of even very bad situations. Thus good circumstances are a necessary, but not sufficient condition for flourishing. For a person to flourish, even in an optimal environment, the person must develop virtue.

We are social animals necessarily dependent on others for long stretches of our lives, and interdependent for much of the remainder. Our attachment to and concern for others grow out of CARE, PANIC, PLAY and LUST. Part of what it means to say that we human beings are naturally social animals is that we are "hard-wired" such that the well-being of others becomes integral to our own, and our relationships to others forms our sense of self and what is required for our own well-being.

Human social groups of all sizes – family, community, culture, state – can usefully be thought of as macro-organisms. Individual human beings cannot realistically flourish if they are not members of a flourishing macro-organism. Flourishing for a macro-organism of human beings means: Maximizing the flourishing of individuals while creating the conditions for long term sustainability of the macro-organism itself.

Persons can conceptualize and pursue goals like flourishing by acting intentionally to alter the future and the environment precisely because we can imagine possible futures and evaluate strategies of how to get there. We can pursue flourishing (and any number of any other goals) because we can imagine and reason. The details of how imagination and abstract thought are built on top of this motivational and behavioural system are unclear. What is clear is that SEEKING and PLAY are essential to learning. FEAR and RAGE more or less shut down higher cognition, and turn off or at least seriously inhibit the action of other ERSs. No one learns much or thinks effectively when they are really afraid or angry. These apparently simple facts have clear implications for which kinds of social norms are going to work better, and which will work worse, to promote flourishing. Systems that evoke FEAR and RAGE responses more will be worse than ones that minimize their activation. Systems that support high levels of SEEKING and PLAY will be preferable to ones that discourage them. In this way we can translate a descriptive account into a normative evaluative framework. If we judge a society as better the more it promotes human flourishing, then we should cultivate institutions and practices that improve performance on the criteria that constitute flourishing.

6. Persons as nested systems: insight into difficulties with notion of person….

In the western philosophical tradition we mainly regard persons as individual human beings. But if human beings are not self sufficient, if indeed they are potentially not even a unified consciousness within a single organism, this is an oversimplification. We do not habitually look at the world and each other in terms of systems (Bertalanffy, 1973). On a Pankseppian view, the prototype person, a fully functional adult human being, is a complex biological system (made up of various interdependent subsystems) whose personality and agency are made up of a complex system of emotional response systems (which are functional ways of organizing the operations of the underlying physical systems). So at one level the system we are interested in can be defined by the boundary of their skin. But this system is necessarily integrated in social systems, and those into natural systems.

In order to talk concretely about the flourishing of the individual person-organism we have to in some way specify the environmental condition(s) that that individual is a part of. This is something we do not habitually do. Because of this, discussions of personhood often "go off the rails" because the surroundings of the system are not identified. In addition, when the constituent parts of the system (the subsystems) and their structure are poorly understood it is easy to make mistakes. Finally, because human beings are necessarily part of several larger macro-organisms (also complex systems) and we are not careful about saying which one of those we are talking about and identifying that system's boundaries and surroundings it is easy to get confused and talk and even think at cross-purposes.

I would like to suggest that prototypical moral personhood is usefully (though not exclusively) understood as a subsystem of a human macro-organism. This is another way of expressing Aristotle's assertion that human beings are social animals, and that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. (Aristotle, 1966) Prototypical persons are free agents; they can act autonomously on their own models of reality in order to pursue their own imagined ends. Specifically, they can shape their actions in the present to bring about a desired future. They are "response-able." This model of human beings and this definition of freedom implies that human freedom in practice admits of degrees. Some people, by virtue of the circumstances, resources, degree of ERS integration, range of experience, and the content of their imaginations are freer than others. To have more freedom is simply to have more live options to choose from, and to increase the opportunity for human flourishing.

The more concrete our thinking about an individual person is, the more we must take account of the macro-organism(s) that person is a constituent of. If the macro-organism is not flourishing then the individuals within it will be limited and diminished as well. If the macro-organism is not sustainable in its surroundings, the welfare of the constituent persons is threatened. Thus, again we see in concrete terms the interconnection between individual and societal flourishing that Aristotle tries to work out in his Ethics and Politics.

7. The concept of personhood revisited

What elements and structures of the proto-type human person are necessary for the concept of "person" to be applied to other animals, to artificial intelligences, to macro-organisms of human beings? What elements of the systems' surroundings must we hold constant to start to investigate and answer the question in a coherent way? What parameters define the beginning and end of personhood? How do we treat those systems who were once full persons but have lost some essential function (once we know what those are)?

I hope that beginning with a more robust model of human being will move the project of understanding personhood forward by making our concepts more closely tied to an accurate description of the world and pointing us toward less controversial outcomes to aim at. Looking at Aristotle's virtue theory through the lens of Panksepp's model of ERS's can illustrate how new knowledge about psychology and neuroscience might deepen and inform our discussions of personhood. 1) A useful theory of personhood must be compatible with the actual structure of human nature. It must not be based on a mistake about the physiological and psychological systems that make up proto-typical persons. 2) Since all complex dynamic systems are teleological by nature and they aim at particular ends (minimally: survival, reproduction, flourishing.) 3) Since individual human beings are not "stand alone" systems over time, a theory that aims at promoting their individual flourishing must be a multi-level theory. A theory of the individual person will not stand alone, it (like the person it models) must be situated in the context of theories about the subsystems that make up the person, and the super-systems the person is a part of.

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PERSONS, THEOLOGY, AND COSMOLOGY

Gilbert Fulmer

Abstract: Traditional theism holds that God created all of Nature. I argue that the concept of a supernatural agent is logically incoherent; any being with an effective will must be natural. Therefore only natural evidence and knowledge are relevant to his existence. Natural evidence shows that there can be no unevolved being, no bodiless mind, no infinitely powerful being, no eternal being. Therefore, neither a supernatural nor a natural God can exist.

Key Words: Animism, Atheism, God, Naturalism, Supernaturalism

1. Introduction

A central question of traditional theology and cosmology is whether the Universe was created, and is sustained, by a single infinitely powerful, wise and good personal entity. This is the doctrine known as monotheism: belief in a superlative, supernatural, creating person. I argue that this cannot be the case.

This paper has two parts: the first tries to show by a purely logical argument that the concept of a supernatural person is logically incoherent. Therefore any existing being must be natural, describable only by natural knowledge. The second part tries to show that such natural knowledge counts decisively against the existence of the God of theism. So there is conclusive empirical reason to reject the existence of God.

This personal concept of God is commonly held in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Moreover, it is the concept held by a very large number of members of today's American culture, many with great political power. So a defensible contemporary world-view requires an understanding of the nature of persons.

To begin, science and everyday life provide two logically distinct forms of explanation, so familiar that the difference may go unnoticed. One form of explanation is naturalistic, referring to natural regularities in the Universe. These regularities may be explicit, as in the laws of physics, e.g., $f = ma$ – a mathematical description of the regular behaviour of objects with mass. Or the appeal may be implicit: the car won't start because the headlights were left on, depleting the battery. Either way, no conscious purpose of any agent is invoked.

The other form of explanation is what I will call "animistic." My use of the word "animistic" is rather different from a more familiar sense, in which "animistic" is often applied to the "primitive" religions of Africa or New Guinea. In this other sense, "animistic" may be condescending, even derogatory. ("Those backward types, with their silly religions, attribute personality to rocks, and trees, and mountains and streams! What nonsense!" You can hear the sneer.)

My use of the word derives directly from the Latin word, "*anima*," meaning "*mind*," so any explanation in terms of the mind or purpose of a person is "animistic." If we say she went to the office to work, or the dog whined to be let out, those explanations are animistic, as is the biblical doctrine that "God created the heavens and the earth." In this sense, Western religions are just as "animistic" as the so-called primitive ones: they say that the natural order was created deliberately, by a conscious personal Creator, God.

The monotheistic religions hold that the ultimate explanation of nature is the will, or command, of a *person, God*. By definition, then, the ultimate explanation of the Universe is *animistic*. According to this widely held theological view, a divine personal being created the Universe *ex nihilo*, (out of nothing). From no pre-existing material, he created all the matter and energy in the Universe. And he also created all the natural laws that govern their behaviour Moreover, having created the natural order, he continues to sustain it in existence; if he should cease to do so, the Universe would cease to exist also. God has done this, and continues to, as an act of his will, his choice.

This God is conceived as a *supernatural* person: he created nature *in its entirety*, including *all* the natural regularities of the Universe. He can act, and know, and be morally evaluated.[1]

The explanatory role of this personal concept of God can be seen (on a *very* sympathetic interpretation) in the Bible. Early thinkers often saw theism as a kind of primitive science: they looked to religion for general laws to account for all observed events. The famous passage says, "The fool hath said in his heart, 'There is no God.'"[2] The psalmist is contrasting the fool, who sees no general explanations, with himself, who wants a wider explanatory context. Wisdom consists in seeking and finding a coherent explanation for *all* the facts around us. The fool looks at the world piecemeal, seeing only separate, unconnected events; the wiser psalmist sees the Universe in its entirety: it is all the product of God's intentional creation. That is why the former is a fool, and the latter is wise.

This picture of God is clearly personal. God is thought to act in creating the Universe. He speaks, thinks, and has emotions such as love, anger, jealousy, pride. This conception of God is most assuredly personal; it is not an impersonal force, or principle; not an abstraction, some sort of Absolute, or Ground of Being. Contemporary liberal theologians may endorse such impersonal ideas of God; but the personal model is widely held, and widely influential.

Discoveries over the centuries have shown that many of the factual generalizations arrived at by

those early "scientists" were incorrect. The earth is not stationary in the firmament, for example, and the sun does not revolve around it. But their explanatory insight was sound: explanations always appeal to an *explanans*, a general principle, of which the *explanandum* is a specific example. Under then-existing intellectual conditions, animistic principles were the most general ones available. So attributing the entirety of the Universe to the work of a monotheistic being was not, in that context, absurd.

But such an animistic world view is not logically or factually tenable. Such a nakedly anthropomorphic conception of God is often today considered naïve; but the fundamentally personal concept is commonly retained: the Universe is to be explained by, and dependent on, the deliberate acts of a personal being.

My thesis here is that this conception is logically incoherent. No conscious, purposive creating being could exist who is not describable by, and therefore subject to, natural laws; thus it is not logically possible that a *person* brought the natural order into existence in its entirety. This is because the concept of an acting, purposive being logically presupposes the concept of a natural regularity. If a being wills something to happen, *and it happens*, then that is a natural fact; it is the way the Universe is. If it is true that, when this being wills *X* to occur, then *X* does occur, then this is a fact of the Universe. The Universe is *this* way, rather than *that* way. Any effective will whatever thus implies a natural fact about the way the Universe works. So the very fact that a being could make anything happen – anything at all – would be a regularity, a law, in the present sense.[3] (This is equally true if the acting person is less than infinitely powerful: if you or I try to lift a railroad car, we cannot. But this is a fact of nature, too.)

It follows that any creating being that *could* exist must be a part, and a product, of nature. No possible being could have created *all* the facts of the Universe; at a minimum, there must be at least *one* fact that just is the way it is, and is not the result of any conscious being's act. At a minimum, it must be a fact of the way the Universe is that events follow the will or commands of that supposed person – i.e., that his will has its intended effect. Therefore, any possible creator would not be supernatural, but would be dependent on at least one of the natural laws that describe the behaviour of nature. He would be as natural as we are.

The second main point of this paper follows directly from the first. Only *natural* evidence is relevant to the properties, or to the very existence, of any such being. That is, we can employ only the natural, experiential, knowledge we have of the Universe and its ways to decide anything *about* the Universe – including whether any conscious being might have brought the Universe into existence in the first place.

This point about natural experiential evidence deserves emphasis. We philosophers have an inordinate love of the logically necessary. We forever want logical *proofs,* resembling theorems of geometry. But in our enthusiasm for this most satisfying sort of knowledge, we may forget that we rarely have it. Nearly all of science, and nearly all of everyday life, are conducted on the basis of "merely" inductive reasoning. Although we may disdain this knowledge as "only probable," it is all we have to use, and we have and should have no hesitation in using it, to decide even the most momentous matters. What foods are nutritious, whom to marry, what field of study to pursue, and even the composition of distant stars – all are the province of such "merely" inductive knowledge. And this is the only kind of knowledge we have or can have of cosmogony. The present arguments show that it is likewise the only kind of knowledge we can have of theology. Our knowledge is none the lesser for that.

But we must now consider, in the second part of the paper, the possibility that there might be a "naturalistic" god, a creator who *is* a part of nature. And I suspect that many who reject literal supernaturalism have something like this in mind. They do not believe in the "anthropomorphic" deity of some form of theism. Yet they cannot quite divest themselves of the animistic, personalistic picture of a creator. So, then, what sort of deity could there be?

All empirically known life forms result from evolution, and therefore develop gradually. Evolution, in the sense that is relevant here, means increased replication of more successful replicators; and such processes are always gradual. No natural cause could have brought living organisms into existence instantaneously. And processes that are logically equivalent to evolution are the only known gradual possibility.

But the traditional concept of God is totally inconsistent with gradual evolution. Evolution produces changes in populations, never in individuals. Any supposedly evolutionary account of life that is couched in terms of changes to individuals has missed the point at the dock. So any evolved being must be, or have been, a member of a population. This would mean that any possible creator must belong, or at some previous time did belong, to a population. But there is no evidence whatever that any such population of Gods ever existed. It is hard to imagine what evidence of previous Gods there could be; but something of that sort would be the only possible evidence for an evolving God. There is ample evidence of evolved human *conceptions* of God. But no evidence whatever is known of the existence of populations of actually existing Gods – much less of the gradually changing sequence required for evolution to have occurred. More to the point, this picture is completely inconsistent with the theistic view that there is only one, unique, God. Moreover, God is thought to have existed eternally, and to exist eternally in the future. But all known natural life forms come into existence at some time, and then die. Evolution requires that older forms must die and be replaced by newer.

However, the very thought of God's coming into existence, or of dying, or of there being previous members of the same population, is literally heretical. Again, the theological picture of a personal divinity is wholly at odds with that of nature.

Again, on many theological views, God is believed to exist necessarily. The concept of necessary existence is philosophically controversial; but it is doubtful that it can even be meaningfully stated in empirical terms. At any rate, the burden of proof would be on the theist to show that a natural, empirical, concept of necessary existence could be defined, and could be shown to apply to God. The prospects for success look dim.

Traditional theistic doctrine also holds that God is simple. The ontology on this point is notoriously contentious. But we might note that no evolved organism could be simple in any empirical way. Known organisms are physically complex: even single cells have many parts; and multi-celled ones like ourselves consist of a staggering number of distinct and differing cells of countless types and functions.

Conceptually, evolved organisms must necessarily be complex. The offspring of any mating must closely resemble the parents – but not exactly: for evolution to take place there must be small points of dissimilarity, which are the ground where natural selection gets traction. Any natural organism, then, could not be simple in any empirical sense.

Most modern theism holds that God is bodiless. But evolutionary evidence indicates that personal qualities must always emerge from organization of matter, especially nervous systems. So a bodiless person is empirically impossible. Any possible conscious person would be embodied. This reasoning also disposes of any abstract concept of personality that pervades the Universe, without physical embodiment. Nor could there be empirical evidence that a "ground of being" could be a conscious person.

Moreover, no corporeal person could be omnipresent – present in all times and all places. Any material object must be present where the matter that constitutes it is present, and absent where that matter is absent. So another usual condition of the theologically traditional God could not be met.

God is thought to be *infinitely* powerful and wise. But infinite characteristics, including power and wisdom, cannot evolve. This is because increasing any natural quality always has an increased natural cost. A speedier gazelle needs stronger muscles, which are heavier, consuming more energy. And a faster animal needs longer and lighter legs, which require more resources to grow, and are more fragile, and so on.

A smarter ape needs a bigger brain, which again needs more energy – the nervous system is a ravenous consumer of resources. Moreover, a larger brain requires a larger head, making childbirth more difficult and dangerous. And the larger head requires (especially in humans) birth earlier in fetal development. This entails still further costs and risks, as the less-developed newborn is less able to fend for itself, having fewer and underdeveloped muscles and cognitive capabilities. Any increase in capabilities is always self-limiting: its costs increase until they are over-balanced by diminished gain.

And obviously, these limitations inevitably interact. Greater intelligence requires greater brain size; but this puts greater strain on the capacities of the muscles to move the body. Any increased capacity that requires more energy – and all do – requires more food. This, in turn, requires more time spent seeking food, hunting, grazing, etc.. And the increased food intake requires additional capacity to digest, etc.

The considerations that apply to infinite power apply equally to infinite wisdom. Knowledge depends on nerve function, as does acquisition of that knowledge. And whatever any organism knows is stored, somehow; the process is incompletely understood; but the overall principle is beyond doubt. Of course, any nervous system is limited in size; greater knowledge of one subject entails less room for knowledge in another.

Consequently, any natural species of organism must strike balances in countless trade-offs. Each species achieves such an "evolutionary niche," a combination of survival traits, every one of which requires scarce resources. (This is, in fact, the "origin of species.") But no level of any trait can ever reach infinity. What evolves are capabilities that are "good enough" for continuation of the species. So evolution will never produce any organism that is infinitely powerful. Or infinitely wise. Or infinitely anything. And thus there cannot be a naturally evolved organism that is infinite in any respect. Thus it is impossible that God could come into existence by evolution. *So n*o natural being with infinite powers could exist. And so no such being could have created the whole of nature.

The conclusion seems clear. The first set of arguments show that there can be no supernatural person, for that concept is logically incoherent. And the second set shows that experience makes it vanishingly unlikely that there is a natural creator. So there is no person who created nature.

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Notes

1. Kenneth R. Miller, in his generally excellent *Finding Darwin's God* (New York: Harper, 1999) Ch. 8-9 endorses such an unabashedly personalistic God as the creator of the Universe.

2. *Psalms*, 14.1.

3. I originally presented this thesis in my article, "The Concept of the Supernatural," Analysis v. 37 (1977); repr. *The Impossibility of God*, eds. Martin Michael and Ricki Monnier, (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2003). David Ramsay Steele has given a clear and accessible explanation of it in his *Atheism Explained* (Chicago: Open Court, 2008), 228-9.

THE EMERGENCE OF PERSONHOOD AND
ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE EXPERIENCE OF THE SUBLIME

Leslie Murray

Abstract: Through an experience of the sublime, one can argue that personhood comes into its own or achieves its own realization. Individual persons often realize their potential as a result of a sublime experience. Unique sublime occasions are physically important because of their mathematical size or dynamical power, but the true importance of the sublime moment is of an internal and personal uniqueness. The sublime experience is a constructive force in the development of our personhood.

Key Words: aesthetic, dynamical, feeling, imagination, judgement, mathematical, personhood, reflection, sublime

1. Introduction

Through an experience of the sublime, one can argue that personhood comes into its own, achieves its own realisation. Individual persons often realise their potential and the fruition of which they are capable as a result of a sublime experience. The experience of the sublime is one, the manifestation of which, is truly subjective (and perhaps more than that) and exists in relation to an intimate experience of the person with the external object or phenomena, which is the focus of that sublime experience. Kant says, 'True sublimity must be sought only in the mind of the judging person, not in the natural object.'[1] Our personhood discloses the complexities of individual realities that are illuminated in the sublime as a transformative renaissance for one person at a given time which cannot emerge identically for differing persons, but varies from one individual to another. Unique sublime occasions are *physically* important because of their mathematical size or dynamical power, but the true importance of the sublime moment is of an internal and personal character. The inner regress experienced in the *temporal* sense is a violent displeasure in our experience; this displeasure alternates with the pleasure of the feeling of judging, but this conflict renders our aesthetic power of judgement non-purposive and purposive in turns. This limitation in our cognitive powers reveals a truly open and enriching ability within each person that can become even more pleasurable than the immediate displeasure felt in the inner regression. The sublime experience is, therefore, a constructive force in the *development* of our personhood that is the result of exercising our power of judging over time.

In *The Critique of Pure Reason* Kant states, 'Time is a necessary presentation that underlies all intuitions.'[2] Kant's *Critique* informs us that time is the *a priori* ground of all human experience. Our thoughts exist along with a successive manifold; in fact, all of our thoughts and dreams are realised within in the context of a world that is dominated by time. Everything that exists is *in* time and *related to* time.[3] Kant says, 'Appearances, one and all, may go away; but time itself (as the universal condition of their possibility) cannot be annulled.'[4] It appears that, perhaps, we do not need objects of space to maintain the grounding of *a priori* time. The inner sense of time is presented prior to the outer sense of space; all spaces exist in time. Time is the form of inner sense and the ground of inner intuition. So it is our basis in time which allows each individual to *entertain* the appearance of existing. Kant clarifies, stating, 'Time is indeed something actual, viz., the actual form of inner intuition. It therefore has subjective reality in regard to inner experience; i.e., I actually have the presentation of time and of my determinations in time.'[5] Our inner intuition needs time as an *a priori* ground for our experience so as to order the manifold of sense in a successive manner. In this regard time allows us to make sense of the world. Without time as an *a priori* foundation of inner sense there would be no way to know precisely when, and in what order, our lived experiences occur. In the experience of the sublime, outer sense intuition is cancelled for want of determinate form. The object is either too large or too powerful to present as a spatial object.

Now that we have established a touchstone for grasping the importance of time to the matter at hand, we can look to the meaning of the word 'sublime.' The French origin of the word sublime is defined as, 'expressing lofty ideas in an elevated manner.'[6] From the Latin root it is *sublimis* which means 'uplifted, high borne aloft, lofty, exalted, eminent, distinguished.' The origin can be further broken down into parts with the root *sub* meaning, 'up to,' plus the addition of the root word '*limen*' meaning lintel, threshold, or sill.'[7] This meaning can be expressed as that which is 'up to the limit.' Thus, the sublime is thought of as being something that sets the limits of *normal* excellence and exhibits the characteristics of 'boundlessness or the infinite,' which constitutes 'a movement of the mind'[8] that sets the limits of our knowledge and even appears to breach the boundaries of the mind. This brief introduction to the meaning of the sublime will be helpful in understanding its importance in developing our personhood and assisting in the understanding of time. The character of the word *sublime* itself has a clear relationship to time and the ultimate expression of our personhood is built in.

According to Kant, the judgement of the sublime and the judgement of the beautiful are similar because

they 'both presuppose that we make a judgement of reflection rather than either a judgement of sense or a logically determinative one.' This is important because, in a reflective judgement, whether or not we 'like' something (in Kant's technical sense) is not dependent on the power of the senses or the power to make logically determinate judgements Our liking is connected to the power of exhibition within imagination. These are *singular* judgements that we claim as universal judgements because we believe that everyone else *would* agree with our judgement of an object or of a situation because s*ingulars* function logically as universals. That is to say, *what* we experience individually, in the fullest sense, *must* be experienced by all, in order to do full justice to the experience itself.

We find that the sublime is different from beauty in a few important ways. First, the liking of the sublime does not depend on the liking of a 'thing.' The liking we feel in the judgement of the sublime can be found in its 'unboundedness.'[9] Second, Kant says, 'that we regard the beautiful as an exhibition of an indeterminate concept of the understanding and the sublime as the exhibition of an indeterminate concept of reason.' The beautiful embodies the liking of a quality in something that makes us judge it 'beautiful' in the same way that we apply a predicate to a subject. The 'presentation of quantity' reigns in the sublime experience through immenseness either in size or in the exertion of power or force. Third, the beautiful is a feeling of liking which imports the idea of a play between imagination and understanding and vitality, i.e. a 'feeling of life's being furthered.' The pleasure associated with the judgement of the sublime, or our liking it, arises out of a conflict or frustration within us which is followed by a feeling that is a much more potent pleasure for us. Kant says, 'It is an emotion'[10] and it provides a deep inter-personal insight. Fourth, the beautiful in nature 'constitutes in itself an object of our liking'[11] and is judged as being something purposive. Unlike the judgement of the beautiful, the judgement of the sublime does violence to our imagination and is 'contra purposive for our power of judgement' The final difference that bears mentioning is that the judgement of the beautiful in nature resides *in* nature and, therefore, outside of us. We judge the beautiful as being purposive, whereas, in the judgement of the sublime we find the purposiveness within *ourselves*. The sublime experience behaves as 'an appendix to our aesthetic judging of the purposiveness of nature.'[12] This final difference within our judging of the sublime allows that 'what we call sublime may be formless,'[13] so it can be separated into two groups, namely the mathematical and the dynamical.

According to Kant the mathematical sublime is 'where reflective judgement finds itself purposively attuned in relation to cognition in general – this liking is by no means a liking for the object (since that may be formless), but rather a liking for the expansion of imagination itself.' The mathematical judgement of the sublime is related to both imagination and to cognition in terms of *magnitude*. We understand it as something very great or as Kant states, 'absolutely large.'[14] By 'absolutely large' Kant means that we have nothing in all of our experience to compare against the largeness of its magnitude. Kant provides us with a palatable example saying, 'The infinite however is absolutely large (not merely large by comparison).'[15] In other words, nothing is comparable. We can try to imagine infinity if we like, but the mathematical infinite can only be apprehended as analogous rather than as an actually existent quantity in either time or space. Our imagination fills in all the necessary gaps and makes a whole, which is sufficient, so that we have to carry out an infinite analysis in order to think infinity. All other things that we imagine as being large in comparison with the infinite pale by comparison. Thus, we can conclude that the [mathematically] sublime sets the limits and, as Kant states, 'It is a magnitude that is equal only to itself.'

The absoluteness of the infinite that is found in the mathematical magnitude constitutes in us the experience of sublimity that the infinite possesses. The ability of our minds to calculate this infinity with numbers is not actual: instead, our cognition goes through either a progression or a regression. Rudolf Makkreel says, 'this imaginative regress is important for comprehending as a whole what is normally apprehended as temporally discrete.'[16] When our minds try to comprehend a sense of the whole, while leaving the individuality intact, there is an oscillation of pleasure and displeasure which occurs when we can't quite get our minds wrapped around the mathematical sublime, the absolutely large. Surprisingly, this conflict initiates our growth as persons.

It is not the infinite itself that possesses this characteristic of growing our minds *beyond* our minds, but it is the power of our own minds. Kant says, 'The sublime must not be sought in things in nature, but must be sought solely in our ideas.' An idea is nothing if not a powerful motive for growth. The power of the sublime rests with the satisfaction we feel upon realising the power of our mental faculties. To continue, Kant states, 'nothing that can be an object of the senses is to be called sublime.' This is because the pleasure which we feel *is in the intellect.* The mathematical sublime directs itself to the *exercise* of our cognitive powers. Imagination experiences onerous frustration in its attempt to comprehend infinity in the aesthetic experience. Kant says, 'What is to be called sublime is not the object, but the attunement that the intellect [gets] through certain presentation that occupies reflective judgement.'[17] The pleasure we experience is paradoxical because we discover that 'the mind has a power surpassing any standard of sense.' I cannot here enter into a discussion of what Kant means by 'standard.' Still, there is an important dis-

cussion called for and still I hope to fulfil that call in subsequent work.

We have previously discussed that Kant regards time as the *a priori* ground for inner sense and therefore of all experience. We think of time as being both mathematical and dynamical, but primarily mathematical. This may be because of our tendency toward measurement. When we judge time, we often do so in terms of distance from a past or a future. We measure time in small increments of seconds and minutes over the duration of hours and days. These days turn to weeks, months, and years. The years span out across an infinite temporal landscape as far back as memory can track. The infinite regression in our minds surges beyond our capacity for comprehension. Our inability to grasp it all is not a pleasurable experience, but imagination fills the gaps and tries to keep up anyway. The power of imagination is a power of cognition that both relies on time and exists in time simultaneously. This power makes *thinking* of time all the more difficult; in the absoluteness of it we cannot even grasp the totality of one moment before it has flooded the gates at the boundaries of our inner sense. Our personal interaction with time itself can become a sublime experience. 'Personal reflection' through time has sublime characteristics and, therefore, exhibits the powerful aesthetic qualities which fit Kant's structure. By personal reflection I mean something akin to the account Kant provides in The Third Paralogism in *The Critique of Pure Reason*.

The sublime is also experienced dynamically. Kant says, 'When in an aesthetic judgement we consider nature as a might [macht] that has no dominance over us, then it is dynamically sublime.'[18] We feel something in the case of the dynamically sublime that might be an extension of reverence or respect for that which we fear but do not flee. Kant mentions experience of the fear of God as an example because of God's power to create and destroy; yet we realise our power to 'resist his will' is impossible. We are inevitably reminded of the Psalm of David; 'Yea though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil: for thou art with me.'[19] The joy we feel might be in the moment when one who thinks about God realises, even in the face of the awesome might of God, that it is God who allows him or her to *persist*, which is a feeling of immense pleasure, given the alternatives. Such 'fear of God' is also a sign of personal freedom, an experience of truly being loved. Regardless of any religious affiliation, one must admit that this feeling, this recognition of a personal kinship with *all that is*, all *being*, is in itself sublime. The point is that the idea of power on a divine scale is sublime and that is what 'the fear of God' is about.

The dynamically sublime can be experienced in the presence of something awesome in might or stature that is not as all powerful as God, yet awesome all the same. Kant conjures the images of, 'thunderclouds piling up in the sky and moving about accompanied by lightning and thunderclaps, volcanoes with their destructive power, hurricanes with all the devastation they leave behind, the boundless ocean heaved up, the high waterfall of a mighty river, and so on.'[20] Exceedingly powerful forces of nature are awe inspiring and completely capable of evoking the closest analogue of our experience of sublimity. Nature can inspire a kind of fearful awe that is accompanied by the inspiration *within* us. We understand that we are no match for such power, yet we are not completely dominated by these forces. There is power within us, in imagination and our other cognitive powers, in much the same way as the forces appear in nature. Our ability to withstand such fear and such power without being razed to the ground, like a helpless tidal village, or being driven into submission under these powerful forces, stirs the feeling of power within us, where true sublimity lies. The sublime is thus the combination of the feelings of fear and of superiority, within us, in our imaginations. The power to comprehend these forces and remain free from their dominance *makes* the experience sublime. Perhaps this faculty of our judgement, of the sublime, is working within the minds of people who push the envelope of fear to see what heights this power in imagination can attain; what, after all, is it like to see what height this power of imagination can attain.

Faced with such power in nature, the energetic impulsion enjoyed in the sublime experience is much greater than the fear of death. Our respect for death connects the sublime with the concept of time once again. The search for sublime experience is likely part of what drives the sky diver, the surfer, and the storm chaser to feel this aesthetic rush of power in the interplay between defiance and respect. We find personal growth through the pain and the fear that precedes the pleasure in the sublime experience. It is not the power of nature alone but a feeling of play with the ultimate power of death which waits silently for us when we overstep our safe boundaries. It is not merely a respect for death, but an affirmation of life. In this life affirmation we develop both a healthy respect for the external powers of the natural world and, thus, gain humility.

The dynamical sublime is experienced through time. Try to stop the flow of time, to resist its weight upon you. Can you? The force of time is known by all of us (humans) for its inevitable character and its power to cause ageing and death. The power is unimaginable in strength and it is unchallengeable. Unlike the brave souls who challenge the volcano or the hurricane, no one resists time and wins, no one escapes death. We never sneak up on time or catch this force unprepared. The fear of time and the fear of death – and this is what I mean by 'respect' – are thus equivalent to the fear of God. The judgement of the dynamical sublime and time may be the feeling that God has granted you *the power* to exist in time. All living creatures strive to make the most of 'the time

that they have.' As human beings we seem to be most aware of the finitude we experience when faced with the unrelenting reality of time. We seem to overcome time in a sense as we ponder the beautiful in the sublime as time slows, or seems to, as we reach our limits. Still, the subjective nature of this emotional relationship with the enduring power of time is what drives us forward; we hope. We experience pleasure in knowing that we exist in spite of the knowledge that our bodies will succumb to the ultimate process of time. This succumbing, this going under, is a great displeasure that does violence to the imagination. It could be the judgement of the sublimity, of infinite time, that prompts the imagination to conjure up the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality in the first place, because it is time's voracity that reveals our own providence as living and free persons.

The sublime experience is both an individual and a personal (i.e. concrete) experience that is subjective and universal, in the sense Kant advocates in the Third Moment of 'the Analytic of the Beautiful.' Each person is built, in the sense of *Bildung*, from infancy through growth to adulthood by encountering the absolutely large in nature, both in magnitude and in strength. We are all small, even when we have become mature adults. The sublimity found in each person is a novelty. Each new and emerging feature we experience in the sensory world is brought inward for our reflection. In the judgement of the sublime we find beauty in the assault on our faculties, because we learn that such beauty is *in us*. We learn through the sublime and over the course of lived time, we grow to understand our own purposiveness through our relationship to time and the sublime experience. The pain and frustration that assaults the senses appears contrapurposive but is judged as purposive and we are humbled. Through the pleasurable experience of our relationship to the infinite we see our own potential and our capacity for personal growth as it 'arouses in us the feeling of our supersensible destination.'[21] Perhaps particular sublime experiences can become commonplace for individual persons, but not before the growing pains of the sublime experience transform us. We are forever changed temporally. We cannot turn back the clock to that which we were before the sublime experience. The sublime experience extracts meaning from nature and reveals the meaning of our own life. Perhaps we learn our place, as individuals in the world, in relation to these absolutely large encounters in nature and as temporal beings encountering others. The sublime experience drives the 'regress in imagination'[22] that allows us to become more than we ever thought we could become. One can see how, through the sublime experience, our personhood comes into its own, achieving its own realisation. Individual persons do realise their potential and the fruition of which they are capable as a result of sublime experience. The experience of the sublime is a truly subjective manifestation and the sublime exists in relation to an *intimate* experience. It is, therefore, clear that the development of our personhood is intrinsically linked to the sublime experience.

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Notes
1. Kant, Immanuel *The Critique of Judgment* 113; hereafter, CJ.
2. Kant, Immanuel *The Critique of Pure Reason* A31; hereafter, CPR.
3. For further discussion on Kant's temporality see, Sherover, Charles M. *Heidegger, Kant & time*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1971. Sherover, however, questions whether it is philosophically appropriate to think of time a something we can be "in." See Sherover, "Are we "in" time?" *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 26:1 (1986), 33-46.
4. CPR A31.
5. CPR B54.
6. This and next, *Online Etymology Dictionary*: sublime.
7. This and next, Makkreel, Rudolf A. *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant* 68.
8. This and next, CJ 97.
9. This and next, CJ 98.
10. CJ 99.
11. This and next, CJ 100.
12. CJ 101.
13. This and next, CJ 105.
14. CJ 111.
15. This and next, CJ 105.
16. This and next, CJ 106.
17. This and next, CJ 119.
18. CJ 120.
19. *Holy Bible* Psalm 23 651.
20. CJ 113.
21. Makkreel 79.
22. Makkreel 93.

QUOTATIONAL CHARACTERS

Joseph C. Harry

Abstract: Journalists objectively keep themselves out of news stories by having highly subjective news sources do the talking, their personal perspectives displayed via quotation – through direct and indirect reported speech and thought. Conceived of as textual *persons,* sources function *subjectively* through reporters' more complex *subjectified* re-vocalizations. As such, journalists assume a prominent although murky personal voice in what nevertheless remains an objective news text. Within a semiotic/linguistic framework, I theorize the narrative interplay of objectivity and subjectivity between journalists and sources.

Key Words: icon, index, linguistics, objectivity, quotation, semiotics, subjectification, subjectivity, symbol

1. Introduction

This article uses the terminology *reported speech and thought* (RST) and *quotation* interchangeably, focusing on quotation's use as a central narrative device in newspaper discourse, to suggest a linguistically and semiotically derived understanding of journalistic quotation, in its portrayal of persons in news discourse, as quotable characters. Specifically, this article conceives of the sources appearing in news reports as linguistic-semiotic entities whose personal presence occurs via the second-order 'voicings' of journalists, who deploy reported speech and thought as the central narrative device in creating news discourse. Short of any physical description of a quoted person – which is relatively rare in straight news articles, as opposed to human-interest or *feature* articles, where physical and attitudinal description are more typical – a person appearing in a news article (that is, as a news source) is portrayed by means of the reporter's quotation of the person's commentary.

The functional, genre-specific requirement of news discourse is to dispense reliable, factually accurate, truthful, daily information as a putatively objective, unbiased account (Waugh, 1995; van Dijk, 1988), and the reporter-reformulated projection of persons' subjective 'voices' or perspectives, via quotation, functions as the chief means of achieving this factual news narrative. As Sanders and Redeker (1993) note, a stretch of discourse is 'perspectivised' if its relative context of interpretation is a person-bound 'embedded' space within a universe of discourse, and quotation is one type of 'explicitly marked' perspective (p. 70). A perspective, in their view, is the 'introduction of a subjective viewpoint that restricts the validity of the presented information to a particular person in the discourse' (p. 69).

Subjectivity and the variety of ways it can be deployed by a quoting reporter will be a central focus of this article.

Quotation is the compositional means of certifying the journalist's truth/facticity/objectivity requirement, through the recasting of what real people have said about recent real-world events, as formulated into direct, indirect, and free-indirect speech and thought, the three most widely recognized quotation modes (Vandelanotte, 2004, 2006; Coulmas, 1986; Keizer, 2009; Waugh, 1995; Redeker, 1996; Sanders and Redeker, 1993). Direct speech is taken to be, with some qualification, the *verbatim* words of a person, and in news discourse always includes quotation marks encapsulating original-speaker content. Indirect speech is the reporter's distanced-from-the-original but still accurate paraphrase and summary of original-person speech, while free-indirect is construed as a vocal half-way house, fusing elements of both direct and indirect but focally sticking more closely to original-person speech and (especially) to a source's 'thought' perspectives than what occurs in standard indirect quotation (Coulmas, 1986; Waugh, 1995; Keizer, 2009; Vandelanotte, 2006; Sanders and Redeker, 1993; Oltean, 1993; Pietila, 1992). As Redeker (1996) defines it, free-indirect quotation:

> … is similar to indirect discourse with respect to the narrator's influence, because the reporting speaker reformulates the utterance and can change descriptions and other expressions. Yet it is more like direct discourse with respect to the quoted speaker's subjectivity, as it admits expressive material, exclamations, and other subjective features (p. 231).

As this definition reveals, the original source's perspective is thus highly subjective, while the more distanced quoting modes of indirect speech may be considered *reporter-subjectified*, while free-indirect quotation falls somewhere in between, having both subjective and subjectified narrative traits. The news writer renders a quoted character's words most often via the basic speech verb of said, a 'hear-say evidential' (Li, 1986) or 'neutral' (Bamgbose, 1986) speech verb, while more evaluatively rendering a person's words and thoughts by means of attitude or 'marked' (Bamgbose, 1986) 'infused' (Pounds, 2010) illocutionary speech-act verbs such as 'believe,' 'felt,' 'warned,' 'accused,' and a great many others. Such marked speech verbs – not to mention a large number of lexically expressive adjectives and adverbs

on the reporter's part – are crucial in creating the perspectival reformulations associated with free-indirect and standard indirect quotation, these latter modes of RST being the journalist's chief means of displaying his or her own implicit presence in the news text.

A typical news story, however, represents personhood, in the form of quoted sources, not as the full-bodied, multidimensional quality achieved by character development in fictional narratives but rather more skeletally, as a series of informational conduits, meaning the quotational characters are explicitly heard but not really seen. News reporters focus almost entirely on what a given person has to *say* about something deemed newsworthy. Objectivity, as a professional norm, is a functional generic requirement of news discourse (Waugh, 1995; van Dijk, 1988), requiring that the reporter's explicit perspectives on an issue at hand remain out of the story, although the journalist's informed judgement about accumulated facts and perspectives are deemed acceptable. But persons quoted in news stories can be as subjective and stridently rhetorical as they wish. The reporter's presence is nevertheless always somewhere in the story, because the reporter has complete control over whom he or she chooses to quote; and beyond this because of the existence of attributional clauses, a variety of neutral and marked verbs of speech indicating different reporting choices, and an array of other lexical choices expressing value-laden terms. All of these writer-controlled linguistic elements cohere to create the quotational characters portrayed in news discourse.

So in reported speech and thought (RST), not only original speakers but journalists themselves ultimately take the stage, although the original speaker's presence as person is much more explicit than is the journalist's, whose personal role remains implicit, especially as voiced through indirect quotation (Sanders and Redeker, 1993: 72). Although it is functionally convenient to distinguish between an original and a reporting speaker in news discourse, from a narrative perspective the role between original source and the quoting journalist is actually merged, especially when it comes to indirect quotation modes, which give a reporter the fullest amount of narrative control in portraying persons and attendant 'voicing' perspectives in news stories (Keizer, 2009; Vandelanotte 2004, 2006; Waugh, 1995; Redeker, 1996; Harry, 2014).

While direct quotation can be seen as *source-centred* (Harry, 2014), because the quoted person's own words provide an immediate, dramatic, theatrical (Wierzbicka, 1974) first-person voicing, indirect quotation is *writer-centred* (Harry, 2014), because the reporter's paraphrasing, summarization, and transformation of original-speech occurs through evaluative speech verbs and other adjectives, adverbs, and expressive generalized perspectives marking

informed judgement, albeit entangled with original-speaker voices. If this quotational process is seen as a very specific and occupationally rule-bound type of language and sign use, the result is that in the news narrative the personification of persons, as information-bearing characters, emerges through a semiotic-linguistic blurring of journalist and source. In this sense journalistic quotation, unlike quotation in fictional narratives, is not so much devoted to standard, full-bodied character development as it is to a rather specialized process of combining verbal sign properties to create different kinds of character 'voicings.' But these voicings are produced by the linguistic-semiotic merging of original-speaker and reporter perspectives on issues at hand.

Personhood in news discourse can therefore be construed in what might be thought of as the source's own *simple subjectivity*, and through the journalist's more *complex subjectivity*. It is this complex subjectivity that, I suggest, provides the journalist's own objectivity, understood as a factually faithful but distanced stance on real-world events and perspectives, and which also, compositionally, grants news discourse its status as objective report. The distancing process occurs through the writer's compositional re-focalisations of newsworthy persons' perspectives.

At a theoretical level, the functional description of how quotational characters are created in news discourse can be broadened by drawing on some contemporary work in linguistics, and combining it within the semiotic-pragmatic theory of Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) and his notions of the icon (signs that have an immediate picture-like resemblance to something), the index (relational signs pointing back to icons), and the symbol (open-ended conventionalized signs that incorporate and refashion indexical and iconic signs). Waugh (1995) draws loosely on Peirce's work as a means of categorizing reportorial modes of quotation, concluding that both direct and (somewhat less strictly) indirect quotation are 'image icons' (pp. 154-55), because they resemble directly or at least (in the case of indirect quotation) closely refashion the verbatim commentary of original speakers, and that news discourse in general is indexical speech because it assumes a real-world set of referents which any news story attempts to faithfully portray.

Waugh, drawing on a phrase often used by Peirce with respect to indexical signs, says the news text is in this sense 'really affected' (p. 165) by the real world and so has a relational, thus indexical connection to it. Direct and indirect quotation are 'both indexes and icons of the original utterance' (Waugh, 1995: 163). Waugh stops short of any further elaboration of Peirce's sign theory with respect to journalistic quotation.

Peirce's communicative notions of iconic, indexical, and symbolic signs are quite useful in

categorizing direct, free-indirect, and standard indirect quotation modes to better understand their linguistic and semiotic properties within news discourse. As will be shown, canonical quotational modes – direct, free-indirect, and standard indirect – routinely used by reporters to introduce the personal perspectives of characters into news discourse, conform closely to Peirce's semiotic definitions of the icon, index, and symbol, and these can be understood still more broadly when associated with recent linguistic notions of subjectivity and subjectification.

The limits of this article preclude a fully detailed account of either linguistic subjectivity or Peircian semiotics. Rather, the narrower attempt in what follows is to offer a conceptual framework for how a combined linguistic-semiotic perspective, when applied to quote-segment samples from daily news articles, can explain personhood within news discourse as narratively occurring through the journalist's quotational construction of main characters. Beyond this, the linguistic-semiotic analysis illuminates how the reporter's relative freedom in constructing source voicings is also a compositional means of ensuring and sustaining the professional journalistic norm of objectivity. This can be seen to occur through the quoting reporter's own free-ranging narrative display of source perspectives, resulting in a complex subjectivity, or *subjectification,* which is a useful means of conceptualizing the objectivity of news discourse, and which can be contrasted with an original source's more simple subjectivity.

2. Subjectification & Subjectivity

Linguistically, a range of subjective perspectives, both from sources and from the quoting reporter, emerge via the communicative voicing capacities associated with various journalistic quotation modes. Subjectification is the 'increasing codification of speaker-related meanings … supplanting representational meanings' (Vandelanotte, 2004: 574), and this generally seems to involve one speaker's assessment of or intrusion into and reformulation of another's speech. Similarly, subjectivity can be conceptually defined as 'the linguistic expression of speaker involvement through lexical, grammatical, and/or construal choices' (Ghesquiere, Brems, and Van de Velde, 2012: 1), and this would seem to involve any individual's personal involvement in his or her own discourse, which would be a fairly standard definition of the traditional notion of subjectivity, whereas *subjectification* is conceptually more complex. Sanders and Redeker (1993), studying subjectivity within news reports, define it as the 'perspective of the speaker/writer or of a character in the text' (p. 69).

Scholars disagree on the line between traditional subjectivity, meaning simply anyone's personal take on a situation, and subjectification, a somewhat more complex determination of a speaker's intervention, intrusion into or added personal perspective or gloss on another's discourse, not to mention disagreements about *intersubjectification,* a much more recent concept, usually seen as a more strictly rhetorical-pragmatically focused concept regarding one speaker or writer's assessment of, or taking into account his or her nuanced perspective with regard to another hearer's or reader's assessment of it (thus the *inter* prefix.) This article leaves out of account intersubjectification, and deals only with the two other concepts, subjectivity and subjectification.[1]

Being restricted to journalistic reported speech and thought, this article is more concerned with differentiating between the actual quoted person (primary speaker) and the person of the quoting reporter (secondary speaker). Therefore, linguistic subjectification applied to journalistic quotation will describe, borrowing Vandelanotte's (2004) terms, the process in which the secondary speaker (reporter) 'supplants' the more 'representational meanings' of primary speakers, and this phenomenon tends to occur with *indirect* quotation modes. On the other hand, subjectivity, as opposed to subjectification, can be seen as the traditionally defined expression of a primary speaker's (the news source's) personal rhetorical viewpoint, or 'the encoding of the *speaker's* epistemic position, attitudes, or perspective' (Vandelanotte, 2006: 143), and this occurs most fully through *direct* quotation.

Subjectification is thus an extension of subjectivity. Said differently, subjectivity and subjectification exist along a continuum, from simple to gradually more complex expressions of speaker or writer personal involvement in discourse situations. In this article the terms are differentiated so that subjectification applies to the quoting reporter, while subjectivity is conceptually linked to the original person quoted as primary source. The various *person* perspectives in news discourse will therefore run a perspectival range from immediately subjective, direct, source-centred commentary (direct quotation is the hallmark), and which I call *simple subjectivity*, to (at the opposite end) indirect quotation modes, or more *complex subjectivity*, the latter a source-distanced, writer-focused, more informationally nuanced perspective resulting from the journalist's evaluative reformulations of previous-speaker commentary. Free-indirect quotation, a middle-point between direct and standard indirect quotation, is more distanced-from-an-original speaker than direct quotation, but less distanced than standard indirect quotation. My notion of *simple subjectivity*, then, is linguistically associated with, borrowing from Company Company (2006), a 'non-subjectified' perspective, while moderately to more fully subjectified perspectives (i.e., *subjectification*) would tend toward *complex subjectivity*.

To clarify at this point – within terms of subjectification theory as I fashion it with respect to journalistic quotation – as an original or 'innovative' meaning is 'paraphrased' and re-appropriated by a secondary speaker or writer, 'the innovative meaning becomes less and less dependent on the surrounding syntactic and semantic context, and, as a consequence, becomes more abstract and more polysemous' (Company Company, 2006: 97). The semantic transformation – from initial-speaker simple subjectivity to secondary-speaker/reporter subjectivization – is, in propositional terms, a move from the intra-propositional to extra-propositional viewpoint (Company Company 2006). The linguistic/semantic movement at work, according to Company Company (2006) is 'from forms conveying descriptive, textual, and the [original] speaker's external meanings toward the same forms conveying non-descriptive, text-independent and the [secondary] speaker's internal meanings' – thus the 'intra-propositional to extra-propositional' continuum (2006: 98).

Vandelanotte (2006) appears to be the only work applying subjectification, defined as interpersonal 'scope,' to news reports, and concludes that 'distancing indirect speech,' which is indirect quotation typically accompanied by sentence-medial or sentence-final attribution, merges original-speaker and reporter voices so that the reporter ends up 'commenting' upon the original speech. A somewhat murky distinction is drawn, however, between 'representational' and 'scopal' distancing, with the former merely 'echoing' original-source perspectives, whereas the latter is said to go further, giving the reporter the fullest voicing, thus the interpersonal scoping/subjectification effect (Vandelanotte, 2006: 559-565). Vandelanotte rightfully acknowledges, however, that news reports using indirect quotation can only provisionally be assigned this subjectified representational and/or scoping effect because they are so otherwise conventional in form, format, and the reliance on authoritative sources. Distanced indirect quotation indicates, in other words, that 'the information is not "mysteriously" part of the general knowledge of the journalist, but rather originates in someone else's discourse' (2006: 563). The distinction Vandelanotte makes between what I have called source-centred direct quotation and writer-centred indirect modes is nevertheless useful: 'In [direct speech] a speaker yields the floor to a sayer/cognizant,' while distanced indirect speech and thought 'on the other hand, is a more "flat" type of representation. The speaker does not yield the floor but confronts two "simultaneous" speech acts within one and the same sentence' (Vandelanotte, 2006: 565) My analysis of quotation modes will generally correspond to the above distinctions, but I will also include all forms of indirect quotation – those also including sentence-

initial attribution – as being 'distanced' and scopal, or subjectified.

Any person introduced into news discourse, therefore, can be considered an information-bearing subjective presence, and this also applies to the reporter's own more distanced textual voice, as occurs in indirect quotation modes, the hallmark of news discourse being most accurately construed as just this kind of double-voiced informational personhood. As mentioned earlier, direct, free-indirect, and standard indirect quotation also demonstrate traits very similar, respectively, to the icon, index, and symbol, the three fundamental sign categories formulated by semiotic/pragmatist Charles S. Peirce.

3. Peirce's Sign System

Peirce's icon, index, and symbol each reflect distinct first, second, and third-level communicative qualities, any sign being nevertheless an irreducible combination of all three qualities, although relatively predominant in just one quality (Greenlee, 1967). Direct, free-indirect, and standard indirect quote modes follow a similar tripartite logic, with direct, free-indirect, and standard indirect each being relatively predominant in just one of the three sign qualities.

Any sign, as a *first*, presents itself as an icon: a picture, image, physical or sonic resemblance of the real or mental object or referent, the icon being a 'simple quality of feeling' (Hartshorne and Weiss [1965 eds] CP5.66: 47),[2] essentially emotional in character, existing 'by virtue of a character which it possesses in itself' (CP 5.72: 50). An *index,* as second, is experientially connected with, evolves from, and is thus in some manner experientially connected to (indicative of) the iconic (referential) object, 'by virtue of a character which it could not have if its object did not exist' (CP 5.73: 50-51). The index is 'a reactional sign, which is such by virtue of a real connection with its object' (CP 5.75: 51). As a secondary sign, the index 'is a further determination of an already known sign of the same object' (Hartshorne and Weiss [1965 eds.], CP 2.320: 184). We can already see how direct quotation is similar to the icon, resembling its object, *picture-like*, while indirect speech carries indexical traits, since indirect is always a distanced (indicative) reformulation of – but still has 'a real connection with' – primary-speaker speech.

The most complex sign, as *third*, is the symbol, which always to varying degrees incorporates and fleshes out both an index and related icon. But the symbol, as opposed to the icon, need not strictly resemble its object, nor does it necessarily directly point to or simply indicate the referential object, as an index must. The symbol, instead, extends and transforms both an icon and index by modifying both into something more distanced, complex, and

relatively autonomous. The symbol 'fulfills its function regardless of any similarity or analogy with its object,' and irrespective of 'any factual connection therewith,' (CP 5.73: 51), having its communicative purpose only because it is conventionally taken to be a representation of something else. For example, a flag represents only whatever shared understanding happens to be applied to it, but it cannot 'resemble' patriotism, for example, nor does it necessarily 'indicate' patriotism. Conventionally, depending on one's context, the flag might symbolize just the opposite.

At a more linguistic level, Peirce associates each sign with a communicative effect: the icon representing a simple term, *thingness in itself*, informationally neither true nor false; the index puts forward a kind of proposition consisting of iconic terms; the symbol, the most complex and elaborated kind of sign, operates more like an argument, carrying forward both propositions and related terms into conclusionary statements (Burks [1966, ed.] CP 8.337-341: pp. 229-231). Unlike iconic terms, propositions (indicative statements) and symbols (propositionally elaborated ones) each project communicative notions of truth and falsity, and roughly sketched this is similar to how direct, free-indirect, and standard indirect quotation function, as well. It is not that directly quoted commentary cannot be deemed true or false, but rather that the journalist, with quote-marked, source-centred verbatim representation, takes no real responsibility for such statements, while having to assume at least some truth-conditional responsibility for his or her own writer-centred, indirect-speech vocal reformulations.

To summarize at this point, these semiotic sign qualities, combined within the earlier-presented notion of linguistic-subjectification, show that any segment of direct, free-indirect, and standard indirect quotation reveals these mixed semiotic-linguistic traits. In the next section, the semiotic/linguistic capacities are demonstrated for each quotation mode, all quotations taken from newspapers covering the 2010 Israeli raid on a Turkish cargo ship headed to the Gaza, and which provoked critical international attention.3 Marked and neutral reporting verbs are underlined, while expressive language adding to overall epistemic, evidential, or illocutionary force of the quote is bold-faced and italicized.

4. Direct Quotation

1) '*Israel condemns the anti-Semitic chants* that were publicized this morning,' Ayalon <u>said</u>. 'The fact that *participants on the flotilla would chant such things shows the true nature* of some of the participants' *real motivation. This amply demonstrates* that many are not against a particular policy of the Israeli government, but *have very real and dangerous hatred for Jews and the Jewish state*.'

2) '*What we saw this morning is a war crime*,' <u>said</u> Saeb Erekat, the chief Palestinian negotiator for the government in the West Bank. '*These were civilian ships carrying civilians and civilian goods* – medicine, wheelchairs, food, construction materials.'

Here, two distinct speakers are indicated, the person talking in the reported clause, and the reporter, via *said* reporting clauses. But the original speaker's perspective, as quoted person, is predominant, making this linguistically a source-centred, non-subjectivised, intra-personal mode (Company Company, 2006), and semiotically an iconic speech mode – a kind of emotional, immediate, highly rhetorical sound picture of what's in the source's mind. The focalisation of viewpoint is clearly the original sayer/cognisant's (Vandelanotte, 2006) actual words, a mimicking gesture or word-image. Semantically, linguistic subjectification, as noted earlier, for the purposes of this article can be seen as the process where some original or 'innovative' word or viewpoint is taken up by a new (secondary) speaker or writer who re-appropriates and paraphrases the original commentary into the newer speaker/writer's own interpretive, thus subjective (subjectified) scope (Company Company, 2006: 97). In this sense the original perspective is then considered 'non-subjectivized' and 'intra-propositional' (Company Company, 2006) because it's an original speaker's overt or 'external' perspective, where the reporter is giving simply a representational account, although direct quotation is usually highly subjective in the everyday use of that term, as *simple subjectivity*. But the picture grows more complex as other modes of quotation are examined.

5. Free-Indirect Quotation

Free-indirect quotation is more nuanced and writer-distanced from an original sayer/cognizant, functioning more like Peirce's semiotic index, having an existential connection with and thus pointing back to, indicating, some original commentary. But free-indirect is, linguistically, relatively more subjectified, because of the writer's interpretive reconstrual of original speech, and thus should probably be considered *inter*-propositional (as opposed to the previous intra-propositional quality of direct quotation) – the *proposition* also being identified by Peirce (CP 8.337-341) as the indexical sign's chief communicative effect.

3) 'The *shockwaves* from the Israeli commando raid on the Mavi Marmara passenger ferry *were still reverberating around the world* last night, as Israel *scrambled to defend its battered reputation*. *Already damaged* after the Gaza war and *a fumbled Mossad assassination* of a Hamas militant in Dubai, **it faced even tougher scrutiny** as it *began to examine what happened, and why*.'

4) 'The raid is ***a public relations nightmare*** for Israel and ***has put the Obama administration in an awkward position just as it hoped to put to rest a frosty period in their alliance***.'

One difference here, compared to direct quotation, is the lack of speech-reporting verbs – a said speech act verb or even a 'marked' one, such as warned, accused, cautioned, asserted, etc. – yet both examples 3 and 4 accurately retain an emotional and immediate closeness to the persons' thoughts being reproduced. In fact, free-indirect, by relatively preserving the dual-voiced quality (of primary [original source] and secondary [journalist] speakers) of direct quotation, but crafted in the mode of indirect speech and thought, is perhaps the most open-ended quote form, granting the reporter extremely wide latitude in expressive reformulations of original-speaker commentary.

Free-indirect, then, should be considered moderately subjectified, since the reporter's voice interpretively intervenes to mix with the original person speaking. If subjectification, operationally, entails that the 'innovative' (original meaning of someone's commentary) 'becomes less and less dependent on the surrounding syntactic and semantic context, and, as a consequence, becomes more abstract and more polysemous' (Company Company 2006: 97) in a secondary speaker/writer's hands, then free-indirect shows the process at work. And as semiotic index, free-indirect turns the iconic mental picture of direct quotation, which it parasitically has drawn on and existentially transformed, into a more distanced, indicative, re-asserted proposition, an index of original-speaker perspective.

6. Standard Indirect Quotation

Standard indirect quotation, like free-indirect, is also a paraphrase and summary of original-speaker commentary, with similar indexical qualities. But unlike free-indirect, which need not have any reporting verb-of-speech (a *said-based* reporting clause, whether marked or neutral), standard indirect must include speech-act or other evidential/epistemic speech verbs, and thus is even more independent from the original, now merging into only one deictic centre – that of the reporting speaker whose propositional reformulation, metaphorically speaking, ushers the original person, as speaker, off the stage. Free-indirect, by comparison, still places the original and secondary speaker collaboratively on stage, with the former's voice still the relatively more narratively prominent, as speaking person. Standard indirect modes often include, interestingly, *a mix of* neutral 'said' speech verbs and other 'marked' (Bamgbose, 1986) or 'infused' (Pounds, 2010) speech verbs, the evaluation provided by the reporter's voice-predominance.

The examples below are of three common but slightly different indirect-speech modes. The first (5)

is with 'marked'-only speech verbs; the next (6) features marked and neutral speech verbs; the last (7), contains 'neutral'-only speech verbs. Relevant speech verbs of both kinds (marked and neutral) are underlined for emphasis, along with any expressive language choices, in bold-face italics:

5) Turkey <u>proposed</u> a statement that <u>would condemn</u> Israel for ***violating*** international law, <u>demand</u> a United Nations investigation and <u>demand</u> that Israel ***prosecute*** those ***responsible*** for the raid and ***pay compensation*** to the victims. It also <u>called for</u> the end of the blockade.

6) <u>Accused</u> by European leaders of using ***disproportionate force*** – ***a charge reminiscent*** of the Gaza conflict and the subsequent UN inquiry – ***Israel rushed*** to ***defend*** its actions, <u>saying that</u> IHH, the Turkish Islamic charity that chartered the ferry, ***had links*** to Hamas ***and even*** al-Qaeda.

7) ***Israel must be prepared to face the consequences and be held responsible for it crimes***, <u>he said</u>.

These three examples show relatively greater interpretive range and still more distanced speaking perspectives. The reporting (secondary) speaker has most fully emerged as central character in the narrative, not so much mimicking as *echoing* or, in Vandelanotte's (2004; 2006) terms, adding interpersonal scope to whatever actual words were used in the original speech. While (5) uses only marked speech verbs, it succeeds in conveying a highly emotional perspective, and from a collectivized source (Turkey), a special feature of journalistic discourse being the quotation of collective entities *standing in* as persons (Waugh, 1995; Harry, 2014). But it is also the journalist's personal voice now soloing on main stage, as all language realizations here are writer-centred reformulations.

Example (6) mixes both neutral and mixed speech verbs, rendering a similar narrative effect but also providing a more journalistically standard representational stance, via inclusion of neutral 'said' speech verbs. On the subjectification continuum, (5) operates somewhat closer to free-indirect speech, while (6) is slightly more distanced, the said/neutral verbs in both serving to help achieve the vocal distancing or echoing effect. In example (7), the reporting clause (said/neutral) achieves a still more perspectival distancing from whatever the 'he' speaker (who is actually the Turkish foreign minister) said in his own words. But the reported clause nevertheless renders – as do (5) and (6) – a highly dramatic statement, with the reporter voice (as person) the relatively most distanced-from-an-original (compared to examples 5 and 6) by virtue of the reporting clause's sentence-final position (Vandelanotte, 2004; 2006). These standard indirect quote examples have, semiotically, moved into the

sign-conventionalized symbolic realm – more independently nuanced, distanced, distinctly writer-centred and linguistically conventionalized, the writer's voice all but evaporating the original speakers'. Subjectified interpersonal scope, on the reporter's part, seems most in evidence in this example. Here, the writer's conventionalized propositional re-assertions have little to no link with the actual words that may have been spoken by an original speaker (as primary person), but, by convention, are assumed to accurately represent (Pietila, 1992) the original commentary.

These modes of standard indirect quotation, coming closest to the conventionalizing sign-effect of the semiotic symbol, also, at the linguistic level, would seem to qualify as the most fully subjectified and *extra-propositional,* placing the reporter as writer (secondary speaker), in fullest narrative control, as the propositional re-asserter of persons who originally did the talking, but who are now merged into a reconstituted narrative person of the quoting journalist. It is also the case that, beyond the simple subjectivity of source-centred direct quotation, once the journalist's writer-centred vocalizing discourse, in its several *indirect* modes, has taken over, the news text becomes less purely subjective and more subjectified. It is in this sense that we can construe reporter subjectification as a kind of compositionally anchored objectivity.

7. Conclusion

This article has shown how persons represented in news discourse are construed via the dual-voicing process, the reporter's appropriating and recasting of original-person voices. Only in direct quotation does the original speaker retain anything like narrative control. Direct, free-indirect, and standard indirect quotation follow a combined *non-subjectification-subjectification/icon-index-symbol* continuum.

At the direct-quote end of source-centred perspectives, reported speech and thought (RST) is generally non-subjectified, intra-propositional, and semiotically iconic, and is closest to what I have called simple subjectivity. Direct quotation does add an authoritative air to news discourse, because it 'serves as evidence or documentation,' implying 'an authentic utterance by a detached and objective writer attitude' (Sanders and Redeker, 1993: 74). But if we define 'objective' in this way, it is narrowly accurate but would seem to be objective only in that the reporter does not intrude into the discourse. So it seems more accurate to call direct quotation reporter-*neutral*, rather than objective, if objectivity is more broadly and compositionally construed as the reporter's autonomy in indexically and symbolically representing facts in his or her own accurate re-voicings. In this respect, only the more indirect quotation modes would progressively serve to achieve objectivity in the subjectified form of

complex subjectivity outlined in these pages. Free-indirect quotation, still psychologically close, as a voicing perspective, to direct quotation, is slightly more writer-controlled, and thus relatively subjectified, *inter-propositional,* and sign-indexical. Finally, at the furthest and most distanced end of the vocalization continuum, standard indirect quotation modes, as the most reporter-autonomous, are also the most fully subjectified, *extra*-propositional and, from a semiotic perspective, *sign-symbolic*, because of their being the most conventionalized and reporter-distanced from original-person perspectives. It is at this distanced end – where a journalist's re-phrasings must be a loosely accurate reflection of, but need not share any of the same words as uttered by an initial speaker – that the reporter's voice narratively evaporates original voices, re-focalising the primary vocal perspectives, and coming closest to the notion of complex subjectivity. There is also a relative truth-conditionally inherent in indirect modes because the reporter must assume some minimal responsibility for the truthfulness and accuracy of the indexical-symbolic/subjectified reformulations of original-source perspectives. What remains to be further elaborated, and has only been provisionally sketched in this article, is the idea that journalistic objectivity – as complex subjectivity – is best demonstrated compositionally by indirect quotation modes, which do to a large degree reflect the reporter's occupational mandate to accurately preserve the basic factual propositions of original speakers as persons portrayed in a text. This portrayal of persons, as information-bearing entities rather than full-bodied characters, is accomplished within a multiple-voiced narrative context that blurs boundaries between the reporter and the reported-on, since journalists are afforded extremely wide latitude in rephrasing and creatively reformulating what was originally said by the real-life persons they interview.

Against, for example, Redeker (1996) and Sanders and Redeker (1993), direct quotation should not be considered 'objective,' but rather as *simple subjectivity* – highly rhetorical source-centred commentary, the reporter's role more appropriately cast as *content-neutral*. However, as I hope to have shown, objectivity and minimal truth-conditionality can be compositionally demonstrated when reporters, using free-indirect and especially standard indirect quote modes, creatively but carefully reformulate and re-assert original source-centred declarations, while still accurately preserving basic informational propositions contained in primary-speaker rhetoric. In this regard, journalistic objectivity, as a good-faith compositional act of perspectival re-vocalizing, can be defined as complex subjectivity.

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Notes

1.See the collection of articles edited by Gilquin and Vandelanotte (2012), for a good overview of subjectivity, subjectification, and intersubjectification

2.Citations to Peirce's published work refer to the *Collected Papers* (CP), by volume and paragraph number, followed by page number.

3.This section draws on Harry (2014), which provides a much fuller account of these stories, identification of which newspapers these particular quote examples are drawn from, a more detailed explanation of the particular Israel-Gaza conflict referenced, and why the newspaper stories and quotation segments offer a valuable opportunity for semiotic-linguistic analysis.

LOVE, IDENTIFICATION AND EQUALITY:
RATIONAL PROBLEMS IN HARRY FRANKFURT'S CONCEPT OF PERSON

Martin Montoya Camacho

Abstract: Harry Frankfurt has published *On Inequality*, but this is not the first time he has written about this subject. Frankfurt already criticized a rationalistic notion of equality on other occasions (Frankfurt, 1987 & 1997). In these works he says a rationalistic notion of equality cannot fit in with our belief that agents possess their own volitional necessities, which shape volitional structures of the human will. However, Frankfurt's explanatory connection between volitions, love and identification make it difficult to talk about personal freedom.

Key Words: inequality, moral necessities, respect, volitional structure

1. Introduction

Harry Frankfurt defends a non-Cartesian and non-standard notion of the will. For Frankfurt, agent volitions are organised in a hierarchical structure. This structure establishes the bounds of desires of the person. Volitional necessities are basic human volitions of this structure and are associated with the effort to pursue personal goals.[1] These deep necessities of the will should not be defined in terms of any cognitive process. Frankfurt also says that the designation of some agents as persons implies identifying them as agents with personal volitions. In this respect, Frankfurt identifies love as a genuine volitional necessity. Love determines personal free action. Love moves agents to adopt caring attitudes because they love someone.[2] If this assertion is true, love is also essential in making decisions about what is important to the beloved person.

This paper has three parts. In the first one I will talk about self-acceptance of the structure of the person and the requirement to accept others as persons, i.e., to act as an agent who is able to act respectfully in society. The second part is concerned with inequality; it explains why both love and rationality must work in tandem to create the conditions for the acknowledgement of others as persons. Recognition of this inequality begins with the acknowledgement of other people. Finally, I affirm that the ability to accept others as persons should be in continuous development, and is a requirement to act as a free person.

2. Acceptance and Acting as a Person

Harry Frankfurt introduced a counterexample against the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) in 1969. PAP's formulation is 'a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise.'[3] Frankfurt thinks PAP is false because a person could be responsible for what he did even if he couldn't have done otherwise. The counterexample is a new version of the Cartesian Evil Demon who is able to deceive some people by manipulating their beliefs, blocking their choices or alternate possibilities to act.[4] But the Frankfurt case goes beyond the level of cognition. These kinds of case were formulated to support intuitions in favour of an agent's moral responsibility beyond alternate possibilities, i.e. the agent's autonomy is exclusively related to volitions and freedom of the will.[5] To salvage a certain kind of freedom, the Frankfurt case shows how agents who are under a power that manipulates their cognition, want to do what the manipulator wants. Hence, in the Frankfurt case, the agent could be morally responsible for his actions because he acts according to his own desires, even if he couldn't have done otherwise. Frankfurt says this would be a case against a universal validity of the PAP, because this principle doesn't explain the agent's moral responsibility founded on the freedom of the will. Frankfurt's conclusion on this point is that a person's will is more important than his cognitive processes.

Frankfurt affirms that freedom of will can't be identified by means of a simple observation of human actions and events that are brought about by the person. Freedom of will is determined by the hierarchical structure of volitions. For this reason 'one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will.'[6] A person is provided with 'the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires.'[7] But, also, Frankfurt explains that a person is not only provided with a hierarchical structure of desires, but also possesses an ability to accept the volitional structure to act based on reflection.[8]

The notions of *person* and 'volitional structure' are distinct and separate. Persons are able to reflect on their own volitional structure. On the other hand, 'human will' is not the same as

> [S]omething that merely inclines an agent in some degree to act in a certain way. Rather, it is the notion of an effective desire – one that moves (or will or would move) a person all the way to action. Thus the notion of the will is not coextensive with the notion of what an agent intends to do.[9]

In Frankfurt's account, a capacity for reflective self-acceptance is essential for the formation of the higher-order desires in the human person. Higher-order desires are hierarchically organised by means of love and a personal reflective activity that is concerned with being a person.[10] The basic material for the

formation and effectiveness of the volitional structure is the primary desires, or what the agent intends to do. Considered together, Frankfurt's explanation of structure of desires and the manipulation of cognitive processes, we can say that, for Frankfurt, even if the manipulator has some external control over the cognitive processes of the agent, the agent still has an inner condition of freedom founded on the structure of his will and reflective self-acceptance.

Now, let us consider what happens with self-acceptance defined as the identification of the person with his own desires. Because not only is the hierarchical structure of desires important for the person, but also the self-acceptance of that structure, both of which are required to be concerned with people, otherwise the ordinary experiences in human life would be only a series of confrontations with others. Through the identification of persons with their own desires, agents should act according to what they want and know about living as persons. This is an interesting idea because the will of the person is the essence of human acts. But the person also needs to identify what he wants to do regarding other people. Frankfurt seems to suggest that a typical necessity for personal identification of desires and possible actions is *love*. *Love* leads us to identify and take care of our genuine volitional necessities.

In Frankfurt's view, *love* cannot be assimilated by the volitional structure. In fact, if love is no more than a kind of desire in the hierarchical structure, then it is not suitable to discover our genuine volitional necessities. *Love* must be at the level of the essential characteristics of the person. Like the person, *love* shouldn't be identified with the basic structure of desires or any elements in it.[11] Therefore, *love* can shape the desires of the volitional structure of the agent through identifying what he loves for himself. Accordingly, what we love shapes our volitions and expands what we think are our options to act.

Love is a kind of power required to identify what the person is able to care about. Frankfurt seems to say that by means of love we can identify our desires, the priority among them, and the main objects of our care. As a consequence, according to Frankfurt, we discover through love both what we are and what we care about. This kind of knowledge based on identification of volitions is what makes us *persons*, and therefore, able to act as *persons*. Accordingly, for Frankfurt, to be able to act as a person is impossible without love and self-acceptance as a person, i.e. the agent must love himself as a person to be self-known as such. This self-love extends beyond the limits of the person's own volitional structure.

For Frankfurt, the objects of personal caring, that are loved by the person, represent the motives of his personal actions.[12] For that reason, the main objectives of caring for a human person are his genuine volitional necessities, or particular objectives that freely determine personal actions. Shaped by *love*, the

agent selects what to take care of using all of his hierarchical structure.[13] These objectives, however, need to be cognitive in some aspects to be identified.

To be consistent with the social condition of the person, we need to say that the ability for self-acceptance of the person must be completed by another ability, otherwise, the volitional structure would be able to identify desires of the self, but not those of others. In fact, if persons can only identify and love themselves and their own volitional structures, they would be irretrievably locked in their own volitional necessities. Love should be enough to go beyond the bounds of human will. If this is not the case, the person is unable to act socially.

At this point, we can say the agent needs to be disposed to both self-acceptance and the acceptance of others to act as a person. The disposition to acceptance of others moves the person to think about the other person's necessities. This disposition is based on personal inequality and is required to be connected with rational decision-making. Otherwise, agents are not able to respect other people's necessities in the ordinary decisions of their lives.

3. Moral Necessities of the Person and the Agent's Decision-Making

In this section we are be concerned with the relationship between love and cognitive processes. Frankfurt's works offer many attempts to refute an ideal position in which the epistemic foundations of egalitarianism can be taken as the basis of a logical decision-making process of the agent. For Frankfurt, 'the fundamental error of egalitarianism lies in supporting that it is morally important whether one person has less than another regardless of how much either of them has.'[14] This means that, for the person, what must be important for an evaluation of the social condition is not the comparative situation of the agent with other people, but the degree of satisfaction of the agent's personal necessities.

Harry Frankfurt explains that 'there is no necessary conceptual connection between a person's economic relative position and whether he has needs of any degree of urgency.'[15] For Frankfurt, from a perspective of personal values, if the conceptual connection between personal necessities and the rational requirements to act does not exist, then the agent cannot perceive the egalitarian requirements as an urgent reason to act in a specific moment. According to Frankfurt, the decision to help other people is not a function of a comparative process, but of *love*.[16]

Frankfurt makes his position about a rational process of decision-making manifest by refuting Thomas Nagel's position about the differences among people. For Nagel, a principle 'establishes an order of priority among needs and gives preference to the most urgent.'[17] Frankfurt contradicts Nagel's account, saying: 'But the preference actually assigned by the Difference Principle is not in favour of those whose

needs are most urgent; it is in favour of those who are identified as worst off.'[18] So, there may be cases such that *the worst off people* do not need any help because to be in the *worse off situation* is not the same as *one's basic necessities are not satisfied*. Therefore, although Nagel's principle can set some priority according to the logic of maximising profit, it may not necessarily determine what the agent needs. Thus, Frankfurt again denies that general principles, like PAP, reveal the real needs of people. For Frankfurt, what constitute our decision-making processes are the reasons that love reveals. And these reasons forge our volitional necessities.[19]

Therefore, for Frankfurt, what is important for the agent and what moves him to action is not the product of a rationalistic mental process that in comparing the rational objects would find advantages or disadvantages among them. Because this kind of mental process is not essential for the person, it cannot resolve the main questions of personal life.[20] Frankfurt's defence of the essential role of personal necessities within the decision-making process is an attempt to protect the personal condition of the agent that permits respect for people. From the Frankfurtian point of view, the person has a necessary ability to accept other people, originating from the identification of personal needs. The agent identifies other persons, and accepts their personal conditions through love. But problems in Frankfurt's account can arise if the *love* that supports this ability is disconnected from the cognitive or reflective decision-making processes. If love is not an integral part of the agent's reflective processes, then the person cannot act as a social agent because he cannot make decisions considering other persons.

Frankfurt rejects a logical maximisation of benefits as a rational process in human life. Actually, this type of rational process is not the only basis upon which to justify human decisions to act. In addition, Frankfurt wants to protect the deep necessities from any extrinsic manipulation so that they can be genuine necessities (e.g. in the PAP counterexample). For this reason, he avoids any relationship between a comparative process in decision-making and love in the formation of the personal volitional necessities. However, eliminating this kind of rationality from the process of shaping the volitional structure could lead to the conclusion that a rational requirement in making choices regarding our own wills is unnecessary. Persons without this rationality cannot recognise others as persons.

Love is required to support a rational decision-making process, otherwise, the ability to accept others cannot be used as support in making decisions about one's personal self-acceptance as an agent with moral possibility. Being morally responsible implies having reasons to act that are chosen with the knowledge of what is better or worse for the self and others. Love and rationality must be applied jointly in the decision-making process, because love and reason are fundamental for self-acceptance and acceptance of others as persons. To make a decision about the beloved, the person needs a connection between volitional self-acceptance and a rational acceptance of others. Personal moral choices must come from both love and cognitive processes to have reasons to act in a personal way.[21] Without both of these elements, how can we identify personal moral needs and genuine volitional necessities, such as the respect for people?

4. Personal Epistemic Condition for Respect and Inequality

Frankfurt's approach to social issues, such as *equality* and *respect*, is closely linked to *love* and rational processes as conditions to 'act as persons.' He clearly states this question, pointing out the difference between two kinds of human agents who are divided into wantons and persons.[22] While the former is a creature without the relevant consciousness to act coherently, persons are able to act according their own personal desires.[23] This idea means that people require a relevant way to know and reflect on their own desires, and to reflect on and assess the moral correctness of their choices.[24] The social relevance of these distinctions is clear, not only in the public sense of morality, but also in the personal one, which is required to build a respectful society for persons. A person is someone who is able to *act as a person* with other persons.

For Frankfurt, a wanton's life is incoherent because it is broken and is lived through a set of disjointed episodes. However, the wanton does perceive these episodes at some level.[25] The wanton wants according to his structure of desires but is not able to want as a person. By contrast, persons maintain their caring for the beloved over time.

The assertion that the wanton is not a person because constitutively he cannot act like a person is not relevant in this discussion. Understanding the wanton as an incomplete person in terms of constitutive characteristics would lead us to an ontological discussion, which is not our concern.[26] A sufficient condition to talk about respect and inequality is to say that the wanton's behaviour is socially incoherent because his loving and reflective processes are disconnected. Even though he perceives that he needs to care for others, he cannot do so. Wantons do not have the relevant condition for their own freedom of the will, i.e., control over their personal desires. Therefore, we can understand the wanton's status as a non-social agent who needs help integrating his inner processes.

Identification as a kind of ability to accept others is required for respecting people. But the effectiveness of this concept requires another one: that the person must possess an effective and growing ability to identify personal conditions of others in order to reflect in a richer and more dynamic way. This ability

is what gives us the freedom to act morally. In this way, *acting as a person* is to be respectful of the personal conditions and the choices of others, i.e. the acceptance of others with their personal lives and choices. This acceptance is not devoid of interest, but rather requires the adoption of a caring attitude. A good example of this is the relationship between parents and children, also present in Frankfurt's work. In a world with this personal condition, the life of a human person will necessarily be respected because personal choices are always shifting.

The power of the manipulator to block personal choices in the Frankfurt cases is a good metaphor for a certain cognitive pessimism. With this blockage, wantons are looking for the effectiveness of their desires only in a cognitive way, but without the personal loving condition, which provides the power to choose, using their volitions to act as persons. The wanton is unable to make decisions as a person. His condition will be not personal, but as a manipulated being. A world of wantons does not need any real manipulator because the main problem is the unarticulated and weak relationship between love and the reflective processes in decision-making.

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Notes

1. Harry Frankfurt (*The Importance of What We Care About.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [1988]: 85-86; 181-182).
2. Harry Frankfurt, "Taking Ourselves Seriously," in *Taking Ourselves Seriously & Getting It Right*, ed. Debra Satz (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 44-45. Also, Frankfurt says: 'Only by virtue of the necessity that it imposes upon us does love intensify our sense of identity and of freedom.' Harry Frankfurt, *Necessity, Volition and Love* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 114. Nonetheless, Frankfurt has not satisfactory answer about how this kind of love would be a rational way to act, and not a blind force in our life.
3. Frankfurt, 1988, 1.
4. This is a broad interpretation of the Frankfurtian counterexample that is shown through the Frankfurt cases' debate. See David Widerker, Alfred Mele, David Robb and

Carlos Moya discussions about the topic. David Widerker ("A defence of Frankfurtian-friendly libertarianism", *Philosophical Explorations* 12 [2009]: 87-108); Alfred Mele & David Robb ("Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases", *The Philosophical Review* 107 [1998]: 97-112); Carlos Moya ("Blockage Cases: No case against PAP", *Crítica* 35 [2009], 109-120).
5. In this sense, Frankfurt case allows a room for a kind of autonomy derived of love's labour in the human will. Frankfurt explains that 'a person acts autonomously only when his volitions derive from the essential character of his will. […] When he acts out of love, accordingly, his volitions do derive from the essential character of his will. Thus, the personal grip of love satisfies the conditions for autonomy' Frankfurt, 1999, 132.
6. Frankfurt, 1988, 12.
7. Frankfurt, 1988, 12.
8. See Harry Frankfurt, *The Reasons of Love* (Princeton, USA: Princeton University Press, 2004), 18-19.
9. Frankfurt, 1988, 14.
10. 'In those senses of the word [person] which are of greater philosophical interest, however, the criteria for being a person do not serve primarily to distinguish the members of our own species form the members of other species. Rather, they are designed to capture those attributes which are the subject of our most humane concern with ourselves and the source of what we regard as most important and most problematic in our lives' Frankfurt, 1988, 12.
11. 'The heart of love, however, is neither affective nor cognitive. It is volitional. That a person cares about or that he loves something has less to do with how things make him feel, or with his opinions about them, than with the more or less stable motivational structures that shape his preferences and that guide and limit his conduct.' Frankfurt, 1999, 129.
12. See Harry Frankfurt, "Taking Ourselves Seriously," in *Taking Ourselves Seriously & Getting It Right*, ed. Debra Satz (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 1-26.
13. In this respect Frankfurt says that genuine necessity of the will should be susceptible to alteration, but not in the same sense as inhibitions or aversions (Frankfurt, 1999, 112). These necessities are required for personal autonomy. But 'what autonomy requires is not that the essential nature of the will be a priori, but that the imperatives deriving from it carry genuine authority. Kant insists that the requisite authority can be provided only by the necessities of reason. I believe that it can also be provided by those of active love.' Frankfurt, 1999, 135.
14. Harry Frankfurt ("Equality as a Moral Ideal", *Ethics* 98 [1987]: 34).
15. Frankfurt, 1987, 35.
16. See Frankfurt, 1987, 36.
17. Thomas Nagel ("Equality," *Mortal Questions* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979], 117).
18. Frankfurt, 1987, 35.
19. See Frankfurt, 1987, 38-40
20. Frankfurt, explaining what is the essential nature of a person, says: "the essential nature of triangles, or of triangularity, includes the characteristics that any figure correctly identified as triangular must necessarily possess. […] The essential identity of an individual differs, however, from that of a type of thing. The essence of triangularity is an a priori matter of definitional or conceptual necessity. The essence of a person, on the other hand, is a matter of

the contingent volitional necessities by which the will of the person is as a matter of fact constrained.' Frankfurt, 1999, 138.

21. See, e.g., Christine Korsgaard, "Morality and the Logic of Caring", in *Taking Ourselves Seriously & Getting It Right*, ed. Debra Satz (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 74-75.

22. Frankfurt, 1988, 16.

23. This statement is concerned with Harry Frankfurt's discussion on drug's consumers. Addicts who are not able to reflect on his first-order desires cannot be identified as persons, because 'his actions reflect the economy of his first-order desires, without his being concerned whether the desires that move him to act are desires by which he wants to be moved to act.' Frankfurt, 1988, 18.

24. 'The wanton addict cannot or does not care which of his conflicting first-order wins out. His lack of concern is not due to his inability to find a convincing basis for preference. It is due either to his lack of the capacity for reflection or to his mindless indifference to the enterprise of evaluating his own desires and motives.' Frankfurt, 1988, 18-19.

25. 'When a person acts, the desire by which he is moved is either the will he wants or a will he wants to be without. When a wanton acts, it is neither.' Frankfurt, 1988, 19.

26. It seems that, for Frankfurt, wanton is a human being, and the respect due to him is about this condition, beyond another ontological consideration. For Frankfurt all humans have the ability to form second-order desires: 'Human beings are not alone in having desires and motives, or in making choices. They share these things whit the members of certain other species, some of whom even appear to engage in deliberation and to make decisions based upon prior thought. It seems to be peculiarly characteristic of humans, however, that they are able to form what I shall call 'second-order desires' or 'desires of the second order' Frankfurt, 1988, 12. Also, all humans 'appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires.' Frankfurt, 1988, 12. The problem with the wanton is that he 'may act wantonly, in response to first-order desires concerning which they have no volitions of the second order, more or less frequently.' Frankfurt, 1988, 17.

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