

APPRAISAL

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Thomas O. Buford

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Global Bioethics?*

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*Bonhoeffer's Problem with the Past:
Personal and Historical Identity in Act and Being*

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A Synthesis of James and Scheler*

Benjamin Bâcle

*The Accidental Personalist:
Samuel Taylor Coleridge and the Benefits of Failure*



Appraisal

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- From time to time *Appraisal* will include *Re-Appraisals*, articles or collections of articles upon 20th C. thinkers whose work deserves to be more widely known.
- *Appraisal* takes a particular, but by no means exclusive, interest in the works of Austin Farrer, John Macmurray, and Michael Polanyi.

Format:

- The maximum length of articles is 10,000 words, although longer articles can be split into 2 parts for publication in successive issues.
- All contributions should be in good, clear English, without jargon, and with end-notes and frequent sub-headings (at approximately every 700 words).
- Please see inside rear cover regarding references to the works of Michael Polanyi.
- **Please ask for the Style Sheet or save or print it from our web site:**

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Notes on this issue's contributors

Thomas O. Buford was awarded received his Ph.D. from Boston University where he studied under Peter A. Bertocci, the most distinguished Personalist of his generation. He taught at Kentucky Southern College, University of North Texas, and Furman University. A member of Phi Beta Kappa, Buford co-founded the International Forum on Person with Charles Conti, the distinguished British Personalist, who taught for many years at the University of Sussex. Buford has written or edited 12 books, contributed essays to numerous edited books, and published over fifty articles in professional journals. He also founded the journal, *The Personalist Forum*, now *The Pluralist*. During his career, he developed a Social Personalism, in response to the individualistic Personalism of Bertocci, and Brightman.

Richard Prust lives in Chapel Hill, NC, where he putters away at a book on personal identity in moral and legal reasoning. He is active in the International Forum on Persons. Before retiring, he taught philosophy at St. Andrews University in North Carolina. His book, *Wholeness: the Character Logic of Christian Belief*, is published by Rodopi Press.

Paul E. Wilson is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religion and CAPE Site Coordinator for Shaw University, North Carolina, where he is also a Distance Education Trainer and online instructor. His areas of interest are ethics, philosophy of religion, personalism, and online learning. Some of his essays have appeared in the *Journal of Social Philosophy*, *Journal of Business Ethics*, *Vetus Testamentum*, and the *Journal for Philosophy in the Contemporary World*. He has served as the editor of the online journal of the North Carolina Religious Studies Association (NCRSA), *Thinking About Religion*. At the 2015 Fall Forum of the North Carolina Association of College and Teacher Educators he introduced his course design plan, "A SMART Checkpoint and Flowchart System for Online Course Design." He continues to do research on non-violence, and delivered an essay at the 2015 meeting of the Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World, "Finding Moral Casualties in Wartime Fatalities."

Greg Moses holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Texas at Austin. He teaches philosophy at Texas State University and St. Edwards University. He is author of *Revolution of Conscience: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Philosophy of Nonviolence* and co-editor, with Gail Presbey, of *Peace Philosophy and Public Life*.

J. Edward Hackett is an ethicist who draws inspiration from phenomenology and pragmatism to tackle issues in meta-ethics, philosophical anthropology, and value theory. He received his Ph.D. from Southern Illinois University Carbondale back in May 2013 and has been exploring the connections between phenomenology and pragmatism ever since. Currently, he resides in Northeast Ohio with his wife, Ashley, and their cat, Olive.

Benjamin Bâcle is a Teaching Fellow in French at University College London. His research (and part of his teaching) focuses on the nineteenth-century thinkers who, in the wake of Samuel Taylor Coleridge in Great Britain and Maine de Biran in France, endeavoured to refute the premises of Jeremy Bentham's Utilitarianism, as well as to show its detrimental effects on personal fulfilment and social justice.

EDITORIAL

Autumn has turned, quite imperceptibly, to winter, bringing us back, once more to the cold, dark stub of the year. Or, in fact, not so much cold as depressingly damp. This may be, as the late and legendary Terry Pratchett said, the time of year to be ‘jolly, with mistletoe and holly – and other things ending in “olly”,’ but the world outside remains grey and gloomy. So let us leave this dark season to its rags of rotting leaves. We shall, instead, return to the warm, wide days of summer, when the sun could still be bothered to do a proper day’s work.

Summer days offer bright reflections indeed. In this issue we bring you a tightly packed selection of the very best papers from the 10th Biennial Personalist Seminar, held at Western Carolina University. This seminar, affectionately known as the ‘Personalist Summer Camp’ is organised by Jim McLachlan and we are grateful to him for encouraging participants to send their papers to us.

Although the lives and works of Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Martin Luther King Jr. provided the Seminar’s theme, presenters roamed far and wide across the intellectual landscape. Thus, we bring you a thought experiment devised by Dr. Paul E. Wilson, which puts each man in the shoes of the other and so reveals a deeper insight into the ways in which they struggled with their own oppression and violence. Sticking with the theme, we also have one of the ‘big hitters’ in the American Personalist leagues, the venerable Professor Richard Prust. A beautifully concise piece on Bonhoeffer’s Philosophy of Action, this; specifically, his failure to accommodate the past in narratives of personal and religious identity. No windy and rhapsodical chat from our Prust. Good things come in small packages, they say; and many is the author – present company very much excepted, of course – who could learn a thing or two from this precise and nicely focused analysis.

Sticking with the broad theme of oppression, Dr. Greg Moses brings us some exciting new scholarship in a hitherto unexplored field. His paper concerns the little known, but very important, African American philosopher J. Leonard Farmer Sr., father of James Farmer Jr. Given the son’s prominent role as a Civil Rights leader and organiser of the legendary Freedom Rides, Dr. Moses’ work on the father’s Philosophy of Hope will undoubtedly prove essential to understanding of the intellectual foundations of the Civil Rights movement.

Bucking the thematic trend more directly, Dr. J. Edward Hackett, weaves together William James and Max Scheler into what he terms ‘Integral Personalism’. This is an attempt, both fascinating and brave, to integrate phenomenology and pragmatism within a richly personalist framework.

Topping the bill, we have one of the biggest of all the big cheeses in American Personalism, a *Grand Fromage* of distinguished philosophical stock: Professor Thomas O. Buford. Professor Buford studied under Peter Bertocci, the most distinguished American Personalist of his generation. Bertocci, of course, studied under Edgar Sheffield Brightman, the most distinguished American Personalist of the 20th Century, who, in turn, studied under Borden Parker Bowne, the founder of American Personalism.

Professor Buford’s thoughts turn here to Bioethics and the troubling issues around the development of a genuinely global moral vision. This is part of a much larger project concerning Personalist Bioethics and we look forward to seeing more of it in the future. (Readers may also be interested in his entry in the 2015 edition of the *Encyclopedia of Global Bioethics*.)

Last, but by no means least, we have a paper by one of the newest members of the British Personalist Forum, Dr. Benjamin Bâcle. Despite being duly warned, Dr Bâcle bravely turned up at our Oxford conference last year and took the king’s shilling. We are very pleased to bring you his most excellent discussion of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, the poet’s apparent short-comings as a philosopher and systematiser, and, consequently, his great value and interest to personalist thinkers.

Those, then, are our tidings for this Yuletide season and we hope they brings you considerable comfort and joy for the duration. Before leaving you merry gentlemen and gentlewomen to your reading, however, a word about coming events. Plans are afoot among the BPF Committee to hold yet another conference, this time at York St. John University during the summer. Provisional dates have been set for the w/c 21st of June; the theme will ‘Philosophies of the Person: New Horizons and Perspectives’, which we hope will attract a wide range of ideas. More details will appear on the website in due course, so do please keep an eye out. Speaking on behalf of the committee, we should very much like to see you there.

Readers might also like to know that 2016 is the 20th Anniversary of our august assembly. We would all, I am sure, like to celebrate this and, most particularly, thank our founder, Richard Allen. Thus, if anyone has any ideas about how we might do this in spectacular style, feel free to contact either me or Dr. Anna Castriota, secretary of our society and human dynamo.

On which cheery note, allow me to wish you all the very best for the balance of the year and bid you a bauble-bedecked *adieu*.

A Merry Christmas to all, and to all a goodnight.
Simon Smith

ANNOUNCEMENT

Internet Encyclopedia of Personalism

A New International Resource for Personalist Scholarship

Funded by a grant from *Think Tank Cura*

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The Objective: An Internet Encyclopedia of Personalism

The Internet Encyclopedia of Personalism will be a peer-reviewed, open-access resource for researchers and teachers, scholars and students, and all who have an interest in the field of Personalism.

The Encyclopedia will cover all the themes and topics central to Personalist thought in philosophy and other relevant fields of scholarship. Each article will be written and reviewed by experts in order to reflect the best historical and contemporary research available, thereby maintaining the highest possible standards of scholarship throughout.

Mission Statement

We aim to facilitate discussion and understanding of the wide variety of ideas and approaches that come under the umbrella of Personalist thought. In pursuing this, we hope to contribute to the shape and structure of Personalism as a field of scholarship and to the discipline of philosophy as a whole.

In the service of this mission, the Encyclopedia pursues the following goals:

- To reflect the highest standards of scholarship
- To function as a point of contact or "hub" enabling individuals and societies with an interest in Personalist thought to contact one another and network
- To track research and publications of interest to scholars in the field
- To work toward translation of content into multiple languages
- To develop teaching materials based on the research included in the Encyclopedia

As the project is now in the initiation phase, comments and inquiries are very welcome. In particular, the Senior Editors, Editorial Board, and Project Organizers are seeking:

Scholars interested in contributing articles to the Encyclopedia
Scholars interested in serving as Content Editors

**Please email us with your thoughts/ideas/suggestions at
encyclopersonalism@gmail.com**

WHAT CAN PERSONALISM CONTRIBUTE TO BIOETHICS?

Thomas O. Buford

Abstract: This paper principally raises a question about the possibility of a universal moral standard, which would underpin a global bioethics. In so doing, it becomes clear that the time has come to re-examine the concept 'person', especially given the continuing hold Enlightenment thinking has on the Western mind. Following a brief history of the formation of global bioethics, different approaches to personalism are identified and, in particular, the ethical thought of Brightman, Bowne, Bertocci, and Macmurray is discussed. After examining some tough cases, our conclusion is that Personalism has not, but certainly could, provide the basis for a genuinely global bioethics.

Key Words: Boston personalism, bioethics, ethics, global, idealism, ironic impersonalism, realism, relational personalism, Peter A. Bertocci, E. S. Brightman, Borden Parker Bowne, John Macmurray.

1. Introduction

In this paper I shall to set before you a problem, place it in its context, and consider what, if anything, Personalism can contribute to finding an answer.

First, the problem. Let's begin by asking Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. to state the question: '...is it possible,' he asks, 'to establish a single, content-full canonical bioethics that can justify a global approach to health care policy and law.'¹ For Englehardt that issue requires an understanding of humans. He says, 'For centuries it had been taken for granted that human beings have a nature, with a directedness or intentionality that point us beyond the natural world.'² Since we are under the influence of the Enlightenment, he asks a second question, '[i]s it time for a more open and engaged revisiting of this understanding of our human nature?'³ That simple question asks that we revisit our understanding of human nature.

Our concern is what, if anything, can Personalism contribute to a better understanding of human nature and to a canonical, richly textured, and defensible universal ethic. Now, let's gain a better understanding of the problem by defining some central terms, and reviewing the context of the issue, specifically its history and formation into the field of Global Bioethics.

2. Some Definitions

First, how best understand 'Canonical?' Canonical seems to mean for Englehardt a rich, fully developed ethic accepted as being accurate and authoritative and content-full, such as the ethical mores of Philippine culture. Another example of 'authoritative' could be

the way of life of a conservative, small East Texas town and its organisations such as First Baptist Church, Overton High School, Boy Scout Troop 319, all deeply Southern racist and male chauvinistic. The way of the people in that small town was authoritative, canonical. Step out of line, and one soon heard about it. Having grown up there, I understood what and how to do everything social. My ethic was a way of life, more subliminal than overt; it was among friends and not strangers; unwritten; taken for granted; obvious except it is written in the Bible, as read through the eyes of the Reformed tradition, i.e. John Calvin. That way was canonical for our community, the authority of which came under devastating criticism when in the 1960's the notion of a cultural authority came under sustained attack. When I moved to Boston in 1958, my Texas ethic did not work; it was viewed as quaint. Through our time in Boston we continued to live by the best light we had but we modified our expectations.

Next, what is ethics? Let's follow the great American Personalist, Edgar Sheffield Brightman, and define ethics as 'the normative science of the principles (or laws) of the best types of human conduct.'⁴ Given this Kantian influenced definition there are three basic concepts in ethics: 'law (principles), value (the good), and obligation (ought, duty).'⁵ Next, to what do 'bio' and 'global' refer? 'Bio' refers to the totality of the natural, social environments in which present and future humans find themselves, live their lives. 'Global' refers to the whole existence in which we live, thus it involves geography and culture and ethics, how we ought to live.

Finally, what does Personalism mean? For clarification, Personalists claim that the person is the key to correct insight into reality, and to the place of persons in it. Other than giving centrality to person, Personalism has no other set of principles or unified doctrine. Personalists also defend the primacy and importance of persons against any attempt to reduce persons either to the impersonalism of an infrastructure, such as scientific naturalism, or supra-structure, such as metaphysical absolutism. Personalists focus on the concerns of persons living in interpersonal relationships in a personal world. Between the Scylla and Charybdis of either type of impersonalism, Personalists trace the origin of the concept of person and the development of metaphysical and ethical Personalism from the ancient world to its flowering in Europe and America. Now let's turn to the context of Global Bioethics, considered historically.

3. Context

When bioethics expanded its scope in the late 1990s to Global Bioethics it was motivated primarily by globalisation, which developed through the growth of an international economy, health care options, and real time communication. 'Global' as we have seen refers to all the cultures and natural environments in which humans live, including medicine, telecommunications, and economics. Globalisation, through expanding economic relations, helped expose the many different and often conflicting cultures of the world. Part of that expansion included medical technology not formerly available in the developing world. Their uses brought into bold relief different cultural mores including the limits of individual responsibility and the role of the family in making medical decisions for the family and in death. While seriously questioning the possibility of a universal or global ethical position, Global Bioethics focuses not only on medical issues but also on the natural environment, society, culture, and fostering human survival, present and future. It also rests on assumption about the dignity and the value of human personality.

Global Bioethics was initially espoused by a German pastor, Herman Jahrs back in 1927 (he coined the term 'bioethics'). He explored Biblical and philosophical resources for surviving in this world as now understood. However Jahrs is not credited with founding Global Bioethics as an academic discipline. He did not pursue and develop his own insights, and had no impact on the discussions of the time. The honorific, 'Founding fathers', belongs to others: Aldo Leopold, V. R. Potter, Daniel Callahan, and Jim Childress. Writing in the legacy of Aldo Leopold, and following his own research in oncology at the University of Wisconsin (1971), V. R. Potter believed bioethics to be a new discipline, combining science and philosophy, with wisdom as its goal. According to Porter this new academic discipline combines knowledge of living systems, the contribution of science (anthropology, sociology, biology and chemistry, and physics; we could usefully add the earth sciences such as geology) and the humanities, and the knowledge of human value systems, the contribution of Philosophy and Theology. Their interdisciplinary goal would be the survival of human life through the development of a conscience for a technological culture. Six months after Potter's publication in 1971, Andre Hellegers used the term in founding the Kennedy Center at Georgetown University. Following soon after was the work of another founding father, Daniel Callahan, who, in 1973, characterised Bioethics as a new discipline.

This interdisciplinary emphasis pre-dated the fields of medical ethics and environmental ethics, two fields that Potter distinguished and coined in the early 1970s; they can be considered to be sub-fields of Global Bioethics. As these two ascended they nar-

rowed the field and Global Bioethics lost its emphasis on 'bio' as well as Potter's interdisciplinary vision. With globalisation, the original focus returned, now emphasising the varied mores and moral standards of human life, personality, and nature of different cultures. If one lives within a non-American culture, its ethical mores can be thought of as friendly to those living in it, and American culture, with its individualism and technological and cultural mores, as 'strangers.'

Although its adherents rarely, if ever, mention it, Global Ethics can be understood as focusing on and reorienting the ancient admonition, Know Thyself. Historically, such knowledge came through knowing Reality, one's ultimate environment and one's relation to it; or, knowing reality conveys how one ought to behave. That view, famously developed by Ancient Greek Philosophers, interpreted the oracle at Delphi. Later, Augustine and Aquinas did so as Christians during the High Middle Ages. For Christians, that meant knowing God through Jesus the Christ, knowing God's will for one's life and acting accordingly, or through God, knowing one's calling. After all, persons are made in the image of God. To know oneself, one must know God. However, their view lost traction during the Renaissance and early modern periods with the development of modern science, physics, and chemistry. New traction was found in the 19th century with the development of biology and Darwin's theory of evolution. Self-knowledge meant one's knowing reality; reality from a metaphysical naturalist's perspective is one's situation in nature, specifically, one's place and role in the evolutionary scheme of nature. John Dewey can be read that way as well as the great Samuel Alexander's exposition and advocacy of naturalism, *Space, Time, Deity*. From this perspective, Englehardt can accurately observe and lament that 'Enlightenment thinking has... attempted to rationalise and naturalise the human in a manner that rejects any transcendent dimension, as if human beings were only in this world.'⁶

To sum up, in its early formulations Bioethics referred to the best way to live life, or simply to the best way to survive, or how we and those who follow us ought to survive. Later, bioethics was narrowed by Childress to refer to medical practice, or how physicians ought to relate to their patients, including patients right to know and the right to make informed decisions. Bioethics occasionally included environmental concerns, but that field split off with its own issues and approaches. Recently, under globalisation Bioethics has renewed its call for a global ethics, even facing the difficulties just noted. To make those difficulties more concrete, let's consider some cases to test the usefulness of the types of Personalism we shall discuss in this paper.

Though these are from the Philippines, they are the kind of problems Global Bioethicists face in various countries such as Africa, China, Japan, South

East Asia, the Middle East, and Indonesia.

4. Cases

I. The Family and Health Care Practices: ‘Basilia, a 75 year old active diabetic female requires amputation of her gangrenous right leg. Basilia’s daughter, knowing that her mother will refuse surgery gives consent, instructing the surgeon not to inform her mother.’⁷

II. Ethical Issues in Caring for the Elderly: ‘An 81 year old single female suffering from chronic obstructive lung disease refuses to continue taking food and medications because she feels she is a burden to her niece. She lives with her niece, who regards caring for her aunt as her duty – not only because her aunt sent her to college but also because her aunt took care of her from birth.’⁸

III. Personal Loyalty vs. Professional Integrity: Direk, a 52 year-old internist, is the director of a 150-bed hospital. His responsibilities include approving drug purchases by the hospital pharmacy. Kabayan, a townmate and former medical school classmate who dropped out of medical school and formed a drug company, approaches Direk to purchase antibiotics from the Katyaban Drug Company.

When Direk and Kayban were students they were like brothers. Kabayan even lent money to Direk to assist in paying his tuition. Direk notes, however, that the prices of Kabayan’s drugs are 30-40 percent higher than other bidders. Direk also knows that Kabayan’s company was banned a couple of years ago because his drugs caused untoward side effects, such as rashes and urticaria. Kabayan assures Direk that his drugs have been tested and approved. He explains that this is why the current prices of his drugs are higher.⁹

IV: Ethical Issues in the PICU, death: ‘C. B., a six month old female, was admitted for ventilator support in the PICU with a diagnosis of bacterial meningitis, hypoxic encephalopathy aspiration pneumonia, and recent cardiac arrest. She was comatose and apneic, with absent reflexes. The medical team felt the prognosis was very poor and discussed with the family the concept of brain death. The parents insisted that all medical support be given at any cost because this child was precious, the youngest of three children. On the fourth hospital day, C. B. died. The family had an unsettled hospital bill of P7,000.00.’¹⁰

5. Failure of Consensus

Through the first half of the twentieth century, many believed a consensus was forming that could be articulated by such scholars as Walter Muelder, Dean of the School of Theology at Boston University.¹¹ That belief preceded and paralleled the foundation of the United Nations and was stated in the UNESCO Declaration of Human Rights (given to committee in

1943, adopted by United Nations in 1948, signed by its member nations.) A prominent French Catholic Personalist, Jacques Maritain, helped formulate the declaration. Since, Personalism espouses the dignity and value of human personality and the interrelation of persons in society it is only reasonable to examine Personalism’s significance for Global Bioethics.

5.1 Problems with the possibility of a universal ethic

The development of globalisation, the real-time communication such as the Internet, international business, and earlier activities of the UN to promote peace through understanding spawned great optimism. Ironically, however, it soon became evident that, along with the act of doing business and communication came the recognition of deep cultural differences in ethical standards and practices. This is particularly noticeable in areas of health care such as informed consent, the process of dying, and in other areas such as the land and the values of the culture. Travelling companion with these differences was the belief that the exportation of health care and views of informed consent of individuals was a new form of American intellectual colonialism. This reduced the former optimism to scepticism about the possibility of any code of universal ethical norms. That was a test case for the optimistic Enlightenment belief that a universal system of ethics could be grounded in the employment of reason guided by scientific procedures. Nevertheless, some believe that a universal ethic can and will be developed. That belief is encouraged by some Personalists whose optimism is rooted in a rich view of person. But which view of person is best and how can it be most useful to us? What is the basis of dignity and value of persons?

6. Personalism and Ethics in Global Bioethics

A central problem facing Global Bioethics is developing a rich and robust ethics in light of seemingly intractable differences among cultures such as American and Western Individualism and South and South East Asian emphasis on the family (deeply influenced by Buddhism and Confucianism). Since the signing of the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, efforts have continued to establish ‘a universal human rights regime.’¹² However, a two tiered system appeals to many engaged in this conversation: thin universal principles and thick local ways. That seems to be true in the arena of international law and economic globalisation. Those facing these issues may find Personalist thought helpful, including those cultures, primarily China, where family relations are central.¹³ Among Islamic societies and cultures, human rights discussions vary between those focusing on political topics and those that emphasised non-state Islamic thought. Personalists’ views on human rights and persons could help, standing as they do in stark contrast to the Naturalism so pervasive in Western

philosophical conversation and writing. But, how can Personalism help, let's go a bit further?

Consider the three most comprehensive Personalisms

Ontological Realism or Thomistic thought – found mainly, but not exclusively among, Catholic philosophers and theologians;

Ontological Idealism – found among many in the Boston and Protestant traditions and among British Idealists;

and

Relational Personalism.

One, more recent, variety is **Organic Personalism**. This is a recent form of Personalism developed by Frederick Ferre (1933-2013). Rejecting panpsychism and personalistic idealism and influenced by Whitehead's philosophy of organism, Ferre argues for a personalistic Organicism. In *Living and Values*, he claims that persons are 'organisms with especially well-developed mental capacities leading to special needs and powers.'¹⁴ By these powers they can 'perceive and manipulate the world, can vocalize and socialize, can create language, can imagine and plan by use of symbols freed from the immediate environment, and can guide behavior by ideal norms.'¹⁵

6.1 Ontological Realism

First, according to Ontological Realism, reals exist; that is, real objects exist independently of any mind, personal or otherwise. For instance, persons exist independently of any other real, mental or otherwise, though they are created by God and do not exist on their own. These Personalists, following Boethius and Thomas Aquinas, assert that persons are substances with a rational nature. Boethius' definition of person sets the framework for development of all things personal by Aquinas and continues until this day. The nature of persons, developed by Western church rooted in Boethius' view, is *Persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia*. So runs the classic definition of Boethius. Catholic Realistic Personalism espouses and celebrates these theses: underlying their thought is a Thomistic metaphysics, a fundamental element of which is a God whose essence it is to exist, and who created the world in his image. The guiding structures of the creative act are the eternal forms. Each created being has a God given purpose and that object will or is obliged to actualise its potentiality. A dog has the built in goal to be the kind of dog it was created to be; likewise, humans have a God given end, their good, and that is to actualise their potentialities, whether organic, sensitive, or rational. To those ends humans can know the natural law and live accordingly, becoming virtuous, wise, temperate, courageous, and just. However, the person can only achieve her full potentiality through the theological virtues: faith, hope, and love. Those are imbued by the grace of God. Aquinas introduces

another element to account for the world of natural objects: matter. Nature is the union of form and matter. With these principles in mind, Aquinas attempts to account for order and purposiveness. Thomas contends that the principle of individuation lies with matter. The differences among humans are attributed to the quantity of matter each possesses and all the accidents that accompany that particular quantity. In persons it is because a soul is connected with the body that a particular person is who he or she is. The soul is immortal, but the body is not. God is that whose essence it is to exist. God can be known by faith. By indirect inference or mediate inference we can know that God can be known to exist. To prove God's existence, Thomas employs arguments drawn from Aristotle and the Greeks as well as from Augustine. But God cannot be known by reason alone as in Anselm's ontological argument. God is the first cause of all things, including matter. Since matter could not have come from pure spirit, God had to have created the world; his is a continuous creation and is the best possible world. God being Good, his will being subordinate to his intellectual grasp of the Good, could have done no other than create the best of all possible worlds.

In humans, the soul is an immaterial, subsistent form, the entelechy of the body; it is organic, sensitive, and intelligent. Humans are also rational animals; and they have a will. The rational element does not control behaviour; the will is the prime mover of the kingdom of the soul. The will acts on what reason places before it, the good. Purposiveness is always rational.

The supreme good of humans is the realisation of the self. Humans realise their true self in the knowledge of God. Humans can know the reason of God, the Good, as expressed in the eternal law. In addition, there is natural law, written in our own hearts. In light of these general principles, Realistic Personalism, in its Roman Catholic form, espouses the following principles:

1. Defence of dogma and the value of human life, rooted in biblical revelation;
2. Freedom and responsibility;
3. Totality, the therapeutic principle;
4. Respect for all persons and living things;

and

5. Sociality.¹⁶

These principles are crucial for any adequate bioethics.

6.2 Idealistic Personalism or Boston Personalism

This type of Personalism began with Borden Parker Bowne at Boston University in the late nineteenth century. It was developed and enriched by Bowne's student, Edgar Sheffield Brightman, and later by Brightman's student, Peter Anthony Bertocci. More than a position to satisfy the intellect, Boston Personalism is the statement of a way of life. These

personalists believe that philosophy begins its work in the midst of everyday living but finds there mysteries that it seeks to corner. As persons who live the fullest lives do so holistically, inclusively, and coherently, Boston Personalists seek to be synoptic and inclusive in their methodology and empirically coherent in their criterion of truth. They believe that purposive living of the life good to live requires no less. As they seek to understand the mysteries of personal living, Boston Personalists are struck by the centrality of the freedom of persons as they seek truth amid error. No genuine options, no truth or error. Preserving the freedom of the individual person and both recognising and reducing the mysteries inherent in knowing and in the nature of the framework within which they live, Boston Personalists appeal to the idea of a Cosmic Person as the Key metaphysical category. Reality in the final analysis is Personal. The framework as objective and real is the expression of Cosmic Person. More empirically coherent than any other synoptic hypothesis, Personalistic Idealism accounts for the structures of our lives and renders them intelligible.

6.2.1 Persons and Truth: In the search for the most empirically coherent interpretation of experience to guide creative living, the Boston Personalists sought truth. In this search they find a pivotal characteristic of the person to be free will. On this point, Boston Personalism turns. Bowne claimed the experience of choice among alternatives to be irreducible and necessary for the possibility of truth-finding. To claim a conclusion to be true requires the possibility that it is false. A person attempting to persuade another person that a proposition is true must assume that the person has genuine alternatives among which she can choose. Bowne argued that if the claim of a person that the conclusion of an argument is true is the outcome of psycho-physical or divine forces working their way through the brain, nervous system, or 'soul' of that person, then we cannot correctly say that the claim is based on the person's deliberating over the problem and evaluating the data presented in support of the conclusion.¹⁷ No genuine alternative, no truth or falsity. Bowne would say that the determinist proposal cannot be true or false.

The search for truth is rooted in the will of the person, who, believing she has options, throws herself 'into one side or the other in the conflict... [Her] willing is datum, as irreducible as his sensory or affective-conative data; it is the datum that issues in his sense of responsibility for his choice such as it is, successful or not, good or bad.'¹⁸ As Bertocci states it, 'Facing the alternative, if no will agency, then no discovery of truth, the personalist, in Jamesian fashion, draws himself up: my first act of free will is to believe in it!'¹⁹ Persons are agents. We are centres of activity that cannot be understood by or reduced to any mechanistic scheme. Believing that to

be is to act and to be acted upon, Bowne holds to an agent theory of the self, not a causal one.²⁰ Through our power of self-control or self-direction, we are relatively independent, though we are neither self-sufficient nor independent in any absolute sense.

In the search for truth, two characteristics of personhood become clear, reasoning and willing. Further examination led later personalists to enrich their understanding of the person. Bertocci, deeply influenced by his work in psychology, included reasoning, willing, desiring, feeling, sensing, remembering, imagining, 'oughting', aesthetic appreciation, and religious sensitivity. He called each an activity potential.

Further, all Boston Personalists agreed that persons are a unity amid changing complexity. These experiences are 'owned,' as James would say. Persons are a *unitax multiplex*, 'to use an expression of Wilhelm Stern that Brightman often borrowed.'²¹ As persons live, they change. To be recognised as change, there must be a self-conscious cognitive unity persisting *in some sense* through that change. All agreed, but they disagreed in what that means.

Bowne held to a substance view of person. He says that '...the self itself as the subject of the mental life and knowing and experiencing itself as living, and as one and the same throughout its changing experiences, is the surest item of knowledge we possess.'²² Personality '...can only be experienced as a fact.... Whenever we attempt to go behind this fact we are trying to explain the explanation.'²³ For Bowne '...be a person is to be an indivisible, self-conscious unity that itself exists through, and knows, succession.'²⁴ This unity includes '...selfhood, self-consciousness, self-control, and the power to know.'²⁵ Our thoughts and feelings are inalienably our own.

Brightman knew well his teacher's position, but in the end he rejected Bowne's view of the unity of the person. If that unity is understood as changeless, and experience is changing, what is their relation? The evidence of personal living suggests that persons active in change are affected by it. In his struggle with this issue, Brightman gave birth to temporalistic, personalistic idealism. Influenced by Bergson, Brightman came to see that Perfect Being of classical thought cannot be reconciled with the unity-in-continuity required for personal living. In place of Bowne's static 'self-identity,' Brightman inserted the process 'self-identifying.' To summarise Brightman's view, a person is 'a being for whom to be is to act and be acted upon. But I am an active being-becoming, a created unity-in-continuity who exists, as I sustain myself, in environments that enable me to change and grow and still identity my unified being-becoming, or myself, through change.'²⁶ Bertocci, learning from his work in psychology, submits that 'the person...is a self-identifying, being-becoming

agent who, maturing and learning as he interacts with the environment, develops a more or less systematic, learned unity of expression and adaptation that we may call his personality. The person-cum-personality is the total being-becoming person. But the organisation of personality(ies) reflects the quality of the person's knowing, striving, and evaluating.²⁷

We have emphasised personal living as the starting point for Boston Personalists, method, coherence as the criterion of truth, and the nature of person. Persons live in a context, a framework, and it is this to which we now turn.

6.2.2 The Framework

In the context of everyday living, Boston Personalists know that what is in us and what is beyond us is not made by us. Furthermore, though we begin philosophising in *medias res*, we cannot assume at the outset that we know 'what is the final nature of what my experiencing refers to.'²⁸ The issue is 'our knowledge' about the nature of that humanly uncreated Framework' in which we find ourselves.²⁹

To begin an exploration of their views of knowledge, Bowne, Brightman, and Bertocci are all sympathetic with Kant's view that the mind is actively engaged in knowing. The more Kantian of the three, Bowne held to the same basic pattern we find in Kant: sensation, understanding, and the self (transcendental unity of the apperception). However, to Kant's scheme of categories Bowne adds time, space, and purpose. For Bowne all experience is constructed temporally and spatially, and the conditions for this lie in the categories of time and space. These categories along with number, motion, quantity, being, quality, identity, causality, necessity, and possibility are the principles in terms of which we recognise and interpret our experience and build our knowledge. However, alone they leave isolated things and events; they do not provide for orderly unification within experience and for knowledge. To accomplish that, Bowne calls attention to the category of purpose. In purpose we find 'the elevation of causality to intelligent and volitional causality, with its implication of plan and purpose.'³⁰ Whereas Kant appeals to the transcendental unity of the apperception to account for the unity of experience and knowledge, Bowne extends this doctrine to include the purposive agent. What accounts for the unity and systematic organisation of experience and knowledge? Only a purposive causal agent can do so. Does this lead us to an essence, a substance? No, Bowne claims; 'back of experience we find no truly real of the noumenal type, but we infer or affirm a cause which is founding and maintaining the order of experience.'³¹ Implicit in Kant's insight but more fully developed in Bowne's philosophy is the experiencing, knowing, purposive agent.

Though Bowne is deeply sympathetic with Kant as he modifies and extends the Kantian scheme, he

parts company with Kant at two crucial points. First, for Kant, the self is phenomenal only; the noumenal self is beyond our knowing grasp, except possibly through the rational will. Bowne rejects this view. He says, 'A phenomenon which is not an appearance for somebody is a logical impossibility. It is possible to look upon things as phenomenal only; but to look upon the self which views these phenomena as itself phenomenal in the same sense is altogether impossible. Where there is no perceiving subject there can be no phenomena; and when we put the subject among the phenomena, the doctrine itself disappears.'³² Again, the self is neither noumenal (a kind of soul substance) nor phenomenal. Rather person is agency or causality. This view stems from Bowne's contention that all thought about reality must be rooted in experience, that apart from experience we can never be sure that our conceptions represent anything or not, and that in the 'self-conscious causality of free intelligence we find the meaning of causality and the assurance that it represents a fact.'³³ This also leads him to call his view 'transcendental empiricism,' as pointed out above.³⁴

Second, on Kant's interpretation of how experience is possible, the creative, constitutive mind tends to lose its way in its own idealistic solipsistic world. No doubt we make the world as it exists for us, *but we cannot make it anything we please*. Bowne contends that we cannot 'fill space with all manner of objects at [our] pleasure, or invert the laws of the outer world at will.'³⁵ Our cognitive constructs necessarily objectively refer to an order other than they; our knowledge never stands alone, isolated from the world. Bowne's epistemic realism manifests itself in his belief that, for all philosophies, things hang together in certain ways, such as orders of 'likeness and difference, of coexistence and sequence, and concomitant variation among the facts of experience. These are revealed only in experience, and whether we like them or not, and whether we can make anything out of them or not, they are undeniably there.'³⁶

In his attempt to give an account of this belief, Bowne appeals to the doctrine of objective reference. In its constructive activity, the knowing mind refers beyond itself to the content existing apart from the perceptive act. 'All thinking has this objective reference. It claims not to produce but to reproduce a content existing apart from the knowing act itself.'³⁷ If there were no harmony between the inner constructions of the mind and outer objects and events other than the mind, the mind could neither impose its laws and forms upon experience nor could know objects and events. On Bowne's understanding of our knowledge of the world,

the mind has the key in itself, but there must also be an objective order and fixed meaning as the presupposition of interpretation. Otherwise we should be

seeking to understand mere noises or random scratches, which would be absurd. When this thought is carried out, it implies an objective rational order parallel to our subjective thinking.³⁸

This order is no static system either of things and relations existing in some kind of natural order, or of ideas related within some cosmic mind. It is a realm of orderly change. Our lives in this world are never fixed, and neither is our knowledge of it. Our knowledge is open to change as we gain new experiences. There is no absolute randomness in it, however. As we experience it there is change, but there is also orderliness. At this point he is very close to William James; in Bowne there is clearly a pragmatic element.³⁹ Brightman arrives at a similar position, though through another route. Bowne develops his transcendental empiricism through a sympathetic critique of Kant, and Brightman appeals to phenomenology for two of his most distinctive insights, the shining present and the illuminating absent. Recognising that phenomenology, specifically that of the early Husserl, is even more abstract than the sciences and could be 'the deadly foe of metaphysics,'⁴⁰ 'yet quite possibly, the data it furnishes may be the source and nutrient of metaphysics.'⁴¹ Focusing on the immediate fact of experience, we find 'a preanalytic unified complex of conscious ongoing, which we call the shining present It is an endured span of indescribably varied experience, a given unity of consciousness without which there would not be the whole *now* we actually experience.'⁴²

Concerned that the shining present could be a sophisticated solipsism of the present moment, Brightman points out that the contents of the shining present are unintelligible without reference to something beyond itself. With reason working, the contents of the 'underived unity in experienced *duree* which constitutes the shining present' cannot be 'completely understood without postulating an absent for the purpose of illuminating the present.'⁴³ Further, the illuminating absent and the shining present are 'never... identical in any shining present.'⁴⁴ Brightman's epistemological dualism is clear. 'The empirical Personalist refuses to identify the *esse* of what is experienced in the shining present with the *esse* of the source or cause of its presence.'⁴⁵ If they didn't, error could not be explained and knowledge will always be less than certainty.

In addition to objective reference, what else can we find in the shining present? We find that reason constantly attempts 'to understand the relations and meaning of present experience in accordance with principles of order which make themselves felt in the very process of organizing.'⁴⁶ As it does so it works with what it does not create or constitute; in the shining present are 'intractable sense qualities' and a 'refractory order of sense data' that are 'inexplainable

except as effects in the shining present of the absent,' making 'sense data and their order... clues in the shining present to an illuminating absent.' From these clues we find the structure of the shining present. It is indivisible, an irreducible unity of varied consciousness, and active aspects of effort and purpose. As given, it has two aspects: the rational, and the non-rational. The rational given is (1) logical consistency and empirical coherence that function as norms 'whose validity is acknowledged even in every attempt to avoid them;' and (2) 'imperatives, norms, or principles presupposed in all valuations.'⁴⁷ The non-rational given 'describes a complex situation, namely, that there are certain aspects of experience which are irreducible qualities or processes (like colors, pains, pleasures, emotions, wants) which may be subject to further ordering in accordance with rational norms but are undeniable brute fact.'⁴⁸

As we pointed out, an understanding of the shining present requires an illuminating absent. Through objective reference and the structure of the shining present we are led to that which can help us understand our experience. But what are we to make of the illuminating absent? Brightman contends that 'from the fact that the shining present exists *nothing in particular necessarily follows about the nature of the absent*.'⁴⁹ All that the Personalist can expect is the most empirically coherent account of the illuminating absent that explains the shining present and that is in some systematic relation to a shining present. Here the Personalist is not attempting to eliminate mystery; she is attempting to corner the mystery and leave no more than is required by synopsis and empirical coherence.

Nestled within this understanding of the human person, God, the Cosmic Person, is a fully developed theory of values and ethic. The human person seeks her full development or full actualisation of her possibilities. As the person guides her life, she hopefully forms a fully developed value system, which Bertocci calls a symphony of values. First what is a value? It is 'a dynamic relation between an object and an interest.'⁵⁰ To that end, persons need moral guidance, which they receive from a fully developed ethics, which Brightman calls the moral laws. First consider their theory of value.

6.2.3 Theory of Value

As an interest, a value is whatever is liked, prized, enjoyed. If left at that, values would be relative to each person. However, we also say, 'I enjoy an apple.' The value of the apple does not stand alone as 'objective' apart from a person's experience, as far as we can tell. Rather, an apple is a value possibility, given my psychophysical constitution and the nature of the apple in relation to my constitution. As I bite into the apple, its value potentialities are realised in my enjoying it. 'Value experiences are joint products of human nature and the world.'⁵¹ In the relation and

its joint product, values, we find dependable values and dependable disvalues. A ripe apple will be enjoyed by a person who likes apples. So she continues to eat apples. But she does not enjoy raw fish and dislikes it every time she eats it. Eating raw fish is a dependable disvalue for her.

Though choices are related to a given person in a given situation that does not involve us in a moral relativism. The issue is this: 'What norms ought a person to use as he seeks to guide his choice of values.'⁵² How do we know which values are most important? We know by following this overarching principle: 'the principle of most inclusive harmony in value experience.'⁵³ 'Is there a pattern to value experiences? Yes, the basic value is existence value,' staying alive. Next, is the pursuit of health. Character follows as 'the discipline to control oneself in accordance with approved conceptions of values or ideals.'⁵⁴

Other values follow such as economic, vocational, recreational, affiliative, sensual, aesthetic, intellectual, and religious. Bertocci contends that a long standing tradition in the West supports these values.

Furthermore, creative living depends on respecting existence, character, and cognitive (truth) values. Clearly these values are related in symphonic form where we find values 'interrelated and themes, sub-themes, and harmonies and disharmonies interrelated in the ideal personality, it is harmony-in-cognitive tension.'⁵⁵ (In searching for the ideal personality we pay attention both to the ethicist and the psychologist. This is an interdisciplinary work.) In cultures throughout the world, we find different conceptions of what we expect of ourselves. Closer to home, consider the Native American Hopi.

The Hopi will tell us that people should be cheerful, keep their temper, be prudent, reliable, industrious, manly, brave, and cordial, friendly, co-operative, kindly, gentle, sympathetic, generous, thrifty, truthful and hospitable. He disapproves of a person being envious, excitable, boastful, argumentative, lazy, snobbish, or conceited, or a gossip.⁵⁶

However, all long lasting self-fulfilment rests on character and cognitive values, especially truth (empirical coherence).

6.2.4 Moral Laws

Regarding the question of principles for guiding moral choice, Bertocci and Walter Muelder appeal to a system of moral laws, first formulated by Brightman in his *Moral Laws*. Love is of supreme moral value, it enhances the full development of the human personality. How can we make defensible moral choices guided by that North Star? The moral laws help significantly. As we consider each law, keep in mind that *they are not culturally specific*. They are for any person, anywhere, in any society who seeks guidance in making moral choices. The first is this, 'as we will to love we ought to will consistently... . A moral person does not will and not will the same

ends.'⁵⁷ Second, given these ideals, all persons ought to 'recognise themselves as obligated to choose in accordance with the ideals they acknowledge.'⁵⁸ Next is the Axiological Law. All persons ought to choose values that are self-consistent, harmonious, not values that are contradictory or incoherent with each other.⁵⁹ Third is the Law of Consequences. 'All persons ought to consider, on the whole, approve of the foreseeable consequences of their choices.'⁶⁰ Fourth is 'the Law of the Best Possible. All persons ought to will the best possible values in any situation, to improve the situation.'⁶¹ Next is the Law of Specification, 'All persons ought, in any given situation, to develop the value or values specifically relevant to that situation.'⁶² 'Law of the Most Inclusive End.' 'All Persons ought to choose a coherent life in which the widest possible range of values is realized.'⁶³ Next is the 'Law of Ideal Control,' 'All persons ought to control their empirical values by ideal values.'⁶⁴ Next, consider three laws that Brightman calls the Personalistic Laws. The first is the Law of Individualism: 'Each person ought to realise in his own experience, the maximum value of which he is capable in harmony with moral law.'⁶⁵ And the second is the Law of Altruism; 'Each person ought to respect all other persons as ends in themselves, and, as far as possible, to co-operate with others in the production and enjoyment of shared values.' The last personalistic law is The Law of the Ideal Personality, which is 'All persons ought to guide and judge all their acts by their ideal conception (in harmony with the other Laws) of what the whole personality ought to become both individually and socially.'⁶⁶ The final group of laws were formulated by Muelder as additions to Brightman's formulation. They include the Law of Co-operation: 'All persons ought, as far as possible, to co-operate with other persons in the production and enjoyment of shared values.'⁶⁷ Next, is the Law of Social Devotion: 'All persons ought to devote themselves to serving the best interest of the group, and to subordinate personal gain to social gain.'⁶⁸ Next is the Law of the Ideal of Community: 'All persons ought to form and choose all of their ideals and values in loyalty of what the whole community ought to become; and to participate responsibly in groups to help them similarly choose and form all their ideal values.'⁶⁹ Finally, the Metaphysical Law: 'All persons ought to know the source and significance of the harmony and universality of these moral laws i.e. of the coherence of the moral order.'⁷⁰ Keep in mind that these moral laws are not natural laws in the Thomistic sense. They are rooted more in Kant than they are in Stoicism.

6.3 Relational Personalism

Now, turn to the third type of Personalism, Relational, developed in Scotland by John Macmurray. Macmurray develops his views in the Gifford Lect-

ures, now in two volumes. In those lectures, he takes on an assumption at the root of the Western intellectual tradition, the subject/object dichotomy, and seeks to replace it with the view that persons are agents. He argues that the mind is not an object for scientific investigation, but an act and must be grasped as action. An instance of that which Aristotle saw as human organisms, growing in the same manner as do other living things, dogs, cats, trees. But animals are different from persons in many ways, not the least of which is that animals have built-in instincts and humans have few, if any. Humans build patterns of behaviour through habituation in a human community. Animals, on the other hand, build their habituation through acting on instinct in an environment for which they are 'prepared' or adapted to at birth.

The core of Macmurray's Personalism is expressed in this sentence: 'All meaningful knowledge is for the sake of action, and all meaningful action for the sake of friendship.'⁷¹ That insight takes us into the two books that emerged from the Gifford Lectures of 1953. The second half of the quote expresses the central claim of the second half of the Gifford Lectures, in 1954.⁷² Macmurray believed Western Philosophy to be off track; and it is time for a correction, which he thinks is the 'exploration of the structures of this personal world and the categories through which it may be coherently conceived.'⁷³ The central tradition regarding persons is that they are thinkers and the human world is 'a multiplicity of centres of reflection'⁷⁴ with the body performing a supporting role. However, when knowers are left in this situation, the body is an object that remains mysteriously interrelated to the mind, and is thought of as organic. The thinker is theoretical and egocentric: in reflection the self is withdrawn from participation in life, isolated from the world it knows. These two ideas, isolated individual that views itself (egocentricism) as an object, are not doctrines argued for but long-standing presuppositions.

However, when the self is understood as agency, it is no longer seen as theoretical, as an isolated thinker; instead, the self is recognised as a derivative of some practical objective, the 'self is a person.'⁷⁵ Further, personal existence is constituted by the relation of persons.⁷⁶ Macmurray substitutes YOU and I for the solitary I of the philosophical tradition. Persons are agents and are constituted by the interrelation of persons.

Thus, Macmurray seeks to transform the Western Philosophical tradition from thinker to agent/and person and from solitary egoistical object resting on an objective organic body to persons in relation.

Now let's return to the four cases given earlier and then analyse them from the perspective of our four personalisms, discovering in the process what, if anything, they can contribute to the central philos-

ophical problem in Global Bioethics.

7. *Analysis of the Cases*

I. The Family and Health Care Practices: 'Basilia, a 75 year old active diabetic female requires amputation of her gangrenous right leg. Basilia's daughter, knowing that her mother will refuse surgery gives consent, instructing the surgeon not to inform her mother.'⁷⁷

Analysis: From the viewpoint of European and North American ethics, The daughter's decision, made without her aunt's consent or even notification, is contrary to principles of all medical practice, informed consent, and prior knowledge. In the Philippines, the family makes the decision. Although the aunt is an authority figure, being gravely ill makes her a member of the family who must be protected. Though the daughter's decision would be highly unethical by Western Standards, the daughter's decision carries out the moral structure and value of her culture

II. Ethical Issues in Caring for the Elderly: 'An 81 year old single female suffering from chronic obstructive lung disease refuses to continue taking food and medications because she feels she is a burden to her niece. She lives with her niece, who regards caring for her aunt as her duty – not only because her aunt sent her go college but also because her aunt took care of her from birth.'⁷⁸

Analysis: Of the three Personalisms only the Boston Personalist ethical view could help here. It could encourage the daughter to be consistent with her ideal values, and she is; her action is in accord with the other Moral Laws. As methodological and regulatory, the Moral Laws do not prescribe values. The daughter's actions are appropriate by these principles.

III. Personal Loyalty vs. Professional Integrity: 'Direk, a 52 year-old internist, is the director of a 150-bed hospital. His responsibilities include approving drugs for purchase by the hospital pharmacy. Kabayan, a townmate and former medical school classmate who dropped out of medical school and formed a drug company, approaches Direk to purchase antibiotics from the Katyaban Drug Company.'

When Direk and Kayban were students they were like brothers. Kabayan even lent money to Direk to assist in paying his tuition. Direk notes, however, that the prices of Kabayan's drugs are 30-40 percent higher than other bidders. Direk also knows that Kabayan's company was banned a couple of years ago because his drugs caused untoward side effects, such as rashes and urticaria. Kabayan assures Direk that his drugs have been tested and approved. He explains that this is why the current prices of his drugs are higher.'⁷⁹

Analysis: What choice should Direk make? This is a clear-cut case of tension between personal loyalty and

professional obligation. Since, in Filipino culture, the interpersonal relation is valued over the impersonal professional relation, Direk will most likely choose loyalty to his friend. If he chooses the professional obligation, Filipino culture will see him as an ingrate and his family standing will be lost. Concrete personal relations trump obligations to an abstract impersonal entity such as the hospital. At the core of this issue is two different moral visions. One, North American, believes that morality is an abstract, impersonal, anonymous project from nowhere, the other is personalistic, interpersonal, and agent relative.

Now what help could the Realism of Ontological Personalism give to Direk? First, follow the natural law, which turns out to be Aristotelian-Stoic. Tell the truth, fulfil your obligations to the hospital and all those it serves: always tell the truth, never lie; your obligations are much larger than to one friend. The result: this perspective would not be helpful, it is distinctly European Roman Catholicism in viewpoint.

What advice can Boston University Personalism offer to Direk? First, its viewpoint would be similar to the Filipino, personalistic view. Muelder would encourage Direk to appeal to the Moral Laws for guidance in choosing what to do. He could encourage Direk to act consistently with his long standing moral commitments, until it became clear that he should not. Further, in so far as possible, follow a coherent group of values. Here Direk has two conflicting values, that to the hospital and that to his long-standing friend. Next choose the values that will make the situation better and chose the value that best fits the situation. Choose the course of action that enhances your ideal of what a person should be and what a community ought to be. Direk could find that the Moral laws are culturally neutral. They fit his situation.

What does Macmurray offer to the moral point of view? He emphasises that persons are agents and that they become who they are in community, in relationships.

IV. Ethical Issues in the PICU, death: 'C. B., a six month old female, was admitted for ventilator support in the PICU with a diagnosis of bacterial meningitis, hypoxic encephalopathy aspiration pneumonia, and recent cardiac arrest. She was comatose and apneic, with absent reflexes. The medical team felt the prognosis was very poor and discussed with the family the concept of brain death. The parents insisted that all medical support be given at any cost because this child was precious, the youngest of three children. On the fourth hospital day, C. B. died. The family had an unsettled hospital bill of P7,000.00.'⁸⁰

Analysis: In the neonate there is no accepted definition of brain death. The attending physicians through constant conversation with the family gives the family the information it needs to make a decision.

Regarding hospital costs the responsibility lies with the family or extended family. When they cannot pay the bill there are limited resources from the government or church or insurance to pay the hospital. The hospital absorbs the cost, running the risk in the long run of restricting care or closing its doors.

Personal Realism could not provide useful help. The Boston Personalists would encourage appealing to the Moral Laws. The family's choice to leave the bill to the hospital to pay violates the Law of doing what is best for the community. Their action is inconsistent with their culture.

8. Conclusion

Consider, first, an irony deep in the heart of all these Personalisms, they fail by the standard they strenuously attempt to avoid: impersonalism. Realistic Personalists join an Aristotelian impersonal Nature and the human body and Reality with the Biblical personal God. Ironically, theirs is an impersonal Personalism, a 'material' impersonalism. Neither do Boston's Bowne, Brightman, and Bertocci avoid the malady of impersonalism. They begin with problems within impersonalist philosophical positions (the Western philosophical tradition, including Enlightenment Philosophy) and find Personalist answers to those problems. Theirs' is an 'formal' impersonalism. If impersonalisms must be rejected so must the problems generated within them be rejected. Beginning with persons, we claim that Personalism is a deeply social perspective but Personalists do little more than make the claim. Boston Personalism focuses on the individual, but it does not account for the social relation, it simply states that God created a society that includes all finite persons and the Infinite Person, God. For example, in *Person and Reality*, Brightman intimates that all persons receive their reality from God and form a society. And that Reality, of which human are imitations, gives humans their personhood and their dignity and value. It is as if Plato claimed that each person is an instance of the universal God. In the thought of Brightman, persons are like the cosmic Person, and thus are related to each other in forming a society. The subject-predicate logic, assumed by both Idealistic and Realistic Personalists, does not help them understand personal relations, relations that are at the core of social relations. Relational Personalists can offer help, but Macmurray does not work out a value theory or ethics.

Insofar as Personalism can develop a defensible social relation it can significantly aid Global Bioethics, especially as practised in the Phillippines. Its emphasis on the dignity and value of personality certainly bolsters efforts to expand acceptance of international law and human rights. However, its Western philosophical and political commitment to individualism remains a problem. If, Personalism

develops an adequate view of social relations it could be helpful in forming a universal ethics.

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 17. Bertocci, "Why Personalistic Idealism?" 185.
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 20. In his language we must distinguish between mechanical and volitional causality. See Bowne, *Personalism* 159-216.
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 61. Brightman, *Moral Laws*, 160.
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 63. Brightman, *Moral Laws*, 183.
 64. Brightman, *Moral Laws*, 194.
 65. Brightman, *Moral Laws*, 204.
 66. Brightman, *Moral Laws*, 242.
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 69. Muelder, *Moral Laws and Christian*, 117.
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BONHOEFFER'S PROBLEM WITH THE PAST: PERSONAL AND HISTORICAL IDENTITY IN ACT AND BEING

Richard Prust

Abstract: In his book *Act and Being*, Dietrich Bonhoeffer proposes transforming theology by basing it in the logic of action instead of the logic of being. The former reasoning about persons in relationship, particularly in relationships with God, recovers the immediacy of personal presence. It also makes better sense of corporate personhood. Unfortunately, Bonhoeffer equivocates on the term 'immediacy' in the process and thereby jeopardises appreciation of his most important insights. He confuses the temporal sense of 'immediacy' with the sense of being non-mediated by language. Since we can only be aware of it through the mediation of language, that conflation makes the past a problem. By making ourselves aware of his mistake we can avoid denying the historical form of the character of personal presence and thus avoid the counter-intuitive claims about historical knowledge that infect the book.

Key Words: Bonhoeffer, *Act and Being*, Immediacy, Corporate Identity

1. Introduction

In his 1929 book, *Act and Being*,¹ Bonhoeffer treats the distinction between act and being as foundational for Christian theology. '...[E]verything depends on the transformation of the concepts of being into those of act' (54), allowing us to think of God as active presence, revelation as active presence, and persons as active presences.

Transforming our concepts amounts to more than changing our vocabulary. It requires changing the logic we use to reason about personal being. Instead of applying predicates to subjects, reasoning about actions applies character to movement. Instead of focusing on objects of awareness reasoning about action focuses on active awareness. Bonhoeffer understood that objective presence *to* and active presence *with* have different epistemic structures. One is mediate, the other immediate; accordingly, it becomes theologically transformative to understand God as active presence, God's revelation as active presence, and our presence with ourselves and with one another as active presence.

To this writer, Bonhoeffer's intuition—that theology's future lies in using the logic of action and not the logic of being—is monumentally insightful, so it is out of enthusiasm for such a transformation that I find it important to point to a simple but important equivocation in Bonhoeffer's reasoning that led him to misunderstand personal presence—both divine and human—in a way that problematizes the past unnecessarily. In fact, much of *Act and Being*, I would suggest, amounts to a struggle to solve that problem.

But before I try to back up my charge of equivocation, let me try to indicate the heuristic power his distinction has and how he used it to transform theology. First, he saw the act/being distinction as recovering God's immediacy for human awareness. Lutheran liberalism in the early decades of the 20th century had become a rather cerebral matter, more concerned with criticism and argument than with the prophetic now. For Bonhoeffer, because God's presence is personal, '...human beings can receive God into themselves, that is, experience God's immediate contiguity in feeling an intuition' (56). Moreover, he had it phenomenologically right when he insisted that temporal immediacy, whether with God, other persons or oneself, is presence 'qualified as future' (111), by which I take him to mean that one cannot characterise someone's active presence except by characterising an intended future. Our character is the character of our living into the future we presently intend. Characterising that projection involves characterising future movement. So far, so good.

The second theological corrective that *Act and Being* allows us to celebrate is the retrieval of corporate personhood. In modern and postmodern sensibilities, 'corporate personhood' is no more than a metaphor, one that can easily lead us astray if we take it seriously. But modernity and post-modernity were nourished by discourses operating with the logic of being and beings so when Bonhoeffer teaches us to think of persons as acts rather than beings he allows us to subscribe in good faith to Paul's conviction that the church is the body of Christ.

We can see why this follows if we look at how two words function in Bonhoeffer's reasoning, the words 'body' and 'immediate.' 'Body' is of course the pivotal word in reasoning about corporate identity. To make sense of its role in theology we need to stop thinking of what we normally think of as a person's body, that objective organism whose life he leads. What counts as the 'body' of an act is the range of moves that accomplish it. For instance, the body of my preparation for this paper included reading *Act and Being*, reading Charles Marsh's *Strange Glory*, discussing some of my ideas with friends conversant with the issues, etc. Each of these actions comprised a series of moves made to accomplish it:

Reading *Act and Being* included
(among other moves)

Reading Part B of *Act and Being*, which included
(among other moves)

Pondering his criticism in Part B of Bultmann
on p. 97.

Notice that each of the lower two levels is part of the body of movement accomplishing the level above

it. It is this same body-of-action reasoning that he applies theologically:

God's action includes

God's action in Christ, which includes

The Church's movement of God's action in Christ, which includes our individual movement in the church's movement.

Again, each more comprehensive accomplishment includes the moves that accomplish it. Thus, Christ is God incarnate, we are the body of Christ, and we are individually members of that Body.

The other term, 'immediacy,' also gets determined distinctively in this scheme. The moment of a move is in the moment of the more comprehensive accomplishment it moves. I was, in mid-July, while reading Part B, reading *Act and Being*, and in reading *Act and Being* I was, just then, in the preliminary stages of writing this paper.

This logic applies as well to our relation to God. We are—in what we do as individuals—presently moving as the body of Christ. One is not the cause or effect of the other. Our movement is *in* the moment of God's act. This is the force of the immediacy of God's life and ours. God's life is in our movement and our movement is in God's life.

So, again, the logic of active awareness makes it reasonable to insist on the immediacy of God in revelation and the conceivability of individuals having corporate identity. (To see how theologically suggestive this is, one might consider how it makes sense of the claim that the body of Christ is actually present in the Eucharist. In our act of celebrating our membership in the body of Christ, Christ is present in our communion. In our communion we share the body of Christ.)

Now though we must turn to the equivocation I accused Bonhoeffer of falling into. It has to do with his use of 'immediacy.' In addition to understanding the immediacy of personal presence as presence 'in the same moment' Bonhoeffer understands the term to mean presence unmediated *conceptually and reflectively*. That makes revelation, he says, an *actus directus* which 'can never be captured in reflection...' (160). And, because Bonhoeffer assumes that temporal immediacy entails the absence of linguistic mediation, he concludes—and here is where he goes wrong—'that the Christian revelation must not be interpreted as having happened' (111) and that personal presence has no past. This seems woefully counter-intuitive on both scores and Bonhoeffer knows it. It implies first that a reflected, mediated past cannot reveal God, so history cannot be sacred! Yet he knows that 'there is no church without preaching, nor any preaching without remembrance.' But what are we to make of theology's role as 'the memory of the church?' For that matter, what are we to make of his reference in the Bethel Confession of 1933 to 'the facts of salvation history to which the

Scriptures bear witness.'² As far as I can tell, he finds no good way out of this paradox. If revelation 'must not be interpreted as having happened' what point is there in remembering?

The same problem with the past is found in his account of personal identity. It flies in the face of our common intuition that we are individuals with a past as well as a present and future. In Bonhoeffer's doctrine of corporate identity, reflective self-awareness, involved as it must be with its past, can only register as un-faith. 'If being-in-Christ means being oriented towards Christ, reflection on the self is obviously not a part of that being' (155). He must have been aware of how odd this sounds. Hadn't his adopted congregation in Harlem sung 'I once was lost but now I'm found?' Didn't Paul speak of his days as an observant Jew? And didn't Augustine acknowledge his pear-stealing youth? For Bonhoeffer, such reflections had to be regarded as suspect, the products of persons 'not yet in the pure form of 'being defined by the future alone' (157). Presumably then, when Paul wrote about his days as a persecutor of Christians and when Augustine lamented his way-ward youth their faith was 'not yet in a pure form.'

I said earlier that I thought Bonhoeffer's fundamental shift from a theology of being to a theology of act represents a much needed revolutionary turn but that he mistook the relation persons bear to their past. To protect his premise about the active presence of persons from the paradoxical entailments he reads out of it, let me suggest a less problematic way to understand a person's past. Keep in mind that as an intentional and active presence a person can only be identified with a characterisation. That is because a richly complex intentional life such as persons live can only be individuated as the character of resolved action and resolve can only be characterised narratively. Since narratives all have at least some past tense claims, to be a character of resolve is necessarily to have *implicit in one's present character is.*)

By the same pattern of inference, in the Christian tradition God can only be characterised by telling a Story. Revelation is only available in narrative form. Accordingly, any member of the body of Christ has her narrative context in the agency of the somebody she is. That means she owns her lamented past—albeit in the mode of renunciation and repudiation—as well her faithful life. She is a saved sinner, *simil justus et peccator*. That is why the present Character of divine Action revealed in a Story is revealed in a Story that includes past episodes of personal disobedience as well as faithful partnership. In fact, it is only because God's Story has what Paul Ricoeur called concordances and discordances that it can contextualise our personal stories with their concordances and discordances.

In summary, I believe that Bonhoeffer did theology and the church an immense service by reformatting

faithful language about persons and revealed truth in terms of the immediacy of active presence. But his assumption that temporal immediacy necessarily excludes linguistically mediated characterisations led him to deny the historical form of presence as a person. Happily, severing the assumed connection between the two kinds of immediacy spares us the unedifying implications that so weighed down *Act and Being*.

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Notes

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2. Charles Marsh, *Strange Glory: a Life of Dietrich Bonhoeffer* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf) 2014, p. 183.

THE POLANYI SOCIETY CONFERENCE AND CALL FOR PAPERS

POLANYI STUDIES: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

8-11 June 2016

Nashotah House Theological Seminary, Nashotah, WI

50th anniversary of Michael Polanyi's *The Tacit Dimension*: to celebrate, the **Polanyi Society** will sponsor a conference to assess the legacy of Polanyi's philosophical work. The conference will also be an opportunity for those in the early stages of their study of Polanyi to interact with experienced Polanyi scholars.

Keynote Speaker: Matthew Crawford, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture at the University of Virginia, author of *The World Beyond Your Head* (2015) and *Shop Class as Soul Craft* (2009).

Call for Papers: The Society invites proposals for papers that examine Polanyi's contributions to the areas of epistemology (including tacit knowing), moral philosophy, intellectual history, aesthetics, religious and theological studies, embodiment, semiotics, economics, and socio-political orders.

- Initial proposals of no more than 250 words.
- Scholars in the early stages of their study of Polanyi are especially encouraged to submit proposals.

Deadline for submission of proposals: Thursday, 31 December 2015.

Proposals should be sent to **Andrew Grosso** at atgrosso@icloud.com.

Polanyi Workshop: A one-day workshop on **Wednesday 8th June** for those interested in an introduction to Polanyi's thought. Senior Polanyi scholars will facilitate various sessions on Polanyi's life and the principal ideas in his major works. Graduate students and those new to Polanyi studies are encouraged to participate.

Registration opens Friday, 8 January 2016.

Early-bird registration (until 15th March 2016): \$225

Registration thereafter: \$275.

Registration fees include access to all conference sessions, Wednesday workshop, and meals. Fees **do not** include lodgings.

Accommodation: Guest accommodations on **Nashotah House campus** is limited. A block of rooms has been reserved at the **Hilton Garden Inn** (3.3 miles from Nashotah House), **Holiday Inn Express** (4.7 miles from Nashotah House), and **Country Pride Inn of Delafield** (4.5 miles from Nashotah House). There are other hotels in the vicinity.

Travel: The nearest international airport is **General Mitchell International Airport** (MKE) in Milwaukee (about 45 minutes away); **O'Hare International Airport** (ORD) in Chicago is about two hours away.

**BETWEEN BERLIN AND BIRMINGHAM:
A COMPARISON OF RESISTANCE IN THE LIVES OF
DIETRICH BONHOEFFER AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.**

Paul E. Wilson

Abstract: In the 1930's, Dietrich Bonhoeffer fought against the Nazi threat and the genocide it produced. In the 1960's, Martin Luther King Jr. faced off against the spectre of racial discrimination. King was a self-proclaimed advocate of non-violence. Bonhoeffer was publically affiliated with the pacifists. Both men were strongly influenced by the non-violent activism of Gandhi. Gandhi used the term 'satyagraha' to describe his version of resistance, since it is not strictly a form of pacifism. Both Bonhoeffer and King faced an existential crisis within their careers that led them to modify their thought and practice of non-violent resistance. In 1930 Bonhoeffer had left Germany to study in the United States at Union Theological Seminary. He chose to return to Germany to engage in active resistance of the Nazi autocracies. For King the crisis came in 1961 in Albany when he came to believe his reliance on non-violent tactics was not successful in bringing about the Damascene conversion of his opponents. Working with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference King began to employ non-violent tactics that aimed to provoke and manipulate opponents. In Birmingham King was jailed for his part in the peace marches to combat discrimination. In Berlin Bonhoeffer was condemned to death for his complicity in a plot to kill Hitler. Did King take the high road? Did Bonhoeffer take the low road? In this essay I compare the commitments of Bonhoeffer and King to the ideal of non-violent resistance and their practical applications of that ideal.¹

Key Words: Abwehr, Barman Declaration, Birmingham Alabama, Birmingham Jail, Bishop Bell, Bonhoeffer, Bull Connor, Confessing Church, Cost of Discipleship, Freedom, Holocaust, Gandhi, Buber, Martin Luther King Jr., Montgomery Alabama, Non-violence, Pacifism, Peace, Rosa Parks, Satyagraha, Stokely Carmichael, Tyrannicide, Violence.

1. Introduction

Dietrich Bonhoeffer was a German pastor and theologian during the Nazi's reign of terror. Martin Luther King, Jr. was an African-American pastor and defender of social rights who grew up amid Southern segregation in Alabama. A cursory reading of the lives of Bonhoeffer and King uncovers an uncanny number of parallels. Bonhoeffer decided at an early age to become a theologian, and King aspired to become the successor to his father's pastorate. Bonhoeffer attended seminary in Tubigen, and King attended Crozer Seminary. Bonhoeffer became a

pastor for the Confessing Church, and King became the pastor of Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in Montgomery, Alabama. Bonhoeffer and King were familiar with Mohandas Gandhi's theory of non-violence called 'Satyagraha'. Bonhoeffer and King were members of resistance movements organised against oppression and social injustice. Both were imprisoned for their role in the resistance against racial discrimination. From behind prison bars Bonhoeffer and King penned some of their most memorable treatises. Bonhoeffer was hanged by the neck until dead, and King was slain by an assassin's bullet. In their respective generations they must count as social rights advocates who openly opposed injustice. What form did their resistance take? Before his death in January, 1948, Mohandas Gandhi introduced to the world his version of non-violent resistance, 'Satyagraha'. At seventeen while living with his grandmother Bonhoeffer discussed visiting Gandhi, but it was a visit he never made. Bonhoeffer respected Gandhi from afar as a leader and opponent of injustice. King was introduced to Gandhi's thought during his years at Crozer Seminary. King had no opportunity to visit Gandhi during his lifetime, but King did visit India in 1959 to observe the positive reforms that Gandhi inspired.

History provides a multitude of similarities in the lives of Bonhoeffer and King with a handful of divergences. Through their writings and public speeches we may discover what values drove each man to become a champion for justice. Their premature deaths by violence leave many questions. If Bonhoeffer had not been imprisoned, would he have taken an active role in plots to end Hitler's life? If King had lived, would he have been successful in suppressing some of the racial riots that followed after his death? History cannot answer these questions or the questions that preoccupy me, but the values of each man provide possible answers. My essay is a philosophical thought experiment that examines the trajectory of each man's character and considers the possible outcome of placing each man in differing circumstances. I ask myself, 'if Dietrich Bonhoeffer was in Birmingham in 1963, would he have consented to the use of violent force to resist Bull Connor? If Martin Luther King, Jr., was in Berlin in 1941, would he have used non-violent resistance to thwart Hitler?' I suppose the answer to both questions is Yes. To understand why I respond in the affirmative let us consider the life and values of each leader.

2. *How the peace advocate in Bonhoeffer responded to Berlin*

H. Fischer-Hullstrung, the doctor who attended Bonhoeffer's hanging at Flossenburg on April 5, 1941, wrote, 'I have hardly ever seen a man die so entirely submissive to the will of God.' Eric Metaxas says, 'Bonhoeffer's sentence of death was almost certainly by decree of Hitler himself' (529). Bonhoeffer was justly accused of being a conspirator in a plot to end the life of Hitler. Was Bonhoeffer a man of violence, was he a pacifist who succumbed to the pressures of the moment, or was he neither?

In the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* Andrew Filia says, 'Most basically, pacifists hold that war is wrong because killing is wrong.' Discussing the distinction between absolute pacifism and contingent pacifism, Filia writes,

Absolute pacifism is an ideal. Some versions of absolute pacifism go so far as to abjure the idea of personal self-defense. Other absolute pacifists may allow for personal self-defense while rejecting the impersonal and political violence of war.

In contrast, the contingent pacifist qualifies his or her opposition to war and violence. Contingent pacifism makes use of consequential reasoning and may endorse some forms of violence. What Filia terms 'active non-violence' I have elsewhere called non-violent activism.² In my view non-violent activism recognises and makes use of the power of resistance that is free of lethal violence, and that form of activism respects the sanctity of life. Perhaps the non-violent activist would qualify as a contingent pacifist, but he or she would not qualify as an absolute pacifist. Was Bonhoeffer an absolute pacifist, a contingent pacifist, or neither?

In his 1937 work, *The Cost of Discipleship*, Bonhoeffer appears to adopt a variety of pacifism. From his view as a theologian and pastor, Bonhoeffer expounds upon Jesus' Sermon on the Mount as it is recorded in Matthew. On the topic of revenge Bonhoeffer writes, 'The right way to requite evil, according to Jesus, is not to resist it' (157). Bonhoeffer says, 'Resistance merely creates further evil and adds fuel to the flames. But when evil meets no opposition and encounters no obstacle but only patient endurance, its sting is drawn, and at last it meets an opponent which is more than its match.'

Bonhoeffer anticipated the practical objection that one cannot be an absolute pacifist in a world filled with violence. In this exposition Bonhoeffer asks two rhetorical questions: 'Is it right to forget that the follower of Jesus is always utterly alone, always the individual, who in the last resort can only decide and act for himself? Don't we act most responsibly on behalf of those entrusted to our care if we act in this aloneness?' Given Bonhoeffer's exposition I suppose the answers to these questions respectively to be No and Yes. No answers the former question, if one

assumes that the decision to eschew or employ violence remains an individual decision. Yes answers latter question, if one assumes that we act most responsibly when we act alone rather than acting as one with the crowd. Later in the same work Bonhoeffer cites Romans 13:1 that calls for obedience to governing authorities. Bonhoeffer comments, 'to resist the power [of government] is to resist the ordinance of God' (293). On the surface it may appear Bonhoeffer embraced pacifism when he wrote this work, but was he an absolute pacifist from the beginning? Clifford J. Green believes Bonhoeffer was not a pacifist and should best be seen as an advocate for a 'Christian peace ethic' (33).

There are some compelling reasons to suggest that Green is correct that Bonhoeffer is an advocate of a Christian peace ethic. Bonhoeffer's ethical theory and praxis emerges from his own grappling with the Christian religion and especially the Sermon on the Mount. His ethical theory is developed in the context of Christian theology, and in that theology humanity is fallen. So, all actions by humanity are the actions of fallen individuals. I suspect it is fair to say that within Bonhoeffer's Christian ethic there is a rejection of the absolutes of principle or ends and a willingness to embrace expediency. Consequently his ethic defies categorisation within the normative framework of deontic or teleological ethics.

Mark T. Nation, Anthony G. Siegrist, and Daniel P. Umbel authored the book, *Bonhoeffer the Assassin?* In their introduction they discuss a mistaken three step move they believe many Bonhoeffer readers make. First, these readers affirm that Bonhoeffer was involved in plots to kill Hitler. Second, these readers then rely on this 'lens' of knowledge to read Bonhoeffer's life and writings. Third, these readers judge that '*Discipleship and Life Together* are works from Bonhoeffer's less mature period before he truly confronted the hard realities of a world war and the Holocaust' (12). To say that the events of Bonhoeffer's life bias some readers' understanding of Bonhoeffer is not to deny that these events happened. Rather it is to recognise the tension between Bonhoeffer's writings read abstractly and his concrete circumstances. Two alternate ways of reading the early works emerge: (1) these are the writings of a pacifist who came to abandon his principles, or (2) these are the writings of an advocate of a Christian peace ethic whose theology was yet to be tested. These authors along with Clifford Green favor the latter reading of Bonhoeffer's early works.

Bonhoeffer seems to have had a longstanding struggle with the ideal of absolute pacifism. During his year of study in America in 1930 Bonhoeffer and a friend, Jean Lasserre, had the opportunity to travel the countryside and even to visit Mexico. Bonhoeffer confided in Lasserre that he had many reservations about pacifism (Marsh 131). In 1933, after he had returned to Germany, Bonhoeffer spoke out against

Hitler on public radio. Perhaps one could charitably suppose that as early as 1937 Bonhoeffer intended his discussion of non-resistance in *The Cost of Discipleship* to be understood in a qualified sense. In the years that intervened between 1937 and 1945, Bonhoeffer did encounter still more practical reasons that would confirm he was not an absolute pacifist.

The path Bonhoeffer takes to endorse overt violence is a slippery slope indeed. What begins as a willingness to tolerate violence for the sake of justice escalates to the point where Bonhoeffer endorses a plot to assassinate Hitler. Bonhoeffer would often prove to be the provocateur in his opposition to the German state. When Bonhoeffer leaves America in 1930 to return to Germany, he anticipates only dimly that he will be enmeshed in a social struggle for justice.

In May, 1934, the Barmen Declaration was largely composed by Karl Barth, and in the declaration the Confessional Church rejects the authority of the German state. Bonhoeffer served as a pastor to the Confessing Church, and he acted as a professor of its seminary in Finkenwald. The seminary was closed by the Gestapo in 1937. Ostensibly Bonhoeffer became a member of the secret-service, the Abwehr, but he came to act as a double agent in that role also. Like the Confessing Church that he helped to birth Bonhoeffer sided against the growing anti-Semitism within the official German church and society. Bonhoeffer's membership in the Abwehr gave him liberty to travel outside Germany, and in 1941 he visited Switzerland. Upon his return to Germany he became part of Operation 7, a plot to smuggle seven Jews into Switzerland under false pretenses (Metaxas 388). When Bonhoeffer offered Werner von Haeften practical advice about the assassination of Hitler, he laid aside his ivory tower theology to lend moral support in a conspiracy to commit tyrannicide. How could Bonhoeffer justify his complicity with this act of violent resistance?

Bonhoeffer's book, *Ethics*, is a compilation of extant writings intended to go into a volume by the same name. They were hidden and preserved from the censorship of the Gestapo. The outline for the book may have been formulated as early as 1937. In a section entitled 'What is meant by 'Telling the truth'?' Bonhoeffer argues for the contextualisation of the truth. He says, 'Every utterance or word lives and has its home in a particular environment' (*Ethics* 367). Bonhoeffer invites readers to suppose that a teacher is asking personal questions about a child's parent who is in fact an alcoholic. Bonhoeffer writes,

A teacher asks a child in front of the class whether it is true that his father often comes home drunk. It is true, but the child denies it. The teacher's question has placed him in a situation for which he is not yet prepared. He feels only that what is taking place is an unjustified interference in the order of the family and that he must oppose it. What goes on in the family is not for the ears of the class in

school. The family has its own secret and must preserve it. The teacher has failed to respect the reality of this institution (367).

This is not the only time Bonhoeffer will make use of this example, and I take the story to be paradigmatic of his understand of truth telling within certain social institutions. In the example the respect of the teacher, that is, the individual, is subordinated to respect for the institution of the family. The truth of the father's alcoholism belongs to the family, but it does not belong to an individual. As an individual outside the family the teacher is not owed the truth. The child fails to uphold truth in the first order, but the child honors a higher order of truth that is owed to the institution. Bonhoeffer says, 'As a simple no to the teacher's question the child's answer is certainly untrue; yet at the same time it nevertheless gives expression to the truth that the family is an institution *sui generis* and that the teacher has no right to interfere with it' (368). If I am correct in my surmise of Bonhoeffer's thought, then Bonhoeffer is willing to subordinate the value of the individual person to the value of certain institutions, and for him one such institution is the Confessing Church. In what way could this justify Bonhoeffer's complicity in violent resistance?

In 1937 Bonhoeffer authored the volume, *Life Together*. If the earlier work, *The Cost of Discipleship*, provides Bonhoeffer's basic theology for the convert; then *Life Together*, gives us Bonhoeffer's theology for life within the community of the church. It is no surprise that Bonhoeffer places the institution of the church above those individuals who exist alone in the world. Bonhoeffer supposes that the church is the great society of individuals restored from the 'fall' that placed them in the world. Bonhoeffer said, 'Christian brotherhood . . . is a reality created by God in Christ in which we may participate' (30). Bonhoeffer supposed that outside the circle of faith one enters into an immediate and distorted relation with the other. As subject in the world, the individual would be lost in the other; or, as object in the world, the other would be absorbed in the power of the individual in Bonhoeffer's view. In the church the individual entered into a mediated relationship that restores the subject to his or her rightful place in society. Bonhoeffer says

Within the spiritual community there is never, nor in any way, any 'immediate' relationship of one to another.... Here [in the world] human ties, suggestions, and bonds are everything, and in the immediate community of souls we have reflected the distorted image of everything that is originally and solely peculiar to community mediated through Christ (33).

In *Ethics*, Bonhoeffer makes a sharp distinction between the government and state. In Bonhoeffer's view government is a Biblical category and state is not. Bonhoeffer writes, 'The concept of the state is

foreign to the New Testament. It has its origin in pagan antiquity. Its place is taken in the New Testament by the concept of government (“power”)(332). He adds, ‘Only the concept of government, and not the concept of the state, can have a theological application’ (332f.).

In Bonhoeffer’s view government was instrumentally valuable for the church. Government’s function was to maintain social stability so that the church could fulfill its mission. Bonhoeffer writes, ‘The mission of government consists in serving the dominion of Christ on earth by the exercise of the world power of the sword and of justice. Government serves Christ by establishing and maintaining an outward justice by men of the sword which is given to it, and to it alone, in deputyship for God’ (340). If a government failed to maintain social stability, then Bonhoeffer believed it became entwined in the sin that it was appointed to redress. Bonhoeffer says, ‘Whenever the state becomes the executor of all the vital and cultural activities of man, it forfeits its own proper dignity, its specific authority as government (335).

Bonhoeffer’s close friend and confidant, Eberhard Bethge, reports in a meeting of Bonhoeffer with Bishop Bell that Hitler was identified as the Antichrist (627). Bethge cautions that Bell’s record of the meeting may reflect Bell’s own sympathies rather than those of Bonhoeffer, and he may be correct. Suppose we concede that it was Bell and not Bonhoeffer who called Hitler Antichrist. Nevertheless, one finds within Bonhoeffer’s writings the theological grounds for condemning the actions of Hitler and the Third Reich as unjust. From Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the role of government, it seems clear the Third Reich had forfeited ‘its own proper dignity.’ So Bonhoeffer could offer a theological justification for his role in political subterfuge just as the child could justify its lie to the teacher. He did not owe his allegiance to the German Third Reich, if it had surrendered its mission, that is, its instrumental value for the preservation of the church; and in Bonhoeffer’s view it had done so.

3. How the non-violent activist in King responded to Birmingham

King says, ‘Not until 1948, when I entered Crozer Theological Seminary in Chester, Pennsylvania, did I begin a serious intellectual quest for a method to eliminate social evil’ (A 17). King’s quest was soon rewarded. In Spring, 1950, he was introduced to the thought of Mohandas Gandhi by Howard University’s president, Mordecai Johnson. During these seminary years King was also introduced to the philosophy of Personalism. The thought of Edgar S. Brightman provided a means for King to ground his intuitive sense of dignity and self-worth in reason. King developed a clear vision of how the respect of persons had important applications within his society.

Rufus Burroughs Jr. says, ‘King’s most original and creative contribution to the Personalist tradition was his persistence in translating it into social action by applying it to the trilogy of social problems—racism, poverty/economic exploitation, and militarism—that he believed plagued this country and the world’ (86). King’s return to his home state of Alabama in the 1950’s would soon put to the test his respect of persons and his decision to use non-violence as a tool for social reform.

In 1955, in Montgomery Alabama, King faced the practical challenge of how to respond to the arrest of Rosa Parks. King had become the newly elected head of the Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA) in December, and he had to decide how to lead MIA members in protest. The outcome was the Montgomery bus boycott, a successful experiment in non-violent resistance. King says, ‘People who had never heard of the little brown saint of India were now saying his name with an air of familiarity. Non-violent resistance had emerged as the technique of the movement, while love stood as the regulating ideal. In other words, Christ furnished the spirit and motivation while Gandhi furnished the method’ (A 67). To say simply that the Montgomery bus boycott worked is an understatement. The path to success was long and arduous, but it succeeded without violence. Relief finally came on December 20, 1956, in the form of a bus integration order issued by the Supreme Court. Not only had desegregation begun, but participants in the resistance movement found a new sense of self-worth. King says, ‘The Montgomery negro had acquired a new sense of somebodiness and self-respect, and had a new determination to achieve freedom and human dignity no matter what the cost’ (A 99). In King’s view the Montgomery boycott was successful as an experiment in social resistance that was free of violence.

During the time of the Montgomery campaign King made every effort to fulfill his pastoral duties at Dexter Avenue Baptist Church. He continued to think not only theologically but also philosophically about the problem of segregation, while he was developing his view of non-violence. In his sermon, ‘Paul’s Letter to American Christians’, King says, ‘Segregation is a blatant denial of the unity which we all have in Christ. It substitutes an “I-it” relationship for the “I-thou” relationship. The segregator relegates the segregated to the status of a thing rather than elevate him to the status of a person’ (Knock 31).

In the seven years between the Montgomery campaign and the Birmingham campaign King was busy promoting his version of non-violence. Speaking in 1957 King said, ‘the aftermath of non-violence is reconciliation and the creation of a beloved community.’ He added, ‘[non-violence] not only avoids external violence or external physical violence but also internal violence of spirit’ (Dream 30f.). In 1959 King undertook a pilgrimage to India

to understand better the life and teachings of Gandhi. After his return from India, King was jailed numerous times for his work for civil rights. In 1962 King called for a Day of Penance to atone for the violence that some protesters had used. A new challenge awaited in Birmingham.

The mayor of Birmingham, Eugene 'Bull' Connor, was more than a figurehead politician. In many ways Bull Connor embodied the spirit of segregation as Adolf Hitler embodied the spirit of the Third Reich. King writes, 'as commissioner of public safety, Bull Connor, entrenched for many years in a key position in the Birmingham power structure, displayed as much contempt for the rights of the negro as he did defiance for the authority of the federal government' (A 172). During this Birmingham campaign merchants were boycotted, lunch counter sit-ins were staged, and marches were conducted to demonstrate that African-Americans had the right to move freely about on public lands. King had expanded the reach and impact of the tactics he used for non-violent resistance.

It was in Birmingham that Bull Connor authorised the police to release guard dogs and use water cannons upon the marchers. It was in Birmingham that Bull Connor obtained a court injunction to order the cessation of demonstrations until a court could review the issue. And it was in Birmingham that King chose to intentionally defy a court order by conducting a peace march in hopes of securing the release of three hundred souls that were jailed during the protests.

On April 12, 1963, while King remained in solitary confinement, he received a letter from white Birmingham ministers asking him to bring the demonstrations to an end. King's letter from the Birmingham jail on April 16 states in clear terms his dedication to the ideal of non-violence. In the letter King reaffirms his commitment to the philosophy of personalism. He says, once again, 'Segregation, to use the terminology of the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber, substitutes an "I-it" relationship for an "I-thou" relationship and ends up relegating persons to the status of things' (A 193).

One of King's biographers, Richard S. Reddie, believed that King's understanding of the role of non-violence had undergone a fundamental shift, and I suppose Reddie may be correct. It seems likely that in the early years of his campaign for civil rights King did hope that non-violent resistance would become the occasion for the oppressors to be convicted of the error of their ways. Reddie says, [King] previously believed that non-violent direct action within a clear Christian framework would engender a Damascene conversion in white Southerners who considered themselves good Christians' (Reddie 98). King's letter from the Birmingham jail reaffirms his commitment to use non-violent resistance, but it also suggests that King sees non-violent resistance as a

catalyst to bring about a social crisis that would require a resolution. In his letter King wrote, 'non-violent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and foster such a tension that a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue' (A 190). King sees non-violence resistance as forceful and confrontational. Perhaps King did believe in the early years that oppressors could be converted by non-violent resistance. It seems likely that at the time he penned this Birmingham letter King more fully understood the power of non-violence resistance to compel the oppressor to change his or her behavior or to expose himself or herself as an author of violence. Elsewhere I have called this the violence of non-violent activism.³

In Montgomery King organised the bus boycott, and in Birmingham a wide array of methods were employed for non-violent resistance such as vendor boycotts, sit-ins, and marches. If the bus boycott in Montgomery was identifiable as a passive-aggressive tactic, then the sit-ins and marches in Birmingham could be identified as active-aggressive tactics. King's array of methods to engage in non-violent resistance had been noticeably expanding. Yet King had not crossed the threshold into life-threatening violence or mortal violence. In other words, King's non-violent resistance would not sacrifice the life of the oppressor for the sake of an ultimate good.

Not long after the Birmingham campaign in 1966, King again came face to face with the possibility of relying on violent activism for the sake of justice. This time the possibility was presented in the form of a symbolic rally cry that endorsed violent activism. King had been part of the movement to reform voter's rights in Mississippi. While Stokely Carmichael and Willie Ricks prepared for a march on the evening of June 16, the slogan 'Black Power' became the mantra of the fired-up rally. King believed that the slogan and the violence it implicitly endorsed was a descent from the high ground of non-violence, and he refused to use or endorse the slogan. In that context King offers a consequential argument that a violent campaign would be doomed to failure. He says, 'I would be misleading you if I made you feel that we could win a violent campaign. . . . The minute we start we will end up getting many people killed unnecessarily' (A 320). King believed that non-violence would pave the way to hope and love and that Black Power could never achieve the good that could be achieved by non-violence. He said, 'Black Power is a nihilistic philosophy born out of the conviction that the Negro can't win' (Where 45).

King argued against the negative consequences of mortal violence in his reply to Stokely Carmichael, but his choice of non-violent resistance may be traced to a higher principle, the respect of the person. After the campaigns in the South, King undertook the Chicago campaign to address economic injustice in the ghettos of the city. King commented, 'Freedom is

never voluntarily granted by the oppressor. It must be demanded by the oppressed' (A 303). To the end King never gave up his idealistic vision of creating a beloved community. If the oppressors were subdued by violent force they would be treated as if they had no dignity. Only if non-violent resistance were used did King believe that the dignity of the oppressed and the dignity of the oppressor could be properly preserved. For Carmichael, non-violent resistance was an expediency that could be abandoned for the sake of justice. For King the use of non-violent resistance was a practical absolute, and underlying this was an idealistic absolute, that is, the dignity of all persons.

4. *Between Berlin and Birmingham*

My philosophical thought experiment is a reply to these questions: What would King have done in Berlin? What would Bonhoeffer have done in Birmingham? The answer to these questions may rely upon the use of inductive reasoning. For instance, if a person of such-and-such a character who handled credit badly was granted an open line of credit by Drive Time, would that person choose to finance a vehicle well within his or her means? Inductive reason suggests it is likely that the person would not act responsibly given his or her credit history. So, what behaviors might one predict for Bonhoeffer or King, if they were to exchange places in these cauldrons of injustice?

In my own investigation of the violence of non-violent resistance I have discovered some criteria that may be important for our study. On the one hand, the willingness of an individual to engage in action that would result in corporal harm may signify that the individual is in danger of abandoning the ideal of non-violent activism. On the other hand, the willingness of an individual to engage in action that promotes or induces mortal harm may signify that the individual has abandoned the ideal of non-violent activism and has embraced the possibility that lethal violence may be used to resolve conflict.

Pit Bonhoeffer against Bull Conner in Birmingham, and what would one expect? In Germany Bonhoeffer shared the same ethnic origins as the Arian oppressors. His close friends may have been Jews, but Bonhoeffer was not. I do not suppose that Bonhoeffer's values would change if he was placed in Birmingham as a Black man, though his relationship to the oppressing class would change. Suppose Bonhoeffer was a Black man in Birmingham in 1950. Bonhoeffer may be identified as a consequential pacifist working for the good of the beloved community. For Bonhoeffer war and genocide were social evils, and in the quest for social justice the means of resistance were negotiable. If he were placed in the Birmingham jail, Bonhoeffer could not align himself with the white ministers of Birmingham that asked King to cease and desist. Like King

Bonhoeffer was prepared to die for the cause of justice. Unlike King, it is not likely that Bonhoeffer would allow water cannons and guard dogs to be released on women and children in Birmingham without retaliation. Bonhoeffer was a master of subterfuge, and he would find an effective way to resist injustice. However, Bonhoeffer's complicity with the plot to kill Hitler was a sign that Bonhoeffer was not an absolute pacifist who would employ only non-violent activism. In his peace ethic he could endorse violent resistance, if it were necessary to achieve his ends. If the Gestapo did not deserve to be told the truth, then Bull Conner did not deserve to be respected either. On the road to freedom and justice I suppose Bonhoeffer could align himself with Stokely Carmichael's Black Power movement.

Pit King against Adolph Hitler in Berlin in 1940, and what might we expect? I myself cannot imagine King to have exchanged his ethnic origin. Our thought experiment asks that the facticity of time be laid aside temporarily even if one's race cannot be exchanged. If King were imagined to be anything other than a Black man, I suppose King would still experience solidarity with the oppressed, that is, the Jews. Bonhoeffer's ethnicity removed him from the oppression of the Jews that escalated into the Holocaust. King experienced firsthand the sting of social injustice far beyond that felt by Bonhoeffer, and I suppose he would willfully identify with the oppressed in any age. Even in Berlin King would not be relieved of the social injustice of racism. One needs only to look at the slaying of Emmett Till to understand the violence of segregation in the South that King knew too well. The sting of oppression would have been familiar to King in Berlin as it was in Birmingham and elsewhere. Although King's tactics of non-violent resistance evolved and expanded over the years, they stopped short of crossing the threshold into mortal violence. I suspect King would have responded to his Nazi oppressors in Berlin as he responded in Birmingham. He would have found effective ways to resist Hitler that stopped short of tyrannicide.

While my thought experiment is an exploration of the depths of character, it is not unimaginable. In his 'Letter from Birmingham Jail' King himself imagines what would happen if he were placed in Berlin during the Nazi regime. King says:

We should never forget that everything Adolph Hitler did in Germany was 'legal' and everything the Hungarian freedom fighters did in Hungary was 'illegal'. It was 'illegal' to aid and comfort a Jew in Hitler's Germany. Even so, I am sure that, had I lived in Germany at the time, I would have aided and comforted my Jewish brothers (A 194ff).

5. *Objections and Replies*

As I prepare to conclude this reflection on the character of two leaders who championed peace in one fashion or another some objections may now be

considered.

Objection: It seems ludicrous to compare the social environment of Nazi Germany in the 1940's and the segregated South in the 1950's. Jews were being slaughtered unmercifully during the Holocaust, while living conditions of African-Americans in the segregated South were tolerable in spite of certain egregious injustices.

Reply: I openly affirm that the Holocaust was an instance in human history that showed the inhumanity of mankind. That does not diminish the moral wrong of the widespread and flagrant oppression of the African-American in a segregated society. Earlier I referred to the incident of the slaying of Emmitt Till. This murder of a young Black man epitomised the widespread toleration of violence in the culture at the time. In other words, those who suggest that African-Americans were not exposed to mortal violence during this era grossly underestimate the power of mob violence and the disregard of human rights in an environment that openly endorsed segregation.

Objection: You have portrayed Bonhoeffer as a pacifist who abandoned his commitment, and he was not.

Reply: Green and other scholars have identified Bonhoeffer as an advocate of a Christian peace ethic. While it seems reasonable to identify Bonhoeffer as a contingent pacifist rather than an absolute pacifist, my thought experiment focuses upon the character of Bonhoeffer in comparison to that of King. I maintain that they chose very different ways to defend peace.

Objection: King was a product of his environment and his times. To think that we can anticipate how King would respond to violence in a different environment or era is to fail to see how heavily King's responses were shaped by other peace advocates of his generation such as Rosa Parks.

Reply: Yes, King was a finite individual responding to the social pressures of his time. Nonetheless, King made the intentional choice to recognise the absolute value of persons. That valuation and the commitment to non-violent activism that follows from it defy attempts to deconstruct King as a product of his time.

6. Conclusion

The lives of Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Martin Luther King, Jr., are strikingly similar. Both men deserve a place of honor in the annals of heroic individuals who sacrificed their lives in the pursuit of justice. Both men were inspired by Mohandas Ghandi to rise up and oppose injustice in their generation. Yet it is in their understanding and implementation of the thought of Mohandas Ghandi and Henry David Thoreau that they agree to disagree. Bonhoeffer offered his consensual approval of the plot to assassinate Hitler, and in principle he endorsed the use of lethal violence to restore justice. Bonhoeffer would have believed that Hitler surrendered his

dignity for a world-order that he could not respect. In Birmingham I suspect Bonhoeffer would have endorsed violent retaliation against Bull Connor.

In contrast, in Birmingham and elsewhere King in practice held the dignity of the individual to be an absolute. For that reason I do not suppose King would have consented to the use of lethal force in Berlin to oppose Hitler, since he did not use violent force in self-defense when he was confronted by the violence of Bull Connor in Birmingham.

Two men, two times, two very different methodologies for the pursuit of social justice are found in the lives of Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Martin Luther King, Jr. Both understand the lesson of Gandhi that non-violent resistance is a powerful and violent means of pursuing social justice. However, it was King rather than the pastor of the German Confessing Church who proved to be committed to non-violence to the end. King said,

The beauty of non-violence is that in its own way and its own time it seeks to break the chain reaction of evil. With a majestic sense of spiritual power, it seeks to elevate truth, beauty and goodness to the throne (Where, 65).

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Notes

1. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the 'Tenth Biennial Personalist Seminar: Bonhoeffer and King.' The paper has been greatly improved thanks to the comments of a number of seminar participants including Jennifer M. McBride, Greg Moses, and Randy Auxier.
2. 'Valuing the Violence of Non-Violence'. Delivered at the North Carolina Philosophical Society annual meeting, University of North Carolina, February 16, 2013.
3. Ibid.

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Madrid, 5-7th May, 2016
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Call For Papers: Society today appears to shun reflection and depth, taking refuge in a fleeting present which satisfies itself with the next instant. Consumption and enjoyment are all that matters. The Humanities suffer the consequences of this, coming last in priority for study, because universities and governments are ruled by pragmatism. Philosophy suffers even more, being excluded from public education as useless. But society cannot envisage its future without critical thought, without the ability to evaluate the proposals of the media and politicians, without knowing its roots and being able to analyse them.

How have we reached this situation? Does the fault lie with a superficial society which abhors reflection, which can endure nothing difficult, which is incapable of abstraction? Or is philosophy at fault for retreating into egocentric constructions unconnected with the general interest? Personalist philosophers wanted to transform the world, but haven't they renounced philosophy under the influence of post-modernist prohibitions upon this task, and, because of that, the world has renounced philosophy? Hasn't it been lazy, out of date, failed to actualise its identity, in a world of vertiginous change?

This conference aims to debate this important question; three principal areas are proposed for consideration, without prejudice to the discussion of other, related, aspects.

1. What is philosophy? Why do we philosophise? What is its epistemological structure? What can personalism contribute to the understanding of philosophy?
2. What is philosophy for? What is its mission and role in a society ruled by superficiality, speed, technology, viscosity or fragmentation? How does personalism engage in the connection between philosophy and action?
3. Like all human knowledge, Philosophy changes. Must Philosophers change their methods of teaching and reaching out in order to be of interest to students and society? How should philosophy teach and reach out?

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Presentations must be unpublished and be a maximum of 15 pages in Times New Roman 12 point, and 1.5 line-spacing. Approval of presentations, with any suggestions, will be sent within one month of their receipt by the Secretary of the Conference, Nieves Gómez.

BLOOD REDEMPTION IN THIS LIFE: JAMES FARMER, SR. ON THE DUTY TO INSPIRE HOPE

Russell G. Moses

Abstract: J. Leonard Farmer, father of American Civil Rights activist James Farmer, Jr., was an important philosopher in his own right. The elder Farmer argued that spiritual insight is measured by its power to bring hope to hopelessness. When the practical problem presents itself as national destruction, exemplary spiritual insight transforms that sacrifice into a warrant that the values cut down shall become the end values of history. This insight finds its paradigm in the teachings of the Second Isaiah.¹

Key Words: Civil rights, history, hope, justice, religion, and spirituality.

1. Introduction to Farmer's life

Thanks to the film *The Great Debaters* we may introduce J. Leonard Farmer as the character played by the great Texas-born actor Forest Whitaker. In the film directed by Denzel Washington, Farmer is portrayed as a super-hero of fortitude the way real heroes would have looked as they nurtured Black families, churches, and colleges in Texas and other states across the Jim Crow South. To Farmer's credit as a father, his remarkable accomplishments as a professor and pastor were heavily overshadowed by the historical importance of his son, James Farmer, Jr., the student debater whose struggle is portrayed as the main interest of the film. As father to the future civil rights activist and Washington, D.C. insider, the elder Farmer is portrayed in *The Great Debaters* as a scholar deeply immersed in his reflections but who is grounded in shrewd awareness of things one must do to live, and to live well, under oppressive conditions. The Farmer family knew what it was like 'to live with their backs against the wall,' if we may use a phrase auspiciously deployed by Howard Thurman in April, 1948, when he spoke about Jesus in a series of lectures given in Austin, Texas at the invitation of Farmer, Sr. (Thurman 11).

What we know about Farmer, Sr. is drawn largely from portraits written in his son's autobiography, *Lay Bare the Heart*. Texas historian Gail K. Beil has also created valuable resources for understanding Farmer, Sr. whom she rightfully characterised as 'a strong force in [B]lack education' from 1919 to 1956 (Beil 1998 18). Arriving in Texas as the first known Black man with a Ph.D., Farmer began teaching at Wiley College in Marshall, Texas; moved to Rust College in Holly Springs, Mississippi; undertook a lifelong commitment to summer teaching of Black pastors on the Mississippi Gulf Coast; moved to Austin, Texas, where, as registrar of what is now Huston-Tillotson University, he was widely credited as rescuing that institution's accreditation; taught at Atlanta's Gam-

mon Theological Seminary; moved back to Wiley College; was recruited to teach at Howard University by the legendary Benjamin Mays, mentor to Martin Luther King, Jr.; and finally concluded his teaching career back at Huston-Tillotson before retiring to the home he had built in Washington, D.C. during the Howard years (Beil 1998). The history of Farmer's intellect is no idiosyncratic anomaly. His wisdom was influential, in demand. Yet, sadly, after his death, his papers were summarily shipped off to the Washington, D.C. dump. As Beil once informed me in a telephone interview, only one box of his manuscripts was saved. That box of manuscripts will serve as our main interest here (Farmer 1958).

2. Introduction to the final works

In the years that surrounded his retirement from nearly forty years of teaching and administration, J. Leonard Farmer brought to final draft at least five books. The first of the five was published obscurely in New York (Farmer 1956). The remaining four books were typed out in 1958 as a four-volume set of some 1,500 pages separated by cardboard dividers and collected under a title page that reads 'Religion in Life' (Farmer 1958). These final works of Farmer have been wrapped in silence since the first book was published in 1956, the year of the Montgomery Bus Boycott. As the King Years galvanised social movements that for many seemed to spring from nowhere, India, or King's readings of white intellectuals, Farmer's final books kept silent witness to distinctive labours of intellectual and spiritual mentorship that had struggled for decades on the Black side of America's colour line.

Farmer's late work teaches us a great deal about his logic of religious practice; that logic in turn instructs us with intellectual and spiritual insights available to King and King's community at church and on campus. There were differences among insights of Farmer's generation to be sure, but Farmer guides us toward a unifying theme of his generation when he collects the manuscript of his late works under the collective title, 'Religion in Life.'

3. An overview of Farmer's philosophy of religion

Farmer was a graduate of Boston University where he received his Ph.D. in theology in about 1917. His dissertation, prepared under the inspiration of personalist Albert Cornelius Knudson, explored the concept of messianic hope among the peoples of ancient Israel. From Farmer's point of view the human function of religion is to sustain hope. And Farmer argued that the messianic ideal of the ancient prophets was a way of sustaining hope for peace and justice.

On Farmer's view, the term Messiah indicated an ideal leader who would help the community perfect itself to the point where it would actually experience a golden age of peace and justice. In their call for a Messiah, the ancient prophets were reminding people that they should not lose hope for worthwhile leadership. As the ancient prophets reminded the community, they enjoyed a special relationship with a God who cared for them. If they also cared for themselves and did their part to sustain a lawful order of peace and justice, then the God that watched over them would surely help them to fulfil the experience.

This reading of the term Messiah remained important throughout Farmer's career as a teacher and scholar, including his influential role as an educator of Black pastors. In his only published monograph, *John and Jesus in their Day and Ours*, Farmer argued that Jesus was a diligent student of the ancient prophets and therefore campaigned to become the Messiah of peace and justice in this life. When he entered Jerusalem during that fateful Passover, Jesus was leading a social movement that intended to produce a change in history. Jesus would be the Messiah who would provide the ideal leadership necessary for the people to fulfil their compact with their abiding God. To update the language of Farmer's thesis, one might say that Jesus was leading an 'Occupy Jerusalem!' Movement.

Followers of Jesus had difficulty believing their own eyes when Jesus was crucified to death. Or when they believed their own eyes, they thought that what they saw might be a refutation of the very hope that Jesus stood for. They were filled with terrible and debilitating doubt. Yet the hope that they organised against that doubt has today become a world-historical religion. And as Farmer says to his reader, '[w]hatever emphasis is placed upon religion *per se* is placed upon it for its values as a social force' (Farmer 1956 11). In general outline then, we see that when religion is able to organise hope, it is able to effect itself as a social force in history. The philosophical problem of religion therefore becomes the problem of the form that hope shall take. From Farmer's point of view, there is a sense in which the followers of Jesus did, but did not, originate the form of hope that they put into practice. In one sense the form of hope that they pursued was a form that was expressed in the teachings of the ancient prophets. But in another sense, the followers of Jesus worked out the historical terms of this hope under determinate social and political conditions.

One can well understand why Farmer would be interested to invite Howard Thurman to publicly reflect upon the religion of Jesus in a series of Austin lectures delivered at Huston-Tillotson University in 1948. From Thurman's point of view the religion of Jesus has a durable message for 'people who stand at a time of history with their backs against the wall' (Thurman 1949 11). And one can well understand

why another young seminary student, raised up in the family of the Ebenezer Baptist Church of Atlanta, would take an interest in Thurman's approach to Jesus, never minding the fact that Martin Luther King, Jr.'s parents were fast friends of the Thurmans since college days at Morehouse and Spelman Colleges. For these reasons we may surmise that King cherished the time he spent with Thurman in the Fall of 1953 when their life paths crossed at Boston University and they together watched the baseball World Series live on television at Thurman's home (Thurman 1979 254).

4. Farmer's view of Jesus

From Farmer's point of view, Jesus is a thoughtful organiser who calculates with great skill how best to communicate hope to a wary people traumatised by occupation. In the 'Sermon on the Mount' for example, Jesus keeps a high ground and purports to be speaking to his own students, the disciples, while the potentially more hostile crowd is invited to listen in if they want to. The arrangement allows suitable distance between speaker and audience, minimising confrontational flashpoints when Jesus says such things as, 'Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you' (Matt. 5:44).

In the life of Jesus, therefore, history preserves memory of a profound intersection where the teachings of the ancient prophets are carried forward by a particularly brilliant student under the determinate conditions of an imperial colony. And for this reason, argues Farmer, the example of Jesus has lasting ethical value for anyone seeking value with social force. But more than this, Farmer also taught that the form of faith that grew up in the wake of Jesus' crucifixion, was, like the life of Jesus itself, a significant extension of teachings found among the ancient prophets. And this discovery is what Farmer valued most about his own scholarship. It is the discovery of the genius of the Second Isaiah.

5. The problem of the Second Isaiah

Before presenting the details of Farmer's view of the Second Isaiah, we must first say something to scholars of sacred texts. The primary concern of this study is not to explore whether Farmer was correct in his interpretations. We are working to understand the philosophy of Farmer in order to consider how his world-view may have played a role in shaping the philosophy of non-violence as it has been worked out through the teachings and practices of Civil Rights philosophers such as James Farmer, Jr. and Martin Luther King, Jr. For this reason we want to understand how Farmer's interpretations struggled to present meanings relevant to the challenges of life as he lived them in Jim Crow America. We are primarily interested in the way sacred scriptures were interpreted by J. Leonard Farmer, as he was renewing his mind in South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida from 1890 to 1910, and how these experiences

shaped his conception of meaning. Surely this was a time of history approaching utter darkness and it was no small accomplishment to work on the problem of hope as a problem of effective social force.

Farmer's son tells us that after his father graduated top of his class from Bethune-Cookman Institute in Florida, he walked from Daytona Beach to Boston in order to further his education. Farmer's long walk exemplified the determination of an entire generation of educators who preceded and mentored King. For the Black South of the early 20th Century the choice was between education or social death. And this is one reason why I think Farmer may have felt especially qualified to make the discovery that he made with respect to the Second Isaiah; because, here was a prophet he could understand completely. What does utter darkness look like? And how do you preach hope against such darkness?

For Biblical scholars, the problem of the Second Isaiah is the problem of determining the authorship and meaning of the later chapters of Isaiah (Chapters 40-55). For Farmer the so-called Second Isaiah was neither Isaiah (the prophet of doom) nor Isaiah the son of Amos (the prophet of blessings); instead, the Second Isaiah was a 'northern Israelitic priest who ministered . . . to the remnants of all Israel . . . in the remains of Jerusalem at the beginning of the second captivity of Judah in 586 B.C.' (Farmer 1958 27). In keeping with Farmer's own exposition of the mystery we will here linger over some general features of the outline and significance of the Second Isaiah before we raise the curtain, as it were, on his definitive historical identity. The Second Isaiah is prefigured therefore as 'a practical preacher with profound spiritual endeavours.' He could be 'easily' compared to Jesus in regard to the seriousness of his 'socio-religious' work. But whereas Jesus was working 'so as to prevent the national destruction of his people' the predicament of the Second Isaiah 'was so desperate that he had to devote himself entirely toward the resurrection of an already destroyed nation' (Farmer 1959 31).

6. Farmer's intimate approach to the Second Isaiah

Farmer's approach to the Second Isaiah, therefore, speaks first to the audience that well knows the difference between saving a nation from destruction and bringing a nation out of destruction. Before Farmer shares with his audience the historical facts that answer the mystery of who the Second Isaiah was, he shares first the profound kinship that he feels toward the mission that the ancient priest was compelled to face. We listen to the following passage in solidarity with Farmer's primary audience, the practical pastors and educators who worked on the front lines to bring Black America out of its experience of utter destruction:

[I] was led into a new approach to this unknown preacher, and to the very serious, life-or-death

problems of his social group which he endeavoured with all of his mental and spiritual ingenuity to solve for them or to help them solve for themselves. It became very clear to [me] that this preacher had designed and purposed his sermons so that they might be instrumental in solving this very critical problem of life and death in the history of his people. They were not designed for assuaging discomfort and grief. They were designed to point out to his blind, hopeless people through midnight clouds stars that were invisible except to the eyes of faith, or to paint them aurora on the eastern sky during the darkest hours between midnight and dawn.

Like Job in his personal vision of God (Job 42:5), [I] no longer heard of The Second Isaiah by the hearing of the ear; but [my] own spiritual eyes saw him for himself. [I] was led, as it were, face-to-face with him against his true historical background, and in the midst of his true geographical and social and spiritual milieu. These declared to [me] very much of the meaning and the significance of every word that this preacher uttered in his speech or wrote in his book. (Farmer 1958 25)

The spiritual work of the Second Isaiah could be appreciated by Farmer, because he could feel a likeness to the daunting seriousness of the task. Even for Jesus, the worldly, social task was somewhat lighter. The social world of Jesus had not yet suffered the coming destruction of the Temple. The work of Jesus was therefore an attempt to deter that destruction. For the Second Isaiah, however, the work was to lift the burden of destruction from shoulders already crushed. And Farmer is resonating with a sense that he knows this work, too. Prophecy under these conditions is not a matter of communicating accurate predictions of the future, it is more a matter of sustaining awareness that utter destruction cannot be allowed to bury hope for the future.

[The] value [of the Second Isaiah] for religion in social life today is not in the fulfilment of his predictions at the time and in the way that he expected it. But his value for religion in life today is his abiding faith and confidence and trust in God's redemption at the darkest hour in his people's history as a nation—and this, too, when at a time when apparently there was nothing left for them to hope for. It was what the apostle Paul would have called 'in hope believing against hope.' (Farmer 1958 34)

For Farmer 'the spiritual, intellectual and cultural level of a religious group' can usually be measured 'by the quality of sermons to which they can attend with comprehension and appreciation.' In the Second Isaiah Farmer found a community that represented 'the religious intelligentsia' of a broken world (Farmer 1958 38). Farmer's generation was explicitly working on the systematic elevation of sermons preached throughout the Black South. Benjamin Mays, the administrator who recruited Farmer to teach at Howard, was very clear about his own commitment to the uplift of preaching in the Black

South (Mays 1938). It is heartbreaking enough to think of King's assassination at the age of 39, but when Benjamin Mays eulogised his most famous student he was also burying a preacher who had been enormously influential in raising the standard of preaching on a global scale.

7. The early Second Isaiah

As Farmer argued, the Second Isaiah was in the first part of his preaching career participating in a social and religious renaissance that moved the centre of power and worship to Jerusalem. 'The new religion was to have been a spiritual religion free from all idolatry, but otherwise liberal toward some of the religious customs of other peoples as a means of winning them to Jehovah' (Farmer 1958 54). The purposes of the Second Isaiah were similar to those of Jesus in the sense that both preachers were intending to move beyond a sectarian spirituality of rules or 'externals' toward a more inclusive, inter-cultural spirituality that stressed 'spiritual aspects' and 'face-to-face human relations which should unite all peoples' (Farmer 1958 55). In short, the Second Isaiah was 'interracial and international' in his 'outlook and endeavours' (Farmer 1958 57). As Farmer tailors the seams of his interpretation, the reader continues to see how Farmer is able to fit the style of the Second Isaiah in a manner that answers to the felt contours of his own life's measure:

The Second Isaiah was doubtless the most thorough scholar in the religious literature of his people in Palestine when he preached. But he knew how to adapt his sermons to the masses of his people everywhere, to whom he was broadcasting from Jerusalem as his station. He was not merely endeavouring to generate a new hope and establish an *esprit de corps* among his despairing people at home, but he was at the time essaying to return and assist in the rehabilitation of his homeland. To be very practical when one must decide between life and death is not necessarily to be political. (Farmer 1958 119-120)

The first Black Ph.D. in Texas, who often re-translated terms from Hebrew into English, the better to bring out fine distinctions of meaning, and who became well known in his time and place as a compelling and intellectual preacher, here doubles his experience in the kindred form of the Second Isaiah, revealing to the reader how such a life must be lived from the inside out:

He was the first to preach redemption, reconstruction, and salvation here and now.... The Second Isaiah was the father of spiritual preaching as the means toward social ends—the establishment of the kingdom of Jehovah upon the earth.... [He was] a priestly interpretive, evangelistic, apocalyptic, missionary, and Messianic preacher. It is this kind of preaching that is Christian preaching at its best. Hence one may truly say that he was a Christian preacher six hundred years before Christianity arose.' (Farmer 121)

The Second Isaiah was seizing an opportunity. Chaldean conquerors had withdrawn. Religious leadership had moved to Jerusalem. A progressive Governor by name of Gedaliah was encouraging the development of a liberal spirituality that would welcome in other races and nations. The Second Isaiah was bold enough to declare before the people that their governor was an incarnation of Abraham reborn!

[The Second Isaiah, in] his many references to the beginnings implied that he regarded himself as standing upon the threshold of and as heralding a new beginning, the beginning of the new age, the Messianic age of righteousness and prosperity and blessedness, salvation and peace for Jehovah's people to be inaugurated by Him through the revived Abraham [Governor Gedaliah], the father of the old Israel, and the prospective father of the new Israel about to be born . . . (Farmer 1958 179)

8. The Second Isaiah after the massacre

From July to October the new administration of Gedaliah was heralded by the Second Isaiah as the coming of the new Abraham and the fulfilment of a promise to extend the community of Jehovah internationally and inter-culturally. The kingdom of peace and justice was miraculously coming into view. The Governor held a banquet where all were invited. And that night, everything changed. A reactionary militia under the leadership of Ishmael attacked the banquet and massacred the progressive party along with their heralded Governor Gedaliah.

Suddenly the curtain fell. Behind them not a sound was to be heard. Nor could the audience utter a sound because of dumbfounding bewilderment. Presently the curtains rose again, but not on the servant of Jehovah. There was lying in the pit the bloody, lifeless body of the actor who was to have played the leading role in the drama. As there was no *deus ex machina* or who dunnit, an unbelievable tragedy had taken place behind the screen. The servant of Jehovah was no more! The preacher's Messiah had been slain! With one stroke all visible grounds of hope for an early redemption and salvation had been dynamited from under his feet! (Farmer 1958 243)

What was to be done? The Second Isaiah was well educated and practical. Everything he had preached for the past four months was cut to pieces. His duty as a preacher was to find some way to sustain hope. But how? The fresh blood of the recent massacre seemed to render everyone hopeless.

Yet our preacher did not lose his faith in Jehovah's promises, or in this servant of Jehovah as the Messiah of his people. Instead, he challenged the holy seed to accept this servant's life-blood that had been poured out in death as establishing a new covenant-by-blood relation between this servant's seed and Jehovah.... In the new religion the servant of Jehovah would take the place of Jehovah's goat in the old Levitical law which, of course, could not

be followed that year. Coincidentally the servant was murdered in the month of the atonement sacrifice, the seventh month, our October. This new religion was to have been the religion of the new reunited Israel in the new age of history. It was to have been more of a spiritual religion replacing the old temple-worship which had ceased with the termination of the old covenant. (Farmer 1958 243)

Together with the Second Isaiah, Farmer shows us how a dutiful preacher doubles down. He does not give up this hope for a more universal spiritual community that would be international and inter-ethnic. He does not relinquish his faith in the liberal truth of his vision. Instead, in a wrenching act of spiritual fortitude he transforms the blood of the present defeat into the sacrificial evidence of victory to come: 'he assured the holy seed... that if the servant's life-blood should be made an offering for the sins of the people, the same results would follow from his death as were to have been achieved through his life's work: he would redeem Israel through his life's blood' (Farmer 1958 244). In short, what Farmer argued with respect to the Second Isaiah is that the movement which followed Jesus also had its scholarly history; their interpretation of crucified hope had a more ancient model.

9. Farmer in his day and ours

Farmer's text says that he had delivered his interpretation to a conference held in Ohio in 1947 and that the work was well received. What interests us today is the way that Farmer's work over decades of teaching and preaching slowly transformed the scope of what is usually taken to be the subject matter of religious interest. What Farmer called spiritual truth was not deprecated if it had an actual history, a time, a place, a person, or a living motive to overcome crushing terror. Whether he was considering the ancient prophets, Jesus, or the disciples, Farmer strove unflinchingly for the 'social force' of the matter. And we begin to hypothesise in this reading that Martin Luther King, Jr. was heir to such a school of wisdom. In this sense, Farmer and King were at once remarkable individuals, heroic for their actions and insights, but also they were participants in generational transformations. To understand the philosophy of non-violence as it emerged from the American South, we should consider returning these remarkable preachers to the spiritual developments that were taking place among their primary audience, as terms of hope were sustained, embodied, and transfigured under the pressure to find 'social force' or perish.

Of course, the movement toward *Religion in Life* was a *zeitgeist* of multiple audiences, spawning a journal by that name that drew contributions from social theologians and scholars far from the primary audiences that we have been considering here. The point to take away from Farmer's example is that the general form of Social Gospel cannot be allowed to subsume or silence or evade the specific topologies of

social destruction and resurrection that were endured or undertaken by the primary audiences that Farmer worked with during his heroic career. The specific historical circumstances shared by Farmer and his primary audience deeply affected the powers of insight and interpretation that were put to work upon texts and traditions. Whereas those texts and traditions may have been more widely shared, they were rarely seen to yield the specific significance that was necessary to sustaining the kind of hope needed to face the destructions and threats of experience in the Black South. Which is why Farmer's engagement with the Second Isaiah was profound. Farmer felt as if he were uniquely qualified to supply the eyes that could see things the way the Second Isaiah saw them.

10. Some closing words from the famous son

In closing I want to consider some remarks made by James Farmer, Jr. that he prepared for a series of lectures in Austin, which remain unpublished. Farmer Sr. was quite proud of his son and worked to have 'Junior' invited to speak at the Mary L. Smith lectures—the same series of lectures that Howard Thurman delivered in 1948, yielding *Jesus and the Disinherited*. In the work of Farmer Jr. we can see themes carried forward. The lectures are a vigorous argument for universal religious experience free from race prejudice. Farmer Junior takes the argument so far as to insist that America's Black Churches integrate themselves.

As James Farmer, Jr. warms up to his topic, his method rehearses principles that had long become recognisable features of the Farmer legacy in philosophy and religion. In looking at the contemporary problem of segregated religion, James Farmer announces that he intends 'to shed light upon the vast unexplored area of the whence and the why of the situation—to supply a basic social interpretation in historical perspective' (Farmer, Jr. 1954). Religions are implicated in history by the influences they subsume and by their effects. 'America's racist ideology has its roots in certain facets of her religious heritage' (Farmer, Jr. 1954 5). And whether we are talking about armies or religions, '[m]ore important than what a thing is is what it does' (Farmer, Jr. 8). On this account, argues Farmer Jr. 'religion as a whole, acts toward the issue of race in a manner which indicates its general function of conserving and supplying the dynamic to the secular life values accepted by the dominant among its adherents at any given time' (Farmer, Jr. 1954 11).

As we prepare to take leave from the Farmers, both father and son, we will conclude that hope as a 'social force' can manifest phenomena of great historical importance. And when we take up any *Testament of Hope*—as an influential collection of King's writings is aptly named—we want to ask, what is the determinate historical quality of this hope. Because hope can come in many historical sizes and

shapes. And because of the historical nature of hope and its ability to effect ‘social force’ through religious communities we are well reminded by James Farmer Jr. that ‘[o]nly the oppressed—the socially, economically, or politically disinherited—can produce a faith of revolutionary impact’ (Farmer, Jr. 1954 12). We assert that what Farmer, Jr. says is true because the oppressed are the ones who know best how the hope of resurrection has suffered a slaughter which seems to leave nothing but spilled blood to work with. And so we find that preachers in the 21st Century still call out to their congregations, as did Rev. Shannon Jones one Sunday morning in August of 2014, speaking to his primary audience at Atlanta’s Ebenezer Baptist Church, ‘If God is for us, who can be against us?’ (Romans 8:31), his words yet echoing the ancient hope of the Second Isaiah, ‘It is the Sovereign Lord who helps me. Who will condemn me?’ (Isaiah 50:9).

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Notes

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SPIRITUAL LIVING AND INTEGRAL PERSONALISM: A SYNTHESIS OF JAMES AND SCHELER

J. Edward Hackett

Abstract: In this essay, I clarify how Scheler's metaphysics could engender a concept of spiritual living rooted in Scheler's value-hierarchy and I interpret Scheler's later metaphysics pragmatically. By combining James and Scheler, I make sense of spiritual living as an exercise in 'strenuous living' James advocated in tension with a religious absolutism spoken about in his *Pragmatism* and *The Moral Philosopher, and the Moral Life*. Then, I synthesise my own account of integral personalism that is both relevant for James and Scheler scholars alike. Integral personalism attempts to integrate the phenomenological categories opened up for pragmatic speculation by Scheler, and then ground these forces in the life-affirming depths pragmatism in James.

Key Words: Max Scheler, William James, Existential-Oriented, Pragmatism, Phenomenology

1. Introduction

With the exception of Kierkegaardians and post-modern Caputo-ians, attempts in Continental philosophy to articulate how we regard the ethical orientation in human life have actively avoided any spiritual orientation. As an example, Jean-Paul Sartre thought of man as a series of undertakings and projects. Simone de Beauvoir felt the same way. The self is a product of self-creation, and these existentialists make specific reference to the artist. We are artists with respect to how the self is a self-directed creation. 'Man makes himself...In choosing his ethics, he makes himself, and force of circumstances is such that he cannot abstain from choosing one.' Even in the last decade, the French turn in phenomenology to concerns about religion awoke the same atheistic spirit found in French existentialism. However, existentialism is a robust form of individualism incapable of integrating the sacred back into human life since the existential self and its subjectivity are all there could ever be following Nietzsche's 'death of God.' In general, existentialism rejects religious and spiritual elements that some have integrated into their own self-conception: 'The existentialist does not think that man is going to help himself by finding in the world some omen to orient himself' However, this delimitation of the sacred elements into how a person may ground their own self-conception is phenomenologically limiting. Rather, persons experience their world as meaningful in respect to Holiness and religious experience *in their very being*.

The sacred can no longer be ignored. The 21st century was ushered in by religiously motivated acts

of terrorism, and there are many elements both here in the United States and in the West that interpret 9/11 as a fundamentally religious event. The call for vengeance on the part of the United States is interpreted as a religious war of an oversimplified 'us vs. Them' mentality. Why is this? The sense of the spiritual and deeply religious are modes of possibility that have never left us—even in their most naïve forms they are still modes of experience. Spiritual and religious modes of possibility are experienced in the primordial depth of feeling before cultural interpretation. Culturally, many persons *perceive* meaning and value of their life and judge culture in light of Holy feelings and value. Typically, secular philosophers observe the spiritual orientation of persons as irrational and the reluctance to abandon religion in the United States leads to irrational actions and orientations towards others. Consider how atrocious Reverend Jerry Falwell's condemnation of society's approval of gay and lesbians led to Hurricane Katrina is, or how the Westboro Baptist Church spews hatred in the name of the religious faith. These marginal cases become prominent when religion is seen as fundamentally irrational. Yet, what if the experience of values required a spiritual orientation towards the world that only persons could achieve? What would that spiritual orientation look like phenomenologically and practically? In this paper, I attempt to answer these questions through a synthesis of Scheler and James's thought.

In this essay, I argue that only a fully integrative conception of the person can successfully explain the spiritual orientation. By combining James and Scheler, a conception of spiritual living emerges, and this conception integrates the freedom of man's perpetual spirit to direct his own energies and the biological life that constitutes his material reality. Yet, I do not regurgitate Scheler's later metaphysics as the wanton answer to the integration of the oneness of man's being from spirit and life into his wholeness. Instead, the pragmatic critique of metaphysics is embraced, and a conception of spiritual living is proposed as a consequence of interpreting Scheler's later metaphysics pragmatically.

2. The relationship between James and Scheler

While the sections that follow hint at a conceptual significance between their relationship, the relationship between William James and Max Scheler is historically complex. William James won international fame in Europe with his 1890 publication of *The Principles of Psychology*. Max Scheler cites him in every major work. Next, Rudolph Eucken, Scheler's dissertation supervisor regularly corresponded with

William James. Indeed, at least as early as 1914, Eucken gave Scheler a copy of *A Pluralistic Universe*, and he more than likely read Wilhelm Jerusalem's 190 translation of the *Pragmatism*.

Most notably, however, Scheler was a bit disparaging towards the James's theorising of religious experience, and the immediate question from either a James or Scheler scholar might be how to square a synthesis if Scheler had reacted with some hostility in both his essay 'Cognition and Labor' and in *On the Eternal in Man*. In that work, Scheler cites an exacting knowledge of James's *The Varieties of Religious Experience* three times. The first and second times are disparaging, and the third citation references James's description in *The Varieties* of pietist religious conversion. In the longest remark, Scheler concerned himself with the very possibility of intuiting the *sense* of that which is *given*, what he called the 'extrasensual,' and he took great pains with Schleiermacher's reduction of everything experienced to feeling or sensation, or thereby constructed out of it. In fact, Scheler nearly identifies the extrasensual with the suprasensual and supernatural. The '*suprasensual* takes its place alongside the sphere of the asensual and extrasensual as an object of phenomenological study.' According to Scheler, James is guilty of drawing from the same chaos of sensation. In effect, James is not *phenomenological enough*.

But, one may protest, here is surely a limitless number of phenomena to study, which rather confuse than enlighten our mental vision? Admittedly, this danger has not been absent from one current... I am thinking of William James's famous work, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, which... made a strong impression in [Germany].... However valuable, in James's work especially, are the vivid descriptions of religious states of consciousness, this undertaking has nothing in common with our present outline of an endeavor to improve the conduct of natural theology. For our attention is not turned toward the chaotic and random world of individual religious experiences, but in the first place to the *nature* and *essential structures* of their objects, and next to the forms of the religious act appropriate to those experiences.... Moreover, this 'philosophy of religion' lacks any specifically religious theoretical criteria of *evidence*, in the light of which one might chart the chaos of 'cases'.

For Scheler, the study of religious intentional life involves never separating out the objects of religious acts from the intentional acts. In so doing, Scheler can discern the proper essential structures. Essential structures or interconnections concern the ever-present phenomenological relation of the act and accompanying object, and paying attention to the act-object structure reveals an order of evidence of the very realities persons are participating in. In one way, Scheler is right. There is no intentional structure in *that* work. There is no phenomenological evidence,

and no way to discern genuine, adequate, and objective structures of experience. In other words, there is no way to use pragmatism to get to what Scheler calls 'spirit,' and this limitation is also spelled out as a central theme in Scheler's treatment of pragmatism in 'Cognition and Labor.'

In other ways, however, if we interpret James as a phenomenologist and we see the blossoming attention to the subjective contents of experience that will eventually lead to radical empiricism from the root of pragmatism as a continuing possibility to make sense of the whole of James, then in essence, we can make the interpretive move to reject Scheler's passing over of James's 'other deficiencies' including, but not limited to, 'divine ontology' to which Scheler's 1922 *On the Eternal of Man* is opening up. This opening will eventually concern my pragmatic interpretation of the 1928 *Human Place and the Cosmos* below. Notice here. Scheler is embracing a conception of phenomenology that nearly identifies the supernatural as accessed through phenomenological description of religious acts and their objects. When he claims this near identification, phenomenology becomes a way to analyze spirit itself. Phenomenology becomes a form of non-natural intuitionism to discern realities beyond concrete experience. I am concerned that this emphasis or turn to the supernatural and supra-sensible removes the explanatory power of his otherwise profound thought and the speculative move beyond metaphysics becomes problematic if we are still concerned with being phenomenologists who want to remain ontologically neutral with respect to descriptions of experience. As such, the section below will emphasise reversing priority and rather than taking our cue from Scheler, I argue, we ought to embrace the call for concrete analysis of experience exemplified in James's pragmatic critique of metaphysics when encountering Scheler's speculation about how spirit becomes through the intentional acts of persons.

3. A pragmatic sketch of Scheler's metaphysics

While the relationship between Scheler's earlier phenomenological writings and the later metaphysics are a tangled mess, I will not touch upon that relation here. Instead, I will focus on the *Human Place and the Cosmos* and sketch its possibilities pragmatically. For the purposes of ontology, we will read Scheler through James. Before that, I do want to mention one caveat. In what follows, I want to make sure that no misrepresentation of James or Scheler occurs in the reader's mind. Scheler transitions from a pre-occupation of ethics to a later metaphysics. In that metaphysics, Scheler ontologises life. Life is interpreted as a spiritual potential to be realised, and while I will draw attention to James's openness to freedom, I do not want to convey the impression that James and Scheler are equal on this point of ontologising life.

In the *Human Place in the Cosmos*, Scheler posits two forces that constitute human life: impulsion (*Drang*) and spirit (*Geist*). All feeling and instinct is undifferentiated in plants and lower animals, but persons, aware of the directedness of life's energy due to their ability to reflect upon themselves, can suspend the forces of feeling and instinct. Scheler posits that a person's capacity for ideation allows for this suspension, and this is a principal characteristic of being a person. In the act of ideation, persons have insight into higher values, and this insight allows us to discover spirit's pull in us. Therefore, ideation is a spiritual act, an intentional act that occurs in the highest form of value-feeling in Scheler's hierarchy of value-ranking. This intentional act allows us to detach from the determining force of organic being. In our reflective awareness, spirit transforms the organic determinations of the world and the *whatness* of the world into objects. Essences are transformed into objects through the fact that what is given in the immediate flux of life is felt. The felt-dimension of human life is the phenomenological order of value inherent in the primordial affectivity undergirding personal life.

According to Scheler, spirit is

a specific type of an intuition of primordial phenomena and essential contents, and it encompasses also a specific class of volitional and emotive acts such as kindness, love, repentance, awe, states of wonder, bliss, despair and free decision-making.

Persons encounter these act-contents and their intended objects in our participation as self-reflective and conscious persons. As a person 'only the human being is able to soar far above his status as a living entity and, from a center beyond the spatio-temporal world, make everything the object of his knowledge including himself.' Here again, notice Scheler's nearly disembodied language. For this very reason, Scheler ontologises the intentional relation phenomenologists take for granted at the heart of human life, but in soaring above the determination of organic being, human beings become 'world-open' (*Welt-offen*). This move is best explained by analyzing the interaction of the two metaphysical components at work in the human person, and it is precisely in the interaction between spirit and impulsion where a pragmatic interpretation can be imposed. Let me explain.

Scheler starts at the bottom-up in life whereas other metaphysical systems might be said to start from the top and work their way down to life. Life is full of impulsion, the feeling and drives that tend to higher forms. Scheler defines impulsion as 'the unity of the human being's complex differentiation of drives and affects.' For Scheler, the reality of the world is given to us in resistance; to put that another way, the coming tension felt between what I anticipate and feel first makes its entrance into

personal experience through the primordial affectivity shared between James and Scheler. The world resists us in terms of drive and feeling-fulfillment. Human striving is, therefore, always falling short of fulfilling its desires. In that moment when spirit reflects back upon itself suspending in the ideational act, persons become aware of the world's resistance. They feel it in the bones of their very being. Persons encounter resistance in the world and this coming-to-be felt reality of the resisting world is *value*. For Scheler, the person is the focus of life. Human life consists of impulsive drives and the ability to suspend their determination on actions. Values highlight and underscore a person's felt reality; this felt reality is given to us in a material intuition *not* by the suspended forces of life *but through spirit*. The intuited content of a value can motivate a person to realise spirit. Intuited content and representations of higher values transform the intuitions and representations into objects. By transforming intuitions and representations into objects, even of the vital functions of our own organic life, persons can shed and nullify the efficacious force of our drive impulsions—what Scheler calls the '*suspension of reality*.' In this way, persons shed the environment and causal order of nature to realise themselves as spiritual persons and values make their entrance into the world simultaneously.

The capacity for realisation is due to the fact that persons transform the resistance of affects and drives into objects of knowledge. Persons may grasp that the drive for pleasure might make us feel good for a time, but creating a work of art no matter the burden serves a higher spiritual ideal than pursuing the transient pleasure of a person's organic being. The process of sublimating drives to spirit is a manner of participation in the ground of being, but the sublimating of drives is ultimately a free decision to let spirit guide us. In this way, persons participate in the very realisation of values, and become as Scheler describes a '*co-creator, co-founder, and co-executor... a condition of involving decisions, man bears the higher dignity of an ally and even collaborator of God*.' In that moment of free decisions, persons must openly choose to let spirit guide us. The freedom of action to improve human life opens up to future possibility by listening to spirit grounded in the very pragmatic freedom of human life. Before life, spirit is impotent; spirit can only guide. The spiritualisation is the suspension of drives that stem from life's enervating impulse and spirit's call to higher values gleaned in insight. Suspending the effect of drives and allowing spirit (*Geist*) to guide human actions by sublimating drives to spirit is, then, the process of making disembodied feelings of psychic and spiritual feeling embodied, but it is also a moment of freedom James would invite us to explore. In this moment between the impulsion of life and spirit, persons can decide between possibilities of a lower or higher form

and through those possibilities the very reality of humanity's social, political, and economic world concretises into a reality we can no longer be skeptical about. The moment between life and spirit is a pragmatic moment of creativity and openness.

Being a moment of freedom, there is no enslavement to the body of drives anymore than there is an elevated Platonic world of ineffectual spirit leading us away from drive-fulfillment. *Geist* and *Drang* are never dual properties of the person as one thinks of ontologically separate forces of *res extensa* and *res cogitans* in Cartesian thought or any other metaphysical dualisms. Instead, *Geist* and *Drang* are aspects of prevailing movements of *experience within the person*. If *Geist* and *Drang* are each one-side of the same coin of the person, one would then find common ground in James's proposed neutral monism articulated about affections in 'The Place of Affectional Facts.' The one reality is given as a union between feeling acts and a resisting world. The world's resistance manifests various values that form the content of the feeling act in relation to the world's felt resistance. Yet, if a person tends to drive-fulfillment over spirit, then the person will be only reactive to the impulses of life. Such persons are often carried by their concerns only for immediate gratification and the impulses of life. So concerned with immediate gratification, such a person may identify their bodily appetites as the limit of their own aspiration and self-activity. If a person tends to let spirit guide them, then a suspension of drives can be enacted and the person can find the freedom to realise more love into the world.

Love is the only way to create values in the world. As Scheler puts this point in *The Nature of Sympathy*:

It is essentially as a movement tending to the enhancement of value that love acquires its significance as a creative force. This is not to say that love first creates these values or itself enhances them. Certainly not. But in all feeling and finding values, all preference even, it is love that within *these* spheres of experience brings utterly new and superior values into existence; as it does for the whole field of will, choice and action to which preference gives rise. Love, in short, is *creative of* 'existence,' relative to these spheres.

Love is a movement, an ascension in feeling and values to which the lover participates in with respect to the beloved. In both respects, the concretion of experience is achieved either as person-as-tending-toward-drives or person-as-allowing-spirit-to-guide. Person-as-allowing-spirit-to-guide listen to the pull of love since love 'brings utterly new and superior values into existence.' Tending toward the latter means allowing God and value to manifest as the ground of being. Being world-open is a way of ultimately deciding how much spirit guides a person's self-activity, or to phrase it in James's words how best to harmonise to an unseen order and manifest

God and value in the space between us. Persons generate world-openness in deciding to be open to others and God through love.

The person may tend toward drives or tend toward spirit-to-guide. If she chooses the latter over the former, then she opens herself up to spirit. The only ideational act in human experience that can open persons up to spirit is love. Through love, the capacity to know the essence of the world, what Scheler called *Wesensschau*, opens up to her. As Eugene Kelly has put this point more forcefully, 'The essences and essential relationships contained *a priori* as functionalised essences in the world-views of all nations and all peoples become familiar to her.' As such, the spirit-guided person becomes familiar with how various totalities in metaphysics (and the cultural instantiation of those metaphysical ideals also) often ignore or identify the natural standpoint with the realm of spirit. Spirit-guided essential insight into the nature of reality allows a person to intuit the very structures that confine and imprison cultures around the world. From this vantage point, the structures of various world-views can be evaluated as limiting human understanding and only the suspension of essential insight guided through love can render various cultural understandings in their true valuational form. In other words, cultural ideals can be judged objectively according to their relative worth in relationship to other ideals. Kelly articulates this insight wonderfully:

Such a person approaches the standpoint of the macrocosm. They are situated in their own time and place, but they are not partisan. They are aware of the limitations of human belief regarding the existence of entities not given in phenomenological reflection, but are not afraid to risk taking a metaphysical standpoint. They love the ordered world, but crave nothing.... In this way, they create a world of their own, but the elements of this creation are provided by the building-blocks of meaning available to all persons.

Scheler *qua* Kelly does not think the ideational act through love can attain absolute clarity in relation to the structure of cultures. This claim is an important restriction since in loving through spirit, persons only approach and glean the standpoint of the divine. No specific knowledge of its essential nature can be known. Instead, some phenomenon or cultural aspect can be given as Holy, and this givenness (this Holiness) is the value-correlation of the deepest spiritual feelings that permeate the entire depth of being a person. In this spiritual feeling, the interconnection between spiritual feeling and the Holy values of the person allow persons to glean the standpoint of the divine. In this standpoint, only from participating in the guiding-spirit within us can persons find at the moment of freedom the impulses of nature no longer pull us in a particular time and place. The drives cannot affect us insofar as persons

sublimate their drives to spirit, and the practiced person can then stand at the edge of the macrocosm in *their* time and place and glimpse divinity. Yet, Kelly called this same person a 'partisan' for good reason. Since human life is given as valuable, the loving participant cannot help but be objectively suggestive about how best certain cultural forms restrict or constrain the purposes persons assign to them. Persons assign and realise value-contents of the Holy and culture over and against the tendencies of life to prefer vitality, sensation and utility values. From this standpoint, persons gain insight in how best to create a loving world to help ameliorate the constant identification of persons-tending-toward-drive-fulfillment. Only love can create values and engender a renewal of cultural life from the debasement where these drives lead.

Practically speaking, cultural spaces are where spiritual living occurs most fervently in opposition to the life-drives. While I do not think Scheler wanted us to resist these drives unwisely since they are partly necessary for human life, Scheler regarded the deliberation of their release and sublimation where persons might be most pragmatic about their manifestation in personal life. Persons need not give into Roman excess regarding *eros* anymore than persons must succumb to gluttony when eating, and some sectors of human life are abundantly necessary for the recurrent manifestation of value-creation to occur. Specifically, art, religion, science and philosophy allow for suspension of drive-fulfillment to attain a position closer to the macrocosm and the realisation of Scheler's cultural idea of the *Allmenschen*. A brief contrast may help advance Scheler's insight.

Consider Heidegger. Heidegger identified very accurately the phenomenological experience of art as world-creation, but seemingly without a valuational structure Heidegger could only identify art as one potential source of meaning in cultural life without discerning the reason for why it is a source of meaning. Dasein, like Scheler's person, is a phenomenological conception of human life purged of the natural attitude, but Dasein's self-disclosure is limited to an existential interpretation of life that has no spirit to guide it. Existentialism amplifies the assertion of self-as-freedom in the vital sphere without regard for the higher possibilities it construes as erroneously inauthentic. Instead, Dasein and other existential conceptions of self are only resolute before their possibilities and the possibilities they will realise into the personal sphere cannot be ordered according to the value-contents such possibilities are given. For Heidegger (and largely the other existentialists refuse act-feelings and co-relational value-contents), there is no order of preference in which these possibilities are given-as-valuable-in-feeling, and as such, these possibilities cannot be ranked nor valued in terms of their relative worth to each other. The highest possibilities culminate in the highest

expressions of culture, that is, in spiritual feeling acts and the value-contents of the Holy. In the next section, I focus on the pragmatic implication of how we might integrate the *enervating* impulses of life and Scheler's call of the spirit to guide us. I call this account 'integral personalism.' But first, I must outline James's critique of metaphysics.

4. A pragmatic gesture towards an integral personalism

An extensive treatment of James on metaphysics cannot be accomplished here. Instead, I will summarise those aspects that bear directly on the questions being asked. A full view of James would spell out his extensive introduction of the pragmatic method in solving the debate between all the philosophical issues that beguiled him: determinism vs. indeterminism, pluralism vs. monism, the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the metaphysics associated with Empiricism vs. Rationalism. In every case, James sought to reconfigure these classical metaphysical problems and focus on their pragmatic content. In so doing, James's pragmatism brought to light the metaphysical implication of the *potential goods* various meta-physical systems offered. For my purposes here, I will focus on the threefold criteria of a genuine option in the rather popular *The Will to Believe* as an example of how James applied pragmatic method to the classical problem of God's existence. He writes,

For what a contradictory array of opinions have objective evidence and absolute certitude been claimed! The world is rational through and through,—its existence is an ultimate brute fact; there is a personal God,—a personal God is inconceivable; there is an extra-mental physical world immediately known,—the mind can only know its own ideas; a moral imperative exists,—obligation is only the resultant of desires; a permanent spiritual principle is in every one,—there are only shifting states of mind; there is an endless chain of causes,—there is an absolute first cause; an eternal necessity,—a freedom; a purpose,—no purpose; a primal One,—a primal Many...

James's list is more extensive. His point is simple. Various metaphysical systems and ideas have all been tried, and yet to this day there is no way in principle to consider one system more certain than another. Yet, giving up certitude is not giving up on thinking through these various claims. For the pragmatist, truth comes to mean something different than accompanying the demonstrably certain. Let's see an example.

In *The Will to Believe*, James defends the claim that we can believe in propositions that we have no evidence to support and that in following the Peircean maxim, we ought to accept beliefs for the conceivable effects they will have in increasing future possibility for our lives. If there are greater conceivable effects that will follow from accepting an idea, then the idea

meshes more with our experience and restores harmony to our lives. Moreover, we cannot experience the whole in its entirety. We cannot reasonably defend any one of the previous metaphysical propositions. Instead, we can only test what the effects on my experience will be from following them. Instead, as C. S. Peirce put it: 'Our beliefs guide desires and shape our actions.' Therefore, one can understand James's threefold criteria of a genuine option of belief when concerning questions that fall between the cracks of science and the audacity of classical metaphysics. In that way, genuine options must be decided in our lived-experience since they matter but we have no evidence available to weigh them. Let us review the threefold criteria:

First, an option must be *living*; the choice must really matter between two hypotheses. Second, the option between two or more beliefs must be *forced*. They cannot be indifferent like asking whether or not you will be taking an umbrella on an easy-going night out. The option is not forced there. You can easily avoid going out by staying in. However, the choice between God's existence and non-existence is extremely forced and living. The belief is unavoidable. Finally, the option must be *momentous*. Religion presents us with a vital good, and that vital good can be lost with our belief or non-belief. It is a *living, forced and momentous* affair.

With these criteria, *spiritual living is an existential orientation towards the possibility of increased future possibility and greater harmony in our lives*. The pragmatic content inhering in Scheler's suspension can proceed to either a higher reality where the person realises spirit or descends to a lower reality where the person realises its sensuous, desiring and brute nature. Very similarly, the truth disclosed to us in that moment of pragmatic freedom is a phenomenological event. Truth is a revelatory event in our lives. 'When we stick to it that there is a truth, we do so with our whole nature and resolve to stand or fall by its results.' The same happens with the freedom of relation found at the heart of being a person. The person may ascend or descend in terms of possibility, and those possibilities take shape, impact the world, and influence others.

Spiritual living opens a space for these two elements of Life and Spirit to stand together in the wholeness of one person. Practically speaking, the culmination of standing together means allowing Holy values and spiritual feeling into a space in cultural life, and this convergence requires the cultivation of those capacities of the person that facilitate achieving an integral wholeness within and without. Spiritual living is a personal orientation towards spiritual feeling and Holy values, and this co-relational act-feeling and value-content can only come about through persons. As we have explained, persons are the locus of value-creation. Values only come-to-be through persons participating in their

realisation. This rootedness to persons is why James insists on the necessity of God in relation to the strenuous mood in his *The Moral Philosopher and The Moral Life*, and also why Scheler regards God as the ultimate personal exemplar. Let us consider a passage from James,

When, however, we believe that a God is there, and that he is one of the claimants, the infinite perspective opens out. The scale of the symphony is incalculably prolonged. The more imperative ideals now begin to speak with an altogether new objectivity and significance.... The capacity of the strenuous mood lies so deep down among our natural human possibilities that even if there were no metaphysical or traditional grounds for believing in God, men would postulate one simply as a pretext for living hard, and getting out of the game of existence its keenest possibilities of zest. Our attitude towards concrete evils is entirely different in a world where we believe there are none but finite demanders.

While metaphysics prior to pragmatism is very unpopular for James and belief in God may rightly be called a genuine option, note the phrase James uses here: '*even if there were no metaphysical or traditional grounds.*' As such, these grounds are still entirely possible for James. Metaphysical problems remain open pragmatically despite the closure of metaphysical systems preceding James historically. Insofar as a metaphysical idea is conducive to action and the improvement of human life, belief in metaphysics and its supported ideals is permitted. In fact, they are encouraged! However, there is a limit; the pragmatist cannot close the door on various systematic alternatives. In this way, I have used 'spiritual' to indicate the openness to the Holy. I have not firmly determined what shape and possibility of the divine can enter into the field of human experience, and not even James wanted to foreclose some alternatives over others. In his *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking* James writes:

But whether you will finally put up with that type of religion or not is a question that only you yourself can decide. Pragmatism has to postpone dogmatic answer, for we do not yet know certainly which type of religion is going to work best in the long run.

In this Jamesian spirit, I can only indicate the necessity of both Spirit and Impulsion in Scheler's later system, and in this way, Scheler's system articulates a process conception of God being the unity of value and feeling. Neither Scheler nor James can prescribe a particular content to what spirituality requires, but only pinpoint the pragmatic and phenomenological necessity why we ought to be open to such content. As such, the very beginnings of the philosophical anthropology outlined here is a general existential openness to the possibility of religion itself. Being world-open elevates the becoming of all persons in oneself, in one's relation to other persons,

and in one's relation to the divine. In this way, the person allows otherness of persons, God, and culture to be realised through their own spiritual orientation.

The sacrifice and moral vision of impartiality are experienced-as-real only if God is present in moral experience, that is the unity of spirit and life, value and persons manifesting between them as a co-experienced unity. In relating to God, the capacities for belief and its orientation towards possibility in action take root and manifest in our participation of those capacities. I call this position *participatory realism*. James attests to the necessity of the Holy precisely in that without the Holy such habits as the strenuous mood for moral living could never take hold. For James, a world devoid of God and completely of inorganic nature cannot support how we experience values. This insight is directly supported in the same section 2 of *The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life* under discussion, and while James's discussion of metaphysics and its implications for values abound in *A Pluralistic Universe*, *Some Problems in Philosophy*, and his *Pragmatism Lectures*, this is the only section in James's corpus where he discusses the metaphysics of value in the most direct fashion. James writes, 'Goodness, badness, and obligation must be *realised* somewhere in order really to exist; the first step in ethical philosophy is to see that no merely inorganic "nature of things" can realise them.' In this text, James supports a non-reductionist account of persons realising value. For him, no strictly materialist ontology of value will do. Instead, values have their origin in the constitutive relation in consciousness. 'Moral relations,' James writes, 'have their *status* in that being's consciousness. So far as he feels anything to be good, he *makes* it good.' In other words, the ontological status emerges out of the relations between how consciousness and the world relate (or better put, *participate*), and such a relational interpretation is phenomenological.

There are several ways that we could read '*makes* it good.' First, we could read James as an anti-realist about value, and interpret the '*makes*' as a form of emoting. Values are explained as statements about how we feel rather than regarding asserting a truth-apt claim about an independently existing set of values woven into the fabric of nature. Yet, anti-realism about value denies the phenomenological work that the term '*realising*' does. As we have seen, persons realise value in terms of either the higher forms of Holy values or the lowest values associated with mere sensation and drive-fulfillment: these are two ways persons may tend. Realising implies a realiser of value, and therefore a dimension for the experiencing experiencer must be the person. For Scheler, values are the intuitive-content in which the world's resistance is *given* to the person. In addition, the process of what that realisation requires can best be explained by the phenomenological work affective

intentionality accomplishes for the person in Scheler. The same personalist structure underscores James's pragmatism as well. Like it or not, James claims, philosophers make arguments from analogies from their own life. In this way, the personal is everywhere, and even the move of radical empiricism is an attempt to make the whole of individual life meaningful.

Let me explain the reasons why I would defend such a view.

The term '*realises*' proposes that the relation between consciousness and the world, especially in Section Two of *The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life*, transforms the affective feeling and its value-content into something tangibly real. Spirit transforms the contents of given experience into irreducible objects of knowledge. In Scheler, intentionality becomes such an operative insight (to borrow loosely from Eugene Fink) that once intentionality becomes ontologised, intentionality's relational aspect to objects transforms the world of sensation into objects; so much in fact, that Scheler becomes a realist about the objects we participate in. This ability is called spirit in his metaphysics, but also refers to the capacity or power of any person to suspend the process of drive-fulfillment via spirit. In spirit, persons experience the freedom inherent in our spiritual orientation towards the world and others. Without spirit, no such freedom could ever be experienced. In other words, the person experiences herself in terms of her own freedom towards the enervating impulse of life and brings about value through the actions to realise act-feelings and her content into the intersubjective space between persons.

This intersubjective space is the cultural space where persons experience themselves as first-personal acting and feeling beings. Husserl called this intersubjective space the lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*). In the lifeworld, such freedom in James comes about when the strenuous mood calls us, where we feel the exercise of freedom in terms of higher purpose as contrasted against the value-contents generated by lower feelings. The very same purposes to which the exercise of our freedom in practical life aspires is what James calls 'the unseen order' in his *The Varieties of Religious Experience* in which James writes 'our supreme good lies harmoniously in adjusting ourselves thereto.' If the world is filled with 'finite demanders,' then the attention we pay to such suspensions is nullified by the affective allure of vital urges, sensation, and the lower utility values. A world without the resources of spirit (and therefore God) cannot adequately challenge let alone explain why we are called to higher values and the ideals they embody. For James, the highest expression of a person is 'that union or harmonious relation with that higher universe is our true end...and spiritual energy flows in and produces effects.'

From their synthesis, a few thoughts could be offered about persons. These ideas will be later explored in a more refined manner in a developed philosophical anthropology, but I feel enough work has been done here to suggest a few conclusions worth exploring.

- (1) Persons are the basis from which an ethics must be built, and developing an ethics therefore requires a systematic reflection on the nature of persons.
- (2) Persons are a living actuality with spiritual potential with a particular orientation to higher values from lower values.
- (3) Corresponding to these higher values, a space in culture is required for their concretion in feeling and persons must hone the capacities to integrate the twofold energies of persons-as-tending toward higher or lower realities in those same cultural spaces.
- (4) Without understanding human beings as living potentials for the actualisation of spirit, there can be no calling to higher values, nor can culture be directed in the correct normative way.

(1) and (2) are explored in this work, and I have devoted a lot of time to reflecting upon them. Taken together, (1) and (2) express the underpinning of *integral personalism* whereas the pragmatic consequence of *integral personalism* is affirmed in (3) and (4), which is also part of that view. More provocatively, (3) and (4) are true by phenomenological necessity if we accept (1) and (2). Persons possess the moment of freedom to decide how best to integrate the symbolic order offered in Scheler's metaphysics or the aesthetics of the unseen order given through religion. These realities are felt, and their purpose is in directing us in response to the overwhelming existential suffering inherent in all life. Both James and Scheler lead to the same point. However, the question is given the inherent freedom of persons, how does one cultivate oneself habitually? Persons do not identify with their own drive-fulfillment. Instead, persons tend, as Scheler believed and called 'spiritualisation', to ascend in being from what they are. Taking note of this ascension requires the earthly insistence on the renewing of those cultural practices conducive to bringing out the best in us and collectively in our culture as well. Since persons constitute (and I mean 'constitute' in the very deep phenomenological sense) these earthly spaces, spiritual orientations find concretion in religious spaces. The very meaning of these spaces are brought into being as people realise higher values into the world, and religions hone and orient these directed energies in human life.

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THE ACCIDENTAL PERSONALIST: SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE AND THE BENEFITS OF FAILURE

Benjamin Bâcle

Abstract: The starting-point of this article is Samuel Taylor Coleridge's conception of the will, which is central to both his understanding of personality and his apprehension of divinity. For Coleridge, the will is indeed what makes personal growth possible and the proof that there is in Man something more than the mere work of matter. This mainspring of self-reflection and action, however, is in the poet-philosopher constantly at risk of being crystallised as an impersonal faculty whose principle transcends human experience and transience. Coleridge, in his life-long effort to lay the foundations of a critique-proof philosophical system, can indeed be said to succumb, at times, to what may be called the 'temptation of fixity.' He is ultimately saved from this temptation by his own failure to complete his system - a failure which can be put down not only to his opium addiction and family problems but also and more importantly to his sense of the infinitely varied texture of personal experience. The result, which always borders on being 'a philosophy that is not philosophy' (G. N. G. Orsini), is an inexhaustible source of questions and visions which reflect the numerous complexities and contradictions of personhood.

Key Words: Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Freewill, Utilitarianism, Personality, Impersonality, Fixity, System, Experience.

1. Introduction

Samuel Taylor Coleridge, perhaps more than any other writer, exemplifies the irresolvable tension between unity of purpose and multiplicity of interests, solicitations and temptations. Animated from an early age by a desire to produce a body of work that would faithfully reflect his worldview, he left this life having barely completed a portion of it, in the form of a handful of outstanding poems and a number of moral, metaphysical and critical works owing as much to historical and personal circumstance as to singularity of vision. As Marilyn Butler has it, 'the Coleridge myth is of a man who failed to fulfil his brilliant promise, through weakness of character and (if this is not the same thing) addiction to opium.'¹ Critics of Coleridge accordingly oscillate between frustration at his inability to finish and polish his projects and fascination for the sublime truths that his fragments seem to allude to.

This discordance is nowhere as evident as when it comes to evaluating his philosophical ventures. For some, the merits of these need to be weighed against the standards of the discipline Coleridge purported to contribute to, at least because his ambitions in this

respect should be taken seriously. G. N. G. Orsini thus refuses the 'notion of a "total Coleridge",' which can only result 'in the notion of a philosophy that is not philosophy, a poetry that is not poetry, a religion that is not religion, but a mixture of all these, each participating in the others and losing its own character',² only to deplore that unfavourable circumstances prevented the man from publishing any 'single complete philosophical treatise'³ that could have helped establish him as a 'systematic philosopher'⁴ equal at least to Schelling. Coleridge still deserves praise as a 'student of philosophy'⁵ or 'a learned and acute writer on philosophy', however.⁶

Orsini's resolute verdict brought scholars such as Kathleen Coburn to insist that 'it is time we stopped dividing Coleridge into departments as if he were a university',⁷ given that 'the poet and philosopher in Coleridge were one and the same man.'⁸ This article aligns with Coburn's judgment and further contends that Coleridge's principal and enduring appeal resides precisely in his unsteady equilibrium between the absolutes of systems and the necessary incompleteness of life. Inside this equilibrium Coleridge the person lies, a person concerned about both the firmness of the ground he stands on and the restrictions that this firm ground entails. Coleridge may never have expressed it in those terms, and may have, for most of his life, striven to present his fellow human beings with a consistent, dependable and more importantly *closed* doctrine, but what his repeated incapacity to do so seems to reveal, more than a weakness of the will, is a distaste for anything that would flatten the richness of experience. Will and experience, in fact, were for him inseparable: there could be no experience without a corresponding force to seek and appropriate it. From this we should infer that Coleridge was present everywhere in his writings, from the least conspicuous to the most ambitious.

The question of free will, or free agency, is at the heart of this article, which is concerned with determining the degree to which we can see Coleridge as a forerunner of Personalism. What in Coleridge usually goes by the name of Will (more often than not with a capital 'W') channels the diversity of experience, unifies it, and feeds it into the self, which it encapsulates. As such, it is commensurate with Peter Bertocci's contention that 'the "will" [...] as will-agency is not a "faculty," a "part" of me. It is my self initiating a course of action that would not have occurred unless the will-agency (rather than the want-agency) had taken hold.'⁹

Similarly, Coleridge's characterisation of the

human Will as a finite version of God's will, just like human Reason is a finite version of God's Reason, and just like the human person is a finite version of the person of God, resonates with Austin Farrer's induction of the latter's existence from our own experience as willing subjects:

Will, action, the creative moment in man, is the only object of consideration which opens a dimension of metaphysical depth, or promises to let through a single ray of uncreated light. Here alone we find a power of making anything to be or not to be, and it is this that raises all the questions of theistic philosophy; leading us to ask, whether there is not such a power underlying all things, not merely the things we make to be; leading us to ask, whether our own creative power is underivative, or whether it does not spring continually out of a deeper source of will, the wellspring of the world; leading us to ask, how nearly analogous that prime creative will would be, to the secondary form of volition we ourselves possess and exercise.¹⁰

Of course, the Personalism of Bertocci cannot reasonably be likened to that of Farrer, and John H. Lavelly has amply shown that Personalism is by nature *plural*.¹¹ The aim here however is not to decide whether Coleridge's thinking corresponds to a particular form of Personalism. Rather, it is to bring to light a number of features in Coleridge's writings which seem to announce a number of personalist themes. But it is also to bring to light what does *not*, in those writings, seem to fit with some crucial premises of Personalism, as expressed by some of its most distinguished exponents.

In order to start this discussion, I will first look into the details of Coleridge's concept of Will and some of its implications, before moving on to his reflection on God as the source of this Will and of personhood. I will then focus on what, in those ideas, and in the way Coleridge formulate them, seems to demonstrate what I call 'the temptation of fixity', a tendency to crystallise concepts, faculties and even the good itself to the extent of making them 'impersonal' again. Finally, I will contrast this proneness to crystallisation with Coleridge's propensity to break his own mould, in his constant effort to make sense of his sensorial experience. And here, in the half-light of his forever stretched self, will hopefully appear Coleridge the person, who can be seen as an integral part of his thought.

2. Will the source of personality

In the beginning was the will.¹² Arthur O. Lovejoy remarks on 'the abandonment of necessitarianism' being often considered 'the turning-point in (Coleridge's) mental history.'¹³ In the early 1790s, Coleridge became infatuated with David Hartley's Associationism, to the point of assuring his friend Robert Southey that he was 'a complete necessitarian',¹⁴ for whom ideas came from the senses and

were susceptible of endless combinations through the mechanism of association. The young Coleridge's subscription to Hartley's theory is arguably indissociable from his enthusiasm for the French Revolution and its ideological background, and more specifically from his conviction that we were all born equal and that any difference in character should be put down to the infinite variety of our respective sensorial experiences. Political disillusion, no doubt, but more importantly the realisation that the determinism promoted by Hartley's system did not allow for any form of personal responsibility or fulfilment, led Coleridge to look more decidedly into himself for a sound principle for these. At the heart of the matter was the need to be in full possession of one's thinking processes, something that Hartley, making associations the product of mere chance, could naturally not provide. Interestingly, Peter Bertocci specifically states that 'the distinction between thinking and associating is critical for understanding what is involved in personal willing. For the switch from associating to thinking involves what I [...] call 'effort' or 'will-agency.'¹⁵ For both Bertocci and Coleridge, the association of ideas was a form of *subthinking*, a phenomenon to be accounted for, but which could not be equated with the controlled intellectual activity of the free agent.

Coleridge's emphasis on individual freedom and activity was central to the Romantic bid to reclaim a world thought to have been dismembered and desiccated by decades, if not centuries of inveterate empiricism. As such it begs the question of the relation Coleridge, as one of the fathers of British Romanticism, entertained with the latter's counterpart and forerunner, German Romanticism. While the vast majority of critics agree that Immanuel Kant's influence was determinant in helping Coleridge out of Associationism, they tend to disagree over exactly how much he owes contemporary German philosophy for his own conceptualisation of the will.¹⁶ At one end, we have Orsini, who claims that Coleridge's idea of a responsible and self-determining human nature should be put down to his substitution, in the role of philosophical mentors, of Kant, Fichte and Schelling for Hartley, Berkeley and Spinoza. At the other end, David Newsome contends that what Kant, Fichte and Schelling gave Coleridge was not so much the idea of the will as the form in which to put and convey it.¹⁷ For Newsome, as for John Muirhead¹⁸ and more recently James Vigus,¹⁹ the influence of Plato and Neo-Platonism predates and transcends that of Kant, who simply brought Coleridge back 'to his earliest intellectual enthusiasm.'²⁰ More specifically, Coleridge had presumably already been led to reflect on the will thanks to the works of the Cambridge Neo-Platonist Ralph Cudworth.

Wherever Coleridge's newfound obsession with the will came from, what is certain is that it soon

proved to be the keystone of his thought. More than the mere necessary condition for moral choices that Kant surmised, it became, for him, the all-encompassing and all-unifying force of the intelligent living thing, and its main principle of self-development. One of the entries to his *Notebooks* is in this respect very telling:

My will & I seem perfect Synonimes—whatever does not apply to the first, I refuse to the latter/ - Anything strictly of outward Force I refuse to acknowledge, as done by me/ it is done with me. Now I do not feel this perfect synonymousness in Reason & the Wille. I am sure, Kant cannot make it out. Again & again, he is a wretched Psychologist.²¹

Epistemologically, the Will stood for the naturally active side of knowledge acquisition: ‘intelligence or self-consciousness is impossible, except by and in a will’,²² for ‘to know is in its very essence a verb active.’²³ It also made possible the creation of new meaning, through the continuous effort to sharpen and refine one’s perception: in Coleridge’s famous distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ imagination, will fuels both the elementary ‘act of creation’ that human beings repeat after God, and the more conscious struggle to ‘idealize and unify’ sense data, and, where possible, ‘to dissolve, diffuse, dissipate, in order to recreate.’²⁴

Metaphysically, the will stood for the spiritual side of human nature: ‘(1) If there be aught *Spiritual* in Man, the Will must be such. (2) *If* there be a Will, there must be a Spirituality in Man.’²⁵ The circularity of this argument must not detract from its pertinence: Coleridge’s faith permeated everything he wrote, but he was also convinced that the only way to account for something that does not obey the physical law of cause and effect was to attribute it to another form of reality. This last point was precisely where Coleridge and the empiricist tradition met face to face. Where the latter admitted no exception to the rules of physics and biology, and as a result saw Man’s development and fulfilment as necessarily depending on those rules, Coleridge posited the primacy of the self-willing self.

But the epistemological and metaphysical implications of the breach that the will operates in the law of cause and effect are both contained in, and fully developed by, its moral and religious essence. In his interpretative work on Coleridge’s unfinished *Opus Maximum*, Murray J. Evans observes that for the poet-philosopher ‘conscience is at the root of all consciousness. For Coleridge’s subject, consciousness depends on a self-consciousness of relation between self and other as mutually acted upon. In this act of conscience, persons are equal by virtue of having opposite wills.’²⁶ The act of recognising the other as a self-willing subject worthy of respect is thus concomitant with, and instrumental in, the act of recognising oneself as an *other*, equally worthy of respect because equally in charge of one’s own

destiny. This ‘othering’ of the self is precisely what constitutes *conscience* and *consciousness*.

From a Christian perspective, the finite human Will is inseparable from the doctrine of the Original Sin. This sin, for Coleridge, is not only a stigma inherited from our forefathers; it corresponds to an all-too-human tendency to favour external stimuli—with all their enslaving temptations—over our power of self-determination. The Original Sin is the Will renouncing itself:

The Will is ultimately self-determined, or it is no longer a *Will* under the law of perfect freedom, but a *nature* under the mechanism of cause and effect. And if by an act, to which it had determined itself, it has subjected itself to the determination of nature (in the language of St. Paul, to the law of the flesh), it receives a nature into itself, and so far it becomes a nature: and this is a corruption of the Will and a corrupt nature. It is also a *Fall* of Man, inasmuch as his Will is the condition of his personality; the ground and condition of the attribute which constitutes him *man*. And the ground work of *personal* Being is a capacity of acknowledging the Moral Law (the Law of the Spirit, the Law of Freedom, the Divine Will) as that which should, of itself, suffice to determine the Will to a free obedience of the law, the law working therein by its own exceeding lawfulness. This, and this alone, is *positive* Good; good in itself, and independent of all relations.²⁷

Two conclusions at least can be drawn from this paragraph: first, humanity can at any time fall back into the state of brute, externally determined nature. Second, the Will, in order to avoid this pitfall, needs to turn itself freely towards the Moral Law, and the good associated with it. Both statements deserve to be examined with an eye to all of their implications.

3. *Persons versus Cogs*

Coleridge’s insistence on the Will was not only a matter of contributing to the advancement of philosophy. His stance was also a response to a much more immediate concern: the threat of empiricism taken to its fullest moral conclusions by the likes of Jeremy Bentham’s Utilitarianism and William Paley’s Consequentialism.

However estimable within their own sphere, such schemes, or any one of them in particular, may be, they do not belong to Moral Science, to which both in kind and purpose, they are in all cases *foreign*, and, when substituted for it, *hostile*. Ethics, or the *Science* of Morality, does indeed in no wise exclude the consideration of *action*; but it contemplates the same in its originating spiritual *source*, without reference to space or time or sensible existence.²⁸

Assessing actions only through their results—and primarily through their tendency to increase pleasure and minimise pain—deprives them of all their moral value. Here Coleridge comes back to a more strictly

Kantian standpoint, by equating the good with the good will. But his critique of utility as the dominant criteria for evaluating moral and social life is altogether far more developed than Kant's, in that it revolves more visibly around self-fulfilment, that of the self and that of others. Utilitarianism, for Coleridge, was not only hostile to 'Moral Science', it was also hostile to personal growth in an organic sense. It subjected human nature to the determination of external stimuli, made it no better than brute 'nature' itself, and encouraged the self (or what was left of it) to see other individuals as mere means to an end, that of its own maximisation of pleasure. That this pleasure could be measured and quantified only served to contribute to the prevalence of the means over the ends. Commensurability having become the main criterion, nothing could be said, ultimately, to be more than a cog in a system whose primary object was its own functioning and perpetuity. This was particularly tangible in the economy:

We are (...) a busy, enterprising, and commercial nation. The habits attached to this character must, if there exist no adequate counterpoise, inevitably lead us, under the specious names of utility, practical knowledge, and so forth, to look at all things through the medium of the market, and estimate the worth of all pursuits and attainments by their marketable value.²⁹

Persons and personalities themselves were bound to become both indifferent and interchangeable. Men, Coleridge thought, 'ought to be weighted, not counted. Their worth ought to be the final estimate of their value.'³⁰ But the education system had to adapt to the imperatives of immediate gratification and performance:

The axiom of education [in a utilitarian society] so defined is: knowledge being power, those attainments, which give a man the power of doing what he wishes in order to obtain what he desires, are alone to be considered as knowledge, or to be admitted into the scheme of National Education. The subjects to be taught in the national schools are to be—reading, writing, arithmetic, the mechanic arts, elements and results of physical sciences, but to be taught, as much as possible, empirically. For all knowledge being derived from the senses, the closer men are kept to the fountain-head, the more knowing they must become.³¹

This kind of education, Coleridge continued, results in 'talents without genius: a swarm of clever, well-informed men: an anarchy of minds, a despotism of maxims. Despotism of finance in government and legislation—of vanity and sciolism in the intercourse of life—of presumption, temerity, and hardness of heart, in political economy.'³²

The Will, in this context, symbolised the vitality and the spontaneity of human life, its emancipation from the implacable logic of objects and externally imposed notions of pleasure, achievement and

success.

4. *God the source of the source*

But in order to become what it could be, in order not to *undermine* itself, this Will needed the help of Reason. The Coleridgean Reason does not have much in common with its Enlightenment counterpart, or at least to the 'classical' reason as Coleridge understood it. Reason, as put forward by the eighteenth-century 'philosophes' eager to dispel the mist of obscurantism, corresponded to what he termed the 'Understanding': the faculty to think in an ordered and consistent way, following a mechanistic sort of logic. Coleridge's own Reason, on the other hand, was a means to access eternal truths, bridging the gap between Kant's 'two worlds',³³ that of phenomena and noumena. Whereas Kant stopped at the edge of the former, Coleridge happily crossed the threshold to the latter, in the wake of Fichte and Schelling. The difference can be put down to the way each thinker understood the nature of the ideas that the working of Reason led to:

Whether ideas are regulative only, according to Aristotle and Kant; or likewise constitutive, and one with the power of Life and Nature, according to Plato, and Plotinus [...], is the highest *problem* of philosophy, and not part of its nomenclature.³⁴

The constitutive power of ideas derived, for Coleridge, from their divine origin, reason being a 'part of the Image of God in us.'³⁵ This last statement is not without similarities with Austin Farrer's assertion that 'man is the image of God in so far as he both has a will and wills the Supreme good according to his ability.'³⁶ Coleridge, just like Farrer and other personalists, saw God as the original person, in whom Will, Reason and all other 'faculties' could be found in all their perfection. By perfection, he meant that they knew no bounds. To whoever conditioned personality to limitations, Coleridge retorted that, were it so,

The wiser a man became, the greater (...) his power of self-determination, with so much less propriety [could] he be spoken of as a person; and vice versa the more exclusive the limits, and the smaller the sphere enclosed—in fact the less Will he possessed—the more a person; till at length his personality would be at his maximum when he bordered on the mere animal or the idiot, when, according to all use of language, he ceased to be a person at all.³⁷

To this logical argument he added the contention that God is 'the root antecedent to the shooting forth of the stem and branches [...].'³⁸ God being 'the source of personality'³⁹ was thus renamed 'person-*ity*.'⁴⁰ Coleridge's effort to define person-ality in such terms earned him praise from John Muirhead, for whom

The meaning of personality as a circumference

continually expanding through sympathy and understanding, rather than as an exclusive centre of self-feeling, and consequently [...] the meaning of individuality and uniqueness as something to be won, and therefore, in the end, as an element subordinate to union with the Whole and undividedness from it, [...] anticipates the best that later idealism had to say on the subject.⁴¹

Muirhead goes so far as to say that ‘so far as I know, it is the first clear statement in English philosophy of this point of view [...]’.⁴² However enthusiastic this may sound, the fact remains that Coleridge presents us, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, with an already rather comprehensive idea of what a person is, or should be. Just like Austin Farrer again, he was intent on reconciling ‘the head and the heart’,⁴³ and therefore on educating people in such a way that they could find for themselves a suitable balance between sensitivity, receptivity, empathy on the one hand and clearness of view, perceptivity and critical skills on the other.

It is here, however, that the parallel between Coleridge and Farrer should be abandoned. By showing that Farrer refused to take on an Augustinian and essentially pessimistic view of human nature, Charles Conti’s take on *The Personalism of Austin Farrer* makes it difficult to think of Coleridge as a forerunner of this type of personalism. For, as we have seen, Coleridge believed in the performativity of the Original Sin, and tended to oppose the natural and the spiritual, or ‘flesh and spirit’,⁴⁴ à la Augustine. This being said, in contrast with Augustine, Coleridge knew that it was possible to reach for the good; he trusted in the human ability to overcome sin and profit from divine truth. The problem with Coleridge, if he is to be taken as a pioneer of Personalism, is of a nature slightly different to that which can be found in Augustine and traditional theology.

5. *The Temptation of Fixity*

Coleridge’s Will is the ability to rise above what Conti refers to as the Augustinian ‘fixity of a fallen appetite.’⁴⁵ Yet in order to do so, it still has to align with the truth as revealed by Reason. That the good life should involve such a harmonisation with the Will of God suggests that there is but one correct way of becoming a person. So we escape one type of fixity only to find ourselves trapped in another, which Douglas Hedley sums up in the following terms: ‘if freedom entails following the good one might ask whether this is a form of determination?’⁴⁶ Hedley answers his own question by specifying that for Coleridge as for Plotinus, ‘the really moral, that is, godlike life has no *external* but only an *internal* determination.’⁴⁷ It is less about ‘the resignation of an essential, servile spirit’, than about ‘the willingness to bring one’s self-will into harmony with the divine will.’⁴⁸ The Will naturally—and of course freely—

directs itself towards the good. This is commensurate with Conti’s contention that for Farrer, human beings, whatever religion they choose to embrace—or not —, still bear the stamp of God’s goodness, and so are naturally inclined to seek the good in all its forms:

The rational man who, according to the Scriptures, ‘perceiveth not the things of God’ can nevertheless often be observed ‘hungering and thirsting’ after volitional excellences, aspiring beyond self-interests and towards that emancipated state where choices are not dictated by *passiones* but are the result of choices according to an ethical code or human ideal we share with others. In short, we realize our common humanity with others because we recognize we inherit the form of our humanity from others. And over all is God, that Wholly Other, who did not rest content with His own perfection, but extended Himself in the form of an incarnation [...].⁴⁹

This seems to fit with Coleridge’s insistence on the role of the Other in the emergence of conscience and self-consciousness: the good can be perceived in interpersonal relations, and does not necessarily have to be perceived in God to have an influence on one’s own behaviour. But is the author of *Aids to Reflection* completely devoid of ‘orthodox insufferability’?⁵⁰ Is he not effectively turning his back on the ‘theology of continuity’⁵¹ and the ‘democracy of multifarious means towards suitable egalitarian ends in the Kingdom of the Good’⁵² when he claims that ‘the great object of my pursuits and studies [...] is to convince myself and others, that the Bible and Christianity are their own sufficient evidence’?⁵³

In *The Age of Immanence: Whiteheadian Metaphysics from a Farrerian Point of View*, Simon Smith perceptively observes that ‘the theologian is faced with a classical disjunction: Being *contra* knowing.’⁵⁴ I argue that, for all his efforts to equate the two and to prove the centrality of the actively knowing subject, Coleridge never fully extricated himself from the scholastic tradition which ‘begin[s] and end[s] with *Ipsium Esse*, the real and self-referential “Being” of God,’⁵⁵ whereby “reality” is abstracted from the contaminating contingencies of particular experience in order to meet the primary requirement for absolute objectivity.’⁵⁶ Without accusing Coleridge of ever wanting to attain ‘absolute objectivity’—his subscription to the Schellingian view of object and subject as presupposing each other would not permit such a thing—I think that his eagerness to prove—to others and to himself—that what he believed in existed led him to make a number of statements that border on the impersonal.

This is particularly evident when we abstract those statements from their immediate religious implications. Coleridge’s quasi-systematic use of capitalisation, when it comes to referring to aspects of the person such as Will, Imagination, Fancy, Reason and Understanding hints at a desire to turn those facets

into ‘faculties’ (something that Bertocci would not adhere to), to place those faculties outside of the realm of plain subjectivity, and to make them reliable grips that our fleeting human nature can hold onto. Will especially is in this respect highly ambiguous. Will, in Coleridge, is both dynamic and static, open and closed. It is the principle of self-creation and narration, and as such welcomes, and engages in a fecund dialectic with, what cannot be planned or expected. But it is also often presented, more or less consciously, as *the* solution to our tendency to self-doubt, fragmentation or dilution—something that would not only be a starting point, but also and above all a ready-made answer to all that life throws at us.

Owen Barfield, in his thorough account of *What Coleridge Thought*, is intent on not giving in what he calls the ‘biological/psychological approach’⁵⁷ or the ‘personalist interpretation’⁵⁸ of Coleridge’s works. He is especially wary of the classic argument that ‘Coleridge’s philosophy was really determined by his emotional need for the Christian faith.’⁵⁹ While one can only acknowledge the limitations of such an approach when it comes to doing justice to Coleridge’s thought, it is, as Ronald C. Wendling suggests, no less detrimental to it to focus exclusively on ‘the objective, impersonal content of his work’ in order to demonstrate ‘their systematic unity.’⁶⁰ And, without delving into Coleridge’s emotional connection with Christianity, one can easily draw the conclusion, from his correspondence and his *Notebooks*, that he was haunted by the idea of not achieving as much as he should, or as he could, and that this cannot be completely extraneous to his obsession with the Will. As William Walsh has it, Coleridge’s ‘notorious lethargy in action [is], when his accomplishment is fairly considered, partly a legend of his own devising.’⁶¹ The poet with only *Sibylline Leaves*⁶² to show for himself, the philosopher with too many ideas and not enough worry-free time, needed the certainty, the rigidity of something that transcended his own frailty, his own shortcomings. He needed a *postulate*. And it is on that postulate of the Will that, as Murray J. Evans observes, the whole edifice of his *Opus Maximum* rests. This moral truth is at once ‘equal *and* superior to scientific ones’,⁶³ in that it is both universal and necessary, but also, as we have seen, finds its full realisation in goodness, i.e. the contingent choice to follow its true moral calling.

The Coleridgean Will, whether seen from a Christian perspective or not, is thus somehow rather monolithic; which is a problem, since it may seem to take back what it has just given, by subordinating individual experience to theory. This fixation has to be understood in the context of Coleridge’s already mentioned long-standing obsession with systems, and more particularly with the systematisation of his entire philosophy. In a rather telling instance of his

‘Table Talk’, he is quoted as saying:

You may not understand my system, or any given part of it—or, by a determined act of wilfulness, you may, even though perceiving a ray of light, reject it in anger and disgust. But this I will say, that if you once master it, or any part of it, you cannot hesitate to acknowledge it as the truth. You cannot be sceptical about it.⁶⁴

This, surely, does not denote the spirit of plasticity that can be expected from a personalist. There is, however, more to Coleridge’s thought than just a predilection for rock-solid, scepticism-proof systems.

6. *The fluidity of experience*

The tension between Coleridge’s fixation on systems and other traits of his personality has been extensively discussed, notably by Jeffrey W. Barbeau and Daniel Hardy, who argue in their respective *Essays on the Opus Maximum*⁶⁵ that Coleridge’s relentless pursuit of truth was naturally restive to any form of crystallisation. In his review of the collection from which those two essays are extracted, Nicholas Halmi offers that ‘one reason Coleridge retains his fascination for us is precisely that he cannot claim to offer a *True Intellectual System of the Universe*’, and sees the same tension at work in Graham Davidson’s account of ‘the conflicts between Coleridge’s lived experience and his conceptualisation of the will.’⁶⁶ Kathleen Coburn similarly remarks that Coleridge ‘believed in growth, the ‘free life’, with a deep antipathy to the ‘confining form’; he had what he called a ‘rooted aversion to the *Arbitrary*’; systems and system-making do tend to become at some point arbitrary.’⁶⁷

No one has taken the measure of Coleridge’s almost existential engagement with the world as conscientiously and enthusiastically as Coburn, who edited his *Notebooks* from 1957 to 1990. In one of her introductory studies to this vast, shimmering mass of fragments, she wishes to have us see

his rare capacity to experience, to recognise, and to participate in the experiences life brought to him and he brought to life (...) There is a special quality in his curiosity, a certain toughness of mind, a scepticism if you will, and over it all his ways of relating one thought to another.⁶⁸

She talks of a ‘gift for minute and searching observation, an intellectual but not merely cerebral exercise that gave the mental and emotional thrusts inward a quality such as the world has seldom seen, even among poets.’⁶⁹ What comes out in Coleridge’s *Notebooks* is the *texture* of reality, its infinite richness and plasticity, as well as its multiple implications. This, Humphrey House suggests, should not be overlooked in favour of the appraisal of Coleridge as ‘a formative influence on Christian Socialism, on Young England, on the Oxford Movement and also

on the Broad Church party', as 'a father of Existentialism, and anticipator of both Freud and Jung, of the *Gestalt* psychology and so on', or 'as the master of F. D. Maurice and Julius Hare'⁷⁰—in short, as a mere *thinker*, whose main ideas and concepts can be explained, categorised, digested and, ultimately, put aside. There is, of course, the complexity of the poetry. But there is also a particular flavour of life in Coleridge's 'side' writings, the writings that never made it to—and were only ever rarely intended for—his great systematic enterprise, and on the contrary kept on sneaking up in its margins—in the margins of every book he ever possessed, really—, sometimes with a welcome explanatory value, but more often than not pointing to an irrepressible tendency to break his self-imposed conceptual mould. What is particularly interesting is that, where the moral and religious works exalt the power of the Spirit—i.e. of Will—over that of the sensual nature of man, the *Notebooks* exalt the power of the senses, as one of the primary sources of personal growth.

7. *The Dialectics of Brokenness*

What we thus have in Coleridge is both a craving for a certain moral 'fixity' and a nature that is 'soft, pliant and full of excessive sensibility.'⁷¹ As has been suggested, however, far from being incompatible, these two trends presupposed, and fed on, each other. The fluidity of experience called for a solid theoretical counterpart, just as the latter demanded to be questioned, if not broken into pieces by experience. What should be avoided here is the giving into another temptation of fixity, that of the critic. A large proportion of the literature on Coleridge so far has been concerned with his consistency—in poetry, in literary critique, in psychology, in philosophy or on the whole—, whether to prove or to deny it. What I propose here is that we see what was broken and contradictory in him as the very principle of his peculiar dynamism, his peculiar relevance. One can do that without renouncing to the notion of a 'total' Coleridge, quite the contrary: 'the basis of his strength', says Coburn, 'seems to me to be his awareness of the difficulties of reconciling everywhere those opposites which he first met within himself.'⁷²

The reconciliation of opposites in order to reach a higher form of individuality is precisely what is at the heart of the *Hints towards the Formation of a More Comprehensive Theory of Life*, Coleridge's attempt at shedding light on the one principle driving the whole living world. This principle, which he terms the 'principle of individuation',⁷³ has for its 'most general law'⁷⁴ polarity,

[...] or the essential dualism of Nature, arising out of its productive unity, and still tending to reaffirm it, either as equilibrium, indifference, or identity. In its *productive power*, of which the product is the only measure, consists its incompatibility with mathematical calculus. For the full applicability of

an abstract science ceases, the moment reality begins—Life, then, we consider as the copula, or the unity of thesis and antithesis, position and counterposition,—Life itself being the positive of both; as, on the other hand, the two counterpoints are the necessary conditions of the *manifestations* of Life. These, by the same necessity, unite in a synthesis; which again, by the law of dualism, essential to all actual existence, expands, or *produces* itself, from the point into the *line*, in order again to converge, as the initiation of the same productive process in some intenser form of reality. Thus, in the identity of the two counter-powers, Life *subsists*; in their strife it *consists*: and in their reconciliation it at once dies and is born again into a new form, either falling back into the life of the whole, or starting anew in the process of individuation.⁷⁵

What is important in this endless dialectic is that it is indeed endlessly *productive*. Barfield pertinently observes that, in Coleridge, 'the apprehension of polarity is itself *the basic act of imagination*.'⁷⁶ Imagination is that 'intermediate faculty, which is at once both active and passive', whereby the action of the Will and sensorial experience combine to produce something new. It may seem surprising that Barfield should not have felt compelled to apply this dynamic to Coleridge's personal life itself. Coleridge's permanent oscillation between fixity and plasticity, 'attachment' and 'detachment', will and the senses is what makes him so captivating, not only as a writer, but also and above all, as a person. It is precisely the irreducible tension that animates him that gives his thought its substance and its significance.

Coleridge may not be the ideal precursor of Personalism, but, through his very dilemmas and shortcomings, and through his 'power of increasing the range and depth and quality of experience in those who read him with care',⁷⁷ what he establishes with those readers is a relationship from person to person, bound to increase their personality by way of the interplay of the various—sometimes conflicting—features of his or her personhood.⁷⁸ All that Coleridge ever wanted to be, after all, was, as the title of his second venture into the world of weekly writing suggests, our friend.⁷⁹

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Notes

1. Marilyn Butler, 'The Rise of the Man of Letters: Coleridge', in *Romantics, Rebels and Reactionaries. English Literature and its Background* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 85.
2. G.N.G. Orsini, *Coleridge and German Idealism. A Study in the History of Philosophy with Unpublished Materials from Coleridge's manuscripts* (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969), vi.
3. Orsini, 262.
4. Orsini, 268.
5. Orsini, 69.

6. Orsini, 268. Orsini's assessment is compounded by a number of critics. William Walsh thus thinks that 'Coleridge is much more significant as a great writer who used philosophic ideas as symbols for his reading of life than as a great philosopher who also happened to be a distinguished writer' (William Walsh, *Coleridge: The Work and the Relevance* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1973) 43-44), while Graeme Garrard observes that 'Coleridge's philosophical writings are very fragmentary, unsystematic and quite often inconsistent. He was not a philosopher per se and, like Burke, never engaged with the philosophes in any sustained or very philosophically serious way.' (Graeme Garrard, *Counter-Enlightenment: From the eighteenth-century to the present* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 66).
7. Kathleen Coburn, *Experience into Thought: Perspectives in the Coleridge Notebooks* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 58.
8. Coburn, 58.
9. Peter Bertocci, *Personality and the Good. Psychological and Ethical Perspectives* (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1963), 185.
10. Austin Farrer, *The Freedom of the Will* (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1957), 315.
11. 'Let us, therefore, confront and embrace what has been called the scandal of philosophy, namely, its diversity, its differences, its disagreements, these usually being taken prima facie as indication of failure or futility. Let it be for personalists the glory of philosophy that they keep open the quest for the truth, that they find satisfaction in contending together, that the desired outcome be found not in some codified unanimity but in the many-colored flame of persons in interaction, a flame to which each may give, from which each may gain.' John H. Lavelly, 'What is Personalism', *The Personalist Forum*, Vol. 7, No. 2, Conference on Persons [Part I] (Fall 1991), 1.
12. As our editor, Simon Smith, keenly observed when first reading this paper, this sentence is somewhat reminiscent of Goethe's Faust's successive assertions that 'in the beginning was the *Mind*', 'in the beginning was the *Power*', and 'in the beginning was the *Act*' (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Faust I & II* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). It will be seen that the German connection is indeed quite strong here.
13. Arthur O. Lovejoy, 'Coleridge and Kant's two worlds', chapter XIII in *Essays in the History of Ideas*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1948), 255.
14. Coleridge, *Letters*, ed. E. L. Griggs, 6 vols (London: Clarendon Press, 1956-1971), I (1956), 237.
15. Bertocci, *The Person God Is* (London: George & Unwin Ltd, 1970), 98.
16. What complicates matters further here is that Coleridge is a 'convicted' plagiarist: from James Frederick Ferrier's 'The Plagiarisms of Coleridge' (in *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, 47 (March 1840), 287-299) to the present day, a number of critics have traced large portions of Coleridge's 'writings' back to those of Kant, Fichte or Schelling, among others.
17. D. Newsome, *Two Classes of Men. Platonism and English Romantic Thought* (London: John Murray, 1974).
18. John H. Muirhead, *Coleridge as philosopher* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1954).
19. James Vigus, *Platonic Coleridge* (Oxford: Legenda, 2008).
20. Newsome.
21. *Notebooks*, ed. Coburn, 6 vols (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957-1990) 1 (1794-1804), # 1717.
22. Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria; or, Biographical Sketches of Literary Life and Opinions* (New York: Leavitt, Lord & Co., 1834), 159.
23. Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 155.
24. Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 172.
25. Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection in the Formation of a Manly Character, on the Several Grounds of Prudence, Morality and Religion* (London: George Bell and Sons, 1884), 88.
26. Murray J. Evans, *Sublime Coleridge. The Opus Maximum* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 90.
27. Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, 190.
28. Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, 197-198.
29. Coleridge, *Lay Sermons* (London: Edward Moxon, 1852), 216.
30. Coleridge, *Lay Sermons*, 243.
31. Coleridge, *On the Constitution of the Church and State, According to the Idea of Each* (London: William Pickering, 1839), 66.
32. Coleridge, *On the Constitution of the Church and State*, 69.
33. See Lovejoy.
34. Coleridge, *Lay Sermons*, 125.
35. Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, 147-148.
36. Farrer, *Interpretation and Belief*, ed. Charles Conti (London: SPCK, 1976), 91.
37. Coleridge, *Opus Maximum*, in *The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, ed. Coburn, 16 vols (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969-2002), 15 (2002), 169-170.
38. Coleridge, *Opus Maximum*, 176.
39. Coleridge, *Opus Maximum* 195.
40. Coleridge, *Opus Maximum* 195.
41. Muirhead, 229.
42. Muirhead, 229.
43. Coleridge, *Notes and Lectures upon Shakespeare, and some of the old poets and dramatists, with other literary remains of S. T. Coleridge*, ed. Mrs H. N. Coleridge (London: William Pickering, 1849), 151.
44. Charles Conti, 'The Personalism of Austin Farrer', *The Personalist Forum*, Vol. 5, No. 2, Humanism (Fall 1989), 88.
45. Conti, 96.
46. Douglas Hedley, *Coleridge, Philosophy and Religion. Aids to Reflection and the Mirror of the Spirit* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 166.
47. Hedley, 168.
48. Hedley, 168.
49. Conti, 99.
50. Conti, 96.
51. Conti, 84.
52. Conti, 89.
53. Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, 300.
54. Simon Smith, *The Age of Immanence: Whiteheadian Metaphysics from a Farrerian Point of View*, *Process Studies Supplement*, Issue 13 (2009), 4.
55. Smith, 4-5.
56. Smith, 5.
57. Owen Barfield, *What Coleridge Thought* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972) 8.
58. Barfield, 9.
59. Barfield, 8.

60. Ronald C. Wendling, *Coleridge's Progress to Christianity. Experience and Authority in Religious Faith* (Cranbury, N. J.: Associated Universities Press, 1995) 55.
61. William Walsh, *Coleridge: The Work and the Relevance* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1973) 175.
62. Coleridge's 1817 edition of the whole of his poetical production was given this title 'in allusion to the fragmentary and widely scattered state in which they have long suffered to remain.' (*Sibylline Leaves. A Collection of Poems* (London: Rest Fenner, 1817), i).
63. Evans, 12.
64. Coleridge, *Specimens of the Table Talk of the Late Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, 2 vol. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1835), I, 169.
65. Jeffrey Barbeau, ed., *Coleridge's Assertion of Religion: Essays on the Opus Maximum* (Leuven: Peeters, 2006).
66. Nicholas Halmi, Review of *Coleridge's Assertion of Religion: Essays on the Opus Maximum*, *The Coleridge Bulletin The Journal of the Friends of Coleridge New Series*, 30 (NS), Winter 2007.
67. Coburn, *The Self-Conscious Imagination, A Study of Coleridge's notebooks in celebration of the bi-centenary of his birth 21 October 1772 (Lectures delivered at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne on 20, 21, 22 February 1973)* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 76.
68. Coburn, *Experience into Thought*, 10.
69. Coburn, *Experience into Thought*, 58.
70. Humphrey House, *Coleridge: The Clark Lectures, 1951-1952* (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1953), 15.
71. Ronald C. Wendling, *Coleridge's Progress to Christianity*, 67.
72. Coburn, *Experience into Thought*, 26.
73. For these remarks, see Coleridge, *Hints towards the Formation of a More Comprehensive Theory of Life* (London: John Churchill, 1848) 42.
74. Coleridge, *Hints towards the Formation of a More Comprehensive Theory of Life*, 50.
75. Coleridge, *Hints towards the Formation of a More Comprehensive Theory of Life*, 50-52.
76. Barfield, 36.
77. House, 16.
78. 'For all things that surround us, and all things that happen unto us, have (each doubtless its own providential purpose, but) all one common final cause: namely, the increase of Consciousness, in such wise, that whatever part of the terra incognita of our nature the increased consciousness discovers, our will may conquer and bring into subjection to itself under the sovereignty of reason.' (Appendix to one of the first American editions of *Aids to Reflection* (Burlington: Chauncey Goodrich, 1829), 384)
79. *The Friend* was Coleridge's second periodical, after *The Watchman* (ten issues in 1796). It ran from 1809 to 1810 and was intended as a 'literary, moral, and political weekly paper, excluding personal and party politics and the events of the day.' (London: Dale and Curtis, 1812).

BOOK REVIEWS

***A Critique of Universities* by Páll Skúlason.**

Reykjavík: University of Iceland Press, 2015, 110 pp. ISBN 978-9935-23-073-7.

A nation-state may want to rule the world. A business corporation may want to produce and sell everything it can. A university does not want to rule or to sell anything. It wants to educate by creating the conditions for humankind to study and seek understanding and truth about the world and everything. (109)

The quotation above sums up and expresses Páll Skúlason's conclusions on what universities are and, at least as importantly, what they are *not*. A philosopher, a scholar, an engaged intellectual and, above all, a former longtime rector of the largest university in his native country, Iceland, Skúlason's slender volume is a must-read for all persons who have a stake in higher education. Not only does it provide a number of valuable arguments on important aspects of university life—its mission, history, defining values and most pressing challenges—but it does so in a plain style that any intelligent reader can grasp, whether she has or not any previous knowledge of the few thinkers of the past (e.g. Aristotle, Humboldt, Ortega y Gasset, Sartre) and of the present (e.g. Kekes, MacCormick, Pouivet, Karlsson) whom he cites. The book comprises a short preface, an introduction covering the essential concepts and arguments discussed, six chapters based primarily upon public lectures delivered in Iceland as well as abroad, and a one-page index.

The first chapter, entitled 'European Universities: Their Traditions, Challenges and Missions', considers the difficulties and opportunities of contemporary universities in light of the three key models of university developed in Europe's modern history, i.e. the French, German and British. The first, resulting from Napoleon's plans to establish a new and more powerful French State, wished the 1806 'Université impériale' (21) to provide 'the *nation*... with the knowledge and expertise it needs', hence 'training [the] professionals' that are deemed necessary and useful to 'society', and to be part of a 'hierarchical... *governing structure*' where the State 'funds and regulates them' as one of many tools for national statecraft. The second, born in 1807 with 'the Keiser[']s decision] to build a strong university in Berlin' under the guidance of 'Wilhelm von Humboldt' (21), interpreted universities as places of 'scholarship or *science*', hence 'training... students for the advancement of sciences', and envisioned 'collegial governance by academics themselves.' (21). The third model, 'which cardinal John Henry Newman described in his famous work *The Idea of a University*' (20), conceived of universities as 'service to the individual *student*', whose 'character and competences' must be developed, whilst the institutional governance should be

left in the hands of 'professional management' (21).

Two hundred years later, in a somewhat perplexing example of European integration, Skúlason believes these three models to have merged into today's universities, which are therefore trying to fulfil very different missions by very different teaching methods and with very different, sometimes contradictory, modes of governance. On top of that, in recent times, a new conception of the university has emerged that is displacing the three original ones and that, according to Skúlason, is causing universities to lose their soul: 'universities have been encouraged to look at themselves as *business enterprises* that have to earn money by fulfilling specific, easily identifiable demands on the academic and educational market... [i.e. producing] *diplomas or degrees* that certify professional competence, and *theories or methods* that are useful for solving various kinds of technical problems.' (30) This business-based conception of the university has led many—e.g. teachers, administrators, students, politicians, the public at large—to think that, somehow, universities have a sheer contractual duty to fulfil *vis-à-vis* their funding parties, such as the State, private industry or the fee-paying students, thus forgetting about the much broader community of 'stakeholders' to which universities *qua* places of education and scholarship owe their allegiance, i.e. societies at large, if not humankind itself. The same conception has also led to the implementation of 'quantitative criteria' measuring the 'two specific outcomes or products' noted above (33). Thus, rankings are made of universities that deliver the most degrees and the most cited or published scholarly and scientific articles. These criteria, however, are far from being a reliable qualitative standard to determine whether a university is actually: (A) preserving knowledge, transmitting it successfully to the new generations, whilst preparing them for the many and largely unpredictable challenges of life, both personal and social, i.e. not just occupational or economic; (B) furthering science and scholarship in novel and original ways; and (C) contributing to societal well-being by monitoring, reflecting upon and thinking critically about whatever may be going on within society. Quite the opposite, reducing universities' functions to official degrees and research papers, which are positive and necessary but also merely a part of the whole picture, fosters 'uniformity... at the expense of diversity', the neglect of 'education and administration', of 'professional criticism', and of all those areas where 'objective standards of measurement are more problematic' (33). Most importantly, it can lead to the neglect of the human, civilising and humanising values upon which universities were established in the first place during the Middle Ages, namely 'the ethical intention

of freeing human beings from oppression and ignorance' (35). Without this, whatever knowledge universities can produce may easily turn into an instrument of 'global destruction' (35)—the book's reviewer is reminded of atomic bombs, carcinogenic chemicals and financial derivatives.

Chapter two, 'The Aims and Institutional Structure of the University', further elucidates what the universities' ethical component is like. It does so by comparing the university *qua* human institution with two other prominent human institutions, namely the nation-State and the business corporation. The former is said to be characterised by 'fundamental goals' such as 'justice... domestic tranquillity... common defense... general welfare... liberty' (the exemplary reference being here '[t]he authors of the constitution of the United States'; 42). The latter is said to centre upon 'economic profit' (43) and, therefore, to be often in a tense relationship with the nation-State which, in the pursuit of its own goals, 'must... keep business corporations at bay' by a variety of regulations, monitoring activities and interventions (44). Neither the defining aims of the nation-State nor economic profit apply to 'the educational institution' as its core goals or animating principle (45). By way of Michael Oakeshott's essay 'The Idea of a University', Skúlason unearths the essential characteristics of the ethical component of universities which, whatever may be their inevitable and even desirable services to the nation-State or their budgetary concerns, must promote 'the advancement of learning... [as] a corporate community of scholars engaged co-operatively in critical conversation, but with various academic values and interests... [within] an organisation that has to be managed and operated in an effective and efficient order, but in a way that is consistent with its institutional order.' (50)

Chapter three, 'The Future of European Universities: The Educational Aims', explains why the ethical component of higher education must be retained within universities, which *a fortiori* 'must assiduously resist the internalisation of a "market mentality"' in order to be able to operate well (51). Since their inception in the Middle Ages, universities have been providing 'general education, vocational education and theoretical or academic education', whilst also promoting 'industrial [or commercial] and academic research.' (53-4) Given the current and growing pressure upon universities to prepare an enormous 'educated *main-d'oeuvre*' dedicated to the tasks of modern societies, modern economies, and modern individual existences, Skúlason argues that the more universities retain their essential characteristics, the better they will respond to these pressures (54). Rather than reducing universities to mere vocational training typical of what, in the past, would have been properly called 'polytechnics', universities should continue to offer that '*studium generale*' which alone can 'prepare [young people] for life as thinking hu-

man beings', making of them persons with some likelihood of leading meaningful lives and responsible citizens (56-7). This complex set of goals cannot be approached if universities provide them primarily or exclusively with highly specific competencies for occupational fields that, later in their lives as actual men and women, may prove unappealing, damaging or quite simply short-fated. Moreover, fostering such a broad education may also counter one of the main problems of contemporary 'academy', i.e. 'overspecialization.' (64) In addition, universities should continue to offer 'theoretical education... [i.e.] how to conduct original research', independent of immediate or even obvious applications to industrial and business needs, for 'that is the way learning is advanced' (62). For any much-sought and much-praised 'innovation' to be possible, ample room for creativity, experimentation, idle contemplation and diversity, rather than uniformity, must be made (55). That is where the core difference between '*industrial* and *academic* research' is grounded: the former is geared towards the specific, short-, or at best medium-term aims of the 'market-driven' sector; the latter is driven by the much more polymorphous yet historically most fertile power of human 'curiosity' (63).

Chapter four, 'The Nature and Purpose of Academic Thought', deepens the point made in the third. 'Political, religious, and commercial thinking' are contrasted with 'the *theoretical* types of thinking to which universities are devoted' or, at least, that universities should return to being devoted to (68). There is certainly many an intertwining between all these forms of human thought. However, political thinking is 'characterized by different visions of how to organise society and settle debates over what serves the common good'; religious thinking deals with 'convictions concerning the ultimate source of meaning and existence are at stake'; and commercial thinking has 'economic advantage' as its 'ultimate criterion of success.' (68) 'Theoretical or academic thinking', instead, 'has only one basic objective, namely to be able to understand and explain whatever it may encounter', without prior limitations or ulterior motives (68). Its scope of inquiry is therefore wider than that of the other forms of thinking and the fundamental criterion of success is given by its ability to help each of us '*to understand for what purpose one does this or that, and why this matters.*' (69) In other words, theoretical or academic thinking offers vast and open-ended opportunities for reflection upon the 'problems of contemporary life', whether they are about 'physical security and well-being' (e.g. 'science and technology'), 'social phenomena' (e.g. 'politics, morality, and the law'), or 'internal life, self-knowledge and self-acceptance' (e.g. 'humanities, art and literature'). (70-1) Contrary to widespread prejudice, what is academic is also eminently practical.

Chapter five, 'The University and Ethics of Knowledge', compares the condition of contempo-

rary universities to that of an individual suffering from an identity crisis. As the State and the business world ask more and more of universities *qua* places for mass education, while at the same time often reducing or demanding control over the resources available to them, teachers and administrators are at a loss how to fulfil far too many and far too diverse tasks all at once. Therefore, it becomes paramount to rediscover what makes a university a university, which is what the previous chapters have already revealed to the reader. In this chapter, Skúlason offers a novel and useful distinction between the ‘*internal aims*’ and the ‘*external roles*’ of the university (87). Concerning the latter, the author mentions ‘the services that the university provides to such institutions as the military, the church and various business corporations.’ (87) Concerning the former, the author recalls how unique and *ipso facto* pivotal is the historical given whereby there exists only one institution—the university—that ‘takes for granted that our life is the life of knowledge—that we are so intertwined with our knowledge that we are unable to distinguish it from our own lives.’ (88) By virtue of this largely presupposed anthropological and institutional philosophy, Skúlason can then work out the internal aims of universities, which are this time discussed in light of another contemporary thinker, Robert Paul Wolff, and his book, *The Ideal of the University* (1969). *In nuce*, these aims can be seen as fostering ‘*critical thought*’, i.e. imbuing members of the academic community with the habit and the skills leading to ‘*a search for understanding as well as a quest for truth*’ in whichever disciplinary field they may wish to immerse themselves. (94) Such internal aims are quintessentially ethical, for they constitute a conscious value choice on the members’ part and a prioritised path of action for them *qua* members of the academic community, namely ‘those who have chosen to devote themselves wholeheartedly to the acquisition, preservation, and transmission of knowledge and is built upon an explicit engagement to concern itself with human knowledge in its entirety.’ (93)

The sixth chapter, ‘The Ethical Mission of the University’, brings together succinctly and clearly the main arguments and claims of the previous five. In it, another modern thinker is cited, namely the Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset, and especially his 1930 book, *The Mission of the University*. Skúlason agrees with him that we *are* fundamentally the ideas that we are nourished with and reflect upon within our culture. It is therefore of primary importance that, for the sake of individual and collective well-being, the members of society are endowed with many ideas rather than few, and with the habit and skills for critical reflection upon such ideas, rather than blind or fanatical adherence to them. Universities are in a unique position ‘to educate young people so that they will be able to orient themselves in the present and make decisions and life-plans based upon clear ideas

about the world and their own enlightened convictions.’ (98) This privileged position is the result of there being ‘no other institution that has yet been developed that’ plays as vital a ‘role in preserving and generating culture... as... [its] central mission.’ (101) Each and every human being can play a part in ‘promoting culture’ or just keeping it alive, but universities have such functions ‘as their daily concern.’ (102) This concern is a profound ethical issue, for it consists in people choosing to belong to the academic community and therefore fight against culture’s ‘tendency to degenerate if not constantly cultivated’ and its ‘risk of being overthrown by different sets of values related to interests’ such as party allegiance, sectarian preference, pecuniary motive or elitist self-promotion (102-3). Universities’ historical dependence ‘for their material requirements on the good will of external parties — the church, the prince, or the state’ does not make this task an easy one (106). Nonetheless, it is an imperative task, especially if one believes, as Ortega y Gasset did, that ‘[c]ulture is what saves human life from being a mere disaster’ (99).

As a member of the academic community myself, I cannot but appreciate what Skúlason is trying to do with this volume, which is just one of several publications that he has written in recent years on the subject of higher education, mostly in Icelandic, but also in English and French (for details see Skúlason’s official website: www.pallskulason.is). I believe most readers of this review are aware of the pernicious pervasiveness of the business mentality within academic institutions and its corollaries of largely hopeless yet immensely time-consuming quantitative measurements of qualitative phenomena (e.g. teaching quality and effectiveness) that distract from actual teaching or research, i.e. genuinely academic activities. I have previously addressed in the *Appraisal* members’ newsletter of October 2012 the ways in which such a mentality contradicts and conflicts with the inherited academic one, whose fundamental criterion is truth, not sales. Páll Skúlason’s book reiterates and reinforces those previous claims of mine and, for that matter, of several prominent intellectuals that, in recent years, have been observing the same degenerative process *in fieri*, e.g. John McMurtry and Martha Nussbaum. Given Skúlason’s prominence in the Nordic countries and his professional network of fellow rectors and former rectors, it is to be hoped that this slender, plainly written yet insightful book may have some influence and help universities to retain or, if needed, regain their soul.

Sadly, Páll Skúlason passed away on the 22nd of April 2015, while the present review was being refereed. This note was added in order to extend my condolences to the members of Skúlason’s family and to pay my deepest respects to him, whose keen intellect, remarkable erudition and kind friendship I had the privilege of enjoying for many years.

Giorgio Baruchello

DISCUSSION NOTES

Reflections On The Mission Of Public Universities

Giorgio Baruchello

Editor's Note: The following was originally published by us in the sixth SPCPS Members News Letter for October 2012. Given the subject of Dr. Baruchello's review, above, with its direct reference to this Discussion Note, this seemed like an excellent opportunity to share the piece once again with our readers. We are grateful to Dr. Baruchello for agreeing to do so and believe you will be too. For anyone with a stake in Higher education, however remote or peripheral it may be, this will, no doubt, be of considerable interest.

Recent discussions among staff and administrators at my State-run university have led me to ponder upon a perplexing yet common equivocation. This equivocation is nothing but the increasingly widespread assumption that public universities (hereafter "universities"), insofar as they participate in and cooperate with today's so-called market economies, could or even ought to be conceived of as market agents. Under this assumption, universities would provide profitable goods and services required by relevant market segments; students would be customers of universities; which in turn would compete with other service providers in attracting investments and somehow lead to wealth creation. Such a characterisation of universities is, to say the least, historically deficient and institutionally ludicrous. Universities do have a budget and train citizens in various useful occupations, but describing them as running a business or being businesses is a cheap metaphor at best, whatever its misleading popularity may have been in recent decades.

Universities are part of those civil commons that societies have evolved through centuries of historical progress. Indeed, the first university was established about a thousand years ago in the country where I was born, Italy. As tokens of civil commons, the paramount goal of academic institutions has been to increase ranges of life capacity and, specifically, attain knowledge and understanding at the highest level of articulation, i.e. *qua* academic disciplines. Initially, access was limited to the male members of a tiny elite. Later on, access was widened to the female members of the elite. Eventually, in several countries, access was extended to large sectors of the population upon selection by intellectual merit rather than birth right or pecuniary means. Along this path, the polar star of universities has been *truth*, not wealth or profit, especially in today's dominant short-run formulation of it.

Unfortunately, this short-run "business-friendly" formulation of wealth has been influencing more and more thoroughly the operations of public universities worldwide. With rare exceptions, the transformation of academic faculties, departments and research centres into tools for the eventual generation of money returns to private money investors and/or managers has been revealed throughout by a set of higher-edu-

cation policies observable in nearly all countries over the last ten- to twenty-five years. This set of policies has regularly involved:

- (a) Increased private-public "partnerships" in research (e.g. company A sponsors university B to have students researching an A-enriching issue).
- (b) Increased private-public "partnerships" in teaching (e.g. privately funded chairs);
- (c) Outright privatisation of educational institutions;
- (d) Market-oriented selection of research programmes and curricula (e.g. reduction or elimination of liberal arts and humanities *in lieu* of market-specific training lines);
- (e) Selective privatisation of management, teaching and research positions (e.g. contracting out and part-time staffing);
- (f) Promotion of the managerial mind at all levels (e.g. bonuses for top administrators and lower staff salaries/higher student fees; private-funds attraction as promotion criterion);
- (g) The use of campuses as business opportunities (e.g. junk food dispensers, marketing surveys, pervasive billboards, renamed classrooms).

Often, these policies have been regarded as the expression of a relatively novel understanding of the long-established academic vocation of universities, namely the "knowledge economy". According to it, the pursuit of knowledge goes hand-in-hand with the eventual generation of money returns to private money investors and/or managers. Unfortunately, this understanding is severely flawed:

- (1) Whereas the academic vocation is to engage in the pursuit of universal truths (hence "university"), knowledge is relevant to the economy if and only if it leads to the obtainment of particular profits; in other words, sales rule, and truth is therefore *not* the fundamental criterion of knowledge in the knowledge economy (e.g. WHO's pandemic "media scares").
- (2) Whereas the academic vocation is to promote the free and open dissemination of knowledge, the economy-defining profit-motive calls for the re-

striction of information flows by, *inter alia*, private patents and copyright controls (e.g. “too expensive” indexes).

- (3) Whereas the academic vocation is to develop staff and students as intrinsically valuable human beings (hence “humanities”) that are autonomous in thought and action, the economy-defining profit-motive promotes the instrumental use of staff and students (e.g. as cheap researchers, consumers, credit-seekers, future labour).
- (4) Whereas the academic vocation is to develop staff and students as free critical minds in nations constitutionally committed to liberty (hence “liberal arts”), the knowledge economy implies the market based selection of staff’s research (e.g. choosing “fundable” topics) and students’ education (e.g. concerns about being “employable”), as well as the conditioning of their unconscious desires (e.g. scientifically crafted slave-reminiscent “branding”).

As regards the reader who may have lost touch with the long-established academic vocation of universities, it should be highlighted that university research and education ought to aim at better understanding *as such*, i.e. devoid of any ulterior motive—profit included—that does not enable further understanding, which is what the profit-motive hampers most visibly as of points (1)-(2) above. Also, if genuinely followed, the academic vocation fosters the acquisition of independent, literate and constructive thinking, according to subsets of human understanding known as academic disciplines (e.g. physics, philosophy, anthropology). Their fundamental criterion of knowledge is the consistent evaluation of evidence according to evolved praxes of interpretation, identification, classification, analysis and testing. Truth, not profitable sales, guides them.

Truth and profit may sometimes go hand-in-hand. By providing knowledge and understanding at the highest level of articulation, universities have certainly educated generations of entrepreneurs, executives, white-collar workers and productive citizens of all sorts and stripes. They have been unquestionable centres of innovative thinking, creative experimentation, thorough revision and groundbreaking vision that translated at times into better business life. At a deeper level, universities have cultivated methods, skills and values facilitating moral socialisation, humane civilisation and intelligent communication, i.e. essential yet regularly neglected preconditions for any economic activity whatsoever. In brief, universities have been instrumental to market efficiency in many ways. Nevertheless, this market-oriented function of universities has been just one of many, often indirect, and possibly adventitious: in the 20th century, cutting-edge research in physics was led in academes of countries that did not have a market

economy.

Finally, I wish to focus upon one function that makes universities unique and may remind the reader of the reason why universities ought to be protected from too direct a market involvement as well as from the market’s defining aim: profit. Universities, as long as they have been allowed to do their job with adequate funding and independence, have served as a *monitoring body* over the excesses, the threats and the falsities endangering the countries in which they were established, if not humankind at large. In this capacity, universities have produced research and issued warnings that have prevented terrible catastrophes, e.g. the thinning Ozone layer in the 1980s. Other times, their evidence and warnings have been ignored at great cost for all, e.g. Joseph Stiglitz’s and John McMurtry’s sophisticated critiques of deregulated financial wizardry in the 1990s and 2000s. Still, even when unheard or marginalised, academic disciplines have generated ideas, novel forms of reasoning and alternative approaches that can be used to cope with the disastrous effects of human and/or natural catastrophes. As long as funds and independence are guaranteed, universities can keep serving societies as vital monitoring bodies. Reduced to a mouthpiece of market forces, they will no longer be able to do it.

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