APPRAISAL

The Journal of the British Personalist Forum

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published twice a year in March and October; four issues per volume.

Editorial Policy:

P *Appraisal* seeks to develop and promote constructive ways of thinking, from within personalist perspectives, in philosophy and other intellectual disciplines.

P *Appraisal* believes that philosophy should not be a narrow, academic and technical specialism, but should address itself to the general public and to the intellectual and practical issues of the present.

P From time to time *Appraisal* will include *Re-Appraisals*, articles or collections of articles upon 20th C. thinkers whose work deserves to be more widely known.

P *Appraisal* takes a particular, but by no means exclusive, interest in the work of Michael Polanyi.

Format:

P The maximum length of articles is 10,000 words, although longer articles can be split into 2 parts for publication in successive issues.

P All contributions should be in good, clear English, without jargon, and with end-notes and frequent sub-headings (at approx. every 700 wds).

P Please see inside rear cover regarding references to the works of Michael Polanyi.

P **Please ask for the Style Sheet or save or print it from our web site:**
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Indexing: *Appraisal* is indexed in *The British Humanities Index* and *The Philosophers' Index*.
Reciprocal Arrangements:
         Appraisal exchanges copies with *Polanyiana,* the journal of the Michael Polanyi Liberal Philosophical Society (Hungary), *Tradition and Discovery*, the journal of the Polanyi Society (USA), *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, and *La Revue Roumaine de Philosophie*, and would welcome similar exchanges with other journals.

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Notes on this issues new or not so recent contributors:

Dr David Treanor is a Research Associate at the School of Humanities in the University of Tasmania. He is also the National Co-ordinator for Arche in Australia and New Zealand. He graduated in social work in the UK and has also completed a Master of Public Administration. David completed his PhD dissertation through the School of Philosophy at the University of Tasmania. His thesis presented a revised and richer understanding of friendship that contributes to improving our understanding of human nature. His areas of academic interest are: Community Living; Disability; Ethics of Caring, John Macmurray, Personalism.

Dr Alan Ford is a retired university lecturer in History and Theory of Art at the University of Gloucestershire, where he taught for too many years. His research interests are in the theory of modernism and the ideas of John Macmurray, especially regarding identity and the ethical. He is editor of the *John Macmurray Newsletter* and Chair of the British Personalist Forum. He lives happily with my wife near Stroud, on the edge of the Cotswolds, but still mourns the loss of his dog, Perry.

Mr Kyle Takaki is an independent scholar interested in complexity and its relations to the continuum of tacit knowing. He continues to struggle with aligning this personalist project with the pursuit of sophia amidst the fractures of modern philosophy.

Dr Charles Conti is a published poet, accomplished pianist, a stonemason (as was Socrates), and a wordsmith. He is best known for his work as editor of Austin Farrer's posthumous books, along with the first major study in which he casts Farrer in the dynamic personalist tradition. At Sussex, he began a unique postgraduate programme in Literature, Religion, and Philosophy of which Dr. Smith is one of its distinguished graduates. In the interests of the well-rounded person, homo rotundus, he has designed a house in Italy and has coached American football in England with the Crawley Raiders and the Brighton B 52s**.**

EDITORIAL

Holy macaroni! It's nearly Christmas already and nary a whisper of *Appraisal*, Vol. 10, No. 2! What catastrophe can have befallen our benighted species? Has the long awaited apocalypse begun at last? Has humanity finally cannibalised itself out of existence?

Fear not dear readers, Armageddon is still weeks, perhaps even months, away. And yet, in a startling reprise of Autumn 2013, I must begin with profoundest apologies for the long delay in bringing you this issue. I am, as those who know me well will affirm, no great fan of such repetition. But what possible reason can there be for the delay? A silent vigil perhaps; candlelit, solemnly awaiting word on the now legendary Lund papers. Not this time. (Of these, by the way, there is still no news; but hope throbs on unabated.) In fact, this shocking lapse in publishing propriety is entirely my fault. I have abandoned my homeland for the second time and fled west to Ireland. Winter in England simply wasn't cold enough or damp enough for me.

Those of you who are interested in the philosophical ramifications of this relocation may wish to keep an eye on the website blog where, God and the little people willing, I shall be posting again very soon.

Meanwhile, you may be interested to learn that, since arriving in the 'auld country' I have had the opportunity to peruse some of the documents in the famous McConnell Collection, housed at Trinity library. These, as you are no doubt aware, include some of the most complete examples of the ancient Irish myth-cycles, both in the 4th Century original, thought to be in the hand of Dhéanamh dom Líomóid, and those better-known copies from a thousand years later. Like many personalists and dictators, I have a considerable interest in national narratives, myths, sacred stories, and the like. One in particular caught my eye, being as it is of relevance to my current situation. I should like to present, if I may, a short excerpt for your edification. The translation is my own; it runs thus:

In ancient days, when the land was young and green; and giants and gentry lived above soft hills and trod the forest paths; and the curl-carved stones of Brúna Bóinne still spoke the language of men, a great hero from across the eastern sea did come. Keen-eyed, was he; orange-bearded, brown-haired, quick-smiling, grubby necked, short-armed, deep-pocketed, south-facing, bleary-eyed, lovely-footed, pinkly-skinned, honey-basted, sparklingly-witted, beautifully-written, modestly-mannered, tastefully-dressed; all this was he also. Broad was his chest as two bulls' buttocks strapped together, broader. Short was his leg, with great thick thighs, thick as thunderclouds, thicker; and divided in the middle by two great misshapen boulders of knees, one on each leg. Strong was his arm, as the mountain water, each one ending in a hand as wide and open and empty as the wide, open, empty look upon his well-organised face.

Big, bold, and brawny was he and his name, in the old tongue, was Skin-the-Cat. He lived in a cottage which nestled snug as Aristotelian stone upon the slopes of Dun a Ri, or Lower Kings Court, or Nobber, as it is known today.

Skin-the-Cat had come in search of a place to sit and think great thoughts. And this he did from the moment the dawn-fire flashed across the distant hills to the moment when evening light died behind the sewage farm across the way. But soon this hero found he had so many great thoughts that there was no longer room for them, even in his capacious head. He determined, therefore, to palm off some of them on his friends across the sea. But how was he to perform such a feat? It seems that word had reached Skin-the-Cat's titanic ears of a magical band of broadcloth. So magical was this broad band that it was said to be capable of carrying not only his great thoughts but a great many other things as well, such as recipes for the dough of New Neapolita and the bazaars of a tribe of giant South-American women.

Fate, however, was no friend to Skin-the-Cat that day for, although the good people of Lower Kings Court, or Nobber, had heard of this magical broad band, sure were they that it should never be found in such a wild and lonely place as this was. Sadly they shook their large and hairy heads saying, 'Never shall we see this magical band of broadcloth, for we are deep in the western wilderness.' And Skin-the-Cat wept. 'A year and a day we are from the nearest town,' said the people, 'which is to say, twenty kilometres or about twelve miles down that road.' They pointed down a terrible rough and bumpy road with great big potholes in it the like of which Skin-the-Cat had never yet seen. Skin-the-Cat looked askance at the good people of Lower Kings Court, or Nobber, and said 'you're kidding.' When it became obvious they were not kidding, he said a very Bad Word which, though true, cannot be repeated here; and then he wept some more. The good people of Lower Kings Court, or Nobber, did not like to see the great hero weep, so they looked the other way in embarrassment and nudged one another. When his weeping was done, they told Skin-the-Cat that he should seek the Salmon of Knowledge and ask his advice, for the Salmon was very old and very wise and he would surely know what to do.

Reluctant to go in search of a talking fish, Skin-the-Cat agreed nonetheless and set out upon a quest to find the magical Salmon of Knowledge.

After three arduous months of searching and a great many adventures, of which I may have occasion to tell one day, Skin-the-Cat finally found the place where this supposedly oracular fish lived. Kneeling down by the edge of a great lake he called out to the Salmon of Knowledge, saying, 'Oh wise Salmon of Knowledge, I come in search of the magical band of broadcloth and the good people of Lower Kings Court, or Nobber, say that you are the only one who may help me in my quest. Will you not help me, oh wise Salmon of Knowledge?'

Just then, because time was getting on, the Salmon of Knowledge appeared above the surface of the water. The Salmon heard the hero's lament and, lacking a neck, sadly shook the front end of it's body. And the Salmon said, 'Fate is no friend to you this day, hero from across the water. Many a sunrise will set the distant hills alight and many a sunset will set the sewage farm across the way aglow before you see the magical band of broadcloth.'   An increasingly frustrated Skin-the-Cat replied, 'But it has already been three months that I have been searching and waiting for the magical band of broadcloth. I am sore in need of it now.'

Lacking shoulders as well as a neck, the Salmon was unable to shrug but contrived to look as though that was his intention. 'Sore you may be, hero from across the water,' he said, 'but the magical band will only make that worse. And besides, what would you be wanting the band of broadcloth for? Sure, don't you know that it's awash with pictures of ladies in the nip and cats playing pianos? You're better off with out it.'

Skin-the-Cat said another Bad Word and then several more. And although all of these were true, none of them can be repeated here. Turning back to the Salmon of Knowledge, he said 'Seriously, it's been three months already. My heart aches to hear news of those I left behind across the water. Is there nothing you can do to help me, oh Salmon of Knowledge?'

And the Salmon of Knowledge replied, 'Sorry but that's not my department,' and made to swim away. But before the recalcitrant fish had got more than a yard or two from shore, Skin-the-cat leapt into the water and, grabbing its slippery body firmly with his big, wide, open, empty hands, flung it onto the shore. Putting his big, wide, open, empty, but above all well-organised, face close to the fish's, he said a number of Very, Very Bad Words, all of which were true but none of which can be repeated here. Then, putting a curse on all those who refuse to help in the search for the magical band of broadcloth, he cooked and ate the fish with a squeeze of lemon and some parsley.

Such, of course, is only the beginning of the tale. But now we must leave the *Fantastical Adventures of Skin-the-Cat* for we have an issue of *Appraisal* to crack on with. *Appraisal*: scholarly journal to the stars, according to no less a source than Tycho Brahe, he of the silver nose.

In this issue we have papers from the very successful Personalist Workshop held last March at the Friends Meeting House in Oxford. Sad to say, we are unable to bring you all we had on that delightful day. A version of Dr. Todd Mei's discussion of Riceour's social and moral philosophy had already been accepted for publication in *Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review*. Mr. Sebastian Greve has, unfortunately, been unable to submit his paper on 'multi-conversational writing' due to circumstances unforeseen. We hope, nevertheless, to bring you this in a future issue; *don't know where, don't know when, but you'll meet Sebas-ti-an some sunny day*. Likewise, Drs Charles Conti and Karl Simms; we hope to have their papers in time for the next issue. We are, however, grateful to Dr. John Preston for allowing us to put his presentation on Polanyi's Philosophy of Science on the website.

So much for what we don't have; what about what we do? In no particular order, we open with Dr. David Treanor who came all the way from Tasmania for the day. Having done so, he put personalism to a very practical use in analysing Australia's *National Disability Insurance Scheme*. This is followed by our own cherubic chairman, Dr. Alan Ford, with an exploration of Macmurray's threefold distinction between science, art, and the ethical. Last from that fine Spring day, a groovy cat named Dr. Simon Smith digs away at the linguistic and psychological foundations of Peter Byrne's all-too 'Innocent Realism'.

Our final paper in this issue is not, in fact, from the workshop. Nevertheless, we are very pleased to have Mr. Kyle Takaki's demystification of the mysteries of creativity from a distinctly Polanyian perspective.

Inspired by Dr. Simms, we thought we might try a little experiment to finish; something a bit more literary, poetical even. That great lover of language—Don Juan of dialogue, Casanova of the captivating phrase —Dr. Conti has kindly supplied three pieces: 'Duns Scopio', 'Duns Annuncio', and 'Spiritus Rector' for your delight and edification.

That, then, is issue 10-2 for the very, very late Autumn 2014. We hope you enjoy it and, what's more, that you will let us know what you think, particularly about our experiment, by the usual channels.

<div align="right">Simon Smith, Lower Kings Court, (Nobber)</div>

DISABILITY, CRITICAL THINKING AND PERSONALISM

David Treanor

Abstract:
The *National Disability Insurance Scheme* introduced to Australia in 2013 is a national system that shifts the locus of control and decision making to people with disabilities. It affirms the dignity of people with disabilities and aims to provide responsive personal services.

Personalism philosophy accentuates the importance of persons and regard personhood as the ultimate expression of meaning. People are by nature relational and indelibly etched in this framework is an infinite reverence for each person.

Personalism is used to critically assess the *NDIS*; it reveals deficiencies in the interrelationship between theory and practice, action and reflection, self and community.

Key words: Disability, Human Dignity, *NDIS* and Personalism.

1. Introduction

> History says, don't hope(
> On this side of the grave,
> But then, once in a lifetime(
> The longed-for tidal wave(
> Of justice can rise up(
> And hope and history rhyme. …
>
> Let us give birth to the unexpected
> So hope for a great sea-change
> On the far side of revenge
> Believe that a further shore
> Is reachable from here.
> (Heaney, 1991)

Disability Activists in Australia have successfully campaigned to effect change in the management and funding methodology of disability services. The new method, the *National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS)*[1] is designed as a nationally co-ordinated, resource directed system that shifts the locus of control and decision making to people with a disability. Its philosophical framework affirms the human dignity of the person with a disability and aims to provide people with 'the care and support they need, based on their individual support needs, goals and aspirations' (*NDIS*, 2013). Nevertheless, as policy managers, service providers and people interested in the welfare of people with disabilities, we need to be prepared to ask hard questions of each other, and be prepared to provide dis-confirming feedback if we want people with disabilities to realize the aspirations implied by the new framework. Although the paradigm is new to Australia, the *NDIS* is not an entirely unique phenomenon. For example New Zealand has introduced systems called *Think Differently* and *Enabling Better Lives* that also aim to advance community attitudes, social participation and inclusion for people with an intellectual disability. In the United Kingdom, a social policy termed *personalisation* aims to position people with disabilities with power over funding and freedom in how services are provided.

This paper uses the philosophy of personalism, to critically assess the *NDIS*. It first explains the *NDIS*. It does not discuss the different schools of thought in the philosophy of personalism, rather it suggests a set of operational principles this robust doctrine has to offer. Then, it proposes how a personalism approach might direct the activities that provide support services to people with disabilities. Finally, while *NDIS* rhetoric suggests it is a personalist approach, the author propose six points of divergence with personalism; that is deficiencies between the interrelationship in theory and practice, action and reflection and self and community.[2]

2. National Disability Insurance Scheme

The *NDIS* obtained bi-partisan support from Australia's national political elites and received Royal Ascent on March 28, 2013 with the provisions commencing on and after July 1, 2013. Succinctly the *NDIS* aims to provide support to people with a disability, their families and carers, (Disability Care/*NDIS*, 2013a). People with a disability are defined as people with 'a significant disability' and the disability or disabilities 'may be attributed to intellectual, cognitive, neurological, sensory, or physical impairments, or a psychiatric condition', (*NDIS*, 2013). The scheme offers a support system that is 'a flexible, whole-of-life approach to the support needed [by people with disabilities] to pursue their goals and aspirations and participate in daily life', (Disability Care, 2013b, 10). It recognizes that, with intervention people with a disability will experience improvements in their 'well-being, independence, social and economic participation, community connections, developing and maintaining relationships' [and experience] choice and control

over decisions affecting [their] life' (Disability Care/*NDIS*, 2013c, 5).

The *NDIS* clearly intends to effect social change, realize social justice and alter organizational or corporate accountability. As an agent of social change, it is tempting to argue the initiative is a 'Copernican Revolution' for people with disabilities, carers and disability organizations. The new paradigm instructs carers and organizations to place 'person-centred' care at the epicentre of their activities. Social welfare or disability organisations will no longer 'accept' people or have people 'referred' to their services rather people with disabilities will 'choose' what services they receive and attend. Therefore with respect to social justice the scheme is concerned with empowerment, realization of personal human potential and enabling personal well-being. Finally, I suggest a premise the paradigm proposes there is a synergy between the 'activities of caring' and the outcomes from 'practices of business' that positively influence the lives of people with disabilities. The scheme therefore aspires to give primacy to the former, the 'activities of caring' and indeed posits them as a 'product' that people will purchase. It is expected that demand for this 'product' will be remain high – more than 314,000 people used the service in year from July 2010 to June 2011; an increase of 45% from 2005/06 with the rate expected to continue to rise, AAP, (2013). Accordingly, organizations that deliver a 'quality product' (defined as: implementing (i) person-centred care; and (ii) accountable and responsible process and practices) will thrive. Indeed, it is anticipated some organizations that deliver lower standard outcomes will not survive.

In this context, the term 'activities of caring' refers to activities and active assistance required by a person with a disability which is offered by another person[s]. These activities and assistance includes practical support in:

> Daily household activities;
> Meal preparation and dining;
> Inclusion and participation in social, recreational and community experiences;
> Positive emotional, behaviour, personal and relationship support.

These activities and assistance ought to have an emotional and educative focus and are provided in such a way to enhance the human dignity of the person with a disability. Ultimately, they directly contribute to the person with a disability' personal, emotional and social well-being The outcome of the 'practices of business' refers to the organisational culture, processes and practices that are primarily directed to operating a service for people with disabilities. The organisation could be privately or statutory owned or a religious organisation or what is known as not-for-profit service.

3. Personalist approach

The *NDIS* sounds appealing and what the preceding account has demonstrated is how it's philosophical values give priority to people with disabilities to maximize their well-being and quality of life. It sounds very personalist! Nevertheless an analysis is required. Accordingly what then might a personalist support system that aims to support a group of people with disabilities, who without this support would find it difficult if not impossible to maintain their well-being and live lifestyles analogous with other people in their community? What characteristics do the workers, the work culture, organisational systems and processes need to meet the demands and challenges to be continually innovative, creative and pro-active in maximizing people with disabilities' personal, social well-being and quality of life? Clearly individual workers and organisations exercise power and authority in the normal course of discharging their roles and functions. Nonetheless, can this power and authority be used in such a way that they engage and struggle together in dialogue and critical review to transform their own and organisational practices so that they become conduits towards maximizing people with disabilities personal, social well-being and quality of life?

I suspect it's next to impossible to describe, with any depth what an exact personalist approach to service delivery might look like without personal knowledge of the people with a disability. First, the need to know who the people are, precisely identify their capabilities and how their disability impacts upon their desired living arrangements, social relationships, the community and so forth is paramount. Furthermore, in itself personalism offers no grand revelation and certainly no immediate 'quick fix' explanations to the multifaceted range of issues and difficulties associated with a nationally co-ordinated disability system. Accordingly, the huge degree of uniqueness in the individuality of each person is such that a predominant methodology is demanded to account for personal pheno- menology. Despite this assertion, the author argues the philosophy of personalism offers a cogent practical framework to people with disabilities, carers, disability organizations and government. He suggests it articulates a set of principles that emphasize the points of reference from which agents can style their interpersonal actions and organisations that can

shape their 'activities of caring' and 'practices of business'. The principles are:

1. All individuals or human beings, regardless of gender, limitations, race, or creed are important and valuable, in their own right and are to be respected;
2. The greatest tragedy for an individual is to experience the contempt of another human being that has the effect of dominating and/or repressing his or her human flourishing;
3. If we are serious about enabling everyone to live life in such a way as to reach their personal flourishing, then at some time or in the future all individuals will need each other; and
4. This interdependency creates us as persons in mutual relationships that are sensitive to and aware of each other's interest and need to flourish.

Accordingly, these four principles of personalism are sufficiently adequate to act as primary personalism premises with the following caveats.[3] First, the principles are open-ended and second they may undergo modification over time. Nonetheless they are relevant when we reflect on (a) the 'activities of caring', (b) the 'practices of business', and (c) the nature of structured support networks for people with a disability, their families and carers. These principles have two further characteristics. First, they offer society a positive vision of humanity albeit an alternative focus. That is, they suggest an explanation to our personal discomfort and anguish emanates from relationships. However, this experience of anguish does not have to overwhelm us. Its optimism is in suggesting we engage in interdependent relationships with mutual goodwill that stimulates another's personal flourishing. Finally, it acknowledges agents have many different and changing traits and relations, which are continually in a state of flux, that change and respond to personal and structural dynamics.

The third and fourth principles mentioned personal flourishing. This term refers to people having a positive self-esteem; having and being a friend, and being meaningfully engaged with activities, people and community. In a personal approach, these principles are the formative glue, which permeate the relationships, culture, processes and practices in the management and funding methodology of disability services. They establish a shared meaning to the 'activities of caring' and 'practices of business' and the ways that these will be created, expressed, reproduced, challenged and changed. Importantly, the principles are also a set of ideas with three significant practice implications for people with a disability, their families and carers; that

is, the macro or societal, the meso or institutional and three, the micro or individual.

In the macro sphere we would expect to find a society that legislates inclusively; that is people with disabilities have full rights to citizenship, avenues to legal and civil recourse in any event or incidences of discrimination and participatory mechanisms to have their voice heard. While these and other societal practices are valuable, society often accords a higher precedence to global processes over developing and promoting a vision of people with disabilities as people who have value and who we need in our society. By global processes, I refer to the state and institutional organisations that take a broad-brush approach to realizing government policies that often have little impact on the day-to-day lives of people with disabilities. Reinders is sharply perceptive about how we interact with people with disabilities when he argues that societies need policies, process and mechanisms that, 'sustain adequate support for [people with disabilities] and their families to the extent that its citizens are the kind of people who are prepared to share their lives with them and who have the character to do so', (Reinders, 2000, x-xi). Macmurray puts it like this: 'abnormality consists in his [the individual] inability to enter into normal personal relations with others', (Macmurray, 1961, 36). Macmurray also suggests: 'any human society is a unity of persons', (127). In other words, a personalist vision gives people a place to belong. How we feel we belong somewhere, to other people, a neighbourhood or society transcends legal, professional or formalized process, roles and physical presence. We feel we belong somewhere when the people with whom we share society with, are people who create and build places where we can encounter each other and which build positive relationships. Accordingly, in a society with a disability personalist vision these principles will find a home. Ultimately the principles are visionary and concerned with structuring and enabling society to focus on honouring and valuing all people regardless of their status or capabilities.

Personalism will also aspire to influence the institutional sphere to focus outcomes from their 'practices of business' on creating sensitive and positive interdependent relationships. This reading of personalism promotes the culture, processes, rules, regulations and so forth as essential to serving the need of people to be in relationships that offer each person meaning and connection with the local and wider community. Therefore, it might be expected the meso tier to have more than a robust form of governance, indeed personalism demands refocusing any form of business as a Community of Persons.[4]

Accordingly, this emphasis aims to prioritise people as prior to the 'practices of business'. Naughton, (2012) argues the roots of moral life in the 'practices of business' within the economic sphere are disconnected with society as a whole. He suggests the means by which business can work to serve society is through accepting that certain goods contribute to human flourishing and these need to be pursued. The list of goods he proposes includes 'community, love' and 'relationships' for these serve as the 'deepest convictions of humanity' (Naughton, 2012, 12-13). Importantly he reminds us that before we were part of the outcomes of the 'practices of business' we are people, born into families and communities. A possible limitation of Naughton's argument is that he advocates a Catholic vision, however I think we can take three central messages from his argument. These are:

1. The outcomes of the 'practices of business' should have a relational focus; how are they contributing to human flourishing?;
2. The means used need to extend the care of humanity and personal flourishing rather than be merely an exchange; and
3. Carers participation in work need to be determined by personalist values and be focused on human development and education.

Finally, the micro sphere refers to each person. Internationally, disability activists are somewhat united in advocating for increased resources and services to their community. However, theorists and activists disagree with each other and amongst themselves on the nature, cause of disability and what service or support paradigms are the most appropriate means to achieving their ends. Indeed, this is congruent with personalism; we know there are many personalisms, and accepting a liberal definitional approach to disability support paradigms has the added advantage of being more inclusive and engaging. This might seem obvious given the primary nature of disability *per se*; a physical and/or intellectual typology that manifests itself differently in each person. Accordingly then when the 'activities of caring' and 'practices of business' intersect there is a level of unusual complexity and to reach some understanding requires a robust analysis. What is proposed is that while there might be 'synergy' to these activities, it is complexity that is more relevant of considerable attention. Consider this aspect. Charles Taylor offers an illumining reference when he highlights the current high level of technology leads to a set of invisible principles, rather than people, to dominate. Although Taylor does not use this example, it is possible to suggest his argument is relevant to the discussion here in that invisible process can structure the 'activities of caring' in such a way that their purpose is diverted at best from individual people to the aggregate level and at worst to prioritizing 'practices of business'.

A personalist will however know the people they provide a service to, they will precisely identify their capabilities and how their disability impacts upon their desired living arrangements, social relationships, the community and so forth. They will apply the personalist principles to the lives of people they support. A possible means of achieving this is: Imagine you are the person in charge of an agency that offers support to people with disabilities. Now think of someone you love or hold dearly in your heart. Lets call this person Oisín. It might seem obvious to say this however the people with a disability you offer a service to will have or had, someone in their life who holds him or her in the regard you hold Oisínin. Now reflect on your service:

Would I be happy to let Oisín attend the service?
How can you lead the service in making a meaningful and positive difference to Oisín's life?
How can you make this difference every day?
How could this practice/policy/direction make a difference for every person in the service?

4. Points of divergence

The peak employer association in Australia, the National Disability Service (NDS), is one of the few voices that highlight potential difficulties associated with the implementation of individual budgets, personal choice and control although their response is offered in a neo-liberal context and designed to maintain '*a disability support market*' (NDS, 2013). Their focus is naturally focused on the 'practices of business' and how employers manage human resources, corporate governance and the changing regulatory environment. Nevertheless as mentioned earlier, it is important to hear critical voices, particularly from a 'activities of caring' perspective, to ask hard questions and be prepared to provide dis-confirming feedback if we want to critically assess the interrelationship between theory and practice, action and reflection, and self and community. The focus here is how both the direction implied by the *NDIS* will inhibit the 'activities of caring' and 'practices of business' to realize a personalism methodology. Using the principles it is argued the *NDIS* has at least six points of divergence from the philosophy of personalism.

4.1 Inherent value
The first principle I offered stated:

1. All individuals or human beings, regardless of gender, limitations, race, or creed are important and valuable, in their own right and are to be respected.

The *NDIS* certainly acknowledge the rights of people with disabilities as citizens of Australia. It does not specify how it will provide opportunities for people with disabilities to act as citizens and employees. Indeed, it does not appear to address the often misleading and negative images the majority of citizens and society at large hold of people with disabilities. Furthermore, the *NDIS* does not appear to address many of the root causes of disability, or address barriers in areas other than individual support, reflecting the absence of inclusive narratives from people with intellectual disabilities in any broader disability policy analysis. Finally, Winther (2014), a man who lives with a disability, writes how the *NDIS* may in fact change his currently living arrangements adversely when in fact he, and his co-tenants, are very happy with.

This individual focus may actually negatively impact upon some people. For instance, the author knows of a practice that is likely to occur as the *NDIS* is being implemented. In a shared home where four people with an intellectual disability live, it is envisaged that each person could hold an individual tenancy agreement with an independent landlord and each person could receive their 'activities of caring' from a different organization or carer[s]. These people have lived together and being supported by the same landlord and service for over 20 years without any complaints. Nevertheless this new direction sounds robust and a possible instance of the expression of personal choice. However what if a person needs the landlord to modify the living environment and the other three people do not want the change? Indeed, what if there are no other options available, that is the person is unable to move into another residence? How will the people be presented with the choices available to them? Furthermore, if each person chooses a different organization or carer, how will the 'practices of business' work together or interact interdependently to promote each person's 'activities of caring' and promote personal flourishing? This could be an example of complexity that I alluded to earlier.

4.2 Misleading personalism
The *NDIS's* second point of divergence from personalism is misleading personalism in so much as it fails to understand or take account of people as relational beings who are affected by structures and processes at the macro level. It also fails to account for the experience of people with disabilities who

have, in the majority first hand experience of the second personalist principle:

2. The greatest tragedy for an individual is to experience the contempt of another human being that has the effect of dominating and/or repressing his or her human flourishing;

In the majority people may have experienced the contempt another human being has for them and in many instances this has the effect of dominating and/or repressing his or her human flourishing. The *NDIS* personalist focus restricts its view of disability as an individual phenomenon, and this is expressed concretely in rigidity of considering services as silos rather than supports that could complement individualized funding and might focus on wider disabling barriers. In effect, by emphasizing the personal or individual services to individual needs, the *NDIS* perpetrates the focus away from disabling barriers that affect all disabled people, and obscuring possible alternative policy agendas. In other words it could become a form of 'cognitive imprisonment' (Brookfield, 1995, 18). Thus, it reinforces the view that people without disabilities do not require any deliberative education on the nature and implications for people who live with a disability. What the *NDIS* appears to ignore is the commonality of negative experiences by people with disability. That is, disability scholars such as Oliver (1990) and Thomas (1999) note that as a cohort people with disability often experience discrimination and oppression which requires a structural response combined with individual remediation strategies. If then, we accept there is a level of complexity to understanding 'disability', that is, it is not simply located in the individual, then the *NDIS* does not appear to adequately account for a politics of disablement that 'extends far beyond specific welfare issues and consumer demands', (Priestley, 1999, 58).

4.3 Needs, Services or Capabilities?
Prior to the introduction of the *NDIS*, the criticism directed to disability funding and administration methodology often focuses on, who receives what resources and how much it costs to provide the service. Typically, demand out weights the government funded supply and the delivery costs appear to be increasing at higher than Consumer Price Index increases. The *NDIS* may, through its continual focus on 'support to access community services and activities' (*NDIS*, 2014), reinforce this negative cycle. Indeed, there is something uncomfortably linear and quantifiable about this focus which however well intentioned in it's desire to be responsive appears to articulate that our human needs can be fulfilled through different services or

service provision! This belief in services and service provision are one-dimensional; that is, they can position 'activities of caring' and 'practices of business' into discrete units and create standardized objectives that are designed as context and culture-proof. Accordingly, it is as if, with services a person with a disability will have and lead a fulfilled life. Within the disability literature there are different discourses on quality of life with scholars like Parmenter (1996), Riches *et al* (2012) and Schalock (2011) being useful guides to understanding these discourses. Notwithstanding the merit of these scholars framework another approach, Nussbaum's Capability Approach (2007, 70-78), is also an appropriate and robust methodology 'since it simply specifies some necessary conditions for a decent just society, in the form of a set of fundamental entitlements of all citizens' (155). The advantages of this framework includes a positive view of people with a disability and assess his or her place in society in respect to other citizens in society. The Capabilities are:

(i)   Life;
(ii)   Bodily Health;
(iii)   Bodily Integrity;
(iv)   Senses, Imagination & Thought;
(v)   Emotions;
(vi)   Practical Reason;
(vii)   Affiliation;
(viii) Other Species;
(ix)   Play; and
(x)   Control over one's environment.

The Capabilities are congruent with national and international rights framework; they are visionary, purposeful, articulate a moral code and have an educative dimension. Indeed, their emphasis moves beyond knee jerk response and refocuses policy, practices and funding by examining

> not how much money [people with disabilities] have, but what are they actually able to do and to be? And then, once we have ascertained that, what are the obstacles in the way of their ability to function up to the appropriate threshold level? (Nussbaum, 2007,168).

4.4 Atoms in a void or interdependent?

There is a strong sense of individualism in the *NDIS,* which may emanate from an undesirable history of disability service provision. Typically prior to the 1950s in western societies, people with disabilities were institutionalized and the emphasis on meeting their personal needs was often overlooked. Accordingly, contemporary disability policy seeks to address these very issues hence the importance of personalization in service delivery. In itself, we might all agree personalization and individual planning is a

good ideal however at what point does it comprise a person's support network with other network members? Indeed, while a personalist approach is congruent with these notions of 'personalization' and 'individualization', the former approach will achieve these goals through its emphasis and desire to indelibly honour each person's human dignity. It will also consider how people act as relational beings rather than atoms in a void. Therefore a personal approach might give primary to a different set of goals to achieve the third principle:

3. If we are serious about enabling everyone to live life in such a way as to reach their personal flourishing, then at some time or in the future all individuals will need each other.

These are: promoting and living mutual positive and respectful relationships that emphasize our shared humanity; engaging people in the 'activities of caring' who have an educative focus and can act as role models; and through the daily activities of living, creating opportunities that offer people with disabilities meaningful and participatory roles.

Hillman *et al* (2013) completed a longitudinal ethnographic study that analysed the lives of nine people with an intellectual disability to assess how people lived their lives and whether they might be judged as attaining personal flourishing. Importantly, the authors offer a caveat to their study: 'their findings cannot be generalized beyond the participants in this inquiry' (Hillman, 2013, 933), the network of support was developed by the study participant's families, their 'activities of caring' focused on personal centred planning, the researchers acknowledge this model of care is atypical. Notwithstanding the particular characteristic of the study the actual findings are significant: the fundamental aspect of 'activities of caring' and 'practices of business' was:

> respect, leading to positive change…The growth and developing autonomy of the person at the centre of the network was not only satisfying to all members of the support network, it also provided the impetus for new opportunities. (Hillman, 2013, 933)

The authors completed their study over a three-year period and their analysis demonstrates 'each support network' (Hillman, 2013, 932) or each person's personal flourishing changed for the better. Moreover, the researchers develop a model from their principles and suggest that this is a *'process of co-creation'* (932), in personalism, interdependent. Therefore, this approach enabled the model used to structure its 'activities of caring' and 'practices of business' that led people to understand and implement the fourth personal principle:

4. This interdependency creates us as persons in mutual relationships that are sensitive to and aware of each other's interest and need to flourish.

4.5 The lack of 'personalisation'

The penultimate point to make is that, it appears the *NDIS* is blind to economic, health or social inequalities of people with disabilities, (Clarke *et al* 2006, Ferguson 2007, Noona, *et al* 2013, Stevens *et al* 2011). It has been mentioned that disability *per se* is individuated; each person lives his or her disability in an unique manner. That is, two people can be classified as having the same type of disability however their personal experiences and circumstances means the impact of their disability will affect them differently and hence their desires, needs and aspirations will be different. If the *NDIS* does truly want to support personalization, then generic or mainstream employment for all people with a disability who so desire to secure meaningful will become a reality. Unfortunately, the workforce participation rate by people with disabilities in Australia continues to lag behind UN target, (ABS, 2009). Furthermore, in a report on ageing in Australia it was noted:

> The process of healthy ageing in not well understood…further most health surveys do not collect data from people living in residential care [that is people with disabilities] and this population sub group is likely to have poorer health than people living in the community. (AIHW, 2013, 44)

The rhetoric in the *NDIS* and the public examples they offer all allude to 'choice', 'personalization' however there are gaps. For example, the author is aware of someone who will be part of the now 'trial' (the language government now uses in 2014 has changed from 'launch' to 'trial' sites) region. He is over 65 years of age and has lived in the same household and with the same group of people for over 20 years. As it stands, this person, is now defined as elderly and the rules are different for him; he may have to move out of his home and go into an aged care facility; if he stays in his current home, he may not be able to access funding: 'to pursue [his] goals and aspirations and participate in daily life', (Disability Care, 2013b).

4.6 Personal integrity

The four personalist principles hold open the possibility of three significant practice implications for people with a disability, their families and carers in the macro, the meso and three, the micro sphere. The few 'How' questions considered in this paper directed attention to process and practice that the 'activities of caring' and 'practices of business' are and will confront. However there is another possible

more grave challenge that each sphere will meet and this concerns the notion of integrity. Williams's (1973, 107-118) concern with the notion of integrity and how this may be construed when applied to practical relationship quandaries in the theory of utilitarianism has relevance to the analysis of the *NDIS*. Indeed, his objections have particular relevance to dilemmas relating to personal and organizational decisions that individuals and groups have to make by virtue of the 'activities of caring' and 'practices of business' particularity when conflict occurs.

Admittedly integrity has a nebulous nature, and when exhibited by agents it is as often expressed as a 'loyalty-exhibited virtue'*,* (Scherkoske, 2010, 336), however it is usually universally acclaimed as 'an important feature of agency',(Scherkoske, 2010, 352)especially as it relates to the interactions between people with a disability and carers. It is possible to argue (Scherkoske, 2010) that Williams sees integrity as a person [or agent] acting congruently with what values, principles or commitments, they respect as essentially moral or ethical. However, for Williams this concept of integrity is *not* designed as a 'counter-example model' (Williams, 1995, 211)as critics may have taken it to imply. Rather it is:

> As a quality that many people prize and admire. It is in such ways that people put the notion to ethical use. My claim was that if people do put it to ethical use, they cannot accept the picture of action and of moral motivation that directs utilitarianism requires- and here were two stories to remind them, perhaps in different ways, of that truth. (Williams, 1995, 212).[5]

Earlier two examples were provided about people sharing a home with different carers and a man who exceeds the age requirements of the *NDIS* to describe circumstances where there are and will be ethical quandaries about 'what one ought to do' that relate to the character or the agent[s]. The decisions that individual and organisations will make may comprise personal and organizational integrity. For example, at an individual level, how does this interact with a Code of Ethics? In addition, other dilemmas will occur and possibly serve to permeate the three tiers mentioned to challenge and comprise the integrity of society, organisations and carers.

5. *Conclusion*

Although the *NDIS* is still in its embryonic stage and being rolled out in a selected number of sites, this paper reveals deficiencies in the proposed system; between the interrelationship of theory and practice, action and reflection and self and community. The *NDIS* does offer narratives of people lives and

suggests different positive possibilities to resolve current 'activities of caring' and 'practices of business' issues. The narratives are real struggles and this author hopes the *NDIS* will make such a difference that the people involved will have a fullness of life. What his concern is how comprehensive are the examples being used? Do they address the more thorny dilemmas inherent in the current arrangements? The government agency responsible for implementing the scheme, the NDIA, released a half yearly report in February 2014, (NDIA, 2014). The review only concerns the launch or trial sites and findings reveal:

1. The average financial agreements have declined by 15%, although it is still above the average used to cost the NDIS. There are of course substantial differences in the monetary value of agreements depending upon the type of disability a person lives with;
2. The trial is likely to cost more than AUD$390m more than expected and the governments bilateral agreements;
3. It takes on average 63 days to complete finalize a plan for a person; and
4. Participant satisfaction rates are high – 1.83 on a scale from -2 to +2.

What is of interest here is the report's focus on finances and how the focus is on meeting strategic goals. We do not read nor do we hear reports on how people experience improvements in their

well-being, independence, social and economic participation, community connections, developing and maintaining relationships [and experience] choice and control over decisions affecting [their] life (Disability Care, 2013b, 5).

As a Personalist, the author takes seriously persons as compounded and complex beings, with a unique personhood. Moreover our very nature is as relational or persons-in-relations (Macmurray 1961). This offers us interdependence and indelibly etched in this relationship is a human dignity that affirms infinite reverence for each human person. The author is yet to be convinced that the *NDIS* fully comprehends this aspect of our nature as human beings and persons. If the scheme prioritizes this approach as personalism then the method will employ strategies to implement what most people will agree that what we need most in life is someone to love, something to do and something to hope for, (Somerville 2007, 184).6

The familiar tale of the unintended consequences of human action applies equally well to human ideas; what their consequences turn out to be is not a simple

function either of their truth or their falsity or the intention of those who use them. (Hindess, 1993, 31).

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Notes

1. The first term used by the Australian Government to denote the new concept was the National Disability Insurance Scheme (*NDIS*). This was changed to Disability Care Australia as the legislation was introduced in 2013. The new Australian Government has changed the name back to *NDIS*.

2. A scholar who kindly reviewed this paper for me pointed out that I did not mention that the scheme as an 'insurance' scheme with a focus on rehabilitation could also be a point of criticism, I fully agree that this is a valid criticism and moreover warrants a separate and complete analysis.

3. I have tried to summarise scholars who I regard as personalists and who are either associated with people with disabilities or who have a personalist focus in their writings. Jean Vanier has spent over 50 years living with people with intellectual disabilities. Eva Feder Kittay is the mother of a woman with an intellectual disability. I regard some aspects of Jenny Teichman works and John Macmurray as having a strong personalist focus. E. Kittay, *Love's Labor: Essays on Women, Equality and Dependency,* London: Routledge, 1999. & E. Kittay & L. Carlson, *Cognitive Disability and Its Challenge to Moral Philosophy,* Oxford: Blackwell, 2009; John Macmurray op cit.; J. Maritain, *The Person and the Common Good*, trans. John J. Fitzgerald London: Geoffrey Blex, 1948); J. Teichman, *Social Ethics a Students Guide*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. and *Ethics and Reality,* London: Ashgate, 2001. & J. Vanier, *Made for Happiness: Discovering the Meaning of Life with Aristotle*, Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 2005; J. Vanier, *Becoming Human,* Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 1998.

4. I personally disagree with using the term 'business' when referring to working with people with disabilities and draw the readers attention to the fact that the 'business' referred to here means 'activities of caring' and 'practices of business'.

5. This refers to the stories of 'George' and 'Jim' who are asked to make decisions which will comprise their personal values and act in a humane way. Williams offers good albeit different reasons for 'George' and 'Jim' to act both humanely and inhumanely.

6. Margaret Somerville makes this point although she refers to older people rather than people in general.

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THE PRIORITY OF THE ETHICAL

Alan Ford

Abstract:

This essay is in two parts: (1) an argument for the priority of the Ethical over, for example, Art and Science—and all else—as a prime and necessary context for human action; (2) arguments to show what happens when the Ethical, in Macmurray's Form of the Personal, is forgotten and logically lesser notions, like subject and object, are seen as the basis of identity and existence.

Keywords

The ethical, context, fantasy/reality, form of the personal, forms of life, logical priority, John Macmurray, modernity, persons as agents, rhythm of withdrawal and return, solipsism, self-evidence, Wittgenstein.

1. Introduction: love and the distinction between fantasy and reality

My argument for the priority of the Ethical follows the form of Macmurray's notion of the Form of the Personal, where in this particular example the prior or, as he calls it, the 'positive' notion, is constituted by its two negatives viz. Science and Art, which are made possible only as reductions of the notion of the Ethical. Because of this they can become effective, but only in the ethical context of a community of persons. This same structure, the Form of the Personal, is seen in his thoughts on the Mind/Body problem, which he resolves by showing that the Person as Agent is the full, positive and logical form of the self and that the notions of Mind and Body are in fact reductions of this and, again, have meaning only in this context. He argues that the mind-body dilemma arose when Descartes convinced us all that the Self was essentially a thinker, totally separate from the body, and hence never the twain *could* meet.

Perhaps the Form of the Personal is exhibited most clearly in Macmurray's *Persons in Relation*, Chapter Four, called *The Rhythm of Withdrawal and Return* where he writes that this dialectic is the:

> … full dynamic expression of the form of the personal as a positive which includes and is constituted by and subordinates its own negative.

And:

> [t]he withdrawal is for the sake of the return: and its necessity lies in this, that it differentiates the positive phase by enriching its content. Without the negative there would be no development of the positive, but only the repetition *ad infinitum* of an original undifferentiated identity.[1]

Without the 'negativity' of the reduced 'languages' of Science and Art, where would we be? Yet, they make proper sense only in the light of an ethical life. He then adds that '[i]n this … we may find the answer to many of the questions which puzzle the moralist.'[2] So it seems to me that understanding these logical priorities enables us to begin to resolve some of these puzzles.

One such puzzle that begins to be resolved is by spelling out his implication that value has *logical* priority over fact, where logic owes its rationality to what we can loosely call value: and where he identifies that most fundamental element of the Ethico-Religious: Love.

Briefly, love, the 'positive' in this example of the rhythm of withdrawal and return, enables the commencement and development of identity by facilitating the separation and differentiation from our mothers, *while still retaining the initial relation.* Indeed, it is this separation that makes identity and hence relations possible. In this Macmurray shows how the negativity between mother and child is necessary so that the child can make the distinction (another kind of separation) between fantasy and reality. As he says, there comes the time when the heaven of stability and predictability has to end; for instance when mother might say: 'Now, come on Johnny, show me you can walk', and leaves Johnny tottering in the middle of the room with no support. Johnny is bound to feel something like 'She's abandoned me! She hates me! I hate her!' etc. Yet if he then walks, he gains praise and a cuddle, and if he falls he will be caught—and also cuddled. Either way he realises that his thoughts/feelings were false and that what goes on 'in his head' can be mistaken, and that Mum *in fact* always loved him, that he can trust her, and because of this he might well be raring to have another go. He can, in short, now make the distinction between fantasy and reality by comparing them in his own experience. This is also a step on the way to establishing his identity as separate from other *persons* whilst necessarily being in relation with them. The 'negativity' creates separation; love re-establishes relationship and trust in Mum and the world. As we shall argue, identity and relationship cannot possibly be established where

the self is merely a thinker and the basic existential distinction is seen as between subject and object, the subliminal Cartesian notion that circulates in our cultural unconscious and has done so in philosophical conversations for over four-hundred years.

We now see Mum's love has made this crucial and life-transforming distinction possible, which continues in relations in the coming life. It is the positive that enables us to distinguish the negative, but without the negative the positive could not develop. Yet, if love were absent, as it sometimes is, the distinction would be at best confused and fear and paranoia would reign: there would be nothing to distinguish the fantasies 'in the head' from what is the case. This suggests that reason, based upon this distinction between the real and the false, is fundamentally dependent on love, the ethical relationship *par excellence* and that it puts Science and Art in their places as negatives that constitute and differentiate the positive, which yet makes them possible. *It is logically the case that logic is based upon the distinction between reality and fantasy, true and false, and therefore upon love in order to be logical.*

Yet, to repeat, the withdrawal, the negative, is absolutely essential to show what is possible and impossible, to create the necessary differentiation for appropriate and sophisticated action, whilst the withdrawal into greater differentiation is guided by love and trust.

Another change of priority follows, related directly to what has just been said, and upon which I can only touch. We tend to be told that reason is about repressing emotion, separating itself from it, whilst I've been advocating the priority of the *emotion* of love. Macmurray writes:

> It is not that our feelings have a secondary and subordinate capacity for being rational or irrational. It is that reason is primarily an affair of emotion, and that the rationality of thought is the derivative and secondary one. For if reason is the capacity to *act* in terms of the nature of the object, it is emotion which stands directly behind activity determining its substance and direction, while thought is related to action indirectly and through emotion, determining only its form, and that only partially.[3]

Thus love is the basis of rationality and creates rational agents and has logical priority over Science and Art that, through their limited 'languages', enable us to distinguish the true and the beautiful. In short it invents them out of the necessity to relate to the real, ever more clearly, and for this *it* puts them to work, and from this, based on the loving care and agency of others, comes persons as agents.

2. The ethical as the context

To add a little more detail. Ever since Wittgenstein's emphasis on the importance of *context* for meaning we have moved in the direction, albeit subliminally, of understanding the nature of the rhythm of withdrawal and return, for the context is, I argue, another example of the positive which is constituted by its negatives, the details of which constitute and differentiate it but which would be meaningless outside it. Wittgenstein's phrase, 'forms of life', captures this.

I would also argue that it is always and logically the ethical to which we must revert to find the ultimate context to any setting: Science would be impossible without the ethical pursuit of the truth. I also suggest that it is the *example,* which is the proper setting, the 'life blood', for any ethical situation, for the ethical is essentially found in human relations and actions, in the good *deed*. The theoretical is the negative, a negative that is essential in spelling out and ordering the moral act, but it is the deed, which underpins, creates the context, for the theoretical in order for it to make sense

Ever since Descartes this misapplication of negatives, this prioritising of thought and thing, subject and object, this getting the cart before the horse, can be seen in our application of the models of the mathematical-mechanical and the organic, as universal explanations for everything*, including persons and values*, which have so dogged our thinking. We see them as 'scientific', and therefore intellectually respectable, when they are both clearly *a priori* and analogical, adapted, *unscientifically*, from the scientific facts of mechanics and animal 'behaviour', where they belong and work, but which gain their meaning because of the context of ethical human attempts to discover the truth. The emotion of passion, the love of the truth, has the priority and science could not begin without it. Again, these are examples of the rhythm of withdrawal and return, where both these models are negatives, which add to the richness and complexity of their subjects. They are reductions of and held in place by the prior notion of the ethical, the context which gives them sense, and which also makes sense of their *application*, for there is *nothing in these models* that can guide us as to how they should be applied—in actual lives. This is why such 'negatives' immediately run into insuperable difficulties when attempting to describe the personal, persons and values. As Macmurray writes, concerning the organic model:

> To affirm the organic conception in the personal field is implicitly to deny the possibility of action; [because the organic is a determinate process, void of the *freedom* implied by choice and action] yet the meaning of the conception lies in its reference to

action. We can only act upon the organic conception by transforming it into a determinant of our intention. It becomes an ideal to be achieved. We say, in effect, 'Society is organic; therefore let us make it organic, as it ought to be.' The contradiction is glaring. If society is organic, then it is meaningless to say that it *ought* to be.[4]

This is because the organic, logically, has no place for *oughts* (and when applied, as in the organicism of historicism in politics, must lead to totalitarianism). This applies *a fortiori* to the mechanical model, which would reduce us to robotic computers: a rather schizoid vision. This does not deny that humans have their organic and mechanical bodily aspects, and although these aspects are necessary, they are not sufficient to capture the form of the personal, try as we might to describe the positive only in terms of its negatives.

It seems that we can be aware of these 'negatives' only because we are constituted as persons, and this necessitates, from the start, having been in a personal relationship with a personal other, usually our mothers, and with and through whom we have been persons from the start: not merely animal or organisms. To be is to be related, and to be related, as a human being, is to be in *communication* with another person.

This is partly owing to the total helplessness of the child, who *has* to be cared for by another person. As Macmurray puts it:

> In the human infant … the impulse to communication is his sole adaptation to the world into which he is born. Implicit and unconscious it may be, yet it is sufficient to constitute the mother-child relation as the basic form of human existence, as a personal mutuality, as a 'you and I' with a common life. For this reason the infant is born a person and not an animal. All his subsequent experiences, all the habits he forms and the skills he acquires fall within this framework, and are fitted to it.[5]

The child thus *begins* in communication with the mother, not in language as such, but in the negative-positive *expressions* of the experience of that relation, of pleasure and pain, crying and crooning, communicated to the mother upon which the child's flourishing depends. In this way the relation with the mother is implicit and necessary from the start; the child begins essentially as a person in relation and communication. This also means that there is an implicit awareness of an other-than-myself, the basis for the distinction between thought and thing, ultimately between fantasy and reality which we dealt with above. This can be seen as the essential distinction upon which reason is founded: 'the conscious reference of an idea to an object' as Macmurray puts it. Yet he immediately returns to the essence of his theme when he says about the above statement:

> But it is to be noted that this is not the primary expression of reason. What is primary, even in respect of reflective thought – is the reference to the other *person*. A true judgement is one which is made by one individual – as every judgement must be – but is valid for all others. Objective thought presupposes this by the assumption that there is a *common* object about which communication may be made.[6]

So much for solipsism!

Unlike the animal, the child depends upon reason, the mother's reason, for its survival, since it is so ill equipped by lack of instinct or reaction to stimuli. All its needs depend upon care by another, upon conscious, rational *action* on the mother's part. The motive behind the mother's care is love, based negatively on fear for the child's safety – and this love is clearly rational and real because the child's helplessness is also real.

Yet the fear, the negative, which exists in both mother and child, enables the child and mother to subordinate it in the positive of their loving relation, since it makes the mother aware of the child's needs, as the child communicates these by its cries, and her fear for the child's safety ends in the *action* of her response to those needs and cries. Yet this is clearly not a mere functional, biological relation since delight in each other's company is clear from the start and for its own sake. (Yet, as already argued, identity, both psychological and physical, depend upon it) And the crooning and playing, the 'communing' in Macmurray's phrase, are clearly the beginnings of communication, expressing the love and satisfaction in each other's presence.

In this we see, once again, the form of the personal, where the positive gives meaning and motivation to the negative and the negative assists the positive. But if the negative, (fear, threat, etc.) takes priority, then relationship, life and meaning are in jeopardy.

It is this positive, in the form of the personal, which makes sense of all our theorising, which forms *the* context that seems so difficult to articulate in theoretical terms, yet makes all theorising possible.

3. Action and the ethical

So we can see that the child is constituted in relation by the *actions* of the mother toward him. But when we think about child development we frequently forget that the self is primarily an agent and that thought, as we've seen above, is secondary to it. Consequently we tend to see the self as standing back from the other, as in thought, and in this way differentiating itself from the other and slipping back

into the dualism of subject and object. We have to remind ourselves that:

> … a Self is primarily an agent, and as such in active relation with the Other of which he forms a part.[7]

This does *not* mean that a person's identity is somehow swamped by or absorbed by the Other, including one's community. But it does mean that it is only through being related to the personal other, in a loving relation, that one can gain a mature identity. The original unity, the 'You and I', as we have seen, is developed from a relation of persons: '[i]t is the unity of a common life.'[8] And the development of the individual arises from the development of this relation, and is achieved through the differentiation of this original unity of 'You and I'. It is because we are members of a society that we can distinguish ourselves from it, even oppose it. In this opposition we might, at the same time, discover our individuality.

> We are part of that from which we distinguish ourselves and to which, *as agents*, we oppose ourselves.[9]

And this underlines the importance of action and agency: only agents can oppose, for opposition is almost an ostensive definition of action. From such opposition flow the moral stances, characteristic of moral agents, as the awareness of conscience, responsibility, (the *oughts* we feel called upon to consider), moral struggle, (that which shows we have a choice—and that it matters):

> … the capacity which is possessed by a person, and only by a person, to represent his fellows – to feel and think and act, not just for himself, but also for the other.[10]

Thought alone cannot resolve its problems from within itself. It can 'work' only in a world of personal identity, based on the 'space' necessary for its application in the mutual relation between identity and separation. Like persons, it has to have a 'world', or it becomes a Wittgensteinian machine doing no work, or language having gone on holiday. One can see Science as a systematic use of this rhythm in its use of hypotheses and the consequent experiments.

4. The metaphysics of modernity

Yet modernity is based on an assumption that the self is essentially a thinker and the basic existential distinction is between subject and object, the subliminal Cartesian notion that circulates in our cultural unconscious, and against which the above pages have argued. Below I try to spell out the paradoxical implications of such a theory.

Descartes' aim was to find logically certain knowledge, based on *self-evidence* and the result was his *cogito*; 'I think, therefore I am,' which, although his argument has been much criticised, his foundation distinction between self and other, subject and object is still assumed to be necessary and sufficient in many quarters. The self, here, is essentially a thinker, a consciousness up against a world of objects. I argue in some detail that, if so, the self cannot have any way of distinguishing itself from those objects, that solipsism cannot be denied, and that value is an illusion, based merely on matters of opinion, an assumption now made by many.

Interestingly, Descartes' argument entails the existence of God, intended to rescue him from solipsism and the possibility of infinite doubt in a realm which otherwise would have no place for identity or truth. (The argument goes: since we can imagine a perfect being, God necessarily exists because he is a perfect being, and if he did not exist he would not be perfect, and because a perfect God would not deceive us, we can believe the evidence of our senses). Since then the role of God's existence has been forgotten, as a kind of philosophical embarrassment, but Descartes was aware of the *necessity* for such a notion that would take us beyond the subject-object distinction into a *world* of persons and objects with identity and within consequent relations. I shall attempt to show what happens when such mediation is absent. Macmurray's notion of the form of the personal, containing the self as agent with its priority in the ethical, spells out the nature of such mediation.

I see Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* as a concise, elegant and even beautiful summing up of the metaphysics of modernity, which have yet visited us with the mind-body, subject-object, fact-value problems. As we know, his intention was to show what could be said (the propositions of natural science), and what could not be articulated: the realm of value consisting of ethics and aesthetics, which he saw as one and the same.

We begin with an insight which almost seems a throwaway line, yet it describes a key contradiction, entailing a conceptual collapse.

> Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.[11]

Wittgenstein does not unpack the implications any further. One such implication is that that the process also happens in the reverse where: *the 'world' of realism shrinks to a point without extension and*

there remains the subjectivity co-ordinated with it.

This is because a world consisting of just these two *substances*, to use Descartes' word (when the mediation of God is excluded), characterised by their non-relationship, cannot establish identity and consequent relations.

This reversal happens *explicitly* in Logical Positivism, whose radical realism flips into its opposite, *a property of consciousness*, in its famous tenet that physical objects are logical constructs from sense-data. (There are other examples.) Why wasn't this phenomenal flip seen earlier, especially since this subjectivist doctrine at the heart of western philosophy tended to breed materialists on one side and idealists on the other, with everything and nothing really separating them?

Thus Realism/Materialism can be seen as in Table 1 , and solipsism can be depicted as in Table 2 (both on p.19).

Each cell in each table shows unstable equivalencies, 'flips' from one state to the other, since there is nothing to establish the identity of either.

The unstable and problematic 'I' is to be seen at the central border of each figure, where the balloon touches it, not knowing if it's a thought or a thing. In this state, without grounds of identity, it could hardly be a person—or anything else.

It all seems like breathing out or breathing in. A demonstration model could be made using two chambers, a balloon, a valve and an air pump! The 'I' has become paradoxical: it has become everything and nothing. It *simultaneously* inherits and loses both itself and the world.

Yet to know that sense-data are properties of consciousness one must have a sense of identity in order to know what these sense-data are properties of. Without this, since what is subjective and objective cannot now be separated or identified, all we are left with are *phenomena*, hence the apt name, *phenomenalism,* given to this aspect of Logical Positivism. Indeed, what we're left with is Descartes' dualism without mediation. Descartes saw the logical necessity for mediation between the Self and Other: God for him was not a mere nod to the Church.

I believe these phenomena are identical to Derrida's 'signifiers', which makes me think that deconstructivism is a *reductio ad absurdum* of this subjectivist philosophy. The Derridian conclusion that not only are there no values, there are no facts either, seems to confirm this.

But what about that part of the *Tractatus* that attempts to deal with value, about which nothing can

be said, but which Wittgenstein insisted was its most important part? He is clearly disagreeing with positivism, which clearly missed the point and tended to ignore this as *mere* nonsense—emotive outbursts of approval or disapproval.

He finds a 'place' for value at the limits of the world and language, beyond the facts constructed by language, and therefore it cannot be spoken about:

> The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: *in* it no value exists…[12]

The route to this realm is, once more, in the Cartesian mode of *self-evidence*, where these limits of language *show themselves*, in the same way as Descartes' self *showed* itself. Once more, true to implicit Cartesianism, there are two limits to the world, the subjective and the objective. The subjective limit is seen in the 'metaphysical subject',[13] not the self of which psychology deals, but the one, which, like the eyeball,[14] cannot possibly see itself, but which makes seeing possible; not part of the world, but 'looking in' from this transcendental limit. Once more this is identical to Descartes' stance, which *assumes* a self that sees. It is like the pure self of mysticism, unsullied by and not part of the world.

Wittgenstein calls the opposite limit 'logical form', seen analogically, and once again self-evidently, in the tautology and the contradiction, which also *show* themselves and don't therefore need to refer to the world for their logical status: one is logically true, the other logically contradictory. According to the *Tractatus* 'The world is determined by the facts, and by their being *all* the facts,'[15] but this 'fact' stands at the limits of language and is not a fact among the other facts within the world; (hence the quotation marks) it is itself transcendental. In this way he can say, and simultaneously imply, the realm of value:

> *How* things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself *in* the world.[16]

> It is not *how* things are in the world that is mystical, but *that* it exists.[17]

This can be seen as recognition of the miracle of existence, which is itself nothing to do with facts as such, but with feeling the world as a 'limited whole':

> Feeling the world as a limited whole – it is this that is mystical.[18]

I believe Buddhists call this 'suchness'. Mysticism certainly has religious connotations, but without the identity of selves and objects this could not be experienced: which might be the aim of some such doctrines e.g. the Cathars wanted to end existence and selves since they saw all as evil, created by

Satan in order to snare us in desire. This is congruent with the influence of Schopenhauer on the *Tractatus*, who saw existence in similar terms.

There is a burgeoning ethical *attitude* here, entailing seeing everything from the point of view of eternity, from outside the world and the psychological self. Wittgenstein is trying to explain that attitude. He writes in the *Notebooks 1914-1916*:

> The work of art is the object seen *sub specie aeternitatis*; and the good life is the world seen *sub specie aeternitatis*. This is the connexion between art and aesthetics.

> The usual way of looking at things sees objects as it were from the midst of them, the view *sub specie aeternitatis* from outside.

He continues in terms spelled out above, when he writes:

> The thing seen *sub specie aeternitatis* is the thing seen together with the whole of logical space.[19]

Seeing 'the world aright' is therefore the metaphysical self seeing the pure other from the timeless state of eternity and realising that the world of facts and conditioned selves cannot be redeemed, since all within the world is void of meaning and significance. The solution to the problem of existence is therefore to see the facts without wanting to change them: an intensely passive ethic. Essentially, once again, we have one emptiness up against another, which means they become one in a kind of Nirvana. But without identity the *experience* of Nirvana and eternity could not be, which only persons, moral agents in loving relations, can provide. This might confirm the above suspicion: that the end of existence is its aim, the only value, oblivion, as in Gnosticism, which also tends to have problematic issues with things ethical.[20]

Alternatively this can be seen as an elegant and heroic attempt to rescue value, but whose theory permits its expression only in a strangled voice, forbids statements about value, and despite its attempts to 'see the world aright,'[21] seems to embrace a theory on the edge of conceptual collapse, as described in the two tables above.

In summary, another table (Table 3, on p.19) lays out the structure of the *Tractatus*, placing it within its parameters of Subject-Object; Value-Fact, whilst recognising that 'object', in the realm of value, should be in quotes—for the reason already given.

> The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world – not a part of it.[22]

The Transcendental Other or 'Logical Form', the Limits of the World and Language in the *Tractatus*.

Yet, if my argument is correct, identity is impossible in a world of two 'emptinesses': a world of phenomena on one hand and a non-world on the other. This shows how two 'negatives', to use Macmurray's term when describing the Form of the Personal, logically require that 'positive', in this case a person with identity and within personal relations, before a distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, or mind and body can be made; as the ethical is necessary in order to make the pursuit of Art and Science logically possible.

Perhaps a better view of 'enlightenment', necessitating identity, relationships and love in a world, *this* world, is described in TS Eliot's *Little Gidding*, in those famous lines:

> We shall not cease from exploration,
> And the end of all our exploring
> Will be to arrive where we started
> And to know the place for the first time.[25]

This is a better notion of eternity than the free flow of phenomena in that world of two emptinesses. It is also a description of love, where the mature ego gives itself, forgets itself, for the sake of, the love of, the Other. Such a person knows the place for the first time because the self no longer intrudes, *but it does not become a non-entity*, for in this a self is *necessary* and formed by the moral struggle in relation to others, where love should be the mediator. One can really *know* the place only if one is unafraid, and it's fear that creates illusion and egotism. The role of love in the rhythm of withdrawal and return in dispelling illusion and egotism underlines this. In this way love creates clarity, and in this loving attention to the other, action becomes more apt to the occasion. Again, this shows how love makes knowledge possible: because in this state *the real* is ever clearer, but logical certainty is no longer an issue. Eternity, clarity, love is then captured a few lines later:

> Quick now, here, now, always –
> A condition of complete simplicity
> (Costing not less than everything).[26]

This can be contrasted with the relation between the solipsistic self and the material Other, as described in the *Tractatus*,[27] which reminds one of psychological narcissism, where the world is used as a mirror of the self, because of fear and lack of trust in the Other, and where the self defends itself from fearful relations by creating a false, frequently glamorous, image, behind which a shrinking self lurks. In the extreme versions of this the self slips into a schizoid state of fragmentation, similar to the phenomena

described as the end state of a philosophy based on subjectivism.[28] In both there is no mutuality, no real relationship between self and Other, where the Other, like Echo in the Myth of Narcissus, because Narcissus pays no attention to her, fades away, loses her/its identity; and, because Narcissus has no relation with the Other (Echo), he fuses with, becomes the Other, losing his identity in the form of a flower. In this we see the dialectic of identity being played out in psychological and philosophical terms, showing how and why, as above, the interpersonal terms of love and human relations, those 'positives', should be included in any *philosophical* inquiry about identity, rather than being excluded by those 'negatives' of subject and object in pursuit of an impossible and unnecessary certainty.

I do not deny the genius of Descartes and Wittgenstein, (the later Wittgenstein did much to combat these errors), but they worked within a theory which wants to deny *that which makes this mistake possible,* because it has no coherent place for the everyday world, which I argue the form of the personal, with agency at its heart, fully recognises and is logically necessary in giving it

where action and consequently the ethical, based on love, must have the logical priority.

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Notes

1. John Macmurray, *Persons in Relation*, Humanities Press, 1991, 90-91.
2. Ibid 91.
3. John Macmurray, *Reason and Emotion*, Faber and Faber, 1935, 26.
4. Macmurray, *Persons*, 46.
5. Ibid 60-61.
6. Ibid 61.
7. Ibid 86.
8. Ibid 91.
9. Ibid; my italics.
10. Ibid.
11. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* Routledge, 1974., 5.64.
12. Ibid 6.41.
13. Ibid 5.633.
14. Ibid 5.6331.
15. Ibid 1.11.
16. Ibid 6.432.
17. Ibid 6.44.

Table 1.	
Subjectivity	**Objectivity**
5.64: 'the self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.'	

Table 2.	
Subjectivity	**Objectivity**
	The 'world' of realism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the subjectivity co-ordinated with it.

actual and theoretical form. Consequently these ideas, in isolation and outside any context, must deconstruct into mere phenomena outside of any identity or relations.

These phenomena are the consequence of a perpetual 'withdrawal'

18. Ibid 6.45.

Table 3		
	Subject	**Object**
Value: Transcendental (Not of the World)	The Transcendental Self or 'Metaphysical Subject'	The Transcendental Other or 'Logical Form', the Limits of the World and Language in the *Tractatus.*
Fact, Facticity (The World)	The Factic Self with which Psychology deals.[23]	The Meaningless, Valueless World. E.g. 'In the world everything is as it is … *in it* no value exists.'[24]

19. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Notebooks 1914-1916,* Basil Blackwell, 1961, 7.10.16.
20. Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium,* Paladin, 1970..

without the 'return', whose context would give them meaning. In their proper place, as 'negatives', they make what are useful, even necessary distinctions, but they are not sufficient in the creation of a world,

25. TS Eliot, *Collected Poems* 1909-1962, Faber & Faber, 1963, 222.
26. Ibid 222-223.
27. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 5.64.
28. Ibid.

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INNOCENCE UNDONE: ABANDONING THE METAPHYSICAL NURSERY

Simon Smith

Abstract:

This paper concerns the philosophy of language underpinning the dominant mode of current metaphysical debate: viz. neo-realism. Taking Peter Byrne's 'innocent realism' as archetypal, I contend that his attempts to assimilate empirical and pragmatic gains made by twentieth century philosophers of language cannot succeed. Those gains, I argue, have been seriously misconstrued by an analysis entirely at odds with both their letter and spirit. Byrne's attack on feminist thinkers and other anti-realists is, as a result, equally misguided.

Pursuing this aim exposes the philosophico-psychological foundations of realism, 'innocent' and otherwise. Drawing on Piaget's developmental psychology reveals significant and problematic parallels between the realist's supposedly common sense world-view and the anthropocentric illusions of childhood.

Ultimately, and despite protestations to the contrary, Byrne offers no intelligible account of knowledge acquisition. The demand for an utterly autonomous reality allows the individual no opportunity to discover and construct explanations for experience. In contrast to realists, young and old, this paper concludes by outlining an alternative epistemology, one grounded in the logic of action. Action, as we shall see, is inevitably *inter* action so requires a minimum of two interagents. This overcomes the realist's subject/object dichotomy by relocating exploring agents in a world explored.

Keywords:

Austin Farrer, Jean Piaget, Peter Byrne, Stuart Hampshire, Innocent Realism, Activist Epistemology

By the middle of the twentieth century, the overwhelming inertia of what J. L. Austin once dubbed 'Stone Age metaphysics'[1] was, it seemed, finally overcome. Linguistic pragmatism combined with descriptive metaphysics to offer a more fertile exchange founded on the practical requirements of language and its users. 'Truth' was rebuilt from the conditions of actual usage into the logical grammar of description. Post-modern theories of language thereby realigned subject and object within the descriptive act. The likes of Austin, Strawson, and Wittgenstein had relieved language of a heavy metaphysical burden. Philosophy and theology had finally done with realism.

Peter Byrne, however, has found a 'corrective' to the 'baneful influence of post-modernism'.[2] No resurrection of naïve correspondence, he insists, his 'innocent realism' is enlightened by the empirical gains of those pragmatic theories of language. It is, moreover, a 'critical realism', one which 'stresses the human, limited, fallible character of even those conceptions we regard as true'.[3] Indeed, only a realism critically evolved could refute the 'error-ridden, magical view' of feminist thinkers, like Grace Jantzen, and other anti-realists.[4]

Sad to say, Byrne has misunderstood those empirical and linguistic insights. Not only is his analysis riven with contradiction, but his attack on feminist epistemology is utterly misconceived. Indeed, his *God and Realism* is quite the collection of confusions. Some are inherent in the realist's presuppositions; others are peculiar to Byrne's own formulation. How, for example, he hopes to account for those anthropocentric conditions of knowledge within a description of the world that 'says nothing about how the world appears to us or how it looks from some standpoint or perspective'[5] is difficult to imagine. All talk of a world 'existing ontologically and epistemologically independent of us'[6] necessarily excludes the 'human', the 'limited', and the 'fallible' supposedly accommodated by his new realism.

Despite claims to enlightenment and evolution, innocent realism is, in fact, archetypal: a prime example of the absolutist trend in modern metaphysics which seeks to preserve an untenable ontology alongside an unfathomable epistemology. On one level, then, this article addresses the supposedly 'common-sense' appeal of realism as typified by Byrne, exposing a foundation of confusion and self-contradiction. More than this, however, Byrne's adoption of the epithet 'innocent' proves particularly apt. For on another, perhaps deeper, level this article also exposes the psychological foundations of his 'customary '"Aristotelian"' world-view.[7] Drawing on Jean Piaget's empirical studies in developmental psychology reveals curiously exact parallels between innocent realism and the anthropomorphic world-view of small children.

Resolving these logical, ontological, and psychological difficulties involves a radical departure

from realism of any sort and an even more radical rethink of epistemology. In addition to identifying the most serious failings of innocent and, indeed, all realism, therefore, this article also outlines just such a rethink in the shape of an epistemology of action. Doing so offers significant advantages over the 'passive observer' model favoured by realists, young and old. Not least, it enables philosophy to 'put away childish *things*' (most especially the obsession with *things* and their names) and embark on more grown-up relations with other people. Crucially, moreover, action is inevitably *inter*action, so requires a minimum of two *inter*agents. This, it shall be argued, overcomes the realists' central subject/object dichotomy by relocating exploring agents in a world explored.

It is worth noting, to begin with, that Byrne himself hopes to bypass this particular issue by (allegedly) supplying empirical grounds for realism. The innocent isolation of subject and object, he argues, reflects 'the content of our empirical claims'.[8] Since those claims do not 'speak about how the world looks from a human perspective', Byrne concludes that the world is 'for the most part independent of us and our representations'. From this follows the realist's founding premise: 'how we say things are is one thing, how things really are is another'.[9] Thus, innocent realism cheerfully accepts 'the logical possibility that our judgements about the world are mistaken'.[10] That is an understatement. The truth is, as a monk once told a saint, 'how we say things are' is not at all a reliable guide to what things actually, or necessarily, are.

This is the heart of the realist's confusion. He conceives 'subject' and 'object' as closed categories, mutually exclusive by definition. Knowing subjects are thereby separated from objects known; the world exists apart from us and our knowledge of it. Such distinctions express a deep-seated metaphysical fear. Fail to maintain them and the claim that 'human symbolising constructs reality' prevails.[11] Such a 'magical view of the relation between words/ideas and things' is 'not so much childlike but childish'. According to Byrne, only realism preserves us from infantile fantasy.

For realism to make sense, logical, ontological, and epistemological isolation must somehow allow us to describe this 'structured, mind-independent world'.[12] The question is 'how?' A mind- and language-independent reality is, surely by definition, beyond our epistemic reach. Somewhat blithely, Byrne accepts the difficulty but not the implications. No allegation of existence can coherently be affirmed or denied since the basic condition of knowledge is absent: viz. the knowing subject. This

supposedly 'minimal' claim of innocent realism is compatible with (we should say almost equivalent to) 'the belief that we know nothing about that part of the world existing independently of us.'[13] This, however, raises Wittgenstein's question: 'if you admit that you haven't any notion of what kind of thing he has before him—then what leads you into saying…that he has something before him?'[14] The realist cannot answer for, as Byrne admits, 'we only know the world as it appears to us, but not as it is in itself'.[15]

Restricting us to talk about appearances, realism surrenders any claim to intelligible reference. Appearances are not logically or epistemologically robust enough to support ordinary existential claims. In themselves, appearances lack the means by which we may legitimately connect one with another; those means lie in the identity of what appears. Without a connection, however, we cannot make the most basic object references. We cannot identify an object at different times or distinguish one from another. As Stuart Hampshire reminds us, 'we always need to attach a sense to "the same so-and-so", where the same so-and-so can be a constant object of reference in a succession of statements'.[16] If we are to find our way around our environment, then we must be able to identify and re-identify particular things. Even the simple act of counting objects is only possible if we have the means to repeatedly distinguish one from another.

Hampshire called these basic principles of differentiation 'necessities of discourse'.[17] Without them, we are unable to identify particular objects. Consequently, every statement would be of the most 'unrestricted general' kind; and this, he observed, 'is a self-contradictory hypothesis'.[18] Utterly unrestricted statements necessarily include all possible references; they are, therefore, logically equivalent to statements including no references at all.

Furthermore, being unable to identify the same thing at different times and from different perspectives, we also lack the 'means of deciding whether the same thing is being referred to or whether the topic has changed'.[19] That, in turn, makes it impossible to contradict any statement, thereby eliminating any meaningful distinction between true and false, reality and illusion.

None of this is news to the realist; such considerations underpin his belief that '[h]ow the world is is one thing; how we represent it to ourselves is another'.[20] The distinction between reality and representation is essential if we are to have any conception *of* reality. According to Byrne, this means that a true description of the world 'says

nothing about how the world appears to us or how it looks from some standpoint or perspective'.[21] On realist premises, however, no such description is available.

Byrne coyly terms this 'a minimally dualist view',[22] seemingly unaware that his real problem is not so much the *size* of the gap as the *fact* of it. Any bridge across it requires a logically necessary connection between word and world, for nothing else could reconcile the realist's repudiation of knowledge of independent reals with his insistence that appearances are appearances of what they appear to be. Byrne's confident rebuttal of naïve correspondence was, it seems, too hasty. Unfortunately, any appeal to entailment relations is out of bounds. Innocent realism stands on empirical, not logical, grounds. Being products of experience, those grounds are a matter of probability. If the evidence is strong, the probability of any claim being true may be exceedingly high. That is the most we can hope for and it is a long way from entailment. Without a stronger connection, Byrne lacks the terms needed to distinguish between experience and its putative objects. If the distinction cannot be made, then innocent realism risks collapsing into the conceptual constructivism it claims to refute.

Byrne, however, is clearly a risk-taker: 'we cannot,' he insists, 'but rely on our language to make that distinction'.[23] Finding a piece of flint in his garden, he agrees that some linguistic resources are essential to its identification; yet it remains ontologically and epistemologically independent for all that. 'If the piece of hard stuff really is a flint and if it really contains a fossil ammonite, then this true of the flint-in-itself'.[24] Having admitted that we know nothing about the world-in-itself, the question is, 'what makes him think this *is* 'flint-in-itself'?' His answer is simple: '[h]ow the flint appeared to me is how the flint truly is—how the flint would have been if there had never been any human beings'. So much for the vital distinction between appearance and reality. 'Conceptualised flint is the same as unconceptualised flint'. But without some cognisable or recognisable difference, we have no reason for supposing that 'unconceptualised flint' is anything at all.

What the philosopher finds problematic seems oddly familiar to the psychologist. There is a striking resemblance between philosophical realism and the basic metaphysics of children. As Jean Piaget's studies demonstrate, children under ten or eleven years old are the archetypal innocent realists. Like Byrne, they commonly confuse 'the sign and the thing signified, the thought and the thing thought of'.[25] Where Byrne detects no difference between

'conceptualised' and 'unconceptualised' flint, likewise the child 'cannot distinguish a real house…from the concept or mental image or name of the house'. Such distinctions evaporate under the pressure of entailment relations: 'to the child's eye every object seems to possess a necessary and absolute name, that is to say, *one which is a part of the object's very nature*'.[26] The necessary correspondence of word and world makes the name part of the thing, assimilating referring acts to the referent. Philosophically, this is essential for nothing else supports the claim to know what 'would have been if there had never been any human beings'. Psychologically, a kind of 'objectification' of action underpins it. To the realist mind, acts which identify objects are merely 'symbols or signs in the same way as words, names, or images' so must belong to 'the nature of the thing signified'.[27] This can be traced back to the inherent literalism of both adult and child realists: words— and actions—mean exactly what they say and nothing more.

The ontological isolation of word from world cuts against psychological grain of realism. It also faces serious logical difficulties for it can only be made *within* the language it claims to escape. Realism supposedly refers to things as they are in-themselves, apart from any reference. Thus, Byrne insists '[i]t would actually make sense to say of me that I had seen and noticed the fossils even if I had no way of describing them as such'. Either this is a matter of vocabulary, rather than ontology, or Byrne has landed innocent realism in the most glaring self-contradiction. If it makes sense to *say* such a thing, then there must be someone to *say* it, otherwise the claim is unintelligible. To make the ontological point, however, we must relinquish any and all reference to the object. It must make sense to say that he had 'seen and noticed the fossils' even if there was *no way at all* 'of describing them as such'. Clearly, however, it does not. For then his claim would read: 'it would actually make sense to say of me that I had seen and noticed…'. The rest is redundant because '…' stands for that which cannot be identified for lack of linguistic resources.

With no one to make such claims and no words in which to make them, Byrne is an innocent in ontological exile. Childlike, the realist remains unconscious of himself and his role in knowing acts. This, Piaget notes, leaves him 'prey to perpetual confusions between objective and subjective, between the real and the ostensible'.[28] Confusion is inevitable: rejecting the latter vitiates any possibility of cogently distinguishing the former from his own point of view. Objectivity is impossible: appearance, reality, and illusion freely mix, being logically and

psychologically inseparable. Thought that 'has not become conscious of self…values the entire content of consciousness on a single plane in which ostensible realities and the unconscious interventions of the self are inextricably mixed'. To grasp objectivity, one must *recognise* and *account for* 'the countless intrusions of the self in everyday thought and the countless illusions which result—illusions of sense, language, point of view, value, etc.'. Objectivity is, therefore, preceded by 'the effort to exclude the intrusive self'.

Realism imagines itself predicated on just this sort of effort. Instead of recognising and excluding, however, the realist simply ignores the presence of the self in knowing acts. On realist premises, this is perfectly legitimate since the self is not involved in knowing and is, moreover, ontologically isolated from other subjects and objects known. Ignoring the self, the realist declares his own perspective—the only one to which he has access—'immediately objective and absolute'.[29] Realism is, thus, the 'anthropocentric illusion' *par excellence*. So much is evident from that other well-known act of realist ego-inflation: psychological project garbed as transcendental posturing that philosophers know as 'the God's Eye View'.

According to Byrne, however, we are mistaken. Innocent realism stakes no claim to that 'stance of pretended transcendence…in which we thought we had, quite impossibly, stepped outside our language'.[30] Rather, he explains, such pretensions belong to the 'standard relativist package' which innocent realism refutes. Both pretension and its erroneous attribution to realism are common failings of feminist philosophy. Grace Jantzen, it seems, is a particular culprit, as demonstrated by her critique of the classical rationalist's 'universal voice'.[31]

By rejecting transcendental objectivism, Byrne argues, Jantzen herself transcends the very relativism she supposedly upholds. This is because her objections are 'only cogent in argument if they themselves are spoken with a universal voice'.[32] Lamenting the confusion that seemingly besets feminist thinkers, he cites Jantzen's (provocatively dubbed) 'holy truth'. '[W]e cannot [she argues] escape our cultural and linguistic web to stand in some place from which objective knowledge can be obtained'.[33] If true, Jantzen's claim must be objectively true. The claim itself is, therefore, internally inconsistent. Its utterance indicts the speaker of the very conceit she claims to rebut.

Byrne's failure to understand Jantzen's critique is likely due to a confusion of 'true' and 'real'. This is a consequence of the correspondence theory of language on which realism ultimately rests

(protestations to the contrary notwithstanding). On realist premises, as suggested, words name things: *unum nomen, unum nominatum.*[34] Like Piaget's child-subjects, the realist is 'excessively concerned with things'; he is 'concerned solely with the imitation of what is'. Being 'indifferent to the life of thought' the 'originality of individual points of view escapes him'[35] along with all logical compatibility. For Byrne, therefore, Jantzen's assertion must be ontological, nominating some mind-independent state of affairs; mind-dependent states of affairs cannot qualify for objectivity and realism admits no third option. It is, however, difficult to see what mind-independent state of affairs Jantzen might be referring to; knowledge cannot be independent of minds that know it.

Evidently, however, Jantzen's claim is logical and epistemological, not ontological. It concerns the coherence of claiming to go 'beyond' all conceivable experience. Hence, what Byrne hears is not a 'universal voice' but the sound of a pragmatic mandate for intelligible talk about the world. As Austin Farrer pointed out, we cannot meaningfully 'talk about types of things, about which we can do nothing but talk',[36] for we cannot claim to know what is beyond our epistemic reach. Any such talk is, therefore, logically and epistemologically empty.

Seemingly oblivious to this, Byrne 'exposes' Jantzen's alleged confusion by usurping her position. Being culturally and linguistically located, he argues, Jantzen's 'holy truth' is inevitably 'truth-from-a-standpoint'. Surely, he suggests, 'it can after all be true from the standpoint of wicked, oppressive, patriarchal epistemologists that… there are "dislocated" subjects who can speak with a universal voice'.[37] This, however, misses the point. It is not a question of whether rationalist epistemology is true or false; it is a question of whether or not it is coherent. Byrne may be right to insist that '[s]o long as wicked, oppressive patriarchal epistemologists are consistent, they cannot be refuted'. The problem is that objective knowledge which excludes any and all reference to knowing subjects is anything but. We cannot even allow Byrne the luxury of 'rampant scepticism' (compatible with innocent realism as it may be).[38] For the sceptic is only a pugnacious agnostic: doubt does not entail denial. Thus, as Ayer might remind us, he who doubts the empirical reality of a 'universal voice' still attempts to talk intelligibly about it. There's the rub: the unintelligibility of the construct rules out such talk.

Nevertheless, we might concede something to Byrne. In one important sense he is right to insist that any 'serious attempt to expose what is relative to some group or limited outlook in a way of thinking,

can only end up confirming something that is universal and objective'.[39] The question is, are 'universality' and 'objectivity' synonymous with 'mind-independence' and Byrne's 'absolute non-perspectival truth'.[40] That 'a single man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife' is, we are advised, 'a truth universally acknowledged'.[41] If Jane Austin was right about this, then her claim, like Jantzen's, is 'true for anyone any time'.[42] It could not, of course, be true even if 'there had never been any human beings'.[43] Otherwise put, realism retails truth, not *for all* perspectives, but *apart from any*: its truth is true, not for everyone everywhere, but for no one nowhere.

Objective truth is indeed 'true for anyone any time'. This is achievable insofar as we can distinguish between our descriptions and the things described. Being, by his own admission, epistemically and psychologically restricted to 'the world as it appears to us, but not as it is in itself',[44] this distinction is inaccessible to Byrne. It cannot be made either as a matter of ontological or empirical practice without isolating knowing subjects from the world they claim to know. If we cannot make the distinction in practice, then we must make it in theory. This, after all, is how that paradigm of objectivity, scientific knowledge, works. Scientists do not simply record observations of their environment. As Hume well knew, such observations would refer only to sequences of phenomena without logical or causal connection. With nothing but observation to go on, systematic study would be hamstrung by the immediacy of every experience. Without a theoretical framework, that is, science would suffer the same epistemic fate as realism. It could offer access to nothing but disconnected appearances, random data series, from which no rule or law could be derived.

Scientists do not record whatever phenomena cross their path any more than they observe just anything and everything. Their choice of a field of enquiry is inevitably theory-laden. It delimits the phenomena that count as relevant—and therefore real—and how they should be counted. Vast swathes of human experience, much of which might ordinarily be regarded as indicating 'truth' or 'reality', are thereby ruled out. Such limitations are essential if the enquiry is to free itself of the realist's 'anthropocentric illusion'. We may rule out, for example, suggestions that the forces constituting physical reality act purposefully or that they express emotional attraction. Whitehead's baroque cosmology notwithstanding, such animistic claims are unlikely to be accepted in the current scientific climate.

Animism is another vital component of the child's psychology (and, by the strongest possible implication, of realism as a whole). Furthermore, Piaget suggests, its gradual abandonment is itself a theoretical, rather than an empirical matter. Neither observation nor 'direct experiment can possibly lead the child to the discovery that a movement is not conscious'.[45] This is because the ascription of consciousness to anything is predicated directly on the child's experience of her environment: the (almost) universal belief held by children that the moon follows them is grounded in repeated observations. Consciousness is a corollary of movement because the child regards all movement as purposive.[46] The discovery of 'bodies whose movement is not self-governed' cannot be empirically verified by so unsophisticated a mind. Children are in no position to disprove the evidence of their senses. If the moon appears to follow them, it is because it does; and if it does, it evidently has some purpose in doing so. What empirical evidence, what experiment, could prove otherwise? More importantly, perhaps, experiment is a matter of controlled interference with one's environment. It presupposes a prior understanding of the distinction between oneself and the world, one's own movements and those of other bodies. But that is precisely what the child/realist lacks.

Evidently, then, the waning of animist beliefs cannot result from 'wider knowledge nor from a developed ability to control circumstances nor from experimentation'.[47] 'Only a qualitative development of the child's mind can lead it to abandon animism'. He requires, in other words, a new theoretical framework within which to interpret his experience.[48] For the child (but not necessarily the realist) this results from the dawning awareness of his own subjectivity. Thus, 'as the child becomes clearly aware of personality in himself, he refuses to allow personality to things'; 'as he realises his own subjective activity and its inexhaustible scope, he refuses to allow self-consciousness to things'.[49]

Indeed, this process is not only found in the development of child psychology. As the scientist and philosopher, Michael Polanyi, shows, theoretical shifts are central to the development and history of science. From Newton to Einstein, scientific progress has more often followed 'the reconsideration of known phenomena in a new context which was felt to be more rational and more real'[50] than the discovery of new evidence. Like the child, the scientist undergoes 'a radical change in the habits of mind',[51] sees old evidence in a new light.

The more systematically a theory can be stated, the more reason we have for believing it will retail

objective facts.[52] Theories cannot be mind-independent, but they can be 'set out on paper as a system of rules' and so universally evaluated and accepted. Indeed, Polanyi argues, 'the more completely…[a theory] can be put down in such terms', the more consistent a guide it will be for organising and evaluating experience.

A system of rules can be applied by anyone irrespective of their circumstances (within obvious limits). It disregards 'one's normal approach to experience' because it is 'unaffected by the state of the person accepting it'.[53] Unlike their users, therefore, theories cannot be confused or deluded, only more or less accurate. Their application may be 'led astray by…[one's] personal illusions', but the theory remains 'right or wrong in itself, impersonally'. This is because a system of rules instantiates the crucial distinction between how things appear to the individual and how things really are. Standing 'between our senses and the things of which our senses otherwise would have gained a more immediate impression', those rules systematically regulate the interpretation of those impressions. Put simply, theories are objective because they are 'other than myself'. They abstract from and thereby overcome the limitations, the sheer immediacy, of ordinary empirical experience. That abstraction is neither ontological nor empirical: it cannot be a matter of existence or experience. It is only possible, and indeed meaningful, in theory.

It is also, Polanyi reminds us, what enabled Copernicus to evict humanity from its traditional place at the centre of the universe. Exchanging 'his actual terrestrial station for an imaginary solar standpoint' meant giving 'preference to man's delight in abstract theory'.[54] However, this astronomical shift from geocentric to heliocentric ran utterly against the grain of empirical observation. It denied 'the evidence of our senses, which present us with the irresistible fact of the sun, the moon, and the stars rising daily in the east to travel across the sky towards their setting in the west'. Copernicus relied on mathematical calculations rather than his senses, calculations that supplied a framework within which the evidence is properly understood.

This marks the crucial difference between Byrne and Jantzen. Byrne relies on a superficial reading of empirical claims and (confusingly, for a realist) the evidence of his senses. He sees clearly that real things are not made of words. The fossils in his garden have nothing to do with 'the state of English in the United Kingdom'; English 'did not create…fossils, or raise some of these fossils to the surface soil in this part of the British Isles'.[55] Language is not a 'fact factory'. He has, just as clearly, misunderstood how archaeological theories work. That they do not, we are reminded, explicitly mention archaeologists, shows that they are to be understood and applied universally.[56] In the words of a more pragmatic thinker, 'knowledge is necessarily subject oriented. It is always the function of some inquisitive mind'.[57] The theory to which concepts like 'fossil' belong is a co-efficient of the theorising archaeologist.

Jantzen does the opposite: rebutting the transcendentalist presumptions of rationalism-cum-realism is part of a theory of language and knowledge. That theory stakes its claim to objectivity, universal acknowledgement.

The real question concerns the compatibility of this with her insistence that 'our cultural and linguistic web' is inescapable. The arguments comprising her theory are not mind-independent or 'non-perspectivally' objective. They are functions of an enquiry, so imply the perspective of the enquirer. Enquirers are socially and culturally located, as their education and capacity for language-use eloquently testifies.[58] Language and thought are, moreover, shaped by social, cultural, political, and even philosophical, pressures. The analytic tools we choose are not neutral; they reflect whole histories of human thought. That is what makes them useful. Further, the histories and traditions of the disciplines to which we have each been apprenticed supply the values and ideals that guide our enquiries. They teach us, in other words, what it is and what it means to undertake the search for knowledge, truth, reality, and so on.

We may, then, concede the point; but we must not overstate it as, perhaps, Jantzen does. That much to Byrne. Her claims do not obviously concern the cultural framework in which they were constructed. They are logically (and metaphysically) basic: the starting point for cogent enquiry. Although not, perhaps, as mathematically exact as Copernicus', their rules can be stated. The principle of non-contradiction is most obvious; and the adequate logical conditions for epistemic and linguistic acts are simple enough. Deeds presuppose a doer: knowledge requires a knower; description, a describer. *Nota bene*, the conditions are *adequate*, not *necessary*; the relation between the terms cannot be made watertight (as realists suppose). Each term is the minimum required for making sense of its correlate.[59] These rules belie the crude egocentricity of immediate experience: we do not, according to (academic) convention, refer to the individual enquirer in our articles but it does not follow that *I* am not right *here* writing this. Rules supply a cognitive framework within which our explorations

may be recognised and analysed; conventions supply a framework within which those things may be coherently communicated to others. Their application is, therefore, universal insofar as it takes no account of the circumstances, situation, or state of anyone choosing to apply them. Hence, we can say with Polanyi, that the importance of these frameworks 'is not a matter of personal taste on our [or Jantzen's] part, but an inherent quality deserving universal acceptance by rational creatures'.[60]

In fact, the theory of language that Byrne lays claim to—as opposed to his unacknowledged correspondence-theory—is *almost* compatible with this understanding of objectivity. Rebutting accusations of isolationism, he begins by locating the enquirer in 'a human community'.[61] We have all, he notes, been 'initiated' into this community and its 'epistemic resources'. The socio-political implications of this, along with the logical and epistemic limitations (identified by feminist thinkers like Jantzen) seem to escape him, however. For Byrne, it does not follow that 'there is no way we could ever discover a real intelligible world-order independent of us'. In fact, 'we can distinguish between true and false judgements' about this independent reality 'because we use the community's resources to investigate the world'. This attempt to mitigate his 'minimal dualism' and the 'rampant scepticism' in which it results may strike Byrne as the merest common sense. The central inference, however, is clearly faulty: wherever our 'resources' come from, it does not follow from our use of them that the object of our investigations is ontologically or epistemologically independent.

Having decried the childishness of post-modernism,[62] Byrne is not above appropriating its more valuable insights. He finds logical leverage for doing so in a Kantian (and, of course, Wittgenstinian) insight: 'experience [he concedes] is concept-laden'.[63] Apparently the integration of subjective experience and ontology no longer precipitates the inevitable slide from 'sensible, arguable positions,'[64] like innocent realism, into sheer conceptual construction. So the realist pendulum swings back from what there is to what we know. Our epistemic resources 'determine how we experience, and what we know of, the world because our concepts act like nets or filters'.[65] Hence, what we know of reality is entirely conditioned by our conceptual 'filters'. They determine the 'character' of experience and our interpretations of it. Indeed, we are only aware of the 'structure and the ontology' of reality 'because of our conceptualising'.

Granting that concepts 'filter what we experience', Byrne demurs: '[i]t does not follow that facts, objects and states of affairs are conceptual creations'.[66] We use our 'filters' to single out the ontologically and epistemologically independent features of the world. Put simply, language 'captures' reality as a net captures fish. Just as fishing nets determine what will be captured and what will not, so the 'only portions of the real world we will be able to notice are the ones which our [conceptual] apparatus allows us to notice'. To suppose, therefore, that our 'filters' thereby create the 'objects and qualities, facts and events' that we experience would be as absurd as imagining that the fisherman's nets create his catch.

There is something distinctly fishy here; but there is nothing absurd about it. The claim that a 'catch' is not created by the apparatus designed to 'catch' it, on the other hand, is nonsensical. Whether our nets are literal or linguistic, nothing outside of them could conceivably count as a 'catch'; all the fish in the sea and facts in the world cannot meaningfully be described as such. Without a net of some sort, fish and facts alike are logically indeterminate: not independent but utterly unknown; in Farrer's words, 'an X absolutely undefined'.[67] Consequently, we cannot say *what* this 'uncaught catch' may be: 'the snort of a hippopotamus or the left great toe of an archangel or the taste of asparagus'. *Sans* specificity, putative reference offers no purchase for even the barest existential claim. In short, as long as it remains uncaught, we cannot reasonably assert *that* it is, let alone *what* it is.

Furthermore, according to Quine's predicate rule, logical indeterminacy issues in ontological indeterminacy. An 'uncaught catch' lacks predicable possibility; as Farrer observed, it is not 'anything rather than anything else'.[68] It—whatever 'it' is—literally defies description: it 'has no unit; it is no more whole than part, nor part than whole, no more one than many, nor many than one'. Consequently, neither can it be cogently identified: it 'is no more 'it' than 'they', nor 'they' than 'it'; it/*they* is/*are* that/*those* in which all such distinctions equally lie'. But now the realist has gone too far. A reference which contains all possible distinctions is, again, equivalent to one that contains none at all. Yielding no particular distinction, 'it' tells us literally nothing.

So much for Byrne's filter theory. Despite its apparent compatibility with our theory-bound conception of objectivity, fundamental differences evidently remain. Having drawn on Wittgenstinian insights into word-world relations, Byrne must hold out for the logical indifference of (allegedly) innocent reference. Exploring the world still involves giving

'meanings to the terms of a theory' about it.[69] Our theory thereby 'becomes comprehensible and can be used to make definite statements about the world'. On realist premises, our terms are defined *a priori*, in isolation from the world we hope to explore. What happens next is out of our hands. Having cast our conceptual net upon the waters of reality, we must wait and see what it dredges up. For 'whether the terms of a theory refer to anything and whether its claims are true…depends on the world'. Ontological distance must be maintained, for any concrete connection between concepts and objects will destabilise innocent realism. Back on solid ground, Byrne insists '[w]e give meaning to the term "igneous rock"…it is up to the world what things, if any, are igneous rocks'.

The idea that we define the terms of our theory in abstraction from the world it allegedly describes seems odd. The word 'igneous' is hardly abstract; it refers, quite concretely, to rock derived from magma. Exactly how geologists might identify those properties without some experience of volcanic rock is difficult to imagine. Apart from the confrontation between rocks and the descriptive requirements of geologists, there are no grounds for constructing concepts like 'igneous'. Indeed, apart from any application to reality, there is no reason to construct a 'filter' of any kind. It seems, moreover, that there is nothing to prevent any such theory from being ontologically empty. We have no guarantee that the world will supply the required object referents; and apart from experience we have no good reason to suppose it might. Without some systematic and ongoing connection between theory and experience, any correspondence of reference and referent that we do discover must seem like nothing short of dumb luck.

That connection is something the realist, however innocent, cannot supply, for it cannot be anything but the exploratory activities of knowing agents. Neither passive observation nor pure cogitation will do and that is all the realist has to offer. Without reference to the world of our experience, the latter is, again, ontologically empty. At best, it means that 'real' is what our theories talk about or, in traditional parlance, anything of which we have a clear and distinct idea. Passive observation, on the other hand, retails nothing but appearances. Being referentially incomplete, appearances alone are epistemically inadequate. As Hampshire observed, '[t]hat something looks like to me exactly like a horse is often strong, but never by itself conclusive, evidence that it is a horse'.[70] Rather, 'the nature of the object itself is determined by the range of its possible manipulations'. Thus, evidence of a horse is found,

not by looking, but by riding, feeding, and, perhaps most conclusively, mucking out the stables afterwards.

Action is the key to overcoming realist innocence. As any educator will testify, we learn most and best by participation: exploration is a matter of controlled interference. Knowledge, as Farrer showed, is a product of our involvement in the processes that we are investigating; if we can 'neither stimulate, direct, modify nor neutralise'[71] those processes, then we cannot really be said to understand them. Hence, Farrer identified touch as 'the primitive sense'[72] because touch entails contact. That, Hampshire agreed, supplies the 'natural criterion of physical reality'.[73] Seeing may well be believing 'but contact is knowledge'.[74] If it is to have any empirical purchase at all, metaphysics must honour the demands of physics. Of course, '[p]hysics is not concerned with the way things look, but the way they act; and the method of physical discovery is physical interference, so it issues in control'.

Farrer dubbed this his 'causal solution'[75] to ontological isolation. It means the world is known and experienced as a field of exploratory action, 'as the playground of human thews and human thoughts'.[76] Real things are only accessible as features of that playground, as they 'disturb and diversify'[77] my field of activity. '[W]e know things as they condition or affect our vital operation';[78] they are recognisable by the 'imprint' they leave on our explorations.

This takes the argument a step further. If action is the key to knowledge, it is because action is always *inter*action. There is, Farrer reminds us, no action *in vacuo*.[79] Every movement requires some relatively stable reference point against which it is delineated *as* movement. Pointing to one object requires at least two: the body marking the location from which the reference is made and the object referred to. It is only in (and *as* the) relation to these two positions that any act of pointing can be performed. Even the simplest acts require a suitable environment. Only the friction between surfaces—feet and floor—makes walking possible; and talking requires the air we breathe and all the objects around us to reflect the sound.

This alters the course of metaphysics. If real things are known as ingredients in some interaction-event, it is because real things *are* interactive agencies. What something is, depends on what 'it' can do or what I can do with 'it'. The existence of anything is expressed or actualised in its 'interference capabilities' or 'disturbance- effect'.[80] Extending Hampshire's point, we can say that appearances are just not only epistemically but also

ontologically insufficient. Farrer put it simply: '*ESSE* is not *PERCIPI*, *ESSE* is *OPERARI*, and an *operatio*, *energia*, has a plurality of elements to it'.[81] Actual operations conduce to co-operative effects; as a 'plurality of elements', *energia* enacts the concrete combination of inter-agents. To be an agency of any cognisable or recognisable sort is to participate in the mutual interplay of patterns of activity. More simply, the world is not made up of discrete reals or independent entities, as realism claims, but is a complex manifold of interconnected processes and systems. This explains how Byrne's conceptual net really works: not by being prefabricated and certainly not by randomly dredging the seas of reality. Language is formed under the pressure of real existence, *in and as* the interplay of action-patterns, one feature of that manifold. Here is the point of practical application for any theory: theory without practice is pointless; practice without theory is meaningless. Reiterating his pragmatic mandate, therefore, Farrer insisted 'no thought about any reality about which we can do nothing but think'.[82] To count as real, reality must offer some interactive potential.

Hence, action always presupposes at least two inter-agents. That is the adequate logical condition required for making sense of anything *as* action. Once again, the logical condition is *adequate*, not necessary, so allows for the possibility of mistakes, hallucinations, illusions etc. Crucially, however, I could not walk or talk (or type) without the other agencies those actions presuppose. As Farrer put it, 'interaction with 'nature' is part and parcel of our action itself'.[83]

Epistemically speaking, the point is anti-reductive. Other agencies cannot be reduced to my experience of them since that defeats the logic of action. If, Farrer observed, I am the object of action, then I must suppose that *something* acts; likewise, 'if I interact with something, something interacts with me'. This does not, however, conduce to realist independence. Apart from some interaction, I have no notion of what might or might not exist; hence, I have no way of knowing what anything is or is not *in itself*. Without the grounds for knowing, there is no reason for making the existence claim. Neither reductive identity nor inflationary independence then; instead, this supplies the concrete re-connection of subject and object.

Seeking knowledge (of any kind) presupposes a world that is logically and ontologically congruent with acts of exploration. Our immediate experience is of 'being up against' other existents that are only known as being '*in pari materia* with our own activity and being'.[84] Farrer's 'Latin tag' (as Charles

Conti put it) means 'that 'mind' is a logical extension of world and 'world' an ontological construction of mind'.[85] Knowing subjects are 'logically co-terminus' with objects known. The distinction between them is grounded, not in radical discontinuity, as realism demands, nor in reduction as it fears, but in concrete correlation. It depends on the fundamental difference between my interferences with my environment and its reciprocal interferences with me. To differentiate between what I do and what is done to me is something I cannot help but do. Deny this and it becomes impossible to see how I could identify anything at all, including myself.[86] I would be unable to distinguish my point of view from any other because I would be unable to adopt one position in relation to anything else rather than another. Even if I was physically paralysed, I should still have to direct my attention somehow, focus on this or that feature of my environment, thereby locating myself in relation to whatever I focused upon. If I cannot adopt or locate my position, then I have lost a vital clue to my own existence. I would have no way of knowing where I was and no way of knowing whether any experiences I appeared to have were real or illusory. That too, is a legacy of realism, as Jantzen is evidently aware. Her rejection of the 'universal voice' is grounded in its abstraction from a social *and* physical context. It transforms knowing subjects into 'disembodied and unsituated minds'.[87] But the very idea is incomprehensible; to be actively bodied forth and, therefore, in some particular situation is a basic presupposition of any and all knowledge, including knowledge of one's self.

Innocent or not, this revival of Descartes' ego-isolationism heralds the final collapse of realism. For here, realism coincides with its own contradiction in anti-realism. Realist and anti-realist alike have access to nothing but the contents of consciousness isolated: representations which are supposed, somehow, to signify reality. This coincidence, and the transformation which precipitates it, is not strictly philosophical insofar as it is (as I have argued) neither justifiable nor intelligible. It is a psychological move, and a regressive one at that. 'Innocence' signifies less a chaste objectivism, free of contaminating subjectivity, and more a psychologically underdeveloped philosophy grounded in an immature theory of language that remains obsessed with *things*. It is hardly surprising that such 'phal-logo-centrism' caught the eye of a feminist thinker like Jantzen. [88] To give that underdeveloped philosophy its proper due, however, we must only recall the striking resemblance between innocent realism and the child's metaphysics.

We have already seen the shared inability to distinguish between representations of the world and the world as it 'really' is. The innocent begins 'by regarding his own point of view as absolute…. [T]hings are always as he actually sees them and independent of perspective, distance, etc.'.[89] We have also seen the shared illusion of perfect self-awareness in which, the realist (young and old) 'must suppose he is aware of everything that happens to him'.[90] Underpinning these factors is the essential egocentricity of the realist who is unable to distinguish between himself and the world, between what he does and what happens to him. 'Insofar as he ignores that his own point of view is subjective, he believes himself the centre of the world'.[91] This 'absence of all knowledge of self or the incapacity to distinguish the activity of the thinking subject' births the realist mind.[92] Psychologically speaking, realism is nothing but 'the fact of being unable to distinguish the part played by one's own perspective in one's conception of object'. It is this which leaves both the philosopher and the child 'unable to distinguish the subjective from the objective'.

Having boldly accused detractors of a childish belief in magic, Byrne himself has, like all realists, returned to the metaphysical comforts of the nursery. Underlying the magical supposition that 'what we do with our symbols can change reality',[93] is the psychological truth that magic is the 'attachment of the sign to the reality'.[94] Philosophically, this attachment issues in correspondence: the realist's foundational construct. Thus, the philosophical realist clings to childish fantasies of over-cultivated innocence and egocentricity. That leaves him unable to recognise or account for the complicated nature of adult enquiry and knowledge. If metaphysics is to grow up, however, a significantly more mature understanding of both philosophy and psychology is essential. That maturity, as I have attempted to show, may be found, not in innocent isolation, but in grappling bodily with the interactions and interpenetrations of real life.

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Notes

1. J. L. Austin, 'A Plea For Excuses' in *Philosophical Papers*, ed. J. O. Urmson & G. J. Warnock (Oxford: Clarendon 1961), 133.
2. Peter Byrne, *God and Realism* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), x.
3. Byrne, 71. Byrne derives this 'accommodationist' premise from John Hick's critique of naïve realism in *An Interpretation of Religion* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989).
4. Byrne, 108.
5. Byrne, 40.
6. Byrne, 8.
7. Byrne, 59.
8. This and next, Byrne, 40.
9. Byrne, 115.
10. Byrne, 77.
11. This and next, Byrne, 32, 111. The metaphysical fear underpinning realism is a fear of non-being. As Sartre—in psychological mode—argues, being *essentially* insecure, realist consciousness conceives itself as a 'flickering, unstable, semi-transparent moment-to-moment "being".' The contrast between the guttering candlelight of consciousness and the 'solid, opaque, inert "in-themselves-ness" of *things* which simply are what they are' is unavoidable. It offers the realist his hearts desire, his only chance of *real* existence. This, Iris Murdoch avers, is the 'condition of perfect stability and completion towards which [consciousness] aspires.' See Iris Murdoch, *Sartre* (London: The Fontana Library, 1967. 62-64.
12. Byrne, 7.
13. Byrne, 44.
14. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), 100.
15. Byrne, 69.
16. Stuart Hampshire, *Thought and Action* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame,1983. 16.

17. Hampshire, 14.
18. Hampshire, 18.
19. Hampshire, 16.
20. Hampshire, 16.
21. Byrne, 40.
22. See Byrne, 35; also 71: 'Realism thus enforces a gap between mind and reality.'
23. For this and next, see Byrne, 65.
24. This and next, Byrne, 118.
25. Jean Piaget, *The Child's Conception of the World*, trans. Joan and Andrew Tomlinson (St. Albans: Granada, 1982), 71.
26. Piaget, 71; emphasis added.
27. Piaget 178. See also M. Luquet on children's drawings: 'The addition of a title has we consider no other meaning than that of expressing the name of the object, which is regarded by the designer as a property inherent in its essence and as worthy of being reproduced as its visual characteristics', *Journal de Psychologie*, 1922, 207; quoted in Piaget, 71-2.
28. This and next, Piaget, 45-6.
29. Piaget, 46.
30. This and next, Byrne, 39.
31. See Byrne, 118-125.
32. This and next, Byrne, 123.
33. Grace Jantzen, *Becoming Divine* (Manchester University Press, 1998), 188.
34. J. L. Austin, 'Are there *A Priori* Concepts?', in *Philosophical Papers*, ed. J. O. Urmson & G. J. Warnock (Oxford: Clarendon 1961), 7.
35. Piaget, 45.
36. Austin Farrer, *Finite and Infinite* (Westminster: Dacre, 1959), 74.
37. Byrne, 123.
38. Byrne, 44.
39. Byrne, 124.
40. Byrne, 40.
41. Jane Austin, *Pride and Prejudice* (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 1.
42. Byrne, 124.
43. Byrne, 118.
44. Byrne, 69.
45. Piaget, 269.
46. For Byrne, the 'objective order' of reality (Byrne, 134. is not only purposive, however; it contains real, i.e. 'non-perspectival', evil. Confusingly, this 'objective order' also constitutes the physical furniture of the world: 'chalk escarpments, oxygen, Scottish lochs and planets', (Byrne, 67).
47. This and next, Piaget, 269.
48. Hence the well-known difficulties faced by popular atheists such as Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens when attempting to convert the religious and the superstitious. Our theoretical frameworks and the presuppositions underpinning them are never independently self-evident or self-justifying. See Michael Polanyi, *Science, Faith and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 25.
49. Piaget, 269-70.
50. Polanyi, *Science, Faith and Society*, 28.
51. Piaget, 269. Cf. Kuhn on the 'paradigm shifts' which characterise the history of science in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). See also Polanyi, *Science, Faith and Society*, 28 and Appendix, 82-96.
52. This and next, Michael Polanyi, PK, 4.
53. This and next, Polanyi, PK, 4.
54. This and next, Polanyi, PK, 3-4.
55. This and next, Byrne, 117.
56. Byrne, 40.
57. Charles Conti, *Metaphysical Personalism,* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 22.
58. This also rebuts the realist's solipsistic tendencies, as many philosophers have endeavoured to show. See, for example, P. F. Strawson, *Individuals* (London: Methuen, 1959. 102-6; Conti, 'Austin Farrer & the Analogy of Other Minds' in *For God and Clarity (New Essays in Honour of Austin Farrer)*, ed. Jeffrey C. Eaton & Ann Loades (Pennsylvania: Pickwick, 1983), 54-5; Farrer, *Saving Belief* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1964), 63 and *Faith and Speculation* (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1967), 126. It is also the point of Wittgenstein's rejection of private language and of Austin's article, already cited, 'A Plea for Excuses'.
59. On this presuppositional logic, see Strawson, *Individuals*, ch. 3 especially 105-6 and 112; and *Introduction to Logical Theory* (London: Methuen & Co., 1952), ch. 6.
60. Polanyi, PK, 4.
61. This and next, Byrne, 118.
62. Byrne, x.
63. Byrne, 68.
64. Byrne, 65.
65. This and next, Byrne, 68.
66. This and next, Byrne, 68.
67. This and next, Farrer, 'Metaphysics and Analogy' in *Reflective Faith* (London: SPCK, 1972), 88.
68. This and next, Farrer, *Finite and Infinite*, 66.
69. This and next, Byrne, 80.
70. Hampshire, 27. Cf. Byrne, 84.
71. Farrer, *Faith and Speculation*, 17.
72. Farrer, *Finite and Infinite*, 232.
73. Hampshire, 48.
74. This and next, Farrer, *Faith and Speculation*, 17.
75. Farrer, *Finite and Infinite*, 231.
76. Farrer, *Freedom of the Will*(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), 171.
77. Farrer, *Finite and Infinite*, 234.
78. Farrer, *Finite and Infinite*, 231.
79. Farrer, *Finite and Infinite*, 233. See also *Faith and Speculation*, 167.
80. For these expressions, see Conti, 'Austin Farrer & the Analogy of Other Minds', 56 and Farrer, *Finite and Infinite*, 235.
81. Farrer, *Finite and Infinite*, 21.
82. Farrer, *Faith and Speculation*, 22.
83. This and next, Farrer, *Freedom of the Will*, 185.
84. Farrer, *Finite and Infinite*, 235.
85. Conti, 'Austin Farrer and the Analogy of Other Minds', 56.
86. Hampshire confessed 'I do not know how I would identify myself as a disembodied being and I do not know what this hypothesis means' (Hampshire, 50).

87. Jantzen, 188.
88. I am grateful to Charles Conti for this useful, Deriderian, expression, encapsulating as it does, both the patriarchal and the rationalist; simultaneously denoting the origins of Logos, or Word-oriented ontology.
89. Piaget, 152.
90. Piaget, 270.
91. Piaget, 152.
92. This and next, Piaget, 275. The child, at least, is not unaware of the 'contents of thought'; she simply tends to locate them contents outside herself (Piaget, 151).
93. Byrne, 108-109.
94. Piaget, 178.

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A CENTRAL MYSTERY OF CREATIVITY?

Kyle Takaki

Abstract:
This paper explores a 'mystery' of creativity concerning highly creative people engaged in the production of products that are assessed to be original, useful, and so forth. I argue that if creativity is mysterious, it presents only a partial mystery due mainly to creativity's productive power. From a Polanyian perspective, this may be a cognitive and exploratory virtue that better accords with the experiences of those engaged in creative endeavours, and that recasts the nature of explanatory projects investigating creativity.

Key words:
Central systems, context of discovery, deep creativity, dynamic/real-time/lived, productive power, second dimension, three dimensions/field of potentiality

1. Introduction

The western tradition has a tendency to downplay the role of creativity in human endeavours. This tendency stems perhaps from Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines, where on the one hand Plato essentially mystifies creativity by attributing it to the ineffable inspiration of one's Muse, while on the other hand Aristotle is concerned with creative processes only to the extent that they bear upon what can be made explicit (in order to give a proper accounting of X). Either way, creativity is not granted a prominent role in these founding logo-centric projects. And given Whitehead's claim that the western philosophical tradition is series of footnotes to Plato, perhaps unsurprisingly this symptom continues into modern philosophy. For example, Kant claims that the art of doing philosophy isn't something that one can be taught; and his third critique views matters from the standpoint of theorizing aspects of creativity (explicating the contours of its 'purposive purposelessness').

The situation remains generally the same for contemporary creativity research in psychology, cognitive science, and philosophy. To the extent that psychological creativity may be mysterious, much of modern psychology ignores this and instead makes explicit aspects of creativity, reifying the lessons gleaned and then projecting an unsafe confidence as to how tractable creativity in general may be. Similarly, explorations of creativity in cognitive science exhibit methodological biases fuelled by Cartesian assumptions that remain beholden to an epistemic lineage stemming from Plato and Aristotle. The same tendencies are also at work in philosophical approaches that strive to give necessary and/or sufficient conditions for creativity. The common hidden denominator present in all three approaches, from a Polanyian viewpoint, is that the skilful, personal dimensions of tacit knowing make possible all of these modes of exteriorization such as giving-an-account-of, making-explicit, etc. which are at the heart of the west's logo-centric regime.

Of recent, creativity has become a hot topic, brought back into the fold of respectable scientific inquiry. Its status is now similar to that of other once neglected topics like consciousness and emotions. What I find a bit surprising is that given the crucial role that creativity plays in Michael Polanyi's thought (see Gelwick 1977, which places the 'way of discovery' at the core of Polanyi's philosophy), one would expect to see more mention made of Polanyi's insights in current research programs. This is not the case. Polanyi still remains outside of the mainstream industries labouring away in their Cartesian lines of inquiry that perhaps hazardously fixate on making-explicit and other sorts of exteriorized epistemic commerce. What can Polanyi contribute to the conversation? The answer I think is simple yet still radical: a personalist, humanistic rendering of accounts of creativity and how such accounts irretrievably bear the mark of our commitments and connoisseurship. We can no more deny the element of knower than that of known, and the (semiotically) enfolded relationships they have with one another.

From a Polanyian perspective I shall provide a broad map of the contemporary terrain of creativity research in psychology and cognitive science. I also deploy certain philosophical insights from philosophy of mind and philosophy of science as springboards to Polanyian themes. Given the centrality of discovery and inquiry to Polanyi's works, it seems only natural to relate these processes to what I submit is the broader notion of creativity (and its variegated manifestations across all domains of human inquiry). From this broader perspective, compared to the confines of logo-centrism, it perhaps isn't too much of a stretch to claim that we are not best classified as 'knowing' man but rather as a fundamentally creative species, where unfortunately ossified regimes of knowing (forgottenly rooted in the tacit dimension) have received too much of the spotlight.

It is time to rectify this situation, and to give Polanyi some of the credit I think he so richly deserves.

2. Structure of the argument

Part of the problem seems to be that creativity is too heterogeneous in its manifestations (whether consummate or pedestrian). Certain works of William Shakespeare and Albert Einstein, for example, stand as exemplars of creativity (as well as of genius) and yet deal with starkly different subject matters. It is clear that instances of creativity are present across a wide range of domains, from the arts to the sciences. And yet despite such heterogeneity, there is an accepted working definition of creativity extracted from surveying various research programs: creativity 'involves the creation of new and useful products…[and] creative cognitive processes occur whenever a new and useful product is created' (Mayer 1999, p.450). In particular, highly creative people engage in the *production* of products that are assessed to be original, useful, etc. (see also Table 22.1, p.450). Given this characterization of creativity, I shall explore and to an extent defend the notion that creativity's productive power presents a (partial) mystery.

The next section sketches three general dimensions of creative activity, two of which indicate major ways of investigating creative phenomena. This overview serves to contextualize the particular type of problem I'll explore. The problem concerns why creative activity appears to be mysterious; the ensuing sections unfold in further detail these dimensions to probe the nature of the problem. The final section then draws brief implications for understanding creativity, given the partial mystery it seems to present. The theme running throughout the essay is that the tacit dimension remains present and yet is ignored to varying degrees either in how investigations are carried out (the ignored tacit skilfulness of investigators), what investigators project (the ignored committal aspect of focal projections), or the manner in which philosophical assumptions configure what creative phenomena are taken to be (the ignored aspect of subsidiary knowing as it relates to the indefinite process of inquiry).

3. Three dimensions of creative activity

In general there are at least three intertwined dimensions of creativity that assist in locating various creative phenomena. Firstly there are the *products* of creative activity that are *conferred* the status of being creative—products that are deemed original, useful, and so forth (Mayer 1999), and which may be artefacts, ideas, actions, performances, etc. (the account I offer is compatible with so-called action-first as well as cognition-first approaches to creativity; see Carruthers 2007, and Sawyer 2006). The first dimension includes, but is not limited to, sociological and historical considerations that bear upon the evaluation of a creative artefact. The second dimension, which is the focus of my paper, concerns the relevant *window* of creative, synthetic 'inspiration'. And lastly there is the '*context of pursuit*' (Laudan 1980, p.174), which is situated between the other two dimensions—between the window of inspiration and the actual finished product. These three inextricably intertwined dimensions can be viewed as generating a field of potentiality by which creativity operates (trajectories and changes in the field correspond to an evolving adaptive-creative landscape, as it were, with shifting peaks of interest).

Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1988, 1999) makes a roughly similar threefold distinction: an 'individual' stimulates novelty; a 'field' concerns a social network of experts who select what is included in a domain; and a 'domain's' socio-cultural system contextualizes what information is historically transmitted. In relation to the threefold distinction I employ, the field and domain map roughly to the first dimension, and the individual maps roughly to the second and third dimensions (note that there is significant overlap between these three dimensions, as discussed in section four). Since my focus is on the second dimension, the individual is too coarse-grained for my purposes, although I see my project as complementing Csikszentmihalyi's systems view of creativity (the congruent systems approach I adopt realigns the three nodes so as to highlight the second dimension). Thus I only briefly outline the other two dimensions to situate and acknowledge their relevance to the second dimension.

Indeed, I do not claim that creative products are produced independently of environing considerations (first dimension). While it is possible for this to occur at least to some degree on rare occasion, it is clear that socio-historical processes influence the production of creative artefacts. Likewise, I do not claim that creative products are products of instant inspiration created independently of the often arduous process of revision and reformulation (third dimension)—a process that can significantly alter the finished product in comparison to the initial inspired vision, whatever that may be. Still, there remains the notion that creative products have an air of mystery surrounding them, and are quintessentially the province of talented individuals

who are able to muster the relevant energies to produce inspired works of brilliance. Of course there are mundane types of creative activity that are recognizable as importantly creative, if in modest ways. However the widespread belief persists that deeply significant works of creativity present an air of mystery not associated with 'lesser' types of creative acts. My concern in this paper is with acts of deep creativity, which are often associated with products of genius. In Polanyian language, while all forms of knowing are either tacit or rooted in tacit knowing—drawing common ground between pedestrian and deep forms of creativity—the sort of creative knowing of primary concern in this paper is associated with not merely skilful know-how, but rather consummate connoisseurship as exhibited across any number of fields of exploration.

3.1 Context of discovery and the second dimension

An illustration of the notion that creativity presents some degree of mystery appears in philosophy of science. In the oft-cited distinction between the 'context of discovery' and the 'context of justification', the mystery pertains to the former—i.e., there is no so-called 'logic of discovery' (see Nickles 1980). The latter, by contrast, can be articulated, as it concerns types of epistemic warrant for accepting theory X, hypothesis Y, etc. (Of course, the focus on logo-centric justification and the bracketing of discovery should not surprise Polanyians, given the mainstream position this distinction represents.) Although discovery is not equivalent to creativity, I suspect that creativity is the broader category that either subsumes or overlaps with cases of discovery.[1] I don't think much turns on this issue, at least for the purposes of this paper, so I shall not discuss it further (compare Cheng and Simon 1995). The main point is that discovery and its ilk (invention, construction, etc.) surely involve creative activity, and the notion remains that some 'mystery' surrounds how discoveries, inventions, etc. are made.[2]

To locate what may be mysterious about creative acts, let us focus on the first and third dimensions. The first dimension pertains to products that can be assessed as creative. Such assessments may be institutional, a matter of expert judgment, and so on. To continue with the above philosophy of science discussion, theories (such as Einstein's Theory of General Relativity) presumably count as creative products, and their assessment as worthily creative—so as to induce belief or acceptance—involves constraints that are tighter than whatever sorts of constraints bear upon the

third dimension, the context of pursuit. In other words, the bar is set higher for widespread *acceptance* of a scientific theory—the context of justification—compared to whatever (most likely heuristic) constraints are placed on the *pursuit* of that theory. If the tightest constraints (highest bar) are on the epistemic warrant for a (worthily) creative product of science, and the constraints on the context of pursuit are less tight, it seems plausible that the constraints on an eureka! creative moment associated with the inception of a theory would be the most liberal of the three dimensions.

While eureka! types of moments evoke the clearest sense of mystery, note that the second dimension is not restricted to a flash of inspiration pertaining to the inception of an idea. Firstly, highly creative ideas may themselves require further flashes relating to deeper and more precise articulations, which can significantly depart from the initial idea. For example, an initial brilliant idea for a mathematical proof can actually shift in the course of construction—suppose with a series of moments of inspiration—where the finished (brilliant) product differs from what the mathematician initially set out to do. So it is not necessary that creative inspiration occur only at the *inception* of the creative process.

Secondly, it is not necessary that creative inspiration occur only in a *brief*, eureka-type moment. The second dimension allows for the possibility that smallish creative steps can be taken towards constructing a magnificent product. In such a case, the mystery would concern how someone is able to put together a stunning magnum opus that involves various gradations of creative activity. For example, Charles Darwin's *On the Origin of Species*—his most significant work though perhaps not his magnum opus—was a result of painstaking labour over many years. I take it that this is a creative work; and although he apparently had a flash of insight influenced by Thomas Malthus' ideas, Darwin often gets credit as the primary discoverer of evolution by natural selection precisely because of his persistent, painstaking work prior to the publication of the *Origin*. Such work allowed Darwin to fine-tune his theory, think through the implications of his ideas to a far greater extent when compared with Alfred Wallace, and present a wide range of empirical evidence in support of his ideas (Desmond and Moore 1991; Gruber 1981a).

It may be objected that historians of science can trace the manner in which Darwin arrived at his results, thus calling into question any claim of mystery associated with the production of the *Origin*. This, however, is precisely the point—the apparent mystery concerns the tacit manner in which

Darwin put his various insights together that constitutes his unique contribution to biology. Tracing how Darwin arrived at his results historically—a high-level and retrospective 'how'—is importantly different from the real-time processes Darwin underwent in synthesizing his data, ideas, etc. For such historical analyses are not substitutes for the enfleshed process of actually probing hidden realities of the sort Darwin wrestled with.

3.2 Naturalized mystery

To further convey this sense of mystery, it may be helpful to make a few suggestive parallels stemming from Csikszentmihalyi's systems view of creativity. Csikszentmihalyi draws an analogy between evolutionary processes and the individual, field, and domain: individuals exhibit variation (novel individual creations); some of these variations are selected (a field's selectiveness); and selected variations are transmitted to future generations (a domain's cultural-historical structure). Csikszentmihalyi's systems view presents parallel 'mysteries' as evolution: random processes that generate variation (what chance events may have prompted some of Darwin's insights, conscious or not, successful or otherwise?); real-time unpredictability—evolution is primarily understood retrospectively (Mayr 1988) (who could have predicted from Darwin's childhood that he would become the genius he is commonly viewed as?); developmental and ecological processes that dynamically interrelate in highly complex ways, making precise comprehension a practical impossibility (Auyang 1998), and that give rise to novel, emergent levels (Keller 1999) (what if Darwin hadn't been selected to travel on the Beagle, which opened the horizon of possibilities it did?); and so on. These gradations of mystery, though, remain within a naturalistic framework. Furthermore, Margaret Boden (2004) argues that a science of creativity, like with evolutionary theory, need only provide how-possibly explanations—and not predictive or precise explanation—to dispel any transcendent sense of creative mystery. I agree, although I shall continue to argue that some degree of (naturalized, lived) mystery apparently is present concerning acts of creativity that emerge in dynamic, real time. These particular acts fall within the bounds of how-possibly explanations, but such explanations by their very level of generality do not address the complexities of real-time creativity. Furthermore, objecting that such real-time processes essentially don't matter for scientific explanation I think begs the question, as such an objection further covers up the tacit element of lived experience concerning creative phenomena. In other words, all our inquiries are always and already centred by our tacit powers of integration (or are centred by what Polanyi calls 'comprehensive entities'), which mainstream logo-centric studies of creativity tend to conveniently ignore (compare Kronfeldner 2009, and Stokes 2007).3

4. The second dimension is present in the other dimensions

In claiming that the second dimension is restricted neither to the inception of an idea nor to a brief eureka-type moment, it may appear that I am potentially confusing the second dimension with the other two dimensions. However the dimensions are not actual entities, nor static conceptual categories; rather the dimensions are best viewed as moments of rather complex and at times chaotic processes, and as such are tools for grasping modalities of creativity (recall the earlier image of a field of creative potential that the three dimensions generate). Csikszentmihalyi (1988, 1999) likewise holds that creativity should not be addressed as a 'what' (what is creativity?) nor a 'who' (who is creative?), but as a 'where'—as a tension across his three nodes (the individual, the field, and the domain). Given the Polanyian stance I adopt, which is a personalistic commitment, this tension (or field of potentiality) is itself a projection of tacit knowing's indefinite ways of exploration.

Accordingly, the context of pursuit (third dimension), for example, may in actual practice bleed indistinguishably into the 'mysterious' manner (second dimension) by which someone of exquisite skill determines what is appropriate in particular circumstances. Indeed, four widely cited stages of the creative process—preparation, incubation, insight, and verification (see Hadamard 1954, and also Sawyer 2006 for a contemporary overview of these important stages)—intertwine the second and third dimensions. Now on a flat reading it may appear that the second dimension (window of inspiration) maps here to insight, and the third (context of pursuit) maps to verification. However the *context* of pursuit can also be seen as encompassing all four stages, and at each stage there would be instances of the second dimension present, as a complex play of ideas would involve conscious and non-conscious integrations. In Polanyian terms, these stages of exploring are either tacit or are rooted in into on-going forms of (not completely articulable) tacit knowing.

The point more generally is that the three dimensions are differentially present in dynamic creative processes (Csikszentmihalyi and Sawyer 1995). And what the second dimension specifically highlights is that the *manner* in which creativity

operates presents something of a mystery. This particular configuration of creativity or particular manner of creative operation is most significantly displayed by highly creative individuals who are able to perform acts of deep creativity that usually leave us with a degree of awe and wonder. Such acts reveal not just tacit knowing's operations, but more importantly the element of consummate connoisseurship exhibited by practitioners who are able to channel the relevant energies into forms of 'focal phronesis', as it were, which always contain an element of the inarticulable.

For example, Max Planck's work on blackbody radiation (as it relates to the development of quantum theory) isn't reducible to a mere sequence of inductive steps, *pace*Patrick Langley et al. (see note 2). For the manner in which Planck actually configured these steps showed subtle 'physical intuition' that invested the formal equations with physical meaning (Pais 1983). In other words, the *art*of creating mathematical physics is not flatly reducible to a mechanical series of inductive steps. Langley et al. mistake the end-product of induction for the subtle and sophisticated element of skillful know-how, mistaking formalism for meaningful content—a collapse that from a Polanyian viewpoint is a non-starter. Indeed, Polanyi calls this sort of collapse a 'pseudo-substitution', which is 'used to play down man's real and indispensable intellectual powers for the sake of maintaining an 'objectivist' framework which in fact cannot account for them. It works by defining scientific merit in terms of its relatively trivial features, and making these function then in the same way as the true terms which they are supposed to replace' (PK, pp.16-17).

4.1 The second dimension and productive power

Thus in locating a core mystery of creativity in a particular manner of operation, it is important to keep in mind that this 'manner' does not concern merely any particular configuration of parts pertaining to some whole. The first dimension can also appeal to a particular manner of configuration in assessing a product as recognizably creative, but there might be no substantive mystery in articulating, say, the sociological reasons for assessing an artefact as creative—indeed, generally speaking, what are called the 'historiometric' and 'biographical' approaches to creativity (Mayer 1999), for example, illuminate quite a bit. Likewise, in the context of pursuit, one might still be able to articulate to some significant degree what one is doing in striving towards a synthesis, though things presently remain rather inchoate. There may be no substantive

mystery in what is being pursued, the strategies and heuristics used towards that end, and the manner in which these resources are employed when struggling towards a significant synthesis (Weisberg 2006)—indeed, the so-called 'psychological' approach to creativity (Mayer 1999) can shed significant light on these elements of the creative process.

What, then, I'm highlighting as a core 'mystery' of creativity concerns some productive power of an individual as that power relates to the manner in which creative activity reveals itself—a 'power' and 'manner' whose complexity is disclosed by emergent properties of interest. Creative activity that is too creative on the one hand (sheer madness or chaos, as were), and creative activity that is too hackneyed on the other hand (mere boring order, as it were), are not the relevantly configuring types of creative activity (Simonton 1999c). Thus it is some complex relevantly-configuring-productive-power of creativity, as that power bears on emergent properties of interest, which presents a core 'mystery' of creativity. I am not claiming, though, that creativity is fundamentally mysterious and cannot be studied—quite the opposite. I am attempting to locate and articulate just 'where' the mystery lies (although I think that creativity is most profitably viewed as a tension, centred by comprehensive entities, across Csikszentmihalyi's three nodes). Creativity can, to an extent, be investigated as a natural phenomenon; however if there is any genuine 'mystery' that creativity presents, it appears to lie in the second dimension. For the second dimension encompasses, for example, the art by which philosophy is done according to Kant, or the manner in which one's Muse is channelled for Plato. But more generally, the second dimension concerns the emergent manner by which subsidiaries are brought to bear on some focal object of interest, where its gestalt-like nature makes what tacit knowing projects always more than the mere sum of its parts.

5. The second dimension and the problem of central systems

Thus far I've attempted to hone in on a core 'mystery' of creativity. I started with the broad distinctions between the three dimensions of creativity and argued that the mystery concerns the second dimension. In further attempting to locate this mystery, I claimed that it is disclosed through a relevantly configuring productive power. I continue to explore the mystery by relating this productive power to the notion of central systems. I shall appropriate Jerry Fodor's ideas about central

systems to convey the parallel problems they raise in understanding creativity.

To contextualize the relevance of central systems to creativity, I start by sketching Fodor's (1983) view of the mind. Imagine that parts of the mind-brain operate like factories. Each of these factories has specialized mechanisms that are geared toward taking a certain range of raw materials/inputs and processing them into standardized products/outputs. These factories are called 'modules'. The general view of the mind is that it consists of 'peripheral systems' and 'central systems', where the former tend to be modular and the latter deal primarily with beliefs, analogical reasoning, etc. Modules are localized in that they operate only on certain kinds of information and yield stereotypical outputs. They are peripheral in this sense plus in the added sense that they serve to process, say, sensory information getting passed to central systems. Central systems are global in that they are not localized, and may in principle access any part of the web of information coming from peripheral or other central systems/processes.[4]

The global nature of central systems apparently makes these systems intractable; Fodor's argument for the claim that central systems aren't tractable is important for understanding a core mystery of creativity, since the creative processes of interest in this paper present a degree of mystery because they involve a mixture of domain specific *and central* processes (compare Martindale 1995, 1999). With that in mind, the strategy of Fodor's argument first employs a particular view of scientific confirmation, which claims that such confirmation is holistic (his argument draws on the earlier mentioned distinction between the context of justification and the context of discovery). Fodor then makes an analogy between this view and how central systems operate. Lastly, the irreducible nature of holistic processes implies that probably no localized account—peripheral or otherwise—can yield an account of central processes.

There are two gaps here: first, if a localized and tractable account were to be given, it wouldn't carry over to holistic processes like central processes because the localized account wouldn't cover the array of phenomena that central processes manifest; and second, given a holistic account of central processes, it wouldn't be completely tractable because it would be underdetermined by the multiplicity of ways in which those processes can be realized.

5.1. Two arguments for holism

The first argument for holism claims two closely related things: that the 'nondemonstrative fixation of belief' is 'isotropic', and that belief fixation is 'Quinean'. Regarding the former, what Fodor has in mind by the phrase 'the nondemonstrative fixation of belief' is that what 'we *believe* depends on the evaluation of how things look, or are said to be, *in light of background information* about (inter alia) how good the seeing is or how trustworthy the source. Fixation of belief is *just* the sort of thing I have in mind as a typical *central* process' (Fodor 1983, p.46). The fixation of belief occurs relative to a network of background information, and how beliefs get fixed depends on how well they fit with the relevant network. What makes the fixation of belief 'nondemonstrative', generally, is that the inference which the fixing of the belief represents is a new inference—it goes beyond whatever information is (strictly) contained in the relevant background information. By 'isotropic' Fodor means that fixation occurs relative to a web of previously established beliefs, and the information that bears on fixation can be taken, in principle, from anywhere in this web. In short, the first respect in which belief fixation is holistic pertains primarily to *individual* isotropic fixation.

The other respect in which fixation is holistic has to do with the closely related claim that it can be *communal*, or 'Quinean'—that 'the degree of confirmation assigned to any given hypothesis is sensitive to the properties of the entire belief system' (Fodor 1983, p.107). According to Fodor, this point is illustrated in Nelson Goodman's discussion of 'projectibility'.[5] Suppose there are two hypotheses that are thought to have degrees of projectibility. If both have the same available data and are similarly consistent with that data, which hypothesis ought to be conferred the status of being confirmed? What can settle the dispute is to look at the past histories of each of these hypotheses. How projectible was each hypothesis in the past (assuming that each has a past history)? Take the hypothesis having the greater degree of past successes and claim that it is the one which ought to be confirmed given the current data. In order to do this, what is presupposed is that there is a background web of (communal scientific) belief not only keeping track of the rates of success for each projectible hypothesis, but also making it possible to compare the current situation and past performances. That is, the degree of confirmation is sensitive to the properties of the entire evolving (communal) web of belief.

Fodor's second argument for holism is by analogy—between the holism of confirmation and the holism of central systems—and it may appear

that just as a general account can be given of how (Quinean) confirmation occurs, a similar story can be told about how central systems operate. But this would be a confusion stemming from the failure to distinguish between the tractable results of the confirmation process, which are open to being evaluated on criteria like how current data fits with past data, replicating experimental outcomes, etc., and the so-called 'logic of discovery' (see Fodor 1983, pp.106-107 and p.129). In the latter case, how discoveries are made is more or less a mystery, and all we have are loose after-the-fact appeals to holistic webs of belief and the like. More importantly, the point with discovery, as with confirmation, is that the *form* of the problem is pretty much the same, at least with respect to the analogy that Fodor wants to make. The proper form of the problem raised by scientific confirmation and discovery is about looking at the relevant web of information and noting that the bits that underlie a confirmation (or a discovery) are a function of the web as a whole—that is, in principle there is access to any bit in the web, relative to what hypothesis is being confirmed (or formed). What occurs after-the-fact may be tractable (i.e., the results of confirmation may be tractable), but an account of how this occurs is not; given the sensitivity of the bits of information to the entire *evolving* web, there are too many ways to carve up these processes, and so with a discovery, there is no robust account of how, say, an eureka! moment occurs.

6. Central systems and creative mystery

The difficulty of central systems concerns in-principle access to the evolving web of information. More specifically, the problem of central systems pertains to a productive power/capacity that enables holistic connections. Keep in mind that the problem does not concern mere holism, since after-the-fact holistic accounts of this capacity can be provided (akin to retrospective evolutionary explanations); rather the problem concerns how real-time discoveries, for example, are made. For how such a dynamism unfolds is essentially unknown. In similar fashion, creativity presents a mystery, as creativity's second dimension raises issues parallel to the problem of central systems (the deep problem that creates difficulties for understanding the mind). In other words, the second dimension's relevantly configuring productive power is holistic regarding the manner in which such a power is able to creatively configure ideas from the evolving web of information; it is those centralized features relating to emergent, deep creative syntheses like forming a *brilliant* analogy, moments

of *profound* insight, *sagacious* inductive inferences, and so forth that present something of a mystery. Thus perhaps it is no surprise that just as no complete understanding of the mind has yet been given, so likewise no complete understanding of creativity has yet been put forth; both of these may be projects that are not (completely) tractable, even if they are naturalized projects.[6]

This of course goes against the grain of the spirit of logo-centric, mainstream research programs. It is a projected hope (and perhaps hubris) that all mysteries are solvable in principle, assuming that the juggernaut of making-explicit knows no a priori bounds. But Polanyi cuts across these notions and their associated divides (e.g., some kind of relativism on the contrasting side of logo-centrism). For our inquires are always grounded in accrediting, personalist tacit knowing on the one hand, and on the other (inseparable) hand pursuing hidden realities via universal intent. Making-explicit always contains an element of the tacit, and indefinite inquiry is part of what affectively fuels the process of further exploration. Thus the issue of tractable and completable projects precisely misses the point of Polanyi's post-critical philosophy. Tractable and completable assessments are already irretrievably bound up with what it means to have enfleshed commitments that bear on indefinite inquiry (that simultaneously enact contact with hidden realities).

Perhaps I am preaching to the choir. Still, it is instructive to disclose the tacit dimension at work in creativity and research into creativity. On the research side, I think it is fair to say that we can place increasing kinds of constraints on creative phenomena to triangulate on better understandings of creativity. For example, investigations of computational creativity (Boden 2004); induction and analogy (Holyoak and Thagard 1995); discovery in the sciences (Langley et al. 1987; Root-Bernstein 1989); cognitive tools of creative thought (Root-Bernstein and Root-Bernstein 1999), etc. all indicate types of constraints that assist in understanding creativity. It might appear, then, that the so-called mystery is a failure to look more carefully at the relevant constraints—constraints enabling how-possibly explanations—that encourage creative activity. I think this objection is well taken, but in line with the previous paragraph it misses the point. There are at least two interpretations of this objection.

6.1. Two interpretations

The first interpretation is that if one could spell out in full the various kinds of constraints operating during the process of creation, any substantial sense of

mystery would disappear (Weisberg 2006). However this would collapse the third dimension—the context of pursuit—with the second dimension, since these constraints pertain predominantly to the strategies that assist in *pursuing* some creation. Give someone who has minimal creative knack the best available strategies and the most up-to-date knowledge of the creative process; it is plausible to suppose that there would be little chance of such a person producing any worthily creative product. Even a substantial number of enabling constraints still leave open a large number of possibilities; and many of these possible creations would fall short of being *deeply* significant creations. Clearly, without the skilful element brought to bear in forming guesses, hypotheses, and so on, there are far more mere possibilities than there are consummate formations. Again, tacit knowing is always already there, ensnared with the relevant sorts of constraints as well as which emergent configurations are brought to the fore.

The second interpretation is along the following lines: 'creativity' carries a sense of mystery because of its social role in conferring respect, encouragement, and so on—where the aura of mystery actually enables such respect, etc.—but there really is no mystery, since whatever 'creativity' refers to regarding the individual is actually attributable to social-historical factors (Merton 1973; Schaffer 1994). The objection is well taken, but it similarly confuses the second dimension with the other two. For while it is generally true that multiple social-historical factors influence creative endeavours and confer respect, etc., it still remains that such factors require individual appraisals. More importantly, to a significant degree individuals, even in synergetic relation to one another, need to synthesize relevant parts into a (worthily) creative whole (see Simonton 1999b). In other words, the second dimension is still tacitly present in the creative process. As with the previous response, individuals with minimal creative knack will be unable to harness the appropriate creative potentialities. To put matters hyperbolically: remove tacit knowing and we end up flailing about, akin to, as it were, randomly pounding a keyboard hoping to eventually turn out Shakespeare.

7. A science of creativity?

Given the argument thus far, to the degree that there can be a science of creativity, it would pertain primarily to the first and third dimensions. For example, to a degree 'historiometric' approaches (Mayer 1999) can establish a science of creativity regarding statistical patterns of prodigious creative

output (first dimension). Likewise, to a degree 'psychological' approaches (Mayer 1999) can establish a science of creativity regarding the types of creative heuristics that are used in the context of pursuit (third dimension). The question remains, can there be a science of creativity concerning the second dimension? For while it appears legitimate to reify to some degree the other two dimensions—keeping in mind they are actually externalized, projected probes of tacit knowing's operations—the second dimension brings us closer to the connoisseurship of the knower and the subtle and often sophisticated ways in which one personally integrates an indefinite range of subsidiary clues.

If increasing constraints on creative processes are imposed via the first and third dimensions, it might appear possible to pin down the second dimension. That is, if enough constraints were given to trap phenomena pertaining to the second dimension, it would thereby appear possible to establish a science of creativity. However I think this possibility confuses the second dimension with the other dimensions by attempting to eliminate or explain away the second dimension. The problem is that investigations along these lines irretrievably presume some productive power of creative acts, centred by individuals able to harness the relevant potentialities. Attempting to trap tacit integrations via externalized constraints of whatever sort fundamentally misses the point that dynamic acts of *lived* integration are relied upon in the first place—whether in acts of creativity or in carrying out such exteriorized modes of investigation and commerce.

To clarify, a distinction made previously is applicable here. The distinction, recall, is that what occurs after-the-fact may be tractable, but an account of how this occurs (in real-time) may not be. For example, in folk psychology what occurs after-the-fact is expressible in propositional form (e.g., an analysis of a brilliant improvisational solo by Charlie Parker), and since folk psychology tends to work, it has some claim to being tractable/projectible. But how this occurs in real-time may not be projectible, because for central processes 'it may be *unstable, instantaneous* connectivity that counts' (Fodor 1983, p.118), highlighting the idea that unique events aren't reliable explanations for future projections—they aren't tractable in terms more general than their particular unique manifestations.[7]

Here the phrase 'after-the-fact' is shorthand for processes whose mechanics in principle can be worked out to yield a projectible account (a contentious but possible example might be certain neural correlates of certain conscious states), or for

folk processes where success is explained at a *reflective* level—that is, although we may tacitly anticipate the behaviours of others, technically speaking, the projectibility of folk psychology would be a matter of figuring out reflectively that the anticipation of the behaviours of others worked in the past (and will probably work in the future); this reflective explanation occurs after-the-fact. These sorts of after-the-fact phenomena are open to public reconfirmation. It is again important not to confuse the second dimension with the other dimensions. For real-time phenomena are importantly different from after-the-fact explanations. A putative theorem constructed by a math genius, for example, can be checked after the fact, but how the genius came up with the solution, not even she may exactly know. Even if she had available to her a full array of mathematical tricks, preparatory knowledge, and so forth, that still may not suffice to account for the window of inspiration when the right idea came to the fore.

The distinction I'm driving at can be illustrated more acutely by observing that a particular act of spontaneity—as with '*unstable, instantaneous connectivity*'—isn't predictable, although someone with a spontaneous character can be relied upon to do spontaneous things. But predicting that some spontaneous act will occur is not the same as predicting what particular exhibition of spontaneity will ensue. Spontaneous characters, let us suppose, form a tractable kind—they are classifiable as a type only after the fact. But how particular spontaneous acts get sparked is, well, spontaneous. So even if a science of creativity can shed light on various creative modalities, such as assessing and inductively classifying types of prodigious creative output, it still apparently would not be able to account for unique creative events (as with particular acts of spontaneity).

7.1 Tacit knowing's productive capacities are presupposed

A science of creativity would need to assume, as a primitive, that a productive power somehow allows for particular kinds of neural interconnections, synergetic group dynamics, etc. when assessing and explaining various after-the-fact creative phenomena. Explanations of these phenomena include: historical accounts of how discoveries are made (Gruber 1981a, 1989); studies of social networks that lead to new, creative products (Csikszentmihalyi 1996, 1999); cognitive heuristics that worked for past notables and which may help to amplify your Muse (Nickerson 1999); and so on. While creative phenomena are explainable (to

varying degrees) after the fact, a productive power is presupposed in accounting for significant production of the relevant artefacts.

Thus no matter how many constraints are applied in attempting to locate this power, the productive power of creativity, I suspect, will not be eliminated, explained away, or wholly demystified. Even stronger, such tacit powers of integration are presupposed in carrying out these meta-level investigations requiring art to skilfully identify and study creative phenomena, and are crucially presupposed in the multitude of ways by which focal, creative objects are enacted via a field of non-explicit subsidiary knowledge. The so-called 'mystery' of creativity (as it pertains to the second dimension), then, apparently both is and isn't a mystery. On the one hand, it isn't a *full* mystery since various kinds of constraints can assist in seeing what is worthily creative; how one went about creating a product (including past failed attempts); the manner in which one developed and refined one's skills; and so forth. Since the second dimension is intertwined with the other two dimensions, and significant light can be shed on these two dimensions, it stands to reason that significant light can be shed indirectly on aspects of the second dimension. On the other hand, the primitive status of the productive power of creativity will not be *wholly* eliminated, explained away, etc. since 1) there remains no precise account of the (holistic and emergent) manner in which the second dimension works, and 2) the gestalt element of tacit integration is already at work in all our inquiries. It is the reason why terms like 'know-how', 'spontaneity', 'talent', 'genius', and so forth operate as (partial) explanations to certain queries. More precisely, these 'explanations' really are markers indicating a (partial) halt, since as answers to queries they serve to reference a certain capacity or power that may not allow for complete articulation. What made Miles Davis play like that? Spontaneity. How did Roger Federer pull off such a shot? Talent. What enabled Andrew Wiles to invent his proof of Fermat's Last Theorem? Genius. Of course such cases can be studied to shed light on creativity, but case studies are, for the most part, carried out only retrospectively. To deny such lived phenomena or to sideline such emergent dynamics—as is the mainstream tendency of logo-centric research regimes—is to deny the very grounds that make possible investigation of creative phenomena. What is brought into view, in brief, is the performative inconsistency of Cartesian practitioners who consummately rely upon tacit knowing while ignoring its implications for investigating creativity.

7.2 Dynamism and emergent creativity

To revisit the image from Csikszentmihalyi, creativity should be viewed as a (holistic) tension across his three nodes (or in my congruent systems approach, the three dimensions generate a field of potentiality). While light can be shed on aspects of these three parameters, it is essentially unknown how this tension unfolds in real-time, most especially concerning the individual. What specifically may be mysterious about the second dimension of creativity is a relevantly configuring productive power, where part of the power's seeming mystery concerns its holistic and emergent nature. It is a key feature of central systems that they are cross-domain systems able to make connections hitherto unmade—the sort of capacity often presumed to be a crucial feature of creative acts. The *dynamic* degrees of freedom implied by such holism suggests no precise account of how the second dimension works, even though such freedom may well remain within naturalistic bounds. Herein lies a primary reason for why creativity presents a mystery, and why perhaps no complete scientific account can be given of its productive nature.[8] Even stronger, completability and its relevant *explanandum* and *explanans* may a source of the problem, as such logo-centric demands inappropriately fixate on making-explicit, discounting the tacit. Polanyi not only challenges disembodied Cartesian ways of proceeding, he also inverts this ordering, placing the tacit as the grounds from which we know, explore, hope, and make-explicit.

It could be objected that there is a scientific story to be told about creativity, and that scientists are already on their way to unfolding that story (using, for example, computational approaches in psychology; see, for example, Boden 2004).[9] I agree, but the story would first need to be careful not to mistake an understanding of the first and third dimensions with the second. Secondly, a complete theory of creativity may not even be feasible if tracking real-time emergent creativity is part of its *explanandum.* And more generally, the prospects of ever establishing a complete science of mind—which ought to cover creative phenomena—are still hotly disputed. If the counter-argument is given that I've misunderstood the nature of scientific possibility, where such possibility is about showing in principle how creative processes work (as exhibited by artificial intelligence systems that creatively compose music, poems, etc.; see Boden 2004), my response is that this still leaves the type of creative mystery I've focused on in this paper untouched. For the question is not just how creative acts are possible in a how-possibly sense, but rather how particular *deeply* significant acts of creativity *actually emerge in dynamic real-time*. That complex power, that element of creativity as lived, remains and may continue to remain, for better or worse, a partial central mystery.

Of course this would be viewed as problematic for one under the spell of a logo-centric framework. However from a Polanyian viewpoint such a partial mystery is a potential virtue, as it gestures towards the never-ending process of articulating universal intent, enacting contact with hidden realities, and the fallible, humanistic nature of inquiry that indefinitely pursues truth. For such a pursuit itself is a creative endeavour and a concomitant expression of tacit knowing's ever-expanding realm. Some degree of mystery it appears is inextricably bound up with agendas for making-explicit, but to draw typical Cartesian lessons from this would miss the fundamental import of what Polanyi's post-critical philosophy offers us, a vision that has yet to be fully appreciated.

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Notes

1. Note that Polanyi does distinguish discovery from invention (PK p.177-8), but the basic 'sallies' of imagination are present in both activities, supporting the point that creativity is the broader category. See also PK p.311 on how 'originality'—personal beliefs accredited by knowers—underlies discovery.

2. Langley et al. (1987) by contrast argue that there is nothing mysterious about scientific discovery. One

case they cite is Planck's work on blackbody radiation, which they claim can be understood as a series of *mechanical* inductive steps (they essentially deny any crucial role for tacit knowing as an irreducibly humanistic endeavour). However the sort of (partial) mystery I will present applies even to their Planck example.

3. Indeed, James McClelland, reflecting on the current state of cognitive science, offers some profoundly Polanyian insights that suggest a fundamental crack in this logo-centric regime:

When it comes to intelligence, the real stuff consists of human success in everyday acts of perception, comprehension, inductive inference, and real-time behaviour—areas where machines still fall short after nearly 60 years of effort in artificial intelligence—as well as the brilliant creative intellectual products of scientists and artists such as Newton, Darwin, Einstein, Shakespeare, Michelangelo, and Beethoven. According to an emergentist perspective, all of these products of the mind are essentially emergents. I do not think anyone who emphasizes the importance of emergent processes would deny that planful, explicitly goal-directed thought plays a role in the greatest human intellectual achievements. However, such modes of thought themselves might be viewed as emergent consequences of a lifetime of thought-structuring practice supported by culture and education (Cole & Scribner, 1974). Furthermore, proponents of the essence of human thought as an emergent phenomenon might join with Hofstadter (1979) and others in suggesting that key flashes of insight and intuition may not have arisen from planful, explicit goal-directed thought alone, but instead might reflect a massive subsymbolic constraint-satisfaction process taking place outside of awareness. In the case of Darwin, for instance, biographers (e.g., Quammen, 2006) have written about the origins of his work on his theory of evolution. It appears that Darwin set his mind to this investigation knowing intuitively that there was something interesting to discover, while not knowing exactly what it was. This intuition, arguably the key factor in his discovery, might have arisen as an emergent consequence of a subconscious constraint-satisfaction process, which then led him to engage in more intentional (yet still perhaps intuition-guided) exploration. This sequence in discovery may be the rule even in formal domains such as mathematics and physics, where the intuition may come first, followed only later by formal specification and rigorous proof (Barwise & Etchemendy, 1991). (McClelland, pp. 752-753)

4. Note that one need not be committed to modularity to subscribe to the claim that central systems are global in nature. Note further that the global nature of central systems isn't necessarily committed to connectionism; all that is minimally required is in-principle access to other systems, where the web of information—which includes the field generated by the three dimensions of my systems approach—is not peripherally enclosed.

5. Projectible predicates take (past) correlated properties that are representative of what such predicates are applied to; what makes them projectible is that they hold up in new instances—they are good inductions in that they reliably work in these new instances (see Goodman, 1983). For the remainder of the paper I use 'projectible' and 'tractable' interchangeably. As I read Fodor, much of what he has to say about central systems—and his related scepticism about ever establishing a genuine cognitive science—has to do with his appropriation of Goodman's ideas. Specifically, the new riddle of induction is implicitly present in many of cognitive science's projects, which potentially undermines their claim to genuine scientific status (involving the discovery of genuine natural kinds).

6. Such centralized deep creative processes I think correspond to what Polanyi calls 'irreversible metal processes', which are 'unspecifiable forms of knowledge' (PK, p.77). I suspect that what makes such processes irreversible is their non-projectible, holistic, and underdetermined nature. If this is right, it might help to explain Polanyi's hypothesis that *all* knowing is irretrievably either tacit or rooted in tacit knowing.

7. This claim finds more recent support in studies of chaotic dynamics in the brain, where spontaneous 'avalanches' (phase transitions) occur for centralized processes like temporal binding—perhaps the most important unresolved problem in cognitive science (Bassett et al., 2006; Beggs and Plenz, 2003; Kitzbichler et al., 2009). I should note that these processes exhibit power law behaviour, which appears to conflict with the above claim. However it still remains that real-time, *particular* exhibitions of spontaneity are not the same as *general*, after-the-fact exhibitions of power law behaviour.

8. If these remarks are on the right track, they would also seem to suggest that since the three dimensions are inextricably intertwined, the other two dimensions also contain significant mysteries occluded by the implicit Cartesian manner in which scientific investigations—investigations that qualify what counts *as*explanatory—are carried out. Furthermore, since the three-dimensional field appears to be more complex than any one of the dimensions individually, holism at that level appears to imply deep naturalized mysteries regarding the groundwork for the emergence of complexified order. This I think remains fully in line with Polanyi's insight that tacit knowing's structure is intimately related to the structure of comprehensive entities of which it also forms a part. It additionally remains in line with the indefinite pursuit of truth, and the non-closure of inquiry.

9. It is important to note that Boden is well aware of the limitations of, and numerous senses associated with, 'computation'. See, for example, her monumental and magisterial *Mind as Machine* (2008). Much of what she has to say there about the bounds of naturalized computation I think is compatible with the sensibility of this essay.

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THREE PHILOSOPHICAL POEMS

C. C. Conti

In the beginning was a beginning

because we think in 'causal' terms.

Then 'hows cum' so many *myths* begin with the words

'in the beginning'?

Perhaps it's because 'in the beginning' represents a *search* for a beginning, the need for *gnosis*; or maybe because we realize *mytho* is as myth-ridden as the 'laws of science' (which a wise sage remarked aren't 'laid up in pickle' to cover every eventuality so there's as much random explanation in ancient myths as there is in modern quantum physics). Or maybe because when theologians are forced to look into a black hole of their own idea of a beginning, all they could come up with one heck of a 'big bang' introduction for themselves, their world, especially their God. Or perhaps it's because we constructed our image in the wrong image in the first place, of an identikit of pseudo-mastery which fails to use philosophy to re-invent 'the self' but only 'reiterate' itself, overlooking a fresh beginning or something called 'developmental psychology' . . . us litt'l space-critters who appear to have had no *absolute* beginning and don't seem to *want* or *need* one, cause . . .

In the *real* beginning was the word;

and it hasn't stopped talking or squawking ever since

It sometimes speaks in riddles, like

'We live in a perpetual "now".'

It all sounded 'existential' enough, but then along came a really clever duchess-dude named Oracula who said there's no such thing as a uni-verse; only a series of overlapping biographies whose narrative the Universe is trying to tell us lies *with us* (of all things) as 'the truth'. It's all a part of an anthropic principle just waiting for us to think this way in order to bring *itself* to pass.

And here I thought constant conjunction was a bit outrageous and far-fetched. What do we call this kind of circularity? I know. . . . How about . . .

The simultaneity of worlds without end! Amen.

After all, 'world' is only a word, as rich or varied as our capacity to take it in. But then one would have to have a brain bigger than the size of a planet to take *that* one in, or find a symbol which combined the scopicity of the Universe with itself, just like that 'fiery brook' who burnt all those rotten metaphysical bridges behind him to force us to a higher plain. **The mind that thinks infinity already *lives* in it.** Then along came another Ludwig who extrapolated on this Feuerbach: -**The infinity of the mind is a mind that thinks *up* to its creative potential by seizing on INDEFINITY**. So it seems God has put infinity into our minds to complete *itself.* (Talk about a cosmic blast from the past!) From such ripple-traces it follows that 'in the beginning' I must have already been there in embryo; whether in the mind of God or the life-force of the Universe itself! So I just have to listen to my echo to explain 'the combinatorial wonderment' of it all and anticipate my part in completing the whole. *What a marvellous telescope the mind is for studying the stars that dance ad infinitum in the soul!*

But then I got to thinking: If the beginning was *my* beginning, then I am 'god' to the world as much as to myself; whereupon I decided to tell a story to that effect, a real God-spell of a redemptive narrative all turning on an axis of co-evality; until some 'one-eyed son-of-a-bitch' perverted it into an axis of evil. And then along came a clever fellow from Vienna who landed me back in the cosmic soup again by insisting 'The world is everything which *finds* a case'. And once again I realized the importance of giving the world utterance. So what do I call my universal anthropicism? How about **The Emergent Novelty of Creative Language**, or **The Simultaneity of Words and World** or**The Salvific Content of Concepts as Constructs**?

Quietly, why not just **Evolutionary Love** whispered the **Elan Vital** in my ear (and poured us both, persons and God, a drink from a very large stein).

The Two Ludies

Duns Annuncio
(**Wittgenstein's Double Helix of Language**)

Some philosophers said it couldn't be done, analyse language metaphysically and practically at the same time, so thought Wittgenstein was self-defeating when he said he had just written a load of non-sense which was so brilliant they couldn't even begin to understand it,

<div align="center">or him.</div>

What he meant is that meaning is not always obviously what is meant. Or obvious. The attempt to get at the sense and reference of language includes an attempt to describe the indescribable. So Wittgenstein turned his back on the *Scripto of Biblos* and exposed his underside to the scopicity of 'open horizons' as a mystical analogue for imagistically richer and significantly more sublime signifiers than the logic for language could provide; no 'tract' of a single-minded truth; more like archaeological or 'architectonic' investigations.

One way of doing this is to use a form of language which counts <u>for</u> and <u>against</u> itself simultaneously, so rises above the language-game, including its own. 'Simultaneity' is a cancelling-out in the very process of raising itself up. So Wittgenstein invented a new logical 'first-principle': - an <u>anti</u>-principle principle; the simultaneity of using a principle of non-contradiction to contradict itself.

Resisting the principle of contradiction is, in fact, the vital 'yes' and 'no' of language. And lest we forget, to resist the contradictions which express themselves in language is not to eliminate creative ambiguity from language. Exactly the opposite. It <u>opens</u> up the language-user to the all-important possibilities of on which side truth <u>more likely</u> or <u>more fully</u> lies. Experience is both ordinary and sublime; the sacred an extension of the profane; the profane is a defamation of the sacred. *A fortiori*– it follows – that some *de re*truths are actually *de facto* falsehoods. And neither 'hold a candle' to *de dicto* truths. They are 'snuffed-out', dead parrot metaphors. Truth dummies, ventriloquists of veracity.

Overlooking this, some mini-minded philosophers think Wittgenstein was a tad schizoid: half a logician or mathematical genius; the other half a mystical geni, letting the fly out of the bottle of his own canned or deeply impenetrable or frozen *a priori* truths.

But it only took some half-witted poet to take the proposition out of all this; those who speak of love and 'the indefinite more' to teach the reason <u>how</u> to reason. (John Ciardi) And it seems the greater the scopicity or limitlessness of language, the richer the language of description and the poorer the theory of language becomes; the impossibility of assessing the more and other of language with an invitational proximity which is 'now'.

So, reading between the lines, Wittgenstein taught us the truth of the adage, that certain descriptions go straighter to the mark by being crooked. But he needn't have 'taught' us that; the truth of iterability. We already knew it. Besides most of us being descriptively promiscuous and wantonly <u>pre</u>-verse, re-iteration or 'reiterability' is the phenomenon of quoting someone's 'apter' words in order to cast light on the less translucent, more opaque worlds of ourselves. And that is why we read (said Proust) to find ourselves in the WORD-brooks of others.

Other philosophers, nearly the twin of each other, have readily farmed out to 'the porosity of language' to 'wring-out' the sponge of experience and its infinite capacity to give us 'droplets' of truth.

So when Wittgenstein used language against itself in order to liberate itself, he was employing the *Porositat der Begriffe*, an apter expression of yet another language-frame to allude to the 'gay, great happening illimitably earth'

<div align="center">stars</div>
<div align="center">sky</div>
<div align="center">heaven</div>

And the afterwards of all befores . . .

<div align="right">which await becoming enunciation.</div>

Spiritus Rector

(eecccummings on the 'life-force' in LG and LW)

Primordial silence
               to the ebbs and flow
                              of *Existenz.*

Mute multitudes
        &
        mired masses
                  stethoscope solitude;

        catchbreathing
 heart-throb sobs and
         listening to the pitter-patter of a flimsy life-veil flutter.

Inner chambers
                  echo desolate preoccupation;

        pondering a puzzlement or speculating a wonderment and confessing a
bewilderment

        Ashes to ashes, dust to . . .
                              Fate?

Origins wane
                  their seminal mirth;
        destiny's waves wash ashore,
   undulate vexingly,

                              anointing
        chromosomic particles

   with protoplasmic corporeality . . .

        (the cosmic pulse-beat gently lapping).

BOOK REVIEWS

Introducción al Personalismo
Juan Manuel Burgos
Madrid, Ediciones Palabra, 2012, ISBN 978-84-9840-646-7, 300 pp.

This book, by the President of the Asociación Española de Personalismo, is a survey of the personalism which takes its primary inspiration from Emmanuel Mounier (1905-50) and is what the term is taken to mean in most of Continental Europe, the Latin world and Roman Catholic circles generally. Other strains are recognised as contributing to it, such as Kant, Kierkegaard and some forms of existentialism, St Thomas Aquinas and Neo-Thomism following Leo XIII's recommendation of Aquinas' philosophy, Husserl and phenomenology, Max Scheler, the post-war Polish school to which Karol Wojtyla (John Paul II) added Scheler, and Jacques Maritain (Neo-Thomist) and Gabriel Marcel (Christian existentialist) who preceded Mounier and helped with the launch of his journal, *Esprit*. Nevertheless Mounier's is taken to be the prototype, archetype, and true vine of personalism which all others lead to or descend from, as is shown by the diagram on p. 218; by Chap. I 'The Origins', which are specified as the Wall St crash of 1929 and the wider cultural crisis of which it was a result and symptom, in response to which Mounier launched *Esprit* in 1932; and by the pride of place given to French personalism in Chap. II, while 'Other Personalisms' are surveyed together in Chap. III. Hence the American school, initiated by Borden Parker Bowne at Boston University at the end of the 19th C., with offshoots in California and continuing to the 1990s, is mentioned only in a footnote where it is rejected as being idealist and therefore not akin to 'personalism as understand here' (p. 12 n. 4).[1]

A survey such as this can degenerate into either or both of a mere catalogue of names, dates and titles of books or only very general statements about the substance of the theme and of the works of particular persons with little or no detail about how and what they really thought and why. To some extent that will prove unavoidable in any introduction which is aimed at those with little existing knowledge of the subject and who would be put off or overwhelmed by a fuller and longer treatment. Dr Burgos rightly compromises by giving in Chap. I an outline of personalism as an answer to two specific features of the modern age—positivism and scientism, and individualisms and

collectivisms—along with an account of its ancestors as mentioned above, and of the cultural renewal of Catholicism for coping with the present age. Also Chap. IV, the final one, is an extended summary of the principal characteristics of personalism, based on the preceding ones and with some repetition, notably in the section on Mounier.

Likewise, in Chap. II, he focuses upon Maritain, Marcel, Mounier and Maurice Nédoncelle, in some detail, which I shall briefly mention to give an idea of his fuller treatments of the more significant figures.

Maritain's contribution to personalism is Thomism but updated and modified since Aquinas, though perhaps a little more on exactly how would have been useful, plus a specific political philosophy of democracy in which the person is the ultimate value and not to be subordinated to society while having obligations to it, personalism's answer to both individualism and collectivism.

Marcel is rightly commended for his attention to existence, the real existence of the concrete, individual person, and his formulation of a 'concrete philosophy', which, aware that narrative is the truly appropriate way to grasp personal being, knows that it can formulate only 'a concrete generality' as a certain type of existence distinct from that of mere things and the categories applicable to them. Particular themes are: corporeality, not as a mere instrument but an essential constituent of the person, our whole interaction with the world and mode of understanding it; the complex personal relations between being and having; the natures of love, hope and fidelity; intersubjectivity and its three modes of immediacy, presence and distance; metaphysics as an ontological reflection, with an echo of Heidegger, which starts with the person and overcomes the abstractions of Aristotle, with love as 'the essential datum'. Such is the complexity of personal being, such as the person's permanence through all his changes of consciousness, that Marcel finally doubted if 'ontology' is the right term for such a study. In short, philosophy can and must be theoretical, but not that of an external observer, but instead the reflection of the engaged person.

Mounier is distinguished by his 'communitarian personalism' and his determination to translate it into action, to make it a 'thinking in action'. Consequently his fundamental principles are not systematically elaborated but sketched with variations in several works. He held that the person, not being an object and endowed with subjectivity, uniqueness, cannot be defined and so he offers 'description-definitions'

such as 'a spiritual being constituted as such by a form of subsistence and independence in his being; maintaining this subsistence with his adhesion to a hierarchy of values freely adopted, assimilated and lived in a responsible commitment and constant conversion; unifying thus all his activities in freedom and developing, in addition to impulses to creative acts, the singularity of his vocation' (p.100).

Community, 'the 'we'' is also essential to the person. But not all groups, and especially impersonal 'mass society', are communities. Lesser forms, such as the family when not founded on love, and associations based on mutual interests, can have their value, but community is an ideal that transcends them for it takes the person seriously as unique and irreplaceable, seeing the other as 'thou' in a relationship of mutual love. Mounier admitted that it would be difficult to create it, and is not of this world, yet is the ideal at which we should aim. Utterly different from community is modern bourgeois or liberal individualism, the 'mass' society based on it, and the 'capitalism' [a Marxist term] which it created.His alternative was a 'personalist economy' or one in the service of the person, in which work would have priority over capital and would be a personal activity in a decentralised economy yet instrumental to the state. He opposed Nazism and Fascism because they subordinated the individual to the state but agreed with their anti-capitalism. Likewise he had some sympathy with anarchism—a significant movement in France and Spain—for its defence of liberty and concern for the poor, but not for its rejection of all power which should serve the common good. Again because of his anti-capitalism, he had a very complex attitude towards Marxism, admiring some of its characteristics and rejecting others, and oscillating between them, but refusing to subordinate *Esprit*to it.

Maurice Nédoncelle (1905-76) represents 'metaphysical personalism' but metaphysics joined with phenomenology. Influenced first by Scholasticism and then Bergson, Blondel, Brunschvig, Husserl and Scheler, he was drawn to Mounier's personalism but remained an apolitical philosopher and theologian, and in 1960 he wrote that it had become only a political slogan. He rejected any preformulated metaphysics which would then be applied to the person and instead began with consciousness as perceived in communion with other consciousness, 'interpersonalism', especially that of 'I-thou'. To have an 'I' one must be loved by and then love another 'I', a love that seeks the perfection of each, who then become a 'we'. Thus 'we' is not a mere conjunction of anonymous entities, as in the collectivisms [and much of what is called 'communalism' or 'communitarianism'], but one of independent, conscious and autonomous persons joined in this love. Nédoncelle was fully aware of the limitations of human existence, and showed that the phenomenology of the concrete *cogito*reveals the priority of God as the cause and goal of our love.

Chap. III sketches the types, histories and prominent figures of personalism in Italy, Poland, Germany and Spain. The personalists given lengthier treatment are, respectively: Luigi Stefani (1891-1956) and Luigi Pareyson (1918-91); Karol Wojtyla and Czeslav Bartnik (1929); Scheler (1874-1928) [far too little in my opinion], Edith Stein (1891-1942), Martin Buber 1878-1965), Emmanuel Levinas (1906-95) and Romano Guardini (1885-1968); and Julían Marías (1914-2005). The reader is shown at least what and whom to look for in each case.

Finally Chap. IV is an overview of personalism's relationships to philosophy, its methods, central concepts and themes, such as the dignity of the person, subjectivity, interpersonality, love and action, which marks the differences between it and its antecedents

All in all this is an interesting and sufficiently detailed yet wide-ranging introduction to its subject. An English translation is in progress to which will be added Appendices on American personalism and British personalists and contributors to personalism, and which will help to spread awareness of personalism and personalisms in those many parts of the English-speaking world which have never heard of it.

R.T Allen

Note:

1. Only Bowne and the independent G.H. Howison in California, who invented the name 'Personal Idealism' for his Berkleyan system, were idealists in the strict sense of denying the reality of matter. But even then Bowne was somewhat ambiguous about it.

   Likewise there is a discussion of Paul Ricoeur's status as a personalist (p. 54 n.6, pp. 229-33), which seems to turn to a large extent on the significance of his later refusal of the label and his infrequent use of 'person'. Too much weight can be given to merely verbal matters. In Britain some Analytic philosophers have used the word 'person' but have treated personal being in decidedly sub-personal ways, while other philosophers (e.g. C.A. Campbell, H.D. Lewis) have had a much more genuinely personal understanding of persons but have used the older term 'self'. In fact the first person to use 'personalist' or 'personalism' for his own position seems to have been Schopenhauer, and the first in Britain was John Grote in a letter in 1865.

Another particular point to note is the use of 'anthropology'. To the English reader this means the empirical study of less complex societies, but in much Continental European philosophy it also means 'philosophical anthropology', the articulation of the whole nature of man and especially what is distinctive of us. In contrast, Anglo-phone philosophy, and especially its empiricist and analytic forms, deals only with distinct aspects in moral philosophy, philosophy of action, philosophy of mind, and above all mind and body (currently just the brain), and hardly at all with the wider questions of our place and destiny in the world.

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***Totalitarian Discourse: A Global and Timeless Phenomenon?* Edited by Lutgard Lams, Geeert Crauwels, and Henrieta Anisoara Serban. Berne: Peter Lang, 2014**

We use language for many purposes, and if the purpose is deception this generates the phenomena known as lying. In a political context a distinction can be made between falsehoods which are intended to deceive, and falsehoods whose function is to demonstrate your slavery. In the latter case you are expected to know that a claim is false; your willingness to parrot what you know to be untrue is taken as evidence of good community spirit. The pursuit of truth as an end in itself (an end which transcends whatever happens to be taken to be true) is a subversive phenomena which accompanies the quite recent development known as civilization. Far from being a new development a lack of interest in truth is a return to the primitive. Viewing truth claims as a sociological phenomena explicable in terms of will to power is used to justify an arrangement in which those who are the strongest determine what is true. Seeking to justify this primitive state is known as a value inversion. Why some engage in value inversions such as this is a subject of debate. It has been viewed as the result of an intellectual error. A disease of thought. In this account all that is required is a better account. Others argue that it is simply a reversion; which is to say it is a reversion to a state prior to the invention of civilization. The collection of essays ***Totalitarian Discourse: A Global and Timeless Phenomenon?*** Edited by Lutgard Lams, Geeert Crauwels, and Henrieta Anisoara Serban, offers us an analysis of totalitarian discourse. The editors are keen to avoid reducing the phenomena of lying to Leftist politics. It accompanies every sort of politics that seeks to counter the subversive potential of appeals to truth. Lying may be justified on the grounds of a rejection of the concept of truth (that all knowledge claims are reducible to class interest for

example) or it may be justified on the grounds of an appeal to what beliefs are deemed to be good for a society, even though they are known to be false. In the latter case the issue becomes one of who decides what is best for a society, and in the former case such disputes are deemed to be determined by nothing more than who has the most power. The extent to which an ideological rejection of the concept of truth is a royal road to tyranny is left unaddressed. Nor is it disputed that a free society is a good thing. The grounds upon which this assumption is made however is left unclear.

You could reasonably expect a review to indicate if you think a book is worth reading. Life after all is brief, and if the reader is not seeking to promote the interests of a particular publisher, or adhere to views which they feel they ought to endorse if they are to pursue a successful academic career, it simply becomes a question of was the book enjoyable to read, or more rigorously, does it extend and deepen the reader's knowledge. Well, I found it quite boring to read, and, speaking for myself, I cannot say the essays left me more illuminated. That they were written and published no doubt achieve some ends, the ends of getting something published, the end of publishing something which it is hoped a university library (for example) may purchase, but it is not something I would purchase myself. This is not because I lack any interest in the topic, it is rather that I did not feel that this book does much to deepen or extend that interest. To be told for example that North Korean textbooks are 'saturated with propaganda, textually and pictorially' (p.133) or that 'schooling is a process of socialization' (p.149) while no doubt true, are claims which barely justify the trouble it took to write and print them. We are told that 'Che Guevara is not the only famous person inhabiting popular memory, as human society has many forms of posthumous remembrances of famous people' (p.41) but for whom does this come as a revelation? Asserting that 'the (compulsory) acquisition of Russian unequivocally reflected the discursive norms of the GDR power-knowledge complex i.e. the far reaching semantic and pragmatic standardization of the official socialist agitation' (p.91) because 'the construction of the socialist personality required a most sophisticated interplay of a whole range of restrictions on the discourse in education' (p.92) seems to be a convoluted way of saying that those Germans who were conquered by the Russians were forced to learn the language and repeat the political orthodoxies of their occupiers. That the Nazi Party situated 'people' 'race' 'nation' and 'Germany' at the heart of their propaganda, and promoted the notion that Hitler was a secularized

messiah in order to disguise 'the cold political pragmatism on which his power and influence were based' (p.119) hardly needs pointing out to anybody with anything much greater than a kindergarten acquaintance with modern European history.

Actually the article about the Marco regime in the Philippines did acquaint me with some facts that I had not previously known, but I cannot say I feel deprived for not having known them, because one authoritarian dictatorship is much like any other, or at least the article did not disabuse me of that prejudice. It is not at all clear that the Marcos regime can be usefully included with North Korea and East Germany as a political type. The same applies to the discussion of Burma. I am reminded of the remark made by somebody on a late night discussion programme on Channel Four called 'After Dark' (which brought together several people in a studio and filmed their conversation on a specific over several hours) about her experience of Iran. She claimed that under the Shah every door was open, except one, opposition to rule by the Shah. After the Islamic revolution every door was closed, except one, adherence to the Islamic way of life. She said that both regimes were oppressive, but in a quite different way. A discussion of Islamic totalitarianism could have usefully have been added to this volume. Tunisia is discussed, but only in the context of the 'neoliberal' secular regime of Ben Ali. There is an article on modern China, but a failure to address any historical context, or derive its totalitarianism from a particular way of thinking about the world, namely Marxism, has the consequence once again of leaving the reader short changed. The author points out that nationalism has led to increasing identification with the motherland rather than the Party, and so 'one can hardly talk of totalitarianism [as being] still alive in contemporary Chinese society' (p.200) but this is asserted rather than examined, although to be fair, discussion of this issue would go beyond the stated confines of the volume. In the next article we are informed that prior to the split with the USSR (1948) the Red Army was praised uncritically by the Communist government of Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia, but after the split they were portrayed in a critical light. It is hard to suppress a yawn. In the 'Pathos of the Soviet Press' it is noted that public discourse was 'de-ideologized' in Lithuania as a consequence of the break up of the USSR in 1989. Words and metaphors that were typical of communist ideology were shunned, not only 'the language but specifically..its positive pathos' by which the author means its wooden language and the images associated with it; an elevated language that people would not use in their everyday language. An attempt is also made to analyse Communist discourse in Romania. It is perhaps 'no accident' as the Communists used to say that these discussions have more content, because by virtue of their topic they do precisely what the editors are keen to avoid, link totalitarian language to Communist propaganda.

Chris Goodman

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Tradition and Discovery
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References to books by Michael Polanyi:
Because of the particular interest in the work of Michael Polanyi, and in order to avoid unnecessary repetition, please make references to his books by means of the following abbreviations followed by the page number:

CF   = *The Contempt of Freedom* (London, Watts, 1940; reprinted New York, Arno Press, 1975)
FEFT = *Full Employment and Free Trade* (London, C.U.P., 1945; 2nd ed. 1948)
KB   = *Knowing and Being* (London, Routledge; Chicago, University of Chicago Press; 1969)
LL   = *The Logic of Liberty* (London, Routledge; Chicago, University of Chicago Press; 1951)
M   = *Meaning* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1975)
PK   = *Personal Knowledge* (London, Routledge; Chicago, University of Chicago Press; 1958)
SFS   = *Science, Faith and Society* (London, OUP, 1946; 2nd ed. U. of Chicago Press, 1964)
SOM = *The Study of Man* (London, Routledge; Chicago, University of Chicago Press; 1959)
TD   = *The Tacit Dimension* (London, Routledge; New York, Doubleday; 1966; reprinted
       Gloucester, Mass., Peter Smith, 1983)
Also:
SEP   = *Society, Economics and Philosophy: Selected articles by Michael Polanyi*,
   ed. R.T. Allen (New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Publishers, 1997).